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Canada, Parliament, House of Commons,
Standing Committee on External
affairs and national defence,
minutes of proceedings and
evidence, 1968-69 No. 1-25.



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HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 1-25

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1968

Respecting

- 1) The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria;
- 2) Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs; including

Appendix A

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs.

WITNESSES:

From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. G. R. Harman, Head, Africa I section, Africa and Middle Eastern Division; Major General A. E. Wrinch, National Commissioner, Canadian Red Cross Society.

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STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Alexander
Mr. Anderson
Mr. Asselin
Mr. Brewin
Mr. Buchanan
Mr. Cafik
Mr. De Bané
Mr. Fairweather
Mr. Forrestall
Mr. Gibson

Mr. Groos
Mr. Harkness
Mr. Laniel
Mr. Laprise
Mr. Legault
Mr. Lewis
Mr. MacLean
Mr. Macquarrie
Mr. Marceau
Mr. McIntosh

Mr. Ouellet
Mr. Penner
Mr. Prud'homme
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Smith (Northumber-
land-Miramichi)
Mr. Stewart (Cochrane)
Mr. Thompson (Red Deer)
Mr. Winch—(30).

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.



HOUSE OF COMMONS,
MONDAY, October 7, 1968.

Ordered,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, membership to be named later this day, convene not later than 11:00 a.m. Tuesday, October 8th to hear evidence on (1) the report of the official observer group on which Canada has a member, of the conduct of federal troops in the prosecution of the war in Nigeria, (2) the reported famine conditions in that country, and to invite Andrew Brewin, M.P. (*Greenwood*) and David MacDonald, M.P. (*Egmont*) to report their observations on the conditions of the civilian population in Nigeria, and to report its findings to this House with all convenient speed.

MONDAY, October 7, 1968.

Ordered,—That the Revised Main Estimates of the Department of External Affairs for the fiscal year 1968-69, be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, saving always the power of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public monies.

MONDAY, October 7, 1968.

Ordered,—That the following Members do compose the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Asselin, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, De Bané, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Harkness, Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Macquarrie, Marceau, McIntosh, Ouellet, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch.

Attest.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

TUESDAY, October 8, 1968.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

FIRST REPORT

Your Committee seeks leave to sit while the House is sitting.

Respectfully Submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman.

(Concurred in Tuesday, October 8, 1968)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, October 8, 1968.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:35 a.m. this day for the purpose of organization and to commence its business.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Buchanan, Cafik, De Bané, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Harkness, Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, Macquarrie, Marceau, Ouellet, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn and Winch—(26).

Also present: Messrs. Schumacher, Stanbury and Yewchuk, M.P.'s.

In attendance: Mr. G. R. Harman, Head, Africa I Section, African and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs.

The Clerk attending and having called for motions for the election of a Chairman, Mr. Cafik moved, seconded by Mr. Anderson,

That Mr. Wahn be elected Chairman of this Committee.

Mr. Fairweather moved, seconded by Mr. Prud'homme,
Agreed,—That nominations be closed.

The question being put on the main motion, it was resolved in the affirmative. Mr. Wahn was declared duly elected Chairman. He took the Chair and thanked the Committee for the honour conferred upon him.

The Clerk read the first two of the Committee's Orders of Reference dated Monday, October 7, 1968.

The Chairman called for motions for the election of a Vice-Chairman.

Mr. Legault moved, seconded by Mr. Gibson,

That Mr. Ryan be elected Vice-Chairman of this Committee.

Mr. Roberts moved, seconded by Mr. Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*),
Agreed,—That nominations be closed.

The question having been put on the main motion, it was resolved in the affirmative.

Mr. Ryan was declared elected Vice-Chairman.

On motion of Mr. Groos, seconded by Mr. Gibson,

Resolved, That the Committee print from day to day 850 copies in English and 350 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

On motion of Mr. Legault, seconded by Mr. Cafik,

Resolved, That the items listed in the Revised Main Estimates for 1968-69, relating to the Department of External Affairs, be printed as an Appendix to

this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix A*).

On motion of Mr. Lewis, seconded by Mr. Laniel,

Resolved, That the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and 7 members appointed by the Chairman, after consultation with the Party Whips, do compose the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

On motion of Mr. Ryan, seconded by Mr. Prud'homme,

Resolved, That the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure investigate and report on the feasibility of printing the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, in both languages, by means of parallel columns or pages.

Mr. Fairweather addressed the Committee and made a number of suggestions concerning future meetings and the calling of witnesses.

On motion of Mr. Thompson (*Red Deer*), seconded by Mr. Roberts,

Resolved, That the Committee seek leave to sit while the House is sitting.

The Chairman called *Item I Administration \$44,591,300* of the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs.

The Committee agreed to hear Mr. G. R. Harman, Head, Africa I Section, African and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, as its first witness. Mr. Harman made an opening statement concerning the current situation in Nigeria. Maps of the area were distributed.

On motion of Mr. Fairweather, seconded by Mr. Ouellet,

Resolved, That the following reports provided by the witness be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence:

Nigeria: Observer Team Report (See Appendix B)

Nigeria: Observer Team's Second Report (See Appendix C)

The witness was questioned on the situation in Nigeria and the role of the Department of External Affairs. At the conclusion of the questioning, the Chairman, on behalf of the Committee, thanked the witness for his expert testimony.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would meet at 2:00 p.m. this day.

The Committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(2)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 4:00 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Ian Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrester, Gibson, Groos, Harkness, Laniel, Laprise, Lewis, Marceau, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Schumacher, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch and Yewchuk—(22).

Also present: Mr. Alexander, M.P.

In attendance: Major General A. E. Wrinch, National Commissioner, Canadian Red Cross Society.

The Committee agreed to hear Major General A. E. Wrinch, National Commissioner, Canadian Red Cross Society, as its second witness. The Chairman introduced the witness, who made an opening statement.

Members of the Committee questioned General Wrinch concerning the appeals for aid and the assistance provided by Red Cross authorities, in connection with the conflict in Nigeria.

It was agreed that General Wrinch would provide the Committee with certain reports in the custody of Canadian Red Cross authorities, concerning the types of aid which would be useful at this time. The Committee will decide what use should be made of any reports forwarded by the witness. The Chairman noted that the Subcommittee will be asked to consider and report on the kind of aid which Canada might usefully provide.

Mr. Thompson (*Red Deer*), on behalf of the Committee, thanked Major General Wrinch for his appearance at the afternoon sitting.

The Committee agreed to hear Mr. Arnold Smith, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, at an evening sitting. At 5:55 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, October 8, 1968

Mr. Laniel: I second the motion.

• 0952

The Chairman: As the members know, the Estimates have been referred to this Committee and it would be in order to have a motion to the effect that the items listed in the revised Main Estimates for 1968-69 relating to the Department of External Affairs be printed as an appendix to today's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence and they will be available to all of us. Will someone so move?

Mr. Winch: May I ask one question at this point, Mr. Chairman? You say that the External Affairs estimates have been referred. As this is a joint committee of External Affairs and National Defence, have the Defence estimates not also been referred?

The Chairman: As I understand it, the estimates of the Department of National Defence have not yet been referred. Will someone make a motion along the lines I outlined a few moments ago?

Mr. Legault: I so move.

Mr. Cafik: I second the motion.

The Chairman: It has been moved and seconded that the items listed in the revised Main Estimates for 1968-69 relating to the Department of External Affairs be printed as an appendix to today's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: The next item of business is the appointment of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, or the so-called steering subcommittee, and it would be normal in these circumstances for it to consist of seven members: the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, two Liberal members and three members of the Opposition parties. Ordinarily the members, other than the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, are appointed by the Chairman after consultation with the whips of the parties concerned.

Mr. Lewis: I so move.

The Chairman: It has been moved and seconded that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure consist of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, two Liberal members and three Opposition members appointed by the Chairman after consultation with the party whips.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, at this stage do you wish to make a formal motion that the subcommittee consider the question of printing the English and French versions in parallel columns?

Mr. Ryan: I so move, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Prud'homme: I second the motion.

The Chairman: It has been moved and seconded that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure investigate the possibility of having our proceedings printed in English and French in parallel columns.

Mr. Groos: I wonder if we could have an opinion from the secretary with respect to whether this is going to delay the printing in any way?

Mr. Laniel: On this point, Mr. Chairman, this is just a motion to ask the subcommittee to study the matter. We have already voted upon the printing of our proceedings, so it will not cause any delay at this time. It might later, if the House of Commons is not smart enough to organize itself.

The Chairman: Is there any further discussion on this motion? I might add that I have been advised the matter is under consideration and that there are a number of problems to be resolved before it could be done physically; problems which involve printing and translation, this sort of thing. Nevertheless, the motion merely instructs the steering subcommittee to investigate the possibilities. I think we would be in order if we proceeded with the motion, if it is the wish of the Committee.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: I understand we have an official of the Department of External Affairs here who could give us some general background on the matter that has been referred to us relating to Biafra. Before calling upon him, I would like to invite members of the committee to make suggestions with regard to their preference as to how we should proceed.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which I would like to present in a few minutes, but before I do so I wonder if you have some facts as to where Major General Milroy is or how soon we can expect him, or shall I now proceed?

Mr. Prud'homme: Before doing so, Mr. Chairman, I thought this morning, since it is quite important, we would hear the two witnesses, Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. Fairweather: They are in New York.

Mr. Prud'homme: I know they are in New York, but I thought when we organized this committee yesterday and this meeting this morning that we would hear these two witnesses immediately.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather has the floor.

Mr. Fairweather: Of course, it is obvious to all of us that this is an extraordinary meeting. It has been convened on short notice and it meets with the expectation that we can take steps here to help people who are suffering and starving. I think there are some suggestions we want to make that would help us to proceed in a very direct way.

We have two tasks; the first is to speed food and supplies to those whose lives depend on them and the second—which is an equally important task—is to contribute to some settlement which will help conclude an unfortunate fratricidal war.

It might be argued that the second task is the proper work of diplomats. It is clear that the responsibility to move food and supplies is our work, our responsibility. We represent the people of Canada, people who are moved now as they have seldom been before—

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I understood that our terms of reference—could you read them out again so that I will have them exactly?

Mr. Fairweather: We have had them read once.

The Chairman: In case there is any misunderstanding, perhaps I should read the terms of reference again:

That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, membership to be named later this day convene not later than 11.00 a.m. Tuesday, October 8, 1968, to hear Evidence on (1) The Report of the Official Observer Group, on which Canada has a member, of the conduct of federal troops in the prosecution of the war in Nigeria; (2) the reported famine conditions in that country and to invite Andrew Brewin, M.P. (Greenwood) and David MacDonald, M.P. (Egmont) to report their observations on the conditions of the civilian population in Nigeria; and to report its findings to this House with all convenient speed.

I might remind the members that I suggested we have a discussion on the procedure to be followed by this committee in taking evidence. Were your remarks directed to that end, Mr. Fairweather?

Mr. Fairweather: The remarks that I have to make were prepared on the basis of what direct way we could help this situation, and I would like to continue.

Mr. Lewis: On the point of order, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Fairweather will permit me, I think it is misleading to suggest that our terms of reference are limited to the motion you have just read. I think it was very clear yesterday—the Prime Minister made it clear, and, may I remind members of the Committee, I pointed out—that we need not be limited to the terms of this resolution if the estimates of the Department are referred to this Committee. At that point we are no longer limited only by the terms of that resolution.

The entire problem of Nigeria-Biafra is before us and we are entitled to call any witnesses that we wish, and not only those that are named there.

I say this so that there will be no misunderstanding. This Committee is not limited to the witnesses named in that resolution nor to the subject matter of that resolution alone. The Committee is now seized of the estimates of the Department and therefore has all the latitude necessary to go into the subject from every angle and to hear every witness we decide to hear.

Do not let us start this very important work by trying to confine this Committee and

asking for one witness or another and getting ourselves stymied right at the beginning.

Mr. Groos: If I may conclude on this point of order which I raised originally, I certainly have no wish to try to delay in any way the work of this Committee. I think it is important that we should get down to work right away. It is a little confusing that we happened to get started on hearing a dissertation by...

Mr. Thompson: According to the terms of reference...

The Chairman: Order.

Mr. Groos: I thought that perhaps we might have before us at some time during the day the report of the official observer. I was going to ask if that was available. Do you have...

Mr. Thompson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman...

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson, on a point of order.

Mr. Thompson: It seems to me that the present discussion is irrelevant. I agree entirely with what the honourable member from York South (Mr. Lewis) has said. What we have to do is clarified in the terms of reference, and I think we should go on.

Mr. Fairweather has the floor.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, on the same point of order?

Mr. Winch: On the same point of order. It is of the utmost importance, Mr. Chairman, that we get started on this most important study on a proper footing.

An hon. Member: Hear, hear.

Mr. Winch: I would like to suggest, on the point of order, that, rather than starting as we appear to be at the moment, we adjourn for an hour to enable the immediate naming of the steering committee, and that the steering committee meet and bring in recommendations on how we should proceed in our work and in the calling of witnesses. I believe that that should be...

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, I have the floor and I would like to...

The Chairman: On the same point of order, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: On the same point of order, Mr. Chairman, this is the first time that I have been to a meeting where a member has taken it upon himself to make the statement that a committee has not made up its mind. I do not see why we should listen to a long statement...

The Chairman: Order, please.

Is it on the same point of order?

Mr. Gibson: Yes, it is the same point. With respect, as a new member of the Committee, I wish to express the view that we seem to be getting into a really acrimonious debate at the early stages. Whether we or you started it, I would agree with you that it is too acrimonious.

I submit, sir, that we should get our agenda established in an orderly fashion. By all means hear from the honourable member who started his speech—we all want to hear it—but we are starting out on a very bitter note. Perhaps it is our side, perhaps it is the other, or jointly, but let us get this important matter resolved, the procedure established and then go on to an orderly discussion.

Mr. Prud'homme: I think, sir, that I agree with Mr. Lewis' statement that we can call any witnesses we want, but I think we should first proceed on our terms of reference; we should start first on what has been sent to us in this Committee. We should hear the witnesses and then call any other witnesses we want, but we should stick to our terms of reference which were to listen first to the direct witnesses of this situation. That is the reason we are here this morning. Logically we should begin by hearing them first, and then if we want to hear anyone else we may. We can hear any statement we wish after logically beginning under our terms of reference. It is very clear to me that this is much more important than any statement anyway.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: On the same point of order, surely it only makes sense to decide how the Committee is going to proceed before we get down to specifics.

The Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Roberts: I think the suggestion we have heard is a very good one, and perhaps it would take an hour or perhaps half an hour would do. But before we get into the general area that the Committee wishes to discuss—and I agree with Mr. Lewis on that point—

surely we should know how we are going to proceed. If a half-hour adjournment for the steering committee to meet and decide will help, then it seems to me that would be the most expeditious way in which to really get the Committee going.

The Chairman: I think it is Mr. Penner and then...

Mr. Alexander: Mr. Chairman, the Chair did ask for suggestions on how we were to proceed this morning, keeping in mind that the matter is urgent. I had the impression that the suggestions made by the hon. member which he thought would be helpful to the steering committee would be accepted. Then all of a sudden we became bogged down and we hear from the other side that they want to advise the steering committee on what its job is supposed to be. The hon. member was trying to make a suggestion about what our terms of reference are and how they are to be effected. The hon. member has the floor; I think his suggestion will be relevant to our further discussion, and I would plead with hon. members if we are going to call this an urgent situation, at least to hear the member out to find out whether he is making a relevant statement.

The Chairman: I invited suggestions from members on the procedure to be followed by this Committee in the order of its business, calling of witnesses, and so on. I think we all agree that we are not limited to hearing one or two witnesses; we have very wide discretion. I know we are all anxious to hear Mr. Fairweather, but were his remarks directed toward the item that I had called? I recognized him on the assumption that he was directing his remarks specifically toward not the whole basis on which the Committee has been established, but to the procedure that we would follow.

Mr. Fairweather: My remarks were directed to how we should proceed and some ideas I have worked out on how this could be done. I must say I find it rather extraordinary not to be given the courtesy of a hearing.

Mr. Laniel: May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman? How long is that statement?

The Chairman: I think a more important question is not how long it is, but whether it is directed toward the item which I have called.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I move that this Committee hear Mr. Fairweather now.

An hon. Member: I second the motion.

The Chairman: Well, I do not think it is necessary to have a motion. I have recognized... Order, please.

Mr. Lewis: Let us just stop wasting time.

The Chairman: Order, please. Mr. Fairweather has been recognized on the assumption that he will direct his remarks to the procedure to be followed by this Committee in its investigation.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Let us get to the procedure and overlook the preamble, please.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Lewis: What are you so sensitive about?

Mr. Fairweather: I have never seen such thin skins; if you are here a little longer they will thicken up.

I suggest of course, that we need facts about the true conditions in Nigeria, Biafra and about aid that has been asked of this country and the aid that has been offered. I would like to suggest for the consideration of the Committee a method of proceeding as expeditiously as possible.

First, I think we should have permission, and we could get it this afternoon, to sit while the House is sitting. Then I think we have to recognize that there are two aspects: the humanitarian, and the Minister has mentioned this, and the political-military aspect. Of course they are closely related, they are overlapping and in many ways are indistinguishable. But I suggest we make the distinction for at least one purpose, namely that it be our objective to bring in findings and recommendations quickly on the humanitarian aspect. This should be our first chore as a matter of priority and urgency.

Following that we could, if the Committee wishes, bring to the House recommendations we feel advisable on action that can, and should, be taken by Canada to bring relief to the civilian population. It is a strong recommendation that we try to complete this aspect of the work first; and, as my leader said yesterday—and it seemed to have general approval in the House—within a week. There should be no delay in bringing recommendations to the House on this aspect.

We undoubtedly have many witnesses, and the department officials are here. We could

even do it in a piecemeal way. Committees in the past have often made reports to the House day by day.

After the humanitarian aspect perhaps the Committee may wish to deal with the findings, or with what I might call the politico-military aspect. Most of our witnesses will probably give evidence about both of these aspects and we will be seeking from all the witnesses as much factual information as possible upon what is happening.

I suggest that even before we have heard the entire list of witnesses it might be possible to reach consensus in the Committee on one or two points, and that whenever we have this consensus, particularly as it affects the humanitarian aspect, we should be prepared at once to make a recommendation to Parliament.

On the humanitarian aspect, and without limiting it, I think there are three major questions to which we will want answers. The first of these is what requests have been made to Canada for assistance up to now, and by whom; the second is what action has been taken, and with what effect; and the third is, of course, what other opportunities there are for relief to be sent.

We will want to hear witnesses on what types of supplies Canada should be sending, the transport and the method of getting this material to Nigeria and Biafra. We will want to hear about the shipment of food, whether aircraft should be provided, what type of aircraft and how many there are available. Finally, I think, on the humanitarian aspect, we will want to consider the possibility of assistance to the various agencies—the Catholic Church, the Red Cross, the World Council, and so on.

On the politico-military situation, I suggest this Committee should consider what Canada can do to bring about a rapid cease-fire and a basis for a just peace. It is my understanding that that is exactly the reason for the Prime Minister's having asked Messrs. Brewin and MacDonald to proceed to New York to see the Secretary of State for External Affairs. We should then find out what Canada has done at the United Nations and what possibilities remain open for bringing the situation before that organization.

We should investigate, too, the possibility of Canada, both unilaterally and at the United Nations being able to persuade countries jointly supplying arms to stop this flow. This happened some years ago with India and Pakistan and it meant the end of that war.

Although I am glad to know that officials are here I thought perhaps we would wish to hear the Secretary of State first. We certainly have no complaint to make about the officials of the department being here, and I hope these representatives can advise us when the Minister will be returning.

The order says we are to hear Messrs. Brewin and MacDonald. We also want to hear Maj.-Gen. Milroy. We would like to know where he is now and when he will be back in Canada. We will need, of course, subject to what security there is, although part of the report has been published, which we would want, a full copy of that report. The Minister, in his press release saying that Canada had agreed to participate in the observer group, stated that Mag.-Gen. Milroy would also be reporting direct to the government so there would be a second report perhaps that would be of some help; that is the report to the government. There are other witnesses. I am sure every member of this Committee knows some. One I think we would want to hear early is Dr. E. H. Johnson, who gave such interesting evidence before this Committee—I think it was on March 14 of this year—and who has been to Nigeria since. Mr. Charles Taylor of the *Globe and Mail* is now in Nigeria; Dr. James Eayrs, the distinguished expert in the field at the University of Toronto; I think of Dr. Donald Savage at the Centre of African Studies at Loyola; I think of Mr. John Drewery of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation who accompanied a flight to Nigeria some time ago. This, of course, is not meant to be—and I have not the competence to give—a complete list, but these are some of the suggestions that we would like to make, and I emphasize that of course in making them in a tentative way obviously we in this Party want to co-operate in any way to see that this Committee gets on with its work. I think it calls for, as the House in this rather extraordinary unanimity yesterday called for, very special action. If, Mr. Chairman, others do not wish to do so I, of course, could make the necessary motions about the reports and so on but I think I have a consensus. I apologize for occupying about six minutes of the Committee's time but I think after members get to know me they will find I am not such an ogre after all.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, just so there is no misunderstanding, and as I raised these points of order at the outset, I would like to

say that I thought those remarks were very helpful to this Committee. I think we are all motivated by the same wish to get down and find out what there is to be found out and to be of as much help as we can in this important matter, and having heard what Mr. Fairweather has had to say, I hope that perhaps we can get on and arrange these in a logical sequence through the means of perhaps a recommendation of the steering committee. There was a suggestion made a little while ago that we should adjourn for an hour and get the steering committee under way. I wondered if it would take an hour to start out in some sort of logical sequence.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Groos. One of the suggestions made by Mr. Fairweather which was probably a good one is that this Committee, in view of the urgency, should have power to sit while the House is sitting. If this is agreeable, would someone move and someone second a motion to this effect so that it can be brought before the House this afternoon. That this Committee have authority to sit while the House is sitting.

Mr. Thompson: I move that this committee ask Parliament to give us the authority.

Mr. Roberts: I second the motion.

The Chairman: Yes. The resolution will be drafted in accordance with the usual wording. Motion agreed to.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I am not going to make a speech, so nobody worry. There is another witness that we should consider calling who is in Ottawa, I understand, for a very limited time and that is Mr. Arnold Smith, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Organization—I forget the exact name. Mr. Smith, as we were informed by the Prime Minister, is in Ottawa now. I have made some inquiries and I understand he will be here only this week or part of this week. I imagine he is not a compellable witness; he probably has a special position. He has been in the various negotiations between Commonwealth countries and Nigeria and I am sure knows a great deal about the Nigeria-Biafra negotiations and what may be done, but if he is willing to come I would like to urge that we ask him to appear as soon as he can possibly make himself available.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: If the Committee agrees that he should be called.

The Chairman: A number of suggestions have been made with regard to the witnesses that should be called and the order in which they should be called, including Mr. Smith, and accordingly, therefore, the appointment of the steering subcommittee should be made at the earliest possible moment. I would hope that the whips of the parties would have their recommendations available for me very soon. I would think it appropriate that the subcommittee should investigate which witnesses are available and the order in which they should be called and try to make arrangements which then could be submitted to this Committee for approval.

In the meantime, in answer to one question, I have been informed that Mr. Sharp will be back in Ottawa on Thursday and presumably will be available to appear before the Committee at that time. I am also informed that the reports of the official observer group are now being xeroxed and will be available to this Committee at 11 o'clock this morning.

Meanwhile, perhaps in order to open up the entire subject for discussion along the lines suggested by Mr. Lewis, I could proceed to call the first item of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs which, I presume, will open up the whole subject and give us a wide leeway to discuss questions which are of prime importance. Therefore, with the approval of the Committee I will proceed to call the first item of the revised main estimates for 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs.

On item 1—

1 Administration, Operation and Maintenance, including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; and authority,

notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of High Commissioners, Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Consuls, Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; cultural relations and academic exchange programs with other countries. \$44,891,300.

I do not think any motion is required. I have called the item. Therefore, the estimates are now available and a general discussion is now in order.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, if I may take another moment. It seems to me there is no need to adjourn the Committee meeting for the steering committee to discuss what witnesses may be called in view of what you told us earlier, that there are some departmental officials here who could start giving us some of the information that all of us are anxious to have. I imagine the question as to what requests have been made of Canada and what we so far have been able to do is a question that these departmental officials may be able to answer now. I would suggest that instead of adjourning for the steering committee to discuss the calling of other witnesses, in order to save time and to get on with the job I would move that the Committee now hear whatever departmental officials are present and prepared to give us evidence on the general subject under discussion.

The Chairman: I do not think any motion is necessary. I was going to make the suggestion, since we have Mr. G. R. Harman from the department here, that with the approval of the Committee we would call upon him to give us general background information with regard to the instructions to the observer group and the report of the observer group. Presumably by the time Mr. Harman has made his presentation and has been questioned by members, if it is your wish, the reports will be here and we perhaps could then have a motion to have them incorporated into our proceedings in printed form.

Mr. Lewis: He need not be limited to background information; some foreground information would be useful.

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Chairman, might I ask one question before Mr. Harman takes the

chair? Where is General Milroy at the present time? Is he available?

The Chairman: I have been informed that General Milroy is in Africa at the present time. Whether he could be made available on short notice would depend upon just what he is involved in over there, but, again, I would suggest that this is a point which the steering subcommittee should ascertain immediately after it has been formed.

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If there are no further suggestions, I would like to call upon Mr. G. R. Harman of the Department of External Affairs to give us the background information. Will you come up here Mr. Harman, please?

Incidentally the library, on short notice, made available some maps of the general area. I do not know whether these will be helpful or not, but perhaps we could get them distributed to members of the Committee. I do not think we have one for each, but perhaps one for every two members. Mr. Harman?

Mr. G. R. Harman (Department of External Affairs, Head of Africa I): Mr. Chairman, while as an official I can offer background information and details at the request of the Committee, perhaps it would be best to start with the origin of the team of observers now operating in Nigeria. The team was invited, or should I say a number of governments were invited, to send observers to Nigeria; invited by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria in the last days of August. The governments invited included those of Britain, Canada, Poland, Sweden and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

The objective was to have a team of six officers, not necessarily military officers—the type of person was not specified in the original invitation—who would observe the conduct of the troops of the Federal Military Government in relation to the code of conduct as laid down by the Nigerian Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, General Gowon. Several of the invitees, that is the governments invited, sent their observers to Nigeria by the middle of September and the team as such was constituted with the arrival of four of the six. That is, the observers from Britain, Canada, Sweden and the representative of the U.N. Secretary-General.

The Chairman: Mr. Harman, I wonder if I could interrupt you just for a second? The

reports are now available and it might be helpful if members have both reports while you are speaking. They might want to glance through them. Could I have these reports distributed please?

Mr. Fairweather: Would you like a motion that they be appended to the *Minutes* of today's *Proceedings*, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes. I must apologize. The reports that I have seem to be only in English. Do we have any French copies of the reports? The French copies of the reports are being prepared and will be available. Is there any objection to distributing these in the meantime?

Mr. Fairweather: I move that the reports be appended to the *Minutes* of our *Proceedings*.

Mr. Ouellet: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

Mr. Anderson: Have these reports been accepted by the government? Is it a government report or is it simply a report of the four members of the committee?

The Chairman: My understanding is that they are unofficial; they have not been accepted. They are unofficial reports, but Mr. Harman no doubt can give us some information on that score when he sets forth his remarks.

Mr. Harman: Mr. Chairman, on that point, formally the reports are reports of the observers to the Government of Nigeria and the governments which are participating in the Observer Team.

Mr. Anderson: That is the unanimous report by all four members?

Mr. Harman: Yes.

Mr. Anderson: Could you give the name of the United Nations representative?

Mr. Harman: The name of the United Nations representative is Ambassador Gusing, who was already in Nigeria as the Secretary-General's personal representative to observe problems relating to relief shipment.

Mr. Anderson: What is his nationality?

Mr. Harman: Swedish.

Mr. Anderson: So, there were then two Swedish members, of the four?

Mr. Harman: That is right, in terms of nationality.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Harman said the report was signed by all four members. Are you not mistaken? The copy I have says it is signed by Generals Milroy, Raab, and Alexander; the UN representative is not given as a signatory.

Mr. Harman: This is true. The UN representative or the representative of the UN Secretary-General considered himself to be in a somewhat different position because of the special nature of the United Nations.

Mr. Anderson: Has he indicated that he concurs in this?

Mr. Harman: It is our understanding that he does concur in the observations and aid and in the report made, but because of his special position he did not sign the report.

Mr. Lewis: I think this point ought to be cleared up, Mr. Harman. I have not read the report, but you said it is your understanding that he concurred. How did you get that understanding? Either he concurred in the report, signed it and let somebody know that he agreed with it, or he said, "I am in a special position and I will therefore not say anything with regard to this report."

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis, I wonder whether we would make faster progress if we let Mr. Harman present his report...

Mr. Lewis: With respect, Mr. Chairman...

The Chairman: ...and then have questions from all members?

Mr. Lewis: ...this particular point has been raised and if Mr. Harman can clear it up I think it should be cleared up now.

The Chairman: Have you anything further to add to what you have said, Mr. Harman?

Mr. Anderson: I understand that while he did not sign the report, the Department of External Affairs have indications, probably from New York, that he nevertheless concurred in the report. Is that correct?

Mr. Lewis: Can Mr. Harman tell us what the indications are? That is all I want to know.

Mr. Harman: As we understand it, he has made a separate report to his principal, that is to the Secretary-General of the UN and—how can I avoid the expression, "it is our understanding"—that this is in similar terms

to the report produced and signed by the other three observers.

Mr. Lewis: Have you seen or has anyone in the Department seen his report to the Secretary-General of the UN?

Mr. Harman: No.

Mr. Alexander: Is there any possibility of getting that report, Mr. Harman?

Mr. Harman: I should think not, but this perhaps could be investigated. It is a private report from the Secretary-General's personal representative to himself and in that sense I assume it is privileged.

Mr. Alexander: Could you ascertain if there is a possibility of acquiring this report?

Mr. Harman: The Department will do so.

Mr. Lewis: Should we not limit ourselves, as far as the facts are concerned, Mr. Harman, to the fact that the report was signed by the three representatives of Canada, Britain and Sweden? We really do not know what the representative of the UN himself has said.

Mr. Harman: That is a statement of the facts.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, that is a statement of the facts.

The Chairman: Perhaps we can proceed with other information.

Mr. Harman: Yes, perhaps I could just follow this point a little further before I resume the description of the basic organization of the Team and say that it was envisaged members of the Team might go in small groups to investigate the various reports, incidents or areas. Therefore the different reports of the different inquiries and observations would not necessarily be signed by all representatives. Nonetheless they would continue to report to the Nigerian government and the governments participating.

Now I left the general description at a point where in the middle of September four of the observers had arrived in Nigeria and the Team constituted itself. It was given briefings by senior Nigerian civilian and military officials. It had a lengthy session with the head of state, General Gowon, and it organized itself for business. It set out, I believe on the 24th of September, on its first observation exercise, an exercise which led to this first interim report of the Team, which you have

before you. Once this report was concluded the Team intended to go on a second general observation into another front line area, but that visit was delayed briefly in order that the Team could respond to reports of the killing of four relief workers during the taking of the town of Okigwi. The Team responded to these reports by sending three Team members to Okigwi to investigate the incident. This investigation and observation resulted in the second report, which you have before you.

Subsequent to the writing and issuance of this report the Team has gone to the area controlled by the Third Marine Commando Division in the area between Aba and Calabar, where they will be conducting a similar observation exercise and presumably will produce another report. They are apparently in the field conducting their observation.

As you are aware, the Canadian observer selected by the government was Major-General William Milroy, the Commandant of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College at Kingston. We have the names of the other observers, if that is of interest to the Committee.

When the original invitation was received the terms of reference, if I may paraphrase, were that the Team would visit all war-affected areas and areas newly liberated by the federal forces to witness the conduct of the troops of the federal government. It was made clear in subsequent discussions that the initiative for the visit would be either in the hands of the team itself or in the hands of the Nigerian Government. That is, the basis of full freedom of movement and initiative was incorporated into the terms of reference. It was desirable that the team should be free to move at its own initiative in order that any reports of misconduct or inappropriate activity on the part of the troops should be investigated, observed and reported upon.

In order to have a general appreciation of this, it is an on-going exercise. The First Report and the Second Report do not tell the full story of what the team is to be there for. It is to observe as operations continue and to report. Therefore, it seems to me, the Reports already issued are just the beginning of a series which will be issued and made available.

Mr. Winch: May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: May I ask Mr. Harman if in the terms of reference there was any specific designation, or a refusal to designate, that the observer team, as well as being in the federal Nigerian area should also enter into the Biafran area to make an investigation in that area itself? Also, is there any indication that such a visit will be made by the Observer Team?

Mr. Harman: In the original terms of reference it was clear that the Observer Team was invited to observe in Federal territory. The terms of reference cite the more affected areas on the Federal side of the fighting line and in newly-liberated areas, which is taken to mean newly liberated by the Federal forces.

As to your second question, sir, there is no—

Mr. Winch: Is there any indication that as an Observer Team they also intend to go into the Biafra side of the war line?

Mr. Harman: I would say there is no indication known to us. The Observer Team may have considered this but there has been no report of any intention, and as it was not envisaged in the Team's original terms of reference I would assume that this is not contemplated.

Mr. Winch: Has Canada made any suggestion that this might be advisable, if not as far as the General Observer Team, then as far as its own representative is concerned?

Mr. Harman: As far as Canada is concerned no specific suggestion has been made along that line.

The Chairman: The questioners in order are Messrs. Anderson, Stewart and Harkness. Mr. Anderson? Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Harman, is the duty of this observer group to observe what is taking place militarily, or are they concerned with such things as genocide, hunger and starvation?

Mr. Harman: As I said, the terms of reference deal with the conduct of the Federal troops. I think you therefore have to assume from that that they are to observe military action if they consider this appropriate. They are to observe the conduct of Federal troops once they have arrived in an area—that is, once the troops have taken an area—and, in that sense, they are to observe how the troops

deal with the civilian population that has arrived on the Federal side of the line.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): What I am trying to get at is this: it seems to me that there is a great divergence between the report as we see it from our observers and the report that we have received from our pilgrims who went abroad. It seems to me that on the one hand they say there is no such things as genocide and on the other hand they say that there is a possibility of genocide. This is the very crux of the whole problem. We are interested in whether or not people are dying and are dying of starvation, and so on. It seems to me that this Observer Team is of absolutely no use so far as what we were called here to do is concerned. We were called here to look into this situation because people are dying and because we have a report to that effect, and yet our Observer Team has given us a report which is based only on one side of the line, which has nothing to do with what is going on in Biafra, but only what is going on in the Nigerian portion. Is this correct? Is what I am assuming quite correct?

Mr. Harman: What you said is correct.

The Chairman: I have a list of questioners, Mr. Groos. I will put you down on the list.

Mr. Groos: May I ask a supplementary to that, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: From long experience, or from some experience at any rate, I find related questions end put by getting quite unrelated at times. I wonder if we could proceed with the questioning.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Chairman, could I continue?

The Chairman: Yes, please.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The point I am trying to make here is that if it is necessary for us to bring together these two stories which are at the moment divergent, and if it is necessary to do this to bring this fellow Milroy, then we should do so immediately. If, on the other hand, he has only been on one side of the line he cannot really add anything to this situation. Therefore, I suggest that either he should go or someone should be able to go beyond on the other side of the lines and I think it is up to our Committee to make this kind of suggestion forthwith. It is pointless for us to wait until somebody comes

back and gives us a half report which does not tell us anything because we still would be no further ahead and in the meantime thousands of people are dying, if the report that we have heard from the two members of Parliament who visited is true.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions for Mr. Harman, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): No, that is all.

Mr. Harman: I wonder if I could comment on this last point? As I said before, your statement of the fact of the operation of the Observer Team is accurate. I think this does not in any way reduce the value of the observers' report of what they did see. They were in an area where fighting had taken place. They did observe, they did inquire, investigate, and they did report and it seems to me that fact formed its part in the whole picture which the Committee is looking for. And it did conclude, on the basis of its observations, that in the area in which it observed there was no evidence of action which is described as genocide.

If I may say, I have no official definition of the term "genocide", but the commonly accepted understanding of the term is that it is the intentional—that is, intentional by government policy—attempt to destroy in whole or in part a group of people, a tribe, an ethnic grouping. As I say, the team in the area in which it observed did not find evidence that this was taking place.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Harkness, followed by Messrs. Ryan, Lewis, Groos, De Bané, Roberts and Cafik.

Mr. Harkness: I take it that this Observer Team was sent in after arrangement with and invitation by the Federal Nigerian Government.

Mr. Harman: That is so, sir.

Mr. Harkness: Was there any attempt to make a similar arrangement with the Biafran Government?

Mr. Harman: There was none. No attempt was made to institute a similar arrangement with the Biafran authorities.

Mr. Harkness: Was any invitation issued by the Biafran authorities for this or another observer team to come into their area?

Mr. Harman: There was none until the press conference of the Biafran leader, Colo-

nel Ojukwu, which, I believe, took place on Sunday, in which he implied that he is inviting them—the observer group—to come to see the other side. This is the first indication but I would say, again, it was only a press report of the press conference that he was interested in having this kind of observation take place inside the Biafran area.

Mr. Harkness: So, up to date, there has been no opportunity for this observer group to go into the Biafran area?

Mr. Harman: That is true.

Mr. Harkness: Therefore, in order to get both sides of this picture we have to get evidence from people who have been in the Biafran side of the country and preferably, I would presume, evidence from this same commission who would pay a visit there after the visits they are now making in the Federal side.

Mr. Harman: There would obviously be considerable merit in having a report from the same people.

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Harman, this observer group only inspected their first area for a period of five or six days and I note that they propose to make another visit to the area of the Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division some time. Could you tell us when that would be?

Mr. Harman: That is the observation in which they are now engaged. I understand that they left Lagos on the 5th, that is on Saturday, and on the basis of the previous one I would assume that their observations will be completed by the middle of this week. They will be issuing a report on that and then going on to the next one.

Mr. Ryan: Would you have any idea how easy it would be to get to any place in these territories in a period of five or six days?

Mr. Harman: Obviously, it is not easy as there is a war going on. Communication and transportation, at best, are not very good in the area and the civil war has complicated this, naturally. On the other hand, the reports so far received indicate full co-operation from the Federal Government in assisting in transportation and other needs.

Mr. Ryan: But this group would be pretty well conducted by the Federal Government

there would it not? Would it have its own initiative as to where it could go? Could it go and look at recent burial grounds and this sort of thing? Just what can it do?

Mr. Harman: In our view of the terms of reference, it can use its own initiative to go anywhere in the areas controlled by the Federal Government. You might take into account the fact that it has been operating for only two weeks. In the original invitation it was envisaged that the exercise would go on for two months or thereabouts. However, this was just a guess to give the governments invited some idea of how long the assignments would run. Therefore, in the first instance, as I see it, the team members are trying to see as much as they can to get a general picture at the same time as responding to the incidents such as the killing of the four relief workers in Okigwi. There is no limitation in our view on the exercise of their initiative within Federal territory.

Mr. Ryan: Are they inspecting territory that has recently been taken? We know there has been a great deal of territory taken by the Federal troops, and this was formerly occupied Biafran territory. Now surely they can get up close to the fighting and can investigate recent burial sites. They can communicate with these Federal troops to some extent on their own, I should think, and really give us far more particulars than we have in the kind of report that we have before us this morning. It is pretty general. There is nothing in detail to describe what is actually happening.

Mr. Harman: I would suggest, Mr. Ryan, that in the first report there is evidence that they were very close to, into the area that had just been taken. An example is given here in the first report of a visit to the area of Obilagu.

Mr. Ryan: Yes.

Mr. Harman: This, to our understanding, was taken only a matter of days before the Team arrived. This is the location of one of the airports that had been used, or an airstrip that had been used for the delivery of relief and other supplies. And this seems to me as evidence that they have been on the scene very quickly after the passage of the fighting.

Mr. Ryan: I notice that refugees are mentioned, but there is no detail as to how many were interviewed.

Mr. Harman: No, there presumably is not. I would say the team is still, as it were, feeling its way and working out its procedures, and perhaps this is one thing that will be improved as it proceeds in its further investigations.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Harman.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Harman, it is along the same lines that I want to go back a little, if I may. First, if I understood the statement either by your Minister or by the Prime Minister, there was one invitation which was not accepted because of the inadequacy or the limitations of the terms of reference.

Mr. Harman: I would not want to appear to contradict anything that was alleged to have been said by my Minister, but I think the point was that the invitation was received and it was considered for a time because of some concern that the terms of reference would not provide adequate freedom of movement. Further discussions about the invitation led to the conclusion that freedom of movement was to be properly guarded and the invitation was thereafter accepted.

Mr. Lewis: Did you get the first terms of reference in writing?

Mr. Harman: The first indication was oral. It was followed up by a written invitation.

Mr. Lewis: And are the terms of reference set out? I think it is of importance to know why you hesitated at first and what made you drop your hesitation. What was it in the original invitation that made you feel suspicious about it? Let me withdraw that. What made you feel uneasy about it?

Mr. Harman: As I recall it was a certain imprecision in the oral invitation that was made by telephone to our High Commissioner and then this was clarified in subsequent discussions and incorporated in the written invitation which arrived five or six days later.

Mr. Lewis: Is that a classified document, or would it be possible for you to let us see the written invitation?

Mr. Harman: It is at present classified, but I will inquire to see—

Mr. Lewis: I would like you to ask. I would be interested in seeing the terms of the invitation in writing.

Mr. Harman: As it is an intergovernmental communication I think we would have to raise the question with the author of the communication, but I see no reason why we cannot do that.

Mr. Lewis: My questions are related to something I thought I heard you say which made me wonder. I think I heard you say—correct me if I am wrong—that the Observer Team was invited to observe the conduct of the Federal troops. I wrote down, “in relation to the code of conduct set out by the Head of State of Nigeria, General Gowon”. Is that right?

Mr. Harman: I did say that, yes.

Mr. Lewis: What is that code of conduct? Why should the invitation be limited to something set out by the Head of State, the conduct of whose soldiers you were going to observe? What was the code of conduct General Gowon set out that you were going to relate your observations to?

Mr. Harman: The terms of reference said that the observers would observe or witness the conduct of the Federal troops. Shortly before the invitations were issued the Head of State, General Gowon, issued a directive to the forces about the way they were to act in what they have described in their press as the final push. This code of conduct I cannot remember the specific details, but as I recall it refers to the need to observe the proper rules of dealing with civilian populations; to assist with the feeding of people who come under Federal control; to assist the efforts of the Red Cross and the Nigerian relief organizations. It was in this area that the government was anxious to ensure publicly that its troops did not carry out any kind of practices which would be subject to question.

Mr. Lewis: Well, what had happened which made General Gowon issue these instructions of conduct to his troops? If they had behaved up to that point there would obviously have been no need for him to say to them: “You ought to behave in such and such a way”; if they had not violated the rules which he set out in his code of conduct. It could be erroneous, but that would be my logical conclusion from his issuing this code of conduct.

Mr. Harman: Without disagreeing directly with your assessment or your assumption, I would suggest also that the propaganda issuing forth from the other side about genocide—and I do not mean to use the word

“propaganda” in any malevolent way—but the reports and the press attention given from the Biafran side could also have led the Federal Government to ensure that there would be no grounds for support of the press reports from the other side.

Mr. Lewis: Did you get a copy of this code of conduct issued by General Gowon?

Mr. Harman: Either a copy or a report on it.

Mr. Lewis: And is that available?

Mr. Harman: Again, I will investigate that, Mr. Lewis. I do not have it with me.

Mr. Lewis: Now, have you any idea why the particular countries chosen were the ones chosen for the invitation?

Mr. Harman: No. The list of countries was formulated by the Federal Nigerian Government. It included, as you know, Britain, Poland, Sweden, Canada and the two international organizations. We do not know why.

Mr. Lewis: I ask because the one obvious omission in the group is any country from Africa.

Mr. Harman: Well, an obvious omission from the list of countries, yes, but the Organization of African Unity, which is entirely African, was invited to send an observer and did so.

I have lost track of this in the original description. He arrived rather later.

Mr. Lewis: He did arrive finally?

Mr. Harman: Yes. He and the Polish observer have now arrived in time to take part in the second exercise.

Mr. Lewis: By “second” you mean killings?

Mr. Harman: The killings at Okigwi, yes, and the OAU representative has arrived subsequently and is now in place. I believe there are two.

Mr. Lewis: He was not there during the first two exercises?

Mr. Harman: No, he was not.

Mr. Lewis: Presumably he is taking part in the one that is under way now.

Mr. Harman: Presumably, but I have no absolute confirmation of that. We have not been told which members are participating in this one.

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Mr. Lewis: I understand also—and this is the last line of my questions—that the representatives of the various governments can make direct reports to their respective governments. Has such a direct report been received by the Canadian government from General Milroy?

Mr. Harman: General Milroy has reported briefly on occasion about particularly administrative problems or questions, about his recommendation that he be sent an assistant as several of the other observers had assistants. He also, I recall, after the first visit sent a report noting that the co-operation from the Federal authorities and been full and helpful.

Mr. Lewis: He has reported to you that he is entirely satisfied with the whole operation?

Mr. Harman: He has.

Mr. Lewis: He has no complaints at all on any score?

Mr. Harman: He has not reported any complaint. He has no complaint; that is being more straightforward.

The Chairman: I have quite a number of questioners. Mr. Groos followed by Mr. De Bané, Roberts, Cafik, Laprise, Gibson, Alexander, Forrestall, Winch.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, my supplementary question has already been answered by Mr. Harman in his reply to Mr. Harkness.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: Mr. Chairman, since the authors of this report are not here and cannot be cross-examined, I would like to ask Mr. Harman if the officials of the Department have any information confirming or denying the reports to the effect that there have been massive deaths in Biafra whatever the cause—famine, war—and so on.

[English]

Mr. Harman: May I reply in English? The only information thus far available is that given in these two reports.

Mr. De Bané: You have no idea at all if it is true or untrue that a great number of people are dying?

Mr. Harman: We have no idea from the observers.

Mr. De Bané: As the observers are not here for us to cross-question, I would like to know—and I would like to leave that report

for a moment—if the Department, the high officials of our Department of External Affairs, have any information concerning or contradicting the news that a great number of people are dying through starvation or any other cause.

Mr. Harman: I am sorry; when you mentioned the observers I thought that you were keeping it particularly to the reports of the observers. There are many reports available to the Department of External Affairs, giving various versions of the death toll and the causes of death. The Red Cross, perhaps, is in the best position to afford information about this since they have been involved in the relief problem from the beginning.

Mr. De Bané: May we know what is the content of the information from the Red Cross? Is it true that thousands are dying from starvation in Biafra in their opinion?

Mr. Harman: I think it would be better for the Committee to hear the Red Cross information and statistics direct from the Red Cross. I could offer the summary impression from the reports given to us. There is a great deal of malnutrition. There is some death by starvation. Malnutrition is traditional in this area of Africa. It has been accentuated by the absence of sufficient high-protein food. I would not hazard an estimate of the number of deaths for any period.

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Mr. De Bané: But would you say, Mr. Harman, that a great number are dying by malnutrition under the circumstances. Would you say that?

Mr. Harman: A great enough number to justify the substantial amounts of aid that are being amassed and sent in by the various church welfare organizations and the Red Cross, together with governments. If there were no starvation these massive relief shipments would not be needed.

Mr. De Bané: What consideration should we give to the news that thousands are dying every day in Biafra? Is the Department more informed than we are on this subject?

Mr. Harman: As I said before, there are numerous reports. The report which has been given the most currency is that there are 5,000 to 6,000 people dying a day. I have seen no firm evidence to underpin that estimate. It is one estimate. The government of Canada does not have any representative in the Biafran area. It is an area that is at war with the

government of the country which we recognize and with which we have relations.

Mr. De Bané: My last question, Mr. Harman, concerns the source of the information that up to 5,000 or 6,000 are dying every day. Is it a source that you judge reliable and serious in your experience?

Mr. Harman: I find it difficult to comment on that one way or another, sir.

Mr. De Bané: But you are not denying it.

Mr. Harman: I would not deny it, but on the other hand we do not have confirmatory evidence that would enable me to say that is a correct estimate necessarily.

The Chairman: Have you finished, Mr. De Bané? Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Harman, has the Nigerian government indicated to the Canadian government that it would not accept the expansion of the terms for the Observer Team to permit it to go to the Biafran side of the battle line, or that they would consider that or, say, the sending of another Observer Team to the Biafran side an unfriendly or hostile act?

Mr. Harman: No, there has been no indication of Nigerian Federal Government opinion on the subject. The question has not been raised. The original terms of reference, as I said, were for the Nigerian side. The question of these or other observers going to the other side has not been raised.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Harman, first of all I would like to agree wholeheartedly with the hon. member from York South that it would be a wonderful thing if we could have a copy of any written invitation concerning observing in that area. Now, I have a number of questions. This report from the Observer Team indicates that they were not restricted in their movements, but there is no indication in the report that they actually exercised any right to go to areas that they were not sort of led to. In your view, did they exercise their right of freedom of movement and look into areas in which they were not expected to go?

Mr. Harman: We have no evidence that they have exercised this particular right. We were concerned that they should have the right to investigate on their own initiative,

and it seems to us that having sent a responsible military officer we should be able to rely on him to decide when that right to investigate should be exercised. That is the position up to now.

Mr. Cafik: I think that it would be advisable for this Committee to know whether these people actually went to any areas that were not forewarned of their coming. I think it is very important to have this information so we can judge the validity or otherwise of the report.

Does the Department itself consider this report—I gather from your comments that you do—to be a valid reflection of the conditions that they observed?

Mr. Harman: On that question, sir, I think the Department does consider this report to be a valid reflection of the observations made by the group of observers.

Mr. Cafik: Could you perhaps inform me as to why Poland and the Organization of African Unity did not send representatives in the first instance?

Mr. Harman: I cannot inform you. We have received no explanation of why they did not do so. I think perhaps the best explanation is the simplest one; they just did not get going on the operation as quickly as the others did.

Mr. Cafik: Could you inform me of the views of the Red Cross or other agencies that are concerned in this area in respect of this report and its validity?

Mr. Harman: I have seen no comments by the Red Cross or anyone. This is a separate operation.

Mr. Cafik: Would you in the Department consider that it is possible or even likely that both the conflicting report—this one from the observers' team—and the observations given by Andy Brewin and David MacDonald (Egmont) are true and not as contradictory as they appear to be? It seems to me that on the one side we have a report of what is going on on the Nigerian side and on the other side we have a report of what is going on on the Biafran side. It is quite possible that perhaps both of them are right, that the conditions are altogether different, that there is not genocide, or whatever it is, on the one side but there is a fear of it on the other. Is it possible, in your view, that the situation is truly different in both countries, or on both sides of that line?

Mr. Harman: I think that you have a valid observation, sir. I think that we can take it that in the areas the observers have visited they have concluded there is no genocide, that in the area which the hon. members visited there were very serious expressions of fear of genocide, and I think perhaps there is the distinction. It is a question of what has or actually is happening and what is feared would happen. There is perhaps an important quality of fear here that may or may not be backed up by fact.

Mr. Cafik: I think you would probably agree that if there is genocide then it would be taking place on the Nigerian side and not on the Biafran side. After all, they are not trying to kill their own people. So if there is no evidence of it on the Nigerian side perhaps that indicates that it does not exist. Or would you feel that that is so?

Mr. Harman: I think the reading of the report, that it is not happening in the area visited, is quite valid.

Mr. Cafik: Is the Government anticipating any steps to overcome this possible confusion between the two conflicting reports, or potentially conflicting reports? Is it doing anything to marry these two and perhaps sift out the truth without the aid of this Committee that would shed some light on it?

Mr. Harman: I think the government would be very concerned to ensure that it has the actual proof of the situation on both sides and would be taking appropriate steps to ensure that it has been.

Mr. Cafik: What steps would you have in mind?

Mr. Harman: This is a matter of government policy. I think that as an official I am obliged not to comment.

Mr. Cafik: Is the Department in favour of sending an observer team to Biafra similar to the team that has been working in Nigeria?

Mr. Harman: I think the Department would wish to consider this—consider it as a lively and useful possibility. On the other hand, there are complicating factors in that there is no confirmation, in spite of the press conference I mentioned earlier, that this Biafran regime really wants an observer group in their territory.

Mr. Cafik: Has the government requested the right to put one in?

Mr. Harman: To my knowledge the government has not done so.

Mr. Cafik: Does it contemplate doing so?

Mr. Harman: It may. As I said, this question is under consideration. The matter of future activity in the direction of getting the whole picture is under active consideration.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Laprise, followed by Messrs. Gibson, Alexander, Forrestall, Winch and Ouellet.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Mr. Chairman, a couple of points I want to have cleared up. I would like to ask Mr. Harman whether the major-general was the only Canadian and the only official Canadian representative?

[English]

Mr. Harman: There are two.

General Milroy is the observer delegated by the Government of Canada and he has an assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Do you know the professions of the other observers from other countries who accompanied the Commission?

[English]

Mr. Harman: Yes, the British observer is a retired Major-General; the Swedish observer is a Major-General on active service; the United Nations Secretary-General's representative is a Swedish diplomat who has been in the service of the Secretary-General for some time on various missions; the Polish observer is an army Colonel and, I believe, the OAU representative is an Algerian official. I am not sure of his profession.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: In other words, they are all military people who went as observers. We don't have, in this official delegation, the point of view of a civilian observer?

[English]

Mr. Harman: Yes, there was no obligation in terms of the original invitation to send civilian or military observers. From Canada's point of view, since there is a civil war going on and since it is a question of the conduct of troops that is the main point of observation, it seemed most appropriate that it should be a military officer.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Following this answer, does the Department of External Affairs give a great deal of importance to the reports made by independent sources, for instance, the Red Cross?

[English]

Mr. Harman: Yes, the government—I should correct myself—the Department of External Affairs does place considerable stock in the reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross in particular reference to the needs for relief materials, for food and other supplies. The Department has relied on the International Committee of the Red Cross to produce information as to what is needed and in what quantities in order that valid judgment can be made about the Canadian contribution.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Another point. Do you know if the delegation tried to find out or to know where the help to both Nigeria and Biafra was coming from, with regard to arms or things that can help these two groups to organize in arms, and food and other things of this type?

[English]

Mr. Harman: These questions, while valid questions to be asked about the situation in Nigeria, are not in the terms of reference of the group of observers to which I assume you were referring. They are, therefore, not the subject for investigation by the group of observers in Nigeria under its present terms of reference.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: Would it be possible or practical to mark in red ink on this little map the areas covered by the visiting delegation, the area where conflict is taking place, and where the Biafrans are principally?

Mr. Thompson: I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, we need a better map. It is a little small. This does not give us a picture: perhaps a relief map—

Mr. Harman: Yes, we have a very large map here, if there is some way in which we could put it up.

The Chairman: Perhaps I could get some assistance in holding this map up so members can see it. Can everyone see that?

Mr. Harman: This is, as you can see, the whole of Nigeria divided in its new form of 12 states according to the plan of the Federal Government. The former eastern region comprises the three states of the new arrangement, East-Central, the South Eastern, and the Rivers State. Its capital was at Enugu and it is this area which was claimed for the Republic of Biafra when it declared itself independent of Nigeria on May 31, 1967.

Military operations have gone on since July of 1967 and the area has been reduced to something in the order of 60 miles in both directions around the temporary capital of Umuahia. You can see the town of Okigwi just north of Umuahia. This was the most recent achievement of the Federal Forces in their pressure upon the remaining area claimed by the Biafrans.

Mr. Winch: So that is now about one-tenth of the original claim?

Mr. Harman: I believe so, yes. I think about one-tenth is a fair estimate, sir.

Mr. Anderson: What about the population in this region?

Mr. Harman: There are varying figures on the population. It is really extremely difficult to get a satisfactory estimate of the population remaining in the Biafran area. There are claims that six to eight, to ten million people are still in the area, but there are also observations that in the prospect of fighting the people in the area, the ordinary farm people, melt into the bush and come out again when the fighting has passed and so you never really know where the population is. I think firm statements on this subject are to be avoided and not necessarily to be considered valid.

Mr. Gibson: What security has the team that is out there observing? Have they got arms, weapons or any security with them?

Mr. Harman: No, they have not.

Mr. Gibson: This is an area of questioning I would like to follow up. This would act as a great restraint on their going anywhere near the fighting, would it not?

Mr. Harman: I should think not. The Nigerian Government has indicated that to the extent of its power it will protect the observers.

Mr. Gibson: When they go are they accompanied by Federal troops?

Mr. Harman: By a federal escort officer, yes.

Mr. Gibson: An officer or a force? I mean, do they have a company of troops with them or do they just go with one or two guards?

Mr. Harman: We have not had a report on the actual numbers.

Mr. Gibson: Would you let us know, sir?

Mr. Harman: Yes, we can. There has been no report from General Milroy that he considers he is in any way hampered by the security aspect of his visit.

The Chairman: Have you finished, Mr. Gibson? Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander: I find something of great significance in the interim report. I wonder if Mr. Harman could make some comment on this. The report says:

The observers considered it significant that in the villages visited the inhabitants displayed no fear of Federal soldiers, even when these soldiers arrived in their midst suddenly.

The following statement seems to me to be very significant:

However, it was also noted that very few of the more educated Ibos have yet appeared in areas occupied by Federal troops.

Have you any comment to make about that statement, Mr. Harman?

Mr. Harman: I am afraid that any comment I could make would be very, very tentative. I have been a little puzzled by that statement myself. I take it to mean that while the common people of the Ibo tribe, who are the ones in the area over which the fighting has taken place, will settle and resume their normal life as soon as possible after the passage of the fighting, what is described here as the more educated, or the elite, are the ones who are more determined to stay within the beleaguered and surrounded area; that is, to defend the independence that they have declared. However, that is only my personal interpretation of this.

Mr. Alexander: Yes, I can appreciate that. I think that is a very important statement that has been made: that the educated Ibos, for some reason or another, are staying away and do not want to become involved, which

means to me that there are some implications that would have to be dealt with and delved into.

I have another question for you. It also states that the observers indicated they encountered no restrictions or investigations into their movements and none of their requests were refused. Could you tell this Committee whether in fact any submissions have been made by our observers to go into the Biafra area and whether or not they were refused?

Mr. Harman: They have reported that no initiatives were taken along this line, to go into the Biafran area.

Mr. Alexander: They never made the request.

Mr. Harman: They have not reported any request and I therefore assume they have made no request.

Mr. Alexander: Mr. Harman, you also stated that it has come to your attention through implication or through press release that the Biafran regime has indicated a desire that the Observer Team should visit that area. What Sunday are we talking about, this past Sunday?

Mr. Harman: Yes. I believe it was in the report in the newspaper yesterday.

Mr. Alexander: I see. Can you tell me what steps the government has taken since that time to ascertain whether or not this is a legitimate request, and are they interested?

Mr. Harman: That question is under consideration. I could not say anything further than that.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Mr. Harman.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Harman, I just have one or two questions. I am a little curious about why our government has relied so extensively on the Canadian Red Cross. Are we to infer from this—and we hear about it constantly; the Minister has referred to it in the House and it has been referred to here a number of times this morning—that we are not taking the fullest possible advantage of reports from, for example, the World Council of Churches, the Roman Catholic organizations that are at work there now, and some of the others that are attempting to effect relief in this very desperate situation?

Mr. Harman: There is no hesitation about the report and information available through the various other organizations including the World Council of Churches or CARITAS or any of the others. You may recall, Mr. Sharp received a large group of representatives of the interested agencies on July 12 when interest in this whole question was beginning to mount and they, together, joined in a fund—the Nigeria-Biafra Relief Fund of Canada—which is a combined effort by all of the Canadian branches of these organizations you mentioned. They have, therefore, gathered together for Canadian purposes and mounted a general combined appeal to the people of Canada for funds. The Executive Director of this Fund is the National Commissioner of the Canadian Red Cross Society. Therefore, there is a linkage through this Fund and through the Red Cross. I might also mention that the Red Cross, of course, is operating throughout Nigeria. That is, it has relief operations on the Federal side and it has its operations on the Biafran side.

Mr. Forrestall: My question was perhaps a little bit more complex than that, in that I wondered if we were actively seeking the advice of agencies outside of Canada—those that might be and indeed are in existence in Europe—that are attempting to do something. Are we actively seeking their counsel and their advice as to what is going on?

Mr. Harman: We have received a good deal of information from these particularly through our missions in Scandinavian countries which are fittingly involved.

Mr. Forrestall: Is this coming voluntarily from them or at our request? I am interested in the scope of our research for pertinent information.

Mr. Harman: I cannot recall whether this was specifically requested. It is a continuous operation of seeking information which may involve requests or the filing of reports by our missions.

Mr. Forrestall: Can you tell us anything, if it was in your prerogative or your responsibility, about the supplies that have gone from Canada to Nigeria? Can you tell us anything about the present disposition? What quantities, what food type, what basic staples are we sending, and how are they being distributed? What is the vehicle? Do we have a critical analysis of the method of distribution. Are we satisfied, ourselves, that food, medical supplies and what it is that we may or may

not have there, are in fact being properly distributed?

Mr. Harman: The International Committee of the Red Cross has established priorities. It has, as a co-ordinator, established the pipeline, if we might use the expression, by which the contributions not only from this country but from the United States and from European countries are funnelled into the distribution arrangements within Nigeria and the Biafran area. They seem, to our way of thinking, to be the most informed and the best co-ordinating agency because of their long experience and because of their deep involvement in this on both sides of the fighting line. They have, therefore, said to potential contributors such as the Canadian Government that such and such foods are required, or medicines or drugs or whatever. I cannot recall the specifics but the main objective is high protein foods. They suggest particularly dried fish and a certain amount of dried skim milk powder and other items of this sort which they judge are the ones most needed. They also, through their observation of the supply depots in the centres from which distribution is made, can best judge how the food should be sent, how soon, how quickly, and in what way, in order that there could be an orderly distribution of food depending on the distribution arrangements they have made. In the light of this, an initial shipment was sent out early in August by air and—

Mr. Forrestall: How many tons was that? Have you any idea of the quantity?

Mr. Harman: It should be something in the order of 20 to 25 tons but I cannot be exact on that.

Mr. Lewis: Shipped out where?

Mr. Harman: To Lagos, and immediately shipped from Lagos by the ICRC through its distribution arrangements to the forward points in the fighting area, that is in Enugu and Calabar, from which distribution was made to those who needed it. Subsequently there were reports that the centres from which distribution is made were filled by contributions from other places. Therefore, although an allocation of a half million dollars had been made for this purpose, the actual shipment of goods was not pressed, because the International Committee of the Red Cross said this should follow an orderly pattern. The orderly pattern results in a ship being loaded—within days,

the thirteenth I believe it begins to load in Halifax—which will carry over 3,000 tons of Canadian contributions.

Mr. Forrestall: You have mentioned two now, the first shipment some time ago...

Mr. Harman: Yes, the first shipment by air in August and now the second, which is the next one involving Canadian government supplies and also supplies provided by the voluntary agencies, which is to load beginning the 13th of October 3,000 tons of which 2,400 tons are from the allocations of the Canadian government in the form of dried fish.

Mr. Forrestall: In fact, Mr. Harman, all that we as a nation have contributed, in any official way through the agency of the Red Cross and its collective distribution effort, is the initial 25 tons back in August, some month and a half ago now?

Mr. Harman: Yes, if you look for the simple fact.

Mr. Forrestall: After all, Mr. Harman, this is the fact, is it not? Food is food and five days from now it is not much good to you, is it? Very obviously we are not satisfied with this. Can you just in answer to this one final question tell me what specifically we are doing to try to determine a better method of distribution? If we are to accept as a generality that people are dying as a result of lack of adequate diet, surely we must be concerned, and surely we must be doing something to effect a better distribution system. Can you enlighten us at all on what steps we are taking?

Mr. Harman: As you say the limitation on the totality stems from the limitation on the distribution arrangements within the area of concern. This includes the areas on the Federal side as well as on the rebel side of the border. Towards the end of September Mr. Sharp and General Winch, the head of the Canadian Red Cross, discussed this problem and an offer was made of a Canadian Hercules aircraft to participate in the distribution of supplies on the Federal side of the fighting. This offer was made and we have been awaiting confirmation from the International Committee of the Red Cross that this would be...

Mr. Forrestall: Is that Hercules still in Canada?

Mr. Harman: It is still in Canada and will be until we get...

Mr. Forrestall: It is positioned here with a crew ready to go?

Mr. Harman: Yes, that is right—until we get the final word as to where and when it is needed by the Red Cross.

Mr. Lewis: Did I hear correctly that it is limited to the Federal side?

Mr. Harman: If the offer...

Mr. Lewis: If the offer was limited to the Federal side in the war.

Mr. Harman: The offer is for distribution on the Federal side.

Mr. Forrestall: Through Lagos—through Colonel Gowon. Perhaps I might come back on the second round of questioning. I would like to pursue what it is that we are capable of doing in terms of...

The Chairman: If you have not completed your question, Mr. Forrestall, please continue. After you I have Mr. Winch, Mr. Ouellet, Mr. Yewchuk and Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Forrestall: I have had ten minutes, so I will pass. Would you put my name down on the bottom of the list again?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to refer to the First Interim Report of the Observer Team because it was signed by General Milroy and, therefore, he concurs in this report.

I know all of us are interested in the feeding of the starving. I therefore find, Mr. Harman, that I am most disturbed. On page 2 on this Report, the paragraph entitled "Restoration of Normal Life", in the last part of section (A) you will read these words:

These arrangements appear to have been adequate to date, but from what was seen it is apparent that they will not be sufficient to handle the task, if the people continue to come out of the bush at the present rate. A contributing problem is the lack of money in the hands of the people.

May I repeat that?

A contributing problem is the lack of money in the hands of the people.

I think you will see what I am driving at. How can you expect people facing starvation and coming out of the bush to be in a position of not getting food because "a contributing problem is the lack of money". This being

stated and signed by General Milroy, my question is do we take from that statement that there is a present situation whereby starving people are not receiving food because of a lack of money in their hands? This having been stated and as it has been concurred in in this Report I, therefore, take it as a fact. I think a logical question would be whether your Department has or is immediately asking General Milroy for an explanation of this and whether the contention of the Canadian Government—your Department—is being put forward that whether or not starving people have money should not have an effect as to their being fed or not. I think there is a most important matter here and it is signed by our representative.

Mr. Harman: I agree with you, Mr. Winch, that that is an important question. I cannot suggest that the answer is the obvious one or whether there is more to it. An immediate request will have to go to General Milroy to get his interpretation because he agreed to it.

Mr. Winch: Because he agreed to it.

Mr. Harman: Because he has signed this Report. There could very easily be a good deal more to this. Possibly it has been compressed for purposes of the Report.

Mr. Winch: You realize the importance of it, the factor involved, and you say that an immediate request for an explanation is going forward?

Mr. Harman: Yes.

Mr. Winch: In the name of God, whether or not you have money should not be the deciding factor if you are a hungry person and need to be fed.

Mr. Harman: I might comment on that. There have been reports from the Biafran area, as well, which are roughly comparable to this. People who have been there have commented that there are people who are well off as well as there are people who are starving.

Mr. Forrestall: But relief supplies are being in fact, sold?

An hon. Member: No.

Mr. Harman: No, I am not saying that.

Mr. Winch: Well, what is the meaning of this then if they are not being sold?

Mr. Anderson: It is in the market as well as relief supplies. Evidently in the Biafran market, according to the reports I read in the press, it functions on the basis of money, Nigerian currency presumably, whereby those with money buy and survive and those that do not have money either get relief funds or starve.

Mr. Winch: I think there is, therefore, also a follow-up question that comes out of this and it should be investigated and I hope it will. Is there a possibility, in view of this statement which is concurred in, of supplies being sent to the hungry in Nigeria, Biafra and some finding their way into a black market where you have to have money in order to buy? I think that is a follow-up on that statement in the report.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, there is a possibility of a separate market as well as relief funds. I quite agree with you and someone could follow that up.

The Chairman: I wonder whether, in the interests of orderly procedure, we could have the questions put through the Chair to the witness. Would you like to add your name, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson: No, it is just that I had a report on this very point and I was perhaps explaining a little more than Mr. Winch happens to know on this, and that is that a market does exist alongside the distribution of relief funds. In some areas, in particular Biafra, this market is fairly well stocked and yet people are starving. So when we consider sending relief funds we should also remember, perhaps, that Biafran and Nigerian authorities could do more to release the food within their areas to the people who need it most. It does not necessarily mean that relief funds are being sold.

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Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, my point is in view of this and that the supplies from the rest of the world are free to assist the hungry, the question of money should not come in and Canada should insist on investigating the question of money and the feeding of the hungry on relief supplies of food that are sent by the rest of the world.

The Chairman: You indicated, Mr. Harman, that the Department proposed to ask for a report on that particular aspect.

Mr. Harman: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: Is it not the situation that the great bulk of the food supplies being used by both the Federal people and the Nigerian people are locally produced in Nigeria and that the food going in from outside is to supplement that because of the destruction which has taken place and the inability of these people to produce their own food in sufficient quantities or buy it?

Mr. Harman: There is that to it, Mr. Harkness, but I believe the main distribution by the relief agencies is of the food that is shipped in from abroad.

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

Mr. Harman: That is their main responsibility.

Mr. Lewis: Presumably this report deals with what they call "normalization" which is a normal market distribution of food which you can only buy and does not deal with the relief agency supplies. Is that right?

The Chairman: I think in fairness to the members who have indicated that they wish to ask questions I should proceed. I will put you down on the list, Mr. Lewis.

Have you finished, Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Yes.

The Chairman: Next is Mr. Ouellet followed by Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Ouellet: Most of my questions, Mr. Chairman, have already been answered, but I should like to go further on the point just raised. Is General Milroy making written or oral reports from time to time or am I right in assuming that the only report you have is the one that has been distributed?

Mr. Harman: The only formal reports we have are the ones that have been distributed. General Milroy does report from time to time to the government separately from these reports. These are his private reports which, as I said earlier, comment for example on the co-operation that has been given to the Team by the Federal authorities and other house-keeping matters.

Mr. Ouellet: Are you able to use him in a capacity other than the one in which he is already performing as an observer? Can he, for instance, go along and check the distribution of food and drugs?

Mr. Harman: That was not envisaged in the original assignment of General Milroy. I am

not certain whether it would be excluded, but he has not been used for any purposes other than his observer task and it has seemed to us that the chief value of the observer group is that it should be always available to observe and investigate at a moment's notice.

Mr. Ouellet: There have been some reports that the Federal authorities are stopping the distribution of foods and drugs in certain areas. Do you have any comments on this? Is it accurate or not?

Mr. Harman: We understand that there have been some difficulties by some military commanders who have felt that military requirements exceeded the needs of humanitarian purposes. These have normally, and in all cases to our knowledge, been worked out in favour of more action on the humanitarian side. In other words, when the issue has been raised, the Federal Government of Nigeria has come down on the side of doing what is necessary for the people and if necessary the military just has to wait.

Mr. Ouellet: In light of the future shipments which you referred to previously, do you think it would be appropriate to have some people on the spot to make sure that these shipments are effectively distributed?

Mr. Harman: Again I would say that we have relied on the International Red Cross people and there are numerous Red Cross people on both sides and I think their status is sound and they are reliable observers and distributors of relief material. It might be appropriate to have additional people, but I think it would tend to suggest a lack of trust in the Red Cross which is not justified.

Mr. Ouellet: I understand that you are receiving reports from the High Commissioner from time to time.

Mr. Harman: Oh, yes; of course.

Mr. Ouellet: Are there any contradictions between the reports from General Milroy and the High Commissioner?

Mr. Harman: None at all.

Mr. Ouellet: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Yewchuk?

Mr. Yewchuk: I have Mr. Thompson's questions, which I will ask first and then I will ask my own. The first question is: Are relief supplies going only through Lagos? Is this the

only entry for Canadian relief supplies into Nigeria or Biafra?

Mr. Harman: In terms of the flight that went in early August the answer is yes, they all went in through Lagos. In terms of the future shipments which I mentioned, it is my understanding that the Red Cross will decide on a proportion of these to go to Lagos and a proportion to go into the distribution system that ends up in the Biafran area.

Mr. Yewchuk: I was wondering if the supplies reached the areas of need and, in particular, are some of them being used by the Nigerian military?

Mr. Harman: We have no knowledge of any use by the Federal military authorities or soldiers of relief supplies at all.

Mr. Yewchuk: Are we not considering shipping supplies through Fernando Po so that the agencies directly dealing with Biafra might be more likely to receive them?

Mr. Harman: That was answered in my first reply. The Red Cross will decide the proportion that should go to both depots.

Mr. Yewchuk: That is all of Mr. Thompson's questions, but I have one or two questions of my own. I think what we are considering is the fact that people are dying either through direct action by troops or through other means, such as starvation. The terms of reference of our observation team are really to observe the conduct of the Federal troops militarily and how they deal with civilians. I wonder whether our reports are as complete as they could be because of this. I think there is a possibility that the Observer Team might wish not to strain relations with the Nigerian Government and possibly they may not be giving us as much information as is available about actual deaths not necessarily resulting from action of the Nigerian troops but deaths from other causes. It seems significant to me that the UN ambassador has not signed this but has written a separate report to the Secretary-General. I wonder whether there is more information that went out in that way and whether we have received what one might consider a censored form of this report.

Mr. Harman: I am confident that there is no significant divergence between the report sent by the UN representative and the one that was signed and presented to the other governments. This flows merely from the special circumstances where the Secretary-Gen-

eral of the United Nations is not a government. He is, as it were, an elected or chosen official and Mr. Gussing is his personal representative. Therefore he has not the same status and I think the fact that Mr. Gussing did not actually sign this is explainable entirely in these terms.

Mr. Yewchuk: He is part of the official Observer Team, though?

Mr. Harman: Yes, but always with the difference. It has been expressed this way. He is a member of the team; he will take his part. He will visit the areas along with other members of the team but it always must be recognized that his position is slightly different from the others. This has generally been accepted by the other members of the team as a natural thing flowing from the special circumstances of the UN.

Mr. Yewchuk: You stated previously that there was no evidence to confirm that the Red Cross reports of genocide were correct. Was there any evidence that these reports were wrong?

Mr. Harman: First of all, Mr. Yewchuk, I have not referred to any Red Cross reports of genocide. There have been reports...

Mr. Yewchuk: Starvation and so on.

Mr. Harman: There have been reports of fear of genocide and Biafran statements that genocide is taking place or is to take place, but the Red Cross has not given credence to these reports. It has not commented on them at all.

Mr. Yewchuk: I think genocide does not necessarily result as a direct action; it could be an indirect thing. This is why I am asking that question.

Mr. Harman: Yes, therefore you refer to the reports of starvation. Well, I think the Red Cross' view of the reports of starvation or malnutrition is essentially a pragmatic one. They see a need and they are doing what they can to fill it. Therefore they put credence in the reports of the need in order that they should go about filling it.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you.

The Chairman: The last questioner is Mr. De Bané.

Mr. De Bané: Well again, as the authors of this report are not here to be questioned, I

will deal only with the Department itself. You have mentioned, Mr. Harman, that you have reports that up to 6,000 people are dying from starvation in Biafra and you are not ready to reject that report first hand. Can you tell me what steps are being taken by your Department to confirm this report that 200,000 people are dying every month? Do I understand that you are not well informed on what is going on in Biafra?

Mr. Harman: There are limitations on the information that the Department has about Biafra because there are no official representatives in the area. Nonetheless, the Department is eager to obtain information through other sources, and in this connection I would refer you to Rev. Mr. Johnson, whose name has been mentioned here and who has been regularly in touch with the Department over the past year about his observations in the Biafran area. That is only one source; there are others.

The point really is that any estimate of the numbers that are dying is no more than that, it is an estimate, and it can vary from area to area and none of these estimates need be correct. There has never been a fully accurate census of Nigeria, and certainly not of the Biafran area during the period in which it has claimed to be free, and presumably there is no organization which will produce accurate statistics on request. We at the Department are eager to get the facts but they are not always readily available.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions at this point?

Mr. Lewis: I was going to ask, Mr. Chairman, whether Mr. Harman is the right person, or someone else—and he will know—to tell us what requests have been made by anybody for help from the government, and so on. If Mr. Harman is the official who has the facts, I would like to ask some questions on it.

Mr. Harman: I may not have all of the facts, Mr. Lewis, because of the fact that liaison is sometimes conducted through the External Aid Office, but if you wish I will attempt to answer your questions.

The Chairman: Before we start a new line of questioning and for the convenience of members of the Committee, do we want to fix a time limit for sitting this morning, such as 12.30 or 12.15? I am in the hands of the Committee. I now have on my list Mr. Lewis and then Mr. Forrestall. Would 12.30 as the ultimate limit be satisfactory, should it be 12.15?

Shall we pick a time and then govern ourselves accordingly? Let us set a limit of 12.30 and perhaps we will finish earlier.

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Mr. Ouellet: Mr. Chairman, did we previously agree that the Steering Committee should meet at a certain time? There were some suggestions made this morning that we should have a break to permit the Steering Committee to make up an agenda. I think it should be done right after the questions.

The Chairman: I have some suggestions to make to the Committee. I think we can assume that the Steering Subcommittee will be made effective before 2.30 this afternoon. At least I would hope so, if the Opposition parties have their representatives named.

Mr. Lewis: I do not think I will be very long.

Mr. Alexander: I hate to interrupt my hon. friend, but I would like it cleared up who Mr. Harman actually is. I know he is an official with the Department but his qualifications have not been mentioned. Of course, I have no qualms about it, but I would just like to know who he is and what his responsibility is so that this can be aired completely.

The Chairman: Could you give us your position with the Department?

Mr. Harman: Yes. I am the head of the Africa I section of the African & Middle Eastern Division of External Affairs. Africa I section covers all of the English-speaking countries in Africa; that is, all of western, southern and eastern Africa.

Mr. Alexander: External Aid, did I hear you say?

Mr. Harman: No, in the African & Middle Eastern Division of External Affairs.

Mr. Alexander: I see.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): As such do you report to the Deputy Minister?

Mr. Harman: I report through the head of the African & Middle Eastern Division to the Under Secretary of State.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Harman, do you know whether any international agency has made any kind of request of the government, either with regard to assistance with airplanes or with regard to any other kind of assistance?

Mr. Harman: There have been a number of requests; not all formal requests in the form of, "Would you do so and so?", but in explorations in some instances. I am thinking in the latter instance and particularly of questions that have been raised by church groups of whether it was possible that the Government might do this or that. The International Committee of the Red Cross has sought assistance in terms of funds and in terms of food supplies. In terms of funds there was an appeal made some time in May to a number of governments for financial assistance in cash and the Canadian Government responded with a donation of \$60,000—Canadian through the Canadian Red Cross to the ICRC. Subsequently there was a sort of general appeal for relief supplies and this was responded to in the two slices, as it were, of \$500,000 each of allocations for food supplies.

Requests for materials or assistance in transportation have been rather less precise. There have been discussions, for example, with the Red Cross about whether aircraft would be made available. For example, this was discussed in Mr. Sharp's meeting with General Wrinch of the Red Cross, out of which issued the offer to send a Hercules to aid in the distribution of supplies on the Federal side of the conflict. Mr. Lewis, I do not have a catalogue or anything with me but that is the source and nature of this.

Mr. Lewis: Let us deal with the airplanes first. My information is that the International Red Cross in particular has asked the government for more than one Hercules plane. Whether it asked formally or in an exploratory way I think is a distinction, Mr. Harman, that may have some weight with an official of the Department. I am not sure I am impressed by it because I know enough about these things to know that when a representative of an organization approaches a government they do not make the demand, they start exploratory talks, and whether or not they follow up with the demand will often depend on whether they get a frown or a smile in reply to their exploratory talks. As I said, my information is that the International Red Cross has asked for more than one Hercules plane from the government and that it be permitted to use them with whatever personnel are available and wherever it sees fit, and the government's answer has been: "You may have a Hercules plane so long as it functions within the Federal Government area and does not go across the line into the Bia-

fran held area." Now is that information correct?

Mr. Harman: I would say that that is roughly correct, Mr. Lewis, but you must also take into account the circumstances of at least one of the explorations, which was towards the end of August, when the International Committee of the Red Cross wished to stimulate a great deal of action in moving relief supplies into the Biafran area. At that time the Commissioner General of the Red Cross for Nigeria, Dr. Lindt, wanted to mount a large operation with a large number of aircraft which he was requesting from several governments in order to get more supplies in. In order to do this legally he attempted to secure the agreement of both sides to the conflict. There would be no problem of conflict over what is essentially a humanitarian mercy mission. He worked very hard at this and accomplished getting the agreement, first, of the Biafran side and then of the Nigerian side. At that time he said: "Well, agreement is near and we need aircraft." The possibility was certainly explored in Ottawa of providing an aircraft to assist in this operation, which would have been a perfectly legal and straightforward one. Then they made an agreement between the Red Cross and the Federal government and the Biafrans turned it down. So nothing happened under that agreement.

Mr. Lewis: Excuse me, Mr. Harman. You make these statements all the time and I must say at the end of every one of them you get a "hook" which is pro-federal and anti-Biafran.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis, I think these are comments which we should try to avoid.

Mr. Lewis: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but there was a reason for the Biafran refusal and the "hook" that the Biafrans then refused is, it seems to me—and I have to be frank—a questionable "hook". As I understand it, there was an argument about the particular airstrip that was to be used and the Biafrans—

Mr. Roberts: You are not attacking the integrity of Mr. Harman?

Mr. Lewis: No, there is no question of integrity but the reason for my comment, Mr. Chairman, will become evident, if I may, in my next question.

The Chairman: As long as we can avoid a debate with the witness, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: Well, I do not know how you avoid it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. De Bané: Mr. Lewis, Mr. Harman is most frank in his answers.

Mr. Lewis: Oh, yes, certainly; franker than is right. Mr. Harman, am I right in concluding, on the basis both of your answer and your emphasis, that the Hercules which has been offered has been offered so long as it is confined to the Nigerian side? Am I right in concluding that your department was not willing to agree to lending an aircraft for use by the international agencies in the way in which they are now flying supplies into Biafra, which is flying them during the night and getting the supplies in there; that you are not prepared to agree to lending to any of the international agencies any aircraft which can be used in that way and that you will only agree to providing an aircraft if the operations of that aircraft are limited to areas which receive the consent of the Nigerian federal government?

An hon. Member: Nine-tenths of former Biafra.

Mr. Lewis: It may not be nine-tenths of the people. Even General Milroy's report does not suggest that all the Biafrans who were in the occupied territory are still there.

The Chairman: In view of the limitation on our time I wonder if we could avoid these side comments and concentrate upon the questioning?

Mr. Harman: I will answer this one. First of all, you asked was it the decision of the department. Of course, it is the decision of the government, not of the department.

On the second point, your phrasing at the end is correct, that the operations, in order to be acceptable in international law, must have the approval of the federal government of Nigeria.

Mr. Lewis: What international law, Mr. Harman? You are dealing with—

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis, I really think that we must avoid argument. You may not be satisfied with the answer but we cannot investigate the state of international law this morning.

Mr. Lewis: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman; I am very sorry; you cannot do that. With great respect, if we want to and the Committee wants to, it can; but in all these discussions

the suggestion has been thrown out that there is some international law that stands in the way; that certain acts would be hostile acts, and all that sort of thing. I would like to know, as—

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis, Mr. Harman has given us his qualifications. I do not think he claims to be expert in international law. Now, if you wish, I am sure the steering subcommittee will be glad to call an expert on international law to answer your question, but as I understand it Mr. Harman just is not qualified in that field.

Mr. Lewis: Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I am not usually consciously obstreperous but when Mr. Harman says that certain things have to be done in order to comply with international law I presume he knows what he is talking about. Therefore, I want to know what he means by this statement. What international law stands in the way of a government lending an airplane to an international relief agency and saying to the international relief agency, "You may use that aircraft for the purpose of distributing food supplies to starving people."? What is it that the government or the department finds that makes it so impossible to do this simple humanitarian thing of letting the International Red Cross use the aircraft as it sees fit, as it uses the Swedish aircraft and the West German aircraft.

The Chairman: Do you feel that you can answer that question, Mr. Harman?

Mr. Harman: I would offer a comment, apart from perhaps apologizing for having made too general a statement the last time, and a hawkish statement before that, which were not so intended but rather to abbreviate for the purpose of the Committee.

Mr. Lewis: I will become a dove as well!

Mr. Harman: I would say the issue is the overflying of federal territory. If a Canadian government aircraft overflies the territory of another government it is customary to obtain clearance from that government. This is the essential point.

Mr. Lewis: You make no distinction, therefore, between the Canadian aircraft being flown on behalf of Canada and the Canadian aircraft being let to an international relief agency and flown by that agency on its own behalf. You make no distinction between these two.

Mr. Harman: As far as I am concerned, it is still a Canadian Government aircraft.

Mr. Fairweather: If we are to think so.

The Chairman: Have you completed your line of questioning?

Mr. Lewis: Yes, I have. That explains a great deal, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall, and then Mr. Gibson. We have a time limit of 12:30.

Mr. Anderson: The opposition has only five members present; they regarded this as an important matter and yet most of their members have gone. Could we perhaps adjourn until they are able to come back?

Mr. Alexander: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, that type of statement is ill-advised. We are here, those of us who are here are here, and I think this is all that is necessary. Those who are not here must...

The Chairman: Order, please. I still have two members on my list. I call upon Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: I cannot help making the observation, because of the interjection, if this is what we are going to put up with for the next four years, Mr. Chairman,...

Mr. Lewis: It may be an extra twenty.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, this Committee exercise may be an exercise in futility if members of the opposite side of this room are going to continue to sabotage the work of the Committee as they did in the beginning and as they are doing now.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall, I believe you have the floor, or the chair. Do you have some questions for the witness?

Mr. Forrestall: I have some questions for the witness if we can get the snakepit quieted down for a minute or two. I would like to change the direction of the questioning, however tempting it is to pursue the points made by Mr. Lewis, and just ask two concluding questions, and perhaps have Mr. Harman's comments on them. The first one is a statistical one; he may not be able to answer it. But can he tell us how many Canadians are in Nigeria today for any purpose of which his Department is aware?

Mr. Harman: It would be a very rough estimate, Mr. Forrestall. I apologize I did not get the figures.

Mr. Forrestall: I am aware of that.

Mr. Harman: It would be upwards of 300. There are of course our missions; there are External Aid experts; there are CUSO volunteers. There is quite a range of people.

Mr. Forrestall: Are these people then, of your knowledge, of your Department's knowledge, of the government's knowledge, in any danger at all from the conflict that is going on?

Mr. Harman: There is a general awareness among the Canadians there that there is a civil war going on, and the High Commission in Lagos does keep in touch with all the people. They rely on the mission to help them if there is any danger, but in fact the war is localized in the area around the old East Central State, and so people in the rest of this very large country are not in as much direct danger.

Mr. Forrestall: Have any Canadians been killed in this conflict either in Biafra or in Nigeria?

Mr. Harman: There have been no killings, no deaths, by the fighting. I believe there have been one or two deaths in this period, but of natural causes.

Mr. Forrestall: The second question has to do with the refugees, and from what appears from reports that we have, whether the facts bear out these reports or not, I would suggest that it is a reasonable assumption that there is a real fear on the part of the Ibos in Biafra on this question of genocide. Has Canada, in light of this, made any overtures indirectly to the Biafran officials to accommodate or to indicate to them that we might as a country or a nation be prepared to accept under special conditions refugees from that country, from Biafra?

Mr. Harman: Well, here the answer is no. No approach has been made to the Biafran regime over this either directly or indirectly.

Mr. Forrestall: Either directly or indirectly.

Mr. Harman: Now this is a fairly wide question. The particular point you hit is related to the fact that we do not have any direct connection with the Biafran regime, naturally, but there is, to my knowledge, no urgent

desire expressed by people from that area to come to Canada. I think if the government were aware that there were, there would be some consideration of this point. There are a number of people from that area in Canada already who came on Nigerian Government scholarships or otherwise and adequate provision has been made for them.

Mr. Forrestall: That was the final...

Mr. Harman: That is your point, I see, yes.

Mr. Forrestall: That is all.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Lewis raised an interesting point on international law and in giving the impression that you are not an expert in that field specifically, would it not be true that in your context of work, you might be told that a certain position is a matter of international law and work on from that line?

Mr. Harman: I think that is quite correct, Mr. Gibson. Perhaps, as I said earlier, the rather glib reference to international law was glib enough to be inaccurate but I clarified this.

Mr. Gibson: Then, sir, following that may I ask this. Without trying to pose a political defence to the Minister's stand with respect to sending planes out there, in your opinion, is it a consideration, of the Department and of the Minister that if planes were sent out to the Red Cross it could quite possibly cause a tremendously serious situation with respect to enlarging the war in that area?

Mr. Harman: With respect to enlarging the war, I do not really follow you on that.

Mr. Gibson: Is there a fear in the Department that if we take an active part in this humanitarian venture it will have serious political implications in the Africa region, in view of the fact that the African states have taken no part in the matter?

Mr. Harman: As an official commenting perhaps on an area on which I am more qualified than on international law, I would say there is a very strong feeling in Africa about intervention in internal affairs. This is one of the key clauses in the Constitution of the Organization of African Unity and it has been a fundamental desire of the new African governments to avoid either interfering themselves in other people's affairs or allowing interference from outside. When there is a colour difference, this is even more important because of the history of colonial intervention

and colonial experience. It is, therefore, very carefully to be weighed whether action by a North American government, a non-African government, in the affairs of an African state, is desirable. This factor has to be weighed against the other factors which are of great importance as well, the desire of the people of the country to participate in helping relieve the suffering of the people of this area. I must say that the question of the political ramifications, not only in Nigeria but across the rest of Africa, in which Canada has a reputation better than almost any other non-African country, the implications of intervention—blatant intervention—in the affairs of an African state is a very important factor.

The Chairman: Would you like to be put on the list of questioners, Mr. Yewchuk? Mr. Gibson, have you completed your questioning? Then I have Mr. Cafik, and did you wish to be put on, Mr. Yewchuk?

Mr. Yewchuk: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Harman, I have the impression, being on this Committee and listening to what has gone on in the House of Commons, that to some extent we are frustrated, technically, from doing what we really think is necessary from a humanitarian standpoint. I understand the technical problems, but perhaps we could overcome these technical problems of interfering in the rights of other nations or performing acts of war by pursuing a technical approach ourselves and taking a lesson from, perhaps, the Second World War where the United States, I think, was faced with the same problem and overcame it through a lend-lease program. I think the point made by the hon. member from York South could be pursued to some extent where we might be able to give aircraft to these agencies by leasing them for \$10 for six months or whatever it might be and have no technical involvement at all. This would allow them to be able to pursue the course that I think we all really want pursued and that is to help the people of Nigeria and to help the people of Biafra. I think if we put our minds to it there must be some means whereby we human beings can help fellow human beings without involving ourselves in a great international incident and I suggest that the Department give some consideration to that suggestion.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Yewchuk: My question pertains to Mr. Harman's remarks about intervention in internal affairs. This is the very point that I was trying to make before, in that I wondered whether fear of intervention or upsetting that government might restrict the free expression of the Observer Team.

Mr. Harman: No, I think that this is a factor, as I have mentioned in reply to Mr. Gibson, naturally in broader government policy development on this subject, but in terms of the actual observations of the observers, I think not. It is a group of people of varying backgrounds and varying political orientations and they are there to do a job and so far as the Canadian is concerned we expect him to observe, investigate and report without any reference to political factors at all.

Mr. Yewchuk: It is difficult to exclude the idea that they are there on the invitation of that particular government.

Mr. Harman: Well, in any event, they would have to be there with the permission of the government or they could not go in.

The Chairman: There is time for one last question I think from Mr. Ryan. Mr. Stewart, do you have one as well? I will put Mr. Ryan first and then Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Harman, you told us, I believe, that there were about 300 Canadians in Nigeria. Could you tell us approximately how many there would be in the remaining Biafran territories and if there would be among these people, people that we could call here as witnesses who could prove very useful to us?

Mr. Harman: Our current information is that there are no Canadians in the Biafran area at the present time. There are, of course people who have visited periodically but there are none from—

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart, this will be the last question.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Harman, you described the feelings of the Africans towards non-African intervention I am thinking about this Observer Team and the fact that it has not visited the whole of the area. I wonder if the Nigerians would not be more amenable to a Canadian team, being a former colonial country and a sister in the Commonwealth? Since they hold us in such high esteem, as

you described a while ago, would they be a little more amenable to having a Canadian group?

Mr. Harman: A Canadian group to do what?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): To do this observing and to be able to go all over the place without our observation being considered as interfering.

Mr. Harman: I think that the Nigerian authorities would lay greater stress on having the variety of backgrounds here. Their original intention was to get a group, including Africans and others, to do this observation and I think they would probably prefer that to anything that came from just one single country. But, again, that is just a guess of the Nigerians' reactions.

The Chairman: That completes the questioning. I would like to thank Mr. Harman.

Mr. Harman: It was my pleasure. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I take it that members of the Committee would find it helpful to have somewhat better maps of this area then we have had this morning. We will try to do that.

I also take it that, assuming we get the permission of the House and the steering subcommittee can line up appropriate witnesses, it would be your desire to proceed just as quickly as possible, if necessary perhaps this afternoon or this evening, with further hearings.

I would ask members of the opposition parties to let me know, possibly before they leave, who their representatives on the steering committee will be.

We are planning a meeting of the steering subcommittee in my office, room 451-S Centre Block, at approximately 2 o'clock.

This meeting is now adjourned to the call of the Chair.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we should proceed and get under way, with your consent. The quorum will be in shortly and we can take as read the evidence which is presented.

We have with us this afternoon General Wrinch who is National Commissioner of the Canadian Red Cross Society and the senior

staff member of that Society. General Wrinch had a number of other appointments this afternoon and has deferred them so that he could appear before the Committee. I think we should do our best to co-operate with him and meet his time schedule. We can sit as long as the members of the Committee wish to do so, and I think perhaps the easiest and the quickest way to proceed would be to ask General Wrinch to give a brief initial statement and then throw the matter open for questioning. So, with your permission we will proceed. General Wrinch.

Major General A. E. Wrinch (C.B.E., C.D., P.ENG., National Comm., Canadian Red Cross Society): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Gérard Laprise: Are we going to have simultaneous translation?

[English]

The Chairman: We will check on that, Mr. Laprise.

We are just waiting for the interpreter to come to the translation booth. It will be just a minute or two. Can we proceed? Is it satisfactory if we proceed pending arrival of the interpreter? General Wrinch, would you care to continue?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your invitation to appear before your Committee this afternoon to discuss briefly with you a subject that is dear to our hearts and a subject that is of tremendous importance.

I would like to say off the bat, Mr. Chairman, that I have not been in Biafra. I was in Lagos in Nigeria in January of last year for a few days and I met a number of the Red Cross people there at that time plus a number of government people including then Lt.-Col. Gowon—now Major General. The Red Cross operation in Nigeria and in Biafra has been going on for some considerable time. I will speak primarily, Mr. Chairman, on the Red Cross operation. I may be able to say something on operations by other voluntary agencies during the course of my time with you, but the Red Cross operation has been going on for some time and we in Canada, through my office, have kept the very closest touch with the operation. I would say, too, that I, personally, have kept the very closest touch with the government, particularly the External Aid Office and also External Affairs, keeping them completely posted at all times

on all information that we have on this subject.

There is each year in the fall of the year a series of International Red Cross meetings, which are held every second year, in Geneva in Switzerland. In other years they are held elsewhere but this year they were in Geneva and I was due to go over on August 23 to be there on August 24 but the previous weekend there were a number of developments in the Biafran problem and it became necessary for me to leave in a rush on Sunday night, which I did.

I spent three weeks in Geneva at that time and spent a great deal of time with the International Committee of the Red Cross during their planning for what they hoped would become the daylight flights into the mercy airstrip from Fernando Po-Santa Isabel. During that period there were many developments. We had word on September 3 that the Federal Military Governmental authorities in Lagos had agreed, but on the basis of a different airport and for a ten-day period. We had hoped at that time that the day flights would start but the Biafran authorities, for reasons which are not known to me, refused to have daylight flights into the Yuli air strip. So the situation remains that there are no daylight flights. However, the extra airlift was started on September 3 by virtue of the fact that certain Red Cross societies made aircrafts available. The Swedish Red Cross Society purchased a C-130 Hercules and made it available; the Netherlands Red Cross Society purchased a DC-7C; the Norweign, the Finnish and the Danish each chartered a DC-6B, while the Swiss society had previously chartered a DC-6B which was already flying. This gave the International Committee of the Red Cross an airlift of seven aircraft which, had they been used under the terms of the daytime flights, would have lifted in a maximum of 73 tons per day.

Meanwhile in Canada interest was shown early in July in the plight of the Biafran people and a group of organizations including The Canadian Council of Churches representing all the Protestant churches, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace representing the Roman Catholic community, the Canadian Red Cross Society, OXFAM, Canadian Save the Children Fund, and UNICEF banded together. We met with the Minister for External Affairs on July 12, placed the problem before him and urged strong governmental action. A statement was made at that time by the Minister for Exter-

nal Affairs saying that Canada would assist very much more than it had in the past in the provision of food aid; further that Canada would assist in the provision of transport when agreement was obtained among all parties concerned. Agreement obviously was not obtained.

Following the original meeting in Geneva I passed back the plans for the daylight operations urged Canadian participation in them, but the Canadian view that agreement of all parties concerned had to be received prevailed at that time. When the agreement with the Federal Military Government was obtained on September 3 a further message was passed back to Ottawa, plus a phone call, notifying the Government of that apparent agreement and seeking aircraft again, but with the apparent refusal of the Biafran authorities to permit the flight the Canadian Government was unable to respond because of its stand on the need for agreement.

In the meantime the fund, known as the Nigerian-Biafra Relief Fund of Canada, was started, which was to run from August 10, to September 10. It has not done well because there has been a great deal of confusion not only in Canada but elsewhere in the world as to the state of affairs in Biafra. As of the end of last week we received through the various agencies that I have mentioned—churches and voluntary agencies—just under \$377,000. This is to be disbursed through those agencies that are active in the field and it is rather less than we had hoped we might receive.

• 1610

The question is often asked as to the views on the number of people who are dying in the entire country of Nigeria because of starvation, malnutrition, and so on, and I believe that it is quite impossible to give a figure with any degree of accuracy whatsoever. I believe that, because a very large percentage of the refugees and those who are suffering most are in the bush, in thick bush, and they are not seen by people. I personally am satisfied with the statement that there are a tremendous number of people who are dying because of starvation, malnutrition and associated causes. I do not think the question whether it is 5,000, 6,000 or 7,000 need enter into this matter. There are a great number.

As to those whom we believe are affected, I had a situation report, which is a summary, up to the 3rd of October which I received on Sunday in Toronto. It states that in the Federal areas, in the general Port Harcourt area, there are about 200,000 needing assistance. In the general area around Enugu, a little far-

ther north, there are some 500,000 and in the general area around Calabar, a little to the east, there are some 300,000, for an estimated total—and it is a rough total—in the Federal Military Government controlled areas of about 1,000,000.

In the Biafran area, which of course has shrunk markedly, there are about 3,000,000, a great many of whom are in the bush, and another 600,000 in about 600 or 700 refugee camps that are run by various agencies, for a total in the Biafran area of something of the order of 3,600,000, or a total in the whole of Nigeria, including Biafra, of about 4,600,000. Personnel available under the Red Cross emblem in all parts of the country, and in Santa Isabel at the base, number 516. When I say "under the Red Cross emblem" I include church groups and others, particularly in the Federal Military Government portion of the country because an instruction—a prerequisite, if you will—was sent out some weeks ago, and I regret that the file that I have with me does not have the document concerned, that any persons coming into the Federal Military Governmental area of Nigeria had to come in under the auspices of the Red Cross. This was regardless of whether or not they were provided by the Red Cross, provided by churches or provided by other voluntary agencies.

There was a small group who went from Canada recently—they went with the Presbyterian Church and the United Church—and in line with this requirement by Nigeria, this group had to be officially enlisted in the Canadian Red Cross Society and made available by us to the International Committee of the Red Cross for operations in the Federal Military Government area of Nigeria. Since the beginning, as I mentioned, of the expanded Red Cross airlift into Biafra which started on September 3 up to last night, there have been 227 flights made by this fleet that I have described during that period.

Mr. Lewis: Night flights?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Night flights, yes sir, into Yuli airport, with some into Obi before it fell to the Federal Military Government control. The tonnage carried in that period—I am sorry, it was 220, not 227—was some 2,174 tons. To this one must add the flights that are going from Sao Tome under the auspices of Caritas Internationalis, the World Council of Churches, and certain other groups which would by themselves have been approximately the same amount, possibly a little more, in addition.

Bearing in mind, Mr. Chairman, that the only estimate that I have ever seen for the minimum needed in Biafra was 200 tons per day, the quantities that have gone in fall far short of that mark. In addition in outgoing flights with the returning aircraft some 475 evacuees have been flown out. These are largely Europeans and nationals of other countries. To these tonnages that I have mentioned must be added—and I think the quantities are limited but I cannot say for certain—certain foodstuffs that have been purchased, that it has been possible to purchase, in those parts of Biafra where food is available for distribution elsewhere. The stocks held—and these are Red Cross Stocks held in various depots which are being distributed at the present time—are in Santa Isabel which is their base for flying into Biafra, 2,827 tons, the large percentage of which is stock fish which is tremendously useful and powdered milk; in Lagos, nearly 5,100 tons; in Enugu, which is the former capital of Biafra as you will recall, 1,224 tons; in Calabar, on the ocean in the far eastern corner of Nigeria, 1,572 tons, and then two smaller depots in the River state area, Uyo, 408 tons, and Agbar, 624 tons. The tonnages in Enugu, Calabar and these other two places have been taken to those spots from Lagos as the base for distribution in the Federal Military Government territory. Everything going into Biafra is Santa Isabel.

Mr. Chairman, we had an appeal—it would now be about two or three weeks ago—for further foodstuffs, because while at that time there were some 10,000 tons between Santa Isabel and Lagos it was estimated, I think hopefully, that those tonnages would have been distributed by about October 10. There have been additional foodstuffs delivered in this period and I have not got the figures involved, but it is for this reason that the figures that I have just given you which approach 12,000 tons might appear high.

Delivery in Biafra has been mentioned. Delivery within the Federal Military Government territory has on occasion been somewhat more difficult than it has been in Biafra. The Red Cross have two DC-4 aircraft which they chartered part time particularly for flying into Enugu, because Enugu is very difficult to reach other than by air; it is a very long train trip. Recently they brought into service two 500-ton coastal vessels for supplying Calabar and Port Harcourt.

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Additional troubles in the Port Harcourt area involved getting off the island across the

river and deliveries, but fairly recently two helicopters been delivered, through the UNICEF in the United States, to assist in that part of the work.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for a rather rambling statement, but I only received the invitation to attend at 25 minutes past one this afternoon, and I was unable to prepare anything; otherwise I might have talked a great deal longer.

If there are any questions I will be delighted to try to answer them.

Mr. Lewis: Before I ask any questions, could General Wrinch tell us about the distribution of the foodstuff to the people actually needing it—how that is handled?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The distribution in Biafra, I believe, has gone very well. All of those who are involved—and I am speaking of missionaries, church groups and voluntary agencies, Red Cross, plus the local Biafran people—have worked together in this. They have had difficulties through lack of diesel fuel or gasoline for their vehicles, but the distribution has gone really quite well within the Biafran territory. There is evidence that suggests that the infantile mortality in many regions in Biafra has been checked, at least to a degree. This is in regions, Mr. Chairman; this is by no means general. But there is evidence to suggest this.

The distribution in the Nigerian part has been complicated more, I think, through the fact that distribution is necessary near the fighting areas and also through slow deliveries into forward bases—particularly Enugu. There was some difficulty, which I think has been resolved, in the southern area, in the FMG-controlled territories, where the military commander felt that distribution and looking after the refugees and so on was his responsibility rather than that of voluntary agencies. This made the task of the Red Cross quite difficult, if not impossible, in that area.

Mr. Fairweather: Is that Col. Adehunle?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. However, within the last few weeks a visit was paid to this commander by Chief Ojo who is the chairman of the Nigerian Red Cross Society and a very fine man. A visit was paid by him to the southern area and he met with this military commander. I have been informed that this problem has been removed and that the general distribution agencies will be permitted in that area. I

have not had confirmation since that time that this has taken place.

The Chairman: Perhaps we should now throw the meeting open for questions by members. It may not be necessary to limit the length of questioning. Bear in mind, however, that there are quite a number of members—I already have indications from some—who wish to ask questions, so that perhaps we should keep members' questions within reasonable limits. By the time we have passed around the table I think we will have had answers to most questions. If not, we can start around again.

First I will call on Mr. Groos.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, we heard this morning that the federal government had allocated, I think half a million dollars in funds for the purchase of relief supplies—I take this to mean food. Am I right in saying this was done twice? Yes. So that would represent \$1 million. To begin with, were there any restrictions on how that money was to be spent?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: It was not a cash grant, Mr. Chairman, it was food aid with purchases being made by the federal government through the Office of External Aid. The bulk of that million dollars worth will go on the ship—I think the name is Silver Cloud—which will sail from Halifax on October 18, I believe. It will carry 2,700 tons of dried salt codfish from the Canadian governmental contribution. It will carry a further 600 tons of the same dried salt codfish which come from the agencies involved in the Nigeria-Biafra campaign. It is to carry 20 tons of food—powdered eggs and powdered milk—from the Province of British Columbia. It is to carry another 20 tons of food from B.C. and also 20 tons or thereabouts from the Province of Ontario, a provincial government gift. This ship was arranged for following a request from the International Committee for food to be delivered in the ratio of three at Santa Isabel and four at Lagos. Mr. Chairman, the delivery is being made in that precise ratio.

Mr. Groos: Could I get some indication about when that will arrive?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Not before November 3.

Mr. Groos: We heard a statement in the House today by the Prime Minister that this aircraft is available and arrangements, I understand, have been made for it to fly into

both Biafra and to Nigeria. This, presumably, will be used to ferry the supplies that you have mentioned from these other places, Santa Isabel, Lagos and so forth. How long do you expect it will take before that will be at work?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The reason for my visit here today, Mr. Chairman was to attend a meeting in the Department of National Defence on the planning of this aircraft. The offer of this aircraft was made about a week ago—I think it was a week ago Monday—in the House. I had to get in touch, which I had done the previous Saturday, with Geneva to find out if this aircraft could be accepted in the Federal Military Government area of Nigeria. It was yesterday morning that I finally got back word from Geneva that the Federal Military Government had agreed to this aircraft operating under the International Committee of the Red Cross in the FMG area and it was to plan those operations that I came up today. Just before walking into this room I was informed of the Statement of the Prime Minister in the House that seems to permit the aircraft to operate, not only in the Federal Military Government territory, but also in Biafran territory. The Biafran aspect will have to be referred to Biafran authorities because the Red Cross cannot force its will on anybody; this is impossible and, therefore, they will undoubtedly have to discuss this with Biafran authorities. I cannot forecast what the—I beg your pardon?

Mr. Winch: Who will have to discuss...

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The International Committee of the Red Cross. I cannot forecast what the Biafran answer will be.

As for the second part of your question, when will the aircraft be available for use in the Federal Military Government territory? It will be available, I hope, as soon as it can get out there.

Mr. Groos: I do not want to take up any more time than I have to but I would like to ask one more question of General Wrinch. Would this decision that the Nigerian Government are willing to allow aircraft to operate over Nigerian territory, presumably by day or by night, into Biafra indicate that Swedish, Dutch, Norwegian, Danish and Swiss aircraft will similarly be able to operate in and out?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not know how the statement that I was given was given in the House, Mr. Chairman, but this does not seem

to say by day or by night. This will certainly have to be discussed with the Biafran authorities. I do not know whether or not they will permit an aircraft to fly from Lagos into Biafra at the present time. I have no idea.

Mr. Groos: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Harkness: I was particularly interested, General Wrinch, in the figures you gave with regard to these several thousand tons of food which is already in Lagos, Enugu, Calabar, Port Harcourt and so on. Now what is the method by which that food is distributed to the people who need it? Is this done by the Red Cross or is it done by the Nigerian authorities?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: In the Federal Military Government controlled territory, Mr. Chairman, there is a national relief council which is chaired, I think I mentioned, by Chief Ojo, a friend and a good man. He has with him on this council certain members of the Nigerian Red Cross Society, which is a good society and a strong society. He also has representatives of other voluntary agencies that are involved in assisting in the Federal Military Government territory. There is also a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, a representative of the League of Red Cross Societies, and there is governmental representation. It is this council's job to guide the over-all relief operation in the Federal Military Government controlled territory.

As far as the mechanics of getting the food and medical supplies out are concerned, these are being flown to Enugu by the DC-4s that I have mentioned. Some have been sent by train but it is a very long trip; I am told it takes about three weeks. This line loops away around to the north and one would assume that there are probably some problems, with priorities too at times with weaponry and so on being moved. I think, in addition, there is a limited quantity going forward by road. Into Port Harcourt there has been very little in the past. Into Calabar it has been going in by sea in the main because there is some question as to the suitability of the airport at Calabar to take heavy aircraft. The airport will take the DC-4 but in the main it has gone in by these 500-ton coastal vessels. Then from these forward depots, if you will, it is distributed more in detail with, say, five tonners and that sort of thing out to refugee camps and to centres from which the populace pick it up.

Mr. Harkness: Are these trucks and so on operated by the Red Cross personnel or are they operated by the Nigerian Government personnel?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I cannot answer that question, Mr. Chairman. I do not know who operates the trucks. They will go under International Red Cross control but I could not say who actually drives them.

Mr. Harkness: I was somewhat concerned to find there were that many thousands of tons of food in these depots and you really did not say anything about how it got from the depots out to the villages, the refugee camps and the various places where the people who are starving actually are.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: It has been moving, I think, reasonably well out of Lagos in recent days or possibly recent weeks. There were holdups previously.

Mr. Harkness: As far as the Biafran side is concerned, is the method of distribution somewhat similar?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Similar, yes.

Mr. Harkness: You said that distribution was better there than in the military districts.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Of course the Biafran territory becomes somewhat smaller as time goes on and the distribution, I suppose, really becomes easier. They were flying into two airstrips, Obi and Yuli, until Obi fell, I think about ten days ago and there were substantial numbers of refugees in the vicinity of these airstrips. Food was also being distributed by road from them.

Mr. Harkness: Well, have you any information about these charges of genocide?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Not really, sir. As far as genocide is concerned, I have only the sorts of figures that I have given you already as to the numbers of deaths. Whether that constitutes genocide or not I am not prepared to say.

Mr. Harkness: You have no information, however, concerning what we might call deliberate attempts on the part of the Federal Government to, shall we say, starve to death or otherwise dispose of the Ibo population?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not know of any specific evidence that the aim of the Federal Military Government is to starve the Ibos to death: no, sir. I do not think there is any

evidence of that. There have been periodic reports of the bombing of hospitals and market squares and places of that sort. I have not seen this personally. I know it has been reported. It has been reported by Red Cross. I am not prepared to say whether or not there were other targets, legitimate targets, nearby or not.

Mr. Harkness: As far as you are concerned, in charge of the operation of the Canadian Red Cross, you have no specific evidence to support the charges of genocide, I take it then, from what you say.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, sir, other than the fact that one is certain that a great many people in Biafra are starving to death, are suffering from malnutrition, will probably suffer from other causes, epidemics and those things, and there has been very little evidence of this at the moment. Whether this is genocide or not, I do not know.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, it comes down to a definition to some extent, I presume.

Well now, concerning the requirements there, what are the requirements as far as medical supplies are concerned? I have noticed in the papers lately that there seems to be a great shortage of certain types of medical supplies.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: We have periodic requests, Mr. Chairman, and they have listed certain medical supplies, the sort of run-of-the-mill medicaments for diarrhoea and other common ailments under these circumstances. They did ask for certain serums some time ago and limited quantities were sent on that first flight of the *Hercules* from Canada to Lagos. However, when I was in Geneva—it is about a month ago now—I checked on the priorities and the priority today is food—high protein food. Medical supplies, to the best of my knowledge, are definitely of a lower priority because if the people are going to die from starvation and malnutrition, food is what you want and high protein food—this fish, for instance.

The fish is probably the best food that can be sent because of its rich protein content and also the fact that it is a normal food in the area and this fact is an important one, Mr. Chairman, because in certain parts of the country powdered milk is just not known and unless it is taken under supervision and prepared under supervision, it can cause a great deal of trouble, diarrhoea and things of that

sort. So the protein-rich food is number one and at the present time it is substantially above the provision of medical supplies or serums or things of that sort. This could change very easily.

The Chairman: I have on my list Mr. Roberts, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Ryan followed by Mr. Winch, I believe, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Fairweather, and Mr. Laniel. Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I would like to ask questions, briefly, on two areas. The first is something that puzzles me a great deal and I hope you can clarify it. If I understand your remarks correctly, there were two occasions—at least two occasions—once in July and once in September when even though arrangements had been made for flights into Biafra, the Biafran authorities themselves refused to authorize these flights to take place. That seems to me to be very puzzling and I wonder if they did not at least offer some explanation for that refusal or if you could, perhaps, surmise what the reasons were for their refusal to permit flights on those two dates?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I cannot offer a reason for it, Mr. Chairman. I was told, and if this is useful I will repeat it, but I simply was told the Biafran authorities felt that day flights into the Yuli airstrip would constitute a serious security risk to the strip, it would locate the strip for the FMG authorities, at which time they could immediately bomb it and get it out of action and, of course, Yuli today is the only strip available. It is carrying various things other than relief supplies. This does not make sense to me, Mr. Chairman, because the strip has been in use now for months, and as a soldier and a communicator, I would assume that the Nigerian forces know precisely where it is so that I simply do not know why they would refuse.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you. The second question I would like to ask is whether there has been any evidence or reports of black marketeering in relation to some of the supplies being brought in by the Red Cross to either Biafra or the Nigerian territory?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, I have heard nothing on black market operations. That is not to say they do not exist but I certainly have heard nothing and I feel certain that had there been black market operations they would have been reported.

Mr. Thompson: General Wrinch, what part of the Canadian contribution, monetary value

contribution, has actually reached Nigeria? I think we have \$1,060,000 involved. Is this all being loaded on the ship in Halifax or has some of it, including I suppose that which was in the original *Hercules*, reached Nigeria?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult to answer this question precisely. The original \$60,000, given in response really to the first major appeal based on a telephone call from myself to External Aid, was sent in cash to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Following that there was the shipment on the original *Hercules* flight and the shipment that is to go on October 18, I think it is. These two shipments, to the best of my knowledge—this is a matter for the government really—but these two shipments are, I believe, chargeable against the one million dollars and pretty well use it up though I am not certain of this because this is an External Aid matter, but the only food shipment that has reached Nigeria was that original 17 tons, I guess, including medicaments in the original *Hercules* flight.

Mr. Thompson: Is the ICRC satisfied with the facility that is provided in the Federal Military Government areas of Nigeria in so far as being able to disperse their food from their depots out to the people who are in need?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I think the answer to that would be no, because the distribution out of Lagos was very slow. I believe that it is much better now, but it was slow, and ICRC was chartering these two DC-4s which were really the mainstay at that time. They were only chartered part-time.

They were also chartered part-time by other users, carrying other articles. This gave rise to the story that the Red Cross aircraft was carrying arms, which it was not. But I think the distribution is better now.

I am quite certain that when the Canadian *Hercules* gets over there it will make a tremendous difference—that one aircraft, able to lift 20 tons per load and lift them quickly to the places where the food is needed.

Mr. Thompson: From the statistics that you gave us about the numbers of bodies, the greatest need actually exists today within Biafran territory rather than within the FMG territory; is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I believe that to be quite true.

Mr. Thompson: Is the Government of Canada or the ICRC investigating the possibility of using the *Hercules* out of Sao Tome or Fernando Póo rather than out of Lagos or other airports in federal Nigeria for the lifting of relief supplies into the Biafran territory?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I really cannot answer that, Mr. Chairman, because, as I said, I got this statement that the *Hercules* could be made available, with authority from the federal military government people in Lagos, to fly into Biafra. As I said, I do not know if the Biafran authorities will accept it on that basis. I just do not know. This will have to be checked.

I can assure you, however, that planning will be going forward, in any event, in the hope that it will be accepted.

Mr. Thompson: Would there be any difference in the status of such an aircraft as compared to those aircraft supplied by the Red Cross, or the Scandinavian countries operating under ICRC, lifting supplies into Biafran territory?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The status of that aircraft and the arrangements for its use under the Red Cross flag were matters to be discussed this afternoon at the meeting for which I came up. I cannot answer the question precisely. It will be different from the Swedish and the Netherlands because the Swedish and Netherlands societies bought these aircraft that they made available.

Mr. Thompson: Did they buy them at commercial prices, or was it merely a matter of convenient changing of registration so that technically, according to the law, these aircraft could be considered as Red Cross aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: As far as I know, Mr. Chairman, they bought them. I do not know the price but they bought them, and, I would suspect, on a buy-back basis from the seller. However, one of the biggest problems that remains is the coverage by insurance.

Mr. Thompson: In your opinion would it be possible for the Canadian *Hercules* aircraft to have its registration transferred, either by purchase or other means, to the ICRC so that it could operate under the flag of the Red Cross?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I hope so. I believe this should be possible. To discuss this very point is the reason for my visit here today.

Mr. Ryan: Has the International Committee's airlift endeavoured to drop high protein food by parachute in planned areas, controlled by the Red Cross or otherwise?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: There has been no para-dropping to my knowledge. The flights that have gone out of Fernando Póo to date all have gone in to either Obi when it was held, or now Yuli.

The Swedish C-130 *Hercules* had to cease operating for a few days a week or so ago. It is back in operation again and has been for the last four of five nights, making two flights a night, but when it was out for overhaul I believe—and I cannot swear to this—that it was fitted for para dropping. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, that we co-operated with them in finding a second pilot for their aircraft one who had recently retired from the defence forces—air force—and he has a good many hours in air-drop operations, so if they do go to air drop operations he will be extremely useful, but they have not so far.

Mr. Ryan: Why could not they have done this long ago? That is what I am wondering. Why could not this have been planned out and proper control over distribution made? Then there would be no need to put this extra pressure on the Yuli airport at all. It seems to me that this is still an alternative and a good alternative. That country is unknown to me, but even if it is jungle country I should still think it would be possible to make clearings and have predetermined sites for dropping.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The problem of dropping by parachute was investigated. You will recall that a Canadian Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel spent a bit of time in Geneva with a group of experts and while he was there they did investigate the matter of dropping by parachute. I believe the consensus was that as long as they could land and take it in landing, it was far better to do so.

I am not an expert in parachute operation, but I do know it is a very difficult and expensive way of taking supplies in. The territory there is thickly wooded in many, many parts. I would expect that the losses going in on a parachute basis would be such that your effort would be cut down. There is also a very real problem in the supply of parachutes and thinking of a *Hercules* that will take in a load of 20 tons—I do not know what one parachute will let down, but you have got a lot of parachutes and you are spread over a

lot of country. They finally came to the conclusion that they should be prepared for parachute dropping, but in sort of special cases.

Mr. Ryan: I should think that at least a couple of tons could be delivered fairly safely if the drop were not from too high an altitude. Certainly they are dropping jeeps and complete hospitals by air now, probably bigger vehicles than that.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: It is quite possible to do so into a drop zone that is manned, controlled and so on. They did do a little experimenting with heavy drops without parachute. They dropped one of the stock fish from the fifth floor and threw it as hard as they could onto concrete. It just bounced and there was no damage to the stock fish, and this led them to believe that this might be used if necessary. But when you have 20 tons of load in the aircraft and you have to move it out the back door, and particularly with some of the other aircraft that have a side-door loading—the DC-6's and DC-7's—which are not really suitable for air dropping on a large scale, it becomes a very difficult operation.

Mr. Ryan: Well, a helicopter like the *Chinook* could drop several tons at a time I should think and it would be a very efficacious system in that type of territory.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I would love to have a fleet of helicopters and *Hercules*.

Mr. Fairweather: A fleet of *Hercules*?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes, sir. I simply said I would like to have them and I would.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: On your distribution through this jungle and hilly territory, I take it there are a lot of trails that lead to where a lot of the Ibos are in hiding. Is this the situation?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I cannot really give any accurate description of the country. I know that the bush is thick. I have flown over it but I have not been in there. I have seen it in other parts of West Africa and it is thick. I am sure there are trails, yes, and I am certain it is these trails that are being used for distribution now.

Mr. Ryan: There was a notation in the Observers' report that we had before us this morning to the effect that lack of money

among the refugees is a contributing factor to their failure to get high protein food. Would this be due to the fact that they cannot get out of where they are, because of lack of money, to reach the food? What might it be due to, in your opinion?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I have not heard of this problem at all, Mr. Chairman, but I know that any relief supplies that are taken in by the Red Cross, there is no question of paying for them. As to the lack of money, I do not know what the situation is there at all. I have heard nothing of that.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Before calling upon the next questioner, General Wrinch, have you received copies of the first and second reports of the Observer Team?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, sir.

The Chairman: Because we have copies available, and you may be interested in them. In the meantime perhaps we will call upon Mr. Cafik, followed by Messrs. Fairweather, Laniel, Winch and Dr. Yewchuk.

Mr. Cafik: General Wrinch, the first question I had in mind I suppose has really been answered. I gather that you have not read the Observer Team report?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, sir. I have not seen it until this minute.

Mr. Cafik: All right, fine. Thank you. Do you believe that the Biafran government is fostering the belief that the Federal authorities are practising genocide in order to create resistance within their own people to the Federal authorities?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: You can get many answers to that question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cafik: But I wondered about your own personal view.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I frankly do not know.

Mr. Cafik: All right. You think it is a possibility. All right. Has the Red Cross made any written report on its findings in Biafra or Nigeria that could possibly be submitted to this Committee?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Do you mean written reports on—?

Mr. Cafik: On the general conditions of the country or countries.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I have really given you pretty well everything. I have abbreviated the report from October 3 a bit. The other reports that we have had have been similar in nature to that, and I am prepared to send copies. They are in Ottawa.

Mr. Cafik: If you thought you had something that could be of value to us that you have not covered verbally here today.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not think there is a lot, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: If copies of the reports could be sent to the Clerk of our Committee, General Wrinch, then we could perhaps decide whether they should be printed as exhibits, or anything of that sort. They might be helpful to some of the members, in any event.

Mr. Cafik: General, in view of the food and other supplies that are available in locations around Biafra and Nigeria, I am wondering whether more aid could be given to these people? Perhaps I could rephrase that by asking if you had more raw materials, more food, more medical drugs, and so on, in those areas that you mentioned earlier, would we be in a position to give more aid than we are presently doing or are we frustrated in giving that aid because of facilities to deliver the goods?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I think the most useful contribution that can be made today is in heavy aircraft, and when I use the word "aircraft" you can take it in the singular or plural, because there is a tremendous need. I discussed this point in Geneva with the International Committee people and they felt very strongly that this was the case. However these contributions are of no use unless you have a planned program of relief. What they have been doing is seeking donations and putting them together to try to get a planned and co-ordinated program that will last over the period. I do not know what the period will be, but it can be a very long time. As a part of that co-ordinated program, in addition to having the relief supplies that you have mentioned, you need the means of distributing them, and here you come back every time to heavy-lift aircraft for your main trunk distribution system and then lighter vehicle of one sort or another for local distribution from forward depots.

Mr. Cafik: Have the Red Cross in any way prepared a list of what they really do require,

or envisage themselves requiring, in order to cope with this problem effectively?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: At the present time we have put forward lists in priority of food-stuffs, medicines and those things that are needed. We have also been in conversation with the government concerning vehicles and transport of different kinds

Mr. Cafik: Have you also given it some kind of timetable to show when you could effectively use these things?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I have not got a long term timetable at the present time from Geneva.

Mr. Cafik: It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that it would be advisable for this committee to have a report from the International Red Cross indicating what the requirements really are in their view so that we might be able to look at it and study it and decide how we may recommend that we try to supply some of these things on behalf of the Canadian people.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The main priority item, as I said, is high protein food, concentrated and dried.

Mr. Winch: And the means of transport.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: And the means of getting it there.

Mr. Cafik: And the transport is in heavy aircraft and possibly helicopters, jeeps and things like this, would it be, and trucks?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: That sort of thing, yes.

Mr. Cafik: I think it would be useful for us to know just what you want. I for one, being new to this, do not understand what you who have been there and your organization really expect or would like to have and I certainly think it would be worthwhile for us to know that.

An hon. Member: The government knows it do they not?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes, indeed.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Fairweather followed by Mr. Laniel, Mr. Winch, and Dr. Yewchuk. Mr. Fairweather?

Mr. Fairweather: You spoke, I think, of something like this, that you would love a fleet of *Hercules*. Have you any idea how

many *Hercules* are owned by the Government of Canada?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not know; 20, is it?

Mr. Fairweather: I just wondered how many there were. I do not know.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I believe 23 might be about right.

Mr. Fairweather: Would it be a fact that 10 of these *Hercules* could airlift the tonnage that is being loaded on the ship *Silver Cloud* in Halifax?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Mr. Chairman, there are between 3,300 and 3,400 tons being loaded on that ship. The *Hercules* on short run can carry 20 tons; it is just a matter of division.

Mr. Fairweather: Would you suspect some of the fears of the Ibo people might arise from statements made by Colonel Adekunle who is in command of the eastern region who is alleged to have said, and is widely reported to have said, "No Popes, no Red Cross, no churches, no"? Would this be one of the reasons why the Ibo people are somewhat suspicious?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: This I suppose contributes, yes, I believe that there is a real feeling among the Ibos that the intention is to exterminate them.

Mr. Fairweather: And the Ibo people in the last few years have had reasonable reason to have this fear because of a slaughter?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I believe something of the order of 30,000 were killed in the summer of 1966 in the massacres at that time.

Mr. Fairweather: And that Colonel Gowon who is leading the Military Government of Nigeria is partly responsible for the death of the former Prime Minister?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not know.

Mr. Fairweather: The former Prime Minister of Nigeria was killed, was he not, after a meeting with our own Prime Minister?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I believe so.

• 1705

Mr. Fairweather: I would like to say that within ten days of a major meeting in Lagos the Prime Minister of Nigeria had his head cut off. Correct?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I cannot answer that, I do not remember the dates. I know it was a short time.

Mr. Fairweather: Why is distribution so much better in Biafra than it is in Nigeria? Is it entirely due to the different geographic area?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I think in large part it is due to the smaller area.

Mr. Fairweather: Is there any information, sir, that you would have as to the number of privately-owned *Hercules* aircraft in Canada?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: As far as I know there is one.

Mr. Fairweather: Did you say that the technique or status of ownership of the *Hercules* aircraft mentioned by the Prime Minister today—or whatever we have to do to make its constitutional status agreeable to the Nigerian people—is what is going on today that it is being demilitarized?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not know what will happen today. The purpose of my visit was to try to work out arrangements that would be satisfactory both to the Canadian government and to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Nigerian authorities.

Mr. Fairweather: You said it would be a technique that might be rather like the lend-lease of the Roosevelt days. It is not beyond the ingenuity of man to work out a system that would fit the niceties of international law.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I feel quite sure that we can work out something that will be agreeable to all concerned. I hope so.

Mr. Fairweather: And you would still love to have a fleet rather than one.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch. Certainly.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: On the same point, Mr. Chairman. You said that the most useful contribution at this stage would be anti-aircraft, but then if I consider that you would need smaller aircraft to airlift your food and materials—aid to the different regions—is it so important that the *Hercules* plane get permission to fly directly into Biafra at all?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I think it is very important, Mr. Chairman, that there should be a heavier airlift into Biafra. I think I mentioned that in the original planning when there was a small fleet of six, one of which was a *Hercules*, one was a DC-7 and four were DC-6's, that the most they could take in in the hours of daylight was 73 tons. Had that fleet been converted to five *Hercules*, instead of the six assorted aircraft, by virtue of its greater capacity, greater load-lifting capacity and greater speed, they could have taken in 160 tons in the same time that the other group could take in 73. So it is for this reason, Mr. Chairman, that I come back time and again to the need for the heavy-lift aircraft that can operate in these airstrips. There is a point that has not come up in the discussions so far, Mr. Chairman, in this regard, and that is the ability of airstrips to handle the heavy load of the *Hercules*. There is some doubt about some of the strips in this regard.

Mr. Laniel: In both Nigeria and Biafra?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No. The only strip left in Biafra is the Yuli airstrip, into which the Swedish *Hercules* is flying. It is satisfactory. I am referring to strips in the FMG territory in Nigeria.

• 1710

Mr. Laniel: Did I hear you to say that the total airlift available right now by the International Red Cross is seven aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Six into Biafra, Mr. Chairman, and whether the two DC-4's that have been on charter from time to time in Nigeria are on charter today or not, I do not know.

Mr. Laniel: And out of these seven aircraft, none have been made available by any government of any country. I think this is a very important point.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, sir, of the six that are flying out of Santa Isabel, two are owned by Red Cross Societies, the other four are chartered by Red Cross Societies from charter companies.

Mr. Laniel: Has the Canadian Red Cross, besides urging strongly for government action in Canada, made any attempt to buy or to rent in any way either from the government or any other source any heavy aircraft like the *Hercules*?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: We do not have the resources to buy or to rent, Mr. Chairman. The Canadian Red Cross has suggested to the government that if an aircraft of the *Hercules* variety could be made available some sort of arrangements might be made that would be satisfactory from the point of view of the people in Nigeria.

Mr. Laniel: Did the possibility ever come to your mind of perhaps asking the Canadian Government for financial aid that would permit you to buy an aircraft, even from the government?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: We have discussed this with the government, Mr. Chairman, on a number of occasions. The financial aid that was available was the \$60,000 which was given us originally, plus the \$1 million in food aid which was provided later, plus the promise of assistance in air transport when satisfactory arrangements had been made.

Mr. Laniel: On a long-term policy, is the Canadian Red Cross looking forward to being prepared for such situations as these by planning the acquiring of equipment, because situations like these could develop more often than they have in the past.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, sir, we have no way of acquiring equipment of this sort. It is not only a case of equipment, but if you have aircraft and are flying them you have extremely heavy expenses in insurance, in air crew, in salaries, in maintenance and all the rest of it. This is why in the sort of world Red Cross, Red Cross turns in most cases to those who can provide. In this regard whenever there is a disaster, we are in touch with the government and the government frequently makes provision in disasters, whether they be large or small.

Mr. Laniel: Even if you get squadrons of *Hercules*, do you think you can handle all the material that they will carry to either Biafra or Nigeria with 516 people working closely with the Red Cross, or within the Red Cross?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Mr. Chairman, I mentioned before that it was necessary to have a thoroughly planned relief operation. Under the present circumstances the people who are there cannot handle it. There are many Nigerians and Biafrans who are working in this as well. But if a very great increase were made in the capabilities of the relief organization, then your personnel handling people and so on would have to be adjusted accordingly.

Mr. Laniel: I am coming back to the point made by Mr. Cafik earlier that the Canadian Red Cross could perhaps prepare some kind of statement where we would know more of your needs. It is very easy to come along and make headlines about the people suffering in Biafra and Nigeria or anywhere in the world, but the most important thing is to solve the problem and to help these people. This can be done much better if you know the exact needs and whatever part Canada can play.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I do not believe in repetition. The questions I had in mind have been asked and answered.

Mr. Yewchuk: I was going to ask General Wrinch whether any requests have been made by the Red Cross down there for helicopters in view of the fact that in some cases they are required to drop food by parachute and so on.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: There are a couple of helicopters, I think I mentioned, that came through UNICEF and the United States channels, that I believe are in Calabar now. I heard today that another couple had been purchased. I have no information from that.

Mr. Yewchuk: The next question has also been partly touched on, but there have been various reports about numbers dying, varying from 6,000 to 10,000 a day, and so on. It seems to me, if my memory serves me right, that most of these figures appear to emanate from the Red Cross. Have you any evidence to support these figures, or are they purely pulled out of the air?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not think that those figures emanated from the Red Cross in Geneva, Mr. Chairman. They may have been passed on, in the odd case, by them, but attributed to other sources. I think that generally speaking those figures have come probably from individual sources in Biafra, and I have the figure here. Concerning the thing I read to you earlier about the estimation of people in need, which they say they cannot do with any accuracy, I was at a press conference in Geneva on September 2 when the ICRC people were pressed for exact figures as to deaths, and they simply refused to give them. They said they could not do it; the figures would not be meaningful. As I said, the only figures that run in my mind are that there are many, many people dying today from starvation and malnutrition; but figures I do not know, and I do not think anybody does, exactly.

Mr. Yewchuk: I am asking this primarily because that really is the thing which determines the urgency of this situation, although not...

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I think the more meaningful figure, Mr. Chairman, is the figure that I gave of some 4,600,000 people who are in need.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Alexander, followed by Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Alexander: General Wrinch, I would like to pose this question to you. I suppose you know that there are ways by which you can have *de facto* genocide, and I refer you to Angola. You have probably had experience in Angola where it was the deliberate plan of the government to do away with all those who had education. This in turn means that without the educated leaders you find that people become more subject to the federal authority. Now I noticed that in one of these reports—I think it was the first interim report—it was stated that the Ibos in general, once an area had been taken over, the general populace would accept the situation, but strange as it may seem, there were no educated Ibos around. I am just wondering whether in your experience and from the reports that you received, you have any knowledge wherein one can come to the conclusion that this is the plan of the Federal Government; that is, that they intend to do away with all educated Ibos?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I have no such knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Alexander: I see. Now another question that troubles me too is a remark that was made by Mr. Harman, whereby he indicated that the non-African governments—and I would imagine that what he is talking about there is the Caucasian—he finds that the African governments are very reluctant to have non-African governments intervene in their domestic affairs, and in particular one of such magnitude as exists in Nigeria. Could you elaborate on that statement?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not get into the governmental end and the question of other governments working with the governments in Africa. The only thing I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that the International Red Cross is working in all the countries of Africa and, as far as I know, we have had no indication

that working with the African people is not wanted. It is very much the reverse. But I could not answer your question.

Mr. Alexander: Well I would say then that there could be a possibility this assumption that perhaps the African governments do not want non-African intervention is slightly wrong, if they are prepared to deal with you. I would think that your organization is primarily Caucasian; you do not find any problem there, do you?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No.

Mr. Alexander: Now I know that you want a fleet of aircraft, and I think this is right. With respect to the aircraft that Canada would supply, who would crew them? I am thinking of the pilots, the navigators, the technicians and so on.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: When I refer to aircraft I mean aircraft complete with crew. I am not suggesting that Canada has to provide all of these things,—

Mr. Alexander: Oh, heavens, no!

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: —and I would not want that inference taken because there are many countries that are involved, there are a great many countries that have given a lot of assistance, and this is the standard procedure within, the Red Cross world. But there are very few countries that have the *Hercules* aircraft.

Mr. Alexander: In other words, am I to conclude then that when you say "aircraft" you mean aircraft with the wherewithal?

Mr. Laniel: Fully manned?

Mr. Wrinch: Fully manned but not armed.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The Red Cross are carrying no arms whatsoever, Mr. Chairman, in any of their aircraft or on any of their vehicles in this operation.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Buchanan: I would just like to check my arithmetic, General Wrinch. Did you say that in the 30-day period just ended 220 flights were flown by your aircraft and they transported 2,200 tons?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: There were 47 flights carrying 400 tons prior to the intensified airlift which went into effect on September 3, and the balance of the 220 flights and 2,174

tons have been flown and carried from the night of September 3 until last night.

Mr. Buchanan: This would mean then that roughly 180 flights, give or take a few, for 1,800 tons flew within approximately a one-month period.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes.

Mr. Buchanan: And if I understood you correctly, you have indicated that probably a similar amount was flown by the aircraft of the World Council of Churches and so on out of Sao Tome. This would mean that in the month roughly 3,500 or 3,600 tons are going in in total and you indicate that the total amount required is approximately 6,000 tons. In other words, I am just trying to get the magnitude of the shortfall. We are getting 3,500 tons in and the need is approximately 6,000 tons.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes, this is so, but I would like to clarify one point. This increased airlift started slowly and, initially, starting on September 3, if my memory serves me correctly, it built up to be one flight, two flights or maybe three, and they got up to 7, 8, 9 and 10. The flights in the last two weeks would average higher than this total average.

I would guess that today—it is a fairly reasonable estimate—something between 160 and possibly as high as 200 tons are going in each night.

Mr. Buchanan: Am I correct, then, General Wrinch, in saying that this 200 tons per night is the figure that is required?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: On an absolute bare basic minimum basis, but when I say 160 to 200 tons a night, this is a night when they are flying. There have been nights with low ceilings and there have been nights with a very fluid military situation around the airstrip when the flights have been lower, but on a good night, the Red Cross will run seven, eight, maybe even ten flights.

Mr. Buchanan: Another two or possibly three *Hercules* aircraft in addition to what you presently have would seem to be quite adequate to fulfill the needs as you have outlined them with a little margin.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: It would be doubtful, Mr. Chairman, that they could be in addition to what is there because the Yuli airstrip is taking about 20, maybe 25, total flights a night and without the navigational aids that

one is accustomed to in this country, 20 or 25 flights are all you can put in during the hours of darkness. The situation is extremely rough; it is a widened bit of the road, as I am sure you know; the lighting is very poor and is only on momentarily; the loading and unloading capacity is not too good, but I think it is adequate for the state of the airstrip.

Mr. Buchanan: In the near future you see no other potential airstrip available to you at all?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No; I do not know of any.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you.

Mr. Anderson: You mentioned that approximately 2,574 tons have been moved into Biafra by the Red Cross and approximately 2,200 by other organizations. Could you tell us how many tons of supplies in that same period have been distributed in the area under control of the Federal Military Forces?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I would like to correct one figure. If I said 2,574 I was mistaken. I think I said 2,174.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I am sorry. Did you not say there was another 500 or so prior to that?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, the extra 400 are included in the 2,174.

Mr. Anderson: So it is 2,174 plus the 2,200, roughly equal for each of the two groups sending stuff in. Now, in that period how many tons were distributed in the area occupied by the Federal Forces?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not have that figure, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Anderson: Could you give me any indication because you do have approximately 11,000 tons in storage in various depots all, as far as I can see, mostly within the area occupied by the Federal Forces. I wonder if this stuff is just sitting there or whether it is just actually going out.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, it is moving, but I do not have the figures.

Mr. Anderson: Do you think it is comparable to the amount going into Biafra?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I would think it might run about the same, but this is not a firm figure. The 11,000 tons that I mentioned—11,700—include 2,800 in Santa Isabel which were destined for Biafra.

Mr. Anderson: Say about 30 per cent.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes.

Mr. Anderson: So that about two thirds of it is nevertheless still in Federal territory waiting to be distributed in areas under the Federal Military control.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes, but you see a great deal of that is already out in the depots from where distribution is being made. The amount of that grand total that is in Lagos is 5,000 and that is where they are drawing from for the distribution forward.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, and, of course, we have no figures on that other distribution.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No.

Mr. Anderson: Could you give me some indication of how many of your actual field personnel are working in Biafra and how many are in the forward areas under the control of the Federal Forces?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: When you say "your field personnel"—

Mr. Anderson: I think you gave a figure of 516.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I can give you the figure of people who are working under the Red Cross banner including churches and various other groups and this is all I can give you. In the Federal Military Government portion of Nigeria 234, in Biafra 145, in Santa Isabel at the base 137. Those figures have changed a little bit even since these figures were in effect. There have been, and the change should be reflected in these, a few who have been brought out from the forward areas since the murder the other day of the Red Cross persons in there, these figures are very close to being accurate.

Mr. Anderson: One other question, which may be outside your competence, so you may not wish to comment on it. How are the Biafran forces themselves being fed? Do they have adequate food supplies from within their own territory or are they being supplied from outside?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I cannot answer.

Mr. Anderson: You have no indication?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not know.

Mr. Anderson: Very good, sir.

The Chairman: Mr. Penner, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Groos. Mr. Penner.

Mr. Penner: General Wrinch, you stated that the greatest need now is for heavy aircraft. This need has existed for quite some time. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes.

Mr. Penner: You are today optimistic that this need will be met as a result of your meeting here today.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I did not say it was going to be met, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Penner: You are optimistic.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I am optimistic that we are going to get an airplane.

Mr. Penner: When people are starving every day is very vital. How do you account for the fact, as an official of the Red Cross, that this confrontation, this opportunity of meeting this desperate need comes at this late date?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Well, an opportunity was presented on July 12, Mr. Chairman, when as I said, a group of twelve or fourteen of us, I have forgotten the precise number, met with Mr. Sharp to discuss the subject. The statement that was put out following that meeting was, I think, given in the House no, not in the House—but a statement was put out on the position of the government. I may say, as I have already mentioned, that I am in touch pretty well daily with the government and I have kept them fully informed on the situation from its inception, so there have been no mysteries about it.

Mr. Penner: Well, it is obvious that there has been some kind of a hang-up. I would like to know how you interpret the hang-up on this matter?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The statement of government policy was given on July 12 and it was confirmed on August 27 or 28, and I cannot say why this hang-up occurred.

Mr. Penner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos.

Mr. Groos: I have just a very short question. General Wrinch just mentioned in passing the problem of weather, and I am wondering if he could give us some idea of the weather prospects for this type of operation in the months ahead.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: We have gone through a rainy season with a great many thunder storms and other build ups of that sort and with low ceilings. Really I have been astounded how few nights there have been reduced flights because of weather, but, the weather has been difficult. However, while I am not an expert on West Africa I am given to understand that the next season of the year brings in—is it the harmattan dust from the Sahara? I see an African expert here. I know that ceilings can be very low during that period which runs I think, subject to correction, from about November until maybe February. I have personal experience in that because I landed at Lagos airport during that season a year ago in January and the ceiling was about 100 feet at that time. Now above it you were fine, you were right in the clear, but it was your final approach that was just a little scary. That season should be coming in, I suppose about the next month or so, which will bring with it certain problems. However, there were flights during that season last February, and the situation at that time was that as you were approaching the Yuli strip the lanterns along the side would sort of go on and off as they were in the haze and the low overcast, and this makes for difficult operation as well. But I do not know what comes after that particular season, Mr. Chairman. One of the members of your Committee may know.

Mr. Groos: So perhaps along with the requirement for aircraft, when you are speaking of this, there should be a requirement for increased landing facilities, electronic landing facilities of some sort?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Certain equipment has been set up and is in use. I cannot say precisely what.

Mr. Groos: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: I have just one question. Have you any projections as to how long relief shipments would be required in the areas which are now under Federal control?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: It depends entirely on the war situation, Mr. Chairman. Certainly they will be required as long as the war goes on, and there has been at least one growing season lost now. I read in the paper that they are using the seed yams, or whatever it is, to

eat and my guess would be that after the war is over you would have to take up the slack of at least one growing season.

Mr. Harkness: This applies particularly to the areas still under control of the Biafrans, does it not, and their relief might have to go on for a long time. I was wondering how much longer you considered it probable that relief would be required in these other areas which are now a very considerable distance from the fighting areas; Port Harcourt, Calabar, and all these places.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I am told, Mr. Chairman, that there are certain areas where the fighting has passed through, and on the map they are sort of under the control of the Federal Military Government. I am told that in these areas it is a little bit dicey as to just who really does control beyond the roads in the town and it is my feeling that, as you suggest, the area that is still Biafran territory is and will remain the worst, and I would think that it would progressively improve as you got out from that and got away from the fighting and the areas of uncertainty, and that sort of thing.

Mr. Harkness: But in these particular areas where the fighting has passed you think it will be another year, in other words, until another crop comes in before the need for relief in those areas will have passed?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: It is very hard to be precise, Mr. Chairman, but I would think it would be quite a long time, at best.

The Chairman: May I now ask one or two questions if the other members have finished? Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: I would like to ask a question. Could you put in terms of percentages the needs that you are meeting now? Would it be 60 or 70 per cent, following the line of questioning of Mr. Buchanan. Is this about the order of your effort now, and what reserve do you need in your stockpiling there, and I am particularly thinking of high protein foods.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I would think that your percentage would be a pretty reasonable estimate in the Biafran area. I could not say what the percentage would be in the FMG areas. I just do not know.

The Chairman: Maj. Gen. Wrinch, you mentioned you would like to have a fleet of *Hercules*. Can you say how many *Hercules*

you actually could usefully employ immediately?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: On the flight into Biafra, Mr. Chairman, four additional *Hercules* could be usefully employed today or tonight if they were available, and available with crews, a couple of crews per aircraft at least. I could not say how many one could use in the Federal Military Government area because there has been the very greatest difficulty in getting any precise sort of information as to the capacity of the airstrips in the forward areas in the FMG territory.

We still do not know, for instance, whether the airstrip at Calabar is usable by *Hercules* or not. The strip at Obi which was suitable for *Hercules* was partially flooded and I do not know today if that is suitable or not. I believe it is not today.

I do not know how much military and other traffic there is at Enugu, so one simply cannot say. The answers to a question of this sort I hope will become available as time goes on and as experience is gained with the operation of the present single *Hercules* aircraft.

The Chairman: You mentioned, General Wrinch, that there might be some objection on the part of Biafra to the use of this Canadian Government-owned *Hercules* which we have mentioned. I think all of us can understand why there might be some problem in getting commitment—why there might be some necessity to get the permission of the Nigerian Government to have a Canadian Government-owned plane fly over Nigerian territory. I find it difficult to understand what conceivable objection the Biafran authorities would have to the use of a Canadian Government-owned plane bringing in relief supplies to Biafra in view of the fact that other planes have been landing regularly, operated by the Red Cross and by these other church organizations.

Is there really likely to be any problem with the Biafran authorities?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I can foresee one problem, Mr. Chairman. If the food supplies are flown from Lagos into Biafra, I foresee great problems, because we are told that the Biafrans suspect every bit of food that comes in to them from the Federal Military Government territories to be poisoned, and they will not accept it. And I would be very surprised, Mr. Chairman, if they would permit food to come in from Lagos. However, if the aircraft is available to fly it from Santa Isabel, then I would foresee no trouble whatsoever.

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Chairman, just one question. In General Wrinch's statement of the resources that are at the disposal of ICRC from other countries, he did not mention the United States. Is the United States making any contribution as far as you are concerned in the Red Cross along the lines that we have been talking of now?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes, there have been very great contributions from the United States, both from the Red Cross and the government sources, and also I have mentioned UNICEF and organizations of that sort. I think, however, that the feeling is that the Great Powers should not be present physically in the operation and, as far as I know, I do not think the United States has been asked, for instance, to supply aircraft there.

Mr. Thompson: Is Britain or the U.S.S.R. involved in any humanitarian activity?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Britain has sent certain assistance. ODFAM in the U.K. sent a shipload of powdered milk, I think it was, some time ago, several thousand tons, and they have sent other assistance. I do not know if the British Government itself has sent assistance. They have offered assistance, but I think that, as far as I know, there is an arms supply agreement between the U.K. and Nigeria, which does not make the U.K. very popular in Biafra. I know of no relief assistance having been sent by the U.S.S.R.

The Chairman: I have one final question, General Wrinch. In recent years there have been a number of areas which have suffered from war and civil war. In your experience, are conditions exceptionally bad in this particular civil war as compared with others? Because certainly there does seem to have been a greater public outcry in Canada.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I do not think there is any question, Mr. Chairman, that the situation among the civilians in the areas concerned is worse in the civil war in Nigeria than in other areas. I have been in Viet Nam, and although there were heavy casualties there I do not think that they approach the civilian casualties in the civil war in Nigeria.

Mr. Alexander: I have one further question. As I understand it, an offer was made for a plane in July—July 12, I believe you said, or thereabouts. Then a subsequent—

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: No, there was no offer made, Mr. Chairman. It was on that day that

a group of us met with Mr. Sharp to discuss this matter and urge greater action on the part of the federal government.

At that time the announcement was made by Mr. Sharp of very much greater assistance in the form of food aid. A figure was not attached to it that day. It subsequently became one million dollars worth of food aid.

The announcement was also made that Canada would assist in air transport as and when agreement was obtained from all those concerned; and, of course, agreement never was obtained.

Mr. Alexander: I take it that at your early meeting in July some submissions were made by you with respect to acquiring a plane in July, and that this would have helped your operation considerably?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: There was no submission at that time, Mr. Chairman. It was a meeting that was held on very short notice, and it was covered verbally at that time.

Mr. Alexander: When did the government indicate to you that they would be prepared to offer you a plane?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I got the firm offer, I think, a week ago Sunday. I got a tentative offer a week ago Saturday morning, that this might be possible. It was then that I got in touch with Geneva. It became firm, I think, a week ago yesterday—Monday.

Mr. Alexander: Have you received any indication from the government at this date when it is prepared to turn that plane over to you?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: As soon as I get to the other meeting, Mr. Chairman, we are going to go into this.

Mr. Alexander: We really do not want to hold you up.

The Chairman: I do not want to cut the questioning short, but we have had quite a good discussion with General Wrinch.

As we all know there is also an important event for us at six o'clock when the portraits of two former Prime Ministers are being hung.

Are there any further questions for General Wrinch before we adjourn?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I do not know if this is in order, but I would like to make some kind of a formal motion as a follow-up

to my original question about what the needs are in this particular area.

I gather from the questioning this afternoon that the immediate need is for a *Hercules* aircraft, but I think it still would be useful if this Committee instructed you, our Chairman, to make a formal request to the International Red Cross to inform us of what their short-term and long-term needs are, so that we, as a Committee, might be able to study this matter.

The Chairman: This might be a little difficult. This would be what the needs are, in the way of contributions from the entire group of countries which are—

Mr. Cafik: Yes; and perhaps recommendations from the International Red Cross on what they envisage Canada could do to help achieve the realization of these needs.

The Chairman: Is it possible, General Wrinch, within a reasonable period of time, for us to receive any such memorandum of suggestions?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: The short-term needs provide no difficulty whatsoever if you will accept the statement from the Canadian Red Cross Society based on appeals that have been received by it from the International Committee of the Red Cross. Indeed, I think that this material is here in Ottawa now, but the longer term is more difficult. I left Geneva about four or five weeks ago now. They were extremely active in their long-term planning but I have not had yet any output from that long-term planning.

The Chairman: Perhaps rather than having a formal motion, Mr. Cafik, you could leave it to your steering committee to investigate the possibility of getting from the Canadian Red Cross, through General Wrinch, some more specific idea of what Canada could usefully provide.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Yes. I think it would give us some guidance in our deliberations.

The Chairman: If there are no further questions...

Mr. Laniel: I have one question. I received notice of a sitting at eight o'clock tonight...

The Chairman: Yes. I was going to make an announcement after we released General Wrinch, who I know has another meeting.

Mr. Thompson: I was just going to say I would like to move a motion of thanks to General Wrinch.

The Chairman: Are you going back to Toronto?

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: I am going back to Toronto tonight. I have to get the information you want.

The Chairman: Thank you ever so much, General Wrinch. You have been very helpful.

Maj. Gen. Wrinch: Thank you, sir. I have enjoyed it.

The Chairman: Perhaps before the Committee breaks up I might just announce some of the decisions made, subject to your approval, by your steering committee. First, that we meet tonight at eight o'clock and Mr. Arnold Smith will be the witness this evening. We will be meeting in this room. Mr. Arnold Smith is the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Then it was suggested that the Committee might also meet tomorrow afternoon. We cannot meet in the morning because of caucus meeting but tomorrow afternoon at 3:45 in this same room we will hear the two mem-

bers of Parliament who have visited Biafra. Mr. Sharp will be back on Thursday and it was hoped that perhaps he and his advisers might be present for a meeting on Thursday. In the meantime, we are accumulating the names of witnesses who might be able to be of some assistance to the Committee.

Apart from that, about the only thing I have to report is that a message is going to General Milroy to see if he can make himself available to the Committee. I understand that at the present time he is out on a tour of observation but we should know within the next day or so whether he will be available to give evidence within the next few days.

One mathematical difficulty has come up with the number of our steering committee. I think it can be solved, if you agree, by increasing the number of the steering committee to nine because this will provide two Conservative members, one NDP, one Rallie-ment and five Liberal members. Is it agreeable to the Committee to increase the steering committee to nine? The members of the steering committee will be announced at the meeting this evening and that number should be large enough to provide for our requirements.

If there is nothing further, then, we will adjourn until eight o'clock.

APPENDIX A

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

REVISED MAIN ESTIMATES 1968-69

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

No. of Vote	Service	1968-69	1967-68	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT					
(S)	Secretary of State for External Affairs—Salary and Motor Car Allowance (Details, page 116)	17,000	17,000		
1	Administration, Operation and Maintenance, including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; and authority, notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of High Commissioners, Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Consuls, Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; cultural relations and academic exchange programs with other countries (Details, page 116).....	44,591,300	42,260,000	2,331,300	
10	Construction, Acquisition or Improvement of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment (Details, page 121).....	7,000,000	5,085,000	1,915,000	
15	Assessments, grants, contributions and other payments to International (including Commonwealth) Organizations and International Multilateral Economic and Special Aid Programs as detailed in the Estimates, including authority to pay assessments in the amounts and in the currencies in which they are levied, and authority to pay other amounts specified in the currencies of the countries indicated, notwithstanding that the total of such payments may exceed the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1968, which is (Details, page 129)	33,362,850	34,437,700	1,074,850
(S)	Payments under the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act and Pensions (Details, page 132).....	50,000	49,000	1,000	
(S)	Credits to the Government of India under a financial agreement entered into between the Government of Canada and the Government of India to finance the purchase in Canada of aircraft and associated spare parts and equipment (Details, page 132).....	20,000	92,000	72,000
		85,024,150	81,923,700	3,100,450	

No. of Vote	Service	1968-69	1967-68	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
	A--DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
	SUMMARY				
	To be voted.....	84,954,150	81,782,700	3,171,450	
	Authorized by Statute.....	87,000	158,000		71,000
		85,041,150	81,940,700	3,100,450	
	B--EXTERNAL AID OFFICE				
30	Salaries and Expenses (Details, page 132).....	4,003,000	2,948,700	1,054,300	
35	Economic, technical, educational and other assistance as detailed in the Estimates (De- tails, page 133).....	138,500,000	130,239,000	8,261,000	
		142,503,000	133,187,700	9,315,300	
	C--INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION				
40	Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission (Details, page 135).....	484,100	489,200		5,100

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT		
		Approximate Value of Major Services not included in these Estimates		
		Accommodation (provided by the Department of Public Works).....	967,200	837,500
		Accommodation (in this Department's own buildings)...	427,000	211,200
		Accounting and cheque issue services (Comptroller of the Treasury).....	778,600	617,700
		Contributions to Superannuation Account (Treasury Board).....	1,555,100	1,216,000
		Contributions to Canada Pension Plan Account and Quebec Pension Plan Account (Treasury Board)....	205,000	171,300
		Employee surgical-medical insurance premiums (Treasury Board).....	52,700	107,700
		Employee compensation payments (Department of Labour).....	2,300	2,100
		Carrying of franked mail (Post Office Department)....	125,500	96,800
			4,113,400	3,260,300
		Statutory—Secretary of State for External Affairs— Salary and Motor Car Allowance		
		Salary.....(1)	15,000	15,000
		Motor Car Allowance.....(1)	2,000	2,000
			17,000	17,000
		Vote 1—Administration, Operation and Maintenance, including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; and authority, notwithstanding section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of High Commissioners, Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Consuls, Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; cultural relations and academic exchange programs with other countries		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Vote 1 (Continued)		
		DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Executive, Scientific and Professional:		
1	1	Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$31,000)		
1	1	Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$25,750)		
3	3	Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$20,500-\$25,750)		
1	1	Chairman, Canadian Section of Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence (\$7,000)		
1	1	Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$18,500-\$23,500)		
1	1	Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$21,250)		
2		(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
4	2	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
6	3	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
3	2	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
4	3	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
1	4	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
9	11	Head of Post (1 at \$24,250, 1 at \$22,880, 1 at \$21,580, 5 at \$20,280 and 1 at \$19,760)		
12	11	Foreign Service Officer 10, External Affairs (\$25,220)		
8	7	Foreign Service Officer 9, External Affairs (\$22,880)		
47	40	Foreign Service Officer 8, External Affairs (\$21,580)		
114	45	(\$18,000-\$21,000)		
7	71	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
106	110	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
216	219	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
79	35	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
160	64	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
30	100	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
3	3	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
10	10	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
30	26	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
91	103	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
179	172	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
43	8	(Under \$4,000)		
		Administrative Support:		
13	2	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
166	111	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
960	966	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
135	202	(Under \$4,000)		
12	12	(Seasonal)		
814	807	Local Assistance Abroad: (Full Time)		
3,272	3,157			
(3,269)	(3,154)	Continuing Establishment.....	18,986,000	18,974,000
(204)	(202)	Casuals and Maintenance Staff.....	401,000	367,000
(3,473)	(3,356)	Salaries and Wages.....(1)	19,387,000	19,341,000
		Overtime.....(1)	516,000	418,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Vote 1 (Continued)		
		DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION (Continued)		
		Allowances.....(1)	7,800,000	7,441,000
		Benefits in Consideration of Personal Services.....(1)	181,000	140,000
		Courier Service.....(2)	560,000	560,000
		Removal and Home Leave Expenses.....(2)	2,007,000	2,170,000
		Other Travelling Expenses.....(2)	900,000	1,119,000
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(2)	247,000	181,000
		Postage.....(2)	340,700	277,000
		Carriage of Diplomatic Mail.....(2)	115,000	52,000
		Telephones, Telegrams and Other Communication Services.....(2)	3,032,600	2,819,000
		Publication of Departmental Reports and Other Material.....(3)	248,500	268,000
		Displays, and Other Informational Publicity.....(3)	165,500	127,000
		Purchase of Publications for Distribution.....(3)	165,000	102,000
		Professional and Special Services.....(4)	982,200	563,000
		Rental of Land, Buildings and Works.....(5)	1,650,000	1,180,000
		Rental of Equipment.....(5)	4,000	3,000
		Repairs and Upkeep of Buildings and Works.....(6)	990,000	750,000
		Repairs and Upkeep of Equipment.....(6)	435,000	310,000
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Office Equipment....(7)	1,050,000	876,000
		Fuel for Heating and Other Materials and Supplies....(7)	330,000	269,000
		Taxes on Diplomatic Properties in the Ottawa Area....(7)	350,000	282,000
		Municipal or Public Utility Services.....(7)	275,000	260,000
		Assistance to Distressed Canadians (Part Recov- erable.....(10)	25,000	25,000
		Official Hospitality.....(12)	75,000	200,000
		Compensation to Employees for Loss or Damage to Furniture and Effects.....(12)	6,000	2,000
		Sundries.....(12)	205,000	215,000
			42,043,500	39,950,000
		Expenditure Revenue		
		1965-66.....\$ 30,009,856 \$1,200,467		
		1966-67.....34,104,940 1,243,206		
		1967-68 (estimated).....39,673,000 1,260,500		
		CANADA'S CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS FOR SUPER- VISION AND CONTROL IN INDO-CHINA INCLUDING AUTHORITY, FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND FIXING OF SALARIES OF COMMISSIONERS, SECRETARIES AND STAFF BY THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL		
		Salaried Positions:		
1	1	Administrative and Foreign Service:		
		Foreign Service Officer 9, External Affairs		
		(\$22,880)		
2		(\$18,000-\$21,000)		
2	2	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
7	7	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Vote 1 (Continued)		
		CANADA'S CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS (Continued)		
		Salaried Positions: (Continued)		
		Technical, Operational and Service: (\$6,000-\$8,000)		
1	1	Administrative Support: (\$8,000-\$10,000)		
1		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
2	2	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
16	17			
30	30	Salaries.....(1)	213,000	209,000
(30)	(30)	Overtime.....(1)	11,000	4,000
		Allowances.....(1)	130,000	108,000
		Travelling Expenses.....(2)	80,000	80,000
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(2)	3,000	1,000
		Postage.....(2)	300	300
		Telephones, Telegrams and Other Communication Services.....(2)	114,300	107,000
		Professional and Special Services.....(4)	5,000	4,000
		Rental of Equipment.....(5)	800	800
		Repairs and Upkeep of Buildings.....(6)	1,000	2,000
		Repairs and Upkeep of Equipment.....(6)	6,400	4,800
		Office Stationery and Supplies.....(7)	15,000	14,500
		Materials and Supplies.....(7)	5,000	1,600
		Sundries.....(12)	3,000	2,000
			587,800	539,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 585,363		
		1966-67.....615,320		
		1967-68 (estimated).....475,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Vote 1 (Continued)		
		SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES INCLUDING PAYMENT OF REMUNERATION, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL IN CONNECTION WITH THE ASSIGNMENT BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OF CANADIANS TO THE STAFFS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DETAILED IN THE ESTIMATES (PART RECOVERABLE FROM THOSE ORGANIZATIONS), AND AUTHORITY TO MAKE RECOVERABLE ADVANCES IN AMOUNTS NOT EXCEEDING IN THE AGGREGATE THE AMOUNTS OF THE SHARES OF THOSE ORGANIZATIONS OF SUCH EXPENSES		
		Special administrative expenses, including salaries, allowances and removal expenses:		
		Asian Development Bank.....(10)	37,000	36,000
		Less—Amount recoverable.....(13)	25,000	25,000
			12,000	11,000
		Commonwealth Secretariat.....(10)	65,000	64,000
		Less—Amount recoverable.....(13)	25,000	25,000
			40,000	39,000
		North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....(10)	78,000	121,000
		Less—Amount recoverable.....(13)	30,000	50,000
			48,000	71,000
		Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.....(10)	29,000	27,000
		Less—Amount recoverable.....(13)	19,000	17,000
			10,000	10,000
			110,000	131,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 51,206		
		1966-67.....68,937		
		1967-68 (estimated).....75,000		
		CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES		
		Travelling Expenses.....(2)	350,000	300,000
		Telephones and Telegrams.....(2)	3,000	3,000
		Professional and Special Services.....(4)	2,000	2,000
		Rentals.....(5)	10,000	10,000
		Entertainment.....(7)	15,000	15,000
		Sundries.....(12)	10,000	10,000
			390,000	340,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 275,187		
		1966-67.....330,728		
		1967-68 (estimated).....377,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Vote 1 (Continued)		
		CULTURAL RELATIONS AND ACADEMIC EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES..... (10)	1,460,000	1,300,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 843,055		
		1966-67..... 838,023		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 900,000		
		Total, Vote 1.....	44,591,300	42,260,000
		Expenditure Revenue		
		1965-66..... \$ 31,764,667 \$1,200,467		
		1966-67..... 35,957,948 1,243,206		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 41,500,000 1,260,500		
		Vote 10—Construction, Acquisition or Improvement of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment		
		Acquisition, Construction and Improvement of Prop- erties for Offices and Residences Abroad, in- cluding Land..... (8)	4,190,000	3,000,000
		Acquisition of Office Furnishings..... (9)	365,000	525,000
		Acquisition of Furniture and Furnishings for Resi- dences Abroad..... (9)	565,000	453,000
		Acquisition of Motor Vehicles and Other Equipment..... (9)	680,000	265,000
		Basic Household Equipment and Furnishings for Staff Abroad..... (9)	450,000	364,000
		Acquisition of Communications Equipment..... (9)	750,000	473,000
			7,000,000	5,085,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 1,983,311		
		1966-67..... 3,081,668		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 6,330,000		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10		
1,319	1,232	HEAD OFFICE—Operational Expenses.....	17,816,500	17,713,000
		Capital Items.....	508,000	436,000
			18,324,500	18,149,000
30	30	INDO-CHINA—Operational Expenses.....	587,800	539,000
		Capital Items.....	43,000	46,000
			630,800	585,000
16	16	Diplomatic Missions— ARGENTINA—Operational Expenses.....	229,000	215,000
		Capital Items.....	16,000	5,000
			245,000	220,000
26	25	AUSTRALIA—Operational Expenses.....	299,000	268,000
		Capital Items.....	68,000	94,000
			367,000	362,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Diplomatic Missions (Continued)		
21	20	AUSTRIA—Operational Expenses.....	300,000	269,000
		Capital Items.....	39,000	9,000
			339,000	278,000
45	35	BELGIUM—Operational Expenses.....	684,000	513,000
		Capital Items.....	42,000	12,000
			726,000	525,000
35	31	BELGIUM—NATO—Operational Expenses.....	447,000	441,000
		Capital Items.....	16,000	10,000
			463,000	451,000
24	24	BRAZIL—Operational Expenses.....	392,000	367,000
		Capital Items.....	12,000	190,000
			404,000	557,000
129	125	BRITAIN—Operational Expenses.....	1,569,000	1,441,000
		Capital Items.....	52,000	105,000
			1,621,000	1,546,000
16	16	CAMEROUN—Operational Expenses.....	217,000	203,000
		Capital Items.....	8,000	9,000
			225,000	212,000
22	22	CEYLON—Operational Expenses.....	199,000	186,000
		Capital Items.....	275,000	20,000
			474,000	206,000
16	16	CHILE—Operational Expenses.....	202,000	189,000
		Capital Items.....	11,000	6,000
			213,000	195,000
14	14	COLOMBIA—Operational Expenses.....	153,000	143,000
		Capital Items.....	35,000	5,000
			188,000	148,000
16	16	CONGO (KINSHASA)—Operational Expenses.....	213,000	199,000
		Capital Items.....	12,000	53,000
			225,000	252,000
13	13	COSTA RICA—Operational Expenses.....	134,000	125,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	23,000
			143,000	148,000
24	24	CUBA—Operational Expenses.....	319,000	298,000
		Capital Items.....	28,000	33,000
			347,000	331,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Diplomatic Missions (Continued)		
18	18	CYPRUS—Operational Expenses.....	160,000	152,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	16,000
			169,000	168,000
25	25	CZECHOSLOVAKIA—Operational Expenses.....	318,000	297,000
		Capital Items.....	25,000	17,000
			343,000	314,000
17	17	DENMARK—Operational Expenses.....	221,000	207,000
		Capital Items.....	17,000	4,000
			238,000	211,000
7	7	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC—Operational Expenses.....	99,000	93,000
		Capital Items.....	14,000	11,000
			113,000	104,000
9	9	ECUADOR—Operational Expenses.....	105,000	98,000
		Capital Items.....	17,000	2,000
			122,000	100,000
16	16	ETHIOPIA—Operational Expenses.....	144,000	135,000
		Capital Items.....	23,000	13,000
			167,000	148,000
17	17	FINLAND—Operational Expenses.....	272,000	254,000
		Capital Items.....	20,000	26,000
			292,000	280,000
104	89	FRANCE—Operational Expenses.....	1,610,000	1,321,000
		Capital Items.....	96,000	75,000
			1,706,000	1,396,000
15	11	FRANCE—OECD—Operational Expenses.....	190,000	182,000
		Capital Items.....		
			190,000	182,000
4	4	GERMANY—BERLIN—Operational Expenses.....	62,000	58,000
		Capital Items.....	5,000	
			67,000	58,000
39	39	GERMANY—BONN—Operational Expenses.....	510,000	477,000
		Capital Items.....	720,000	498,000
			1,230,000	975,000
21	21	GHANA—Operational Expenses.....	313,000	271,000
		Capital Items.....	85,000	19,000
			398,000	290,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A--DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Diplomatic Missions (Continued)		
23	23	GREECE—Operational Expenses.....	308,000	288,000
		Capital Items.....	29,000	7,000
			337,000	295,000
19	19	GUYANA—Operational Expenses.....	180,000	158,000
		Capital Items.....	24,000	15,000
			204,000	173,000
10	10	HAITI—Operational Expenses.....	131,000	122,000
		Capital Items.....	17,000	8,000
			148,000	130,000
59	59	INDIA—Operational Expenses.....	612,000	556,000
		Capital Items.....	671,000	9,000
			1,283,000	565,000
29	27	INDONESIA—Operational Expenses.....	414,000	366,000
		Capital Items.....	17,000	27,000
			431,000	393,000
19	19	IRAN—Operational Expenses.....	245,000	229,000
		Capital Items.....	6,000	9,000
			251,000	238,000
13	13	IRELAND—Operational Expenses.....	152,000	142,000
		Capital Items.....	8,000	3,000
			160,000	145,000
22	22	ISRAEL—Operational Expenses.....	271,000	250,000
		Capital Items.....	20,000	8,000
			291,000	258,000
33	33	ITALY—Operational Expenses.....	575,000	537,000
		Capital Items.....	55,000	42,000
			630,000	579,000
17	16	JAMAICA—Operational Expenses.....	237,000	209,000
		Capital Items.....	24,000	2,000
			261,000	211,000
46	45	JAPAN—Operational Expenses.....	638,000	601,000
		Capital Items.....	109,000	22,000
			747,000	623,000
17	18	KENYA—Operational Expenses.....	173,000	176,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	19,000
			183,000	195,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Diplomatic Missions (Continued)		
25	25	LEBANON—Operational Expenses.....	288,000	257,000
		Capital Items.....	21,000	13,000
			309,000	270,000
26	26	MALAYSIA—Operational Expenses.....	306,600	278,000
		Capital Items.....	80,000	19,000
			336,000	297,000
25	24	MEXICO—Operational Expenses.....	258,000	213,000
		Capital Items.....	7,000	5,000
			265,000	218,000
27	27	THE NETHERLANDS—Operational Expenses.....	400,000	374,000
		Capital Items.....	23,000	18,000
			423,000	392,000
16	15	NEW ZEALAND—Operational Expenses.....	212,000	189,000
		Capital Items.....	13,000	11,000
			225,000	200,000
21	22	NIGERIA—Operational Expenses.....	248,000	247,000
		Capital Items.....	112,000	191,000
			360,000	438,000
19	19	NORWAY—Operational Expenses.....	253,000	235,000
		Capital Items.....	15,000	9,000
			268,000	244,000
41	42	PAKISTAN—Operational Expenses.....	401,000	399,000
		Capital Items.....	696,000	207,000
			1,097,000	606,000
14	14	PERU—Operational Expenses.....	182,000	178,000
		Capital Items.....	12,000	2,000
			194,000	180,000
31	31	POLAND—Operational Expenses.....	335,000	301,000
		Capital Items.....	415,000	192,000
			750,000	493,000
18	18	PORTUGAL—Operational Expenses.....	203,000	197,000
		Capital Items.....	7,000	8,000
			210,000	205,000
18	18	SENEGAL—Operational Expenses.....	195,000	183,000
		Capital Items.....	44,000	20,000
			239,000	203,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Diplomatic Missions (Continued)		
13	13	SOUTH AFRICA—Operational Expenses.....	177,000	165,000
		Capital Items.....	6,000	23,000
			183,000	188,000
22	23	SPAIN—Operational Expenses.....	377,000	343,000
		Capital Items.....	24,000	14,000
			401,000	357,000
17	17	SWEDEN—Operational Expenses.....	244,000	234,000
		Capital Items.....	20,000	10,000
			264,000	244,000
16	16	SWITZERLAND—Operational Expenses.....	198,000	172,000
		Capital Items.....	34,000	2,000
			232,000	174,000
18	22	THAILAND—Operational Expenses.....	162,000	98,000
		Capital Items.....	38,000	60,000
			200,000	158,000
17	16	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO—Operational Expenses.....	193,000	168,000
		Capital Items.....	31,000	5,000
			224,000	173,000
16	16	TUNISIA—Operational Expenses.....	194,000	182,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	18,000
			203,000	200,000
23	23	TURKEY—Operational Expenses.....	266,000	249,000
		Capital Items.....	47,000	81,000
			313,000	330,000
42	41	U.S.S.R.—Operational Expenses.....	650,000	609,000
		Capital Items.....	40,000	66,000
			690,000	675,000
35	35	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC—Operational Expenses....	422,000	378,000
		Capital Items.....	28,000	36,000
			450,000	414,000
48	48	PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA—		
		Operational Expenses.....	782,000	734,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	42,000
			792,000	776,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
40	37	Diplomatic Missions (Continued)		
		PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK—		
		Operational Expenses.....	858,000	737,000
		Capital Items.....	109,000	18,000
			967,000	755,000
28	28	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA—		
		Operational Expenses.....	408,000	388,000
		Capital Items.....	19,000	31,000
			427,000	419,000
79	77	U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	1,226,000	1,190,000
		Capital Items.....	134,000	62,000
			1,360,000	1,252,000
9	9	URUGUAY—Operational Expenses.....	98,000	92,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	38,000
			108,000	130,000
14	14	VENEZUELA—Operational Expenses.....	261,000	246,000
		Capital Items.....	21,000	10,000
			282,000	256,000
31	31	YUGOSLAVIA—Operational Expenses.....	330,000	315,000
		Capital Items.....	575,000	23,000
			905,000	338,000
	19	NEW MISSIONS—Operational Expenses.....		116,000
		Capital Items.....		64,000
				180,000
		DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS—Operational Expenses.....	23,424,000	21,503,000
		Capital Items.....	5,194,000	2,724,000
		Total, Diplomatic Missions.....	28,618,000	24,227,000
18	17	Consulates—		
		BORDEAUX, FRANCE—Operational Expenses.....	201,000	176,000
		Capital Items.....	8,000	6,000
			209,000	182,000
14	14	BOSTON, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	223,000	206,000
		Capital Items.....	18,000	6,000
			241,000	212,000
18	18	CHICAGO, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	263,000	219,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	19,000
			273,000	238,000
1	1	CLEVELAND, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	2,000	1,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Consulates (Continued)		
1	1	DETROIT, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	20,000	19,000
4	4	DUESSELDORF, GERMANY—Operational Expenses....	27,000	25,000
		Capital Items.....	1,000	25,000
			28,000	50,000
4	4	HAMBURG, GERMANY—Operational Expenses.....	54,000	47,000
		Capital Items.....	7,000	3,000
			61,000	50,000
10	10	HONG KONG—Operational Expenses.....	94,000	87,000
		Capital Items.....	17,000	
			111,000	87,000
18	18	LOS ANGELES, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	256,000	237,000
		Capital Items.....	4,000	4,000
			260,000	241,000
5	5	MANILA, PHILIPPINES—Operational Expenses.....	73,000	69,000
		Capital Items.....	21,000	2,000
			94,000	71,000
17	16	MARSEILLES, FRANCE—Operational Expenses.....	176,000	153,000
		Capital Items.....	3,000	4,000
			179,000	157,000
4	4	MILAN, ITALY—Operational Expenses.....	60,000	56,000
		Capital Items.....	25,000	20,000
			85,000	76,000
12	12	NEW ORLEANS, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	174,000	164,000
		Capital Items.....	8,000	3,000
			182,000	167,000
33	32	NEW YORK, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	581,000	522,000
		Capital Items.....	30,000	40,000
			611,000	562,000
1	1	PHILADELPHIA, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	2,000	1,000
		REYKJAVIK, ICELAND—Operational Expenses.....	1,000	1,000
14	14	SAN FRANCISCO, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses....	243,000	224,000
		Capital Items.....	13,000	11,000
			256,000	235,000
1	1	SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL—Operational Expenses.....	30,000	28,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Consulates (Continued)		
13	13	SEATTLE, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	183,000	173,000
		Capital Items.....	5,000	10,000
			188,000	183,000
		CONSULATES		
		Operational Expenses.....	2,663,000	2,408,000
		Capital Items.....	170,000	153,000
		Total, Consulates.....	2,833,000	2,561,000
		Unallotted Operational Expenses.....	100,000	97,000
		Unallotted Capital Items.....	1,085,000	1,726,000
			1,185,000	1,823,000
3,302	3,187		51,591,300	47,345,000
		RECAPITULATION		
		Operational Expenses.....	44,591,300	42,260,000
		Capital Items.....	7,000,000	5,085,000
			51,591,300	47,345,000
		Vote 15—Assessments, grants, contributions and other payments to International (including Commonwealth) Organizations and International Multilateral Economic and Special Aid Programs as detailed in the Estimates, including Authority to pay assessments in the amounts and in the currencies in which they are levied, and authority to pay other amounts specified in the currencies of the countries indicated, notwithstanding that the total of such payments may exceed the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1968		
		(Contributions, Grants and Payments to International Commissions and Organizations including Commonwealth, and Miscellaneous Grants and Payments)		
		UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES		
		INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (OPERATIONAL BUDGET) (\$57,000 U.S.)..... (10)	62,000	62,000
		INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (PART REIMBURSEMENT FOR COMPENSATION PAID ITS CANADIAN EMPLOYEES FOR QUEBEC INCOME TAX FOR THE 1967 TAXATION YEAR)..... (10)	125,000	120,000
		INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION—GRANT TO ASSIST IN DEFRAYING COSTS OF ACCOMMODATION. (10)	500,000	500,000
		UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND..... (10)	1,000,000	1,000,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Vote 15 (Continued)		
		UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES (Continued)		
		UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM..... (10)	10,750,000	10,750,000
		UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES.. (10)	350,000	350,000
		UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST..... (10)	500,000	500,000
		UNITED NATIONS TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE.. (10)	60,000	60,000
		WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (\$2,291,666 U.S.)..... (10)	2,475,000	2,475,000
		COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATIONS		
		COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE (£ 500)..... (10)	1,300	1,500
		OTHER INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS		
		INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS..... (10)	20,000	20,000
		PAYMENT TO THE LAKE ONTARIO CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, UNITED STATES AND CANADA..... (10)	90,000	90,000
		PAYMENT TO ROOSEVELT CAMPOBELLO INTERNATIONAL PARK COMMISSION FOR THE PURPOSES AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT RESPECTING THE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED TO ADMINISTER THE ROOSEVELT CAMPOBELLO INTERNATIONAL PARK (\$88,000 U.S.)..... (10)	95,000	108,000
		MISCELLANEOUS GRANTS AND PAYMENTS		
		ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF CANADA..... (10)	2,500	2,500
		DEFENCE SUPPORT ASSISTANCE TO COVER DIRECT EXPENDITURES ON BEHALF OF COUNTRIES NOT MEMBERS OF NATO..... (10)	3,100,000	3,500,000
		DEFENCE SUPPORT ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY. (10)	1,000,000	1,000,000
		CANADIAN-GERMAN SOCIETY OF HANOVER (50,000 DEUTSCH MARKS)..... (10)	14,000	14,000
		LA MAISON CANADIENNE, PARIS..... (10)	313,000	159,000
		ASSOCIATION OF FRENCH LANGUAGE UNIVERSITIES..... (10)	50,000	
		UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION IN CANADA..... (10)	27,000	17,000
		GIFTS TO COUNTRIES ATTAINING INDEPENDENCE AND TO MARK SPECIAL OCCASIONS..... (10)	10,000	25,000
		(Assessments for Membership in International Commissions and Organizations, including Commonwealth)		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Vote 15 (Continued)		
		UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES		
		UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (\$3,800,000 U.S.).....(10)	4,104,000	4,244,000
		UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (\$958,333 U.S.).....(10)	1,035,000	966,000
		FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (\$1,134,738 U.S.).....(10)	1,225,500	1,339,000
		INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (\$318,600 U.S.).....(10)	344,000	282,000
		INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (\$250,000 U.S.).....(10)	270,000	271,000
		INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (\$918,000 U.S.).....(10)	991,500	913,000
		INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION (\$14,000 U.S.).....(10)	15,000	15,000
		WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (\$1,797,000 U.S.).....(10)	1,941,000	1,912,000
		COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATIONS		
		COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION (£37,250).....(10)	96,850	112,500
		COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT (£90,000).....(10)	234,000	270,000
		OTHER INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS		
		GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (\$187,000 U.S.).....(10)	202,000	181,000
		LAOS INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION.....(10)	35,000	35,000
		NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (COST OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION) (40,027,573 BELGIAN FRANCS)...(10)	871,000	871,000
		NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SCIENCE PROGRAMS (\$243,600 U.S.).....(10)	263,000	299,000
		ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (5,429,237 FRENCH FRANCS).....(10)	1,189,000	1,243,000
		PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (4,000 DUTCH FLORINS).....(10)	1,200	1,200
		ITEM NOT REQUIRED FOR 1968-69		
		United Nations Emergency Force.....(10)		729,000
		Total, Vote 15.....	33,362,850	34,437,700
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....	\$32,315,953	
		1966-67.....	31,209,404	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	31,890,843	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Statutory—Payments under the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act (Chap. 82, R.S.) and Pensions..... (1)	50,000	49,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$	43,023	
		1966-67.....	46,250	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	42,000	
		Statutory—Credits to the Government of India under a financial agreement entered into between the Government of Canada and the Government of India to finance the purchase in Canada of aircraft and associated spare parts and equipulment (External Affairs Vote 97, Appropriation Act No. 5, 1963)..... (10)	20,000	92,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$	222,774	
		1966-67.....	159,810	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	91,300	
		B—EXTERNAL AID OFFICE		
		Vote 30—Salaries and Expenses		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Executive, Scientific and Professional;		
1	1	Director General, External Aid Office (\$28,750)		
2	2	Senior Officer 3 (\$20,500-\$25,750)		
4	4	Senior Officer 2 (\$18,500-\$23,500)		
12	9	Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$21,250)		
1		(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
	1	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
9		(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
4	9	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
1		(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
10	6	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
19	19	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
40	38	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
16	11	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
69	60	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
8	10	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
1		(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
1	3	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
3		(Under \$4,000)		
		Administrative Support:		
25	22	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
244	206	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
20	29	(Under \$4,000)		
490	430	Continuing Establishment.....	3,021,000	2,271,000
(490)	(430)	Casuals and Others.....	35,000	29,000
(10)	(10)			
(500)	(440)	Salaries and Wages..... (1)	3,056,000	2,300,000
		Overtime..... (1)	5,000	7,000
		Allowances..... (1)	75,000	30,000
		Travelling and Removal Expenses..... (2)	308,000	203,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		B—EXTERNAL AID OFFICE (Continued)		
		Vote 30 (Continued)		
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(2)	200	200
		Telephone and Telegrams.....(2)	70,000	61,000
		Advertising.....(3)	9,000	8,000
		Publication of Reports and Other Material.....(3)	52,000	20,000
		Professional and Special Services.....(4)	181,000	145,000
		Photographs, Films and Radio Tapes.....(4)	86,000	47,000
		Rental of Office Equipment.....(5)	25,800	14,500
		Repair of Office Furniture and Equipment.....(6)	1,000	
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Equipment.....(7)	96,000	89,500
		Acquisition of Furniture and Furnishings.....(9)	31,000	16,000
		Sundries.....(12)	7,000	7,500
			4,003,000	2,948,700
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 1,131,433		
		1966-67.....1,709,612		
		1967-68 (estimated).....2,948,700		
		Vote 35—Economic, technical, educational and other assistance as detailed in the Estimates		
		INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE—PAYMENT TO THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT ESTABLISHED BY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS VOTE 33D, APPROPRIATION ACT NO. 2, 1965, FOR THE PROVISION OF ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND TO EXTEND THE PURPOSES OF THE SAID VOTE TO AUTHORIZE IN THE CURRENT AND SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS PAYMENTS THEREFOR OUT OF THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT, SUBJECT TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS APPROVED BY THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL, TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR AGENCIES, TO EDUCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL INSTITUTIONS IN SUCH COUNTRIES, AND TO RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS.....(10)	62,900,000	50,000,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 48,500,000		
		1966-67.....48,500,000		
		1967-68 (estimated).....50,000,000		
		INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RELIEF.....(10)	200,000	239,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 100,000		
		1966-67.....45,000		
		1967-68 (estimated).....239,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		B—EXTERNAL AID OFFICE (Continued)		
		Vote 35 (Continued)		
		INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID PROGRAM, INCLUDING COMMODITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST AND TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM IN THE CURRENT AND SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 35 OF THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION ACT.....(10)	69,000,000	75,000,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 34,538,000		
		1966-67..... 100,500,000		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 75,000,000		
		CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INDUS BASIN FUND.....(10)	1,400,000	5,000,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 1,748,000		
		1966-67..... 3,025,000		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 3,158,000		
		CONTRIBUTIONS, ON TERMS AND CONDITIONS APPROVED BY TREASURY BOARD, TO THE COST OF APPROVED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY CANADIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.....(10)	5,000,000	
		Total, Vote 35.....	138,500,000	130,239,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 84,886,000		
		1966-67..... 152,070,000		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 128,397,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		C—INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION		
		Approximate Value of Major Services not included in these Estimates		
		Accommodation (provided by the Department of Public Works).....	18,800	18,900
		Accounting and cheque issue services (Comptroller of the Treasury).....	2,800	5,500
		Contributions to Superannuation Account (Treasury Board).....	13,200	11,000
		Contributions to Canada Pension Plan Account and Quebec Pension Plan Account (Treasury Board)....	900	800
		Employee surgical-medical insurance premiums (Treasury Board).....	300	600
		Employee compensation payments (Department of Labour).....	100	100
			36,100	36,900
		Vote 46—Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission		
		SALARIES AND EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION		
1	1	Chairman, Canadian Section (\$23,000)		
2	2	Commissioner, Canadian Section (\$12,960)		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
1	1	Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$21,250)		
1		(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
1	2	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
1	1	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		Administrative Support:		
2	2	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
2	2	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
1	1	(Under \$4,000)		
12	12	Salaries.....(1)	132,500	124,700
(12)	(12)	Travelling Expenses.....(2)	15,000	15,000
		Postage.....(2)	200	100
		Telephones and Telegrams.....(2)	3,500	3,000
		Advertising of Public Hearings.....(3)	3,500	3,000
		Reporters' and Professional Fees.....(4)	3,500	2,500
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Equipment.....(7)	2,000	3,000
		Acquisition of Furniture and Furnishings.....(9)	1,000	3,000
		Sundries.....(12)	1,000	900
			162,200	155,200
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 126,001		
		1966-67.....146,746		
		1967-68 (estimated).....150,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		C—INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (Continued)		
		Vote 40 (Continued)		
		CANADA'S SHARE OF THE EXPENSES OF STUDIES, SURVEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE INTER- NATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION		
		Studies and surveys of the Mid-Western Watershed.....		2,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the Champlain Water- way Reference.....		2,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the studies of Boundary Waters Pollution.....	306,900	310,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the Great Lakes Levels Reference and St. Lawrence Board of Control.....	5,000	10,000
		Canada's share of the Air Pollution Reference	5,000	10,000
		American Falls Reference.....	5,000	
		(4)	321,900	334,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 52,709		
		1966-67..... 145,430		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 300,000		
		Total, Vote 40.....	484,100	489,200
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 178,710		
		1966-67..... 292,176		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 450,000		

APPENDIX B

NIGERIA: OBSERVER TEAM REPORT

Following is the text of the Observer Team's First Interim Report dated October 2, which they released to the press in Lagos, 1000 hours GMT, October 3.

(The report is addressed to the Governments of Nigeria, Sweden, Britain and Canada, with copies to the Organization of African Unity and Poland. It is signed by Generals Milroy, Raab and Alexander.)

Text begins: *Observer Team to Nigeria First Interim Report.*

Visit to First Nigerian Division

The Swedish, British and Canadian representatives invited by the Federal Military Government to observe the conduct of the Federal troops in the war-affected areas, visited the First Nigerian Division during the period of 25 September-30 September, 1968. The representative of the United Nations Secretary-General travelled with the group. This report covers this particular visit.

On arrival in Enugu the group split into two teams, one visiting the area of 1 Sector from Enugu through Awgu to Obnago (Obilago) and the other visiting the area of 2 Sector from Abakaliki south to the front lines. Each team visited front line positions, military units and hospitals, villages, market places, medical and food distribution stations, refugee camps and major cities and towns. The Observers talked to officers, soldiers, local inhabitants, refugees, members of the civil administration, police, Red Cross officials and missionaries.

Throughout the period of their visit the Observers received the fullest co-operation from the military and civilian officials. They encountered no restrictions to their movements or investigations and none of their requests were refused. Representatives of the press were free to accompany the Observers and did so on several occasions.

Conduct of the Federal Troops

The Observers found the Federal troops in the area they visited to be alert, cheerful and well-disciplined. They neither saw nor heard any evidence that the troops had committed acts with intent to destroy—wholly or in part—the Ibo people or their property. The Observers did see considerable evidence that the troops in the area were assisting the local

population, in particular by feeding them until the civil administration and the Red Cross could take over the responsibility.

Conduct of the Civilian Population

Discussions with village leaders and refugees confirm that the Ibo people feared the Federal troops until they actually met them. This fear is the result of the actual fighting and the propaganda put out by the rebels which leads the Ibos to believe the Federal troops will kill them. Once some of their people make contact with the Federal troops this fear is rapidly allayed. The Observers saw a number of village leaders who had just come out of hiding and noted that the numbers of inhabitants returning to the villages are increasing. The Observers considered it significant that in the villages visited the inhabitants displayed no fear of Federal soldiers, even when these soldiers arrived in their midst suddenly. However, it was also noted that very few of the more educated Ibos have yet appeared in areas occupied by Federal troops.

Restoration of Normal Life

The major problems in facilitating the return to normal life in the war-affected areas visited include the provision of food and medical facilities and the restoration of buildings and public services such as water, power, etc. The Observers noted that:

(A) When an area is first occupied the army provides the civilians found there with the foodstuffs necessary to supplement the food that is available. This responsibility is taken over as rapidly as possible by the civil administration and the Red Cross, assisted where necessary by soldiers. These arrangements appear to have been adequate to date, but from what was seen it is apparent that they will not be sufficient to handle the task, if the people continue to come out of the bush at the present rate. A contributing problem is the lack of money in the hands of the people.

(B) The major medical problem observed was the malnutrition caused by a poorly balanced diet. The problem exists in normal times in this area but it has been accentuated in the case of those people who have spent a long time hiding in the bush. The Army, missionaries and the Red Cross are doing a good job but their efforts are hampered by a shortage of drugs, reported to be caused by difficulties in transportation from Lagos. In

addition, the numbers of medical personnel do not appear to be sufficient to handle a large increase in the number requiring attention. For example, the Observers noted in Nenwe that there was an increase from 100 on 21 September to about 1,500, mostly women and children, when the medical team returned on September 28. In the areas where fighting took place there is a considerable amount of physical destruction. This is the result of deliberate destruction of public utilities attributable to the rebels when retreating, destruction by shellfire, the use of materials for shelter by soldiers, the inevitable looting by civilians, and deterioration caused by the weather. No damage was seen in villages visited that were not in the areas affected by the fighting. Some action has been taken by military and civil officials to preserve property.

SUMMARY

In summary, in the areas of the First Nigerian Division that the Observers visited they found:

(A) *Genocide*: There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified.

(B) *Conduct of Federal Troops*: The troops in the area are taking positive action to obtain the confidence of the local population and assist them in re-establishing a normal life.

(C) *Conduct of Civilian Inhabitants*: An increasing number of the inhabitants of the villages, almost all of whom are Ibo, are returning to their homes. The people who have returned to the villages display no fear of the Federal troops.

(D) *Food and Medical Assistance*: These are being provided to the civilian population through the combined efforts of the army, the civil administration and the Red Cross. While the supply of food has been adequate, the supplies of drugs and medical assistance in the area seems to be inadequate because of a shortage of transport, particularly air transport. This situation could become serious if an expected large increase in the number of refugees and people requiring such assistance takes place.

(E) *Destruction of Property*: The Observers received no evidence of deliberate and unnecessary destruction of property by Federal troops. There has, however, been considerable destruction as a result of the war, and the work required to repair this situation, which is just beginning, will be very expensive.

Future Plans

The Observers propose to make their next visit to the area of the Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division.

Text ends.

Ottawa,
October 3, 1968.

APPENDIX C

NIGERIA: OBSERVER TEAM'S
SECOND REPORT

Observer Team to Nigeria
Investigation into the
Circumstances of
Deaths at Okigwi

Object of Visit

At the request of the Federal Government of Nigeria a team consisting of Major General H. T. Alexander of the United Kingdom, Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland, Lt. Colonel Car Areskoug of Sweden accompanied by Mr. Daniel Caulfield of the U.N. carried out an investigation into the circumstances under which two members of the ICRC, Mr. and Mrs. Savoury of the WCC, were killed and three members of the ICRC wounded at Okigwi on Monday, September 30, 1968.

Programme of Investigation

The team carried out the following programme of investigation: We interviewed: (A) The Divisional Commander, Col. Shuwa Mohamed, the Sector Commander, Ltd. Col. Wya, the Battalion Commander, Major Isa Mohamed, Commanding the 21st Battalion of the Nigerian Army, the Commander of C Company of the 21st Battalion, Ltd. Joseph Ochai and an officer of the HQ Company of the 21st Battalion Lt. Ogoja. (B) The following members of the ICRC team in Okigwi: Dr. Mischa Vucinic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Bengt Renstrom of Sweden in company with two Yugoslavs: Mr. Bravle Vukcevic, Mr. Brani-slav Rakij and another Swedish national, Mr. Kurt Qvarnebo, and Mr. Percy Nilsson of Sweden. The team visited Okigwi on October 3. During the course of our visit we inspected the site of the incident which was the ICRC hospital at Okigwi.

Cooperation Received

The statement given by the members of the Red Cross coincided in all material respects, although some were interviewed in Enugu and some in Lagos. It is, therefore, our conclusion that their statements are as accurate as is possible under the circumstances. So far as the statements received from the officers of the Federal Army are concerned:

(A) The Divisional Commander has not yet completed his own investigations. This is understandable since operations are still in

progress in the outskirts and around Okigwi. It is therefore difficult for him to arrange interviews with the witnesses whom he may require to be cross-examined.

(B) The Sector Commander: It is doubtful whether the sector commander knows the complete story either, for the same reasons as are given above in respect of the Divisional Commander.

(C) The Battalion Commander, Major Isa Mohamed: The team believes that his account of his own actions in the matter are true. We were much impressed by this officer who certainly gave all the assistance he could to the surviving Red Cross once he realized their plight. He also took as early action as possible to ensure their safety by sending another officer ahead into the Red Cross building as soon as he had identified these.

(D) Lt. Ogoja, HQ Company: This officer was responsible for bringing the survivors out of the ICRC area. As he arrived at the scene of events after the actual killings, he is not in a position to explain how these occurred.

(E) Lt. Ochai, Company Commander: We are not entirely satisfied with the evidence given by this officer, who appears to us to be withholding information. We consider that he probably knows a good deal more about the incident than he is prepared to disclose at present.

Conclusions

From the evidence we have gathered we conclude that the incident occurred in the heat of battle for Okigwi. Notwithstanding: (1) The killings were unprovoked and inexcusable. (2) They could have been avoided had an as yet unidentified officer taken action to quell the excited soldiers. (3) The killings cannot be excused on the grounds that the unidentified officer and soldiers did not know that these people were Red Cross personnel since the building is clearly marked, even in

the compound. Furthermore each member of the ICRC team was wearing the easily identifiable Red Cross badge on his left chest. The Savourys wore a similar insignia. In addition there was a Red Cross flag flying and the ICRC people also had a red cross flag which they waved from their shelter.

Comments

As a result of our joint investigation we offer the following comments, with the hope that the risk of further incidents of this nature may be avoided.

(A) We understand that federal forces know the location of ICRC buildings in the various towns. If this is the case, it did not save the

lives of four people. We, therefore, consider that in all orders for attack on towns the troops should be clearly briefed as to the exact location of the ICRC buildings. They should also be briefed on what to do when encountering ICRC personnel.

(B) When the ICRC buildings are sited beside a main road on the main axis of advance of the federal forces, it would seem most imprudent to advise the ICRC personnel to remain in these premises once an attack by the Federal Forces has started. In this particular case not only were the buildings right beside the main road but dug rebel positions were just outside the ICRC area on the same hill, a good defensive position.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 2


TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1968

Respecting

- 1) The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria;
- 2) Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs.

WITNESS:

Mr. Arnold Smith, Secretary General of the Commonwealth.



ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Anderson	Mr. Harkness	Mr. Prud'homme
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Laniel	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Buchanan	Mr. Laprise	¹ Mr. Schumacher
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Legault	Mr. Smith (<i>Northumber-</i> <i>land-Miramichi</i>)
¹ Mr. Carter	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. De Bané	Mr. Macquarrie	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Marceau	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Forrestall	¹ Mr. Nesbitt	Mr. Winch
Mr. Gibson	Mr. Ouellet	¹ Mr. Yewchuk—(30)
Mr. Groos	Mr. Penner	

(Quorum 16)

¹Replaced Messrs. Alexander, Asselin, MacLean and McIntosh on October 8, 1968.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

TUESDAY, October 8, 1968.

Ordered,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be granted leave to sit while the House is sitting.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Nesbitt, Yewchuk, Schumacher and Carter be substituted for those of Messrs. Alexander, Asselin, McIntosh and MacLean on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

Attest.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, October 8, 1968.

(3)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day, with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Buchanan, Cafik, De Bané, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Marceau, Nesbitt, Ouellet, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Schumacher, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch and Yewchuk—(24).

In attendance: Mr. Arnold Smith, Secretary General of the Commonwealth.

The Committee continued its discussions concerning the situation in *Nigeria* and the *Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs*. Members had agreed to hear Mr. Arnold Smith, Secretary General of the Commonwealth, as their third witness in the current hearings.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Smith, who made an opening statement. Members questioned the witness concerning Commonwealth relations, in the context of the present situation in *Nigeria*.

It was agreed, unanimously, to include the Prime Minister's statement to the House, dated October 8, 1968, on the subject of *Nigeria—Use By Red Cross of Canadian Aircraft* as an Appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*see Appendix D*).

At the end of the questioning, the Chairman thanked Mr. Smith for his appearance before the Committee.

The Chairman reported on discussions held by members of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure concerning additional witnesses. It was agreed that Messrs. Brewin and MacDonald (*Egmont*), M.P.s, and Mr. McNeill, CUSO official, should be heard as the next witnesses, followed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Committee adjourned at 10:25 p.m., until Wednesday, October 9, 1968 at 3:45 p.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVENING SITTING

Tuesday, 8 October 1968

● 2012.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is a little past eight o'clock so perhaps I should call the meeting to order and we can proceed.

We have with us Mr. Arnold Smith, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat. I believe probably the best procedure would be to continue as we have with previous witnesses and ask Mr. Smith to make a short introductory statement giving us background with regard to his views on the present crisis, following which we can have questions from members of the Committee with a view, perhaps, to winding up this particular meeting at 9.45 or 10.00 o'clock, or thereabouts.

I now call upon Mr. Smith.

Mr. Arnold Smith (Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat): Mr. Chairman, it is a great delight for me to be back in Canada, although briefly, and it is a great honour, of course, to be here with you and members of your Committee.

When you asked me to speak to you I accepted because I thought it was my duty but I did have some hesitation because there are some aspects of the situation on which I will have to be reticent, and I may have to refuse to answer certain questions in detail because of the fact that for the last 18 months I and my colleagues in the Commonwealth Secretariat have been rather intimately involved with the leadership in Nigeria and in the former eastern region, now called Biafra by the Biafran authorities.

In our role of using good officers we have, of course, inevitably become privy to a good many confidences about views, hypothetical views sometimes, conditional views, about things that might or might not prove acceptable to the authorities of the two sides. Because some of these things are confidential I may have to be more reticent than you would like or that I would like to be if I were in a freer position in view of the respect I have for your Committee and the important task that you are performing. I hope that you will understand this and forgive me.

● 2015

I should perhaps begin by outlining something of my involvement in this problem as an international public servant. As you know,

after the military coup in Nigeria at the beginning of 1966—in fact it was after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in January of that year when I was in Lagos—there was a military regime established. There was a further coup in July. Difficulties developed between the Federal regime and the leadership of The Eastern region. General Ankrah, the head of state of Ghana, tried to assist them in resolving this in a conference at Aburi in January 1967 when an agreement in general terms was reached, but a couple of months after that the crisis became deeper and in effect the dialogue, consultation, meetings and discussions broke down entirely. My secretariat was involved from about March 1967, and of course we had been following the matter earlier, in trying to re-establish our dialogue between the head of the Federal Government and his colleagues in Lagos and the Governor of the Eastern Region, Colonel Ojukwu and his colleagues. There was some but not sufficient success in these efforts. My Deputy, Mr. Adu, a very distinguished African, visited Nigeria at that time and had talks with General Gowon and all of the regional governors, including Colonel Ojukwu, and we had planned a follow-up on this with a visit by myself, which had been arranged on the same conditions, for the end of May, at the end of a Commonwealth Conference in Nairobi which we had organized. Immediately before this visit, a few hours before I was due to leave Nairobi for Lagos, there was the declaration of secession. I postponed this visit but remained in touch with the government and the regional authorities. I was in Lagos at the beginning of July 1967 immediately before and during the first two days of hostilities. We had been trying, as I say, to re-establish contacts and discussion to resolve the difficulties. The Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Military Government, General Gowon, and Colonel Ojukwu asked us to use our good offices to try to resolve the differences between them, and I was glad to try to do so. It is my own view, which is an unorthodox but I think a sensible view, that what between sovereign states are called diplomatic relations are more important than ever during a war, during a state of hostilities. The traditional theory is that you break relations during a war and you do not talk to the people you are fighting with. This seems to me exactly upside down. It is precisely in that situation, I think, that contacts are more important than ever and I tried to develop

direct and continuing contacts between representatives of the two sides during hostilities with a view to assisting them in discussing and resolving the differences and thus bringing the fighting to an end.

• 2020

In terms of general diplomatic practice, as I say, this is unorthodox. The only other case I know of is when China attacked India a few years ago and Mr. Nehru, despite a lot of pressures, refused to withdraw the Indian Embassy from Peking and I think established a very good precedent for maintaining a line of talk. Another precedent, not quite analogous, was when I was Ambassador in Moscow during the height of the Cuban crisis. Immediately after that crisis, the hot line was established by agreement between Moscow and Washington. I think this sort of development makes sense. I think that the traditional theory that you do not talk during hostilities to your enemies is, as I say, exactly upside down.

I developed, with the consent and at the request of the leaders of the Federal Government and of the eastern region—Biafra as they called themselves after secession—a very close and continuing contact and tried to get representatives of the two sides to meet together to discuss their differences as well as discussing them with me and sometimes passing views for communication with comments, and so on.

In the autumn of last year we did have some meetings, informal and secret, between representatives of the two sides and some progress was made in moving towards what I hope will prove a complete resolution of the differences, but not enough progress. These talks were broken off by the Biafran authorities. I will call the Biafran authorities "Biafra" and "Biafran" without prejudice to questions of diplomatic recognition, if you do not mind. The very word is contentious but one has to talk and convey one's meaning and I propose to do that.

Following this breaking-off of contacts that I think showed promise of being useful, we maintained separate contacts with leaders on the two sides. These became at times very intensive. Altogether hundreds of hours of meetings took place between me and my deputy and the Biafran ministers on one hand and similarly with Federal ministers and representatives on the other hand. In these

separate talks we managed to make some progress towards possible bases for compromise but again it proved insufficient to get agreement that was ratified by the collective leadership on the two sides.

During January there was quite a lot of progress and then there was a breakoff and a refusal to meet and again this was a Biafran refusal to negotiate for some months. Finally, in April both sides did agree to meet to negotiate their differences during hostilities. The meetings began with a series of 12 days—I think it was 11 or 12 days—in my headquarters in London. They met in my flat, actually. They did not want to meet in Marlborough House on the ground that this would be too formal, and then there were formal talks in Kampala after again about 12 days and, I think, 12 days in which quite a lot of progress was made and in which there was a real possibility of a compromise deal that would meet what was declared to be the essential needs of the two sides, the talks were broken off again by the Biafran delegation. We had a number of separate meetings with representatives—ministers on the two sides—after that in an attempt to revive these talks. Lagos agreed to revive the talks at the point at which they had broken off. We had a promise to do so, after some time, from the Biafran representatives, but this was not kept and they did not return for the talks.

• 2025

Finally, in July there was a change of position on the willingness to resume negotiations by the Biafran leadership and I received word that they were coming to London to resume negotiations right away with a view to returning if the exploratory talks proved promising, as they might have to Kampala, to work out a final compromise agreement. But from the day before the date for this return the Organization of African Unity took an initiative which I thought was very promising and invited General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu to Niamey. I welcomed this. I hoped that they would succeed. The talks at Niamey looked promising, again, but were preliminary and to be followed by more formal negotiations at Addis Ababa a week or so later. By the time Addis talks came there was an increased—well, a diminished flexibility—let us put it that way, and, as you know, unfortunately the Addis talks failed to result in an agreed settlement just as the earlier Kampala talks which we had organized failed to result in an agreed settlement.

The question was due to come up a few weeks later at the Organization of African Unity summit meeting at Algiers and in between those two meetings I had a number of visits from Biafran ministers and some from senior Federal representatives, but in Algiers an agreement was not reached. There was a very important OAU resolution with which I am sure you are familiar as it is a matter of public record. You know the resolution.

• 2030

I have heard a good bit from the two sides about the secret negotiations that went on at Niamey and at Addis. I do not feel at liberty to go into detail about that. These talks at Niamey and Addis were not under our auspices and the reports that I heard were, of course, in confidence from members of the governments of the two sides, but I had further discussions with ministers of the Biafran Government. Again, you can assume quotation marks if you wish to do so, in terms of recognition and, of course, with Federal representatives. There again seemed to be a possibility of a resumption of negotiations, but, again, this did not happen. More recently, in the latter part of September, I had telephone calls from Paris at midnight to my flat from Biafran ministers telling me that they wanted to come and see me very urgently the next morning and they came next morning. The approaches, which again I am sorry to say are confidential and I cannot go into them in detail—I do apologize for this—did indicate a degree of flexibility to some very grave decisions that the Biafran Government felt it had to face in view of the course of the war: whether to organize a government in exile if they lost more territory, whether to organize long-term guerilla resistance if more conventional resistance became untenable, whether to adopt a passive policy of no negotiations, no deal, no administrative co-operation and just see what happened, or whether to resume negotiations and try to work out a compromise. Again I do not feel at liberty to go into detail about these talks though they looked promising, but again they failed. In other words there has been a long record of approaches since April 1967, I think sometimes very close approaches to compromise deals between the two sides and deals with some support from important people sometimes and the authorities concerned accepted.

In our role of using our good offices and acting as mediators to the two sides of course I have had to be entirely impartial. There is a Ghanaian saying that if you try to separate fighting dogs you are apt to get your hands bitten. During a civil war or an international war inevitably there are a number of aspects of warfare, one of which is political warfare—intelligence that tends to exploit differences between members of the other sides' leadership. Another aspect is propaganda. I was trying to avoid involvement in these aspects by giving honest and impartial advice, as I saw it, and using our good offices to assist in working out a compromise deal which seems to me much the best solution for all concerned.

Propaganda efforts still go on and propaganda problems still exist but I want to avoid getting involved in that to the extent that I can. On the other hand I do not want to be misleading in any way and when one has to select those parts of the full truth that I am at liberty to talk about the problem of selection is tricky. I know this is not very satisfactory to a Committee such as yours and I apologize for it, but I hope you will appreciate my good faith in this.

It seems to me that in analyzing the issues there are of course a number of aspects that are important. One tremendously important one is the humanitarian aspect, the problem of survival—the problem of adequate food, adequate medical supplies and so on. Bound up with this humanitarian aspect is the problem of bringing an end to the hostilities as quickly as possible. Of course this is much the best solution to the human problems as well as to the political problem, but it is bound up with the political situation. It seems to me that for the Federal Government of Nigeria, the central issue, the one issue on which they have from the beginning been absolutely firm, has been to seek to maintain the territorial integrity and the political integrity of Nigeria as a federation, the terms of the federation—the powers of the central government on these things they have been flexible, but on this issue of the integrity of the federation they have been from—rigid—whatever word you wish to use. On other matters they have, in my judgment, shown a very great flexibility.

• 2035

From the Biafran side the situation is somewhat more complicated. There are many

authoritative statements that the key points are physical security, assurance that there will not be genocide, physical security for the lives of the people and economic viability in the future deal for the Ibo people and their neighbours, in the former eastern region. At other times, the issue of absolute separate sovereignty has been a point of rigidity. In between these things there has been a good bit of play.

In my judgment there have been many occasions in the past eighteen months when compromise deals that to me, as an outsider, looked pretty tolerable—pretty good—guaranteeing physical security and economic viability, could have been attained at the cost of concession on this point of separate sovereignty for Biafra. It is not my judgment that is decisive in these matters, but I give you my judgment for what it is worth.

On the other hand, there is a very real, deep and widespread fear of genocide among many of the people in Biafra. The charges that genocide is a policy of the federal government, in my judgment, are entirely unfounded. It is not the policy of General Gowon and his colleagues. According to my information, which coincides with that of the international observers in the territory now occupied by the federal authorities—a territory in which there are now some millions of Ibos—there has not been genocide. Certainly there have been some very deplorable excesses and atrocities on both sides. These things are apt to happen in a war and I do not try to minimize their horror in any way, but I think that impartial observers would agree that in territory controlled by the Federal government there has not been the implementation of a policy of genocide.

On the other hand, the fear of genocide among people inside the Biafran lines is a very real fear. Some people could say that it is a product of their propaganda policy; other people could say that it is understandable in view of the history and the horrible pogroms that took place against Ibos and other easterners in the north well before secession in 1966.

I am not going to go into the rights and wrongs of the issues and the things of the past that led to this crisis, but I did want to make the point that the fear of genocide is a real political factor. I see no evidence for charges that there is a policy of genocide by the Federal government, and I see a great deal of evidence to the contrary; and I know the people concerned, and so on.

In my judgment, one of the difficult problems in trying to reach a compromise solution is the question of the issues on which the leaderships of the two sides are prepared to be flexible. Apart from the fundamental principle of sovereignty for one Nigeria, and it could be a re-establishment of a Nigeria rather than a formal renunciation of secession, I see a good bit of evidence of flexibility on the part of the authorities in Lagos. On the other side, there is a fear on the part of some of the leadership that unless they have a recognized separate sovereignty they will not have the points which they say are the essentials, that is, physical security and economic viability.

• 2040

In my judgment—and this has been my judgment from the beginning and I have made no bones of it in talks with the leadership on the two sides, and my judgment could be wrong as I am an outsider—an agreed settlement would have to involve compromises on both sides. It would have to involve on the sovereignty point compromise by the Biafrans, and on the physical security point and the economic viability point, flexibility and compromises by Lagos.

We have found, as I say, different degrees of flexibility offered at different times by one side or the other. But when it has come to the crunch of ratification as opposed to hints or indications by delegates, there has not been the requisite flexibility on the political issue of sovereignty by the Biafran side and the war goes on and this I think is a great tragedy for all concerned. I am not trying to allocate praise or blame, but I do want to suggest that it is very difficult and indeed dangerous for outsiders to be pushed into a position of trying to force the solution to the political issue. It seems to me that this is essentially an African problem, if you like, and much more particularly a problem for the many tribes and peoples of Nigeria, including the Ibos, one of the very great peoples, and the other two big tribes, and the very numerous minority peoples who taken together form about half the population.

Essentially the political issues are something that they themselves are going to have to work out. Efforts have been made and are going to continue to be made until this war is resolved to bring in outside pressures to influence and determine the decision on these political issues. My own judgment is that it is wiser to concentrate on relief, certainly,

which is something that outsiders can help on, the provision of medical supplies, which is something that outsiders can help on, and the logistics involved in both of these things. Outsiders can also help in providing good offices and in sometimes giving advice and facilities for negotiations on the fundamental political issues. But in my judgment no outsiders can determine the resolution of these political issues. They can help in them, they can influence them, or they can do quite a lot of harm in reducing flexibility and stiffening rigidity on these issues. It is quite important, I think, how outside influence is allowed to be brought to bear or kept from being brought to bear on these matters. It is still my view—and of course the bargaining power on the two sides is very different from what it was six months ago or three months ago or even six weeks ago—that the course of battle in any war is one of the factors in bargaining power. But in my judgment there is still the possibility and the very strong desirability of a negotiated settlement which would bring about a ceasefire on political terms acceptable to the two sides and then the maximum outside assistance in quick provision of relief, of some guarantees to observers. A short time ago there was acceptance on both sides of not merely observers, but a Commonwealth peacekeeping force in which both sides agreed that they would welcome Canadians. So now a lot of water has gone under the bridge in the last few months. I think the real point now is a much smaller thing, it is observers. But there is still the possibility of a compromise settlement involving these things and, of course, after the ending of hostilities involving outside assistance—I hope it will be generous—in the very big reconstruction efforts that will be needed. But it seems to me it would be dangerous and counter-productive for any outsiders and I include my own country, Canada, and my own office as Commonwealth Secretary-General, to think that they can themselves determine and resolve the political issues. This is a matter for the peoples directly involved. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

• 2045

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Smith, and I think perhaps we will proceed in the usual way with questions from our members. Mr. Smith may possibly have to reserve on certain questions. I know he will try to answer as broadly as he can any questions which our

members may have. I think we should bear in mind the fact that his particular qualifications as Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and the specialized knowledge which he has by reason of that office and the limitations which membership in the Commonwealth impose upon our government by reason of the fact that both Canada and Nigeria are members of that Commonwealth, which we all believe has a useful function to perform in the world.

I have marked down first Mr. Laniel, Mr. Fairweather, Mr. Gibson, Mr. Winch, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Buchanan, and Mr. Roberts. Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Smith, you have given us the political evolution of this situation in Nigeria, but I conclude from your remarks that you also know that the terms of reference of this Committee are limited more or less to the humanitarian aspect of the situation. I am sure that the Committee would be more united on the question of auto-determination than it would be on the other aspect. We are united on the principle, but not the approach to it.

My first question is: do you think that the secessionist government of Biafra still considers itself a member of the Commonwealth? Did they ask the Commonwealth Secretariat or organization for help in any way? You did comment on some of the talks that you have had with representatives of the Government of Biafra, but I am wondering when they occurred, and if you still, at this stage now, have communication with the Government of Biafra.

Mr. Arnold Smith: Yes, certainly. Membership of the Commonwealth in the formal legal sense is sovereign governments recognized as such by other sovereign governments—and Biafra is recognized by two Commonwealth governments but not by the others as a separate government—and admitted to membership by the consensus of Commonwealth heads of government. In that sense, of course, Biafra has never been a separate member of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, the Commonwealth is an association of peoples as well as of governments. Both leaders sought and got our good offices, and although I have not counted them up there have been hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hours of separate meetings with representatives of the two sides in addition to the formal peace conferences. These have gone on and are going on. There were several

meetings with Biafran representatives a couple of weeks ago just before I left, in fact since then.

• 2050

Our good offices remain available, so I think do those of the Organization of African Unity, and we have been both of us trying to help in the same purpose of bringing about an agreed settlement in the restoration of peace; not as rivals, but helping each other in this thing. Of course these officers remain; anybody in a position to help ought to do so.

Mr. Laniel: Has the International Red Cross approached the Commonwealth Secretariat in any way, because there seems to be some kind of a "résistance," as we say in French, from the Biafran people to acceptance of aid from some Commonwealth countries because of the position taken by some of these countries?

Mr. Smith: We have been in very close touch with the heads of the International Red Cross. They sent a representative to Kampala during the peace talks which we organized there. They did not sit in, of course, on the secret negotiations, but their senior representative asked me to arrange for him meetings with the leaders of the two delegations. This I did, and I was present at his request and at the request of the leaders of the two delegations; and we have been in touch a great deal since then. These contacts go on.

The problem of getting relief supplies in has been a thorny one, as you know. It seems to have been greatly improved by news that I learned today, and which I suppose you also have learned.

There has been terrible suffering in this war, and it is very important that, if possible, it be ended by political agreement as soon as this can be done. In the meantime I have quite a lot of respect for the efforts of the International Red Cross, and of other organizations helping them, to try to alleviate the suffering.

Mr. Laniel: Would you have any opinion on the reaction of the political leaders of Biafra? They seem to be ready to accept direct aid from any country, but it seems that the minute that country seeks to consult the Nigerian government, or Lagos, they change their minds and refuse the aid.

Mr. Smith: I have opinions on this and on many other things that are probably better

not expressed publicly if we want to continue to assist. Yes, I do have opinions.

Mr. Laniel: Yes; I ask that because I do not foresee the Biafran people thinking that Canada or any other Commonwealth country will at any time stop recognizing Nigeria.

Mr. Smith: It is obviously desirable to the extent that, if possible, the starving be fed; and I think efforts are being made to do this.

I think it is also desirable that international charitable organizations such as the Red Cross should not themselves try to swing the balance politically in the political issue. Certainly the decisions of the Red Cross in various tactical and organizational problems have been theirs, not mine. I sympathize with some of their difficulties. There have been many problems in this area.

I think the key point is that to get an agreed settlement there has got to be flexibility on both sides. I heard myself quoted on the radio tonight as saying that there has not been flexibility on either sides. That is not an accurate statement of what I said. You need the flexibility on two sides. If you have it on only one on a given point at a given time that does not meet the condition for getting a deal.

Mr. Laniel: Although I know that you are not responsible for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, do you by any chance know if there will be representatives from both sides at the next Parliamentary Association meeting in the Bahamas at the end of the month?

Mr. Smith: I do not know the answer to that.

Mr. Winch: As Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Association, Canada Branch, I can tell you that it is not possible under the constitution of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.

Mr. Laniel: I did not get that, Mr. Winch.

• 2055

Mr. Winch: It is not possible under the constitution of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. We ran up against that two years ago when Canada was the host country and at that time—it was after the military coup—we wanted to invite them to come at least as observers and we found at that time, under a constitutional decision, that we could not do so as a conference of the

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association is based on representations of Commonwealth countries that have elected a democratic government. So on the basis of a decision having been made—and we also had a similar decision some two years before on Pakistan—and in view of those two precedents, as the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association I think I can say that I doubt very much whether they will be represented at Nassau about a month from now. I would say not. But the invitation, basically, has to come from the host country and to my knowledge it is not possible for them to do so.

Mr. Laniel: I will pass this time, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather?

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was very interested in this and I suppose it is an arguable point of view that it is primarily an African problem. I do not argue that point but I would like to ask whether the fact that Britain, the USSR and France are supplying arms does not change the rules somewhat?

Mr. Smith: What I really said, I think, or what I meant to say, was that the resolution of the political issue of sovereignty—the integrity of the federation or of self-determination—this issue is essentially not merely an African problem but a problem for the people of that particular territory themselves.

Mr. Fairweather: But the military problem is a world problem.

Mr. Smith: Yes. Undoubtedly there is an important world influence in this in terms of arms supplies, in terms of finance supplies and also, I would say, in terms of contributions to the propaganda war.

Mr. Fairweather: So that the initiative of Canada at the United Nations or private diplomatic initiatives with the countries supplying arms would not be amiss.

Mr. Smith: I do not want to comment on...

Mr Fairweather: All right.

Mr. Smith: ...issues between parties in Canada or an individual...

Mr. Fairweather: This is not a party matter.

Mr. Smith: ...government. I know, but it is a matter for governments. In my present job I am collectively responsible to 28 sovereign governments. They have different views, and I think the decisions taken on these things are matters about which I think it would be wiser if I did not comment. I have my own views, of course.

Mr. Fairweather: Is it possible for us to have a comment on the explanation—if not, I am sure I will understand and I assume the others will—of France's supply of arms to Biafra at a rather late date in the war—late, militarily speaking.

Mr. Smith: General de Gaulle has expressed his views on this. I do not think it would be helpful if I commented publicly. I wondered if what I think our American cousins call an executive session might be a good idea, but I gather that a public session such as this is more appropriate. I do not think it would be helpful if I commented on the actions of individual governments in this matter.

Mr. Fairweather: Would the same follow with respect to an explanation as to why the organization for African unity has not taken action lately? Is that in the same category as France, and if so...

● 2100

Mr. Smith: The OAU took quite a lot of action in terms of promising initiative. I hoped and fought at Niamey to bring the leaders of the two sides together, and at Addis Ababa under the very active, energetic and thoughtful aegis in mediatory attempts of the Emperor of Ethiopia to get the two sides to agree. They did not succeed, just as we did not succeed in our earlier efforts and have not succeeded in our later efforts; but I think they did try to take action. They also expressed certain principles in a resolution which has been made public.

Mr. Fairweather: It would help me to know a little more about the Ibo people's suspicions. In the warring part of Nigeria are not some of the leaders people of very great world stature?

Mr. Smith: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Fairweather: Very great in world forums...

Mr. Smith: Yes, undoubtedly.

Mr. Fairweather: I mean, we are not dealing with upstart people of little education.

Mr. Smith: I know a good many of these people well and I must say some of them are very brilliant; some of them less wise than others; some of them very wise. The same is true I should say of Moruba leaders and others...

Mr. Fairweather: Oh, yes, I am not...

Mr. Smith: ...such as the Hausa leaders—I mean the federal leaders of other tribes—but the Ibo tribe has been one of the outstanding tribes of any part of Africa.

Mr. Fairweather: Having no direct knowledge of deaths I cannot subtract, but presumably we are dealing in this situation with 10 or 11 million Ibo people? Is this not about it, or are there more?

Mr. Smith: I think there have been about 8 million Ibos in the Eastern Region and perhaps a couple of million who lived in other regions, some of whom went back to the Eastern Region after the 1966 attacks on the Ibos in the North. There have been a few millions of peoples of other tribes, Ibibio and others, in the former Eastern region—the Rivers State, the Calabar State; so that in the original area that called itself Biafra the total population was about 12 million.

Mr. Fairweather: Two short questions. In the context of developing countries in Africa is Biafra a viable concept? Could it go it alone? Leaving aside whether it should or should not, which you say is not our business—and I agree—could it?

Mr. Smith: No; I said it is not a thing that we can determine. I think we are right to be interested in these things. I do not believe that one should be disinterested in anything that goes on on this planet. We may have to extend the work one of these days. We cannot be decisive in these matters.

Coming to your question, it depends on what you mean by "Biafra". As the Biafran authorities defined it originally it was the whole of the Eastern Region. That used to be a poorer part of Nigeria and the very energetic and able Ibo people moved in very large numbers to other parts of Nigeria. They were strong federalists. They were very active in commerce; in all sorts of technical fields. Many of them were very highly educated people. This part used to be poor and there was a big exodus to

other parts of the country. Then very large oil supplies were found there. The part now held by the rebel regime, if you want to use that word, or the Biafran government, if you want to use that word, is, of course, about a tenth of this original territory. It is very much smaller. It is very compressed. Unless one knows just what territory you are talking about it would be difficult to answer the question.

Mr. Fairweather: I was thinking of the part that seceded in May.

Mr. Smith: The total territory, the Eastern Region—very wealthy indeed; I would say, one of the potentially richest parts of Africa. The oil resources there are already very important and have been in world commerce but the potential resources—the discovered but not yet developed resources—are incomparably greater. And, of course, this potential wealth has played some part in this civil war.

Mr. Fairweather: Lastly, sir, is it not true that no matter what happens militarily the reconstruction job that Nigeria, or the two countries—the territory—faces is a very, very formidable one and will take perhaps a decade or two?

Mr. Smith: It is formidable. It will take, I think—and I hope this will be forthcoming—a lot of international compassion and practical assistance. On the other hand, the resources that can be developed after the immediate war damages are repaired are very great and, in due course, if these can be restored I think it will become a very prosperous part of Africa.

• 2105

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Gibson followed by Mr. Winch, Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Nesbitt, Mr. Roberts, Mr. De Bané, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Laprise and Mr. Ouellet. Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Smith, would it be a reasonable guess or possibility that steps are being taken at some level to curb the flow of arms from Britain and France into this area? I said "at some level" on purpose so that you would not be pinned down.

Mr. Smith: Well, I have heard a good bit of discussion of this problem at all sorts of levels. There is a difference between the moral and

political problems posed for a country that has been a traditional supplier of arms to a government that it has recognized and another country that has not been a traditional one. In a sense, whatever decision you take, either to supply arms or to cease supplying arms, if you have been the traditional supplier it involves in effect a decision that can be called an interventionist decision. The decision will influence the outcome. It is a different sort of decision, at least in degree and perhaps in kind, from a decision of a government that has not been a traditional supplier to accede to requests for supplying arms.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I have been most interested in the remarks of Mr. Smith and I certainly realize the rather delicate position he is in.

I was interested in one of your comments, Mr. Smith, to the effect that although outsiders, as you put it—countries outside of Nigeria, the African states—should be careful in what they do and in offering advice. At the same time, you said that it would be helpful. Now, could you comment on that a bit further by saying whether or not when you made that statement you had in mind operation helpfully through the United Nations and if so do you think that if Canada were to give some leadership there it would be considered helpful?

Mr. Smith: I have given a great deal of advice to ministers on both sides. It has not been public advice. There is quite a difference, I think, between private advice to people in this sort of crisis and struggle, and public advice. I did not intend to comment—I do not think I did—on action through the United Nations and I do not think I should comment on...

Mr. Winch: No, you did not, sir. You did not, but you said that we could and should be helpful. Now, in order to try to pin that down a bit more I am asking whether you include that perhaps that should mean action through the United Nations.

Mr. Smith: I think when I was talking about the importance of Canada being helpful I was speaking about Canada as a relatively very rich country, thank heavens, being generous and helpful in the provision of those things in which we are well supplied—food, perhaps

medical help, logistic help, and that sort of thing. I think in terms of diplomatic advice these things on the whole are best done through quiet diplomatic channels where they are quite different from what might be called political pressures and intervention in the propaganda or political warfare aspect of the struggle, but on the particular issue, which I know has been one under consideration and discussion in the Canadian House of Commons, I think it is more appropriate, as I am temporarily an international rather than a Canadian citizen, that I do not comment on that.

• 2110

Mr. Winch: Would you then carry on a bit further in view of what you just said about Canada's being a rich country—and I am certain that its people and its government would like to assist on a humanitarian attitude to help both with food and with medical supplies. I think I am right, Mr. Chairman, in saying that is one of the major problems that this Committee has to deal with and an aspect of it is not only making available the medical and food supplies, but the distribution, and at least from our present information we gather that one of the major problems is transportation. I am not speaking just in particular of transportation into Lagos, Nigeria itself, but into Biafra. We have heard more than once that what is required is, for example, *Hercules* planes. Now we have the major supply of *Hercules*, which leads me to ask if you could comment on this: if it was Parliament or government policy—it would have to be government policy—to make transportation assistance available, which basically now comes under our RCAF, do you think that would be acceptable not only to Biafra—I think it would be acceptable there—but to the official Federal Nigerian Government, and not considered an act of war?

Mr. Smith: I heard on the news a couple of hours ago a statement by the Prime Minister that the Federal Government of Nigeria had agreed that the supply of Canadian planes to the International Red Cross for transport—

Mr. Winch: That is one *Hercules* that has been out for quite a while and which the federal authorities now agree could be used not only in Nigeria, but for supplies to Biafra. However if I might make it clear, I think our general impression is that more than one *Hercules* is required and that it should be able to deliver supplies from the Portuguese

islands to Biafra. Are you able to comment on that at all?

Mr. Laniel: On a point of order. I do not want to correct Mr. Winch, but talking about help he said that it would be and it is acceptable to the Biafran people, and gave the impression maybe it was not acceptable to the other side. The way I have heard the story up to now is that on the two occasions there was a refusal it was by the Biafran people and not by the Nigerian Government. I just wanted to make that point.

The Chairman: Would you like to continue with your questions Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: I just wonder if it is possible, from your knowledge, that the offer of more transport from Canada would be acceptable, in particular on the transport of goods into Biafra.

Mr. Smith: There have been differences of view, as you know, in recent months, between the Federal and Biafran authorities about channels, airstrips and all sorts of things. One could go into that in a lot of detail, but I do not think it would be very profitable for me to do so. I understood the news this afternoon to be that the provision of Canadian planes to the International Red Cross—perhaps I am wrong on this—would be acceptable to Lagos. I agree with you that we can assume that will be acceptable to the Biafran authorities too. The question of which airstrips, flight routes and so on is a matter that I assume is under active discussion by the Canadian Government and the authorities both in Lagos and in Biafra because these things are practical necessities, but I am not up to date on the state of these negotiations which I think have been taking place today.

• 2115

Mr. Fairweather: Would it be helpful to all of us if the statement—there was a little difficulty about this statement. I think our witness this afternoon had a conclusion that I did not draw from it, not that that is fatal, but could the statement of the Prime Minister be incorporated because I think there are different views on what it actually was.

The Chairman: Incorporate it in the minutes of the proceedings? Would that be agreed? It is agreeable that this should be annexed to the minutes of our proceedings as an exhibit. There was some question, I

believe, as to whether it applied to one aircraft or a number of aircraft and I suppose the reason would be that there was only one aircraft that we were talking about at the time. Would you care to continue with your questions please Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: There is just one and I hope I will not be out of order on this but it is something that has been on my mind and perhaps Mr. Smith could assist us. It is on the general background. I had the privilege of being in Nigeria myself for several weeks a few years ago—all over Nigeria—and I have met the various tribes and the leaders. Could I ask, on the general background, whether basically it is tribal difference or economic and religious?

Mr. Smith: Well, I do not think it is religious. There are many Christians in the armies on both sides. Most of the Ibos are Christians, as you know.

Mr. Winch: But the Hausas are not.

Mr. Smith: That is right. On the other hand a very large number of the Yoruba, all together over half, are Christian, as are many of the Tivs. General Gowon is a Christian, and so on. I do not think it has been a religious war in any significant sense at all. Tribal aspects are certainly present.

The economic prizes of control of the quite fabulous new oil reserves have been very important in terms of internal differences of view and in terms of external interest by various governments. These have been big factors. I would not say that they were dominant because I do not think any external factors have been dominant. But they have been very important.

Mr. Winch: What I am trying to get at is that federated Nigeria as it is set up would be in serious trouble economically unless it included the area which is known as Biafra. And does that not have a major effect on what is going on in Nigeria today?

Mr. Smith: Yes. I do not think the main motive of the Federal Government has been this economic one. I think the main motive has been a desire, indeed a determination, to preserve the territorial integrity of their country. But I think that when you come down to conditions, in negotiations the prize of these oil reserves has been very important; not decisive but very important. I do not think they should be minimized.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Smith, you referred to the meeting at Aburi. Was not the original break because Colonel Ojukwu felt that there had been specific undertakings given by General Gowon at Aburi which he subsequently, after going home again and discussing with his own government, reneged on? Is this not where the original break came in the relations and if so, what were the specific matters that Ojukwu feels were backed away from by Gowon?

• 2120

Mr. Smith: I do not think I can adequately answer this question. I have a lot of information on this matter in my files in London. I did not come to Ottawa to discuss Nigeria and I certainly did not anticipate the honour of being with you this evening. Certainly Colonel Ojukwu and his colleagues have made this point repeatedly. Certainly there have been points made repeatedly by members of the Federal Government that a plan for secession—in fact, the determination for secession and manoeuvring secession—began long before on the part of the eastern leadership.

I do not think I should try to pronounce on the rights and wrongs of these charges and countercharges. I think the distrust, the fear the unwillingness to talk things out has been a very grave factor in the prolongation and exacerbation of the crisis and I tried without success, although sometimes we seemed quite close to it, to get these things resolved. I do not think trying to give judgment on the rights and wrongs of the charges and countercharges would be very profitable.

Mr. Buchanan: It is not so much judgment on rights and wrongs. It is my understanding that when this meeting terminated the feeling was that they had, in fact, reached some satisfactory agreement and had the terms of this understanding been adhered to the whole situation would never have developed. Or is that too much of a simplification?

Mr. Smith: I do not think I can answer that. I think there are many people who would agree with that. I know some people who disagree with that but I do not really feel in a position to give a judgment on this matter. I think the causes of this crisis as opposed to the reasons for the failure to resolve it thus far go very deep into the history of Nigeria; I

think we would all agree on that. It is very complicated and there has been lots of rights and wrongs on all sides.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: That is fine; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The order of questioners that I have at the moment is Mr. Nesbitt, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Thompson, Mr. De Bané, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Laprise and Mr. Ouellet. If that is satisfactory, I will call upon Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. Nesbitt: I have two or three questions. You mentioned a few minutes ago, Mr. Smith, in reply to a question from Mr. Fairweather, that there was a great deal of oil in what is known as Biafra. What other minerals are in that area; would you tell us?

Mr. Smith: I am afraid I cannot. There is a good bit of palm oil. I do not really know of minerals other than oil—perhaps I should—but they have an awful lot of oil.

Mr. Nesbitt: The oil is very extensive. In your view—and it is a matter of opinion, of course—does this partially account for the interest of France in Biafra?

Mr. Smith: Well, one's assessment of General de Gaulle's motivation is a very complicated question. It certainly would account for the interest of some Frenchmen. It would also account for the interest of some people in a good many countries.

Mr. Nesbitt: It would be safe to say this perhaps accounts for some of the international interest in Biafra.

Mr. Smith: Undoubtedly.

Mr. Nesbitt: You mentioned I believe, Mr. Smith, when you were giving your statement to the Committee, that some of the Biafran ministers had telephoned you from Paris. Was this a regular procedure? Did they keep their headquarters in Paris during these negotiations?

Mr. Smith: I have had, I suppose, hundreds of phone calls from various parts of Europe to my flat, often at night over the last year.

Mr. Nesbitt: No, but from Biafran ministers? Were all these phone calls from Europe from Biafran representatives, or were you referring to other phone calls?

Mr. Smith: No. I have often had phone calls from Federal representatives, too.

Mr. Nesbitt: From other capitals of Europe?

Mr. Smith: Yes.

Mr. Nesbitt: Other than Paris?

Mr. Smith: Yes, Lisbon is a very important meeting place.

Mr. Nesbitt: What other capitals besides Paris and Lisbon would there be?

Mr. Smith: Well, I think those would be the main two, but those people are travelling around and sometimes they phone from many places in the world.

Mr. Nesbitt: Could you give us any indication—I suppose you must have some idea although I realize of course, this might be classified from your point of view—of the extent of arms supplied Biafran authorities by the government of France?

Mr. Smith: No, I do not think I can properly comment on this. The French government has stated that it has not supplied arms. I think it is generally considered that a lot of arms have been going in from Gabon.

Mr. Nesbitt: Well, perhaps not directly. This is perhaps a different kind of question. Of the number of observers who have been to Nigeria and Biafra to gather information which we have all heard of from time to time would you say that many, in general terms, are there for the purpose of gathering impartial and factual information or would they be there, perhaps, with preconceived notions and were they going there for the purpose of bolstering the notions?

• 2125

Mr. Smith: Are you speaking of the official international observers?

Mr. Nesbitt: Observers of all varieties; just in general.

Mr. Smith: There have been hundreds of people and I suppose their opinions are as mixed as the generality of mankind, but a great many people who have visited Nigeria or Biafra have come to see me afterwards and sometimes before. Many of them are people whose good faith and motivation I respect quite a lot. There have been some others who

seemed to me naive even though very sincere and some others who may have had rather more mixed motives. I do not think I should try to categorize these people.

Mr. Nesbitt: But there are some with mixed motives, you would think? Now, I have a couple of more direct questions. I think time may be getting short; we understand that there may be a vote in the House this evening so I will not take up too much time. It has been brought to our attention by newspaper reports and other sources, Mr. Smith, that the Biafran authorities have, on occasion, refused to accept relief supplies going in which seems rather confusing. We have also received reports from the other side that it has been difficult to get relief supplies into Biafra overland by road. Is this because the Biafran authorities, for defence purposes, do not wish the roads reconstructed to bring in supplies for fear it would facilitate the invasion of the Nigerian authorities?

Mr. Smith: It is always a tricky business assessing motives of political decisions, but I have heard this expressed as one motive in certain cases, yes.

Mr. Nesbitt: From your own observation do you think it would be reasonable to assume, at least in some cases, that would be the reason for not wishing to have roads reconstructed?

Mr. Smith: I think military calculations about logistics have to enter into the political issues on both sides, and I think they have on this issue of relief supply channels as well as other things.

Mr. Nesbitt: I have a final question. Although I realize you have not been here very long, Mr. Smith, I suppose you are fairly familiar with Canadian press reports of the situation vis-à-vis Biafra and the central government in Nigeria, or have you had the opportunity of seeing many?

Mr. Smith: I have been reading, of course, in the last few days. In London I get Canadian papers; I get papers from a good many parts of the world and have to see summaries of them. Of course I pay particular attention to the Canadian ones because I am a Canadian after all.

Mr. Nesbitt: Without singling out any newspaper or newspapers specifically, do you find that in general the reporting and the editorial

comment has been accurate or has it been misleading in any way?

Mr. Smith: I do not really think I know enough in the way of a balanced picture of total Canadian press coverage, and so on, to comment fairly on that. I am sorry. I am not trying to duck the question.

Mr. Nesbitt: Have all the reports that you have read been thoroughly unbiased in your view, Mr. Smith, or would you say some of them might have been somewhat misleading?

Mr. Smith: Do you have the CP particularly in mind?

Mr. Nesbitt: No, no. Oh, heavens no.

Mr. Smith: I thought you referred to the *Canadian Press*.

• 2130

Mr. Nesbitt: Canadian press in the broad sense of the word.

Mr. Smith: I think Canadian newspapermen are pretty good.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, that line of questioning—comments on editorials—is not permitted even in the House of Commons and I do not see why it should be permitted here.

Mr. Nesbitt: Mr. Chairman, with respect to Mr. Laniel's objection...

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe Mr. Smith is competent to decide in his own mind whether he can make any useful comments.

Mr. Nesbitt: I do not care whether or not Mr. Laniel likes it.

The Chairman: Do you have any useful comments on this?

Mr. Smith: No. I would say that the general standard of Canadian newspapermen is very high, but I do not think I should comment in detail.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Roberts: I hope this will not be received in a contentious way. I think, Mr. Smith, in this Committee we have been searching for a way in which Canada can help with this dreadful problem by trying to draw a fairly sharp and clear distinction between the political problem and the humanitarian aspects of the problem in the hope that we might be able to do something

in the humanitarian way which would not be conceived as interference with the political situation. But I wonder if you would feel able to comment on the possibility that we may not be able to make this clear distinction, from the point of view of the parties to the dispute, given an addiction to propaganda and public relations, that the whole humanitarian problem becomes really a weapon in the war itself and that a strong stand or an effort by Canada, even simply on the humanitarian grounds, in the United Nations or elsewhere, at least if it were a misconceived stand on the humanitarian issue, might be taken by one or other of the parties as interference with the political situation and therefore lead to the kind of dangers that you described of an attempt to settle the political problem by outside parties.

Mr. Smith: I think that contributions of food supplies, of methods of transport for food and medical supplies, of personnel to help in them especially where there is agreement between the two authorities and control on the ground for effective channels to get relief in are very good.

Mr. Roberts: Would you say that it would require agreement by both the authorities to really make this kind of...

Mr. Smith: Not always, no. Certainly supplies to Federal territory would not require Biafran agreement. Supplies into Biafra over Federal territory and perhaps also for reasons of sovereignty some people might hold would require agreement by both sides. Land so applied—and the land route, of course, is the most effective way of getting a lot in quickly—does require agreement from the two sides and this has been difficult to get. I have been involved a bit in trying to get agreement on this and a great many others.

Mr. Roberts: So that supplies to Biafra really would be a sensitive area, or possibly a sensitive area, without the agreement of both parties to the dispute to that kind of shipment by air or by land?

Mr. Smith: Some governments and international agencies have taken this view; some have not taken this view. It is a matter, I think, for the judgment of each person concerned. It is a more difficult one, I think, for

a Commonwealth government in good relations with Lagos, but could I say the government, as I understand it, is prepared to allow supplies to go in by air under the Red Cross using Canadian planes. I hope this news is correct. Agreement on a land route would be much more effective in getting in a lot quickly and I do think this point needs emphasizing.

Mr. Roberts: Could I take it from your last comment, therefore, that the Commonwealth connection might lead a Commonwealth country to tread even more warily in this matter than, say, a non-Commonwealth country?

Mr. Smith: Well, two Commonwealth governments recognize Biafra and diplomatic relations with these countries have been broken off by Lagos. I think Commonwealth governments because of habit—and a good habit it is, I think—take an interest in each other's welfare and so on. It is an important factor in the whole situation.

• 2135

Mr. Roberts: Would you agree that in terms of eventually picking up the pieces and the massive aid effort such as you have described would be required, that the maintenance of the Commonwealth connection in this regard would be particularly important because, hopefully, it would be the Commonwealth countries which would be able to play a very large role in providing that aid?

Mr. Smith: I would hope that the richer Commonwealth countries who are in a position to help significantly would do so in the reconstruction. Yes.

Mr. Roberts: Presumably, we would not be able to do that if relations were broken off, for instance.

Mr. Smith: I beg your pardon?

Mr. Roberts: We would not be able to act in that way if relations had been broken off?

Mr. Smith: Well, I hope there is no question of anything like that.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson, and then Mr. De Bané, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Laprise and Mr. Ouellet.

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Smith, while we appreciate the fact that you have to answer as an international Commonwealth Civil

Servant, we are very pleased to have you on home soil again.

Mr. Smith: Thank you very much, I am happy to be here.

Mr. Thompson: In our discussions we are more or less agreed I think, in the Committee that our basic responsibility is on the humanitarian level, speaking of Canada, but as Mr. Roberts said it is not too easy to completely cut the line between the political and the humanitarian side as we try to reason this thing out because basically you are here as an expert witness on the political side and all the ramifications of it. Might I ask whether or not the fact that the Federal Government of Nigeria is not a constitutional government—it is a government that assumed its authority as the result of a military coup, it is a military government—has any effect on the situation, in your opinion, as we struggle with the problem of knowing what our responsibility is here?

Mr. Smith: Defining a constitutional government is an ambiguous thing. The Federal Government of Nigeria has been recognized as the government by most members of the Commonwealth, including Canada. Certainly it got power by a military coup d'état indeed, a second military coup d'état within a period of some six months in 1966. A good many governments, of course, get power by one means or another and once they are recognized they are usually considered a constitutional government. That is a different matter than a government elected by constitutional processes. It is certainly the hope of a lot of members of the Nigerian government—they have expressed it to me and I am quite sure they are sincere—that they will work out a new constitution as soon as possible after hostilities can be ended and returned to a more normal system of rule, but this has not yet been done.

There have been several military coups in various parts of Africa in the Commonwealth and outside it, as you know. In Ghana there is active procedure going on to have elections and return to civilian rule. In Sierra Leone there has recently been a return to civilian rule after a military coup was ended. I have no doubt, personally, of the sincerity of the Nigerian leaders about their desire to return to a parliamentary system of civilian rule, but at the moment it is a military government. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. Thompson: Just a few moments ago you used the words "by reason of sovereignty". I think that same consideration has been a major factor in Canada's withholding its contribution on the humanitarian level and that we must be very careful not to transgress the sovereignty of the state of Federal Nigeria. In your opinion, is this question of sovereignty as important as it has been held up to be in so far as us attempting to extend our humanitarian—

• 2140

Mr. Smith: I am not as well informed as you are about what Canada has been contributing but my impression has been that it has contributed quite a little bit. I do not think I should comment and I do not feel in a position to comment on the motivation of Canadian government decisions—you have been much closer to these things than I have—but I would be surprised if there has been a real inadequacy in Canadian contributions. The problem, you see, the bottleneck has been how much relief could be taken in. Now this has been a complicated thing partly for logistic reasons and partly for political reasons in terms of getting agreements between the authorities whose agreement is considered necessary. Contributing an extra \$1,000, let us say, or \$100,000 or \$1 million before ways have been worked out to get the stuff into the places where it is needed, to the people who are starving, could be useful in terms of assurance of future prospects of getting things in, but it has not been decisive. I do not know that there has been a withholding of Canadian contributions, but I am not really in a position to comment on this.

Mr. Thompson: No, I do not intend to draw you in on that. I just wanted your thoughts in this matter because we have heard this afternoon that at least during the past three or four months there has been much opportunity of getting in larger amounts of food and medicine and this type of thing than we have responded with. In fact perhaps one of the reasons in rejecting or turning down these requests has been that we are infringing or we are in danger of infringing on the rights of a sovereign nation, a sister member of the Commonwealth.

Let us come back to the O.A.U. for a moment. The O.A.U. has taken a strong stand in support of federal Nigeria. I think the vote was 29 to 4 when the negotiations in Addis

Ababa came to an impasse. What would be the reaction of some of the other African countries, particularly the other Commonwealth African countries, if we were to take the initiative, shall we say, that perhaps the Scandinavian countries have towards more or less moving aggressively forward with humanitarian aid? I am also putting this question in view of the fact that there have been some remarks made that this outside help from white nations is not really desirable.

Mr. Smith: In my conversations with political leaders on both sides there has been appreciation of outside willingness to help in relief, prospects of help in reconstruction and so on. There has certainly been some resentment on one side or the other at times about particular pressures regarding particular routes or methods and that sort of thing but I do not think there has been a dislike of outside generosity and goodwill towards helping in the alleviation of suffering. Many people have felt and said quite strongly that the most important way of helping to relieve the suffering is to get the war ended as quickly as possible and this probably involved some political decisions by the two fighting parties. But that is a different matter. I think that outside generosity and goodwill has been appreciated on both sides. I think there has been a feeling sometimes on one side or the other that inadequate awareness and judgments have been made on various issues and this is a complicated matter, but it is a different one.

• 2145

Mr. Thompson: What is the attitude of the Commonwealth African countries who are supporting the federal Nigerian government towards the two Commonwealth countries that have extended recognition to Biafra?

Mr. Smith: Well the Commonwealth does not try to be a political block, you know.

Mr. Thompson: No, no, I am only asking you because you probably are aware of their reactions. Is there a bitterness?

Mr. Laniel: What are these two countries?

Mr. Smith: Tanzania and Zambia have recognized Biafra.

Mr. Thompson: Is there any bitterness on the part of the other African Commonwealth nations towards Zambia and Tanzania?

Mr. Smith: I think this decision caused some bitterness in Lagos. No, I have not been aware of general Commonwealth bitterness one way or the other on this. There is an understanding I think of the fact that there have been differences of views on the most promising ways of bringing about a quick agreed ending to the fighting. About two weeks ago I was in Tanzania and had a very interesting talk with President Nyerere, chiefly on other matters but also on this. This was a confidential talk. No, I would not say that there has been bitterness about this sort of thing in general.

Mr. Thompson: With the vast majority of O.A.U. nations in support of the Federal Government of Nigeria and a majority of Commonwealth African nations as well, really the only satisfactory way of ending the fighting would be for Biafra, as we know it now, to agree to come back into the federal union, would it not?

Mr. Smith: That is certainly in line with the O.A.U. resolution.

Mr. Thompson: To maintain federal autonomy.

Mr. Smith: That is one part of it. Another part is amnesty.

Mr. Thompson: But knowing the officials of the Federal Government of Nigeria as you do, do you have confidence that there would be amnesty extended?

Mr. Smith: Yes.

Mr. Thompson: To Colonel Ojukwu himself as well?

Mr. Smith: There have been various and sometimes apparently contradictory statements on this issue. Chief Enahoro, who has been the senior negotiator at many of the meetings for Lagos, has said that this would depend on the time and conditions of ending hostilities, of agreement. Personally, I think that what I said earlier, that given to Lagos, to the federal government, acceptance of one Nigeria there could be great flexibility on everything else. That is my general judgment on a very wide range of points. But what is going to happen is another matter because it does depend on the timing, the conditions and the situation in which hostilities are ended and agreement is reached. You know the terms of the O.A.U. resolution on this matter.

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Chairman, I apologize for probably taking us away from the humanitarian aspects but I felt that Mr. Smith would have advice and counsel to us on the other side too that affects our thinking, and I am very grateful for his comments.

Might I just conclude with one last question? Do you yourself see any hope of a peaceful settlement of the war other than general capitulation by Biafra?

Mr. Smith: On several occasions in the past 15 months I have seen considerable hope, but of course it all depended on agreement by the top authorities on the two sides to accept deals that were well within sight. Again as recently as a couple of weeks ago I felt there was a very real hope in this matter. I think it would be very wrong to abandon hope of an agreed solution. I think if you start despairing you make what you fear almost inevitable and I do not think one should despair. But it certainly is late in the day. I think many chances have been tragically rejected and I think the sooner there is an agreed solution the better for all concerned.

Mr. Thompson: You do not see any real danger of genocide then as we interpret the word in the widest sense, that the government of Nigeria is not intent on forever destroying the strength of the Ibo tribes so they will not have the problems that resulted about two years ago.

• 2150

Mr. Smith: The policy of General Gowon and his colleagues is certainly not genocide; it is to re-establish the territorial and constitutional integrity of Nigeria but the constitution, a new one to be worked out later by negotiation. They have offered equal participation on the basis of population to elected Ibo leaders with those of other tribes. I do not doubt their sincerity in this. I also do not doubt the fears on many people on the Biafran side and this is part of the problem. I think that there have been many occasions on which very great guarantees, including the stationing of international peacekeeping forces, have been accepted by both sides. Now, as I say, it is very late in the day for that.

Under present conditions when the bargaining power is very different than it would have been a couple of months ago, three or four months ago, very different than at Kampala, very different than last January and so

on, I think that a peacekeeping force is probably not practical politics at this stage but an observer force of rather larger dimensions, perhaps much larger dimensions than the relatively few generals and aides in there now could be practical politics. I think that the sooner agreement is reached to end the war, probably the more liberal the terms would be. Capitulation is an ugly word; I think a negotiated settlement, something very different than unconditional surrender has been possible and I think it is still possible.

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Chairman, one very short question comes to mind. Mr. Smith, do you see the division of the eastern region into three provinces as a practical political alternative?

Mr. Smith: Well, I do not want to pronounce on rights and wrongs in this issue but certainly there has been considerable pressure for a long time by the smaller tribes of Nigeria—together they came to about 50 per cent of the population—to improve their relative bargaining power as compared with the three big tribes the Hausas/Fulanis, the Yorubas, and the Ibos who basically ran things before; sometimes two of them with one weaker and the two of the three shifted from time to time.

In the past year and a half in the Federation there has been a very big evolution in terms of more political influence by a host of small tribes. These things are very important. General Gowon is a Tiv; he is not a member of one of the big three. Enahoro, Taika, a lot of the key people are members of small tribes and together, as I say, they come to about half the total.

The drive of the Lagos side for breaking up all of the big regions—they broke up the north into half a dozen states, there has been pressure to divide the Yorubas and so on—is a very deep thing. I do not want to pronounce on whether this is good or bad from the point of view of one tribe or another, but it has not been aimed at merely one tribe. It is a very deep thing with roots that go many years back into the past and I think it has to be understood really if you want to see the division into three states by decree of Lagos in perspective. It was a paper decree when issued because all of the territory of the eastern region was in the control of the Biafran authorities, but since then the military developments have meant that the territory called the Rivers State, the territory called the Calabar

State and a good bit of the territory of the East Central State is now in Federal hands. Now all these things change the bargaining power, if you like, and will no doubt have some effect on the politically viable, political attainable sort of settlement that can be reached.

The Chairman: Is that your final question, Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson: Thank you.

• 2155

The Chairman: Mr. De Bané, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Laprise and Mr. Ouellet.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: Thank you.

Mr. Arnold Smith: If you wish to speak French, please do. Excuse me if I make a few grammatical errors.

Mr. De Bané: Apart from providing arms to the Federal Government, has the London Government also provided medicine to the Federal Government since the beginning of the war?

Mr. Smith: I do not know. I would be surprised if it was not the case but I really do not know.

Mr. De Bané: But it could well be according to you?

Mr. Smith: Medical supplies?

Mr. De Bané: Yes.

Mr. Smith: Well, yes, you know Nigeria has used to buy a lot from England. And I would be very surprised if medical supplies were not one of the things that were bought. But, I cannot really tell you for sure.

Mr. De Bané: Do you know if the London Government is sending medical supplies to Biafra?

Mr. Smith: No, I do not know. The London Government has certainly given amounts of money to the Red Cross.

Mr. De Bané: But not directly medical supplies as such?

Mr. Smith: Well, no, only money for all areas including Biafra, but it is possible that the Red Cross bought with these sums of money medical supplies, I do not know. I would assume, yes, but I cannot tell you for sure.

Mr. De Bané: This morning Mr. Harman was saying that certain reports said that up to a five or six thousands people were dying every day, of starvation or of other causes and he said that the External Affairs Department could not confirm those reports, or could not deny them. Is the Secretariat of the Commonwealth able to say whether such a number, 6,000 deaths every day, is possible?

Mr. Smith: Well, I could not certify any figure but from what I have heard, from various observers, I am afraid there are certainly many many deaths. I have heard figures quoting many thousands. I have no reason to doubt them but I cannot either confirm anything.

Mr. De Bané: You know that this Committee was created mainly to find out the facts, to make a full investigation.

[English]

A full investigation, this is one of the first aims. I am beginning to realize that it is not possible to have the real facts and the complete story of what is going on. Am I too pessimistic? I am wondering if the average citizen in Canada is less informed than our Department of External Affairs or the Secretariat of the Commonwealth. We have some information, we try to have confirmation or denial of this information, and nobody takes the chance of saying whether that is what is going on or not. If I understand what was said yesterday in the House of Commons the first task of our Committee is to make a full investigation and I am beginning to realize that nobody can tell us what is going on there. Am I wrong? Am I fair? Am I correct in saying that?

Mr. Smith: A detailed running census on these things is something that perhaps highly organized governments under reasonably stable conditions maintain so that you can get the estimates of death from this cause or that, but I do not think that anybody is in a position to give that sort of statistic with confidence from Biafra. The fact that there is very great and very tragic suffering, a lot of hunger, I am afraid seems to be established beyond doubt. Just how great quantitatively, I am sorry I am not in a position to assess. However, I do not think anybody else is either.

• 2200

Mr. De Bané: I would then like to ask for your suggestions. What would you suggest to

us in order to attain our aim to make a full investigation of the facts? Do you have any names of people that you suggest we can hear from who can help us make a full investigation of the facts?

Mr. Arnold Smith: No, I do not think I do.

Mr. De Bané: The Prime Minister said yesterday in the House of Commons that he was not totally satisfied with the report he received from our representative there, so he said, "With the consent of the Leader of the Opposition, we are going to set up a committee to make a full investigation of what is going on there." I wonder if you can help us in telling us how we can achieve that full investigation?

Mr. Arnold Smith: That is a very complicated question.

Mr. De Bané: I realize that our task is to make a full investigation. I do not think I am making an unfair assessment of our difficulty.

Mr. Arnold Smith: I think, if you assume that very large numbers are dying, that the need for food is very considerable. This would be a sound assumption. I think it is very difficult to quantify it exactly. I do not know any way of doing it, really.

Mr. Prud'homme: Perhaps when Mr. Brewin or Mr. MacDonald come tomorrow they will know.

Mr. Arnold Smith: That could be.

Mr. De Bané: So you cannot give us the name of any person that we might ask to comment to help us in conducting a full investigation? It is surprising that in the twentieth century it is so difficult to find out what is going on somewhere. I thought perhaps the Commonwealth had some organization that would be in a better position to tell us.

Mr. Arnold Smith: Well...

Mr. De Bané: In other words, do you think that we cannot achieve the purpose for which we have been set up as a committee?

Mr. Arnold Smith: I think as a group you are better able to determine the nature of your task than I am! I should think analysis and putting the various aspects of the problem in some sort of proportion, even though you cannot exactly quantify them, would be

very relevant to your task in trying to arrive at a judgment on the basis of this proportion based on an analysis of the various facets.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. De Bané?

[Interpretation]

Mr. Smith: I am very sorry not to be able to answer all your questions.

Mr. De Bané: Thank you very much.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I was really going to ask Mr. Smith some questions along the same line as Mr. De Bané, the previous speaker; that our function is to determine the facts and then try to arrive at a proper course of action in the light of those facts. The first question I had—and perhaps I had still better ask it—is to what extent is the knowledge that you are giving to us tonight based on first-hand experience? It has not been brought out as to when you were last in Biafra or in the Federal Territory of Nigeria.

• 2205

Mr. Arnold Smith: Most of my experience has been in conversations with ministers or senior representatives from the two sides. Most of these conversations took place in my office or my flat in London. It has been first hand in that sense, but I have been concentrating, as I mentioned at the beginning, on trying to help the two sides without trying to force the terms of the agreement; trying to help them to reach an agreement. This has been a different matter than assessing the quantitative terms, the degree of hunger at any given moment. I think the degree is great. I think it is a very tragic situation. I think it results from political inadequacies over the past that have led to this tragedy. There are lots of things that need doing. I have been trying to concentrate on helping the parties and trying to persuade them to resolve their political problem by political means.

Mr. Cafik: Would I be fair in assessing your comments tonight as, number one, to your knowledge there is no genocide in the area and, number two, there is a definite humanitarian need in these two territories and that perhaps we have some obligation to fulfil that need?

Mr. Arnold Smith: On the human need, on the fact of human suffering, surely there can

be no doubt. Genocide is a very big word, and I said that certainly in my judgment genocide is not any part of the policy of the Federal government and I know of no evidence that would suggest it has been going on. I do have some evidence—mainly it has not been recent, but earlier on—of some atrocities by groups of soldiers on both sides, and these things have been very deplorable. Great efforts have been made by General Gowon and his officer corps to check them. I think that if the war really gets to a stage of guerilla resistance it could become very dangerous indeed. You really cannot tell a guerilla from a civilian and if there is a serious decision to undertake long-term guerilla resistance, in my judgment this could create a profoundly dangerous problem. There are certain predictions, you know, that become self-justifying. If you start out thinking that all the world is your enemy and act accordingly, you are likely to make a good bit of the world your enemy. Perhaps I should leave it at that. However, I do not want to sound complacent when I say that to my knowledge genocide is not part of the Federal policy. It is not. And there is great concern on the part of Federal leaders to prevent this.

On the other hand, with reference to a policy of organized guerilla resistance, there has not been any evidence that I know of on a big scale of organized guerilla resistance in territory firmly held by the Federal forces that was formerly Biafran, which may be relevant, it may suggest that there is not so likely to be long-term guerilla resistance, but if there is this could create a situation that I would regard with grave apprehension. If guerillas who are dressed as civilians shoot at troops and the troops shoot back, it is very hard to tell one civilian from another. This could create a really dangerous situation. I have been doing what I can—and it has not been successful to date—to try to bring about a settlement before it gets to that stage. But in the meantime the hunger has certainly led to substantial and I believe growing numbers of deaths. I hope that the relief supplies will check this trend towards growing numbers of deaths.

The Chairman: Mr. Laprise.

• 2210

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Mr. Smith, we appreciated very much your contribution to our Committee and we like to thank you very much for

it. As we all do—and you mentioned it yourself—you believe that the main thing is to look for an end to this war in Nigeria.

Are you of the opinion that a request made by the United Nations for a cease-fire in order to improve the negotiations possibilities between the two parties, would be possible and do you think that this could be accepted by Nigeria and Biafra?

Mr. Smith: According to my information in the present situation, there is no possible practical possibility that a majority of the United Nations, or even the Security Council members would agree to order a cease-fire without conditions, that is a matter which is purely academic for the time being. What I tried to do myself was to assist both parties in achieving a cease-fire via a political agreement, leaving it to the future to decide on the details. But my first intent was to come to a political agreement in order to come to a cease-fire, because I see in it the only possibility, at this time. But conditions could change that could bring a change in the situation. But I believe that for the time being, the United Nations are not going to order a cease-fire. So would it be a good idea or a bad one, this is another story. But at any rate, it will not happen.

Mr. Laprise: Another question. A lot has been said about fear of genocide and it is believed that this fear is due to the fact that some massacres happened at the beginning of the present crisis. According to your knowledge, do you believe that this fear of possible future massacre is shared by all the Ibos or is this only shared by an elite of leaders in Biafra?

Mr. Smith: You know, I believe that at the present, there are millions of Ibos in the territories that are presently in the hands of the federal troops, and there, there is no genocide. So I believe that those Ibos are not fearful. At the beginning when they were in the territories held by the federal troops, they were afraid and this is normal. But now the situation has changed. But I believe that inside the lines which are under the Biafran authority's control, there is a fear. And it is a very significant political factor.

Mr. Laprise: This would be a general feeling among all the Ibos?

Mr. Smith: Well, a public opinion is often stronger among leaders than among the

masses, but I don't think it would be fair to disregard the reality of this fear. This is why I, and the leaders of both parties, we were all interested in the possibility of having an international organisation, either the Commonwealth or the Organization for African Unity, to meet or to do something in order not only to dismiss all the dangers but also to dismiss the fear. In other words the psychological as well as material objective. Again, I am sorry I did not give you an accurate nor quantitative answer, but I believe that your question does not enable me to make a correct and accurate answer.

Mr. Laprise: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Ouellet.

Mr. Ouellet: Mr. Smith, I would like, first of all to tell you how much I appreciate your good knowledge of French.

Mr. Smith: Thank you very much. This is a compliment that I really appreciate.

Mr. Ouellet: It is very comforting to realize that so high Canadian officials can express themselves in a complete bilingualism. I hope that the majority or almost all of our high diplomats or high officials will follow your example.

Mr. Smith: I do too, but I hope that they will do as well as you do and better than I.

Mr. Ouellet: I would like to ask you first if you could comment the decision of the Nigerian government which invited observers from Great Britain, Canada, Sweden and Poland, and also an observer from the Organisation of African Unity. What lead them to invite representatives from these countries rather than from others.

• 2215

Mr. Smith: I don't know. This was a decision which was taken in Lagos. I am sorry, I could not answer your question.

Mr. Ouellet: During your talks, or by hearsay, did you come to learn that the Biafran authorities thought that the observers were bias?

Mr. Smith: I read remarks in the press which were attributed to Colonel Ojukwu and his colleagues. You know, in order to know whether there is a genocide policy in the federal authorities, it is in the federal territories

that you should have the observers. But myself, I was interested in another matter. That is the possibility, as I hoped, of an agreement to a cease-fire that would be accepted by both parties. So it would be good to have observers in this case also inside the Biafran lines. But this is another matter which would be real if there were a political agreement to a cease-fire. And should this opportunity come up, and this could be very rapid—I hope it will come up one day, and it won't wait too many days, because every day costs a lot of money—I hope then, that a larger number of observers could be sent. But there always are the prerequisites of some political flexibility in order to reach an agreement. And this is what has been missing so far.

Mr. Ouellet: Earlier tonight, you mentioned the possibility of having a larger number of observers. Did you think of special countries or were you thinking of a United Nations sponsored intervention?

Mr. Smith: Non. I was thinking of having the invitations sent by the Nigerian government, but this would be part of an agreement between the two parties, in other words, this invitation would be sent to nations that would be agreed to by both parties. The essential element would be to have both parties to agree to extend this invitation. If it were coming from an organization, it would certainly be less important, less significant. The essential would be to have an agreement between the two parties.

Mr. Ouellet: During the last few months, the Biafra problem has been in the newspapers almost every day. It has been a constant worry of many Canadians and organizations in Canada, and most particularly it has almost been the key issue in Parliament since the House resumed. I understand that the Canadian people and parliamentarians are very considerate of the human aspect of this question, but do you think that this is a unique case in history? Have other, or is there similar consensus or awareness in other countries of the world?

• 2220

Mr. Smith: Yes, certainly. In England, there has been a great deal of agony, of anxiousness about what could be done. In Germany also. I was in Swaziland four weeks ago during Independence Day and the chief of the

African bureau of the German Foreign Ministry talked to me about the great political interest that this matter had taken in his country. The same interest was noticed in Holland and in Scandinavian countries.

Mr. Ouellet: Are you talking of individuals or governments?

Mr. Smith: Governments, Parliaments, and public opinion. There is quite a strong feeling in many countries of the world. It is a human tragedy of large proportion that is taking place under our eyes. The question of knowing how to help, is complicated, but the significance of the matter is not to be disregarded.

Mr. Ouellet: Have other parliamentarians in other countries held meetings like this one. Did they reach any conclusion. Are you aware of any conclusions or decisions that could have been taken by other parliamentarians in other countries which we should know?

Mr. Smith: I believe that I am not in a good position to advise you in this matter. It can very well be that someone from the Department of External Affairs could answer your question but undoubtedly the fact that there have been and that there still is a great interest in many countries is not to be questioned but whether there are External Affairs Committees in other countries dealing with the matter, that I cannot answer.

Mr. Ouellet: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Well, gentlemen, we have had a long and a very good session, I believe.

Before thanking, Mr. Smith on your behalf I would like to announce that we will be meeting again at 3.45 p.m. tomorrow and hope at that time to hear from Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald. I have also learned that Mr. McNeil, an official of CUSO who is in Ottawa, has recently returned from Nigeria and although I have not been able to clear this with the steering committee, unless you disagree, I suggest that I try to make arrangements to have him here as well, so perhaps we may hear all three at the same time.

Also, I am informed by the Clerk that he was able to amend the resolution so that the steering committee, by reason of unanimous agreement, now consists of nine members, four from the opposition and five from the government, and the personnel can be

announced tomorrow when all the vacancies have been filled.

If there are no further questions, I would like to thank Mr. Smith very sincerely on your behalf for a very helpful presentation.

Mr. Smith: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you for coming, Mr. Smith.

APPENDIX "D"

NIGERIA—USE BY RED CROSS OF CANADIAN AIRCRAFT

On the orders of the day:

Mr. David Lewis (York South): Mr. Speaker, yesterday I asked the right hon. Prime Minister whether he had received a cable from the head of state of Biafra sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to heads of member states of the United Nations regarding allegations of acts of genocide. The right hon. gentleman undertook in reply to ascertain whether the cable had reached his office, and promised to inform the house today concerning any action he is contemplating in this regard.

Right Hon. P.-E. Trudeau (Prime Minister): Apparently a communication addressed to me by Colonel Ojukwu was received at our permanent mission in New York by registered air mail. The communication called upon us, as the hon. member indicated, to take action to prevent acts of genocide allegedly being perpetrated by the government of Nigeria. There has been no reply to this communication as yet, but this is part of our over-all policy of trying to avoid intervention in the political side of this conflict while trying to help as much as we can in the humanitarian side.

Mr. Lewis: I have a supplementary question. Can the Prime Minister inform the house whether the Secretary of State for External Affairs has had any more success in his quest for support to bring the matter before the United Nations? He may not have any report as yet, but I wonder whether he could inform us.

Mr. Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, I have no report as yet on the success of this mission but I do have a report, which I have just received, on the success of the minister in negotiating with the Nigerian commissioner for external affairs, who is in New York, on whether they would object to the International Red Cross using Canadian aircraft which we put at their disposal. These aircraft would be used to bring supplies to all parts of Nigeria and not only those parts under the control of the Nigerian government.

The answer was favourable. In this answer Dr. Arikpo, the Nigerian commissioner for foreign affairs, now says the federal government of Nigeria would have no objection to the Red Cross using a Canadian aircraft and crew in its relief operations anywhere in Nigeria, including flights into the area under rebel control, under the existing arrangements and understanding between the federal government of Nigeria and the International Red Cross.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 3

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1968

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1968


Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P.; Mr. David MacDonald, M.P.; and Mr. William McNeill, Co-ordinator for Nigeria, Canadian University Service Overseas.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Anderson	Mr. Harkness	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Laniel	Mr. Schumacher
Mr. Buchanan	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Smith (<i>Northum-</i>
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Legault	<i>berland-Miramichi</i>)
Mr. Carter	Mr. Lewis	¹ Mr. Stanbury
Mr. De Bané	Mr. Macquarrie	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Marceau	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Nesbitt	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Gibson	Mr. Penner	Mr. Winch
Mr. Groos	Mr. Prud'homme	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)

(Quorum 16)

¹Replaced Mr. Ouellet on October 9, 1968.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
WEDNESDAY, October 9, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Stanbury be substituted for that of Mr. Ouellet on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

Attest.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, October 9, 1968.

(4)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:50 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, De Bané, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Harkness, Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, Macquarrie, Marceau, Nesbitt, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Schumacher, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stanbury, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk—(30).

In attendance: Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P., Mr. David MacDonald, M.P. and Mr. William McNeill, Co-ordinator for Nigeria, Canadian University Service Overseas.

The Chairman introduced Messrs. Brewin, MacDonald (*Egmont*), and McNeill as witnesses for this afternoon's sitting.

The Chairman announced that the Secretary of State for External Affairs would appear before the Committee at 3:45 p.m. on Thursday, October 10, 1968.

Messrs. Brewin and MacDonald (*Egmont*) made opening statements concerning their recent visit to Biafra.

It was agreed, unanimously to append a copy of the News Release issued by Andrew Brewin, M.P., Greenwood, and David MacDonald, M.P., Egmont, dated Sunday, October 6, 1968 (*see Appendix E*). Copies of the News Release were distributed to the members present.

Members questioned Messrs. Brewin and MacDonald (*Egmont*) on their recent trip to Biafra. Mr. McNeill was also questioned concerning his knowledge of conditions in that region.

The Committee completed its questioning of Mr. McNeill. It was agreed to continue the questioning of the other two witnesses at a morning sitting on Thursday, October 10, 1968.

Mr. Alexander, M.P., suggested that the Committee consider inviting Mr. Allan Grossman of Time Magazine, Ottawa and formerly of its West Africa Bureau, as a witness. This matter was referred to the Subcommittee for its recommendation.

At 6:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 11:15 a.m., Thursday, October 10, 1968.

THURSDAY, October 10, 1968.

(5)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:25 a.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, De Bané, Fairweather, Forrestall, Groos, Harkness, Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, Macquarrie, Marceau, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Schumacher, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stanbury, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk—(27).

In attendance: Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P. and Mr. David MacDonald, M.P.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee had met earlier in the day, to consider the nature and the degree of urgency, of a report to the House at this time. He noted recent statements concerning aid offered by Canada, and that Major General Milroy may be able to return to Canada next week.

Members continued to question Messrs. Brewin and MacDonald (*Egmont*), following the list of questioners prepared by the Chairman at the previous sitting.

With the questioning of the witnesses continuing, Mr. Lewis moved,

Agreed,—that the Committee adjourn until 3:45 p.m. this day, when the witness will be the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

AFTERNOON SITTING

Wednesday, 9 October, 1968

• 1552

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I am informed that we have a quorum. Before introducing our three witnesses for this afternoon perhaps I could make the following announcement. We hope that Mr. Sharp will be available to give evidence tomorrow afternoon. It is impossible to arrange a meeting in the morning. If it is satisfactory to the members we might perhaps plan on calling a meeting for 3.45 tomorrow afternoon to hear Mr. Sharp. At that time he will have with him officials from the Department.

The three witnesses that we have today need little introduction as they are well-known. They are Mr. Brewin, Mr. David MacDonald and Mr. Bill McNeill. Mr. McNeill was the co-ordinator for CUSO in Nigeria. He was out there for four years and returned just a short time ago.

Because of the shortage of time we thought possibly the simplest procedure would be to ask each one of the witnesses to make a short statement and then we would follow up, as we have before, with questions. You may direct your questions to any one of them or to all of them. In this way we will perhaps save some time. Is that arrangement satisfactory?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one question? In order to expedite business may we hear all three of the witnesses first and then put our questions?

Mr. Lewis: I want to raise a small objection, Mr. Chairman, to your proposed procedure, which I think may well be more confusing than helpful. The two Members of Parliament were there a very short time and are going to tell us what they found. The other gentleman was there four years, presumably not in one spot in Nigeria but in several places. It seems to me that the nature of the evidence of the three people you have mentioned will not be the same, and I wonder whether you are really going to save time by doing it this way. Perhaps it would be better

to hear Mr. McNeill at one point and the other two Members of Parliament separately from him. I am not making this a very big issue, Mr. Chairman.

• 1555

The Chairman: I am in the hands of the Committee. Could we meet your objection by hearing their initial statements and then, if you prefer, we could separate the questioning of the two Members of Parliament from the questioning of Mr. McNeill?

Mr. Lewis: I suggest that would be a better arrangement.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, because Mr. McNeill has lived in the country for four years he would have a very intimate knowledge of the whole situation. Would it not be preferable to hear his statement first and then question him? It might, in the long run, shorten our proceedings.

Mr. Lewis: I do not care who is first. All I am saying is that it will be confusing if we ask questions of all three.

Mr. Yewchuk: I think there would be a lot of duplication if we do them one at a time when you are asking the same questions of the same people.

The Chairman: Can we proceed with their statements in any event and then if the procedure is not working out, we will change it to meet the convenience of members. Do you have any preference which one of you speaks first?

Mr. Brewin: No. Instead of making just one statement, as each of us has one or two subjects he wants to cover, may we alternate? Neither of us has a long statement.

The Chairman: A duet?

Mr. Brewin: We will do a duet.

The Chairman: Well, proceed in whichever way seems best to you.

Mr. David MacDonald (Egmont): I will begin then, Mr. Chairman. I might say in

opening that ever since I was first elected a member of Parliament I have been anxious to be a member of the External Affairs Committee, but this is likely the hardest way to make it and a very short one at that.

It will likely be true as well and there will be value I think, although I have not had a chance to talk with Mr. McNeill, in having someone before the Committee who has had considerably longer experience in Nigeria; much longer, certainly, than Mr. Brewin or I have had and what with the exposure that both these issues have received and our own involvement in it, perhaps the advertising will go even beyond the actual product that you have here this afternoon.

I think it might be wise for us to inform the Committee why we made the trip and how we came to be involved in this particular situation. I think the Committee knows—at least those who were here in the last Parliament know—the personal interest that both Mr. Brewin and I have had in the subject of the civil war in Nigeria, both during the questioning in the House last winter as well as the one committee hearing that was held when Dr. Ted Johnson appeared before the External Affairs Committee late in March.

Shortly after Parliament convened in September, it was proposed to us by a personal friend of mine—a chap who spent some years in Nigeria, Reverend Walter McLean—that we might consider going to Biafra on a fact-finding mission. At the time the proposal was made I must admit that as far as I was concerned I thought it would likely never come off, and therefore it was likely safe to agree to the idea, but about two weeks after that—it was really very short notice—having received confirmation from the Government of Biafra that we would be welcome, we made plans within two or three days to travel to Biafra leaving on Saturday—I forget the date but it would be a week last Sunday—and spend as much time as we thought wise seeing the situation as it pertained in Biafra first hand.

We were fortunate enough to be able to travel from Europe on a chartered flight. We traveled via Trans Avia Airlines with about a quarter of a million dollars worth of drugs that was being sent into Biafra by the Jewish Community, the B'nai B'rith, of New York and then from a small island, Sao Tomé owned by the Portuguese, we flew into Biafra on a Tuesday evening, remained there until Thursday morning and returned in the early hours of

Thursday morning to Sao Tomé. We then returned from Sao Tomé to Europe on Friday evening and back to Canada on Saturday night.

• 1600

I think it might be of some use to the Committee to know specifically the various people that we talked to in order that you can gain some perspective about the credibility or the reliability of the witnesses. We had to rely in very large part, because of the shortness of our visit, on the people that we talked to. We did have some opportunity to see the results of the war in terms of starvation, the way it affected the children, the overcrowding in the one hospital that is now at present under control of Biafra, the tremendous over-population problem of the refugees, the results of the bombing.

Many of the things that we should have seen, perhaps, to get a wider picture in terms of the effect the war is having and the response of the people in Biafra we were simply not able to see because of the pressure of time. I might say that time was a factor to us because of the uncertainty of how long the airport would be in operation and, not wishing to spend longer in Biafra than we really had determined to, we decided it would be wiser to return earlier than later and therefore we made our trip as short as possible in terms of getting what we felt was the necessary information to return home with some perspective on the situation in Biafra. Mr. Brewin is going to give you a list of the various people we talked to and their position as it relates to Biafra.

Mr. Andrew Brewin (Greenwood): Mr. Chairman, as Mr. MacDonald has said, we think it would be useful for you to know the people we were in touch with because the value, if any, of our evidence depends on the quality and credibility of the people we spoke to. He has made clear, and indeed it would be obvious to all of you, we were there such a short time that although our observations might confirm something we had heard, obviously we were not there long enough to pretend to make any sort of comprehensive survey, although we certainly got the feel of things in a way that is hard to do without being there.

We saw a wide variety of people. I think we could say that we seriously interviewed or discussed the matters there with about 20 people altogether. This is aside from contacts here or there, and of those about seven or

eight were Biafrans and of those most, but not all, occupied important government positions. We saw the Permanent Secretary in Foreign Affairs. I find it very difficult to pronounce the names so unless you ask me the names, I will not try to give them to you. We saw the Chief Justice who has played an important part in the history of his country and in the negotiations that have gone on. We saw the Secretary to the head of State. We saw an official of the Government known as the Commissioner of Home Affairs who has a very wide jurisdiction and we are told is an influential member of the Government. We saw a number of young students who were working for the Government and who conducted us around and we had very interesting discussions with them.

The next group of people we saw were largely those engaged in the administration of relief in the country. I should say to you that the major work of relief that is being carried on now, as we were able to see it, is being done through the churches, through both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant church organizations. The CARITAS, the Roman Catholic body, for example, has 372 feeding centres. We talked to the people in charge of these and the air flights in and we talked to people who are priests, teachers and people of that general description, doctors and so on.

They were a mixed group from a national-point of view. We talked to about four Canadians, an Israeli businessman, two Irishmen, two or three Americans, a Norwegian, a Scottish chap; we got a fair mixture, ecumenical not only from the church point of view. It is pretty international, this administration of the relief effort.

Mr. Lewis: Were they people who were there a long time?

Mr. Brewin: Many of them were people who have lived a great part of their lives there. We would have to look at each one individually, but nearly all of them were people who have not only lived there recently but have lived there many years and been there during the course of the recent rather tragic history. We can give you more details about who we saw if you wish us to.

We prepared, Mr. Chairman, a report on the day we got back. We were under pressure and in a hurry but rather than take the time of the Committee to read this report, some of which has been carried in the press and some probably not, we thought if it is the pleasure

of the Committee we could just file our report. I do not know what you want to do with it. It is about 10 pages; it is rather long.

An hon. Member: Do you have copies?

Mr. Brewin: No. Unfortunately, at the moment, no. I have only two or three copies. I suppose there could be copies made available to the Committee.

• 1605

Mr. Alexander: With Mr. Brewin's consent, and that of Mr. MacDonald we could have their minutes of their experience appended to the Minutes of this particular meeting. If that is satisfactory, I think we would like to read it all and to digest it properly.

The Chairman: Is that agreeable to the members of the Committee?

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, it may take a day or two before we read the evidence in a case like this, and I would suggest that this be taken immediately by one of the people of the staff here and we could get it back within 15 or 20 minutes or half an hour.

The Chairman: In any case we should have it appended to the minutes for us.

Mr. Laniel: Oh, yes. But I would like to have copies distributed this afternoon, if possible, and I think it is possible.

Mr. Yewchuk: I think if we are going to question them with any intelligence we need to know something about their views. Maybe you could give us a summary.

Mr. Brewin: Well, we are going to anyway.

Mr. Yewchuk: Well, that is fine. I thought you had finished talking.

Mr. Brewin: No, we have not quite finished yet.

Mr. Winch: Have you finished on the persons you met?

Mr. Brewin: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Winch: Well, I understand from Mr. Chairman that you had a most interesting meeting with the governor of the Portuguese Island from where you left, with an interesting discussion.

Mr. Brewin: Oh! Did I leave him out? I should not have. The military governor of the Portuguese Island of São Tomé entertained us and interviewed us and gave us some very

interesting information. Thank you very much, Mr. Winch. I had forgotten about that. I had him on my list.

The Chairman: Is that complete, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: No, what we thought was that we would make a very brief statement. I do not think that either Mr. MacDonald or myself would be more than four or five minutes each on some of our conclusions, so at least you will know the subject matters that we think we could discuss with you in more detail, if you wish to. I was going to deal with two of these items and Mr. MacDonald with two.

The first thing I would say is that we got consistently from everybody concerned, including the relief workers who should know, a statement that there is at present very real starvation. Various estimates, and I think you heard from the witnesses yesterday that estimates are only estimates, varied from 4,000 deaths a day up to 10,000. The figure that seems to have been settled on by some as the best figure is about 6,000 a day. I think we want to make the point to you that this is only the start of the tragedy if the war continues because the situation is worsening in that even though the sources of supply of reliefs may be increased, and that will be discussed by Mr. MacDonald, a lot of the supplies are necessarily grown at home—grown within the area—and these supplies are being used up. There are more people concentrated in this area—and it is quite a small area—than can be supplied by the food that can be grown there. In addition, for that reason, the seed yams, a major form of food, are being consumed now, so that the prospects of starvation running instead of thousands into hundreds of thousands some time in the future if the war proceeds are very, very real in our opinion and from the information given to us by these people we have mentioned.

Another item that you may want to discuss is what I might call the will to resist. There are some people who believe, and it has been announced again and again, that there will now be a final push which will end the war. One can see where in a way this might be a good thing, of course depending on the consequences. But this is thought by some people to be a likely circumstance and plans are being made accordingly. In other words, where you are dealing with starvation, humanitarian aspects, if the war is over

through the collapse of one side, then presumably all the action that will take place will be through following up the victorious armies and dealing with the militarily successful group. However, one of the impressions that we wanted to make very clear is that we found a most amazing will to resist; a feeling, whether rightly or wrongly, that the people faced extermination if they gave up for reasons which I will not go into now, a strong feeling that their security, their lives, their survival and their freedom—everything that seemed worthwhile to them—depended upon continued resistance and a firm determination. The only comparable time I can remember was the Battle of Britain when in Britain they were facing an invasion and when the same sort of spirit and attitude prevailed. We found this amongst everybody we spoke to, young and old, and amongst not only the Biafrans themselves but we were told before we even got there that they intend to keep on fighting and, of course, the country lends itself to that because it is forested. The cities and the towns are relatively few. The highways are not too many. A military force can occupy all of the cities and can be astride nearly all the main highways, but there still will remain more or less impenetrable forests which are the homes of many of these people, a large number of people determined to resist in any way that they can. So that any strategy to deal with the human problem involved, I would think, must take account of the fact that unless there is some form of outside intervention, or some form of negotiated peace, the war will likely go on for a very long time.

• 1610

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have to say. Mr. MacDonald has a couple of other topics he wants to bring to your attention.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I might say that in going to Biafra and getting our minds prepared for what we would see and in being concerned about major issues, I think we went with two things firmly in mind. One was what Canada could do to increase the flow of relief to Biafra, and the other was what kind of contribution Canada might make to bringing the war to an end. I think they were in that order, that we were primarily concerned about the relief and then, on a secondary basis, about the conclusion of the war. I can say very firmly that having made the trip, we reversed those pri-

orities and felt that the first priority was the matter of bringing the war to conclusion, that the question of relief, by its very nature, had to be a secondary one. But I do not want to take too much away from it, however, because it is the critical question today and every day as long as there is this fragile life-line that is feeding Biafra, about how much relief material can actually get through. And we found that at São Tomé, the one relief-staging operation with which we became familiar there was building up there a very large supply of relief materials. We were informed as well that a similar situation prevailed at Fernando Po, but that the real problem was that the planes that were being used, the DC-7C's basically, and the UB's were able to carry only so much, with the DC-4's, and that in many cases these planes were not equipped for ease of loading or unloading. They also are planes that take up a fair space and the airport, as you may have been told, the only airport that is now servicing Biafra—Yuli Airport, or as the airmen call it, "Annabella"—is really a highway that has been closed off at either end. Lights have been established, beacon lights and a ground control system, but there is a very limited parking facility and I think only about seven aircraft can be on the ground at any one time. Even at that, the night we arrived, 25 aircraft were able to land, unload and take off again, and this was one of the best nights they had actually had. I think actually their average per night is about 15 planes, which means, when you think about 10 tons on an average per plane, they are lucky on a good night to get 150 tons of food. When you consider that as somehow alleviating the starvation conditions among millions of people, you can realize that the relief is still a very small trickle compared to the need. It was made very clear to us in talking to the officials who were operating the transport of relief that there was a fundamental need for Hercules aircraft. I might say, too, that because of the fact that the church operation, which we saw closely, was doing an extremely effective job we felt quite strongly that, if at all possible, Hercules aircraft could and should be made available for this particular operation in the same manner that the Swedish Red Cross had made available their only Hercules aircraft for the International Red Cross operating out of Fernando Po. There is an additional advantage to the Hercules aircraft apart from the loading and the size of room it takes up and the

speed at which it flies; it is one of the few aircrafts that can do a successful airdrop. And inasmuch as Annabella or Yuli airport is very close to the military line, it could quite conceivably be taken in a very short period of time, and as there may be a real increase in the starvation after the yam crop is gone the availability of Hercules aircraft to do a very large parachute-dropping of relief materials in the next few months may become absolutely crucial. That is why we believe the Hercules aircraft to be fundamental to the continuation and the expansion of the present relief program.

• 1615

As I said in the beginning, it seems to us that all of this is really only applying a small bandage to a very large wound, and unless some kind of surgery is performed then we can expect to see a continuation not only of the starvation but, we believe, many senseless killings. This is why we believe that it is fundamentally important that the International Community accept its responsibility and take some action.

The Organization of African Unity held a meeting in Addis Ababa; they issued a statement there urging a cease-fire, but they were unable to produce the kind of solution that would be acceptable to both sides. They have admitted that this is as far as they are prepared or able to go. It therefore seems to us that the only forum left which is large enough, responsible enough, objective enough, and having the functions available to it to use methods that could in all fairness effect a cease-fire, is the United Nations. This is why we have been very concerned over the past day or two to express this view very strongly both to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of External Affairs, because we felt, from talking with Biafrans and non-Biafrans, that their response was such that Canada is one of the countries with the necessary respect and trust that could take the lead in bringing this whole issue before the United Nations General Assembly. We know there are some countries who are extremely interested in such a lead-taking place, and we believe there might be many who might not be. It could well be that such a lead might not be successful, but we feel that is not sufficient reason for our country not to make this move. And if the International Community allows the precedent of this situation to go on the books without being challenged, one

can only shudder at the possible future incidences which may occur in any part of the globe, to which, again, the International Community will simply have to say, "We have already taken the position, this is not our affair, we cannot get involved."

I think that is all we will say by way of an opening statement.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald. Mr. McNeill, could you help us with a few comments?

Mr. William McNeill (Director of West African Programs, CUSO): I do not care to make any general statement before the Committee. I would prefer later to answer any questions and clarify any points that you may like to raise.

I would like to give you a little bit of information about my background. I went to Nigeria four years ago as a CUSO volunteer. I taught for four years a few miles outside of Umuahia. After that I went to Ibadan, which is the capital of the western state now, as the co-ordinator or director of CUSO's volunteer program in Nigeria. As such I travelled throughout the Federation a great deal, through the north, the west, the mid-west, and what was then the eastern region. In fact, because over half of our program at that time was located in the eastern region, so much of my time, perhaps the majority of my time, was spent there.

• 1620

I left Nigeria about three weeks ago. I have not been to Biafra now for at least a year. I have talked to a few people who have come out of there, and of course I am aware of the various charges, countercharges and observations that the people are making about the situation there. From my own experience I am not aware of any active policy of genocide on the part of the Federal Government. I mention this because I gather this is the whole point of your meeting: to attempt to reconcile the views of the International Observer Commission and both Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald's visit.

I would hesitate to be too specific about my observations because I find that so many people have recently made rather emotional statements about the situation and have made rather broad and sweeping statements on the basis of in fact very little information or very little association with the problem. If there is anything I can do during the course of this

meeting to answer any questions that may help to clarify the situation for you, I would be quite prepared to do that.

I would like to point out as well that we have a driver, who is an Ibo from Onitsha, who has been with us now for over a year, and he has travelled with me freely through all of the known military parts of the Federation. In fact, within the last four months he has on two occasions gone all through the North, from Sokoto to Maiduguri, with me without experiencing any difficulty at all. Now of course he has the advantage of speaking fluent Hausa at the road blocks and he also had the advantage, for whatever it was worth, of being with me, which I think undoubtedly was a factor in it. But at the same time I have not noticed any molestation of Ibos or any active policy on the part of the government to either discriminate against them or punish them in any way. I do not know to what extent this has been going on. I gather a lot of charges have been made that this is so. I can only say that from my experience over the last three years, and in particular over the last year this has not been so.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?

The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Admittedly, I have not been in Nigeria for five years, but five years ago I spent several weeks travelling in all sections. In view of what you just said, were you in Nigeria in 1966 when there was a slaughter of the Ibos in the North?

Mr. McNeill: Yes, I was.

Mr. Winch: Then how do you reconcile the statement you have just made with the slaughter of the Ibos in 1966. Would you please explain.

Mr. McNeill: Yes. First of all, I meant to stress that I am not aware of this policy since the civil war or since the secession.

Mr. Winch: Do you get my point. In view of what happened then in the North, when the Hausas did slaughter the Ibos and left, I believe, about 2 million of them down in the Biafran area, would you like to comment now.

Mr. McNeill: Well I think that since the exodus of the Ibos from that area the tension has been greatly reduced, which probably explains or may help to explain why there is

no longer this problem. However, there are Ibos living in Kano at the moment, and I did not notice that they were particularly uneasy...

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman...

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, would you please allow the witness to finish his statement and then we will take the questioners in the order in which I have their names. Did you wish to finish your statement?

Mr. McNeill: I think I will leave it at that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Laniel, Mr. Groos, Mr. Laprise, Mr. Yewchuk, Mr. Ryan, Mr. De Bané, Mr. Buchanan Mr. Macquarrie and Mr. Thompson.

An hon. Member: Mr. Laniel has left.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos, you are next.

Mr. Groos: I would like to say at the outset that you must know that you are among friends here in view of the way the House adopted unanimously the decision to set up this special Committee, and I think we are all very anxious to get to the bottom of this thing and do what is right.

I begin by asking what may seem a very stupid question. How do you tell the difference between an Ibo and a Hausa? Is it a simple matter or not?

• 1625

Mr. McNeill: It is not a simple matter, it is not one that would be immediately apparent to someone who has not been there for some time. Of course there are different characteristics. The Hausas tend to be a much taller, slimmer race of people with more aquiline features. The Ibos tend to be shorter, stockier, with more prominently Negroid features such as a flat nose, thicker lips and so on.

Mr. Winch: And there is a religious difference too.

Mr. McNeill: Yes. That of course is less immediately obvious though.

Mr. Groos: Now that the maps have been distributed this is the first time I have ever seen it clearly outlined just what part of Nigeria is left in Biafran hands.

An hon. Member: It is not very well marked though.

Mr. Groos: Well it is not very well marked on these maps we have here but it is on the

one up on the wall. Perhaps one of you could show us just exactly where it was you landed and when so we could get a better idea of your itinerary.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well we pulled in from Sao Tomé which is on the equator about 200 miles off. This place that I am indicating is Umuahia.

Mr. Groos: That is what?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Umuahia. That is the one remaining city.

Mr. Groos: Would that be where the airport was that you landed.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We flew into the Yuli airport and then we drove by car from there to Umuahia, some fifty to sixty miles I would say.

Mr. Groos: At night.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): At night, yes.

Mr. Brewin: You could only go at night.

Mr. Groos: And you stayed there the whole time and you came out the same way, did you?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We came out the second morning.

Mr. Groos: I seem to remember from what I read that you landed there at around 4 o'clock in the morning and you...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, we landed about 8 o'clock Tuesday evening, spent some time there and then we got into Amushia about 1.30 in the morning. We spent all the next day in Umuahia, came back to Yuli about 10 o'clock in the evening and left there about 4 o'clock the next morning.

Mr. Brewin: Could I add that we were invited to go to the front line with the Head of State at 4 o'clock in the morning and we declined to go because we were exhausted. It was not only us; all the journalists were exhausted too.

Mr. Groos: What day was that?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It would have been 4 o'clock Wednesday morning.

Mr. Groos: You landed there at 8 o'clock at night—I am just trying to visualize it in my own mind—so it was dark when you flew over the coastline from the south.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I should say we left Sao Tome at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon—it gets dark very rapidly at the equator—and we hit the mainland of Nigeria at about 6 o'clock. We flew then for one-half hour over Nigeria, getting there about 6.30. However there were five planes there before us so we were stacked over the airport. I think there were five to seven aircraft there at one time. We circled the airport for an hour before we finally were given permission to land.

Mr. Groos: Was it a Hercules you flew in?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, we flew in a DC-7C.

Mr. Groos: I read the report in one of the newspapers about the telegram from Biafra which said, "The Parliamentary delegation welcome. Come soonest. Safety adequate." Was that the full telegram?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): The full telegram; it cost about eighty cents a word.

Mr. Groos: Since a Parliamentary delegation normally consists of representatives from all sides of Parliament was there any special reason it consisted of just two of the Opposition parties?

• 1630

Mr. Brewin: Perhaps I could answer that by saying that we do not know. We were invited and we had nothing to do with the choice of people who should go. We were invited and we said we would go. Perhaps it was because the church people who invited the two of us happened to know the two of us. Whether they considered extending it beyond that, I do not know. I am sure they would be glad to consider it. We were not, as it were, self-appointed to this mission.

Mr. Groos: You are not the only two Christians in the House. That interested me and, I know, a number of our colleagues.

You mentioned that Uli or Annabella was under attack or likely to be under attack. Could you expand on that a bit.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): The airport, as we were told, is about six miles from the line of fighting. There seemed to be a little disagreement actually—some said six and some said twelve, but the chap who lived right on the firing line said that it was six miles. Before we went in, two of the pilots suggested that it would be about two days before the

airport was going to be overrun. That did not make us too optimistic. Then after we got in a chap who had considerable knowledge about the situation came to us that night and said the situation was very desperate. Now I must admit that I have a very lively imagination and I did not get much sleep that night. The next morning we decided, and it was agreed to by the Biafran officials that we talked to, that we should try and cover our interviews as quickly as possible and then get back out so we might do something useful on the outside rather than trying to survive on the inside.

Mr. Groos: We discussed here the other day the priorities and I think we reached about the same priorities as you did in discussing this—the matter of bringing immediate humanitarian relief to this disaster area and, secondly, the longer range military political solution of the problem. Could we just stick to those in that order. I will direct my first question towards the bringing of immediate relief. Now that Hercules aircraft have been offered by the government we seem to be having trouble getting to the nub of the figures. We are in the numbers game in this respect. General Wrinch yesterday said that 200 tons a day of relief supplies are what are needed now, and he indicated that they will need more later on. I read in other papers that have come out that Doctor Middelkoop said that Biafra needs 400 to 500 tons of protein-rich food. Now that is quite a difference when you are speaking of aircraft which can only carry twenty tons a day or twenty-five perhaps at the outside. You also speak of the Annabella airstrip which will only handle so many aircraft a day, and I presume that not all of these aircraft are bringing in food supplies. What in your opinion is the amount of food that is required there right away per day?

Mr. Brewin: Well I do not think we can give a precise figure. We talked to several people who were handling relief matters. We talked to Father Byrne who started the church end of it. There are, roughly speaking, the Red Cross and the church, the Red Cross from Fernando Po and the church groups from the other island. As I said, we spoke to Father Byrne who started the operation and is in charge of it; we spoke to various people who are closely connected with the planning of this, and my recollection is that they said, "You are getting in now between 150 and 200 tons a day." You can count the number of

flights. Present planes can bring in about ten tons. So it works out that they might get as many as 15 flights in a night, which would be 150 tons.

My impression is that under existing conditions, and assuming the situation does not worsen greatly by reason of the declining amount of domestically-produced food, somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500 tons a day would go a long way towards improving a minimum diet.

Mr. Groos: You see, your statement is in conflict, and this is where we are in trouble, because General Winch said that there were about 170 tons a day coming through, and it seemed to me that with the addition of two more Hercules aircraft, which could probably bring in 25 to 50 tons a day extra, this would meet the bare minimum requirement. However, it looks now as though it will have to be considerably more than that. Is that correct?

Mr. Brewin: I would think, from our information, that it would have to be more than that.

Mr. Groos: Well, one of the great difficulties we have is sort of unravelling this on the basis of the information that we can get hold of.

Mr. Brewin: I do not say that Mr. Winch with the Red Cross would not be well-informed on this but our people, the ones who are organizing the distribution and have these feeding centres and a system of cards for people, must have a pretty close estimate of what they could use if they could get it.

• 1635

Mr. Groos: I do not think General Winch left the impression that they would not be able to use it if they could get it. It was a matter of minimum requirements to prevent this disaster from getting any greater; in fact, diminishing it. I would like to leave that matter for a moment and move on to the second point, as I know there are a lot of other people who want to ask questions. When we get on to the business of the political and military solution to the problem I notice that there are four countries that have recognized the Biafrans, all of them African nations, and it seems strange to me...

Mr. Winch: Two Commonwealth countries have recognized Biafra.

Mr. Groos: And two Commonwealth countries. What are they, Tanzania, Zambia.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Gabon and the Ivory Coast.

Mr. Groos: It would seem to me that they, being closest to the problem, between them would initiate this action at the United Nations. Can you give me any ideas, having been out there, as to why...

Mr. Brewin: We cannot really give you any idea from being out there, but we were in New York yesterday and we were discussing it. Do you want me to give you...

Mr. Groos: Yes, I do.

Mr. Brewin: I do not know that we learned too much there about the other state. The Organization of African Unity recently had a conference in Algiers and it brought out a resolution which was passed, I think, by 29 to 4, the 4 against it being the ones you have mentioned. The essence of this seems to be that it is an appeal to what they call the secessionist leaders to cooperate for the purpose of restoring peace and unity in Nigeria. Certainly from the phrasing of it it might be regarded as an appeal to them to surrender and that is why we feel, from our background knowledge of the situation and knowing the mental attitude of the Biafrans, that it really is not too realistic a solution.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I will try to answer your question more specifically. For instance, I do not know about Tanzania and Zambia, what their concerns are in terms of raising it with the UN, but it is my feeling from the visit we had yesterday and from looking at some of the statements that have already been made to the General Assembly that there are at least three or four countries that have indicated they would like to see this raised, but for one reason or another they may not be able to raise it themselves. In other words, they might be prepared to support the matter if it was raised, but they feel that they are not in a strong enough position to take the initiative. I think it would be wise, if Mr. Sharp is here tomorrow, to pursue this further with him because this is one of the matters I think that he has been...

Mr. Anderson: Could you name those countries?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I could not do it from memory. I cannot recall it. It has been some time since I looked at the list. I think it would be better if you spoke with him tomorrow. I think he may have something on that.

Mr. Groos: I would like to ask some more questions, but I would like to give up my place now and then you can put my name down at the end. Would you agree to that?

The Chairman: Thank you very much. Mr. Laprise?

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brewin, you mentioned earlier that people in Biafra seemed to believe that they will be exterminated if they surrender. In order to get this information, have you talked to peasants, to Biafran people or do you hold this information only from a part of the elite that you met?

• 1640

[*English*]

Mr. Brewin: We spoke to some younger students, I do not know if you would call them the elite or not, but as we already mentioned we also spoke to teachers, priests, people who are in daily contact with the situation, and we are really handing on what they say. We did not have time to speak to a large section of what you might call the ordinary people. We saw some of them but generally speaking we got our information from two groups; there were the Biafran officials, who gave us their version, but as far as we are concerned in our conclusions we would place even more reliance on this group of people who were in fact working throughout the country and who had been in the country and who shared, you might say, the problems of the people there for many years.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: Now, another question. Information coming from Biafra told us that there seemed to be a reinforcement of the army on the Biafran side in a sense that Biafran people apparently are better prepared for defence and attack, and that they would be assisted by voluntary officers coming from Europe. Are you aware of this information and of this new action in Biafra?

[*English*]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It seemed to us at the time we were there, in comparing our impressions with the information that we received about the situation earlier, that perhaps Biafra at the moment is in a better situation militarily. I think it is fair to say that they have a better supply of ammunition

today than they have had for some time. Although we did not see anything except the entrance to a commando camp, which involves a mixture, I would gather, of Europeans as well as Biafrans, it is well known, I think, that there are mercenaries fighting on both sides of the conflict. We did see one mercenary. In fact, he travelled by car part of the way with us, this was a young chap who was dropped off at the commando camp, and we saw a few others around the airport, but we did not have any conversations with them or have much opportunity to examine the actual military situation.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: Have you been able to obtain information, for instance, about the armament supply sources of Biafra, as well as officers' sources?

[*English*]

Mr. Brewin: On the Federal side we were told that the USSR and Great Britain are the main suppliers and have been for several years. On the Biafran side we were told that the supplies that they got—which were very much less in volume because of the difficulties of getting them in, amongst other things—that some of them came from France and some of them came from Portugal, and that some of their arms were manufactured by themselves right within their own country. This is what we were told but we have no means of ascertaining whether this information is correct.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: I would have a last question and I think Mr. McNeill might be in a better position to answer it since he lived a certain period of time in Biafra. Could he tell us if the industries, particularly the oil industries, are still in the hands of foreign capital, and what countries is this money from?

[*English*]

Mr. McNeill: My understanding is that the oil industry is largely controlled by British Petroleum and Shell, with the British Government holding the major shares. I understand that SAFRAP, the French oil agency, also has some exploration rights, or had prior to the civil war, and I also understand from newspaper reports in Nigeria that some of the oil has begun to flow again.

The Chairman: Mr. Yewchuk?

Mr. Yewchuk: We have been told that many of those people who are starving are hidden in the bush, and you mentioned the figure of an average of 6,000 dying a day. Were you able to visit any areas in the bush, or any of the feeding centres, where you might ascertain this fact with some accuracy?

• 1645

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): To ascertain the exact number of people throughout Biafran-held territory that are actually starving to death, as we said earlier, is really a guess. We did see feeding stations in operation. We know that they are operated on a pretty businesslike basis by all of the relief organizations and that in many cases they have problems that perhaps they had not foreseen in advance. One of them, as a matter of fact, is the nature of the food that has been sent in, and one of the problems is that if you are sending or distributing food that is not familiar to the Biafrans, very often they do not realize the protein value that is there. They have gone out and sold it and then bought their native food of yams, which is not that high in protein efficiency. Some of them, in other words, have not been able to effect a good cure for this protein disease called kwashiorkor. They have had problems in trying to get the right materials in. In terms of whether or not all of the starvation is being met, we did not have enough opportunity to travel far into the bush or to see refugee camps to know whether all of the serious cases were being handled.

In some cases they are now bringing children out, because they are beyond the point of just feeding, and hospitalizing them and giving them blood transfusions. They have established a new field hospital in São Tomé. They have some hundreds of children there. I think they have now flown in close to a thousand children to Gabon and are looking after some of them there. They try to take them out, rehabilitate them, and then put them back with their families in Biafra.

Mr. Brewin: May I add something to that? The sort of information we got from Father Finucane, whom we met and who has a parish in an area where there are 26,000 people, was that from his knowledge 900 people died of starvation in the month of August, 500 of whom were children. That sort of information, I think, judging from its source, is reasonably accurate. One can piece these things together.

The other figures we gave you, of 6,000 daily, were based upon multiplication which was not done by us, but by the relief agencies. We could probably give you their names and how they estimated their figures. I think the Red Cross, on a slightly different basis, are coming to the same sort of conclusion.

Mr. Yewchuk: Mr. McNeill, having lived there do you think these figures are close?

Mr. McNeill: I am sorry, I would have no way of knowing about the rate of mortality in those areas any more than would anyone here. I think, though, that we should also bear in mind that that area of the world, under normal circumstances, has an infant mortality rate of at least 50 per cent. This should be kept in mind when you are considering death rates.

Mr. Brewin: Do you mean half of all the children die there?

Mr. McNeill: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: I would like to know your authority for that statement.

Mr. Yewchuk: I want to change the subject a little bit, as a possible solution to some of these things. You mentioned that some of the children have been evacuated. Did you meet any people—refugees—who might fit into the Canadian way of life and have you received any requests for refugees to go to Canada?

• 1650

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No. I think some requests have actually been made by relief agencies to bring children out of Africa and into Europe, or into the United States, but the Biafrans feel strongly that this should not happen. This relates to a number of things. Perhaps the strongest reason is that there is among Biafrans, especially the Ibo people, a very close-knit family situation. They are very reluctant. They are even reluctant to have children who are seriously affected leave Biafra to go for treatment to Gabon or to one of the colonies. This, as I understand it is the limit to how far they will go in allowing these children to leave. During the week that we were in Biafra there was an active proposal to take about 40 or 50 children out of Biafra to Holland for treatment. I understand, from talking to officials, that they were very much opposed to that idea.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you very much.

Mr. Prud'homme: I have a supplementary. Can you reconcile what you just have said, about the Ibo people being a close-knit family, with the fact, as stated by you in the *Toronto Telegram*, that they believe children can be reproduced at those camps? That is why the children appear to be suffering. How can you reconcile that?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Reconcile what?

Mr. Prud'homme: That they are a well-knit family, with the fact that they would rather see the children die. Is it because they do not care that much? It is quite difficult to reconcile.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Oh, not at all. I should explain, perhaps, that, as sometimes happens, I did not actually write that. That was inserted into an article I did write. I read it last night in the *Toronto Telegram*, but it is not part of the article I wrote. It was an additional embellishment.

Mr. Anderson: Did you correct the article? There are other statements...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): That is the primary one, I think, but I would like to clarify it because it is an important point. There is an African tradition—I do not know how widespread it is—that if starvation occurs the first people who should bear the brunt of it are the old people and the children. Now, the rationale for this is that the old people have pretty well lived their lives and have served their usefulness; therefore, it is easier to let them starve; and that the young people, if the parents die first, would be left alone and therefore would likely end up starving to death or being caught in the elements. In Biafra now, because of Christian influence, it has been happening during the starvation period that, instead of the traditional African pattern whereby the children and the old people are allowed to starve to death first, the mothers also are. They have been starving to death because they have been depriving themselves in order to assist their children. This has been a problem in terms of the over-all relief effort.

That is the story as we heard it; not the greatly shortened but highly inaccurate one in part of that article. I am sorry it is there.

Mr. Prud'homme: Yes; but do you...

The Chairman: I think we should adhere to the list of questions.

Mr. Prud'homme: If you do not mind, it is on this same question.

The Chairman: We will deal with that question later, Mr. Prud'homme. We have a list of questions...

Mr. Prud'homme: It is not a question, sir; it might influence a...

The Chairman: I think it is something which should be raised in order...

Mr. Prud'homme: I think the witness, to do himself justice, should tell us what is his own article and what is not. I do not mind for myself. I did not write it so...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I will tell you afterwards.

Mr. Anderson: We have these things before us; they are written by you. Some of our questions are geared to what we have read.

The Chairman: I think we should proceed. Is there anything else you would like to correct in there?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): As far as I can remember that is the only part that I would regard as highly...

Mr. Anderson: Is it only the first sentence of that paragraph which reads: "It does not help to know that Biafrans will sacrifice their children first in this war."? Is that the only thing that was added?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): There were a few other editorial changes, but as far as I know I would still stand behind the rest of the story.

The Chairman: Dr. Yewchuk, did you have a...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is written in haste; but that was inserted. I did not write that.

Mr. Roberts: You will doubtless be writing a letter of correction to the newspaper?

The Chairman: Dr. Yewchuk?

Dr. Yewchuk: Yes; if I may have another minute I have just one further brief question. We have heard from various reports that many Biafran officials are refusing to accept food that comes by way of Lagos. Did you find this to be so, and for what reason?

Mr. Brewin: We did not have any occasion to observe it to be the fact.

Mr. Yewchuk: From Lagos?

Mr. Brewin: We have heard that that is so; that in the course of negotiations with the Red Cross there was unwillingness to accept food coming through from Lagos.

Various reasons were advanced. One was that it was proposed to come over a land route. The Biafrans were afraid that the opening up of any land route would be militarily disadvantageous to them. The other story we heard was that they thought it might be poisoned. But, again, this is in the realm of what we were told and have read; it was not anything we could ascertain.

Mr. Yewchuk: You were talking, though, to actual government officials. Did any of them give you that impression?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not think we really spent any time asking them whether they would consider this as an active proposal. We had the impression pretty firmly implanted that the question had been seriously considered and had been abandoned. Therefore, there was little point, in our minds, in raising it at that time.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. McNeill and Mr. Brewin some questions. I will start with Mr. McNeill.

Mr. McNeill, I take it that you were living in Nigeria in January of 1966.

Mr. McNeill: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Ryan: In what part of the country were you living at that time?

• 1655

Mr. McNeill: In Ibadan, the capital of the Western State.

Mr. Ryan: And are you familiar with the events that occurred politically and militarily by way of a sort of coup d'état at that time? Would you tell the Committee just what happened, to the best of your knowledge? I think that was the start of all these events.

Mr. McNeill: At that time Nigeria was a federation made up of an alliance between a faction of the Yoruba party, the action group and the northerners. A group of Ibo officers, five majors, I believe, planned and led a military coup on January 15, executed or assassinated

the Federal prime minister and the premier of the northern region, the premier of the western region and the Federal minister of finance, as well as a number of army officers who had not agreed to go along with them. Major General Ironsi, who was the commander in chief of the armed forces at that time, suppressed the rebellion, and I gather at the invitation of the Federal civilian government took over with the military government. The Federal government resigned and he assumed full powers. He then suppressed the military rebellion in the north, the five majors were arrested, and he installed a military governor in each of the four regions: Colonel Ojukwu, Colonel Ejoor in the Mid-western State, Colonel Fajui in the Western State and Colonel Katsina in the Northern State.

Mr. Ryan: Did this coup d'état by the Ibos last for any appreciable length of time before the military government took over?

Mr. McNeill: Well, General Ironsi was himself an Ibo as head of the first military government. He suspended the constitution and so on. Then he issued a decree unifying the country and abolishing the region's making them groups of provinces. This was an attempt on his part, I gather, to unify the country. Now this caused a great deal of suspicion from the northerners, because General Ironsi had surrounded himself by a number of Ibo advisers. As well there was a lot of resentment, I gather, on the part of the northerners because no prominent Ibo politician had been killed in the military coup, although both the premier of the northern region and the Federal prime minister, both northerners, were.

Mr. Ryan: Are there any Ibos now with the existing military government?

Mr. McNeill: Yes, I am told there are. I do not personally know of any Ibos who hold high places, although the minister for foreign affairs is an easterner Dr. Arikpo, or commissioner, I suppose he is, for external affairs.

Mr. Winch: He is not an Ibo, is he?

Mr. McNeill: No.

Mr. Ryan: There has apparently been quite a change, though. It is now the Ibos who are in trouble. Therefore I would take it from that that substantially the military government is controlled by those who are not Ibos.

Mr. Thompson: You have to tell the story of the counter coup to complete your picture.

Mr. Ryan: Would you do that, Mr. McNeill?

Mr. McNeill: Initially when Nigeria was established as a federation and gained its independence it was a coalition government between the N.C.N.C. and the northern party. That coalition collapsed and the north formed a coalition government with one of the parties in the west. Then the first coup occurred and six months later, because of Ironsi's decree unifying the country, this was interpreted as a move on the part of the Ibos to gain further influence and to consolidate their position, because he said that now civil servant jobs and so on would be competed for on an equal basis throughout the federation. And since the Ibos were the most educated people they were obviously going to dominate the civil service in all of the areas of the country, not just in the federal government. So while General Ironsi was on a reconciliation tour of the federation in Ibadan, a military coup occurred and Major General Gowon—he was then Lieutenant-Colonel and had been appointed chief of staff by Ironsi—was now appointed the new commander in chief of the armed forces, and Ironsi and the military governor of the west were executed. This is the state of the government now.

• 1700

Mr. Ryan: Before the first coup d'état of January 15, 1966, were there a great many people dying of the protein deficiency disease known as kwashiorkor, a disease Mr. MacDonald mentioned?

Mr. McNeill: Well, kwashiorkor has been a problem in that area of the world for some time. It was not a problem, of course, on the massive scale that it is now. The problem has undoubtedly been aggravated tremendously.

Mr. Ryan: What percentage? Would you have any idea?

Mr. McNeill: I am sorry I could not give you any idea.

Mr. Ryan: In your recent experiences in the country, have you seen evidence of people dying, the corpses lying around? Could you give us any picture of this?

Mr. McNeill: I saw a good deal of rioting in the Western State before the first military coup, people being killed and so on, cars being set on fire. These were political riots between various political factions, largely

between the N.C.N.C. Ibo party and the action group, a combination of them, in opposition to the western and federal governments.

Mr. Ryan: So you saw these casualties?

Mr. McNeill: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Have you seen much evidence in the bush country or along the trails or in the cities and towns of death by this protein deficiency disease?

Mr. McNeill: No.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, I direct your and the Committee's attention to the first page of the news release by Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald down about six or seven lines. I quote:

In one small city of 26,000, 900 people died of starvation in the month of August; of these 900 victims, 500 were children.

Would you be able to identify that city, Mr. McNeill, and could you either confirm or corroborate?

Mr. McNeill: I would not be able to corroborate that. If you told me the name of the city I may very well know it.

Mr. Ryan: Does Mr. MacDonald know the name?

Mr. Brewin: No. I gave you the name of the person who informed us, Father Finucane.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This is taking a flyer, but I think it was likely Uli itself, which is a neighbouring city to the airport.

Mr. Ryan: And at page 3 of this report, Mr. Chairman and Mr. McNeill, at the end of the third line, I quote:

The surrounding forests lend themselves to guerilla warfare.

I was wondering, Mr. McNeill, if behind the Federal lines at this time, or in recent weeks, there is any guerilla activity on any substantial scale that you know of from your own knowledge or that you are fairly certain exists?

Mr. McNeill: I am told that there is guerilla warfare. It is sporadic and not on a massive scale, although there was, I gather, some of it in the midwestern areas, of the Biafran troops infiltrating. Just north of Asaba there was quite a lot of that.

Mr. Ryan: Do you feel that if Biafra were completely overrun there would be a lot of this guerilla activity continued, or not?

Mr. McNeill: That is very speculative and I would not know. Certainly I would agree that it is ideal country for that.

Mr. Ryan: Still on page three, in the third paragraph.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, Mr. Brewin would like to make comment on that last question.

• 1705

Mr. Brewin: I think we had in mind the future rather than the past. I think you should bear in mind that the area now occupied by the Biafrans is what might be called the heartland of the whole area in which the Ibos are the majority race, and in this sort of redoubt or circle you see on the map, many of the Ibos from the surrounding areas have withdrawn in there, and many of the areas which are occupied by the Federal forces are areas in which the Ibos were a minority and not a majority group. So that when we talk about guerilla warfare, while there may be some now, I do not know, the prospect of the growth of guerilla warfare in the future is what we were really referring to.

Mr. Ryan: I also direct your attention, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, to the third paragraph on page 3 of the news release:

In the areas of Biafra, now occupied by federal troops, there was almost total evacuation of Ibos, the majority people of Biafra. Those who were left, non Ibos for the most part, the educated and leaders have been shot.

Mr. McNeill, I do not know if you are familiar with our Observers' report or not. We studied it the day before yesterday, and we were told that the educated and the leaders have left these areas that have been taken over by the Federal troops, or they are not coming out of the bush, as the uneducated Ibo is. Would you comment on this?

Mr. McNeill: I would say that it does not necessarily surprise me. If you say that they were shot by whom were they shot? Do you have any indication of that?

Mr. Ryan: The implication there is certainly strong that they were shot by the Federal troops who are now occupying it.

Mr. McNeill: I remember reading a report in one of the British Sunday newspapers of a great deal of tension and some reprisals being taken by the Ibos against some of the elite of the minority tribes because they suspected them of informing the Federal troops of their movements, and so on. In fact, this was a rather brutal occurrence that took place in the market in Umuahia. So I would not be surprised if the leaders of the intellectuals have fled from that area.

Mr. Ryan: And where have you been living in Biafra or Nigeria for the last several months, what locations?

Mr. McNeill: For the last three years I have been stationed in Ibadan, which is the capital of the Western Region. For the first year I lived three miles outside of Umuahia.

Mr. Ryan: So you have not been in Biafra recently at all, then?

Mr. McNeill: Not for a year.

Mr. Ryan: Not for a year. I think I just have one question for Mr. Brewin, Mr. Chairman, and then I will conclude.

I would ask you to turn your attention, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, to page 2, paragraph 4:

We therefore call on the government of Canada to take the initiative at the United Nations General Assembly to bring about a ceasefire, the negotiation of an end to the conflict and a massive international relief action.

I direct my question, Mr. Brewin, to the first part of this particularly, that is, "the initiative at the United Nations General Assembly". In view of the fact that Tanzania and Zambia are both Commonwealth countries as well, and far more closely associated with this situation ethnically and geographically, why would it not be more proper for one of these countries to take the initiative rather than Canada? Why should Canada take this initiative?

Mr. Brewin: The African states in various ways are all closely involved in this matter. After all, Nigeria will be a major military power if they are successful in this war. There are all sorts of crosscurrents that affect the future and the relationships of these African states, and the view that was expressed to us by the Biafran leaders with whom we discussed it was that Canada was disinterested and free to take an initiative, and this was

partly because she was not so much involved in the problems. This was the view that was expressed to us and this is the view that we have repeated.

Mr. Ryan: Why not Australia or New Zealand, or some other British Commonwealth country—

Mr. Brewin: Well, you put a bell on a cat. If a thing is desirable someone should do it, and it was suggested to us that Canada is a country that is interested because she is a member of the Commonwealth, because she is a middlepower and not directly involved. Britain is directly involved and so are some of the other countries, and that someone should start this thing, and Canada—a nation known for her concern with humanitarian causes, I believe—would be a suitable country to get it going.

Mr. Ryan: I will pass then. Thank you, Mr. Brewin.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. De Bané: I would like to ask a few questions. Mr. MacDonald, is this your first trip to Nigeria?

• 1710

[*English*]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, certainly.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. De Bané: Is it your first trip to Africa?

[*English*]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. De Bané: How long was your stay in Biafra?

[*English*]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): About a day and a half.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. De Bané: Could you have stayed longer?

[*English*]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): That was, of course, the debate that Mr. Brewin and I had with each other during the time we were there. I can say that I think we felt more like staying close to the time we were leaving, if I can put it that way, than shortly after we got there. When we first got there—perhaps it

was our timidity or our unfamiliarity about being in that kind of a situation—we really wondered how long we should stay in order to make sure we could get back out. I think we both felt, after we had made arrangements to leave and it got close to the time of leaving, that we could have stayed for a few more days and safely left, but on the other hand we felt that perhaps we had stayed long enough to get a useful appreciation of the situation. We might have added more breadth to our knowledge.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. De Bané: So you have stayed one and a half days. How many hours of sleep have you had during that time?

[*English*]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Not very many, I will tell you. I do not know. We went to bed about three o'clock in the morning and we were up about seven o'clock. I guess it was about four hours' sleep.

Mr. Lewis: About four hours a day.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, that is right.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. De Bané: And I understand that after one and a half days, you came to the conclusion that you had pretty well evaluated the situation and that you could give a judgement?

[*English*]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): One of the things that assisted us—and we might have stayed longer had we not run into this—was that we found an amazing degree of unanimity on major points among a wide variety of witnesses. We felt that in large part these witnesses were very credible people; for the most part they were people of education, people who had travelled a good deal themselves. Even many of the Biafrans had received doctorates either in Canada the United States or Great Britain. They were very intelligent people. In many cases the relief workers were people of considerable background and ability. But on the major points that concerned us there was a high degree of unanimity and for that reason we felt that the conclusions we had reached probably were ones with which we could live and which we could speak to.

Mr. Brewin: May I add a comment to that? It is true we were only in Biafra for 36 hours, or whatever it was, but we were also at São

Tomé for about a day before we went in. We were also at São Tomé a day after we came out, before we were able to get accommodation back to Europe, and during that time we interviewed a number of people who were very close to the operation, who had been in Biafra, who were operating the relief operation from São Tomé, so it was partly what we learned there that helped us to arrive at such conclusions as we were able to come to.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: I would like to direct more questions to Mr. MacDonald. According to you, did the government of Biafra make a mistake in refusing assistance sent by land? Do you think it was wise for them to refuse help that could have been sent by land?

[English]

Do you think they reached a good decision by refusing to have medical and food supplies delivered by road?

Mr. Alexander: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I am just wondering what my honourable friend is attempting to do. I have a gathering feeling that he is attempting to cross-examine our charitable witnesses and...

Mr. Brewin: That is all right; we do not mind.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): That is all right; we do not mind.

Mr. De Bané: One thing is sure: that Mr. MacDonald is bright enough to answer for himself.

• 1715

Mr. Alexander: It is not that, Mr. Chairman. I can see there is no question about that but I am wondering whether we are here to receive the charitable gestures of our witnesses or are we going to rake them over the coals. In view of this last statement that was made or this last question, I am just wondering how far we can go.

The Chairman: Well the witnesses do not seem to have been too seriously inconvenienced so far, perhaps we could proceed, bearing Mr. Alexander's remarks in mind.

Mr. De Bané.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: I think Mr. Lewis will agree with me. One thing is sure, our observers have been deeply moved by what they have

seen, the Canadian people are deeply moved, I would like to try to throw light on certain topics. According to you, Mr. MacDonald, was the Biafra government right in rejecting the offer made to send supplies by land?

[English]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think that question is likely beyond my capacity to answer. All I know is that the government made the decision for the reasons outlined a little earlier by Mr. Brewin. They felt it would be unacceptable to them, basically I think for military reasons, not to use a land route. I have no way, because of the shortness of the trip, among other things, of knowing whether their decision was a correct one or not, but it was a decision they had made very firmly.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: Have you met during your one day and a half stay in Biafra, some federalists or some people who were partisans of the federal government?

[English]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, we could not meet these people in Biafra. We had some brief opportunity yesterday while we were in New York to talk with Dr. Arikpo, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and I had a private conversation last night with an individual who was originally an attorney general with Colonel Ojukwu when he was Military Governor of the Eastern Region so we have more recently had this opportunity.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: Am I right in saying that you were not interested in going to the sector held by Nigerian forces to see the other aspect of the story?

[English]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This is a good question, whether we have seen the other side, in other words.

Mr. De Bané: And, if you did not, why did you not?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, I think there are two reasons basically why we did not. One was the time factor. In order to get to Lagos or to get around to the other side we really would have had to go back to Europe, because there is no real way of getting from the places we were into that part of Nigeria. We would have had to go back to Europe and

then come back to Lagos. There was a whole time business there. I do not know how long it would have taken us to do this. The other reason which was really, I think, basic for us, is that we felt our access in Canada to what is happening from the Federal side had been quite good. Our country has full diplomatic relations with Lagos, we have a representative in Lagos and we are receiving communications from them regularly. It had seemed to us, and this is one of the prime purposes of our trip to Biafra, that we were well informed on the views and the situation as it looked from the Lagos side but that there needed to be some viewpoint from the Biafran side.

As a matter of fact you may know that there are not very many people who in the last year, say, have been able to make the trip into Biafra for various reasons. We were, for instance, the only two Members of Parliament so far that have travelled to that area, and even the number of newsmen has been relatively limited. Perhaps there have been more there during this past month than have been there during the past year.

• 1720

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: Mr. MacDonald, have you met during the past year in Biafra people who were not Ibo, who were Europeans or others?

[English]

Mr. MacDonald, have you met people other than Ibos?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): In Biafra?

Mr. De Bané: Yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, we met some of the representatives of the minority people while we were there.

Mr. De Bané: Did you also meet people from outside Africa, such as Europeans living there?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes.

Mr. De Bané: Did all those people concur in the assessment of the situation by the Ibo people?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, they did.

Mr. De Bané: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman, if possible I would like to direct my first question to Mr.

McNeill. Speaking in terms of the shortage that presently exists, the short-fall estimates of 300 to 400 tons a day, I think Dr. Midlekoop was estimating that in December we are probably going to be looking at a figure of 3,000 tons per day, and I am curious to know what the seasons are there. Is this going to be a period when it will be virtually impossible to fly an aircraft? Is it a rainy season or what? There is no problem about flying food in at any time?

Mr. McNeill: The rainy season is not then.

Mr. Winch: It is over now.

Mr. Buchanan: Well, the next thing is the crops. Of course, there would be very few crops being planted and harvested in the Eastern Region. Also there would be virtually no yield which is normally harvested at this time of the year, or is it harvested all year round?

Mr. McNeill: No, the cassava, which is one of the staple starch crops, has a longer maturing period and can be harvested at various times during the year. Yams are planted and harvested during the rainy season. They also depend largely on yams, but under more normal conditions they have chickens and goats and so on. All of this, of course, will be disrupted.

Mr. Buchanan: We are told that presumably the seed crop of yams will be exhausted by December.

Mr. McNeill: Yes.

The Chairman: Would you speak more loudly, Mr. Buchanan, so that the other members of the Committee can hear you?

Mr. Buchanan: Fine, thank you.

Getting back to this military aspect, Mr. MacDonald, you indicated—or possibly it was your colleague, Mr. Brewin—that the Biafrans are opposed to the land corridor for military reasons. They are afraid of poisoning and the fact that it will open up a route into the heartland of their country. On the other hand, I believe I read somewhere in your material that, there was unquestionably a fair amount of military equipment going in to Uli. Did I understand that correctly or not? In other words presumably this is the reason the Nigerians are violently opposed to the airlift.

Mr. Brewin: They are really not all that opposed though because recently arrangements have been made that for anything

supervised by the Red Cross they will let the airlift in during the day time and without hostile action.

Mr. Buchanan: Right, but the concern is how long are they going to leave this airport operative?

Mr. Brewin: Oh, yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This is a very good question we could not get answered while we were there.

• 1725

Mr. Buchanan: If the planes can fly in but have no place to land it is of no benefit whatsoever. The other point is, getting back to the United Nations, that the impression I have from reading is the reason many of these countries are dragging their feet is because in a matter coming before the United Nations which is primarily an internal matter there must be pretty firm proof. I gather the matter they are trying to bring to the fore is that it is, in fact, genocide and therefore deserves to be on the agenda of the United Nations.

Mr. Brewin: There are a number of matters other than genocide that might be brought up at the United Nations. I would like to make it perfectly clear, in view of something Mr. McNeill said, that I do not think either Mr. MacDonald or I have used the word "genocide". "Genocide" means the destruction of a group of people or a race of people with the intent to destroy them and, of course, you would have to look at who is going to do the genocide—the government. What we have said—and I think the Pope, after sending people to both sides used this expression—there is genocidal implication and whether genocide is intended or not there is a danger of the same result being arrived at by the destruction of people. The Pope used the words "genocidal implications". This means that in certain areas at certain times there is such a prejudice, such a feeling of hatred—there is an unsettled, uncontrolled situation—that acts of genocide, not necessarily planned in any way by the central or political authorities of Nigeria, may well take place and are believed to take place. Now, I did want to make it clear that we were not alleging that the Government of Nigeria was engaged in genocide.

Mr. Roberts: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. Are some of the statements in this

report that we have been given not accurate? There are at least two and perhaps three statements to that effect in it.

Mr. Brewin: Where do you find them?

Mr. Roberts: On Page 2:

It is our considered opinion that in the absence of a ceasefire imposed or required by the international community the destruction or genocide of a nation will become a reality.

Mr. Brewin: That is right, "destruction or genocide".

Mr. Roberts: And Page 6:

The United Nations Assembly has the power and the duty to take action for the prevention of genocide.

Mr. Forrestall: They do not say it is taking place; they say it could take place.

Mr. Roberts: In a report on Tuesday which may be inaccurate since it is the *Toronto Daily Star*—and I gather the newspapers had some difficulty with your comments—you are reported as saying that you were shocked to read a report from an independent Military Observer that there was no evidence of genocide.

Mr. MacDonald: We were very much shocked by that.

Mr. Roberts: You seem to be making references to genocide.

Mr. Brewin: We think that to make a conclusion like that in a preliminary report is very unfortunate and I associate myself with Mr. MacDonald's word that it was shocking.

Mr. Roberts: But not the no evidence of genocide? My impression in going over this document was that the whole case was really based on the concern about genocide.

Mr. Brewin: Well, we want to make it clear that there are two different things and we are not coming to a final judgment. We have only heard one side. We have not gone into the whole thing. There are two different things. One is the destruction of a nation arising out of the fact of war. I suppose if we had a nuclear war whole nations would be destroyed. Now, if the nuclear war were launched with the purpose in mind of destroying a particular group of people I suppose you would call it genocide. But to the people who were destroyed what was in the heads of

the people who did it would not make all that difference, and so we are saying that we have not come to a conclusion whether there was or was not genocide. We say there are some situations in which genocidal actions took place and, in any event, the people are likely to be destroyed if the war continues in the way it is. Now, what we are criticizing...

Mr. Roberts: Are you saying then that there is no evidence...

Mr. Brewin: May I finish what I am saying?

The Chairman: Order please. I think we should permit Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald to finish their statements.

Mr. Brewin: I will just finish with one sentence. Where we criticize the military observers in that comment you have brought up—I think Mr. MacDonald made the criticism but I fully associate myself with it—we think it was shocking to draw conclusions in a preliminary report when it is quite obvious that the observers could not have had adequate knowledge or gone into the matter thoroughly enough to draw conclusions. Despite what you say, I do not think we have drawn that conclusion.

The Chairman: That helps to clarify it. I think what is in the newspaper report is not what we are concerned about. We are concerned about the evidence that is now being given to the Committee by the two witnesses and I think they have indicated what they have in mind.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I could ask this later in my questions.

The Chairman: Perhaps Mr. Buchanan will continue.

Mr. Buchanan: To comment, though, on Mr. Brewin's remarks, I think the point was made in this report that it referred only to the one area in which they had worked, which I think is at the First Nigerian Division—I have forgotten the numbers. This was the only area and I do not know whether you had read the reports or not at this time.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, we have read it.

Mr. Buchanan: I do not know whether you had read it at the time the remarks were made but the point is that I think, in fact, the observers did make it clear that it was an interim report and only referred to the area

in which they had, in fact, worked, so I think their comments on that basis were legitimate.

Going back to the question of getting this matter onto the agenda of the United Nations—you were down there yesterday and I do not know whether you discussed it with other than our own people—did the stumbling block seem to be this fact that if there were not some strong evidence of genocide it was an internal matter of civil war and therefore they were very reluctant to have it before the United Nations? Is that correct?

• 1730

Mr. MacDonald: Well, I do not profess to be any kind of expert on procedure so far as the United Nations is concerned, but it seems to me that there are reasons other than genocide whereby this could be placed on the agenda of the United Nations. For instance, there is a substantial body of material now dealing with human rights and it would seem to me that if human rights are being violated, even though this is a period of wartime, this might in itself, apart from whether or not it can be proved conclusively that genocide is occurring, is sufficient reason for the United Nations to consider it.

Mr. Buchanan: Well, I am very sympathetic and, like yourself, would like to see it there but is this not the reason that people are dragging their feet?

Mr. Brewin: May I deal with another point you make about it being an internal matter? That raises in my mind an extremely interesting question that I think this Committee will have to consider very seriously and that is whether, when a civil war has been going on for 18 months as I think this has, when you have a people who were estimated at about 10 million on one side as different from the others as the French are from the Germans, and when you have them threatened with wholesale loss of life, in all these situations it does not become an international matter, and our position is to take the view that under modern world conditions the world community has an interest in preventing this.

Now, I agree with Mr. MacDonald that to go into that in detail you would have to get the views of international lawyers and we do not profess to be that, but we think it transcends a merely internal matter; at least a broad or liberal view, shall I put it, of world problems.

Mr. Buchanan: I think that is right, but again I think the point is that the United Nations is composed of nation states and nation states are very concerned about their prerogatives as states as well and, in fact, they are the only ones that can bring this forward. That is why I think there is a great deal of dragging of feet so far as this matter is concerned. The final thing comes back to the negotiated peace. How much likelihood do you feel at this point in time there is that there can be some satisfactory negotiated settlement betwixt the Biafrans and the Federal Military Government?

Mr. MacDonald: I cannot speak at all here for the minimum or maximum demands of the Federal Government but it was our conviction that any kind of negotiated settlement in terms of the Biafran government will have to have for them fundamental guarantees of security for life and property. The recurring refrain as we talked to these various people was that unless they have some definite assurance and, to a very large degree, are able to control their own security, then no kind of negotiated settlement will be acceptable to them.

Mr. Brewin: May I answer that question too, because I think it is very fundamental? At the present time the negotiations, I understand, have broken down because the Federal authorities put as a pre-condition that: "We are ready to negotiate and be flexible about all sorts of things but we insist on the maintenance of a federal structure." The Biafrans, on the other hand, have said, "We insist upon self-determination. We are ready to discuss all sorts of confederations or associated states and various other joint common markets, common economic services, but we insist on maintaining the control over the services which give life and security, namely the police and the defence forces because," they say, "not having had these we have been subjected to loss of these things." Mr. Ryan I think was pointing out one or two million of them had to leave the northern and western parts, so they say they want that and the difficulty is to find a formula that squares these two things and also to deal with the problem. At one stage one side may think it has an advantage to win militarily and the other side thinks it has an advantage to win militarily. These are things that create the difficulty of settlement, but we do not want to take the position that it is not possible, that

rather that some sort of settlement can be made that will equate these two different positions.

• 1735

Mr. Buchanan: This is just a case of reconciling, as Arnold Smith pointed out last night, the physical security which the Biafrans demand and the economic viability of their state with the determination of the federal military government to maintain the federation. Now, the concern is, can that in fact be negotiated or is it only going to be secured by a military solution?

Mr. Brewin: We do not know. That is what we would like to find out.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It was our appreciation that there is no acceptable military solution. The assumption is made that once federal Nigeria controls all the territory, the military situation will be at an end. But our assumption was made on the fact that once, or when or if the federal forces are able to completely control the territory, there will still be considerable guerilla activity involving some millions of people.

Mr. Buchanan: The question is unlike Viet Nam in that once the supply routes are cut off for a very lengthy period, how can the Biafrans in fact, I mean they can go in...

Mr. Brewin: You can still drop some supplies by parachute. There is no way under modern conditions of completely shutting off supply routes.

Mr. Buchanan: No, but we have seen how difficult it is even with aircraft landing facilities to get an adequate amount of supplies in.

Mr. Brewin: We have found the Biafrans and their friends to be infinitely ingenious.

Mr. Lewis: Is it your suggestion that we should let the war go on in the hope that the Nigerians will soon kill enough Biafrans that the facts will not be necessary?

Mr. Buchanan: No, not at all, certainly not. As I indicated earlier, the hope that we could find some negotiated settlement that we are trying to pursue, whether in fact...

Mr. Lewis: You are not going to find it if you do not try.

The Chairman: I think we should confine the crossfire to the questioning of the witnesses.

Mr. Buchanan: Well, I think we have pretty well exhausted in this area whether in fact, having spent some time there and discussed this with the Biafrans, the two Members of Parliament felt there was any possibility of a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Brewin: I think there is a possibility. As in all negotiated settlements, both sides may have to give a bit. There are deep-seated fears on the part of the Biafrans with whom we were in contact. We are not able to speak with any authority whatsoever really of the people on the other side of the equation, but we think that they may have to make very considerable concessions too.

Mr. Macquarrie: Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that it is so long since Mr. McNeill testified that I forget his precise expression, but do I recall you, Mr. McNeill, as saying that while you were in Nigeria you saw no evidence of genocide? Would that be a good recall of your comments?

Mr. McNeill: Yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: And to follow up what Mr. Winch began, were you in Nigeria at the time of the event which has been much talked about in the world and which is referred to on page 3 by our colleagues of the massacre of certain thousand Biafrans and the subsequent movement of up to two million people into the eastern regions? Were you aware of that?

Mr. McNeill: Yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: Did that impress you as having—to use Mr. Brewin's terminology and that of His Holiness, the Pope—did that have genocidal implications to you?

Mr. McNeill: Well, not if we applied to this the definition which was just given to us, an attempt—I have forgotten your precise definition—a systematic attempt to exterminate a certain group of people. I think that this program in the north was systematic and determined and organized. This is my personal opinion. I do not think it had the support of the federal military government or the sanction of it, and I think that all responsible Nigerians were equally horrified by it and regret it deeply.

Mr. Macquarrie: You would perhaps assume that the migrants over-estimated the potential terror involved?

Mr. McNeill: Yes, and I think that is understandable that they should. After all, it directly affected them.

Mr. Macquarrie: You were aware of this at the time in Nigeria. It made an impact upon you.

Mr. McNeill: Quite definitely, yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: I would like to ask Mr. Brewin, in reference to page 3 of their document, which I may say except for the cover I find a most commendable one...

• 1740

Mr. Brewin: We worked on that with great strain and hurry.

Mr. Macquarrie:

"In the areas of Biafra, now occupied by federal troops, there was almost total evacuation of Ibos".

I presume you mean of course a voluntary evacuation by the Ibo people?

Mr. Brewin: Yes.

Mr. Macquarrie: They were not given any alternative by the federal forces?

Mr. Brewin: Well, they chose—either they could have waited for the federal forces to come in I suppose but they voluntarily left because they thought they...

Mr. Macquarrie: What I want to make clear is that the conquering forces did not, in disposing of the people, evacuate them?

Mr. Brewin: No.

Mr. Macquarrie: Push them out?

Mr. Brewin: No, no.

Mr. Macquarrie: Now, the next sentence is the one to which I would like to make reference:

"But of those who were left, non Ibos for the most part, the educated and the leaders, have been shot".

Is there anything that we can take out of this report that the non Ibos chose to remain? Is there something of significance between the non Ibo ex-residents of Biafra and the Ibos which would heighten the feeling many people have that religious overtones are very prominent here? What is the value to be given this?

Mr. Brewin: This is a matter of greatest controversy. One group of people say that the non Ibos in Eastern Nigeria are quite well disposed towards the federal group and they stayed behind and were perfectly happy and everything was fine, and that the real trouble is with the Ibos. Another group of people told us, and the ones we saw tended to take the opposite view, and they said these non Ibos were so badly treated by the incoming federal troops that some of them and many of them have now joined with the Ibos in the central area which they still control and they have in a sense acceded to the Biafran side of the situation. We had both of these. The particular instance that we refer to there was told to us in regard to the province of Calabar and which has been occupied by the federal troops since April. We were told that after the initial occupation—not as they came in and the initial battles, but some time after that—a group of federal troops out of control and very likely not acting, certainly not acting on any instructions from their own government or anything like that, got many of these non Ibos, the leaders, the people who were educated, the leadership sort of people, and took them out of their beds and shot them. Now this is what we were told by people who asserted this with great firmness and vigour, and said they knew the people who were involved. Whether this is correct or not or how extensive this sort of thing was, I do not know, we do not know.

Mr. Macquarrie: It is not suggested here, is it, that by and large the non Ibo people are not withdrawing into the remaining primitive land?

Mr. Brewin: No, no, we did not mean to suggest that.

Mr. Macquarrie: A question for Mr. MacDonald. On page 6 you refer to the prospect of future associations. Would I be pushing you too far if I interpreted your statement to mean that you can see nothing further than economic union between these two areas, but that is as far as in the realities of the situation one could go and expect that they would go?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, I think that is as far as any of the people that we talked to were prepared to go in their discussions with us. And it was interesting that even though they were involved in this war and very much under siege they were still suggesting that this could be a possibility,

that some form of economic association could exist with the federal. . .

• 1745

Mr. Prud'homme: Associated state.

Mr. Macquarrie: Yes. You would have to make it plural. Now a final question for a very distinguished author and now a distinguished traveller, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Groos: Stand up and take a bow.

Mr. Brewin: It is too bad that my book is out of print.

Mr. Macquarrie: The item is not on the United Nations General Assembly agenda and at this stage of the procedural situation it cannot be put on by Canada alone as it could have been until a month ago. How, precisely, would you suggest that this country proceed to have the UN General Assembly or any other body seized immediately of this matter?

Mr. Brewin: With all the practice you have given me I hate to say that I do not think I can adequately answer your question. I think it is important to consult international lawyers and people who have made a great study of the United Nations to find precisely the right committee to bring it before. I think it affects human rights. I believe there is a committee of the United Nations that deals with that. I am not too happy for the reasons I have explained with trying to bring it forward as an indictment of a nation for genocide. I think the form and nature of the resolution requires a study that I have not yet given to it, but I believe there are methods. I think it is consistent with the United Nations Charter, as I have read it and understood it, that this matter is one of international importance and affects fundamental human rights and that the United Nations can properly be seized of it.

Precisely who and how many should introduce it—we would like Canada to seek the initiative. We understand, perhaps wrongly—I think Mr. Sharp is speaking today—that the Canadian Government does not think an initiative would be useful.

Mr. Macquarrie: May I just say as one who has for many months been interested in this tremendously painful problem that I am deeply grateful and much impressed by what the two witnesses have done in this important matter. We welcome them here and we are delighted that they came back safely.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): May I just say, Mr. Chairman, I do not want this to end up to be a mutual back-slapping thing, but it was Mr. Macquarrie who first raised this with me. I do not know if he even remembers it. One winter's day back in January he asked me what I thought of the Biafra situation and I asked him what Biafra was.

Mr. Groos: Was that on the trip to Charlottetown?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, it was on a trip in his office, I think.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, there are still quite a number of people who want to ask questions and quite clearly we will not finish this evening. If the witnesses would be available tomorrow morning at 9.30 a.m., would Committee members be agreeable to continuing in the morning?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Perhaps I am wrong, but I do not know whether Mr. Brewin and I have a great deal more to contribute. I think our views are reasonably well known to the Committee. I personally would rather we sat longer this evening and wound up our part of the testimony.

Mr. Brewin: I must say that I usually agree with Mr. MacDonald, but not at this point.

Mr. Lewis: You are tired, Andrew.

Mr. Brewin: First of all I am tired, and I think Mr. MacDonald could even be tired himself. Second, I think that all of the members of the Committee who want to question us should be given the opportunity to do so. I do not think we could...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am not opposed to that. I thought that if we just sat a little longer this evening...

Mr. Brewin: They can get us some other time.

The Chairman: Would you be available tomorrow, Mr. McNeill?

Mr. McNeill: I am sorry I will not be; I have a meeting.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We cannot be available in the morning.

Mr. Brewin: We have made a commitment for the early part of the morning.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We could be available later on in the day; in the afternoon.

The Chairman: We have made arrangements for Mr. Sharp to appear before the Committee at 3.45 p.m. tomorrow afternoon. He could not appear tomorrow morning. What is the wish of the Committee? Do you wish to continue now?

Mr. Lewis: Would Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Brewin be available about 11 a.m. tomorrow?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Shortly after 11 a.m., yes. Certainly Mr. Brewin and I could be here at 11.30 a.m.

Mr. Lewis: I suggest we do that.

Mr. McNeill: I am sorry I cannot appear tomorrow; I am going away.

Mr. Groos: Perhaps we could finish any questions there are for Mr. McNeill now. May I suggest that, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Would that be agreeable? Would it be satisfactory to the members of the Committee if any members who have specific questions for Mr. McNeill, who cannot be here tomorrow, ask them now? Then we will plan on meeting at 11.15 a.m.

• 1750

Mr. Roberts: The witnesses could not be here earlier tomorrow, is that the problem?

The Chairman: I gather not.

Mr. De Bané: Can we continue this evening?

The Chairman: We will not finish in half an hour. We shall continue then until six o'clock tonight and primarily direct questions to Mr. McNeill. If you have finished with your questions to him then perhaps you could question the other two witnesses and continue tomorrow at 11.15 a.m. Would that be satisfactory to everyone? I believe there is a Finance Committee organizational meeting tomorrow at 11 a.m., but that should be over by 11.15 a.m.

Mr. Thompson: Does the speaking order remain as it is?

The Chairman: The speaking order that I have is Mr. Thompson, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Carter, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Penner.

Mr. Roberts: I will wait until tomorrow.

The Chairman: Do any of these members who are on the list have any questions to direct to Mr. McNeill?

Mr. Alexander: Yes, I would like to ask Mr. McNeill...

The Chairman: We will take Mr. Cafik, then...

Mr. Cafik: I hope this does not take me off the list because most of my questions are for the two gentlemen who bravely made that trip, and I, too, want to thank them for being here today.

However, I would like to ask Mr. McNeill if he has read the Observer Team report—I presume he has—and whether he, generally speaking, is in agreement with its content and that it is a true reflection of the conditions in Nigeria.

Mr. McNeill: The conditions in Nigeria, or in Biafra?

Mr. Cafik: No; in Nigeria. The report only concerns itself with Nigeria.

Mr. McNeill: I am sorry then perhaps I am not familiar with the report.

Mr. Lewis: Occupied areas of Biafra.

Mr. Cafik: It concerns itself with the areas occupied by the Federal troops.

Mr. McNeill: I am sorry, no.

Mr. Lewis: The Nigerian areas occupied by the Federal troops.

Mr. McNeill: No. I am sorry, I did not realize you were referring to this report. I am not familiar with it.

Mr. Cafik: You are not familiar with the report.

Mr. McNeill: No, I am not.

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Alexander?

Mr. Alexander: First, on a point of order, I would like to bring to the Committee's attention, Mr. Chairman, a man who is prepared to appear before this Committee, a Mr. Alan Grossman, who was the West African Bureau Chief for *Time* magazine. He was in Nigeria and Biafra in that capacity from 1966 to 1968, to May of this year. I think he would make a fine contribution to our deliberations here. The only question is when he can be available. He cannot be available for the rest of the week, but I am sure that some arrangement can be made for him to be here next week. I think he will make a fine contribution.

The Chairman: What is the name of this man?

Mr. Alexander: Mr. Allan Grossman of *Time* magazine here in Ottawa, who is the former West African Bureau Chief and who just returned from Nigeria and, in fact, Biafra in May of 1968.

I have just one question because I know that we are all pressed for time. Mr. McNeill, I was under the impression that at one time the Nigerian army was a good army; it was well respected, Sandhurst and all the rest of that...

An hon. Member: Jazz.

Mr. Alexander: Jazz. What is your impression of the army at this date? What type of personnel are in that army now?

Mr. McNeill: Because of the two military coups a number of people in the army have been executed. The Nigerian army prior to the civil war had been composed largely of Ibo officers and northern infantrymen. There were exceptions, of course. The Ibo officers either were shot or returned to the East. The army now is largely made up of minority groups taken primarily from the Tiv non-Muslim areas of the former northern region. Many of the commanding officers in the field are Yorubas. A couple of them—I am thinking primarily of Adekunle—have distinguished themselves in their military actions in the field, but I think that the bulk of the Nigerian army has been rather hastily trained.

• 1755

Mr. Alexander: Yes. That is what I was going to deal with.

Mr. McNeill: If that is the object of the questioning. Do I think that they are going to be very responsive to orders, and so on, from their field commanders?

Mr. Alexander: Yes, I was going to get to that question. I am under the impression that the recruit program ended up with material that was not too good. In other words, they were irresponsible, they were not well trained; and perhaps there may be a semblance of great discrimination and prejudice by this type of person against the Biafrans.

Mr. McNeill: I think that that is not...

Mr. Alexander: Is this not a fair assessment?

Mr. McNeill: That may very well be true. They are largely an uneducated, illiterate people. I am basing my experience, for instance, on the people who are manning the military roadblocks throughout the country, most of whom cannot speak, read or write in English and their deportment is rather careless, sloppy. I am told that the training, if not haphazard, has been at least rushed, so that they can maintain the numbers they need in the field, and so on. However, I would suspect that this is even more true of the Biafran army.

Mr. Alexander: That is all I have to ask right now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos, do you have a question for Mr. McNeill?

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, arising out of the question of Mr. Alexander and the reply by Mr. McNeill, it has just occurred to me that when the Nigerian government therefore gives permission for volunteer manned aircraft to fly across Nigeria and into Biafra on mercy missions, you are saying they are really then in no position to guarantee their safety if by chance there were some Nigerian troops with anti-aircraft weapons nearby? Would that be—

Mr. McNeill: No, that is not what I intended to imply at all. I would assume that no Nigerian soldier would fire on an aircraft without instructions from his superior officers. I do not think, in fact, that it is the ordinary private who does that sort of thing. It may very well be but I would be surprised if it were so.

I thought the other question was related more to the code of conduct which was issued to the troops and whether in fact they were able to interpret it properly.

Mr. Alexander: This is what I was getting at, and time was short. I was primarily interested in knowing the type of discipline that exists in the Nigerian Federal Army now in view of the fact that the recruitment that has been going on has accepted the dregs, and I am just wondering—even though the Federal government has made statements that there is no plan of genocide—what the feelings are of those on the lower end of the ladder. The sergeants, the corporals, the captains, for whom I understand discipline does not mean too much down at that end of the ladder.

Mr. McNeill: Sir, I could not comment on what the feelings of these people are. I really would not know. The general impression, the rumours—not the one here—is that in fact discipline leaves a great deal to be desired. I do not know how effective they are in the field, and so on.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions for Mr. McNeill?

Mr. Anderson: I have a question. I understand the war actually began when Biafra attacked the mid-western region. Do you say this is correct? Is that when hostilities actually broke out? There was a push about a year ago in the mid-western region.

Mr. McNeill: Yes. In fact, the federal troops were moving down through Nsukka, through the northern part of the eastern region at that time. In fact, the midwestern region under Colonel Ejoor attempted as much as possible to remain neutral and they had an agreement with General Gowon that he would not station federal troops or non-midwestern troops on midwestern territory. So there were a number of midwestern Ibo officers in Colonel Ejoor's army and he insisted that they remain loyal to him, but he did not want them to be provoked into any kind of precipitate action which might result from Federal troops coming into that territory. In fact, they finally revolted and assisted the Biafran penetration into the midwest. But until that happened the Federal government did not move militarily on the eastern region from that area.

• 1800

Mr. Anderson: Would you say, then, that part of the reason for the determination of the federal government was the fact that if they did not attack Biafra, Biafra was going to attack them? This is the situation as it appeared to me at that time and I would like to have your comment on whether that is a correct assessment or not.

Mr. McNeill: I do not really think that the federal government at any time was very much afraid of an invasion by the Biafran army because, in fact, they were really not equipped for that sort of thing. Instead, I think that General Gowon was desperately trying to achieve some sort of political solution in order to avoid war. I gather that a number of military men in the Federal army wanted to go in much earlier. In fact, Ojukwu in one of his press conferences admitted that if the Federal army had come in much

sooner they could have walked right over the East. But the delay, I think, was purely a concern—with a great deal of pressure, I presume, from international sources—on the part of General Gowon to give enough time to try to get a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Anderson: You mentioned international influence. Last night we heard a witness explain that Nigerians would react negatively if the United Nations or an international body attempted to interfere in this matter. Would you agree that there would be suspicion of the United Nations if we attempted to arrange any sort of cease-fire that was suggested here?

Mr. McNeill: Yes, I think so. Rightly or wrongly, I think they would regard it suspiciously. They have indicated several times that they consider this is not the affair of the United Nations but because it is happening in Africa to a weaker nation, and so on. Western powers feel that they can intervene, can tell them how to run their affairs.

Mr. Anderson: This would be so in the case of intervention, but would you then say that this would extend to bringing the matter up and discussing it at length in an unwilling United Nations, which it apparently is.

Mr. McNeill: I would think it would because the Organization of African Unity had a great deal of difficulty in discussing it as well, because I gather the position of the Nigerian Government is that if you are going to discuss it like this with the Biafrans it is tantamount to recognizing their potency and their position.

Mr. Anderson: Last night we heard various figures on this. One witness said one million, one said two million Biafrans or Ibos are now in the area occupied by the Federal Military Forces. Would you care to hazard a guess on—

Mr. McNeill: No I am sorry, but I would have no way of knowing that. The driver for our organization was an Ibo and he had many friends. There are many non-Ibo Easterners in the Federation as well still moving about and working quite freely and who do not appear to me to be under any kind of harassment.

Mr. Anderson: So they do not share the fear that has been described—the fear of Ibos in Biafra—which was described to us today.

Mr. McNeill: No, I do not think they do share that fear. I think it is also apparent,

though, on the other hand, that many of them identify very closely with Biafrans and sympathize with their tribesmen, their kinfolk.

Mr. Anderson: Do you know of instances of atrocities now that may have taken place, let us say, in the last few years, even outside the military government area but in Nigeria generally, where Ibos perhaps are put up against the wall because they just happen to be Ibos.

Mr. McNeill: I do not have any personal knowledge of this but I am told by people who were in Benin City when the mid-west was liberated from the Biafran occupation that a number of midwestern Ibos were executed.

Mr. Anderson: This was within the military government's control, not—

Mr. McNeill: Yes. I gather as well that many Binis and midwesterners who were non-Ibos participated in this as retaliation against the Biafran initial attack, although I think it should be pointed out as well that when the Biafrans occupied the mid-west they took very great pains to see that all of the northern and non-midwestern population were evacuated safely. In fact, they took many civilians down and put them on boats, and so on. But it was still a highly unpopular move, primarily because the Midwestern Ibos up to that point had controlled a lot of the business and they were in the officer corps of the Midwestern Army; and it was felt that they had betrayed Colonel Ejoor by opening up the defences and allowing the Biafrans in. I think that this largely accounted for the retaliation which took place later.

● 1805

I do not know whether this execution was largely by federal soldiers or not. I know that the reports I have had on it suggest that a number of midwestern civilians took part in the execution.

Mr. Ryan: How many were involved? What would the order of that be?

Mr. McNeill: I have heard many varying and conflicting reports of what it would be. One gave the approximation that there were 500, but I do not know how accurate that is.

The Chairman: We have exhausted our time. We will begin at 11:15 a.m. tomorrow.

On your behalf I wish to thank all the witnesses, particularly Mr. McNeill, for being with us.

An hon. Member: You said 11 a.m. at one time. Is it 11:15?

The Chairman: The meeting will be at 11:15 a.m.

— — —
Thursday, October 10, 1968.
11:15 a.m.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is past 11:15 a.m. Perhaps we should start our hearing. I have a very brief report to make from your steering subcommittee. Originally, members of the steering subcommittee thought it would be desirable, if possible, to have some sort of interim report by the end of this week to present to the House. There have been a number of changes which now make this unnecessary or undesirable, perhaps.

First, the fact that it appears as though aid will be able to move more freely takes some of the urgency off the making of an interim report. Second, I have received information from the Department of External Affairs that it is possible General Milroy will be able to come back to Canada next week to give evidence before this Committee and it would appear undesirable for us to make any interim report until such time as we have had an opportunity of hearing him, if he can be here next week.

The steering subcommittee took the position that we should inform the Department of External Affairs that we would very much like to have him back, if possible, but not if it would prejudice the work that he is doing over there. The Department feels that perhaps it would be possible for him to be back and give evidence next week without interfering with or prejudicing his work.

Mr. Winch: May I ask what you mean by next week? Would that be Wednesday or Friday?

The Chairman: We do not have a definite date. It might be Wednesday or Thursday.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, I have one point. Is he to be replaced during his period in Canada by another officer so that the work he has been doing which, we understand is...

The Chairman: There is a team there and...

Mr. Anderson: There is one other Canadian officer who could take his place?

The Chairman: There is one other Canadian officer who could replace him.

Mr. Thompson: They have assistants; there are four or five.

Mr. Anderson: I am sorry; the way it was given to me I understood there was only one other Canadian officer there.

The Chairman: I emphasized that we did not want to prejudice the work he is doing but we would like to have him back, if possible.

Mr. Anderson: My only question was, would he be replaced from Canada for that period?

The Chairman: I have a list of questioners from yesterday and I will continue with that list, if I may. The first one on the list is Mr. Thompson. Mr. Brewin is available to answer questions. Mr. MacDonald will be here a little later.

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Chairman, may I just preface my questions with a remark or two? In years past I have known this area intimately. Most of my experience was, first of all, in the preparation for independence, the division of the country into the three original regions and then later doing footwork for the setting up of the Organization of African Unity. Now, I realize that our basic intent in this Committee is aimed at the humanitarian aspect of Biafra. I realize, however, that we have had some very good testimony concerning this from the head of the Red Cross and we also look forward to having the Minister with us tomorrow. I wonder if you will excuse me if I were to bring out a few questions that border on the political side of things, more for our information about developments that are taking place there now? It might help us.

The Chairman: If I may interrupt for just a second, we expect to have the Minister here this afternoon at 3:45.

Mr. Thompson: I should like to ask Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald a few questions relating to this as background material, because obviously their impressions are important in this regard at the immediate time. I should say, also, Mr. Chairman, that I believe the visit of these men to Biafra, short as it was, has had a tremendous impact on public opinion in Canada even as it relates to governmental action and I think it has been a

very worthwhile exercise. But an interesting aspect of your remarks and your report, Mr. Brewin, related to an area that has hitherto not been questioned here in the Committee and that is the attitude of the Portuguese officials on Sao Tomé. You mentioned that you had the opportunity to talk to them in some depth.

Mr. Brewin: Perhaps I should say we had the opportunity to talk to him.

Mr. Thompson: To the military government?

Mr. Brewin: The only Portuguese officer we saw was the Governor of the island, a Portuguese man of military background who has spent 26 years in Africa.

• 1125

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Brewin, in the opinion of the Military Governor of Sao Tomé, is there a hope of settlement in this situation?

Mr. Brewin: Quite frankly, I do not know that we discussed that with him. He is deeply concerned and exercised by what he sees as lying ahead and he urged upon us the importance of international action. He did not specify. I think he mentioned the United Nations but I am sure he would include the Organization of African Unity or any other Commonwealth or any other collective form of action. He emphasized very strongly to us that if this did not happen, in his opinion he would be immensely concerned. We could see his eagerness. In fact, we were told by one of the people there that he hardly slept. We were told of his assistance to the humanitarian activities that are being conducted through the island over which he is the governor.

Mr. Thompson: Did you gather any information that might be helpful in regard to Portuguese policy in Africa as it might relate to this particular situation?

Mr. Brewin: I do not know that he discussed with us Portuguese policy as such. He discussed his own policy, which no doubt is under instructions from Portugal, which was to be of every possible assistance to the humanitarian relief work which was staged in the island he was in. We were told by Father Byrne who is head of the Caritas organization in the islands and who initiated this thing, that the name of this Portuguese governor is His Excellency Silva Sebastião. We were told

that he had been personally extremely helpful.

Mr. Thompson: There would be no objection to Canadian planes under Red Cross registration operating out of São Tomé in direct delivery of...

Mr. Brewin: Absolutely none, except the physical size of the airport and the facilities. I cannot speak of that, but there would be no objection whatever from the Portuguese authorities. They are doing everything they can to help.

Mr. Thompson: In other words, this avenue is completely wide open for Red Cross or...

Mr. Brewin: Yes, absolutely. The only limitation at that time was lack of adequate transport planes, some lack of adequate fields to land on and some lack of facilities on the island itself.

Mr. Thompson: There is fuel and that type of thing available?

Mr. Brewin: There is a problem of fuel. As I understand it, if you have a *Hercules* plane you have to have appropriate fuel. They have enough for a while but it soon might become a problem.

Mr. Thompson: Referring to Biafra itself, did you gain an impression of the attitude of the Biafran officials towards military intervention through the supplying of arms, for instance, from France?

Mr. Brewin: They are desperate to get any arms they can; they are much undergunned. For example, they told us that their troops would advance, take possession of a certain locality and then they would run out of munitions, so they would have to go back again. In other words, they are desperately short and undergunned as compared to the other side.

Mr. Thompson: We know that the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. are involved in supplying armament and munitions to the other side. What other countries are helping Biafra in addition to France? Did you see evidence of Red China's influence?

Mr. Brewin: No. In fact, we spoke to the authorities and they said they had received messages of encouragement and support from Red China but nothing more than that. Moral support and nothing else. We were told another thing along this line that you might be interested in. The Russians had offered

support to the Biafrans in the early stages of the war and they turned it down on the ground that this might be the buying of influence, and they did not wish to be beholden to the U.S.S.R. They were questioning, in view of their rather desperate plight, whether they had made a wise decision.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): May I just add that they told us on two occasions the Russians had expressed an interest in assisting them. I think the major reason they did not get involved was they thought that basically there was no compatibility between the U.S.S.R. and its system of communism and the system of government that they were developing in Biafra.

• 1130

Mr. Brewin: A good private enterprise.

Mr. Thompson: In the shipping of supplies out of São Tomé is military equipment going into Biafra via that same approach or is São Tomé limited to relief and refugee work?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): As much as we could determine it seems to be completely limited to relief operations. The only exception I would make to that—and I do not think it is really an exception—is that the agencies were moving in support equipment for the airfield. In other words, one night we were there they brought in two generators to power the aircraft while they were unloading them, but that was really part of the overall airport operation for their relief planes. But they tried to assure us as well, because they were quite concerned by some stories carried earlier that the churches had been moving ammunition, and they told us very emphatically that this was not true.

Mr. Brewin: Could I supplement that by adding that we were told that the planes with military supplies came in from Libreville and Gabon. How true that is we do not know, but that is what we were told.

Mr. Thompson: It might be a reasonable assumption to say, though, that São Tomé could be strictly a refugee base for relief supplies.

Mr. Brewin: We believe it is and that the people there would be glad to submit to some sort of fair inspection to make sure that that is the only use to which their base is put.

Mr. Winch: Is that the impression you got from the governor, that it must be strictly relief supplies going into Biafra?

Mr. Brewin: I do not recall the governor saying anything about that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We did not question him specifically on that point but I think that would likely be so. The governor takes a very close interest in everything that moves from São Tomé into Biafra. I know they got a rather large shipment of soap and he intervened and was very concerned and wanted to know whether this was really necessary. In fact, he raised a bit of a fuss about sending this much soap in. So I think if they got to anything as militarily important as some kind of equipment he would raise a real hue and cry.

Mr. Thompson: In the press and from the reports we have heard from witnesses apparently it is the Canadian intention, in making *Hercules* aircraft available, that these will fly out of Lagos over Nigerian territory from Nigerian-based relief supplies.

Mr. Brewin: Are you sure about that, Mr. Thompson? That is not our impression. We discussed this matter with the Nigerian authorities in New York and I thought they made it clear that provided it was subject to Red Cross inspection to see that it really was relief, they were ready for it to be flown in from São Tomé and through the church organizations, not from Lagos.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Or from Fernando Po, the Red Cross station area.

Mr. Thompson: It is useful to know that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): That is very important because I think if it were to be brought from Lagos it would be completely unacceptable to the Biafran government.

Mr. Thompson: I was concerned this morning to hear that the planes are now being delayed possibly for another couple of days to complete further negotiations and details with the Nigerian government. If it merely meant authority to fly over Nigerian territory, I do not understand this delay. Do you have any other information that might help us?

Mr. Brewin: In a way we are not too sympathetic with the idea of getting everything checked by the Nigerian government. We think the other governments have flown indirectly without asking Nigeria's consent.

When we were in New York Dr. Arikpo was very definite that they were willing to consent to this as long as it was under the auspices of the Red Cross.

Mr. Thompson: One of the points that has come up in our discussions and also, I think, from several of our witnesses is the possibility of the Red Cross being recognized as an official UN agency, making it possible perhaps to get the Biafran-Nigerian problem on the agenda of the UN. Did you discuss this at all at the UN? Do you think there is a possibility of this facility being provided, making the Red Cross an official UN agency?

• 1135

Mr. Brewin: We did not discuss that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We do not know. We did not explore it when we were in New York. It is a new proposal as far as we are concerned.

Mr. Thompson: One more question, Mr. Chairman. You mention in your report that countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark and some of the Low Countries have been very active in supplying and getting in relief supplies. Did you sense any political repercussion to, say, Sweden, for example, in taking the initiative that it has taken in so far as political implications are concerned?

Mr. Brewin: We heard of none at all.

Mr. Thompson: Do you see that Canada could...

Mr. Anderson: Was that in New York or Biafra?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We have heard of none at any point really, either from—of course we did not pursue the subject extensively with the Nigerians in New York and quite naturally we did not hear all that much from the Nigerian point of view while we were in Biafra, but someone else would have to clarify that. We have not heard of any.

Mr. Thompson: From your observations or conversations with authorities, do you see any obstacle to Canada's assuming a position similar to that which Sweden has taken, in so far as getting in, from the humanitarian standpoint?

Mr. Brewin: No, and we have urged that Canada should do and could do at least as

much. We do not believe there are real political difficulties. We are aware that a different view was taken by the Prime Minister at one stage. They are trying to get over the political difficulties. We have not believed that they were as real as they appeared, perhaps.

Mr. Thompson: There are four African countries that belong to the Organization of African Unity. Two of them, Commonwealth countries, have recognized Biafra officially. Did you see any of the officials of these countries in Biafra or did you observe that they may have been present there?

Mr. Brewin: No. We did not see them. We followed some of the statements that have been made by the leaders of those countries with interest but we did not have the opportunity to interview them.

Mr. Thompson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: I would like to, if I might Mr. Chairman, direct the question to either one of the two witnesses and to join in with Mr. Macquarrie's remarks of yesterday in my appreciation as one member of the House for the time and effort and the concern displayed by the two witnesses in going to Nigeria under the circumstances and conditions.

I am a little concerned. I heard late last night that in spite of all our good intentions, in regard to *Hercules* aircraft, it is quite possible within the next week or so there will be no place to land them in Biafra. Can you tell me what the conditions of the roads are there? I understand that Annabella is just simply a stretch of highway that they clean the brush away from and operate from. Are there other straight stretches in the roads or are they pretty winding, narrow tracks that might not permit the conversion to airports in other areas?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We believe that there are other airports that are in readiness should Annabella be closed out, and we were assured by a number of people we met there that as long as the Biafrans control as much as a postage-stamp size of territory they would be having an airport there to land. Now, again this goes back to something we said yesterday that we feel that is one of the reasons why the *Hercules* aircraft could be very important because there might be a period of time in setting up the airport in

terms of beacon lights and radio equipment, and during that period of time air-dropping would become very crucial to such an operation. And as you know, a *Hercules* aircraft is well suited for that.

Mr. Forrestall: I do. Well, I heard it last night and I thank you for telling us.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would not place too much weight on losing Annabella airport too quickly. I think it is reasonably well fortified and that the Biafrans have put up quite a struggle to maintain it, even though the front is quite close, within, say, six to 10 miles. Those will be pretty stiff miles for the Federal Authorities to overcome, I would think. This is the impression, at least, that we got while we were there.

Mr. Forrestall: A question related to one asked by Mr. Thompson. Is there any danger in Biafra of the failure for example of Western countries to recognize their political status? Is there any danger or did you detect or note any danger in their turning away from it? I ask that because you thought or had the impression that some of them might just be questioning the wisdom of their turning to the USSR for—I think in one case it was—a hospital that was offered to them on two different occasions but was turned down because of certain political experiences.

• 1140

Mr. Brewin: We found very great prejudice about the position of Great Britain. They were very closely tied with Great Britain and many of them were at British universities and so were many of the leaders. There was great bitterness against Britain. Certainly I think if they could, at this stage, get support from China they would be willing to accept it and damn the consequences, as it were. There is a very real danger, but they were extremely friendly to Canada. We found that some of our friends in External Affairs were very unhappy because the Head of State announced that Biafra had three friends, major friends in the outside world: France, China—the People's Republic of China—and Canada, and apparently some of our friends in External Affairs thought we were in very bad company.

Mr. Forrestall: Well, it is lofty company anyway, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Lewis: De Gaulle, Mao and Trudeau.

Mr. Forrestall: I pursue this or ask this question because it would seem to me a tragedy if that bloc of people in this part of Africa particularly is lost to us, but I thank you very much and again express my appreciation for the fact that you did go. It is more than many of us have done. Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: First of all, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could say I would like to congratulate the dynamic duo on their courage in having gone, and say really how much I envy them. I would like to have had the chance to look at things first hand myself.

Mr. Winch: It is still possible.

Mr. Roberts: Still possible? I have some questions in several areas. On the question of shipment of arms, I was very interested in the comments you have just made and I gather you found no evidence at all that there was shipment of arms from the airport from which you left. At the other end, did you find that there was evidence there of considerable arms being flown in from, I gather Gabon from your statements. Could you make any kind of estimate of what the percentage of arms would be as opposed to relief supplies coming in?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It would be difficult for us to make an accurate judgment but, as I said yesterday, I believe they are getting more arms now than perhaps they have been getting for some time. How much is really anybody's guess. But I would think they are able to make fairly full use of the arrangements from Libreville to fly in ammunition so that, relatively speaking at least, I still do not think that their supply is anywhere near—and what you can move by plane is of course greatly limited and unlike the Nigerians who have a full complement of heavy artillery and the British Saladins and the Ferrets and of course the interlocking air equipment that is used. So that it would still be basically small arms that would be coming in.

Mr. Roberts: I assume, or is this true, that they could also if they wished move relief supplies in that way, but is there some logistical difficulty in doing that?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think that is possible but we got the impression—I think I am right in this—that even the Biafrans are anxious to make a clear distinction between where their arms are coming from, that this

is one set of shipments that they are moving in, and then there is the relief and that is a separate item and not to be confused with the way in which their arms are coming in.

Mr. Lewis: I suppose there might be some difficulty if they flew in from the same port in Libreville.

Mr. Brewin: I think I might make an observation. We heard the accusation that the Churches were flying in arms, which is rather surprising, but I think the explanation is that in the initial stages before they had chartered their own planes they probably did sent supplies in, in planes that were going in with arms. But they claim that since they chartered their own flights, they have no arms whatever going in with their planes.

• 1145

Mr. Roberts: Is this food, the humanitarian supplies which do come in, unloaded in different places from the arms, or does part of this food go to the fighting soldiers, or is it all directed towards relief of the civilian population?

Mr. Brewin: So far as we know it all goes to be administered by the Church agencies to the civilian population.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): The relief material.

Mr. Brewin: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: The material that came in, I mean.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You are saying that the arms come in and it is all together.

Mr. Roberts: One area really, and the food comes into another and the food is handled entirely by the Church relief agencies. Is it not partly diverted to the supply of troops because troops, of course, obviously eat as well and from your comments the other day it is obvious that they, in some cases, prefer to support their soldiers for quite good reasons.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would like to make a comment on this, but I prefer not to have it reported. Perhaps at some point if the Committee meets in camera I might make a comment on that, but I do not think I should at the moment.

An hon. Member: You have just raised everybody's curiosity.

Mr. Roberts: Yes. Now I am really puzzled.

Mr. Anderson: As a new Committee member may I ask whether the Committee does go in camera?

The Chairman: We do, yes, definitely. For the preparation of our report we could do this.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is not that important.

Mr. Roberts: There is one point that has really interested me and puzzled me from the beginning which you now touched on again, just briefly. We understood from some of the testimony we have already heard before the Committee that at least on two occasions—I think in July and September—arrangements had been made to use a Canadian airplane coming from Nigerian territory into Biafra and that on both occasions—I think we have been led to believe in any case—the Biafran authorities refused. I still have great difficulty understanding the reasons for this. I know that it has been said that they were afraid of poisoned food, but surely if the logistical arrangement was being guided by the Churches or by the Red Cross that should have been sufficient to allay their fears. Did you talk to the Biafran authorities about this and really get some idea of why they had, on these two occasions or why they might again, I gather from your remarks, still refuse to accept aid coming in from the Nigerian side?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We did not spend a great deal of time talking about it primarily because we had some considerable discussion with people who had been to Biafra even before we went there and it seemed to be a closed book. It relates not only to the potential poisoning of food which I think is a secondary—really a minor—consideration, but I think the major one was that if the planes were coming, say, from Lagos into the airport in Biafra, some areas of military vulnerability would be opened up in terms of the Nigerians becoming familiar with how the airport was operated, with landing patterns and with procedures. As you can imagine, there is a fairly strict code of secrecy in all of this operation. There is a real code under which the flights are made because there is radio monitoring of what is happening at the airport. The Biafrans are quite anxious for military reasons to keep as much of their operations as secret as possible to limit their military exposure.

Mr. Roberts: The crews would not be Nigerian crews, presumably, and the whole running of the operation would be in the hands of the Red Cross, the Churches or the personnel, say, of the RCAF who are attached to these planes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Right. The Biafrans do take some risk now in doing this operation with Sao Tome and Fernando Po, but I think to extend the operation out of Lagos, whether there would not of necessity be some familiarization at that end with how the thing was operating, would to their mind, at least, make them very vulnerable.

Mr. Roberts: I find it very puzzling when you think of the amount of relief supplies that could have been flown in, say, from July or September that they would have made this kind of calculation.

Mr. Brewin: I think I should re-emphasize what David has said. They made it clear to us that their real motives were military; that the conditions under which the proposals were made were such as they thought would place them at a serious military disadvantage. This was the reason they gave.

Mr. Roberts: What were those conditions which placed them...

Mr. Brewin: What David has described already. At one stage, as I understand it, the proposal was that they should set aside an airstrip solely for relief supplies, but they only had one and if they set it aside solely for that purpose they would not get the munitions and so on that they thought so essential to them.

• 1150

Mr. Roberts: I thought they had two airports operating at that stage.

Mr. Brewin: They may have and they said that...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): For a while they did.

Mr. Roberts: In July they certainly had two airports operating.

Mr. Brewin: They claim that they did make available—they were willing to make available—an airport solely for military supplies, but conditions were laid down which might have affected the security and so on.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): They built an airport, as a matter of fact, to do just a relief

operation, but this was unacceptable to the Nigerians. They said, too, for military reasons of their own it was unacceptable so there was a bit of a back and forth here.

Mr. Roberts: I am sorry to go back over old ground. I was a bit puzzled yesterday by a response I thought you gave to a question by Mr. Buchanan, but perhaps I did not hear it correctly. Am I right in saying that you had not read the Observer Report by the time this statement was made on Sunday?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We only read newspaper reports up to that time. We have since read the actual reports, but at that time we had only read the newspaper reports.

Mr. Roberts: When did you read the Observer Report? I am curious because we received it on Wednesday and I wondered when you had received a copy.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): On Wednesday of last week?

Mr. Roberts: On Wednesday of this week—at least I got it on Wednesday.

Mr. Brewin: We were given the Observer Report—a full text of it—at the UN by our Canadian officer there on Tuesday.

Mr. Roberts: On Tuesday. So the remarks which you made about the shocking things you found in this report were made before you had actually read the full text?

Mr. Brewin: Correct.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes. They were in response to the newspapers' comments on the report.

Mr. Roberts: You have had a chance obviously to see the report since then. Could you point out to me the statement with which you disagree in the Observer report?

Mr. Brewin: Let me see the report. First of all, even though it is very limited in its extent, to say "There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified" we think irresponsible. To make a finding like that without having heard the accusers' story on a very limited opportunity of observation is irresponsible.

Mr. Anderson: Could you read from the summary down? There are some words which modify the statement you just read: In the

areas of the First Nigerian Division that the Observer visited..."

Mr. Brewin: Oh, I beg your pardon.

SUMMARY

In summary, in the areas of the First Nigerian Division that the Observers visited they found:

(A) *Genocide*: There is no evidence of any intent...

We think that even from that point they should have waited until they had made a full survey before they started to make pronouncements which were reported without the qualifications that you have pointed out.

The Chairman: With those qualifications, if I may interrupt, do you still feel so strongly about the report? This is a very important point. One of our basic questions in our order of reference is to consider this report as well as your observations on it. As you know the report of the UN Observer has been released in New York and from the newspaper reports in this morning's paper it seems to be rather similar to this. Incidentally we will have that tomorrow. We just wanted to know whether your original observations which were based upon newspaper reports apply also to the actual text of this report.

Mr. Brewin: I think they do, but this Committee will have to decide that after it has heard all its evidence and after it has heard Major General Milroy. We think that they did not have, by the nature of things, adequate opportunities to enable them to make conclusions. We think they should therefore have been very chary of making conclusions. It might be said that we are in the same position, but we have not made a definite conclusion.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, did you have any further questions?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, I did.

Mr. Chairman: In view of our limit time—we have quite a number of questioners—we will have to perhaps start limiting each questioner to about five minutes.

Mr. Roberts: Yes, but I just wanted, still on this same point to verify for myself that you yourselves know of no evidence which would contradict this statement in the paragraph on page 3? You just believe that procedurally it is impossible to be sure of this kind of thing.

Mr. Brewin: I think there is no evidence of any intent to destroy the people. It may be a proper statement that they did not see any evidence or hear any evidence. I am sure that is a correct statement, but that "the use of the term genocide is in no way justified," seems to us—to me at any rate—to be a conclusion unwarranted on such a review as the team were able to make as far as we can judge.

• 1155

Mr. Roberts: Did you hear any reports of, say, the killing of Biafran prisoners by Nigerians, or any reports of the shooting of civilian population, not in a process of battle but afterwards?

Mr. Brewin: Oh, yes, indeed.

Mr. Roberts: Were those reports from Biafrans or from the various Europeans, or from both?

Mr. Brewin: At least one of the priests told us of his personal observation of shooting.

Mr. Roberts: Did the Red Cross people to whom you talked have these reports?

Mr. Brewin: We were not in the island from which the Red Cross operated. We talked to the Biafran head of the Red Cross, but I do not think he reported to...

Mr. Roberts: Do I gather from your last statement that you really regard your report as raising tentative questions rather than as coming to definite conclusions, based on the amount of time you were there? I notice that you criticize rather severely on page four.

A handful of military officers (four) on guided tours will hardly be able to ascertain the truth.

Therefore, as you have said...

Mr. Brewin: I can certainly stand behind that statement.

Mr. Roberts: Two members of Parliament in 38 hours can hardly be better able to ascertain the truth than that.

Mr. Brewin: I do not know; we may have seen people who did know the truth.

The Chairman: In view of the fact that we have only an hour to go before we break for lunch perhaps members should attempt to limit their questions to about five minutes

each. If that is not long enough we could come back to them, if we have time.

We have Mr. Carter, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Penner, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi), Mr. Buchanan and Mr Alexander. Mr. Carter?

Mr. Carter: Mr. Chairman, my remarks will be brief.

Did our colleagues observe any strong bitterness in Biafra because of the lack of tangible support from the Commonwealth in regard to relief?

Mr. Brewin: I do not know; perhaps I could answer that. The bitterness we noticed was mostly against Britain rather than against the Commonwealth because of the active part the British are playing in sending in arms.

A remark was made by Sir Louis Mbanefo, who is the Chief Justice of Nigeria, that we were the first Commonwealth parliamentary representatives he had seen since this had happened. He is a strong Commonwealth man himself—a great believer in the Commonwealth—and he was a little wistful in his feeling that they had been rather ignored or neglected by the Commonwealth.

Mr. Carter: The second part of my question, Mr. Chairman, was whether they observed any bitterness because Britain was supplying arms to the Federation and not to Biafra?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Very much so; this was a point of great unanimity. It was made clear to us on at least one or two occasions, however, that the bitterness was directed primarily at the British Government and not the British people. It was bitterness mixed with perplexity, and I think this extended from key political people, such as the Chief Justice, to perhaps lesser people in the government, who, having been raised in what they considered to be a British tradition of parliamentary democracy, simply could not understand what they were being exposed to. As many of them put it, the war really would not have been possible, as far as Nigeria was concerned, without the support of British arms; that this was the key factor in the war being waged.

Mr. Carter: It has been said, Mr. Chairman, that two *Hercules* planes a day will be sent once the red tape has been cleared.

The observers have reported that 6,000 people a day are dying of starvation. This may

be a difficult question to answer, but to what extent, in your opinion, will this 40 tons of relief a day, as I believe it is, alleviate the situation over there?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We should make clear that the use of the *Hercules* aircraft will probably mean more than one flight per day. It is not a very great distance. Most of the planes are now making at least two flights. Therefore, if there were two *Hercules* aircraft then presumably each of them should be able to deliver about 60 tons, or thereabouts, which would mean about 120 tons a day. That would increase by almost 80 per cent the amount that is now getting in. That would begin to approach at least some of the estimates of the need that now exists in Biafra.

Mr. Carter: How many planes per day could the existing facilities over there handle? Say we are sending two. Could we send 10, perhaps, or 11? Are there facilities to handle that number?

• 1200

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think 10 would be too great a figure. Probably somewhere in the range of four to six aircraft would be manageable; because actually the *Hercules* aircraft takes up no more room on the tarmac than do the planes that are now being used. The night we went in there were 25 landings made and they could handle about seven planes on the ground. They are expanding their tarmac facilities a bit. They might be able to handle up to nine or 10 eventually, and, of course, with the ease of loading and unloading of the *Hercules* there is not the problem of having so many on the ground at any one time.

Mr. Carter: So they could handle up to what—nine or ten planes a day?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would think not; I would say six would be a maximum at the moment.

Mr. Carter: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: First of all I wish to preface my remarks with my word of congratulations to both of you for your courage in going down. That has been said by everyone and I wholeheartedly concur with it. I have a few very short questions that I would like to ask.

As a result of having gone down to Biafra have your views changed in any way from what they were before you went down?

Mr. Brewin: Speaking for myself, they have only changed to the degree of being intensified. We had already discussed these problems with people familiar with Biafra and sympathetic, if you like, to Biafra. Therefore, I would not say my views have changed. They have become clarified and strengthened.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would say that perhaps from being there I have a greater appreciation of the situation as it seems to exist. As I mentioned yesterday I think my own sense of priorities was reversed. The relief effort was the one of major concern to me when I went there. The ending of hostilities was a secondary one. I would have to say now that for me the ending of hostilities is the major priority and the relief operation is the minor one.

Mr. Cafik: Do you concur with that view, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Absolutely; this was impressed on us and we saw the logic of it, because by feeding people you just maybe keep them alive for another later fate. As long as the war continues I doubt that one would be able to feed the people adequately. The restrictions on doing so are such that, as long as the war goes on it is dubious.

Mr. Cafik: My second question is: Do you feel—and I have the impression from your news release that you rather do—that the war being waged by the Biafrans against the Federal authorities is a justifiable one?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Pardon me?

Mr. Cafik: Do you feel that the position taken by the Biafrans is justifiable? In other words, are they right in fighting the Federal authorities? I have the vague impression that you rather do feel that way.

Mr. Brewin: I would not want to give an endorsement of the political wisdom they have exhibited in all the negotiations, but on the basic issues, whether they have the right under the circumstances to seek full guarantees of their security, to seek a setup in relation to the Federal government that gives them real and not paper guarantees of their security, I think they are absolutely right.

Mr. Cafik: Do you concur with that?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, I do.

Mr. Cafik: In your news release you talk about two delusions that we suffer from. I would like to pursue that for just a moment so that I understand exactly what you have in mind. One delusion that you refer to is that the war will end soon. I gather—and I may be wrong in this—that you feel that that position is justified because the people in Biafra have an intense fear of genocide. Is this the justifying reason for that statement?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And their ability to carry on for a considerable length of time, either as they are operating now, when they have military lines drawn up, or, as we said earlier, by going to guerrilla warfare. We think that the military will and ability of the Biafrans are such that there can be no quick and complete military conquest by the Federal forces.

Mr. Brewin: I would also add that it is not just fear of genocide, although I think that is a real fear—certainly fear of physical destruction. I think they are also fearful that unless they have their own state and their own means of protecting themselves they will be in a perpetual position of inferiority. Even if they are allowed to live it will not be under conditions that are acceptable to a people who are very gifted and aggressive, and many of whom are well educated.

● 1205

Mr. Cafik: Would you believe that this fear of genocide, this fear of oppression if they do lose this war, could possibly be propaganda in order to create the will to fight?

Mr. Brewn: It is very genuine, I think. They have had enough experience to justify it.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): They have had the experience. One cannot discount the fact that propaganda does get generated in any kind of war effort, but I think even allowing for some propaganda the fear is justified and this is a genuine thing that has grown out of the people's experience, and it has not been something organized by any kind of public relations propaganda effort.

Mr. Cafik: So I can conclude from that that you really believe they have legitimate complaints, and they have real reasons for fear, based on the truth, that they will be subjected to an inferior position or indeed done away with.

Mr. Brewin: Their fears may be somewhat exaggerated and propaganda may be a little extreme, but that there are real bases in fact and in experience in what is going on, we believe is true.

Mr. Cafik: Would you think that perhaps to find the real truth of the matter one should go to the Federal area of Nigeria, because that is where these things ought to be happening, if they are happening, not in Biafra. Is that not true?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): What do you mean by going to the Federal area?

Mr. Cafik: For instance if there is a real possibility of genocide or if they are really taken advantage of and made second-class citizens, pushed around, lose their property, and so on, then obviously this must be happening in the Federal state, because that is where there are a number of Biafrans at this moment.

Mr. Brewin: But the people who have experienced this, the people who know about it and are free to talk about it, are sometimes within the other area.

Mr. Cafik: The only investigation report that we have from Nigeria itself is from this group of military men who went there and it does not contain too much evidence. Would you not think that it is possibly a good idea to send someone down to Nigeria itself to confirm these suspicions you have?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would like to see us get a great deal of information of this kind and it was mentioned earlier by Mr. Roberts that he would like to have gone to Biafra. We would even hope that, perhaps, the government might arrange for some delegation, either from this House made up of members of Parliament or other government officials, who might do an intensive kind of fact-finding tour that will omit no part of Nigeria and Biafra. In other words the whole story could be seen as a unit and not in fractions, such as the aspect that Mr. Brewin and I have seen, or the aspect seen by the military observers.

Mr. Cafik: Right; I think that would be worthwhile. I have one last question. Do you think the Biafrans would be satisfied to give up their thought of independence if the United Nations were to give assurance to them and back it up with some kind of peacekeeping force so they would be protected in the

areas they are most fearful of, such as their lives and their property?

Mr. Brewin: I think they want to be able to guarantee their own security. International guarantees are important from an interim point of view, but at some stage or other they cannot expect outsiders to handle things forever. They want sufficient control over their police and sufficient control over the armed forces within their borders, that they can rely on a degree of permanent security which international guarantees, and even international forces, might not be able to provide.

Mr. Cafik: In other words, in order to achieve this end—if I can just pursue this for one minute further, Mr. Chairman—they can only envisage this happening in a state of independence?

Mr. Brewin: That is the way they envisage it, but I think as we indicated before we believe they might well be ready to consider a form of association with the rest of Nigeria, which would provide for common services and an economic union. The precise arrangements are at the nub of any future settlement.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

● 1210

Mr. Anderson: My first question relates to how food is distributed in Biafra itself. We have heard reports of a market in existence while people starve, yet there is food in the market. We have also heard reports—from yourself actually—that a deliberate and conscious decision is being made to let the children starve so that the men can continue to fight. Now could you give me some indication of how food grown in Biafra, the food that is there apart from relief food that we send in, is distributed? Is it by ration card on the basis of age, or what? How do they get around the food distribution problem?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not know how effectively this problem is solved. I know, as you say, that there is still food available that you can buy. The great problem in Biafra today seems to be one of money and the whole problem of inflation. The value of money has just gone crazy in Biafra today. I am trying to recall the prices of some of the things that were quoted to us.

Mr. Brewin: What were the cigarettes?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): A couple of dollars for a cigarette, I think. A battery for a flashlight was around ten dollars. Money had really lost any sense of meaning. One of the things told to us, as a matter of fact, was that if some of the relief could come by way of direct money it could be used to buy and make available some of the food that is there. This was a real problem.

Mr. Anderson: I can see your point, but we have not solved the problem. What are the Biafrans doing about it? If we send money there, I cannot see that we really increase the amount of food in Biafra, and unless we increase the amount of food in Biafra, we do not increase the number of people being fed. So I cannot say I am very sympathetic to the suggestion that we send money.

How are the Biafrans themselves determining who gets fed? How are they determining who gets food? From what you have just said I assume it is only the market place, it is only the money, that decides this. Is that right?

Mr. Brewin: I do not know. You are not talking about the relief.

Mr. Anderson: No...

The Chairman: It is the rationing, in other words, of Biafran supplies.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Frankly I think you are in an area on which we have very little available information. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that we did not pursue this matter more fully than we did. We did get the impression that it was difficult for people, unless they had money, to avail themselves of the native food that was there unless they had grown some themselves. Now as far as the details are concerned in terms of how the government is rationing, if it is rationing, local food supplies, I do not think...

Mr. Brewin: I had the impression, I may be wrong, that at least in some areas the relief agencies were distributing locally produced foods as well as the imported supplies on a ration basis.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): They bought it, I suppose.

Mr. Brewin: Oh, yes, they buy it.

Mr. Anderson: I raised that point because I cannot understand, I am totally unable to understand, why the Biafrans themselves refuse to allow food to come in by land corridor from Lagos. My point is this: we have

had evidence here of how many tons can go in an aircraft, and what we really have learned is that aircraft cannot really solve the problem. It took an aircraft every 90 seconds to feed the people in Berlin and there are just about as many people in Biafra as there were in Berlin during the airlift. I just cannot understand why the Biafrans refuse to allow a land corridor from Lagos to feed the people who need the food.

Mr. Brewin: This is purely a military decision. They say if they have a land corridor, it can be used, and might well be used, to put the troops in that could make an end to their resistance, with consequences which we have already described. That is my understanding of their reason. It seems to me they have some force from their point of view.

Mr. Anderson: And yet they have also turned down the suggestion that aircraft fly from Lagos into Biafra which basically would not create that same problem.

Mr. Brewin: They have turned down certain conditions; they might not have turned it down under other conditions.

Mr. Anderson: I heard the reason was a question of poisoning. Now this seems so flagrantly ridiculous. When your children are straving and dying anyway, why should you be too worried about whether the food is poisoned? If it is, they are going to die anyway; if it is not, they are fed.

Mr. Brewin: There is a great feeling about poisoned food in Africa. There is a tradition: poisoning of food is a good way to deal with your enemies, and they have some suspicion of this. But I do not think it is a serious matter. The officials told us that the reasons they had refused these conditional offers were basically military reasons and had nothing to do with the poisoning. There may have been the fear of poisoning by some people, but that was not the reason they turned it down.

• 1215

Mr. Anderson: To get back to the point you mentioned about the Observers' Report, you say that you had spoken to people who were in a position to know what had happened in the First Nigerian Division's area. So far as I can see, the report said nothing more than that they saw no signs of this, that or the other thing. Now that you have had a chance to read it in full, now that you have had a chance to see how it is restricted, would you agree that your original criticisms of it were unfounded?

Mr. Brewin: I should like to hear from Major General Milroy first. I still am inclined to be critical—perhaps wrongly so—of the pronouncement of opinions that are generalized and which seem to me to have been arrived at without listening to both sides. I think it is elementary that you listen to what people say so you know exactly what you are looking for. If you only go with the people who have a very great interest in hiding evidence and do not listen to people who say there is evidence, you may arrive at erroneous conclusions.

Mr. Anderson: Would you agree, then, that the two reports, yours and his, are on a totally different basis? You have just said that he should be listening to people. So far as I can see, he and the other generals reported on what they had seen. There is a difference between a report of what you have seen and a report of what you have heard. I think you have given a fairly good indication in this of what you have heard other people say. This is important, remember, because we will have this man here; we are bringing him back from Africa for this purpose. Would you agree that what he has seen is perhaps as he describes it?

Mr. Brewin: We are not saying that he is not telling the truth when he says that he did not see anything. The conclusion drawn from that is that at this stage we think it is premature and perhaps quite wrong.

Mr. Anderson: So your criticism, then, is of the press's drawing conclusions rather than the report itself.

Mr. Brewin: I think the report lends itself to that a bit. Maybe we are overly critical. I do not know. I would like to hear what they have to say about it.

The Chairman: May I just interrupt here because it relates to what has been said? I draw your attention, Mr. Brewin, to the Appendix. The paragraph under the heading "Conduct of the Civilian Population" in the report at page 49 reads:

Discussions with village leaders and refugees...

I presume that would be the Ibos.

...confirm that the Ibo people feared the Federal troops until they actually met them.

The paragraph goes on and you can read it yourself. This does indicate that...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I point out the last line, though, which it says:

However, it was also noted that very few of the more educated Ibos have yet appeared in areas occupied by Federal troops.

The Chairman: It is a more educated approach.

An hon. Member: I wonder why no conclusion was drawn on that particular basis?

Mr. Brewin: I would like to know who they spoke to and I would like to know whether there were Nigerian officers standing by. Sometimes there are conditions under which people have a very great interest not to say what they know about things. These are the sort of things we would like to know before we...

Mr. Fairweather: Which is evident in the second report on the relief workers.

The Chairman: I just drew that to your attention, Mr. Brewin, merely to indicate that they not only looked, they talked as well.

Mr. Brewin: Oh, yes.

The Chairman: They did have discussions.

Mr. Brewin: Oh, yes.

Mr. Anderson: Well, we have established, though, that you are taking back nothing of your original criticism of the report.

Mr. Brewin: That is right. We may modify it; you never can tell.

Mr. Anderson: If we could go back to your arrival at the airport, there were 25 flights that night but I understand only 150 tons of food were delivered. I think these were your facts on that.

Mr. MacDonald: That is about right.

Mr. Anderson: So, in other words we can assume that 100 tons of military supplies were delivered in the same period?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Oh no, no, no. We are not getting into that game. We are just making an estimate. We did not check off or look. We know that from São Tomé in the month of September there were 211 relief flights, but we do not have any idea of the proportion of armaments in relation to relief, that night or any other.

Mr. Anderson: The point is this: You have just mentioned that generators were flown in by relief agencies which probably are being used also to light up the flights of ammunition deliveries. My problem is this: I do not want us to get involved in an operation whereby, because for some reason or other we are feeding the civilian population, we are making it possible to use another strip for the military supplies and the Nigerians themselves say: "Right, we will use our MIG fighters to cut off the airlift".

I think it is important that we get as many facts as we can about the actual operation of the airport. So your figures of 25 flights and how many tons were delivered are certainly guesses, then.

• 1220

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): The estimate of 150 tons is the average that we would say is coming in there per night. I think it likely on that particular night with 25 flights there were well over 150 tons.

Mr. Anderson: However, if our Canadian aircraft do start flying in during the day, I can draw the logical conclusion that this strip will then be more available for military flights if they are able to have more aircraft to bring in military supplies. Is that the case?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is possible, I should think.

The Chairman: Mr. Smith?

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Mr. Chairman, I should like to associate myself with those who have congratulated the members.

I will be quite brief because my question is somewhat the same as Mr Anderson's. I would like to ask the witnesses that if there...

Mr. Brewin: Could we interrupt a minute, please? I am sorry. We were both invited to go and speak to a group of students at Carleton University. Would the Committee be willing to have one of us, namely me, stay here and release David MacDonald to go and speak to this group or do you think we should both stay?

Mr. Forrestall: I think it is almost lunch time, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we can adjourn until later.

The Chairman: Well, we still have a few questioners and at 3.45 the Minister will be appearing to give evidence.

Mr. Lewis: These two members are always available, Mr. Chairman. They can be heard tomorrow; they are stuck. They are not like other witnesses who can go.

The Chairman: Is it your wish to finish the questioning this morning with Mr. Brewin or to adjourn?

Mr. Lewis: If both of them were invited, I move we adjourn.

The Chairman: Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

APPENDIX E

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1968

Attached is a "CORRECTED COPY" of News Release issued Sunday, October 6, 1968 regarding statement on Biafra by Andrew Brewin, M.P.—Greenwood, and David MacDonald, M.P.—Egmont with the following list of corrections:

Page 3, Paragraph 4, Line 1: In the areas of Biafra, now occupied by federal troops—NOT friendly troops as in original release

Page 4, Paragraph 3, last line: that the secessionist state is NOT a successionist state as in original release.

Page 5, Paragraph 1, Line 2: to those who seek to maintain the federation denied to those who NOT and deny to those

Page 8, Paragraph 1, Line 10: The work is entirely non-political. NOT actively non-political

NEWS RELEASE

ANDREW BREWIN, MP, GREENWOOD,
AND DAVID MACDONALD, MP, EGMONT,
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1968—2.30 P.M.

We have one overwhelming compelling conclusion from our trip to Biafra: there is there unfolding one of the most tragic dramas of history. A gifted and courageous people are facing extermination; by starvation or war or both. It is not a distant prospect. According to the reports we could get from the most reliable sources, 6,000 are dying daily of starvation. A large number of these are children. In one small city of 26,000, 900 people died of starvation in the month of August; of these 900 victims, 500 were children. The prospect of an even more extensive disaster is imminent. Today eight to ten million Biafrans are compressed with a small and tightening circle. They are living off a trickle of relief supplies airlifted from the outside world and upon the gradual exhaustion of internal food supplies. Seed yams which should be retained for future crops are being consumed. In spite of good crops, the internal supply of food grown within Biafra will if the war continues diminish and disappear.

When we went to Biafra we were much concerned with the question of outside assistance to the starving people of Biafra. We

were indeed tremendously impressed with the heroic effort now being made by the World Council of Churches, Nord Church Aid, Caritas, a Catholic agency, the International Red Cross, and Jewish organizations and individuals. We saw for ourselves the operation of a nightly airlift from Sao Thome, a Portuguese Island off the coast of Nigeria to Annabelle, at present the only airstrip available to Biafra at this time. The International Red Cross from a base in Fernando Po and the other organizations operating from Libreville in Gabon are also airlifting food and drugs and other essential supplies. This has been the life line which has enabled the people of Biafra to survive; and has saved many lives. We recommend to the Canadian people and the Canadian government that every effort be made to give effective support to these voluntary non-political organizations which have taken the initiative in a bold and effective work of mercy. We will refer later to detailed needs of which we learned in our trip.

But however successful the airlift, it cannot in itself end the destruction of a people by slow starvation and eventual extermination.

It is our considered opinion that in the absence of a ceasefire, imposed or required by the international community, the destruction or genocide of a nation will become a reality. It will not be enough twenty years later to claim that the world did not know the facts.

We therefore call on the government of Canada to take the initiative at the United Nations General Assembly to bring about a ceasefire, the negotiation of an end to the conflict and a massive international relief action.

It will, of course, be said that the simplest way to bring about a ceasefire would be for the Biafrans to accept defeat and surrender. After this it is suggested that international relief would be poured in. We want to state emphatically that we do not think this will happen. We had discussion with Biafran officials, with relief workers, with Biafra's Chief Justice, with young Biafran civilians and with many others in intimate touch with Biafra. We were assured with the utmost firmness and unanimously that even if all the cities, airstrips and paved roads in Biafra were occupied and garrisoned with federal troops the resistance would go on indefinitely.

The surrounding forests lend themselves to guerilla warfare. The reason for this determination is simple. The Biafrans believe that if they do, in fact, surrender they will be exterminated in any event.

Nor, in our opinion, or in the opinion of many observers (not Biafrans) to whom we talked, are the fears of the Biafrans on this score groundless. Before the war started, 30,000 Biafrans, settled in the northern and western regions of Nigeria were massacred. As a result between 1 and 2 million Biafrans returned home to the eastern region, now Biafra.

In the areas of Biafra, now occupied by federal troops, there was almost total evacuation of Ibos, the majority people of Biafra. But of those who were left, non Ibos for the most part, the educated and the leaders, have been shot. Umahia, now the capital city of Biafra, which we visited, has grown from an original population of 26,000 to over a million. The wooded areas near by are densely populated by refugees. The Biafrans see the stark alternatives as death by extermination or fighting on. They choose to fight for their liberties, for the right to build a state of their own which can give them security of life and property and the rule of law. Whether they are right or wrong is not here the question. The point is that they will not surrender. They have fought vigorously with a minimum of arms and supplies for 18 months. There have been innumerable announcements of the "final push" which was to have ended the war. The Ibos are on all counts the most ingenious and best educated and most energetic of the peoples of Nigeria. They are determined to continue to fight to the bitter end if need be. They adopt spontaneously and with apparent unanimity and purposefulness the words of Patrick Henry in the American Revolution; "Give me Liberty or give me death." Their attitude resembles the attitude of Britain under Churchill's leadership awaiting the Nazi invasion.

In these circumstances, those who believe that relief from the outside world must await the early and complete victory of the federal forces, and that the main push of humanitarian efforts to save a people from starvation should follow this event, are suffering from a double delusion. The first delusion is that the war will end soon. The second is that if the war was ended by the complete victory of Nigeria, the federal authorities, the army which would be in control would fairly and

adequately distribute relief supplies to the starving people—at least in the absence of a strong international intervention. What has happened in Calabar a coastal province of Biafra, occupied by federal authorities since April, is evidence to the contrary. We are told that in Calabar there has been no relief, and indeed, as we mentioned earlier all the leaders in the community who did not escape when the federal forces moved in were eliminated. Has there been any international enquiry? Have observers been allowed into Calabar to determine the facts? A handful of military officers (four) on guided tours will hardly be able to ascertain the truth.

Much has been written about the causes of the war and the rights and wrongs of the conflict. In particular, the federal cause has been justified and the Biafran cause denigrated, upon the grounds that the breakup of a federation is on principle to be deplored and that the secessionist state is, by definition, rebellious and wrong.

Aid, military and otherwise, is therefore to be channelled to those who seek to maintain the federation denied to those who seek to set up an independent state.

We believe that this approach is oversimplified and, indeed, wrong; and it cannot be applied without reference to the facts. A situation may develop when the maintenance of a federal structure is no longer possible or desirable. At one time the Biafrans were the leading exponents of a federal structure for Nigeria and the leaders of the northern regions, the exponents of separatism. In our view, the federal structure cannot be maintained if its basis is force and discrimination. We are inclined to think that a federal solution for Nigeria died when 30,000 Ibos were massacred and 1 million or more Ibos returned to the eastern region. We doubt if the Canadian federation would survive such a strain. But, today as one young lady (a university graduate and teacher now working at Airport Armabella) there is scarcely a Biafran family which has not had its war casualty. In such circumstances a federation is likely to be based upon suppression and discrimination. The Biafrans and the Nigerians are now divided, not only by race and religion but by a complete contrast of cultures and the deep wounds of war. The Biafrans are ambitious, articulate, democratic and eager to educate themselves and their children. A federal state imposed by force would condemn them to a

status of inferiority and frustration. Federations are, undoubtedly, an excellent means of attaining the benefits of large scale political organizations, and regional and decentralized administration. Indeed, the Biafran state itself is a federal structure modeled, as we were told, on the Canadian system. But there is nothing sacrosanct about a federation. The West Indian Federation and the Malaysian Federation are two examples of federations which have been dissolved.

The Biafrans, as the Chief Justice, Sir Louis Mbanefo, a former judge of the World's Court of Justice told us—cannot accept the Nigerian Federation because it denied the Ibos security of life and property. Indeed, the police and army not only failed to protect the lives and property of the Ibos but actually encouraged the massacres.

No settlement or arrangement in his view was possible that did not give the Biafran State sufficient control over the police and army to ensure security of life and property. Is this an unreasonable demand in the circumstances. On the other hand, Biafra would be willing to enter into arrangements with Nigeria for economic cooperation for a common market, which would preserve some of the basic advantages of federation.

What action can be taken to stop the war, the only possible action is international action, through the United Nations. The United Nations assembly has the power and the duty to take action for the prevention of genocide. From our discussion with military men in Africa, we believe that an international force of moderate size would effectively police a truce and enable international relief operation to be undertaken. We were told by the Biafran authorities and others, that Canada had an unique opportunity to take the initiative. In our view this opportunity gives us responsibility. The O.A.U. has for various reasons declined to intervene. Britain and many other countries have been directly involved, Canada is disinterested. The whole future effectiveness of international order can be undermined if no action is taken in the face of impending disaster. Humanity demands action and Canada can and should take the lead. Whether or not a truce can be secured the work of mercy must go on. The relief of starvation in Biafra has been dependent upon the airlift from Fernando Po and Sao Thome to airstrips in Biafra. Other means of access have been effectively blockaded. The airlift is a truly ecumenical and international work of

mercy. The airstrips at Uli receives a regular shuttle service at night. Daylight flights are not possible because territory occupied by the Nigerian forces must be crossed and aircraft flying by day would be shot down.

The International Red Cross has one Hercules operating out of Fernando Po. It was made available by loan from the Royal Swedish Air Force (the one and only Hercules). The aircraft at Sao Thome, with two exceptions, do not have cargo doors and loading and unloading is a slow job. Their capacity is roughly 10 tons compared to the Hercules capacity of 20 tons. It is obvious that a small number of Hercules loaned to Caritas, Nord Church Aid, in the same manner as the Hercules loaned by the Royal Swedish Air Force to the Red Cross could considerably increase the effectiveness and volume of the airlift. This could save the lives of many civilians, women and children threatened with starvation.

We propose that the Canadian government could and should do what the Swedish government has done.

To give some indication of the size of the operation—by Friday, September 27, 283 successful landings had been made by Church organizations. Together with Red Cross flights this has meant 150-200 tons of supplies reaching the starving Biafran population every night. The night we arrived some 25 flights came in to the improvised airstrip, each bringing about 10 tons of relief supplies, food and drugs.

The air operation was initiated by Father Byrne of Caritas International a Catholic relief agency, who remains a key figure. At Sao Thome the present chief of operations is a Canadian citizen of Danish origin, Captain Axel Duch. He works for Norchurchaid an organization of Protestant churches of Scandinavia also supported by churches of West Germany. The distribution of supplies in Biafra is handled by teams of relief workers, many of them former missionaries and teachers in Biafra. The Catholic and Protestant agencies work in close cooperation and harmony and have been joined in the work by Jewish organizations and individuals. The work is entirely non-political. Caritas and the other organizations operate in Nigeria as well as Biafra but it is in Biafra that the greatest need exists. The International Red Cross operates from Fernando Po. At present the Sao Thome operation has available 8 or 9

small aircraft. The bottleneck in the whole operation is not money, supplies or personnel. It is the lack of suitable transport aircraft. Bigger and faster loads will be possible if Hercules Transport planes were made available. Should the airstrip at Uli be overrun Hercules would be essential to transport the equipment necessary to continue the operation to missions, hospitals, camps and villages. 104 missionaries and sisters and native lay brothers and 140 African sisters are engaged in this relief work. The Protestant distribution chain

is similarly operated. We take off our hats to those who are carrying on this magnificent work at very great personal risk.

It is our intention to report in detail our experience and the information we have to Mr. Sharp and Mr. Trudeau. We will urge that Canada has a vital role to play in bringing about a ceasefire and in stepping up the relief operation. We believe that Canadians generally would warmly welcome such double initiative by the Canadian government. Only thus will a tragic human disaster be avoided.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

4

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 4

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1968


Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria;
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs,
and Mr. Gordon Riddell, Head, Africa and Middle Eastern Division,
Department of External Affairs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Anderson	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Prud'homme
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Lefebvre	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Buchanan	Mr. Legault	Mr. Smith (<i>Northumberland-Miramichi</i>)
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Carter	Mr. Macdonald	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Fairweather	(<i>Egmont</i>)	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Macquarrie	Mr. Winch
Mr. Gibson	Mr. Marceau	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)
Mr. Groos	Mr. Mongrain	
Mr. Harkness	Mr. Nesbitt	
Mr. Laniel	Mr. Penner	

(Quorum 16)

¹Replaced Messrs. Schumacher, Stanbury and De Bané on October 10, 1968.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, October 10, 1968.

(6)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 4:00 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Carter, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Harkness, Laniel, Laprise, Lefebvre, Legault, Lewis, Macdonald (*Egmont*), Macquarrie, Marceau, Mongrain, Nesbitt, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk—(30).

Members also present: Messrs. Alexander and De Bané.

In attendance: Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Chairman opened the meeting. Mr. Fairweather answered that Mr. Keith Bezanson of CUSO and Mr. Daniel Turner of UNESCO wish to present a brief to the Committee. Mr. Bezanson wishes to appear as a witness as well. Mr. Brewin suggested that Mr. Charles Taylor of the Globe and Mail newspaper should be invited to appear as a witness. These suggestions will be referred to the Subcommittee.

The Chairman introduced the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Minister read a prepared statement and was questioned thereon.

The Committee agreed, unanimously, to include the following documents as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Discussion of Nigeria During United Nations General Debate (see Appendix F)

Report of Incident At Okigwi, Nigeria (see Appendix G)

First Interim Report By Representative Of Secretary-General To Nigeria On Humanitarian Activities (see Appendix H)

Declaration of Organization of African Unity (see Appendix I)

With the questioning of the Minister continuing, the Committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m., until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING

(7)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Laniel, Laprise, Lefebvre, Legault, Macdonald (*Egmont*), Macquarrie, Marceau, Mongrain, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk—(23).

Member also present: Mr. Alexander.

In attendance: The Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Mr. Gordon Riddell, Head, Africa and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs.

Members of the Committee continued their questioning of the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Gordon Riddell, Head, Africa and Middle Eastern Division also provided information to the Committee.

The Chairman thanked the Minister on behalf of the Committee at the end of the sitting.

A suggestion by Mr. Anderson, to invite Dr. Kenneth Lindsay as a witness will be referred to the Subcommittee.

The meeting adjourned at 10:15 p.m., until Friday, October 11, 1968 at 9:30 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

AFTERNOON SITTING

Tuesday, October 10, 1968

• 1601

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman. Are we operational? I just have a request.

The Chairman: While we are waiting for the Minister perhaps we could take up any points the members have. Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: There is a Mr. Keith Bezanson and Mr. Daniel Turner who have both been in Nigeria/Biafra. Mr. Turner is going back under the auspices of UNESCO and they would like to table a brief and Mr. Bezanson would like to appear. They are both Canadians.

The Chairman: We will be having a steering committee meeting immediately after this meeting. Perhaps we could decide upon that at that time. Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Could I make another suggestion for witnesses. The steering committee could take it up. Mr. Charles Taylor of the *Globe and Mail* is at present in Biafra but he has a report in this morning's paper that might be very relevant to our inquiries. I wonder if we could find out from the *Globe and Mail* when he is expected back and whether he would be available as a witness.

The Chairman: I will make a note of that, Mr. Brewin.

There is perhaps one point that I should mention arising out of evidence given this morning. I have been informed by an official of the Defence Department that the capacity of the *Hercules* aircraft is 40,000 lbs. rather than 40 tons. I believe one of the witnesses this morning may have . . .

Mr. Brewin: Exactly 20 tons.

The Chairman: Yes. Some of the witnesses mentioned 40 tons and I believe there have been newspaper reports, so that the Defence Department just wanted that correction made for the purpose of the record.

Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Our witness this afternoon is the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I believe he has an initial statement to make, following which he will be happy to answer questions. Mr. Sharp.

Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Secretary of State for External Affairs): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to apologize for my delay in

getting to the meeting but, as you know, we had a distinguished group from Germany and the only opportunity I had to see them was between the question period and appearing here. I hope that you will accept my apology. It was not because of my reluctance to appear before the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, this Committee has devoted its urgent attention during the past two days to the important and compelling problems posed by the situation in Nigeria and the Biafran area of that country. My comments will, I hope, contribute further to this inquiry and will also give a more comprehensive account than has previously been possible of the principles on which the Government has been basing its policy and actions towards the complex problems involved.

I should like, first to touch on three fundamental aspects which condition the Government's approach.

The first is that the Government shares to the full the deep concern that has gripped the Canadian people in recent weeks as they have watched the Nigeria-Biafra situation unfold.

The second aspect is that the Government's policy on the Nigerian problem has evolved within the context of the long-standing relations between Canada and Nigeria. That country, a federation of many peoples and the most populous nation in Africa, attained independence as a member of the Commonwealth on October 1, 1960. This event was greeted warmly by Canada and other Commonwealth nations, and opened an era of development of increasingly close relations. Contacts between Canada and Nigeria have been frequent and friendly, based on full and continuous respect for the sovereign status of each nation. We have also been able to provide assistance for the development of Nigeria. This aid has not only been appreciated but effectively used. I would venture to say that Canada has closer relations with Nigeria than any other other country in the world except Britain and, as far as Nigeria is concerned, we are in a sense the second most important country to the United Kingdom itself. It was in the light of our relationship that we have watched with concern as the internal situation in Nigeria has deteriorated over the past two years and more.

My third point is that the Canadian Government's policy and actions on this problem must be seen in the broad context of Canadian foreign policy. This involves Canadian

policy toward all the African states, as well as its policy at the United Nations.

One of the principles of international relations is that of non-interference by one nation in the internal affairs of another. Non-interference and territorial integrity are issues of manifestly great importance to the newly-formed states of Africa—as indeed they are to Canada. African concern was re-confirmed only recently in the overwhelming majority by which the members of the Organization of African Unity at their Heads of State meeting in Algiers, underlined the importance of these principles with specific reference to Nigeria. It would be a grave move for any non-African state, and particularly a white non-African state, to take steps which could be interpreted as intervention.

I should like now to review the background of the present situation in Nigeria. These difficult and heartrending problems have not arisen overnight. They are the result of a long series of developments with which the Canadian Government has been constantly in touch and sought to influence in a favourable direction where such action was open to us.

To the outside world, the first break in the progress being made by the new Nigeria was the coup d'état that occurred in January 1966, during which the Prime Minister and other Nigerian leaders were killed. I say "to the outside world", whatever it may have appeared within Nigeria. But to most of us the first time that Nigeria appeared in the headlines of the world was when the coup d'état occurred. This resulted in the installation of a military government dominated by the Ibo. Dissatisfaction with the centralizing trends that developed in six months under this regime led to new frictions among the regions and resulted in another coup by military officers in July 1966, from which issued the present Federal Military Government.

Subsequent to these events friction and conflict between the Ibo and the other main groups which comprised the nation grew steadily more bitter. To recite these events in this simple manner is to suggest a mere struggle for power among military officers; in fact the conflict had roots deep in the previous experience of the peoples of the area.

• 1610

In the course of the remainder of 1966 relations between the new Federal Military Government and the Ibo military leadership of the then Eastern Region became increasingly tense; it was also a period of riots, leading to

massacres, concentrated largely in the Northern Region—the numbers of those who died have never been accurately established and may never be—and of the return to the Eastern Region of large numbers of Ibo who had lived peacefully and successfully in other parts of the Federation. As relations became more strained, it became evident that only in the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (which included the head of government and the Military Governors of the four regions) could some agreement be found to ease the strain and allow for renewed co-operation and progress. This meeting occurred in January 1967 at Aburi in Ghana, under the sponsorship of the Ghanaian Head of State, General Ankrah. Whatever the actual results of that meeting, about which there are different versions, it did not in practical terms produce any improvement. The situation thereafter steadily deteriorated and further efforts to bring the two sides together were unsuccessful. The final break occurred at the end of May 1967 when, in response to a Federal Government decree replacing the existing four regions with a new structure of twelve smaller states, the Ibo-led government of the former Eastern Region declared the independence of the "Republic of Biafra." Fighting between this regime and the Federal Government did not begin seriously until July, and has gone on with intermittently mounting intensity since then.

I would not wish to give an account of the various stages in this bitter civil war, but I think it would be useful to point out that interspersed with the fighting there have been numerous attempts at negotiation between the two sides. From the early stages of the conflict, both sides were in touch with the Commonwealth Secretary-General who assiduously explored the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. It might be noted that from his central position of trust, Mr. Arnold Smith, who has already appeared before this Committee, is often able to provide assistance and good offices to Commonwealth Governments who might be reluctant to seek such help farther afield. His efforts culminated in a series of meetings at the end of May 1968 at Kampala, the capital of Uganda. After these were broken off, Mr. Smith remained in contact with both sides, but the initiative passed to the Organization of African Unity which had already in September 1967 established a Consultative Commission of six African heads of government to assist the Nigerian sides to come to a negotiated settlement. This initiative led to talks in Niamey and later, in

August, in Addis Ababa, but again it was not found possible to come to agreement.

While I was in New York I had opportunities to speak to foreign ministers who had been to these conferences and the one impression that I got was of the valiant efforts made, particularly by Emperor Haile Selassie, to bring the two sides together. He personally spent night and day and was greatly disappointed and frustrated when he was unable to bring the two sides to agreement.

While avoiding involvement in the political issues, the Canadian Government has been very actively concerned throughout with the human problems raised by the conflict in Nigeria. Our concern with the human element has been continuous but has naturally grown in intensity since the Biafran area was cut off from the sea. We have allocated more than a million dollars in food and other aid and we sent an aircraft out to Lagos with the first shipment. The remainder of this allocation will be going forward next week, to replenish the stocks of relief supplies in Lagos and in Fernando Po which were until recently sufficient for the distribution arrangements available. Now that these stocks are going down, our shipment will help maintain the flow of urgently needed relief.

Our food and other contributions have been consigned to the International Red Cross through the Red Cross of Canada. This organization has been co-ordinating foreign relief efforts in Nigeria, and it has maintained an organization supervised by the International Committee of the Red Cross personnel for the distribution of relief in the areas under the control of both the Nigerian and the Biafran authorities.

• 1615

The Red Cross has, despite great difficulties, been able to send in relief supplies and distribute them in the areas controlled by both sides. It has been able to do so because its activities do not carry the political implications that actions by governments may do. Remembering that there is great suffering on both sides of the lines, and that the Red Cross is able to get relief to both sides, it is in our view best to leave it to the International Red Cross to send relief where it is needed most. We have given the Red Cross discretion as to where the food supplies provided by the government should be shipped, whether to Lagos for distribution in federal-held territory, or to Santa Isabel on the Island of Fernando Po whence they can be airlifted into the Biafran area.

I worked this out with General Wrinch when he visited me some weeks ago, and it did not appear to us there would be any difficulty if the food were sent either to the airports in which supplies might be flown in, or to Lagos where they could be distributed to the airlifts of Biafra under the control of the Federal Military Government.

Now, there has been much discussion of the possibility of Canada providing service aircraft to assist with the distribution of the food and other supplies in the areas of need on both sides. I should like to report to the Committee on the efforts we made to provide assistance, and particularly to find a satisfactory arrangement under which Canada could be helpful in bringing relief to the rebel-held area.

Although international concern has been concentrated on an airlift as the only way to bring relief to the needy in the Biafran area, it is well to remember that it is not the only means possible, or by any means the most satisfactory. Since February 1968, the Federal Nigerian Government has repeatedly offered to co-operate in the delivery of food and relief supplies, first by sea and then by road. The Red Cross has given its opinion that only by the opening of land routes could supplies be sent in the quantities required. These offers have been declined by the Biafran authorities. Whatever the motives of either side in this matter, it is important to recall that in this question of an airlift into the Biafran area there is more than one dimension.

As I told the group of representatives of Canadian private relief agencies that came to see me on July 12th, the Government would respond to the request to provide an aircraft if a way could be found that would have the approval of both parties. The search for an agreed arrangement was pursued intensively by the International Red Cross during the succeeding weeks, unfortunately without success. In this period, the Canadian Government provided a Lieutenant Colonel from the Canadian Forces as an expert adviser to the ICRC in planning the airlift. At that time, we had every expectation that there would be agreement between the Biafran and the Nigerian authorities for an airlift to which there could be no exception taken whatever. Indeed, so optimistic were we about this—as was everyone—that we sent a colonel to Geneva to help in planning the airstrip to receive it in the Biafran-held territory.

By mid-September it became clear that agreement could not be reached with the Biafran authorities for the flights into their area which had been sanctioned by the agreement made on September 3rd between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Federal Nigerian Government.

I might point out in this connection that Canada faced special problems which did not necessarily apply to other countries who were as eager to help. First, the Canadian Red Cross was asked for an aircraft, but was unable through lack of funds to charter one privately. One of the problems that we sometimes—well not one of the problems—one of the aspects of this situation that we sometimes overlook is that in other countries of the world, where the response to the voluntary campaigns has been so much more generous than in Canada, the local authorities were able to charter an aircraft. When the Red Cross authorities came to see me they had not been able to raise money both to charter an aircraft and to buy the food. So they turned naturally to the government. Secondly, when they did make a request to the government it was a specific request for a *Hercules* aircraft. This meant immediately that service aircraft and crews would be involved. The result was that we had to be extremely careful, more so than other nations, that our actions conformed to the basic principles underlying relations between sovereign states. Moreover, I think we can say that apart from Britain, as I said, Canada has had the closest relations with Nigeria and it was necessary to work this question out in the spirit of that relationship, a relationship which can allow Canada to exert a moderating influence upon the course of events.

• 1620

When I was in New York I had a number of lengthy conversations with Doctor Arikpo, the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, during which I had the opportunity of pursuing this question further. I explored with him the possibilities of our providing aircraft—that is, the government providing to the Red Cross—for delivery of supplies into the rebel-held area. Our earlier offer, as the members of the Committee may recall, of an aircraft for service within Nigerian federal territory had been agreed. As to the flights into the Biafran-held area, there was obviously some hesitation, in line with the opposition

to the unofficial ICRC airlift which the Nigerian authorities had expressed earlier.

I would like to read to the Committee...

Mr. Lewis: I did not get a word. The ICRC what?

Mr. Sharp: I am sorry; airlift.

Mr. Lewis: Airlift.

Mr. Sharp: I would like to read, if I may, the position which had been taken earlier about these flights. This is the text of the Nigerian Government press release of July 5th, concerning possible violations of Nigerian air space. It reads as follows:

The attention of the Nigerian Armed Forces has been drawn to plans announced by certain British organizations and others to drop supplies by parachute in parts of the East Central State without the approval of the Federal Military Government. Any such act will constitute gross violation of Nigerian air-space and an act of hostility against Nigeria. Instructions have, therefore, been issued to the Nigerian Air Force to seek and destroy all aircraft which enter into Nigeria on missions not expressly authorized and cleared by the FMG with regard to emergency relief food and medical supplies from Britain, the Armed Forces recall agreement reached during the recent visit of Lord Shepherd, Britain's Minister of State to the effect that all such supplies should be sent to Enugu or any other place designated by the FMG to be conveyed from there along temporary "corridors" to the distressed areas. The FMG still stands by this agreement and will not tolerate departure from it by any foreign organization on any pretext. All relief organizations concerned are urged to co-operate to avoid any embarrassing incidents.

I read that to indicate the attitude that was taken by the FMG in July. Perhaps under questioning I could give some other examples of it, but I think that is sufficient to illustrate the sort of attitude that was being taken by the FMG at that time. That is why I say that to flights into the Biafran-held area when I was talking to Doctor Arikpo there was obviously some hesitation in line with the opposition to the unofficial ICRC airlift which the Nigerian authorities had expressed earlier; and I wanted to illustrate that it was very strong objection.

After my discussion with Doctor Arikpo, I ascertained that his government was now prepared to permit Canadian aircraft to make flights into rebel territory with relief supplies. This was a significant move and may give rise to similar arrangements with other countries. Indeed I understand that when Doctor Arikpo was speaking on radio the other day he said that he hoped this might open the way for similar arrangements with other countries, but to us who had been struggling with this problem for so long it was a tremendous advance to have the Foreign Minister of Nigeria say on this occasion that as long as we turned the planes over to the Red Cross there would be no objection and we had never had such a clear indication before.

• 1625

I cabled immediately to Lagos. I got a reply in which this was confirmed and on the basis of this we were able to announce that the way seemed to be cleared now for us to move our supplies in without any problems and this, I think, is a great advance and I think it arises partly out of the fact that we have been very careful in Canada in dealing with the Nigerian authorities, never to go over their heads, never to defy them, always to work with them in co-operation and I believe this is one of the results of the very careful way in which we have avoided defying the legitimate government of that country.

We hope that a Canadian *Hercules* aircraft will be on its way to Nigeria within 48 hours with a reconnaissance party to survey the condition of all available airstrips in Federal and rebel held areas of Nigeria as well as Fernando Po. A second aircraft is being placed on standby for a possible early departure.

I think it would be useful at this point to mention the international team of observers operating in Nigeria, to which some attention has already been given by the Committee. As is known, the Federal Nigerian Government invited four governments and two international organizations to send observers to witness the conduct of Federal troops in their current efforts to subdue the rebels. The Observer Team has full freedom of movement in Federally-held territory. It does not operate in the rebel area, but along the lines where the Federal troops are fighting. Indeed, our High Commissioner in Lagos recently reported the Team has, on occasion, been uncomfortably close to the fighting.

The Team has investigated thoroughly in the areas which they have visited and, as far as I can see, reported impartially. This is illustrated by its two reports issued thus far. It will continue its activities in different areas of the front and in response to individual reports and incidents. The capacity to move quickly on its own initiative enhances the value of the Observer Team and, as I noted in announcing the Canadian decision to participate, we believe the Team's very presence has a calming influence on the situation.

Members may have noted press references to the reports made to U Thant by his representative on the Observer Team, Ambassador Gussing. The text of his first two reports, which covered the same ground as the Team's reports thus far, has now been released and copies are available. I have copies here, I think.

The Chairman: Could we have them delivered?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, perhaps they could be delivered. They cover the same ground as the Team's reports thus far. They support the Team's findings, but are worth reading for the additional light they throw on the situation. And it is interesting, you know, when we are considering whether these are impartial reports, that these reports have by no means been whitewash reports. They have been very critical of certain incidents they have witnessed and I believe we are very fortunate that we have Ambassador Gussing, whose impartiality could never be questioned as the representative of the Secretary-General, a representative of the OAU, and representatives of Sweden, Poland, Britain and ourselves. I am not sure whether the OAU representative has yet appeared. I am sorry; I am not right up to date.

Mr. Lewis: We were told he had.

Mr. Sharp: I see, I am not certain.

Mr. Lewis: Both he and the Polish representative appeared after the first two reports.

• 1630

Mr. Sharp: I see. Yes; but at any rate even without them it would be a very impartial sort of group and I think it is not only what they report but their very presence there which is very useful at this time and, I said in the House of Commons when we were asked to make an observer available, we had

some misgivings and we examined the question very carefully and we came to the conclusion that since all those who had been asked were going to make observers available it would be impossible under these circumstances for the reports to be anything but thorough and impartial. When we received assurances about freedom to move about we finally came to the conclusion that not only were we not in any danger of taking part in any whitewash operation, the presence of representatives from these countries and these organizations would itself have a salutary effect upon the conduct of the fighting.

General Milroy, the Canadian observer, has reported that the Team has received full co-operation and support from the Nigerian authorities. As to whether the Team should operate in the Biafran area as well, I point out that its task is to observe the conduct of the Federal troops of which there are, of course, none in the areas controlled by the Biafran authorities.

This brings me to the question of whether genocide is being committed in this conflict. There have been many changes made and opinions offered. This is a delicate area in which I believe it is necessary to tread very carefully. The word "genocide", recalling as it does certain horrors of the past, cannot be used loosely. In the genocide convention the word denotes any of a number of acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. Among the acts cited are killing of members of the group, causing them serious bodily or mental harm and deliberately inflicting on them conditions calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction.

All the reports and accusations that refer to genocide must be weighed with care because of the gravity of the charge.

Members of the Committee will have noted that the first interim report of the Observer Team contained the statement that there was no evidence of genocide by the troops they have seen in action. In contrast they have observed Federal forces attempting to help with the feeding and resettlement of Ibo and other civilians displaced by the war. It is also a fact that there are many Ibos living and working freely in Federal territory and the Ibos found in villages retaken from the rebel forces stand as proof that the Federal troops have no directives or determination to destroy this tribe. I think we must take into account the fact, however, that this is a bitter

civil war and civil wars are certainly no picnic. After all, the most bloody civil war in the world's history was fought in our southern neighbour; it was the bloodiest war fought up to that time. So it is not surprising that civil wars are bloody and the sooner this one can end the better the world will feel and the better we will all feel here in Canada because I am sure we all share the horrors that we have witnessed in the pictures that are coming out from the areas that are being subject to bloodshed.

I realize the Committee is understandably concerned over the possibility of action through the United Nations. The Canadian delegation undertook intensive consultations with a number of delegations and with the Secretary-General to try to establish what, if anything, could be done to help with the urgent humanitarian problem of improving the delivery of food and relief supplies to those suffering from the conflict. I continued discussing this problem in the numerous contacts I had with other foreign ministers in New York. It became increasingly clear during these conversations that in the view of the vast majority there was no way of attempting to achieve action through the United Nations without raising the political issues which everyone agreed should be left to the Nigerians themselves to resolve. It would not be appropriate to give a list, as suggested by one hon. member in the House, of those countries whose views were sought, nor of how they reacted. After all, I asked them their views in confidence and I am sure they would not appreciate it if I were to reveal their confidences.

It may none the less be useful to have on the record of the Committee the comments of some of the delegates who have touched on this subject in their major addresses in the general debate in New York. I have with me a summary along these lines which could be tabled if the Committee wishes. I have not prepared it myself. It has been done by my officials and I asked them to try to summarize what was said by each of the delegates on this subject and I cannot guarantee its impartiality. All I know is that I had nothing to do with it. It was prepared by my officials at my request and I am sure they are likely to have been impartial.

• 1635

Mr. Brewin: It is more impartial than if you had done it.

Mr. Lewis: This is a switch. They usually blame their Ministers.

The Chairman: Would it be satisfactory to members of the Committee to have this appear as an exhibit to Mr. Sharp's testimony?

Mr. Sharp: You would like to have it printed in the Minutes? Yes, fine. What it does indicate is how careful every country that spoke about the issue was. I might point out, for example, that Mr. Rusk's mention of Nigeria was made in passing.

Mr. Fairweather: He has one of his own?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, that is right. He says:

After noting the situation in Czechoslovakia, Viet Nam and the Middle East, Mr. Rusk added that "the Assembly's concerns inevitably include the greatest troubles and greatest needs of the world community. They include the suffering in Nigeria, where, despite dedicated efforts within Africa and elsewhere, civil conflict continues to bring death by war and starvation to uncounted thousands."

Mr. Lewis: Do you have a more persuasive witness than Mr. Rusk?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, I could give you the Swedish comment which states:

The Swedish Foreign Minister mentioned "the growing feeling of interdependence among all peoples" which resulted in waves of sympathy and compassion around the world when people are struck by "national disasters or military action". He said that one example was the support given to Iran after the earthquake and another was "the wide and active participation in the humanitarian relief aid to the civilian population in Nigeria which has been so cruelly struck by the hostilities there". Mr. Nilsson noted the concern which the Organization of African Unity recently expressed in Algiers for the suffering population and its appeal to all parties to co-operate to ensure the rapid delivery of relief. He said that "the Swedish Government wants to do all in its power to support the relief programmes for the Nigerian population" and noted with interest the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative. Mr. Nilsson hoped that the Secretary-General would provide information on the progress of

the relief and the humanitarian activities in Nigeria.

And so on. I could go through many of them.

I think there was one country only that wanted to have a debate and that was Sierra Leone. I do not know whether it got in here. Maybe it did not get that far. Did this get to the latest day?

Mr. Sharp's Aide: Yes, it covers yesterday.

Mr. Sharp: Is Sierra Leone listed here? They may not have quite got as far as that last one.

Mr. Lewis: About the third—Haiti and Jamaica, also.

Mr. Sharp: Yes. But he did not specifically—he just called for them to call upon both sides to put in an immediate ceasefire into effect. That is right. He did say that.

You know, this is just an account and generally speaking there was the greatest care. And what is very clear is that there would have been very little support for inscribing this item on the agenda of the United Nations.

This debate illustrated that there is widespread concern among the nations of the world with the humanitarian problems posed by the Nigerian conflict, but it also shows that there is a great deal of caution about taking at face value the charges that genocide is being committed and about the desirability of intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign member of the United Nations against the wishes of that member. This is the difference between the present situation and the two previous situations when the United Nations was able to intervene at the request of the Governments of the Congo and of Cyprus.

In my own address in the general debate yesterday, I made reference to the concerns of the Canadian people and Government with this question, and we shall continue to be alert to the possibility of advancing the humanitarian aspect of this problem in the United Nations context.

Indeed, in my statement that I tabled in the House of Commons today, I will draw your attention to one paragraph on the problems of human environment. And I said this—no, not problems. I am sorry. The plight of civilians in war. It states:

In the broader context of Human Rights, the review of the arrangements for co-ordination between the activities of international relief agencies in case of

natural disasters should, we think, be extended to cases of hostilities so that in such cases also assistance can be provided quickly and effectively to the innocent victims involved.

• 1640

In other words, we think that the United Nations ought to try to work out some agreed procedures by which an agency such as the International Red Cross could know in advance, and so could all sides, how such an agency could operate for the relief of innocent victims.

Throughout the negotiations to which I have referred earlier in this statement the one unqualified condition upon which the Federal Government has insisted is that the insurgents must acknowledge the unity in some form of the Nigerian state. Only on this basis has Lagos been prepared to consider a ceasefire. It is therefore evident that from the Nigerian point of view any attempt by an outside agency, even the United Nations itself, to impose a ceasefire would be tantamount to underwriting the Biafran claim to the right to secession. This view is accepted by all but four of the member states of the Organization of African Unity and explains their opposition to United Nations action, as well as their own reluctance to go further than extend their good offices in the effort to stop the fighting.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the significance of this in the African context. We must bear in mind the bitter tribal rivalries which the newly independent states are striving to overcome in the task of building nations from the geographical units they have inherited from their colonial past. In the eyes of these emergent nations, the spectre of secession on a tribal basis threatens their very foundations. More than that, it opens the way to bloodshed across the whole of Africa and could far outstrip the death toll in Nigeria, tragic as we must all recognize this to be. It opens the way also to the very outside intervention from which Africa is passionately concerned to rid itself. The fate of Africa, and of Africans, has only recently been returned to African hands, and there has yet to be built up the confidence that it will be allowed to remain there. Katanga and its aftermath is only too fresh in African memories.

We cannot—whether as individuals or as governments—turn our backs on the suffering in Nigeria. No one, least of all in Canada,

would wish to do so. But neither can we in the name of humanitarianism, and with the best of intentions commit ourselves to action, which, in the wider context of the situation in Africa and African experience of aliens' intervention, could turn out to be the height of irresponsibility.

I might conclude with a brief reference to a conversation I had in New York with Henry Labouisse, the Director of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The Fund has been deeply involved in relief in this area, and Mr. Labouisse was most concerned about the food situation, not only in the present period of crisis, but into the future, when he considered it would become yet more serious. We all need to be conscious of the fact that the need for assistance in Nigeria will continue for some time whether the war ends or whether it does not.

I referred in my address at the General Assembly to the fact that Canada stands ready to play its part in the task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In the immediate future, I hope that the Canadian people will do their full part in supporting the appeals of the voluntary agencies which are trying their best to provide food to the hungry.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Sharp. I have a new list of questioners which is as follows: Messrs. Brewin, Buchanan, Fairweather, Lewis, Harkness, Forrestall, Ryan, Laprise, Cafik, Yewchuk, Stewart and Laniel. Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sharp, I do not want to cover the whole field after the very comprehensive statement the Minister has made. I just have at this stage, at any rate, one or two specific questions. In the *Globe and Mail* this morning there is a detailed account under the byline of Charles Taylor, a well-known correspondent, of his having seen witnesses who he says attested, with a great deal of consistency, to an incident in which it is said that in one small town of Urua Inyang 16 miles south of Umuahia where he was, Nigerian troops opened fire in the marketplace and killed 500 Biafran civilians of non-Ibo origin and he says he heard and saw these direct witnesses in Umuahia. My question is, does the Minister think it might be possible to arrange to have the inspection team go to Umuahia in the near future so that they can investigate whether the stories given to Mr. Taylor and relayed by him are in fact, justified? It does speak of thousands of civil-

ians fleeing the town in terror and hiding in the bush. This is supposed to have happened last Friday, just a very few days ago when two of the members of this Committee happened to be in the neighbourhood, although they knew nothing about it. It seems to me that the inspectors are as useful as the places they happen to be in; they cannot be everywhere. Obviously, there should be a great many more inspectors at some stage, but here is a very detailed specific story with names of witnesses given and I wonder if it would be possible to arrange that the inspectors go and investigate this particular matter.

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, like all members of this Committee, I was very disturbed by this report which was brought to my attention just as I was leaving New York last night which I read for the first time in the paper this morning. I immediately directed that a cable go to Lagos drawing their attention to this report and asking if the International Team could report. I believe that this is one of the advantages of having host people there: that they can immediately go in and investigate on the spot incidents of this kind.

Mr. Brewin: Does this not suggest, too, that possibly an inspection team that goes into the area which, in a sense, is making the complaint would have advantages over one that is only in the area which naturally is not too anxious to reveal situations like this?

Mr. Sharp: In a civil war of this kind, as I have said earlier, there are bound to be incidents. I have never known any civil war in which there were not atrocities—the very nature of fratricidal conflict—and you know, if Mr. Taylor is reporting correctly—I certainly do not throw any doubt upon his reporting as he is a very trustworthy reporter—it is an incident in a civil war. But the question of whether it amounts to any attempt to wipe out a people or anything like that is quite a different question. It does not bear so much on the question of genocide as upon the conduct of the Federal troops, which is one of the questions that the Observers were asked to report on.

Mr. Brewin: If this sort of incident were fairly common and fairly widely reported it would certainly indicate, perhaps, the necessity or the importance of some international attention in regard to the matter.

Mr. Sharp: Yes, but I do not think it has ever been denied that this has been a bloody

civil war. No one that I know, has ever denied that there have been massacres on both sides.

Mr. Brewin: But this Committee, Mr. Sharp, and you, yourself, I am sure, are very anxious that when we formulate our policies in this matter we know the facts.

Mr. Sharp: Exactly.

Mr. Brewin: And it certainly would be helpful to have them.

Mr. Sharp: I want to know the facts, too, so I sent off a cable immediately I saw the report this morning.

Mr. Brewin: I just have one other question on quite a different subject. In discussing the relief matters you quite naturally, perhaps, put emphasis on the Red Cross, but in a sense I would like to call to your attention and ask your comment on the fact that one of the most successful wings, as it were, of the present relief efforts is being conducted from São Tomé by the World Council of Churches and other church organizations—Caritas International. I want to ask whether you confirmed with Dr. Arikpo—if that is his name—the statement he made when we were in New York that as long as the aircraft were to be inspected by the Red Cross and have Red Cross markings, the arrangement concerned could extend to the operations going on in São Tomé through the churches that are actively operating an airlift there.

•1550

Mr. Sharp: Perhaps I could answer the question most briefly by saying that after we had received all the information orally we now could put a service aircraft and crew at the disposal of the Red Cross which would be permitted to fly anywhere, I first of all confirmed this with Lagos to make sure there was no misunderstanding and then prepared a draft press release which was agreed to by Mr. Arikpo which said quite specifically that this was agreeable providing it was operated under the arrangements between the Red Cross and the government—The FMG. So that was specifically the agreement we reached and, therefore, whether it is possible for individual volunteers or church organizations in this country who want to co-operate with church organizations in other places to hire their own aircraft and so on, there certainly could be no objection to that. But as

far as the *Hercules* aircraft is concerned, it was provided under those conditions and I think that if we want it to operate effectively we should abide by the agreement.

Mr. Brewin: But I want to make clear what I am speaking of, and that is, that if the Red Cross and the Churches can arrive at an agreement whereby the Red Cross supervises them, would the government be ready to provide—

• 1650

Mr. Sharp: The aircraft will be in the charge of the Red Cross—we are turning it over to the Red Cross—so it will be under agreement made between the Red Cross and the FMG. If they want to co-operate with the Churches, we can have no objection to that. We have turned it over to the Red Cross to use in the most effective way in agreement with the Federal Military authorities.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Sharp, General Wrinch, I believe, mentioned that he felt the Red Cross could probably make effective use of four to five of our aircraft. Is there any limitation on the number we can provide, either from the Nigerian point of view or from our point of view?

Mr. Sharp: There is no limitation so far as I know from the Nigerian point of view. I think that the limitations may be imposed by the capacity of the airstrips, although the capacities within the Federal Military territory may grow. That is one thing. You know when you look at that map, five-sixths of Biafra is in the hands of the FMG. We are not talking about aid to Biafra in the sense that it is only the rebel territory. When we talk about aid to Biafra we mean all the people in the area the rebels once considered was the Republic of Biafra.

But on the other question about how many aircraft there should be, we have, as I said in the House, agreed only to two so far and it will depend upon our experience with those two how far we go. There is no limitation in any agreement that we have. The limitation is on how many can be used effectively and how much of its military aircraft the government is prepared to put into this particular operation.

Mr. Buchanan: Probably like all the members of this Committee and unquestionably yourself, I have been receiving telegrams urging that we should bring this matter

before the United Nations and you, of course, mentioned this matter as well. I wondered if it would be possible to explore this. I know that this was not our intention, but if we assumed that we did bring it before the United Nations I think it might be worth-while just to explore what the ramifications of doing that would be.

Mr. Sharp: In the first place, it would be resented by the member states of the Organization of African Unity. I understand that the declaration or the resolution of that Organization now before this Committee was tabled amongst the documents and it quite specifically deals with that point. The Organization of African Unity does not believe that it would be useful to bring this matter before the United Nations; neither does the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has a responsibility for the peace of the world—a responsibility superior to that of any of us—and whose advice to me and whose advice to every foreign minister present in the United Nations was to not put that upon the Agenda of the United Nations now because that would be counter-productive and would introduce a political issue into the debates in the United Nations that would interfere with the peaceful settlement of the dispute and the provision of relief. And on those bases I think we are justified in taking the advice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

• 1655

Mr. Buchanan: The odds, to all intents and purposes, of this being passed are non-existent.

Mr. Sharp: The odds against having it inscribed on the agenda are minimal. You have to get half of the members to agree and I think if we got a handful of countries that might want to create mischief by raising it that would be a high estimate. The universal opinion is that this is not now the time. There may be a time when the question can be discussed in the United Nations but right now would only be counter-productive and would interfere both with the peaceful settlement of the dispute and the provision of relief. I am satisfied that is the course we ought to follow.

The Chairman: Mr. Sharp, if I may interrupt you just for a second, you mentioned you thought that we had tabled the declaration of the Organization of African Unity. I do not think we have done that as yet. Is a copy available from one of your officials? Perhaps with the agreement of the Committee we could have it printed as an exhibit.

Mr. Sharp: Sorry, I was misinformed. I was told that it had been.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that some time within the last...

The Chairman: I wonder if we could settle this point? Is a copy of that available?

Mr. Sharp: We are getting one printed.

The Chairman: When it is available, is it satisfactory to have it printed as an exhibit?

Mr. Buchanan: An impartial account, is it?

The Chairman: Is it agreed by the members? Agreed.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Sharp, it is my understanding that some time within the past four to six weeks the Nigerians have agreed or did agree, I should say it is in the past tense now because the military situation has altered substantially—on certain terms for negotiating peace and that they would in fact be willing to permit a UN peacekeeping force in the occupied areas. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. Sharp: I would have to check that with my officials. It is not my recollection; no. My recollection of the position of the Nigerian Government is that they would agree to a ceasefire if the Biafran rebels would give up their ambition to become independent, but that the Nigerians were willing to talk about the terms for the Federal union. That was open for discussion. However, as far as I know they have not agreed to any peacekeeping operation because, in fact, to do so would be in a way to recognize that Biafra is not part of Nigeria. That would be my general feeling about that proposition, at any rate.

Mr. Buchanan: I thought it was somewhat similar to Cyprus, where they were going to permit...

Mr. Sharp: No, that is not my recollection.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Sharp, have you been somewhat surprised by the response of the Canadian people to the situation in Nigeria and Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: Well, shall I put it this way? The response in Canada has probably been greater than that in any other country. I have been talking to the foreign ministers of other countries and they told me that it did not occupy as much newspaper space elsewhere.

However, that as an indication of popular interest is quite another matter, but certainly the Nigerian-Biafran situation has not occupied as much of the newspapers elsewhere. People from other countries who have visited Canada tell me the same thing; they find this quite remarkable.

Mr. Fairweather: I was interested in the document we have, this sort of synopsis of the various delegations—I know that experts can shoot me down on this but let them—of the failure of the UN delegate, in your words, to create mischief by seeking a political solution through the UN. Do you suppose this explains some of the frustration that the ordinary citizens of the world feel towards this organization and its effectiveness?

• 1700

Mr. Sharp: If I may put it this way, Mr. Fairweather, I devoted part of my speech before the General Assembly on this occasion to the general question of the functions and operations of the United Nations. I said that two mistakes were sometimes made about the United Nations. First, that it was just an organ for propaganda, and second, that it was a quasi—legislature or a world government, and neither is true. The United Nations is not a super government, but it is more than a place simply to talk. It is a place where one is trying to get governments to act together to support certain principles.

Mr. Fairweather: But not to create mischief.

Mr. Sharp: That is right. Now, there are two principles involved here and I hope the Committee understands what a difficult problem is before the United Nations when two principles are under discussion, both of them in a sense central to the United Nations. First of all then is the principle of non-intervention; that is one principle. It is, I suppose, one of the most fundamental principles in the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, there is a principle which is very inchoate, which has never been employed very often because it is very difficult to apply, and that is the principle of the self-determination of peoples.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Is it not a principle of human rights as well?

Mr. Sharp: And a principle of human rights and a principle of opposition to genocide; all those matters. The two principles involved particularly here are the principle of non-intervention, which is in effect being put forward by the Nigerian Government and by the

African states, and there is another principle which I think is being urged by the Biafran authorities, and that is the right of self-determination of peoples. Now, when those two principles come into conflict it is very, very difficult to know how to act. The judgment of the members of the United Nations at the present time is that this is a matter in which the principle of non-intervention is the right principle and will likely promote a settlement most quickly. Now, this is the judgment really that has been made.

Mr. Fairweather: Do you feel that the irritation of the public, whether it is due to a misunderstanding or not, is for another philosophical debate at another time, that this irritation of the ordinary citizen is refreshing and that it bodes well for the future possibilities of strengthening the United Nations?

Mr. Sharp: Let me put it this way, Mr. Fairweather. One thing that it does illustrate is the need for a better understanding of the United Nations. Therefore, anything that contributes to an interest in the United Nations such as this debate that we are having here in which we are considering how the United Nations can play a most effective role is I think, very useful. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, I welcome this opportunity to have a discussion about a very, very, important matter affecting Canada and affecting the rest of the world. Indeed, I am one of those people who take seriously the proposition of involvement in politics, and the interest of the Canadian people in this question indicates their interest in this field. I hope out of it will come a better understanding of the United Nations.

Mr. Fairweather: Perhaps if I could turn to a more specific line of questioning, what technique has the government used to demilitarize the aircraft? I was going to say deconsecrate; it is the same principle.

Mr. Sharp: You probably should direct that to a minister other than myself but my understanding is that the planes will be painted white with a red cross on them. The personnel will be turned over as Red Cross personnel, although of course, the command of that aircraft will be in the hands of the commander, whoever he is. He will have some responsibility for the safety of his crew as well as the Red Cross.

• 1705

Mr. Fairweather: The only thing that Canada has to do then to get this—I am not down-

grading, I think it is a great achievement and we welcome it and are glad—is to paint an aircraft white and put a cross on it and it becomes acceptable to the combatants?

Mr. Sharp: No, it becomes acceptable, in Red Cross hands, to the FMG. We do not know yet what attitude the rebel authorities will take. I assume they will accept it. But the question that was involved here, you must understand, is that we were turning over to the Red Cross to carry relief to a rebel area an aircraft owned by the Canadian Government with service personnel aboard and it was most important that that operation should be carried on with the full authority and co-operation of the Federal Authorities. That was what we strived to do, and I am very glad that we got that accepted. You know the kind of questions that arise if it is done in defiance, as if you are a blockade runner, and this was one of the considerations that lead the Prime Minister in the House of Commons to say: You know, we are not going to go to war with Nigeria. This has to be done in full agreement with the Federal Military Authorities.

Mr. Fairweather: Do you really seriously believe that Nigeria would declare war—I mean—

Mr. Sharp: Well, should I read the statement again?

Mr. Fairweather: Oh no.

Mr. Sharp: You listened carefully?

Mr. Fairweather: Yes, very. It was one of the sillier parts of this growing debate, if I may say so, from my point of view, but I am an average citizen.

Mr. Sharp: Let me read the policy statement on the internal situation issued by the Nigerian Permanent Mission in a circular note dated July 9, 1968 in the United Nations.

While it is doing all within its power to ensure that emergency relief supplies reach the rebel held areas to alleviate the human sufferings brought upon the civilian population of Nigeria by the rebellion lead by Ojukwu and the consequent civil war, the FMG wishes to emphasize unequivocally that any supplies brought into any part of Nigeria, including the rebel held areas of the East Central States, without the clearance and consent of the FMG constitute a gross violation of Nigerian airspace and an act of hostility against Nigeria. The undertaking of the

FMG to assist in channeling relief supplies... and so on.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Could I ask a supplementary? Why was that counter-manded?

Mr. Sharp: Well, apparently the first time we got a clear indication was the other day.

The Chairman: I might mention we have been avoiding, with some success, supplementaries. I will put your name down, Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): At the end of the list, yes.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Minister, on September 18 I believe you suggested in the House that the movement of food was going to take place from Vancouver to Halifax and go aboard a ship leaving soon for Nigeria. In the light of your intention announced then why is it taking so long to get this ship underway? When is it expected to arrive?

Mr. Sharp: I will ask my officials that part of the question. The answer to the first part of the question is that the idea was to save the voluntary organizations the shipping costs and the voluntary contributions were all gathered together and put on board this ship. This was done in co-operation with the International Red Cross who said the supplies would arrive at a good time.

Mr. Fairweather: And, again, on September 18, in answer to a question in the House you said that we are flying supplies, using *Hercules* airplanes of the Canadian Armed Forces. I would like to know what supplies, when these aircraft left, and when they arrived.

Mr. Sharp: I am sorry, but would you repeat the question?

Mr. Fairweather: I think it was on September 18 that you said in the House in answer to a question, that "We are flying the supplies using *Hercules* airplanes of the Canadian Armed Forces."

• 1710

Mr. Sharp: Yes, in my statement, I dealt with that—

Mr. Fairweather: Was that actually from Vancouver to Halifax?

Mr. Sharp: No, these supplies were flown at the time that the International Red Cross believed that they had got the Biafran authorities to agree to the airline running from Lagos into Biafra. And we sent the plane all ready. It did not have to be a Red

Cross plane. This could be a Canadian Government plane ready to fly supplies from Lagos into the rebel-held territory. But when they got there the plane waited around a few days, and our man was over in Geneva hoping to help in getting the airstrip prepared, and the negotiations broke down. This is very unfortunate because if that had happened then of course there would have been no problems of this kind; there would have been an agreement between the rebel authorities and the Nigerian Government in which supplies could have been flown in by virtually anybody without any problems whatever. But unfortunately that did not work and that was at the time that the supplies went over.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Sharp, this afternoon in your three fundamental aspects, I think were your words, when you discussed the evolution of our policy you said that Nigeria's relations with us were closer than any other country except Britain.

Mr. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Fairweather: Would this not be a wonderful reason to suggest to the Government of Great Britain that that country stop the supply of arms to Nigeria?

Mr. Sharp: The Prime Minister expressed our views. As for making direct representations to the British Government, it seems to me that the people of Britain have just as tender consciences in this as we have and I think we should leave it up to their democratic institutions to deal with that question.

Mr. Fairweather: Then what about the democratic feelings of the people of the U.S.S.R.? They are not as tender perhaps.

Mr. Sharp: No, they are not.

Mr. Fairweather: Have we made any representations there?

Mr. Sharp: No, but their government is not quite as susceptible to public pressure.

Mr. Fairweather: But there has been no effort on Canada's part to have these—

Mr. Sharp: The Prime Minister expressed in the House of Commons the other day what is the Canadian view, that we would like to see all these arms stop, including the arms that are being supplied to the rebels, but we have not made direct representations on this. It did not seem to us that this would advance the cause one iota. Our views are well-known.

Mr. Fairweather: So the policy has not evolved here yet. There has not been an evolution of policy here.

Mr. Sharp: What do you mean.

Mr. Fairweather: Well, it has a fixed position here. We have had a rather wonderful evolution of policy vis-à-vis the humanitarian aspect.

Mr. Sharp: The evolution of our policy in the humanitarian aspect has been to try to work out the best possible means of moving the supplies. We have never wavered in our desire to help.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis, are you deferring your questions?

Mr. Lewis: Let me take about five minutes now and then unfortunately I have to leave for a service for the deceased Israeli Ambassador.

Mr. Sharp, you drew our attention to directives from Nigeria regarding flights over Nigerian airspace as being hostile and so on, but the fact of the matter is that the International Red Cross and church agencies have in fact flown over Nigerian airspace and have delivered relief to the Biafra-held territory, and as far as I know, from reports I have read, there have not been many incidents. I have a vague memory of one or two. Would you not say that those rough statements in July had in fact been abrogated by them?

Mr. Sharp: I think it is fair to say, Mr. Lewis, that what happened was that there was a tolerance; there was never active approval until now. And this has been the change that has taken place. That is why we operated so carefully here. You must remember that the need in Nigeria in the areas of fighting now in the control of the FMG is so great that even if we did nothing else except supply those parts we would be making a great contribution. But now we are free to do both. And I think that if our craft could only have flown in the FMG territories it would have been a great contribution to the humanitarian objectives that we all share.

• 1715

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Sharp, you are going a little more afield. I have been informed that the Canadian authorities have known for at least a month or more that the Nigerian FMG authorities had no objection to flights through their airspace into Biafra with relief.

Mr. Sharp: That is right, privately.

Mr. Lewis: Well, this is the distinction that the Minister and the Government have constantly been making. If you lend your aircraft you knew that this was possible and therefore the July directives from the Nigerian Government were obviously been looked at with Lord Nelson's blind eye. If Canada had lent an aircraft to the International Red Cross what reason did you have to think that that would be considered an act of war or a hostile act if the aircraft was painted white, as Mr. Fairweather brought out to you, with a red cross on it. The International Red Cross flies into São Tomé or Sao Paulo and brings relief into the Biafran-held territories. Why should we have been so frightened about that being a hostile act?

Mr. Sharp: Because if that plane had been flown without the express approval of the FMG and there had been an incident we would have been involved in a very, very serious deterioration in our relations with Nigeria; and the people of Canada would have questioned our judgment in not getting the agreement of the FMG before sending a Canadian aircraft with Canadian aircrew aboard, regardless of how they are painted and how they are garbed.

I believe that our policy paid off, because now we have clearance; now we can operate with full knowledge, without any worry that there is going to be danger to these people. Let there be no doubt of that; because if the fighting gets close to that airstrip then, of course, there is danger involved. It will now be done with the full authority and agreement of the FMG, which we were never able to get up until now, I can assure you.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Sharp, I guess we can continue to disagree on that point, and there is no sense belabouring it since we now have the FMG authority.

Mr. Sharp: I was criticized for not having it, and now I am criticized for getting it; is that it?

Mr. Lewis: No; that is what I said. You listened with your prejudices and not with your ears, Mr. Sharp. I said that now that you have got the authority there is no sense arguing about what might have been earlier.

I want to take you, because I have very few minutes, to the other—the major—problem. I can understand that the problem of putting the Nigerian situation on the agenda of the United Nations is not a small one, and

that there are all sorte of ramifications in it, but what I cannot understand is why you should constantly be characterizing it as intervention in the affairs of Nigeria if what Canada would do, if it took the initiative, was to try to persuade the United Nations to offer its good offices to both sides for the purpose of achieving a ceasefire and seeking a political settlement of the situation. I may not understand the ramifications, but I cannot for the life of me see why you should call that intervention in Nigerian affairs and why you should so categorically reject the suggestion that Canada place it before the United Nations.

For example, if I may complete my statement and question to you, I could not for the life of me see why, as far as the press reports are concerned, in your statement to the United Nations yesterday, you could not have made that kind of appeal on behalf of Canada; that here is a great human tragedy, a great fratricidal war; that despite all the legalities and the fineness of print in various documents the international community must have an interest, and that we, Canada, are urging the members of the United Nations to find some way of offering the services of this international organization to obtain a ceasefire and to start political negotiations again, and, may I add, with the guarantee that the U.N. would give the Biafrans, in particular, in this context, of protecting their physical security and their economic viability, and that kind of thing.

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Lewis, the purpose is to bring about a settlement as quickly as possible. I am sure you will agree that the sooner this conflict is over the better, because no matter what kind of relief we supply it is not going to end the suffering.

Mr. Lewis: That is why it gained U.N. intervention.

Mr. Sharp: Yes; well, this is just a question of judgment, Mr. Lewis, and the judgment that has been formed by the foreign ministers of a very high proportion of the civilized world is not on your side.

• 1720

Mr. Lewis: That is the kind of argument that is not justified in my mind, I am afraid. The great foreign secretaries of countries, Mr. Sharp, support wars in Viet Nam and in other situations across the world, with which I, a humble Canadian, very profoundly disagree.

Mr. Sharp: Yes; but you and I would both want to have the Viet Nam war ended quickly, just as we would the war in Nigeria.

The question is not whether that is a good thing. The question is how do we best arrive at that result. And the judgment of the neighbours of Nigeria, the members of the Organization of African Unity, which is a regional organization of the United Nations, and the view of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, is that to raise that question now would not advance but retard the prospects for peace.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Sharp, may I put this to you? I do not know what you mean by "that question", because as I have read—and I have read carefully—the report every time "that question" is referred to it is referred to in terms of some kind of political intervention. I am suggesting to you, without any animus but with great depth of feeling, if I may say so, that precisely because Canada is so well-regarded by Nigeria, and by both sides in the fighting, it seems to me that we missed a tremendous opportunity yesterday, through you, sir, in failing to put to the United Nations the moral obligation that the international world has to try, as a total international community, to bring an end to this fratricidal war and the suffering of millions of innocent people.

Mr. Sharp: Well, may I say this to you, Mr. Lewis...

Mr. Lewis: Whatever the results might have been.

Mr. Sharp: You have said because of our very close relationships with Nigeria. The Nigerian Government has asked us not to bring this matter before the United Nations.

Mr. Lewis: Of course; they hope to have a military victory.

Mr. Sharp: Yes; but you were talking about our relations with Nigeria. Our relations with Nigeria are through the Government of Nigeria, and when we were exploring this matter the fact that we talked about bringing this matter before the United Nations was picked up by Colonel Ojukwu who said—indeed I think it was reported in the paper that he had written a letter to me thanking me for supporting Biafra. If that does not inject the whole political issue into the United Nations, I do not know what does. And it is possibly the best evidence that, regardless of how you raise this question, what you do is embark upon a debate about the merits; and our

interest is not in interfering in the internal affairs of Nigeria, but in getting help to the people in need, and to work with other states to try to get the conflict ended. And the judgment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is that to raise that question in the United Nations in the way you have suggested would not advance the cause of peace.

Mr. Lewis: I have to give you the last word, I am afraid.

The Chairman: It has been a very interesting debate.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Sharp, one of the things I am not at all clear on—in fact I do not understand—is why the present arrangement could not be, and was not, made earlier. Now, this is particularly the case in a few of the parts that I read in this morning's *Globe and Mail*—an account that other countries, Dr. Arikpo, the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, said, could begin delivering aid under a similar arrangement through Red Cross channels. He said the agreement originated not in bilateral talks with Canada but through a proposal made several months ago by the Emperor of Ethiopia.

He is seeking to convey the impression, I take from that—whether the impression is correct or not—that the Nigerian federal authorities would have been quite prepared to accept this arrangement that was suggested; and I say that the implication is that it had really been agreed to with the Emperor of Ethiopia several months ago.

Mr. Sharp: Well, Mr. Harkness, the only thing I can say about this is that if we had been able to get these kinds of assurances earlier we would have been only too happy to have avoided the kind of questioning that I have been subjected to in the House of Commons.

We tried to arrive at this kind of an arrangement earlier. This is the first time that we have ever had satisfactory approval of this particular arrangement, in which a Canadian aircraft with a Canadian crew of military personnel would be acceptable to the Federal Military Government. I am very grateful that this would be done and I certainly do not want in any way to affect the understandings that have been arrived at. I can only say to you, Mr. Harkness, that we tried very hard to get this agreed to. Indeed, one of the evidences of this is that it was only some two or three weeks ago that I had my conversations with General Wrinch, and since

it did not seem possible to get the kind of assurances that were necessary, at that time we assigned the *Hercules* to working within federal military territory.

• 1725

Mr. Harkness: When did you become aware of this agreement, as I take it, that was made by the Emperor of Ethiopia to carry in relief supplies on this basis?

Mr. Sharp: I only know about the Emperor of Ethiopia's efforts to bring about peace. As I say, I read the statement which is dated in July as to the general attitude. When we got this information in New York that it was now all right—we wanted to make quite sure, because there had been many disappointments in the past—that is why I immediately sent a cable to Lagos and got reasonably good assurances.

Mr. Harkness: When did you first try to make an arrangement along this line?

Mr. Sharp: We have been in constant touch with Lagos.

Mr. Harkness: But I say when did you try to make an actual arrangement along this particular line?

Mr. Sharp: When I was with General Wrinch we discussed this with Lagos, which was three weeks ago, and at that time it did not seem practical. That is why we decided to put the aircraft for use in the federal military territory. I had an opportunity in New York to meet Arikpo—because we felt that it must continue to be their general position—and it was when I was having these discussions that I put the question to him specifically. I said, "We have now got this aircraft available to use in FMG territory. Could we not also use it? Would you not agree now?" He said, "If you turn it over to the Red Cross it is fine".

Mr. Harkness: When was this? Just two or three days ago?

Mr. Sharp: That was last week, when I first met Arikpo.

Mr. Harkness: I can understand that perhaps there are certain things you do not want to say in regard to this matter, but it still seems to me there is a bit of an area of considerable difference of opinion here as between what Dr. Arikpo says and what you have said in regard to the attempts made in order to get this arrangement put into effect earlier.

Mr. Sharp: Yes. May I say that I think there may be some misunderstanding here.

One of my officials has given me a note. What the Emperor of Ethiopia proposed was what the International Red Cross tried to negotiate and did not succeed. This was, namely, an agreed to airlift, an airlift agreed to by both the Biafran government and the FMG, but that broke down. We sent our plane over to try to take part in it. So that must be what he was talking about because that was what the Emperor of Ethiopia was trying to promote. The situation has now reached the point where the FMG presently controls most of the area of Biafra and it has become quite a different problem.

Mr. Harkness: My next question is has the Canadian Military Mission in Nigeria been completely withdrawn, or what parts of it are still there?

Mr. Sharp: The Canadian Military Mission?

• 1730

Mr. Harkness: The Canadian Military Training Mission.

Mr. Sharp: It was withdrawn a very long time ago.

Mr. Harkness: How long ago was it withdrawn?

Mr. Sharp: I will have to ask. I was not the Minister then. It was about a year and a half ago.

Mr. Harkness: That was very shortly after the assassination of the prime minister, was it?

Mr. Sharp: Just before the assassination.

Mr. Harkness: So there is none of that Military Training Mission of ours there at all now?

Mr. Sharp: No.

Mr. Harkness: As far as the provision of these claims is concerned, what arrangements have been made and who have they been made by, as far as the servicing, repairs and general back-up of these claims are concerned? I know from some past experience that you just cannot send a plane. You have to send a back-up organization; otherwise the plane will not fly very long.

Mr. Sharp: That is right. The Department of National Defence is now working out the arrangements with the Red Cross authorities, and the plane or planes will go there with all the necessary equipment—as much as can be provided—the necessary support crew, and so on. Indeed, it is quite relevant here that the

Swedish *Hercules* was out of service for some time simply because there were not enough crews and there were not enough back-ups. As the plane remains our plane and it is just for use with the Red Cross, we can take a much more direct responsibility for its servicing, and so on.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, we will really be sending out repairs with the planes, and so on.

Mr. Sharp: So I understand.

Mr. Harkness: Which I suppose will be established at Fernando Po, or some such place.

Mr. Sharp: Yes. It depends on whether the planes operate into FMG territory entirely or whether they operate from Fernando Po. They can operate from either.

Mr. Harkness: In regard to the reports by our High Commissioner in Lagos, which no doubt have been coming in more or less daily for a long time in regard to this whole matter, has there been any indication in those reports of anything in the nature of genocide or, we will say, widespread massacres or killings which would give rise to the idea that genocide was one of the elements in this whole situation?

Mr. Sharp: In the time that I have seen the cables there has certainly been nothing like this. What is true is that there is widespread fear of genocide on the part of the rebels. There is no question about this at all. This must be one of the most powerful factors operating on the prolongation of the war.

Mr. Harkness: But as far as the official reports from our High Commissioner are concerned, there is nothing in them to provide evidence in regard to this matter.

Mr. Sharp: Certainly not in any that I have seen. My officials tell me they have never seen any either.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: I will just pursue with the Minister for a moment or two, if I might, the arrangements for the aircraft. Is the Minister satisfied, Mr. Chairman, with the landing strip facilities? He has made some comments that would lead me to believe that this is being closely looked into, but I would like to ask him if in the conversations that he has had to date with the International Red Cross and the Nigerian officials or from other sources, he is satisfied or not that there are adequate landing facilities in the country?

Mr. Sharp: So far as I understand the situation there is believed to be adequate landing facilities in the rebel territory, and the plane certainly can take off from the plains in Spanish-Portuguese territory.

When we turned the *Hercules* over to the Canadian Red Cross for use in the FMG territory there was some doubt as to when the airstrip there would be available. Some of them were under water and some of them had been damaged, but the latest reports we had from Lagos were to the effect that probably airstrips could be made available for the use of the *Hercules*.

• 1735

Mr. Forrestall: Primarily these are not what we now understand airstrips to be. These are portions of paved highways that are straight enough to land aircraft on.

Mr. Sharp: I have not had the advantage of being anywhere, even for a day and a half.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Next time we will take you!

Mr. Forrestall: Have you then not been advised of the nature of these facilities?

Mr. Sharp: The Minister of External Affairs would not be concerned so much with that; it is the defence people who would be supplying the planes.

Mr. Forrestall: You are relying on their assurances that this plane could land.

Mr. Sharp: Oh yes very much. They are the finest air force in the world.

Mr. Forrestall: Then I gather there were no discussions in the International Red Cross about the use of other Canadian aircraft, such as the Cariboo or the Otter or any of these planes with stall capability and air drop capability.

Mr. Sharp: The specific requests that were made to us were always in terms of *Hercules*.

Mr. Forrestall: Because of their carrying capacities.

Mr. Sharp: There were no reasons why the Red Cross could not have had other types of planes if they wanted to hire them. But that was never the way it was put to us; it was how valuable it would be to have large capacity cargo planes available, and that is why we were so anxious to get them into service if we could.

Mr. Forrestall: This question was raised by Mr. Yewchuk in the House today. There were

no discussions of use of rotary wing aircraft as one instrument to overcome some of the problems in distribution which the Committee was led to understand is the major problem?

Mr. Sharp: I am sure that the Red Cross would welcome anything under these circumstances. What they wanted from us specifically were *Hercules*, and that is what the Red Cross in Canada were asked to provide. Of course, I am sure they could use helicopters, but other people can probably provide helicopters better than we can, so the particular contribution we can make is in *Hercules* which are not readily available elsewhere.

Mr. Forrestall: What duration is envisioned as a result of your discussions for the use by the International Red Cross of this type of equipment? Is it until such time as the hostilities end, or until such time as children are no longer starving, if I may use those two generalities?

Mr. Sharp: I can only reiterate what I said in my opening statement about my conversations with Mr. Labouisse, who is very concerned that the problem of food is going to become more serious, not less serious, because in the fighting areas the crops are not being planted.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Minister, you took the occasion to go back in time a little in describing some of the background of this tragedy that exists. Is there not, in your opinion, a history over the last 24 or 30 months that might lead us as an independent nation to consider, perhaps, changing our attitude towards a nation that would permit such atrocities, or which would permit such a lack of political control over its military structure as to permit the events of two years ago? After all, you recognize the reality of the fear. The fear certainly was not born of myths and rumours. There is ample international evidence by independent observers who spoke first-hand with the refugees as they poured back into the areas closer to their natural habitat. Is there not a point in our Canadian thinking where we have to—and we must—consider the moral obligation of rethinking our relationship with a country that has permitted the enjoyment of such laxity?

• 1740

Mr. Sharp: I do not understand. You are talking in very general terms. You will have to be more specific before I can answer those questions.

Mr. Forrestall: Would Canada forever continue diplomatic relations with a country that permits the atrocities that were perpetrated upon the people in Nigeria two years ago?

Mr. Sharp: Which government are you talking about?

Mr. Forrestall: Our government, our country, Mr. Sharp.

Mr. Sharp: Did we commit atrocities some place?

Mr. Forrestall: No, no. I have asked you at what point would Canada break off diplomatic relations with a country that permits such atrocities?

Mr. Sharp: Which government do you mean? I am sorry; you are talking in such general terms. Are you laying charges against some government?

Mr. Forrestall: I am saying that I am satisfied, and the world community seems to be satisfied, that upwards of 30,000 people were killed over a period of three or four days in Nigeria about two years ago, and I am just wondering whether this is the type of country with which Canada would forever maintain friendly diplomatic relations.

Mr. Sharp: Are you accusing this government of having killed 30,000 people?

Mr. Forrestall: I am sorry if I am failing to get across to you. What I am saying...

The Chairman: Which Nigerian government?

Mr. Forrestall: There is only one Nigerian government.

The Chairman: Well, it changes from time to time just as ours does.

Mr. Forrestall: The Nigerian government at the time two years ago. What did Canada do two years ago, diplomatically, about the atrocities that were perpetrated by the northern army on the Ibo people living outside of what we now understand to be the rebel Biafran district? Did we object to them? Did we do anything to voice our concern then?

Mr. Sharp: I was not here, so I really cannot answer that question. I was not in this position, but if you want me to examine that I will, but it does not seem to be very relevant to what we are considering.

Mr. Forrestall: What I am curious about, Mr. Minister, is whether we forever and a day continue to be nice to a country that permits this to happen to its people?

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall, I think we have to give very wide latitude to questioning, but I think that is a question the Minister could not be expected to answer. It is hypothetical and involves expressions of opinion. Can you not be more specific in your questioning?

Mr. Forrestall: It is obvious I am not going to get any answer, but just permit me to say that in spite of our very friendly relations with whatever government happens to be in control in Nigeria, I find it very difficult to be so sympathetic that we would delay, for example, sending food in to starving people for a period in excess of one month as has been revealed today, I gather, at the United Nations.

Mr. Sharp: These are all very general comments, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: I do not think my appeal is that difficult to understand.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is quite clear that we cannot finish this afternoon. Although Mr. Sharp had other commitments, he is willing to come back this evening at 8 o'clock if that is satisfactory to the Committee members.

Our Steering Subcommittee has to meet for a few minutes immediately after this meeting. I ask them to wait, if they will, so perhaps if members of the Committee agree we might adjourn now and reconvene at 8 o'clock.

Mr. Prud'homme: Could I ask the Minister whether it is more convenient tomorrow morning?

The Chairman: Well, tomorrow morning we still have many questioners. We have Mr. Ryan, Mr. Laprise, Mr. Cafk, Mr. Yewchuk, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Groos, Mr. Alexander and Mr. MacDonald. We cannot possibly finish even if we continue until 6.15.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Is there any possibility of continuing tomorrow, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Well, we have not finished with Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald who would prefer to come on tomorrow morning rather than this evening, I gather.

Mr. Brewin: I have been waiting for the Minister.

The Chairman: The Minister is prepared to come on this evening.

Mr. Sharp: If it would help, I would prefer to finish it tonight, if we can finish it tonight.

• 1745

The Chairman: I think we can finish tonight if we start at 8 o'clock. Is that agreeable, then, to the members? Before we adjourn, I would just like to...

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): It is not agreeable to me, Mr. Chairman, because we have spent practically the whole day in this Committee while the House was sitting, and I am sure there are some members who would like to spend some of the time with the other duties they have. We all have many, many duties and although this is a very, very important Committee I think there are other things that are also important and I do not think we should use up all of the sitting time of the House for this Committee.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart, what is your suggestion?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): It is my suggestion that we reconvene tomorrow.

The Chairman: Tomorrow morning? We would then not be able to finish with Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald. The House sits at 11 o'clock tomorrow. If we met at 9.30 we would have only one hour and a half before the sitting of the House in any event.

I am in the hands of the members, but it does seem to me that if we met this evening at 8 o'clock we would probably be able to finish with the Minister.

Mr. Prud'homme: We have very important duties to attend to, but I am sure the Minister also has many more important duties. I wonder if we were sure to finish tonight, whether we could not proceed with the Minister tonight?

The Chairman: At 8 o'clock?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I wonder whether it would be helpful for the Committee to have a copy of Mr. Sharp's remarks? Could they be photostated and circulated between now and 8 o'clock along with the notice of the meeting?

The Chairman: I have no objection.

Mr. Sharp: I hope I have the edited copy.

The Chairman: We will certainly do the best we can. If we can get them xeroxed, we will, Mr. MacDonald. Is it agreed that we adjourn until 8 o'clock? I apologize to those members for whom it is not convenient but it is a large committee and all we can do is our best.

Before we adjourn, may I have permission of the Committee to have printed as appendices the reports from the United Nations Observer that have been tabled this afternoon?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: We will adjourn until 8 o'clock.

An hon. Member: And the Steering Committee?

The Chairman: The Steering Committee will have a meeting now upstairs.

EVENING SITTING

Thursday, 10 October 1968

• 2009

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we can start. The names I have on my list are Messrs. Ryan, Mongrain, Gibson, Cafk, Laprise and MacDonald. Were there any others who had questions? I have committed the unforgivable sin. I mislaid the list that I had earlier. I finished with Mr. Forrestall, I think. You had completed your questioning I believe, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: If I had read the Toronto Telegram you would not have been finished with me, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Smith, yes, that is right. Had you completed your questioning, Mr. Forrestall? Mr. Smith is not here. Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Sharp, I think I am speaking for everybody here when I say we are very, very happy that the government is going to commit these *Hercules* aircraft to this great humanitarian effort in Nigeria and Biafra. I want to congratulate the Minister for the part he has played in this. I think it has been a very substantial and effective part.

There are a few questions I would like to ask, however. First of all, Mr. Sharp, are the two *Hercules* to be supplied by our government to continue to be regarded as service aircraft, or are they being transferred to the International Red Cross or let to them on some lend-lease basis, or something of that nature?

Mr. Sharp: They are remaining the responsibility of the Canadian Government in the sense that we will be responsible for seeing that they remain in operation, but they will be acting on behalf of the Red Cross in supplying relief. This is the only way that we

can be sure those aircraft can be effectively used. May I add—this is one of the points I think the Committee should understand about this position—there is no other country in the world that is operating as we are operating in helping the Red Cross. We are putting this at the disposal of the Red Cross with the Canadian Government standing behind it, the Canadian air force standing behind it, to see that it keeps operating, is adequately manned and so on. Now, this is one of the reasons the circumstances surrounding the approval are so different from any of the other arrangements that have been made.

Mr. Ryan: According to today's *Citizen*, Mr. Sharp, there is a headline saying: "Flight problems delaying airlift". Then there is a quote to the effect that the officials want to be sure the airfields can handle the \$2,500,000 four-engined *Hercules* which can carry up to 40 tons of supplies. I think that is a mistake; it should be 20 tons of supplies. They also said only one aircraft, not two, has been placed on forty-eight-hour standby alert to take part in the Biafra run. Is this the situation?

Mr. Sharp: Well, my understanding of the situation was as I answered in the House of Commons today, which was supplied by the authorities, and I will read it again:

We hope that a Canadian *Hercules* aircraft will be on its way to Nigeria within 48 hours with a reconnaissance party to survey the condition of all available airstrips in Federal and rebel-held areas of Nigeria as well as Fernando Po. A second aircraft is being placed on standby for possible early departure.

And that is exactly the situation.

Mr. Ryan: And further the report has this to say: "The *Hercules* would carry a double crew of 14 men to cope with the high probability of disease."

Mr. Sharp: That is right. One of the problems all these arrangements have suffered from is that the crews are subject to a very high incidence of tropical diseases. That is why it is so important to be able to keep this aircraft flying to carry on the relief operations.

● 2015

Mr. Ryan: I take it there would only be seven men at a time in charge of the aircraft and seven on relief?

Mr. Sharp: Well, you probably know more about the air force than I do, but at any rate.

Mr. Ryan: I do not really.

Mr. Sharp: Yes, we are providing crews, not just one crew that could fly only when all of them are well, but enough so that the aircraft can be flying all the time. This is a very, very, big operation and it is one of the reasons we have to look at the arrangements, to make sure just what they are so that we can work most effectively on behalf of the relief.

Mr. Ryan: Does the government have an understanding with the IRC that one of the *Hercules* will be used on the Uli run from Sao Tome or Fernando Po, and the other one from Lagos to the three main airfields in occupied Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: Our position is that we are operating on behalf of the International Red Cross, and wherever they feel without limitation the aircraft can be most effectively, that is where they will be used. We do not have control over the destination of the aircraft. We do have control in the sense that our men are in charge of it, but it is acting on behalf of the Red Cross and will fly where they say, and our understanding with the Red Cross and with the Nigerian Government is that it can fly wherever it can be most effectively used including into rebel areas, from non-Nigerian territory.

Mr. Ryan: Is there any estimated date when one of our *Hercules* could touch down with supplies in Uli, in the besieged area?

Mr. Sharp: I do not know. I really cannot answer. That will depend on the arrangements made by the Red Cross, not by us.

Mr. Ryan: The UN observer reports that there has been severe destruction in the conflict areas he inspected, and further reports that Ibos are coming out of the bush to a clinic, in the first area observed at 40 old men the first week, 100 persons the second week, and an estimated 1500 the third week, and he says further that the demand for supplies is likely to increase very significantly and very quickly. We are told that there will be an escalation in the need from somewhere near 200 tons at the present moment, inside besieged Biafra, to about 3000 tons in that area alone. This looks as if the relief at the present time is a trickle compared with what will be needed in the future. I wonder if the government is prepared to meet quickly fur-

ther demands for high protein food and its transport, particularly—I would suppose in the first instance—to the five-sixths occupied area, that is occupied by the Federal troops, because that apparently is much easier to get to. Will we go further, because this is surely just an initial step in this picture because it looks like a picture that will rapidly become far more demanding than it is.

Mr. Sharp: I do not think that Canada is going to be able to do all of this. I am quite confident that there will be support from the Canadian people and the Canadian Government for very large-scale relief. I have sufficient confidence in the Canadian people that I believe they will respond to the various campaigns that have been put on.

As I said earlier to the Committee the information I have leads me to believe, as you have said, Mr. Ryan, that the needs will increase very rapidly in the future, first: because, as we hope, the people will come out of the bush back into civilization where they will need treatment—we hope that their fear of genocide or whatever it is that is now inhibiting them will disappear.

Second, the problem that will emerge because of the food situation which will get worse, not better, in which there will be shortages not only of the protein foods, but also of the ordinary starches. I believe that we of this world, including Canada, are going into the midst of a very substantial relief operation. This is my own feeling and my own information.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman; those are all my questions.

The Chairman: I have now located the list I had before dinner. The order is as follows: Messrs. Laprise, Cafk, Yewchuk, Stewart, Laniel, Groos, Alexander, MacDonald (Egmont), Thompson, Mongrain, Gibson, Smith. Mr. Laprise.

[Interpretation]

• 2020

Mr. Laprise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the first place, like my colleague, I was very happy to hear the decision of the Minister and the result of his representations in order to help both Nigeria and Biafra for humanitarian purposes and I only regret that these representations have not been able to go further, that is to say, to a ceasefire to put an end to this war.

I understand the position of the Canadian Government, that it should not intervene in the affairs of another country. But it is a pity that other countries particularly Great Britain, Russia and also perhaps France, have not had the same intentions as Canada in not intervening in the affairs of this country. If Biafra and Nigeria had not received arms from these countries, probably that war would come to an end sooner.

We are happy to hear that we will be able to have a more active role in helping to supply foods and drugs for people who are suffering.

I would like to ask the Minister whether he is sure that foods and drugs which will be sent on the *Hercules* planes supplied by Canada, is sure that these drugs and foods will be used only to help civilians, old people, children, women, rather than the military people?

[English]

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, I am not in a position to give any such assurance. In these matters we must depend upon the Red Cross. Their purpose is certainly to see that the food goes to the civilian victims of war and not to the armies. But in all these operations we can only depend upon the efficiency of the International Red Cross or the other Red Cross Societies they are operating.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: During your negotiations at United Nations, I understand it has not been very easy to obtain help from other countries in view of a ceasefire, but, can we expect in one way or another that there will be diplomatic pressures put on Nigeria in order to obtain a ceasefire?

[English]

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, as I said in the House of Commons quite some time ago, Canada has made it quite clear both to the Nigerian authorities and to the rest of the world that what we want is a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, to say "Let us have a cease-fire" is not likely—for the reasons that I have expressed in my opening statement—to do very much to advance the matter. There must also be some meeting of minds between the rebels and the government about the future organization of Nigeria and therefore a cease-fire is unlikely to be responded to unless there is that underlying agreement. And notwithstanding the very great efforts

that have been made by various people, so far that agreement does not exist.

There is a fundamental difference of view between the rebels and the Nigerian government. The rebels want to have an independent country. The Nigerian government wants to have a federation. Until that central question is settled I do not think appeals for a cease-fire are going to have very much affect.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Sharp, I would like to ask you a few questions, if I may. The first one is in respect to the inspection team that is over in the Biafra area now. You had indicated in your opening statement that their very presence in itself, aside from gathering information, was valuable in that it perhaps deterred atrocities from happening, and this type of thing.

• 2025

In view of this, would you consider it advisable for more than one team to be there for the purpose of gathering information and achieving the other objectives that you outlined?

Mr. Sharp: Certainly if the Nigerian government were to ask us to supply more people to engage in the inspections, we would be happy to oblige. I would think that that would be so of the other countries and the organizations that are represented on the teams. I would have thought, however, that until there has been some demonstration of the operations of this team, it is unlikely that the Nigerian authorities would ask for more people. They have shown their goodwill by saying, "We want people to come in and observe and we are giving them the facilities to observe." They too will be watching to be sure that this team is actually operating as they hoped it would, namely, to give impartial accounts.

Mr. Cafik: When they made the original request or allowed this to happen, did they limit it to one team and to any number of people, Mr. Sharp?

Mr. Sharp: They asked us to supply an observer and I think that all the countries concerned asked whether they could make their inspection more efficient by providing assistants. We did that. We have one assistant. I believe we have another man who is helping. In any event, we have one assistant. Each of the other countries has at least one. I

do not know if any of the others have more than one, but each of us was permitted to have another assistant, which doubled the number of people—doubled the number of eyes, at any rate.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Sharp, according to the terms of reference of this team would the Federal Nigerian Forces or the government now allow this team to cross the fighting line into the besieged area of Biafra? Was that spelled out, or...

Mr. Sharp: No. The purpose of the team was to observe the conduct of the Federal troops and also to observe what happened in the areas which were reoccupied by the Federal forces. In other words, it was related to the question of are these allegations of genocide or purposeful destruction of a race—namely, the Ibos—justified. Now, the place to find that out is where the government has full control and where it could, if it wished, eliminate a whole group of people who are powerless. As far as a war is concerned, that is a different matter. Here you have soldiers facing one another and civilians being concentrated within the rebel-held territory, exposed to the possibility of being destroyed in the course of the conflict. The fact that those things happen has really nothing to do with the question of whether there is a deliberate attempt to eliminate them. You get the best test of that behind the Federal lines where the Ibos are completely at the mercy of the Federal troops.

The question of whether the observers should be permitted to cross the lines is a matter that may arise. In the meantime I should think that it is important to all of us to know whether, in the areas where the Ibos are at the mercy of the Federal government, there is a policy of genocide.

Mr. Cafik: Right. The reason I asked that question, Mr. Sharp, is that it was pointed out by witnesses earlier—the two men that came back from that area—that we had really only seen one side of the story in respect to genocide. I do not really follow the line of reasoning, but in order to eliminate that feeling I thought I would bring up the point.

The second line of questioning is in respect to the *Hercules* aircraft. I gathered last night—and I do not know whether this statement is true or not—from an Ottawa newspaper that the Prime Minister had been attributed with a statement that we, the government, would make more *Hercules* aircraft

available to other relief agencies if they requested them. Do you know whether that statement was actually made or not?

• 2030

Mr. Sharp: I do not. I was not here to hear it. I can only say what I have said to the Committee before, that the agreement that we have with the Nigerian authorities is that we will turn these aircraft over to the Red Cross. That is as far as the agreement goes. If the Prime Minister said something else I am not really aware of it. At any rate, it goes beyond the agreement I made with the Nigerian government.

Mr. Cafik: It has not been stated, but I presume that the aircraft will be allowed to fly into these areas in daylight flights?

Mr. Sharp: That depends upon the arrangements that the Red Cross can make with the Nigerian authorities. We have no control over that. We are putting this plane at the disposal of the Red Cross and to fly it where they tell us to fly it. If they can make an arrangement to fly in the daytime, that is fine, but that is not our decision.

Mr. Cafik: In the original agreement with the Federal authorities in Nigeria did they indicate that we could fly in in the daytime or was it just not discussed.

Mr. Sharp: No, it was not discussed. It would not be our plane then. There is no reason why they should discuss it with us. The question is with the Red Cross.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Sharp, do you have any idea what the cost will be to Canada on a sort of monthly basis in supplying...

Mr. Sharp: No. The Minister of Finance has not protested yet.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Now, pursuing another line, some have suggested we ought to bring this before the United Nations. I heard your opening statement and I agree wholeheartedly with it, but it occurs to me that possibly there is some other approach that might be used. From earlier testimony I have the impression that the Biafrans are continuing to resist the Federal authorities because of the fear of genocide; the fear that they will lose their property and if they do lose the war on top of all this, whoever might survive feel that they would be in an inferior position in the Federal State of Nigeria.

If these are the real problems, and I gathered from testimony that possibly the attitude

they have toward having an independent state is maybe a result of those factors, do you think there is any way that Canada, not by taking it to the United Nations, but by its good offices with the Federal State, can directly negotiate with these two groups to assist in any way through what you might think of as a task force for peace or something down there?

Mr. Sharp: Needless to say, we have no relations with the rebels.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I realize that.

Mr. Sharp: However, in our relations with the Nigerian authorities we have made it very clear to them, as I am sure you would expect that we would, that the Nigerian Government should make it very clear that there would be no reprisals; that there would be a general amnesty. We are urging this point of view upon the Nigerian authorities as are many people. Because if it is the fear of genocide—if it is the fear that the Ibos will not be given a proper place in the life of Nigeria—then these fears should be dissipated and removed as quickly as possible. This is the line we have been urging upon the Nigerian authorities.

Mr. Cafik: And does Nigeria agree that these are baseless fears that they have or are they willing to guarantee these rights to the Ibo people at the moment?

Mr. Sharp: I really cannot speak for the Nigerian Government, but they certainly deny the allegations that have been made.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Mr. Sharp.

Mr. Yewchuk: Sir, I would like to just ask a little more about the team of observers that is in Africa right now. Mr. Cafik has mentioned that he did not see any point in having them observe the other side, but I think there might be some merit in that suggestion in that they might be exposed to certain acts if they were observing on the other side that they might not see from the Nigerian Federal Military Government side. I wondered if Canada had given any consideration to having the team travel all over or if there has been any communication with the Biafrans on this point?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, when the hon. member ask me what communications we have had, it is of the essence of this situation that we have no communications with the rebel authorities. We deal with the Govern-

ment of Nigeria and any act on our part to deal with the rebels would be considered a most unfriendly act by the Government of Nigeria, which does not believe that Biafra should be recognized as a separate state. We were in the same position when we resented Gabon's insisting on dealing with Quebec. We found this just a bit contrary to the rules of international behaviour and for exactly the same reasons that Nigeria would take exception to our dealing with a rebel authority—although Quebec is not a rebel authority—as it is not the Government of Nigeria and has no right to speak with foreign governments. Therefore, the communications we receive which we are told are directed to us or which we receive in various ways are never responded to. We have no one to deal with except the Nigerian government. Now, this is just not a legalistic point, this is the essence of good international behaviour that preserves the peace of the world.

• 2035

Mr. Yewchuk: I understand that and I accept it, but the team is there at the invitation of the Nigerian Federal Military Government and they have been advised also that there are no limitations to where they can travel to make their observations. I wondered whether you thought there would be anything to be gained by their going on the other side even—

Mr. Sharp: I cannot be very certain about the answer to that question. Again, you get into the question of recognition. It might be, for example, that the Nigerian authorities would have no objection to that team of observers moving into the rebel-held area providing it was recognized as being part of Nigeria. Therefore, if it were a question of the team's having to negotiate with the authorities of Biafra to move about in the area, I am sure that the Nigerian authorities would object, but if it is a question of their moving, as of right, into Nigerian territory, there would be no problem about it. So this is why the Nigerian authorities, in asking for these observers, are really giving the observers an opportunity of observing what is going on in the areas in which the Federal Authority is unquestioned. But as I said, as far as we are concerned, if the Nigerian authorities said: "Please cross the lines and go into the other part of Nigeria", we would have no objections.

Mr. Yewchuk: I am asking this primarily because there is sort of a conflict between the

reports of the official team of observers and our own two unofficial observers and maybe this would help to clarify the situation.

Mr. Sharp: There is a great difference between the activities of the two groups.

Mr. Yewchuk: Yes, I understand.

Mr. Sharp: You know, our observers are moving about the country day by day; moving in and questioning people who are on the spot, who are exposed to the possibility of genocide. Our good friends who went into Biafra—I am not questioning their motives at all—had no opportunity of doing that.

Mr. Yewchuk: To change the subject for a minute. In 1966 there was a coup d'état in which the official prime minister was killed and in which installation of a military government took place which was primarily Ibo and then in July of the same year there was another coup which upset that government and installed the present Federal Military Government. I wondered if you had any figures on what percentage of the present Federal Military Government is composed of Ibos, if any?

Mr. Sharp: No, I am afraid I do not. All I can say is that the foreign minister with whom I had my talks, while he was not an Ibo, was from the Biafra Region and was a good Presbyterian.

Mr. Yewchuk: According to the Federal Military Government's news release of July 5 any airplane flying over Nigerian territory would be considered to have committed an act of hostility or war. General Wrinch stated yesterday that he had asked the Canadian Government for a *Hercules* airplane—I think the date he stated was July 12—and was refused. Was this refusal based on refusal by the Nigerian authorities at that time to allow our planes to fly or was permission specifically asked at that time?

• 2040

Mr. Sharp: The situation at that time, as I understand it, was that flights were getting through notwithstanding the expressed opposition of the Nigerian Federal Military Government and we, as a government interested in maintaining good relations with the Government of Nigeria with whom we knew we had to work if we were going to get supplies in to help the people of Nigeria, did not feel that we should participate, as a government, in that kind of operation. Now, if individual

Canadians wanted to go and engage a private plane or wanted to do any of those kinds of things, that did not concern us. But if it was a government plane that was involved, we did not feel that we could operate successfully unless we had the full approval of the federal military authorities, and it was not until the last few days that we got that complete authority, without which we could not have operated successfully. It would have put us in a very curious position of wanting to break a blockade which had been imposed by the Nigerian authorities, except where they had agreed with the Biafrans for land and air routes. You see, one of the points that I cannot help emphasizing enough is that the Nigerian authorities were always willing to send in food to Biafra. They never refused. There were two conditions, however. One of them was that it move by land or that it be moved on agreed air corridors, and both of them Biafra turned down. That is the position and one can understand why the Nigerian authorities under these circumstances took a pretty hard line for a long time against this sort of surreptitious supplying of food. They never actually did anything about it. It was barely tolerated, but for us to be effective it was most important that we should work with the full agreement and authority of the Nigerian people.

Mr. Yewchuk: I understand that, sir, but according to the way the news release was read or the way I understood it and maybe I misunderstood it, the implication was that they may have given permission had it been sought directly to fly openly and so on with their blessing, and I wondered whether this question had been put to them.

Mr. Sharp: I took occasion during the dinner hour to check on the report that appeared in the *Toronto Telegram*. My information is that the report is not right. Perhaps I might put on the record what was said, although I cannot vouch for the accuracy of it: I can only report what my mission reports to me. What was said was that Nigeria has never denied food or medical supplies to the Biafrans. For example, their offer of an overland route was refused by Ojukwu. They also permitted the Red Cross to fly under agreed conditions. On Canada, they had only said that they were happy to agree to Mr. Sharp's proposal when he raised it. They had not dealt with any hypothetical reference to the past. So I hope that this will end that particular story, which I think was very mischievous

because it was raising an unnecessary controversy.

Mr. Yewchuk: This is referring to the *Telegram* story. In that case that is satisfactory, sir.

Mr. Sharp: This is the only story I have seen to this effect.

Mr. Yewchuk: The *Telegram* reports that Canada had not actually asked Nigeria until last Sunday specifically whether they could fly airplanes into their country.

Mr. Sharp: Well, the report I got from my representatives in New York was that they disclaim having said anything of the sort.

Mr. Yewchuk: I still wondered whether you personally or your Department had asked them prior to Sunday.

Mr. Sharp: Well, I have answered this many times. If we had thought when I had my conversation with General Winch that we could at that time have got the agreement of the Nigerian authorities to using that RCAF plane with military personnel aboard to fly supplies into the rebel-held territory from outside of Nigeria, we would have done it at that time. Our enquiries indicated at that time that that would not have been possible, and that is why I was so delighted when I was in New York to learn that the attitude had changed, and I hope that that is so. This is going to be a very difficult operation and I only hope it is successful. We all hope that way, too, and would rather put the supply of food ahead of political controversy.

• 2045

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Yewchuk: I take it, sir, that you mean then that this story is simply an error on the part of the reporter.

Mr. Sharp: I do not know. I am only telling you what I am told from New York because I was disturbed by the story and I wanted to check on it.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you very much. That is all, Mr. Sharp.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to thank the indulgence of the Committee because I was a few minutes late. My presence was required in the House. In fact, we just survived a vote.

Mr. Minister, since the beginning of these hearings there has been a difference of reporting on two different sides. We have

heard one side of the story from a report that has been given to us by an international group which examined only one side of the situation. On the other hand, we have heard a report from witnesses, members of Parliament, who visited the other side and who gave us the other side of the story. In neither instance did we get an over-all picture of what is going on on both sides of the fighting line in Nigeria. In each case we have heard only one side of the story. On the one hand, we have a Canadian representative who gave a report which was verified by the member from the United Nations but it was based on only one side of the fighting line. They were there for the past three weeks; some of that was undoubtedly hearsay evidence; some of it was first hand evidence which they have seen themselves. On the other hand, we heard a report from two members of Parliament who spent a short time—

Mr. Sharp: I am sorry, my attention was distracted. What did you say about the Observers' Report?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): That the Observers' Report was based on the situation in one part of the country.

Mr. Sharp: Their first report, you mean.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Both reports.

Mr. Sharp: Each on a different part.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We have never received a report from the Observers on what is going on on the Biafran side as it is at present.

Mr. Sharp: The ones who are there.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The one sixth of the country which is in the hands of the Biafrans.

Mr. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We have received a report only on the other side from them. On the other hand, we have received a report from two members of Parliament who went over and who have given us, from what I can see up to now, hearsay evidence. I do not say this in a derogatory fashion. This Committee undoubtedly is very glad to have this evidence because it is the type of evidence we could not get ourselves, but it is not sufficient. As far as this Committee is concerned, it is not sufficient. We need first hand evidence on both sides. Now my question is this. Does the government feel that there should be either a group from this country or the international group which would examine both sides of this

situation so that there will no longer be a divergence, so that we will now see what is going on on both sides? We have heard about genocide. We have heard of denials of genocide. We have heard two different things on the two different sides. Maybe these reports are all correct, but they are on two different sides of the war. I think that it is time now that we heard something that covers the whole aspect of both sides. Is the government prepared to have someone give us this kind of report, or make this kind of investigation?

Mr. Sharp: Well, Mr. Chairman, our Observers are in the Nigerian territory at the invitation of the Nigerian federal authorities and they are in there to observe the conduct of the Federal troops. As I said previously, it is only there that one can be sure that any atrocities would be either deliberate or not, because they would have the situation under control. If you get into the rebel-held territory, which is under attack, where military operations are going on, you are engaged in a different kind of operation. You are then trying to find out what the targets are. That is relevant but it is a difficult question how one could settle this controversy. As I understand the situation, the principal motive is the fear of genocide amongst the Biafran rebels. They say, "If we give up we will be destroyed."

● 2050

When you come to answer that question you can only answer that outside of the zone of conflict where the people are under the control of the present government of Nigeria. There you can see evidence whether, once the Federal authorities get control, they destroy the people. What happens in the civil war is quite a different matter; all civil wars are terribly bloody. I do not think you would suggest that the armies of the north set out to destroy the people of the southern United States, but they killed a great many of them in the course of that civil war in the United States. This is true of all civil wars.

So we have two different questions involved here and I do not think it is possible, quite, to answer the question the way you have put it. Moreover, I would add just this: Colonel Ojukwu's views are not held by all Ibos. There are Ibos in the world today, outside of the rebel-held territory, that are in favour of a settlement of this war within Nigeria with Biafran areas remaining inside Nigeria. Actually there are Ibos who are trying to persuade Ojukwu to accept that as a condition; so far they have not succeeded. But it is not all Ibos who fear genocide; there are

some who are quite willing to work out a place within the Nigerian society.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Are some of these within government—

The Chairman: Mr. MacDonald, I have you a little later on the list.

Mr. Sharp: No, no, these are very influential Ibos.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I think, sir, the point is that there are a number of people who have reported what is going on on the Ibo side and they have reported quite differently to what we have heard about the other side. In fact, Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald have the impression that it is a much worse situation on the Ibo side than what we have heard from our observers on the Nigerian side—The federal side.

Mr. Sharp: Well they are both reporting different things.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Exactly.

Mr. Sharp: No, no. They are reporting about different things. What our friends who went into the rebel territory observed were conditions in a beleaguered area, under pressure as that map shows, a very relatively small area under pressure from the surrounding Federal forces. In war, what the observers are observing is what happens in peace.

Mr. Brewin: On a point of privilege, that is not at all what we have taken into account.

Mr. Sharp: Well, no, I am sorry, but that is what you observed; you were there. But also as I recall—I have not read your evidence here, I have not had an opportunity—what you said to me in New York was that you did not believe the reports made by the observers about what they saw in the areas they visited. Now, you may have changed your mind in the meantime.

Mr. Brewin: You are quoting me inaccurately.

Mr. Sharp: I am sorry. All right, I will not.

The Chairman: Perhaps we had better restrict ourselves to the question.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): It is certainly true that these gentlemen did not agree with the report; in fact they were shocked, to use their words. Now, I do not see that they have any right to be shocked or even to pass judgment on its first of all, because they were talking about a different situation. They were talking

about one side of the line whereas the other fellows were talking about the other side of the line. But this is the whole point; we keep getting one side or the other side. I would like to see this Committee get both sides at once from someone who has seen both sides at once.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Sharp: Perhaps I could add that I am quite sure from my conversations with the Foreign Minister of Nigeria that he would welcome a visit from Canadian members of Parliament into the Nigerian areas including our two friends who have already been into Biafra.

The Chairman: I think this would be a terrific idea.

• 2055

An hon. Member: Who is going to go?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make an observation before I sit back. Many of us have hesitated to mention this perhaps, but very often things look differently depending on whose window one is looking out of. I would like to remind the honourable members of this Committee that although it is not very likely, it might be well to think of an analogy which could exist in our own country when perhaps one group of this country may wish to go away from the rest of the country. Would we want this to be brought up to the United Nations and would we want some other country—not to mention any in particular—to come and interfere in our affairs? I think it would be well to bear this in mind.

The Chairman: The next questioner is Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Minister would agree that the only way we can bring relief to the different regions of Nigeria is through international and charitable organizations at this time? Is it not also a fact that these organizations cannot force their will upon the people they want to aid, neither the Nigerian Government nor even the rebel government? If this is so will you not agree that the position of Canada would have been quite difficult if we had followed the advice of some of our colleagues here and tried to force the presence of Canadian planes over the Nigerian territory? If we really want to help we have to be honest. I think that unless we do it the way we have done it, we could cause quite a bit of prejudice and even

compromise the position of these international organizations.

Mr. Sharp: I entirely agree with what you have said, Mr. Laniel; not only is this so but we would have compromised our own position. I believe that we have operated in the right way in seeking the full co-operation of the Federal Military Government in our relief operations; otherwise we would not be in a position to be able to help as we are today. Indeed, I doubt very much if we had defied the Nigerian authorities, if we had taken the advice that was offered to us so freely to put in military planes, Canadian Air Force planes—not even under Red Cross control but just Canadian Air Force planes—to force our way through. I think the results would have been disastrous. In the first place there would have been no relief at all going from Canada to Nigeria, we would have so messed our copy book.

Second, our possibilities for influencing for good events in that great continent would have been reduced to zero.

Mr. Laniel: We spoke of relief; let us come to the way we could help besides the giving of food and medical aid. If I heard you correctly, the Red Cross at one time made a specific request for one *Hercules* aircraft. Is that right?

Mr. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: Did they at any time make a general request for all of their needs?

• 2100

Mr. Sharp: My memory is not quite clear on the actual sequence of events. They made it quite clear to us that they could use *Hercules* aircraft. Of course, as I reminded the Committee, we did make a *Hercules* aircraft available—a Canadian government one, a Canadian Air Force plane—to fly supplies on an agreed corridor. The ICRC had thought they had agreed between Lagos and the rebels. That broke down. Then the Red Cross said to us that they would like to have a *Hercules*. They did not have, as I am sure General Winch told you, very much by way of resources to hire planes. Therefore it was quite clear that if a *Hercules* was to be made available it had to be provided by the Government with its crew, because not only would it have been too expensive for the Red Cross but even if we had supplied the plane they could not have manned it. They had indeed been looking around for crews to sup-

plement the Swedish *Hercules* because it had inadequate crews.

Mr. Laniel: Excuse me, sir, but when you speak of the Swedish *Hercules* you are not speaking of a *Hercules* supplied by the Swedish Government.

Mr. Sharp: No, it is supplied by the Red Cross but the Swedish Government made that plane available to the Swedish Red Cross. This is quite clear, I have no doubt about this at all. But the position that Canada had in relation to this was really quite different. What we wanted to do was to make a *Hercules* available which could fly all the time, which had adequate crews, which would be manned not as in the case of the Swedish one, partly by Canadian and partly by Swedish crews, but one entirely Canadian crew because we could not get any crew anywhere else for it and the Red Cross could not get it anywhere else. So our arrangements had to be very specific that the FMG would not object if a Canadian service *Hercules*, manned with Canadian servicemen, were put at the disposal of the Red Cross to fly food into the rebel areas. That was the proposition. And for quite some time, as is quite clear, there was a great reluctance on the part of the Nigerian authorities to agree to that proposition. But they have, and I think we should all concern ourselves now with seeing that that plane is used to the maximum by seeing that it has lots of food to carry in, and that requires not only government assistance but I think the support of all the voluntary organizations.

Mr. Laniel: Now that we have given food aid and supplied an aircraft I hope that technicalities will not stand in our way in bringing aid and relief to the people over there.

There is one other question, the question of genocide. Can we stop genocide in any way other than by having observers over there to control the situation and by keeping friends with the Nigerian Government to try and see to it that they continue to follow their present policy of trying to prevent abuses of war as much as possible.

Mr. Sharp: Well, Mr. Laniel, I am sure that many members of this Committee who are familiar with the Charter of the United Nations and of the other declarations of the United Nations would agree that there are circumstances in which the international community would be justified in intervening in the internal affairs of a country because it was practising genocide. There is no doubt

about this at all. And I, for one, if I were the Minister of External Affairs, would advise the Canadian Government if there was clear evidence of genocide to support any motion or resolution in the United Nations to bring that matter before that body. But in this case there is, so far as we have seen as yet, no evidence of genocide. We had the testimony, I gather, from the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, who said he saw no evidence of genocide. We have the evidence of the observers who so far have not seen evidence of genocide. We do have a great fear of genocide—a great fear, and there have been many atrocities. This is quite clear. But atrocities and genocide are two different matters and we have not yet seen any evidence, that I have seen at any rate, which would justify Canada in going to the United Nations and saying that we bring a charge of genocide against the Government.

• 2105

Mr. Laniel: My next question concerns the participation of the Biafran people in all this, and how much they were following their leaders from the beginning. You gave a partial answer to my question a minute ago by saying that there were important people among the Biafrans that would not go along or did not go along with secession. Even though it might be a big percentage, is this an indication that a proportion of the population of Biafra would prefer a settlement within Nigeria itself? I will carry it further than that. You might not be able to answer that question, but would you feel that even among those people who consider themselves the Government of Biafra there are some that would prefer, if possible, a peaceful settlement within the Nigerian Federation.

Mr. Sharp: I am not in a position to answer that question with any great conviction. What I do know is that there are influential members of the Ibo community who are trying to bring about a settlement on the basis of the federal state. I would not know for whom they speak. I am sure that if it had not been for a fairly strong support for secession the operation would have been carried as far as it has been carried. But I do not think it would be appropriate for me to express a view as to what is the right settlement in Nigeria, and indeed this is one of reasons I do not want to participate in an operation in the United Nations which would raise those questions. We are a people who believe in determining our destiny and it would take very serious

charges of genocide or something like that to justify intervention. So I am trying, as Minister for External Affairs, and I am sure I speak for most Canadians, to avoid intervening in the internal affairs of Nigeria. This is a question for the people of Nigeria to settle, not for the people of Canada to settle.

Mr. Laniel: Sir, when we speak of Biafra you keep on referring to Ibos and there are minorities within that territory. Out of the 12 million, were there not maybe 4 million that were other than Ibos? They are a minority and they have a right. I think I will conclude by saying that we have minorities in Canada and these minorities within the minority areas are also very important.

Mr. Sharp: Yes, I agree. I was using Ibos not because that was synonymous with the rebels, but it was they who were charging genocide.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos, you are next.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Minister, I would like to strike out in a slightly different direction. When we first started our investigations I think we were concerned with the matter of bringing immediate relief to the starvation situation that existed in Biafra, in particular, but in parts of Nigeria, and now that we have seen our way to providing *Hercules* aircraft we seem to be skipping pretty lightly over this and perhaps proceeding merrily on our way without taking into account the real facts of the situation. As I see it, we have been bombarded with figures from various witnesses. Two or three witnesses have said that, roughly speaking, 200 tons a day are required now; Dr. Middelkoop says that we need 500 tons a day, the two members who visited that area came to the conclusion that five times the 150 to 200 tons which is arriving now is needed to halt the starvation in Biafra—that is 1,000 tons a day. Later on, I think it was Dr. Middelkoop again—said that by December we are going to need 3,000 tons of food a day in Biafra alone to stop the starvation. Now it is pretty obvious to me that in sending two *Hercules* to lend a hand over there these two *Hercules* are not going to be able, no matter what the airfield conditions are, to supply even the 500 tons that seems to be the minimum that Dr. Middelkoop thinks is required now, let alone the 1,000 or the 3,000 that we are going to need in two months' time. It is perfectly obvious to me that we are going to need road communications into that area and we are going to have to supply large dumps of food

in the vicinity of the Biafran state to be taken in quickly. To give some idea of the immensity of this problem that ship that is leaving Halifax this month is going to carry in it, I understand, some 3,600 or 3,700 tons of food, which is enough for one day. I would like to have some information and, I hope, assurance from you, since we are not directly represented in Biafra but the various missionary groups there are, that these missionary groups are co-operating amongst themselves and with the ICRC so that they are informing the governments who are standing behind these relief arrangements in sufficient time so that the governments are not embarrassed when it comes to December which, after all, is only two months away. We must be planning now to meet that emergency situation. This is, I feel, still within the bounds of our terms of reference and I wondered if you could give me some idea, Mr. Minister, about the liaison that does exist between these missionary groups and the liaison that exists between the governments and whoever speaks for them.

• 2110

Mr. Sharp: Well, I cannot speak with any great authority on this, Mr. Groos. It is my understanding that within the rebel-held territory the relief is being distributed by various charitable organizations. The church and the Red Cross and so on are doing the best they can in what must admittedly be very, very difficult circumstances. In the area controlled from Lagos the Red Cross is working with the military in trying to get supplies forward. Sometimes there are difficulties, as has been reported in the House and, as many of us know, there have been times when military commanders—as is, I suppose, natural—put military considerations ahead of humanitarian, and I think that in both areas probably the means of getting relief to the population could be improved.

This is one of the reasons, when we got the agreement to put in one of our planes to help in moving supplies within the Federal Military territory, that I felt that even if Canada never got involved in the question of taking supplies into the rebel areas, we had enough on our hands. There are tremendous needs. Labouisse told me when I was in New York that there are areas behind the Federal lines where the supplies of food are very short too, and he said there is lots to be done there. And to the extent that our planes could have helped in moving food forward to meet those needs, it would be a very great contribution

by Canada to the needs of the Nigerian people.

• 2115

It is better to be able to move anywhere, and I do not think this Committee should have the idea that because we have not until recently got the permission to move it into the rebel territories that somehow we have not been doing anything. This is quite absurd. But it is better to be able to operate in all the areas.

As I said earlier, Mr. Groos, I think we all should be thinking—and this includes governments all around the world—about the kind of situation that we may face this coming winter which I am told by the people that I rely on is going to be very difficult indeed, and the kind of relief operations that may be necessary will dwarf those that are now being carried on. And let us hope that the war is over by that time so at least we can move without interference from military operations.

Mr. Groos: I think it is something that we just cannot do alone. We seem to be in a remarkably good position vis-a-vis the Nigerians to be able to get results, and I just hope that by the time December comes we will be in the right posture to be able to supply the needs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Alexander?

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Minister, I notice you made a comment about the headlines of the article that was given by Mr. Robert MacDonald in *The Telegram* and it disturbed me because of what you said, sir. And just to refresh your memory as stated here, it says,

Abdul Razag, assistant head of the Nigerian mission to the United Nations, said Canada had not suggested using Hercules aircraft for mercy flights into Biafra until last Sunday.

Then, sir, you stated that our diplomats had indicated that the Nigerians had disclaimed saying anything of the sort. This would lead one to believe that perhaps there is extremely irresponsible reporting on the part of this particular newspaper.

Mr. Sharp: You say that; I am not saying it, sir.

Mr. Alexander: Well, would you entertain the thought, sir?

Mr. Sharp: Under prompting from you, yes.

Mr. Alexander: Well, now let us just cull this through, Mr. Minister. When was the suggestion first made to the Military Government about the use of *Hercules*?

Mr. Sharp: Well, Mr. Alexander, there has been a continuous process going on for quite some time in this whole area. We have been striving to find some way agreeable to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria by which we could be more effective in supplying relief, so this is a process that has been going on for a very long time. As I told you, about three weeks ago when I was talking with General Wrinch it did not then seem possible to put this particular arrangement into effect. I do not know what happened in New York; I am simply giving the denial that was given by the Nigerian Authority. But what we are talking about is not some general rule. What we are talking about in the Canadian case is the supplying of a Canadian service aircraft turned over to the Red Cross with its crew and the question was, would that plane be able to operate flying supplies into rebel territory? We never did get, until a few days ago, the kind of assurance which would enable us to fly that plane knowing it was being flown with the complete approval of the Federal Military Government.

Now, that is the situation. I do not want to get into any controversy with officials of the Nigerian Government. They want the food and we want to supply it, and I think we should concentrate our efforts on getting that food in and not really trying to—what shall I say—create a controversy about some dates which might interfere with the response of the Canadian people to the opportunity they now have.

• 2120

This is my own feeling about it and I am very happy to say that I do not have to deny anything that the Nigerian Authorities apparently said in that article. They have denied it and I think that will help to create the right atmosphere.

Mr. Alexander: I see, sir, but you know, the unfortunate thing about the article is that the charge has been made and I think the government must face this charge. Perhaps you did answer my question but I was just wondering when, in fact, did you make a representation to the military government that *Hercules* could be used through the Red Cross?

Mr. Sharp: We have been doing this for a very long time.

Mr. Alexander: When was the time first did you mention that?

Mr. Sharp: The first case was when we supplied the *Herclues*.

Mr. Alexander: And when was that, sir?

Mr. Sharp: Early September; it flew to Lagos, and it was there. That was the first. We have never hesitated. Any suggestion that we have been reluctant is most absurd. We sent the plane there. It could not fly because the Biafran authorities refused the air corridor at the time.

Mr. Alexander: Yes; but are you not talking, sir, about the aircraft that would be used flying directly to Nigeria? I think that you could accept this question. I am talking about the date of the *Hercules* that would be for use in Biafra.

Mr. Sharp: There is only one date that I can be very clear about, if there is any point to this—and I am not quite sure what the point is.

Mr. Alexander: We are here just to elucidate the facts, sir. I think it is important, particularly when we read of this charge that Canada could have sent planes into Biafra a month ago.

Mr. Sharp: But this has been denied.

Mr. Alexander: What I am trying to ascertain, sir, is when our government indicated that planes could be sent for use in alleviating the suffering in Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: The first one; we offered the plane to the Red Cross for this purpose in connection with the ICRC agreement with the FMG on September 3. That was the first time. That proved to be abortive. The plane could not go through.

From then on we have tried to find out how we could do this in a way that was agreeable to the FMG. I read you the position that they originally took about airlifts that were...

Mr. Alexander: Yes; that were flying over...

Mr. Sharp: Yes; that were flying without express permission. Therefore, when I had my discussions with General Wrinch we were not in a position to have sufficient assurance about this. That is really the only answer I can give you. We have been trying consistently to work out an arrangement acceptable to the FMG that would fly supplies in. That has been our constant purpose. We have never had any reluctance about it, but we wanted to

do it in such a way that it would be effective; and I hope that the agreement that we reached the other day will result in an effective arrangement. But, you know—and we should have no doubt about this—this is a most extraordinary thing that is being done—the Federal Military Government of Nigeria permitting a Canadian aircrew and Canadian service plane to fly for the Red Cross and carry food to rebels. This is an extraordinary thing.

Mr. Alexander: I will move on, and perhaps I can conclude now by saying that your initial statement—and I think we believe it—that there is great friendship between our countries, is apparently being denied as of October 10, by the statement that has been made by the Nigerian authorities which seems to be in direct conflict.

Mr. Sharp: About what?

Mr. Alexander: Well, I think that the statement that has been made now is certainly attempting to...

Mr. Prud'homme: It is being denied.

Mr. Alexander: Yes; that is true enough. It certainly is attempting to embarrass our government, if I read it correctly. But anyway...

Mr. Sharp: We will see what the denials are. They say they are going to issue the denials.

• 2125

The Chairman: Have you any further questions, Mr. Alexander?

Mr. Alexander: Yes, I have, Mr. Chairman, and I hope the Chair will bear with me. I would just like to read something, sir. I have the statement from...

The Chairman: Is it a question, Mr. Alexander? I realize that a wide latitude should be allowed but it is getting late. I take it there are others who still wish to ask questions. Perhaps we should have questions rather than comments or charges. This would be helpful.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I have followed your conversation.

Mr. Sharp, it appears to me, at this particular time in world events, that the question of leadership now comes into force in terms of humanitarian interest. I notice you have read the statement by the officials of Haiti, Netherlands, El Salvador and Norway, and it seems to me that there is a suggestion—and I think that many millions of people are follow-

ing the suggestion—that Canada should give leadership, regardless of political implications or diplomatic repercussions, when faced with the fact that millions of people are starving. My honorable colleague across the way has indicated that this is a very grave situation. He has indicated this most emphatically.

My question is: Do you not consider that this is the time—this is the year—that Canada should take the leadership before the United Nations with respect to the humanitarian aspect of a conflict which neither of the two states can solve themselves?

Mr. Sharp: Yes; and I think we have given the kind of leadership that is most effective, and that is on the humanitarian question.

We took the advice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose advice we asked, and he said the best way to give leadership was to support the international relief agencies. That was his advice. I think it is the advice that we ought to follow. That is the kind of leadership that I hope we will continue to show, both as a country and as a people.

Mr. Alexander: Well, Mr. Chairman, I was just hoping that perhaps Canada, after assessing the many cries that come from throughout the entire world...

Mr. Gibson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that we get on with the questions and not have comments.

The Chairman: I must ask you, Mr. Alexander, to ask questions and not make comments.

Mr. Alexander: All right, Mr. Chairman. I will conclude by stating that I was hoping that perhaps this government would give leadership on the humanitarian aspect of this entire crisis.

Mr. Sharp: Of course, Mr. Chairman, I do not expect that the opposition would want to say that the Canadian Government had given leadership, but perhaps I might be permitted to say that I do not think that any country has outdone us in our efforts to provide humanitarian relief to the people of Nigeria. However, I do not expect that Mr. Alexander will echo that.

Mr. Alexander: I will not go any further, Mr. Chairman. I just wish to thank Mr. Sharp for his answers, which I appreciate.

The Chairman: The following members still wish to ask questions: Mr. MacDonald, followed by Mr. Thompson, Mr. Mongrain, Mr.

Gibson—I had Mr. Smith on the list but he is not here—Mr. Anderson and Mr. Roberts.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Sharp, perhaps I should apologize—you have been hearing enough from me over the past day or so—but there were two or three points that arose out of your comments to the Committee this afternoon that I would like to examine with you.

Mr. Sharp: Wait until I get my copy and I will remind myself of what I have said.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Perhaps there is another copy around. It was reproduced. Here it is.

Mr. Sharp: Thank you.

• 2130

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): On page 3 you mention in the second paragraph, referring to the developments that have taken place, I think, particularly in the last couple of years, that:

the Canadian Government has been constantly in touch and sought to influence

When you say that the government has been constantly in touch with the developments over the past few years, could you be specific about what you mean by “in touch”?

Mr. Sharp: Through our mission in Lagos.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Our mission in Lagos?

Mr. Sharp: That is right.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Has there been any attempt by our government or by the Department of External Affairs to directly ascertain the situation as it prevailed inside what was formerly known as eastern Nigeria and then, as of May 30, 1967, became known as Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: Needless to say, the Canadian government can have no relations with the Biafran authorities; otherwise we would soon lose our contact with Lagos. They would refuse to deal with us if we dealt with a rebel government. However, I have had the advantage of many descriptions about what is going on from people whose sincerity I do not question, including these two honourable members. I hope they do not think that I have anything except the highest respect for them or that I think they have acted in any way except what they felt was right and according to their conscience. I may disagree with their prescription, but I understand that they were really concerned about what they saw. I have

also had the advantage of many conversations with Dr. Johnson, who has taken a special interest in this. I have had newspaper and television men come in and spend an hour or two with me, not for the purpose of trying to influence me but only to tell me what they saw. So that I do not know that I am as well informed as all Canadians in this, but at least I get as much advice as anyone else. However, it would be quite impossible for us to deal with the rebel authorities, so I cannot say that we have ever made any official contact.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Is it not true that from time to time during the last year and a half there has been—I realize I am asking questions before your time of jurisdiction in the Department of External Affairs, but I believe your officials might advise you on this—contact by people who claim to be, and appear to be at least, accredited representatives of the secessionist regime, the Biafran regime, who I think at one point were unable to contact the Department of External Affairs but perhaps in the latter period were able to make some contact?

Mr. Sharp: I think my officials are in the same position as I am. I would never admit it if it had happened. It would all have to be done through third parties to avoid any charges that we were dealing with rebel authorities.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): There seemed to be some confusion in the House during March when I raised this same question with the then Prime Minister about whether or not officials of the Department of External Affairs would be permitted to meet with the representatives of the Biafran regime, and I think at one point it was indicated by him that there would be nothing to stop our officials from meeting with these representatives. I just wanted to clear up whether such meetings had been taking place or whether they...

Mr. Sharp: There were private meetings. I suppose that is all right. It is rather like Mr. Rossillon. Was he here in a private capacity or was he here as an official of the French government? This is the problem that arises.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): The main assumption we might draw from this, at least, is that this “constantly in touch with the situation” would be almost 100 per cent communication to and from Lagos; our representative there and the government in Lagos. Is that correct?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, that is right. We can only influence the government of Nigeria. That is our contact and Nigeria is a member of the United Nations.

• 2135

Mr. MacDonald: Right.

Mr. Sharp: We have watched what Colonel Ojukwu has said, and he has made representations to us which we have not been in any position to reply to. We have also made public declarations which we hope that the rebel authorities have read. Then we have Arnold Smith, who does not represent any government.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): In the next paragraph, in reciting a brief history of what transpired from January of 1966, you mentioned the fact that this resulted in the installation of a military government dominated by the Ibo. Are you implying by that that the previous government, the one that had been democratically elected, was a government that contained no large element of Ibos?

Mr. Sharp: No. I was trying to keep out of controversy when I wrote that paragraph. I was trying to give the Committee some description of the backward and forward business. That this is a situation of great confusion and great bitterness, and I was merely trying to illustrate that it is not just the events of yesterday you have to look back to, you can go back two years and you can go back farther than that. I was not attempting to lay any responsibility, or anything like that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But you did recite a history and the history is interesting in that it seems to include certain things and omit others, and this is what interests me from the standpoint of your own recounting of facts. For instance, on page four, the second paragraph, you refer again to the Ibo military leadership and the riots and the Ibos returning. The Ibo is the only group you refer to. You made no mention of the other groups that are involved. Is there any reason, for instance, why the Hausas were not mentioned? In all the reading I have done it has usually included some reference to the involvement of the Hausas in all this, or the Yorubas.

Mr. Sharp: The only reason that it was written this way was really because of the concentration of attention upon the problem of the Ibos. This is where the genocide is being alleged, and so on, and we thought it was interesting to the Committee to have some indication of this sort of movement. It

was not selected for any purpose other than to illustrate the nature of the problem.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But when you suggest that genocide has been occurring to one race of people, are you not bound to finish the story by perhaps indicating where it has come from?

Mr. Sharp: I do not think there is any genocide. I disagree.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You do suggest, though, that there was—I think you use the word “massacre” yourself.

Mr. Sharp: Massacre, yes. That is a different thing from genocide.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Riots leading to massacres. You mention that the object of the attack was the Ibos but you do not indicate the motivating force for these attacks. It is a rather incomplete document from that point of view, I would say.

Mr. Sharp: I would be quite happy to have it supplemented. I have no pride of authorship. It was not intended to be biased in any way, I can assure you.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Going on further on page 6, you mention in the second paragraph:

Our concern with the human element has been continuous but has naturally grown in intensity since the Biafran area was cut off from the sea.

When was that?

Mr. Sharp: That was in the summer, about July. This was the capture of Port Harcourt, which had been one of the main ports.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Was it not true that the actual blockading of Biafra occurred not this summer but at the very outbreak of hostilities a year from this past summer when, in fact, Port Harcourt was rendered useless by a blockade?

Mr. Sharp: I am not quite sure. Do you mean a military blockade intended to prevent arms getting in, and things like that?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I mean a blockade that really prevented anything from getting into Biafra.

Mr. Sharp: I believe there was a blockade by sea.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But you are talking about the sea and that is why I am referring to it.

Mr. Sharp: Yes. That was when it grew in intensity.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But the sea blockade did not occur this past July, it occurred a year ago, 14 months ago. Is that not correct?

Mr. Sharp: Yes. Port Harcourt was a port all right and it is true there was a blockade there before, but it was also a very big airport and even though there was a sea blockade the Biafran did get supplies in by air through Port Harcourt.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): All I am saying is that in the previous line you say, and I will read it again:

Our concern with the human element has been continuous but has naturally grown in intensity since the Biafran area was cut off from the sea.

Mr. Sharp: Yes. Actually in the text that I have—I do not know whether the correction got in—it would have been a little clearer if we had left in the words “by the capture of Port Harcourt early in July”. The words were taken out but perhaps it would have been a little clearer.

Mr. MacDonald: I think the impression is being conveyed here that somehow or other the real blockade of Biafra only began two months ago, it actually began 14 months ago, and the situation that we are facing today did not begin a couple of months ago but well over a year ago and this is really coming to the peak now in terms of the effect of the blockade.

The Chairman: Order, please. I think perhaps we should have the questions directed to the witness.

Mr. Sharp: I would just say to Mr. MacDonald that there was not a particularly selective intent here. We were trying to put down a few words that would give the Committee, which might not know as much as the hon. member does about this—I am sure he studied the problem—some idea of the background against which we are facing this problem and it certainly was not my intention to bias the account in any way. The last thing I want to do is to get mixed up in the politics of Nigeria.

Mr. MacDonald: If I can change the subject, Mr. Sharp, I think, as has been mentioned on many occasions here, all of us are exceedingly pleased, particularly Mr. Brewin and myself, that developments have come. I

do not feel particularly strong one way or another when the developments really occur but the fact of the matter is that if *Hercules* aircraft are going to be made available and are going to be able to accelerate and expand this relief program then I think we all will feel this is a tremendous step forward, and certainly we applaud your efforts—and we know they have been considerable—to engage this program and to see that it will be successful.

Mr. Sharp: Well, I would just like to echo your last words, I hope there is nothing that happens to interfere with this. This is a very, very difficult situation and one that we are watching with the greatest of concern because there have been so many occasions in the past when we thought that some arrangements had been made that would work well only to discover that something happened. We are all keeping our fingers crossed, hoping that these arrangements work out well and that we can get as much food as possible in.

Mr. MacDonald: I come now to what might perhaps be considered a question or a word of caution or both, because it is my own fear that because of the particular perspective that our Government has this in fact may prove to be the case. I am wondering, for instance, what knowledge we have or what arrangements have been made to ensure that the operation of our *Hercules* aircraft will be acceptable to the government or the authorities in Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: We are concerned about this and that is why I have emphasized to the Committee so many times that this is an extraordinary operation. It is not just like a private Red Cross operation which goes out into the market and buys a little plane, picks up a crew some place and flies it. That is not what this is. This is an extraordinary arrangement and one that I hope works. But we must think of how extraordinary it is that the two authorities should permit the Red Cross to be using the service aircraft of a government with a crew aboard and all these facilities in an operation to move food. Now I believe that it is justified from a humanitarian point of view and I just pray that it works well. But let us have no doubt about it, it is an extraordinary thing and I hope that the arrangements work out well and that they are acceptable on all sides.

Mr. MacDonald: What I am really asking is whether or not we have made an attempt

directly or indirectly to make sure that our arrangements are going to be acceptable.

Mr. Sharp: It is the Red Cross that has to do that.

Mr. MacDonald: To the best of your knowledge, do you know whether or not the Nigerian Government will be seeking any kind of permission to include its own authorities aboard these flights, or will it in any way be involved in the operation of these flights?

Mr. Sharp: As far as I know, nothing like that is involved. They have simply told us that if those are put under the Red Cross they are satisfied to have them.

Mr. MacDonald: Mr. Chairman, I have another question but I think, in fairness to the other members, I will pass in the hope that I will have another opportunity—not this evening but perhaps at a later time.

Mr. Sharp: Well, Mr. Chairman, while I am willing to appear before the Committee I have matters other than Biafra to attend to.

• 2145

The Chairman: This raises the question as to how long we can continue tonight. Mr. MacDonald has indicated that he has not really completed his questions, and then we have Mr. Mongrain, Mr. Gibson, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Roberts. Can we go on till 10.30? Would it be possible for you to stay, sir?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, if I thought that we could get through tonight I would prefer that. I would just say to the Committee that I have a number of distinguished visitors arriving from now on. They all want to see the new Government and the Minister of External Affairs has to be on hand. Some of them are of very great importance. I would just say to the Committee that I hope I could get through this part of the proceedings at any rate and that I would not be expected to appear in the near future.

The Chairman: Mr. MacDonald, how many more questions do you have?

Mr. MacDonald: I have, in my opinion, one very important question. In view of the considerable amount of emphasis the Minister has placed on the fact that it has been necessary to go through a considerable amount of discussions and arrangements in order to clear these flights and in view of the fact that he has been concerned that we might in some way be offending the Military Government of Nigeria, I am wondering if he could indicate whether or not the Government of Nigeria

has taken any action, internationally, to censure the government of France or Gabon for their alleged involvement in supplying military equipment to the secessionists or to Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: Perhaps the best advice I can give the Committee is to watch for the Nigerian speech before the General Assembly.

Mr. MacDonald: But there have been other opportunities for the Government of Nigeria to break off diplomatic relations presumably, to issue statements censuring the government, or to take such action as imposing trade embargoes and so on. To your knowledge, have any of these measures or others been taken?

Mr. Sharp: They have issued statements, of course, but I do not know that they have gone so far as to break relations. I have not heard of any threats of that kind. You may recall because I think you were in New York at the time, that after the French Foreign Minister spoke Nigeria put down its name to exercise the right of reply, withdrew it because I understand they thought they had better cover the point in their own presentation.

Mr. MacDonald: Thank you. I pass.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Mongrain: Mr. Chairman, I would save this Committee...

[English]

The Chairman: I am sorry, Mr. Mongrain. You are after Mr. Thompson. Excuse me, I overlooked Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson: I will try to be very short. Mr. Chairman. First of all I would like to say that I believe that we are all very grateful to Mr. Sharp for the decisions that have been taken and for the fact that transportation facilities are being provided by way of *Hercules* aircraft and crew to transport food and relief supplies to the suffering in Biafra. This actually was the basic purpose in this Committee coming together and I think, regardless of how and the timing of it coming about, that we should be very sure that we underscore that fact because it is basically on the humanitarian side that our concern and our intent were focussed in these meetings.

• 2150

I only wish that we in Canada, we in this Committee, we in Parliament, our Department of External Affairs and Government were just as concerned about the hundreds of thousands who are dying in Tibet and else-

where. We certainly should equally reach out to the starving, the dying, and suffering hundreds of thousands in other parts of the world. Having said that and having in mind the testimony of General Wrinch, which I think was very significant, I hope that the Government will see fit, if the possibility is there, not to just send one or two but three or four aircraft, if these arrangements work out, because General Wrinch himself said in his testimony that he thought that four aircraft could be used even at the present time, as it related to the tremendous need and also the backlog of food that already is in depots ready to be transhipped. I think any other discussion is really redundant, although it may have some political overtones of whether or not the government acted as quickly as it might have in coming to this decision.

I believe that the journey of our two colleagues to Biafra, the coming together of this Committee and the efforts at the UN have all intertwined to produce the result that we really want. However, it troubled me a bit as I read General Wrinch's testimony to learn that on the 12th of July when he, along with other voluntary agencies, put the need up before the Minister that he did not get a reply until the 30th or 31st of August. Then it was October 1st before there was any specific indication that this action was going to be taken. I do not think that questions in this regard are really necessary at this point. However, I might just ask one or two questions relating to it.

Mr. Sharp, in your opinion, would the humanitarian efforts in Nigeria be facilitated through the recognition of the ICRC, if it were to become an official agency of the UN, for this emergency or maybe for other emergencies.

Mr. Sharp: It was partly for this reason that I raised the question in my speech before the General Assembly. I think that it would be useful if there were some agreed procedures which had been approved by the United Nations—rather like the Geneva rules in war, something of this kind—that would relate to the provision of relief supplies for innocent civilians. Whether the agency should be the International Committee of the Red Cross I am not in a position to know, but if some agency, and perhaps the International Red Cross, could be designated in advance as the agency that would be responsible it might help us to deal with similar situations in the future more expeditiously. I think this is really what you are driving at too.

Mr. Thompson: Will our aircrew and our service personnel auxiliary thereto wear military uniforms or will they be dressed in Red Cross uniforms?

Mr. Sharp: I cannot answer that question too clearly yet. Would it be a good thought to entertain the latter suggestion? At least they will have Red Cross armbands, but whether they will wear other uniforms I am not absolutely certain yet.

Mr. Thompson: General Wrinch in his testimony inferred that both the Nigerian authorities and the Biafran authorities had given their consent months ago to the service of the Red Cross, and I think what the Red Cross has done has been indicative of that. Was this known to the government back in July, shall we say, when the Canadian Red Cross and other agencies conferred with you?

Mr. Sharp: You are asking a number of different questions. We knew that the Red Cross was operating in both federal and in rebel territory. What was not clear was the conditions under which relief could be moved into rebel territory. The military authorities in Nigeria said they were willing to have food moved through federal territory into the rebel territory. They also tried to work out an air corridor for this purpose, but neither was acceptable to the rebels. In that operation the Red Cross would have been used. When you come to other types of operations you get into a more difficult area. That is, whether the flights that were being made were simply tolerated or whether they were approved. It was a very difficult and very shadowy area. That is why I was delighted that it has finally been clarified.

• 2155

Mr. Thompson: One more question, Mr. Chairman. In your discussions with the Nigerian authorities, both directly and through our mission in Lagos, have you received adequate assurances to your satisfaction that the Federal government of Nigeria will extend amnesty to the Biafrans? Our reports have said that many of the common people are coming out of the bush. None of the educated or leadership-type people are. Military reports say that it is only a matter of time until formal collapse of the Biafran operations. Just what is the official attitude of the Nigerian government, particularly as we hear the word "genocide" bandied about.

Mr. Sharp: I have been advised that the Federal Military Government has offered am-

nesty, with the possible exception of Colonel Ojukwu. Secondly, they have offered that the police in the eastern province would be staffed by Ibos. Thirdly, that there would be foreign observers during a transition period and, fourthly a mixed commission to run the "Biafran area" pending constitutional government. I understand that this is the sort of general offer that has been made. So, it does include amnesty I think but there has always been a little bit of uncertainty as to whether that would extend as far as the rebel leadership.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson: No, I do not.

The Chairman: Mr. Mongrain.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Mongrain: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask several questions but I am going to delete them because I believe that after having studied the report of all these meetings and after hearing what has been said in the last two meetings, everything has been said. We are just repeating the same things and asking the same questions under other names. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are too serious to carry on such futile exercises.

• 2200

I believe that the statement by the Minister this afternoon is objective, detailed, unbiased, and it should satisfy, I guess, all those who want to take stock in that matter between Nigeria and Biafra. But I am wondering what we are doing here, and how we can advise the Minister, blame him for not having done this or that now that he has given such a good report. He can rely on a good staff, on experts in the field of foreign affairs. He also enjoys the advice of all our high commissioners and officials in all the foreign countries. He is in contact with officials of the foreign affairs departments of all our friendly countries. He is also counseled by Mr. U Thant who can not be accused of favoritism. I believe that we are wasting our time, we are wasting the time of the Minister and his staff who could better follow the situation from his office and find some solutions. The Minister will then report on the situation. If we are not satisfied, we will then ask questions. But now he is the only one to be competent and to have competent people around himself. I believe that what we are doing here is a waste of time. We are repeating the same questions and

meaningless questions. I do not want to under-rate the importance of our two colleagues, Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald. They are people I admire, but I would insult them if I would believe that they would consider them as experts in that matter because they only spent two days in Nigeria and Biafra. I imagine they have slept some time. Now they come back and a good number of journalists try to make us believe they are experts when we have people who have spent all their life studying international politics.

The Chairman: I do not wish to interrupt, but the purpose of this is to ask questions of the Minister.

Mr. Mongrain: I was supposed to ask questions but, Mr. Chairman, I realize that we are losing so much time that it is time we came to some conclusions. If I had a seconder I would move that we finish this discussion on Biafra, at least for a week, until there are new developments.

Mr. Alexander: On a point of order . . .

The Chairman: I wonder if we need trouble ourselves with points of order, Mr. Alexander. Mr. Gibson, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Roberts wish to ask questions.

Mr. Gibson: I just have one short question. Mr. Sharp, is it possible for Canada to check directly on the fair distribution of the supplies after they have been put on the planes and shipped to Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: We have to depend essentially on the Red Cross. That is a short answer.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Sharp, I would like to preface my question by saying that this civil war has given one example of something that is unique and that is a nation which is allowing observers and which is allowing overflights into rebel territory, which I do not think has happened before in history. It certainly did not happen in the US Civil War as far as I know.

An hon. Member: Even by ship.

Mr. Anderson: Even by ship. More recent examples would be China, in particular. There are other cases of civil war where there has been no contact with the rebels. In this case despite very sensitive feelings on the part of the Nigerians, they have allowed us to fly things in, they have allowed others to do the same, and they have allowed observers to go on the spot. I say this because I think we

should appreciate that the Nigerians have gone farther than any other nation that I know of engaged in a civil war to make some attempt to satisfy world opinion. But world opinion is not satisfied, so I would ask you, sir, whether you intend to request an increase in the number of observers now in Biafra, Nigeria, from the Nigerian authorities: in other words, people who support General Milroy. That would be the first thing, and also whether you would consider suggesting, perhaps the United Nations, perhaps the Organization of African Unity, to have some representative in Biafra so that negotiations between the two sides would perhaps be expedited. As far as I know there is no diplomatic representative there who could deliver any message. I think it is important that someone who could do that should be there.

Mr. Sharp: Thank you very much, Mr. Anderson. As far as representation of the rebel authorities is concerned they have, as you know, been able to attend the OAU meetings or at least the efforts that were made by the Emperor to try to bring the war to an end. And there the two parties faced one another—they were there together. I am not certain whether in the OAU there was any effort made to hear the . .

Mr. Gordon Riddell (Head of the African Middle East Division): As a consultative group.

Mr. Sharp: Yes, they set up a consultative group which did deal with both sides. We have also had, of course, the example of the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth who actually went in and negotiated with both sides. This is one of the points about that kind of an intermediary. He is not representing a government; he is much freer. It does not mean that he is unacceptable in Nigeria if he goes into the Biafran area. He can act as an intermediary. Similarly in the OAU if they set up a group to try to bring the war together they can hear the representatives. It is a case of the Biafran authorities, not having had an opportunity of stating their case before those who might act effectively. It is quite another matter, as you recognize, however, to bring an area before the United Nations, which is a body composed of member states represented by their government, unless there are some charges of the breaking of human rights.

Mr. Anderson: I always thought they had a representative of Biafra at the United Nations, but rather they have a representative of the United Nations in Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, well, as I understand it many agencies of the United Nations have gone into Biafra, particularly the relief organizations, those that are associated with the United Nations. The UNICEF have had people in there and so on. All these organizations have been in, but they have not been in as representatives to the government of that rebel area. And then, of course, you have the fact that there are four countries that are recognized.

• 2205

Mr. Anderson: Do they have diplomatic representatives in Biafra?

Mr. Sharp: I would imagine so. Certainly if they do not have them they could easily do it; they would be very welcome. You have got Tanzania, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Gabon, so there are points of contact that are quite available.

Mr. Anderson: You are satisfied that these are sufficient?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, I have not heard anybody suggest that it is lack of contact. The difficulties are very fundamental—the unwillingness of Ojukwu to accept the Federal organization of Nigeria. He wants to be independent. In other words, he is a rebel in the eyes of the Nigerian authorities.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Sharp: I have forgotten the first half of your question; I am sorry.

Mr. Anderson: I would think, sir, that in view of the world's concern over the possibility of atrocities in the areas controlled by the Nigerian Government the number of observers present there was sufficient to satisfy at least the two M.P.'s who went to Biafra and were highly critical of the type of guided tours that a few people were doing and in one certain area at any one time. My question is, would you be willing to entertain requesting from the Nigerian Government an increase in the number of observers presently operating with their forces in the area behind the Federal lines?

Mr. Sharp: We did ask for one additional observer and received permission. I certainly would not foreclose the possibility of having others. I do think, however, that we ought to

have some experience with the group that is there to see how they get along. They will report to us as to how effective they think their own inspection is. They have every reason to want to make this as thorough as possible. So I think we should await some advice to us from General Milroy on his own operations as to whether he thinks this is effective or whether there should be more observers and so on because I am sure he has the same objective as all of us here have, to get at the facts.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sharp, I am sorry to be the last straw at the end of such a long evening, but I will be very brief.

I noticed Tuesday evening that Mr. Smith said in his testimony:

A short time ago there was acceptance on both sides of not merely observers, but a Commonwealth peacekeeping force in which both sides agreed that they would welcome Canadians.

He then goes on to say:

So now a lot of water has gone under the bridge in the last few months.

Is this idea now dead or is there perhaps, not in the near future, but not too far way, some possibility of reviving this idea with Canadian participation in such a peace force?

Mr. Sharp: My understanding is that that agreement was given by both sides after a settlement had been reached within Nigeria.

Mr. Roberts: I see. So it would be a post-settlement peace force?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, it was a post-settlement peace force.

Mr. Roberts: The other question I have really stems out of the same kind of concern that Mr. Groos mentioned earlier. What has become quite clear to me, at least, is that grave as the situation is now, it is going to be appalling within a very short time. The figure we have been talking about is 3,000 tons a day and this is obviously going to require a land operation. I would be most anxious myself that we not take any action which might possibly enrage the Nigerian authorities because their co-operation might be needed in that operation. I was glad to see your comments in New York. Would you say Canada stands ready to play a full part? That sounds, perhaps, a bit negative to me in a sense. I hope that maybe you are already pursuing conversations with other countries—perhaps Scandinavian countries—and doing some con-

tinuous planning so that once we get to that situation where it is practicable and feasible we will be ready to participate fully and without a great deal of delay in such an operation, because it is obviously going to be essential very quickly.

Mr. Sharp: I can assure you, Mr. Roberts, that the international relief agencies of the world are canvassing everyone to make them aware of what they think the problem is going to be and to call upon them for assistance. I do not think it can be done adequately except on an international scale and it is most desirable that everyone should get involved anyway. So when I say we will play a full part I hope it means there will be other people with us. Then there will be a better job done. Thank you.

• 2210

The Chairman: With Mr. Mongrain's permission I might ask some questions at the end of a long day. Mr. Sharp, General Wrinch's evidence indicated that although there have been wars and civil wars in other areas, there was a truly extraordinary need in this particular area. I am speaking from recollection, but I think he said that the need in Nigeria and Biafra exceeded that in other areas. I think he referred specifically, for example, to Viet Nam. He also indicated, if I remember correctly, as you have said, that although there is a great deal to be done within the area now controlled by the Federal Military Government there is more to be done in the area still controlled by the rebels. I believe he said there would be about a million people needing help in the FMG area, and about three and a half million in the area which is now controlled by the Ibos.

Mr. Groos has very kindly done the arithmetic that I would not have been able to do and he has come up with a figure of 3,000 tons a day being needed in December and my concern, and I think the concern of many members of the Committee, is the same as that expressed by Mr. Groos and Mr. Roberts, namely; can these international relief agencies do the job? In other words, is it enough for us to rely upon what Caritas can do, what the International Red Cross can do and what the World Council of Churches can do, or is this problem going to be so great that there will have to be an intergovernmental effort to meet the problems? I do not want to overestimate the extent of the problem, but General Wrinch struck me as being a very competent witness, and he did indicate this was a truly

extraordinary situation. I would like to get your views on whether we can rely safely upon the International Red Cross and these other church agencies' doing the job, or whether there must be some concerted effort by governments, and if such a concerted effort by governments is needed, whether Canada could not, as one of the wealthy nations of the world, take a leading part? We realize we cannot do the job ourselves, but can we not provide the leadership if the international agencies are facing a situation which will overtax their strength?

Mr. Sharp: It may be that the agencies that are now on the job will have to be supplemented. It may be that national Red Cross societies may want to go in and help on a greater scale than they are now. It may be that you have associated Red Cross societies working rather than just the International Red Cross.

• 2215

I would think it most likely, however, that the Nigerian authorities would want this work to be done by relief organizations rather than by the governments of other countries. They themselves, of course, would probably have to play a leading part. However, as far as I am concerned at the moment this is a subject we have not examined in depth, but just thinking in terms of what is ordinary practice I imagine it would be international agencies or recognized agencies such as national Red Cross societies that would work. I do not think they would lack people. Their problems are going to be in transportation because food will have to be moved by land as they cannot move enough by air, and there will have to be trucks and there will have to be all sorts of arrangements made to get the food moving.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Sharp. Before thanking the Minister I will just remind members that this Committee will meet again tomorrow morning at 9.30 a.m. to conclude the testimony of Mr. David MacDonald and Mr. Andrew Brewin.

Mr. Anderson: May I suggest as a witness, Mr. Chairmann, Dr. Kennedy Lindsay, who is a Professor at the University of Nigeria and now in Toronto. He has just written something for the Toronto *Globe and Mail* which is very interesting.

The Chairman: Is he in Toronto? Do you know where we can contact him?

Mr. Anderson: I presume he is. I have not checked it out.

The Chairman: Any information you can give us with regard to him—his name has been mentioned by others and we are trying to track him down. If you happen to know where we can reach him, let us know.

Mr. Prud'homme: Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to what we discussed in this Committee. I think it is about time we decided how long we want to go on and how many witnesses we want to hear. We already have quite a line-up for next week of all witnesses who have something to say or know something about the question. We even have contrary-minded witnesses, the man from CUSO who is going to come here and most probably say just the contrary to the other man. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if the Committee could not come to an agreement about how long we want to continue our discussions and when it will be time to report to the House of Commons and do something. Unless we decide soon we will be discussing the entire political situation of Nigeria and we are all more interested in the humanitarian side of it. So if we decide we are going to send *Hercules*, and if we decide we are going to send food, I think that is what the country is interested in. We are not going to go on, and on, and on, in this Committee calling all witnesses who think they have something to say.

I have a full list of people who pretend they have a lot to say about Viet Nam that has appeared on l'émission *Aujourd'hui* and who have said exactly the contrary to what we have listened to for the last seven full meetings.

The Chairman: I think you have a good point, Mr. Prud'homme, and perhaps I should have indicated earlier to members of the Committee the program we outlined at the steering committee this afternoon but not too many members of the Committee are here at the moment, and perhaps we could do this first thing tomorrow morning.

In the meantime, on your behalf I would like to thank the Minister for making so much of his time available.

Appendix F

DISCUSSION OF NIGERIA DURING
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL DEBATE

October 2

Of the seven speakers during the General Debate on October 2, four (Libya, Dominican Republic, Burma and Brazil) made no mention of the Nigerian situation. The United States and Sweden mentioned Nigeria in guarded terms. Gabon, which recognizes Biafra, in effect, called for UN intervention in Nigeria.

United States

Mr. Rusk's mention of Nigeria was made in passing. After noting the situation in Czechoslovakia, Vietnam and the Middle East, Mr. Rusk added that "the Assembly's concerns inevitably include the greatest troubles and greatest needs of the world community. They include the suffering in Nigeria, where despite dedicated efforts within Africa and elsewhere, civil conflict continues to bring death by war and starvation to uncounted thousands." Mr. Rusk then went on to mention other issues.

Gabon

Although the Gabonese intervention devoted four paragraphs to the Nigerian subject, the word "Nigeria" was never used. Mr. Ayouné noted that upheavals in Africa over many years had caused mass destruction of human lives to which the UN could not remain indifferent "whether it be a question of putting down a rebellion or quelling a secession." He agreed that "in a pinch... others should maintain a passive attitude" out of respect for the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States, but added that "it can happen that those principles are advanced in order to camouflage a pogrom or genocide in our multi-ethnic states, where the ethnic minorities are not sufficiently protected." Mr. Ayouné then argued that what States cannot allow themselves to do with regard to another State because of the principle of non-intervention, the UN has a duty to do in order to "ensure the safeguard of human life." The UN, he continued, "has the right of vigilance over the affairs of States whenever a cause that cannot be determined from outside endangers the life of individuals and groups of individuals." He added that the UN must "inform itself about the origin of the incidents in order to

determine the obscure causes and to intervene eventually so as to stop the massacres by immobilizing those who would take refuge behind the principle of non-intervention..."

Sweden

The Swedish Foreign Minister mentioned the "growing feeling of interdependence among all peoples" which resulted in waves of sympathy and compassion around the world when people are struck by "national disasters or military action". He said that one example was the support given to Iran after the earthquake and another was the "wide and active participation in the humanitarian relief aid to the civilian population in Nigeria which has been so cruelly struck by the hostilities there". Mr. Nilsson noted the concern which the Organization of African Unity recently expressed in Algiers for the suffering population and its appeal to all parties to co-operate to ensure the rapid delivery of relief. He said that "the Swedish Government wants to do all in its power to support the relief programmes for the Nigerian population" and noted with interest the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative. Mr. Nilsson hoped that the Secretary-General would provide information on the progress of the relief and humanitarian activities in Nigeria.

October 3

Two of the six speakers during the General Debate on October 3, Haiti and Jamaica, called for consideration by the United Nations of the Nigerian situation. A third speaker, Guyana, mentioned the Nigerian situation but the reference was limited to an expression of humanitarian concern. South Africa in effect drew a comparison between the "achievement and progress" in Southern Africa and the situation in Nigeria. Neither the Soviet Union nor Indonesia made reference to Nigeria.

Haiti

Mr. Chalmers of Haiti blamed all the world's trouble spots on "obstinate refusal to abide by the needs of international co-operation". He discussed the Nigerian situation at some length, stating that it was "reported to be taking on the character of veritable genocide". Mr. Chalmers expressed sympathy for the Biafrans who were dying "by the thousands in order to ensure the survival of the population" and noted that the Ibos had

played an important role in the Haitian Revolution of 1804. He said that Haiti did not wish to intervene "even verbally" in the domestic affairs of a sovereign people but added that all regional organizations (thus including the OAU) were inadequate to deal with "the martyrdom of an innocent people" and said that the United Nations should take up the Nigerian question should the confrontation continue. Mr. Chalmers called upon the Nigerian government to "show itself magnanimous in victory".

Jamaica

Mr. Allen said that neither the Commonwealth nor the OAU had been able to assist Nigeria to reach a peaceful solution to its problems. He called on the international community to provide all possible assistance to Nigeria and said that "the sorry plight of the refugee children is of most major concern to my government". Mr. Allen then said that the General Assembly should "call upon both sides in Nigeria to put an immediate cease fire into effect" and also call upon all states to cease supplying arms to either side. The United Nations should also, he continued, "offer its assistance to the Nigerian people in the solution of the differences which have plagued them up to now" and referred to the possibility of observer groups along the lines of UNFICYP.

Guyana

After noting that small states cannot achieve their objectives of development irrespective of international tensions, Mr. Ramphal mentioned the Middle East, Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, and then went on to state:

"We have watched, as a brother watches, with anguish and agony, the tragic struggle among the peoples of Nigeria and the loss of life which the resolute efforts of so many have failed to prevent. We have noted the resolution passed by the Organization of African Unity on 16 September which was subscribed to by an overwhelming majority of African States. We hope that this call from the substantial voice of Africa will not go unheeded. It has been a long night for Nigeria; we pray for its end and that with the dawn the leaders of that great nation may be guided through the no less critical problems of peace by those same principles of respect for human dignity which were

the foundations of the united national movement to self-determination."

South Africa

Mr. Muller, in his reference to Nigeria, said, "Is it not ironic that while bloody warfare is devastating a region of Africa for which so much was hoped, while so many innocent men, women and children are exposed to suffering, starvation and death, so much time, money and energy should be devoted in this Organization to attacking my country as a so-called 'threat to world peace'?"

October 4

With reference to the Nigerian situation, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands indicated, on October 4, that his Government would welcome action in the General Assembly "directed towards co-ordinated efforts in the humanitarian field". References to the situation in Nigeria were also made by Venezuela, Japan and El Salvador. Mexico, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Jordan made no mention of the Nigerian situation.

Netherlands

Mr. Luns expressed the "deep and anxious concern" of the Dutch people at the tragedy of the Nigerian conflict. He noted that \$4 million for relief has been contributed by private individuals in Holland and that Dutch relief actions had been co-ordinated with the actions of other countries and the International Red Cross to which an airplane has been made available by the Dutch Red Cross. The Dutch Government, he said, has explored all means of bringing relief to the suffering and expressed the hope that the O.A.U. would bring about an end to the conflict. He endorsed the O.A.U. resolution in so far as it called for co-operation to ensure the rapid despatch of humanitarian relief and expressed Dutch appreciation to the Emperor of Ethiopia. Mr. Luns noted the "participation of the Secretary-General in co-ordinating humanitarian assistance through his personal representative in Nigeria" and felt that a report by Mr. Gussing might constitute "a valuable basis for dispersing the apprehension of people all over the world". He then referred to the possibility of an initiative concerning Nigeria in the U.N. in the following terms: "Should it be possible to bring about a discussion in and subsequent common action by this Assembly directed towards co-ordinated efforts in the humanitarian field, the Netherlands Government would whole-

heartedly promote such a development." (This suggestion would seem to resemble the possibility which you have been considering of referring to the provision of a framework for humanitarian action in future civil-conflict type situations.) Mr. Luns also appealed to both sides for a cease fire.

Venezuela

In a very short reference to the Nigerian situation following upon the section of his speech dealing with colonialism, Mr. Iribarren expressed his hope that "over and beyond political differences, the feeling of human solidarity will triumph and put an end to the dire sufferings of the innocent victims of the conflict".

Japan

Mr. Miki, after discussing human rights, expressed the "deepest compassion" and concern over the Nigerian situation and expressed the hope that the parties to the conflict would make further efforts to bring the war to an end at the earliest possible date.

El Salvador

Mr. Guerrero noted that the "international community apparently has no appropriate answer through institutional channels" to meet events such as those in Nigeria. He added that indifference was, nevertheless, impossible. Mr. Guerrero praised the efforts of the O.A.U. and said that "the most effective action to be taken in this case would devolve upon the Organization of African Unity". He also suggested that it would be worthwhile to examine the international rules which apply to civil war situations and to determine the "limits and principles of the rules of humanity that exist within the system of international regulations and principles" in order that "appropriate legal recourse" would not be lacking when a similar situation arose in the future.

October 7

During the General Debate on October 7, Mr. Debré of France called for the application of the right of self-determination to the secessionists in Nigeria. Both Ethiopia and Morocco endorsed the sovereignty of the Federal Military Government. The Nigerian situation was also mentioned by the representatives of Finland and Lesotho, but the President of Chad and the representatives of Greece and Sudan did not mention Nigeria in their speeches.

Ethiopia

After expressing the deep sorrow of the Ethiopian people at the tragedy in Nigeria, Mr. Yifru mentioned the efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie to being about a peaceful solution of the civil war. There could be no lasting solution "except on the basis of the will of the Nigerian people as a whole and of extending justice and security to all elements of the population". Mr. Yifru spoke of his hopes for a second serious dialogue between the Federal Government and the secessionists, and added that "a solution to the Nigerian crisis should be essentially left to the Nigerians themselves". Those who want to assist should do so on the basis of the recent O.A.U. Heads of States resolution "which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the solution of the problem within one Nigerian sovereign personality". Mr. Yifru warned that "any departure from this principle would be tantamount to interference in the domestic affairs of Nigeria; it might also introduce... elements of the cold war and commercial and other rivalries". He noted as well that the O.A.U. resolution also called for the giving of assistance in such a manner as to avoid compromising Nigeria's sovereign rights and the "introduction of complications". Mr. Yifru expressed the hope that the humanitarian organizations would keep these "twin objectives" in mind.

France

Mr. Debré said that revolt and war were a certainty if the first principle of international relations, the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination, was ignored. He denounced the "tragedy of Biafra, the martyrdom of the Ibo people" which the world community contemplated without trying to put an end to it. He called for the provision of food and medication as well as for a halt "to the shipment of weapons that are prolonging the fight". (A member of the French Permanent Mission has told us that the call for a halt in arms shipments by Mr. Debré implied a denial by the French Government that they were supplying arms to Biafra.) The Biafran problem could only be solved, however, on the basis of the "incontrovertible personality of that people, and consistent with the principle of self-determination... the French Government desires that solution".

Morocco

Mr. Laraki called on the secessionist leaders to heed the appeal of the O.A.U. and put

an end to hostilities "within a framework of reconciliation". Morocco endorsed the efforts of the Federal Government "to preserve the unity of that country".

Finland

Mr. Karjalainen expressed Finland's concern at the terrible human suffering in Nigeria. He mentioned Finnish contributions to the I.C.R.C. and said that Finland would join in further international relief activities. Mr. Karjalainen also said that no relief action could save the people unless the hostilities were ended and a permanent settlement achieved.

Lesotho

In a brief reference to Nigeria, the Permanent Representative of Lesotho expressed "the horror of all nations and all Africans in particular" at the suffering in Nigeria.

October 9

Foreign Minister Abdoulaye, Guinea, Foreign Minister Gregoire, Luxembourg, Foreign Minister Lyng, Norway, Minister of Finance Nzanana, Rwanda, Foreign Minister Medici, Italy, Foreign Minister Hasluck, Australia, and Canada spoke in the General Debate.

Australia briefly expressed "deep concern" at the Nigerian hostilities.

Italy urged support for relief while realizing internal nature of conflict and urging the United Nations to throw weight behind the O.A.U. with its primary responsibility.

Guinea said the situation was an African tragedy because of its grave nature. It pointed out the dangers still inherent in tribal difficulties. In context of the rich natural resources of Eastern Nigeria, Guinea referred to other nations interested in encouraging the conflict.

Why didn't those nations condemn atrocities in other troubled areas of the world? The civil war must end immediately according to the principles of the O.A.U. Charter which dictated respect for territorial integrity. A glance at the map of Africa would reveal a number of potential Biafras.

Luxembourg said world conscience must not remain silent in the face of a fratricidal struggle. The United Nations should consider the humanitarian question. The UN should call upon the Federal Military Government to facilitate direct distribution of relief and assure "physical security" of all inhabitants. It praised the efforts of Ambassador Haile Selassie. The O.A.U. must use its influence to find a lasting solution acceptable by the entire population.

Norway pointed out that the efforts of many governments and international organizations had "purely humanitarian objective with no political aims". Relief transports had not been sufficient to prevent the tragedy from reaching "frightening dimensions". These dimensions also appeared unnecessary. There was no basis for criticism of the UN or its Agencies which had not shown "any lack of will or devotion to help". The situation focused attention on insufficient mandate and authority given to the UN and its Agencies. The UN should consider the possibility of giving the UN and its specialized agencies a stronger mandate to carry out the purely humanitarian task of organizing and providing relief to "a civilian population enduring great sacrifices brought upon them by wars or conflicts or by other calamities".

Rwanda referred to the failure of all appeals for peace. It referred to the complicity of economic and financial interests of the great powers to continue the conflict.

APPENDIX G

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media—Not an
official record)

Press Release SG/1716
9 October 1968

REPORT OF INCIDENT AT OKIGWI,
NIGERIA

Introduction

1. During the taking by federal troops of the town of Okigwi on 30 September, two members of the International Committee of the Red Cross team in the Red Cross compound there were killed and three were wounded. In addition, an official of the World Council of Churches and his wife were also killed. An investigation was conducted at the request of the Federal Governments: the Observer Team designated three of its members (Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) to investigate the incident; the Representative of the Secretary-General delegated one of his assistants* to participate in the investigation in order to enable the Representative to report to the Secretary-General.

Manner of Investigation

2. The Representative's assistant travelled with the members of the group Observer Team to Okigwi in order to carry out an on-the-site investigation. En route they had discussions with the divisional and sector commanders of the Nigerian Army in whose area of responsibility the incident took place. The group also received the testimony of the three wounded survivors (two Swedish and one Yugoslav). The persons concerned were interviewed individually. Their statements in all essential elements were credible and were not contradictory. The Representative's assistant and the members of the Observer Team made an on-the-ground examination. They were accompanied, at their request, by the Sector Commander, by the Acting Commander of the battalion whose area of responsibility

comprised Okigwi, and by the Company Commander responsible for taking that portion of the village in which the ICRC compound is located. From divisional through battalion level the military authorities were helpful, co-operative and concerned that the incident be clarified. The assistant viewed the bodies of two of the deceased (Swedish and Yugoslav) and attended the burial of the W.C.C. official and his wife (United Kingdom).

Findings

3. The assistant's findings are based on the testimony of the Red Cross personnel and Federal military authorities and upon visual evidence. The testimony and evidence, which appeared to be mutually corroborative, enable the assistant to report as follows:

- (a) Federal soldiers deliberately and without provocation by the persons concerned shot and killed two Red Cross officials and two W.C.C. representatives: they wounded three other Red Cross officials. Several rounds were fired at a distance of 3-5 metres. The officer-in-command, who has not been identified, was present at the site of the shooting but was either unwilling or unable to prevent it;
- (b) All the victims had taken shelter in front of one of the Red Cross buildings, which were clearly marked and which were within an equally clearly identifiable Red Cross compound. At the time the troops moved into the area, the compound appeared to be in a tactically important position between the lines. All were easily recognizable either by the ICRC insignia on their shirts or by the simple red cross worn by the W.C.C. couple. Immediately following the incident, several Nigerian officers, including the Acting Battalion Commander who had not been present during the shooting and who by all accounts behaved in an exemplary manner, succeeded in protecting the surviving members of the group since the battle was still in progress. He also took charge, together with a wounded member of the ICRC, of treating the wounded;
- (c) During the evacuation of the wounded which was accomplished partly by themselves and partly with the help of

* Daniel W. Caulfield.

the Federal troops, they underwent considerable harassment and threats;

- (d) Fighting is continuing around the town, and under the circumstances, given the constant and continuing movement of troops, it has not been possible to identify the officer who appears to have been responsible either by commission or by omission for the shootings. The assistant considers that the testimony of the commander of the company which occupied the Red Cross compound was unsatisfactory. The Representative's assistant, together with the members of the team, was repeatedly assured by military commanders at

battalion, sector and divisional level that no effort would be spared to identify the person concerned and to bring him to justice.

4. The three members of the Observer Team have submitted their report upon the incident directly to the Head of State. It should be stressed that the Observer Team in their report reached conclusions which are substantially identical with those reached independently by the Representative's assistant.

5. The Secretary-General will be informed as soon as the Head of State has expressed his intentions regarding the action he intends to take in respect of the report of the Observer Team.

APPENDIX H

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media—Not an official record)

Press Release SG/1715
9 October 1968

FIRST INTERIM REPORT BY REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL TO NIGERIA ON HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

Following is the first interim report by the Representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities on a visit to the northern front:

1. The Representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities in his capacity as Observer left Lagos with his assistant on 24 September and returned to the capital on 1 October. He travelled in the same aircraft and land transport as other observers.

2. On the way he visited briefly the city of Benin where he saw a camp for displaced Ibo people and a relief supply depot. He spent the remainder of the week in the area of the first division of the Federal Nigerian Army where he saw civil administrative and military headquarters at Enugu, the town of Awg, market places and villages both on and off

the main road, military posts, camps for displaced persons, relief distribution centres and clinics. In the time available it was, of course, only possible to visit a limited selection of places. The Observer chose to travel through the first military sector (Enugu-Awg Obinagu, which is also known as Obilagu, the site of the airstrip recently discussed as a possibly neutralized air relief landing place) which had been the scene of recent fighting and where there was still extensive military activity.

3. In the course of their visit both the Observer and his assistant were afforded every facility and had full freedom of access to all relevant places, persons and sources of information. They were able to speak freely with local inhabitants and displaced persons as well as with civil administrators, police, officers and soldiers. Although the language limitation confined their talks to English-speaking persons, representatives of the federal forces were only present during interviews when requested to assist in interpretation.

4. There was evidence of severe destruction in all areas affected by the conflict. Apart from the obvious signs of damage caused by shelling, mortars or small arms fire, the thatched roofs of many village huts had been burnt and corrugated iron roofing removed. Although the corrugated iron sheets as well as doors and shutters from houses had obviously been used in constructing troop field shelters, there was no evidence in the areas

visited of wanton destruction of property. In villages which had not been affected by the prevailing pattern of attack and counter attack, village houses and other buildings remained completely intact.

5. Federal troops gave every impression of being alert and well disciplined. The officers showed clear indications of attention to discipline and a good understanding of the "operational code of conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces", issued by the Commander-in-Chief, which calls on all members of the armed forces to observe high standards of conduct and respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention. From all appearances, the officers endeavoured to communicate this to NCOs and men. The reaction of those Ibo who had either remained behind or returned to their villages in the area visited by the Observer, seemed to reflect confidence in the conduct of the federal troops.

6. Fear of warfare and a natural timidity towards armed soldiers, together with the belief spread among the Ibo people that the federal forces were bent on exterminating them, had driven most civilian villagers into hiding during periods of conflict. Some spoke of having been in the bush as long as ten months, although others had returned to their homes after only three days. It was apparent that the initiative of one individual in establishing contact with the armed forces was often sufficient to reassure the rest of the villagers and bring them out of hiding. In many cases, however, this initiative had obviously been lacking. Many senior traditional leaders had not returned to their villages and there were few indications that middle class, educated Ibo were coming out of hiding or had remained in their homes.

7. It was, however, obvious that the movement out of the bush back to the villages had gathered considerable momentum in the last week or two. At Ishiagu the Observer met senior representatives of eleven villages, who had decided and in fact returned the following

day accompanied by some 500 villagers, and more were still expected. The Observer also spoke to two groups who arrived at Awgu over the weekend carrying the safe conduct passes which had been air-dropped in the area by the Federal Air Force.

8. Once contact had been established between villagers and the federal troops, there seemed to be no obvious signs of fear. On every occasion when the Observer arrived in a village or market place, in almost all cases unexpected and unannounced but accompanied by a military escort, the people continued to go about their business and showed every sign of friendliness. This tends to confirm the impression that in these areas at least, the Ibo had not experienced wanton destruction of life or maltreatment at the hands of federal forces. Troops showed a friendly attitude to the local population, which seemed to be quite unafraid.

9. With the rapid increase in numbers of persons coming out of the bush, the demands placed on the relief work of the army and the ICRC relief teams are growing fast. As an example of the increase, one rural clinic recently opened on a once-a-week basis was visited during the first week by 40 old men, during the second by about 100 persons, and during the third (which occurred at the time of the Observers' visit) by an estimated 1,500, many of whom required attention. It is widespread practice for the army to undertake feeding for two weeks after entering a particular place before handing over the responsibility for relief action to the Red Cross or civil authority. Although there are indications that Ibo villagers are capable of organizing the distribution of food supplies with only a minimum of supervision, the demand for additional foodstuffs and personnel is likely to increase very significantly and very quickly. The shortage of drugs due to transport difficulties is already serious.

10. The Observer plans to proceed to the southern front within a few days.

APPENDIX I

DECLARATION OF ORGANIZATION
OF AFRICAN UNITY

(OAU CONFERENCE) (1) "Expresses its appreciation to all Heads of State members of Consultative Committee and in particular to His Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie I for the invaluable efforts they have exerted in accomplishment of mandate confided to them by virtue of Kinshasa resolution; (2) Takes note of report of Consultative Committee on Nigeria; (3) Appeals to secessionist leaders to cooperate with Federal authorities for purpose of restoring peace and unity to Nigeria; (4) Appeals for cessation of hostilities; (5) Recommends to Federal Military Government of Nigeria, if foregoing conditions are

fulfilled, to proclaim a general amnesty and to cooperate with OAU with a view to assuring the personal security of all Nigerians without distinction until mutual confidence is restored; (6) Appeals once more to all interested parties to cooperate with a view to assuring the rapid despatch of humanitarian aid to all those who need it; (7) Asks all Member States of UN and OAU to abstain from any action susceptible of impairing the unity, territorial integrity, and peace of Nigeria; (8) Invites the Consultative Committee in which it renews its confidence to pursue its efforts with a view to putting into effect the resolutions of Kinshasa and Algiers." September 16, 1968

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

5

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 5


FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1968

Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P. and Mr. David MacDonald, M.P.



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Anderson	Mr. Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Mr. Nesbitt
Mr. Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Mr. Prud'homme
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Laniel	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Smith (<i>Northum-</i>
Mr. Carter	Mr. Legault	<i>berland-Miramichi</i>)
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. MacDonald	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Gibson	(<i>Egmont</i>)	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Mr. Macquarrie	Mr. Winch
Mr. Harkness	Mr. Marceau	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Mongrain	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
THURSDAY, October 10, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Mongrain, Lefebvre and MacDonald (*Egmont*) be substituted for those of Messrs. Schumacher, Stanbury and De Bané on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Hopkins, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*) and Barrett be substituted for those of Messrs. Groos, Penner, Buchanan and Lefebvre on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

Attest.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FRIDAY, October 11, 1968.

(8)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Ian Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Carter, Fairweather, Forrestall, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Gibson, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), Macquarrie, Marceau, Mongrain, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk—(25).

In attendance: Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P. and Mr. David MacDonald (*Egmont*), M.P.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure recommended the following witnesses and scheduling of future meetings:

Friday morning, October 11, 1968—Messrs. Brewin and MacDonald (*Egmont*)

Tuesday morning, October 15, 1968—Dr. E. H. Johnson

Tuesday afternoon, October 15, 1968—Representative of CARITAS

Wednesday afternoon, October 16, 1968—Mr. Allan Grossman followed by Mr. Keith Bezanson, Major General Milroy, and possibly, Mr. Charles Taylor, although the scheduling has yet to be arranged.

It is expected that the Committee will be planning to make its Report to the House during the latter part of next week.

For the reminder of this sitting, members of the Committee completed their questioning of the witnesses which was interrupted at the close of the sitting on Thursday morning, October 10, 1968. At 10:50 a.m., during questioning by Mr. Forrestall, the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, took the Chair.

The Chairman thanked the witnesses and at 10:55 a.m., on motion of Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*), the Committee adjourned until 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, October 15, 1968.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Friday, October 11, 1968

• 0938

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have a quorum and we shall continue with our evidence. It might be helpful to members if I indicated the plans for today and next week. Your steering committee thought that this morning we would conclude with the two witnesses, Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald, which presumably we can do by 11 o'clock, and have no hearings during the rest of the day. Then, it was felt that we should call Dr. E. H. Johnson on Tuesday from the World Federation of Churches and a representative of Caritas to give evidence; on Wednesday, perhaps Mr. Alan Grossman of *Time* who has been in the area and Mr. Keith Bezanson of CUSO.

Everything would depend on whether or not it is possible for General Milroy to come back to Canada. The position there is that your steering committee unanimously agreed that we would like to have General Milroy appear before the Committee next week if it could be done, but only if it could be done without prejudice to the work that he is doing there. Earlier this week it looked quite possible that he would be here next week but now perhaps it is a little less possible, but we still hope that he will be back and we will have to fit the rest of our witnesses around him.

There are a number of other witnesses who have been there who could probably give very valuable testimony but we think it likely that much of it would be duplication of evidence which we have already heard or which we expect to hear on Tuesday and Wednesday of next week. So, subject always to change and any new developments, we hope that we could perhaps finish taking evidence next week.

We have no further witnesses on the list at the moment apart from those names I have mentioned, subject to any correction that...

• 0940

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Charles Taylor has been mentioned.

The Chairman: Well, I have not mentioned him because we do not know whether it will be possible for him to be back, but inquiries are being made to see if he would be available.

Mr. Lewis: I had word last night affecting Stephen Lewis, who is in Biafra. Mr. Taylor telephoned from Europe to inform my son's wife as to where Stephen was and said that he was coming back this weekend.

The Chairman: Who? Taylor was coming back?

Mr. Lewis: That is the information I received.

The Chairman: The Clerk is getting in touch with the *Globe and Mail* to see if he would be available. But even on that basis we would hope, unless we have additional witnesses, to finish this next week, subject of course to new developments or any new witnesses whom it might become desirable to call, with a view to commencing preparation of our report sometime toward the end of next week and presenting it to Parliament early the following week. This is always subject to change but I thought members would like to have some idea of what we have in mind. With regard to Mr. Taylor, the Clerk is making inquiries. Of course, he would be fitted in if he could become available.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, when will we be meeting on Tuesday? Do you have any idea of the schedule?

The Chairman: It is suggested 9.30 a.m., with Dr. Johnson appearing first and a representative of CARITAS appearing later.

Mr. Ryan: You do not know who the representative from CARITAS is?

The Chairman: We expect to know later this morning. We do not know at the moment.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, are you not afraid that you will not have a quorum on Tuesday morning?

An hon. Member: We will not sit on Monday.

The Chairman: I know.

Mr. Laniel: I think at least you have to allow time for trains and planes to arrive, for people arriving in the morning.

Mr. Prud'homme: Could we make it 10 o'clock on Tuesday morning?

The Chairman: Well, there is one difficulty. I gather that Dr. Johnson is leaving for the West at noon or later that day. We thought we should call the meeting for 9:30 a.m., in the hope of getting a quorum and be prepared to take evidence at any rate in the hope that we can proceed.

Mr. Winch: Could we ask how many could be here at 9.30 a.m.?

The Chairman: I think we come fairly close to getting a quorum. Are there any further questions about that program? If not, Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald are here to finish the questioning and I thought we could continue with the list of questioners which I had left over from the previous sitting. Mr. Buchanan is first on the list. He is not here. Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: I have a relatively short question. On page 4 of your statement you said "the handful of military officers (four) on guided tours will hardly be able to ascertain the truth". With your experience, having been there as a group of observers, do you really feel that observers going to either Biafra or to Nigeria are not particularly valuable? I am sorry, but I cannot understand why military people who are appointed by a number of different countries with not necessarily identical political systems who go there and observe what they see and report on what they see should be treated so scornfully. I apologize for belabouring this point, but it is important. As far as I can see, the only way the world is ever going to get any idea of what is going on is by sending observer teams and yet you are particularly scornful and I would like to know why.

• 0945

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I will speak for myself, and let Mr. Brewin answer as well. There are two things that disturbed me about the Commission. First of all, it was a Commission that was set up with an international status and therefore could have been expected to have a considerable degree of objectivity. Now, it seems to me right off the bat it

was limited in having that objectivity in two ways: one, that it was going to confine itself to one side of the situation and then seek to make a report that would speak for both, and I felt that would not provide the full story of what is actually happening in Nigeria-Biafra. The second thing was that I could not help but get the impression, as I looked at the way in which the Commission was set up and the way in which it was allowed to operate, that it was very much under the control of the Nigerian Government in terms of its movements and in terms of its arrangement as to where it was going and so forth. A genuinely international commission that might seek to make a substantial report on the whole area would, I hope, even before it began, have arrived at agreements with both sides: in other words, that both, whatever you want to call them, the rebels, the secessionists, the Biafrans, and the FMG would have said yes, we want this Commission, we both authorize its presence, we are going to give it a certain kind of freedom of movement, we are going to let it look at the whole situation, and then let it issue its report. This was the feeling that I had at least about the lack, if you like, of certain characteristics about this particular Commission.

Mr. Brewin: I would like to add to that. One of the difficulties is the sharp contrast in the report of this military Commission that after a very brief tour, issued the interim report which said there was no evidence of genocide whatever—true, they confined it to the places they were in. This gave the wide impression that an international body had given some sort of clean bill of health. At that very same moment or about that time we had reports from people like Charles Taylor saying that they had spoken to witnesses who claimed to have seen uncontrolled troop movements within villages in which, in one instance 500 civilians were shot, not in the course of action but afterwards when they were in the market-place and not engaged in any hostilities. I agree with Mr. MacDonald that any commission which goes only to one side may get a partial picture. Where are they taken and how do they decide where they are going to go? If it is known where they are going to go, are all signs cleared up? Do they interview the witnesses without military people standing by who might not be very helpful or friendly to them if they did make allegations against the operations of the military? All of these circumstances made us feel that a one-sided picture of that sort might be

highly misleading. We hope that General Milroy will be able to come back and explain what they did. We are not accusing the Commission of being purposely deceptive in its reports. We are sure that to the best of their ability they would be impartial, but unless they listen to the side that makes the accusations, as long as they hear only the people who say no, and as long as their arrangements are under the control of those people, we are afraid that a fair and objective account cannot be secured.

• 0950

Mr. Anderson: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. With your permission may I make this suggestion on this point. I am trying to be direct because I studied the UN Observer's Report carefully and the difference is precisely the difference that it seems to me Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald were talking about. The UN Observer's Report gives the same facts that are in the military Observer's Report but there is no conclusion drawn in the UN Observer's Report. He does not state that there is no evidence of genocide of any nature in any part of that report, and as I understood Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald their objection was to that general conclusion. They were not questioning the veracity of the facts which were described but they thought it was too early to make a general conclusion.

Mr. Lewis: And if you look at those two reports...

The Chairman: Order, please. I am afraid that this might develop into a cross-table discussion.

Mr. Lewis: No, I am just pointing that out.

The Chairman: I wonder if we could have questions directed to the witness, please.

Mr. Anderson: Perhaps, you have not too much respect for the Observer's Report and you admit that your criticisms of it were before you had read it.

Mr. Brewin: Before and since.

Mr. Anderson: The suggestion by Mr. MacDonald that the report is speaking for both sides I do not think is necessarily correct. They were sent in.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, I did not suggest that. I suggested that there was the expectation perhaps that it could be objective

but the fact that it could be on only one side of the dispute greatly limited its usefulness.

Mr. Anderson: My queries on this are strictly because having spent over a year in Indo-China on a similar sort of commission and activity, I know full well the physical problems you are presented with. There is French expression which says that if you know everything, you will forgive everything. This is probably the case and we are trying to get absolute certainty and absolute truth which we never will arrive at. I think to criticize the observers for having reported on what they have seen is, well, personally I find it rather strange because they are only reporting what they have seen. They have made that clear and you do not necessarily object to their report as far as it goes, based entirely on what they have seen. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Except I think it tends to be misleading, and this is the thing that disturbs me; in other words it tends to give the impression that this is a full-blown objective Commission that is going to have a look at all the facts of the situation. That I do not feel is the case. It is like hearing one set of witnesses but saying no, we are not able to hear another set, and that is what disturbs me.

Mr. Anderson: I can understand this attitude developing because yesterday Mr. Brewin read out one paragraph and omitted the qualifying paragraph which was before it which we had to prompt him to read out.

Mr. Brewin: You got the qualifying paragraph right away.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): What is your point?

Mr. Anderson: The point is this, that you yourselves have cast doubt upon a Commission report which evidently had greater ability and more time on its hands to investigate the situation in a certain area than you did in the areas in which you went. Your criticism of them not knowing what happened on the Biafran side is certainly equally applicable to you.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We were not accredited as an international commission, we were two individuals who travelled privately to look at the situation. We did not try to pass ourselves off as being fully and completely objective. This Commission has international connections of one kind or another and for

that reason it seems to me that it is fulfilling an entirely different kind of role.

Mr. Anderson: So if I can use your own words, the report that you gave is not fully and completely objective.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, you could say that.

Mr. Brewin: It never purported to be a final...

Mr. Anderson: The word used is "objective", do you agree that your report is objective or not?

Mr. Brewin: We would be the first to admit, and we have made it perfectly clear all along whenever we have discussed this matter, that we only saw one side and only spoke to one group of people for a relatively short period of time, but we think what we learnt during that time was sufficient to cause us very grave disquiet and to suggest that the matter be reviewed much more impartially than either we were able to do or these military observers have so far been able to do.

Mr. Anderson: Well with this I will agree, but is your report, nevertheless, on what you saw a fair and objective report? I am trying to establish what is the value of your evidence.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): That is what you have to establish.

Mr. Anderson: Let us pass on to another point.

Mr. Brewin: I can tell you what I think is its value. We spoke to people who lived in the country and who we thought were creditable people. They told us that certain things had happened and we are passing that information on to this Committee.

Mr. Anderson: So unlike Mr. MacDonald you feel it is a fair and objective report?

Mr. Brewin: I feel it is a fair and objective report; whether or not I am unlike Mr. MacDonald in that regard, I really do not know.

Mr. Anderson: This question of guerrilla warfare is important because certainly from all the other witnesses that we have heard, yourself included, there is definitely the fear among Biafrans of genocide in Biafra; yet in the areas recaptured by Federal troops guerrilla warfare is not taking place and we have reports—I am thinking in particular of the

one in *The Globe and Mail* today on page 4—of the Federal Government taking steps to feed the people and take care of them. In view of the fact that this guerrilla warfare is not taking place there is not this feeling among the Ibos in the Federal area that they are going to be exterminated, and it seems to me that the fear of those in Biafra might well be unfounded.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It seems to me that you are operating on a couple of assumptions that may or may not be true, one of which is that there is a considerable population of Ibo or minority people in Biafra now in territory held by the FMG. This was certainly not our impression from having visited Biafra. The feeling is that by far the vast majority of the population has continued to draw within the Biafran perimeter and that the eventual guerrilla warfare which may occur will actually take place if there is complete territorial control by the FMG. Now Mr. McNeill, when he was here the other day, I think indicated that he had some knowledge of guerrilla warfare already going on; this was news to me at least because we felt that this was still a condition for the future and not necessarily the present.

• 0955

Mr. Anderson: On the first point about the numbers in the area controlled, it is strictly a guess and I know nothing about it perhaps but we have heard two witnesses whom you were unable to hear because you were not here at the time; one was General Wrinch, who talked of a million plus, and the other was Mr. Smith, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, who talked of millions. I do not want to go into this because I do not know anything more than what they have said. However, I do know that the Red Cross, according to General Wrinch's figures, has most of its relief workers, most of the people working under their banner, in the Federal controlled territory. So if they are putting their people there to help the starving it appears they must be starving there. In addition 75 per cent of the Red Cross supply depots are located on Federal territories, so it does indicate that they feel that there are a fair number of starving people in Federally-controlled territory.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): They indicate a number of things. I am not sure what it indicates but I am sure that there are people in the area who are starving; I do not know

what percentage they are of those who were in part of the original Biafra. This of course is a situation that perhaps other witnesses will have more knowledge of and will be able to tell us.

Mr. Anderson: I hope we will get further witnesses on this point because it is important. It appears to me that the morale of the Biafran people is effectively bolstered by their fear of being slaughtered, and it also appears in the evidence of other witnesses that this fear is not necessarily well-founded.

Mr. Brewin: It may appear to you but it does not so appear to me. I think their fear is quite well-founded on what has happened in the past. I hope conditions will change, perhaps international observers on a substantial scale will help it to change, but it is not right to say that it is not well-founded when we have what appear to be well-authenticated reports of troops moving into villages and killing civilians by the hundreds at a time. From all of these reports and from all we have heard we are not prepared to say it is not well-founded; in fact we suspect it is very well-founded.

Mr. Lewis: Would Mr. Anderson like to read a short paragraph in the *Globe and Mail*?

The Chairman: Order, please. Mr. Anderson, continue with your questions, please.

Mr. Anderson: Again we come back to what is genocide and what is an atrocity, and it is a futile argument. Certainly no one denies that it is a terrible atrocity that is taking place.

Mr. Brewin: You were saying that these fears were not well-founded and I just want to make it perfectly clear that I do not agree with you, if it means fear of destruction. Genocide depends on the state of minds of the people who do it. We really do not want to play with words but when you say the fears are not well-founded that they may be exterminated, or a large number of them, I draw a different conclusion than you.

Mr. Anderson: Well unfortunately the word "genocide" occurs often in this press release put out by you. I do not want to play on it but it appears...

Mr. Brewin: Well will you look at its context before you generalize about it? We have made it very clear that we were not drawing any final conclusions of genocide as a charge

that could be made against the Nigerian Government. We have made that clear at any time we have discussed or tried to discuss this matter.

Mr. Anderson: We will leave genocide out of it, as you apparently wish to. I have read this a number of times, and it says that the destruction or genocide of a nation will become a reality unless there is a ceasefire imposed or required by an international community.

Mr. Brewin: I suggest that that leaves it open. We say "destruction or genocide". Some people have said it is genocide.

Mr. Anderson: Well destruction of a nation, I would say, would be genocide. Would you agree with me?

Mr. Brewin: No, I do not agree with you for this reason. Suppose you dropped a nuclear bomb. As a result of doing so you might destroy a whole people. However that might not be your intention; it might be just to deter them from destroying you or something of that nature.

Mr. Anderson: I think we are getting into a futile debate on what constitutes genocide. My own view is that you are quite wrong. If a nuclear bomb or something of that nature is dropped on a people and they are destroyed then, in my opinion, that people are destroyed and that is genocide.

Mr. Brewin: Are you saying that both the USA and the USSR in maintaining nuclear forces are preparing for genocide?

Mr. Anderson: That is absolutely incorrect and you know it full well. What I am saying is they have the ability to commit genocide by one means just as other nations have the ability to starve people to death or to shoot them.

The Chairman: I think we should reserve the argument for the preparation of the report. I wonder if we could proceed with the questioning?

Mr. Brewin: I must apologize, Mr. Chairman, but his questions were a little argumentative and I was led into a few arguments.

Mr. Anderson: The questions are argumentative perhaps because the report is so unsatisfactory. I wish to make it clear that if we have to accept what you said in this report as your statement then I regret to say

questions will have to be argumentative. There have been many conclusions drawn which I am afraid I do not see any evidence of in your report, and I cannot as yet understand how you have come to those conclusions on the strength of your testimony here.

• 1000

Mr. Brewin: I will refrain from commenting on your assertion which, I presume, is intended as a question. I would rather not comment on it unless you want me to.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson: I will pass on this, Mr. Chairman. I do feel, however, that in future when people go abroad on a visit of this nature they should take more care in their report to separate what they have seen from what they have heard and to restrict themselves perhaps to observations rather than to conclusions drawn on the strength of other peoples' conclusions.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can get at some of the concerns that Mr. Anderson has been expressing, but I hope it will be in a more friendly manner, or at least one which will not arouse the witnesses.

You know, I really do think that you performed a great service in going to Biafra. You focussed attention on the situation, you dramatized what is happening and you have undoubtedly increased public awareness of the problems, but I do think in one area you have inadvertently, to my mind, done some disservice and that is that some of the newspaper comments—and we all know that it is very easy for implications which are not intended to be taken from statements—based on your testimony and in some cases, comments you yourselves have made in the course of discussion or controversy, have really tended to throw, I think, a great deal of doubt, or some doubt in any case, on the objectivity—reliability is perhaps a better word—of what the Observer Team is doing. It seems to me that really the activities of this Commission and hopefully perhaps another one or the same on the other side are of great importance and perhaps even potentially of much greater importance. I know this is a bit of preamble, but I really do have questions in mind which I wish to ask you about this.

Mr. Brewin: May I interrupt?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Brewin: All we want to say is that we are not hostile to the Observers' Report, but we think it would be very unfortunate if people were soothed into the idea that nothing serious was happening after reading the Observers' Report based on less than a full opportunity to get the facts.

Mr. Roberts: For instance, Mr. Brewin, I noticed in this morning's paper that it says that you reiterated it was irresponsible of the Team to draw such a conclusion on the basis of its preliminary investigation. I assume that you would hold to that statement?

Mr. Brewin: Yes, I do.

Mr. Roberts: It seems to me that given the context it may be understandable, but the allegation of irresponsibility does tend to discredit the Team.

I would like to point out to you and ask your comments on—given some of the comments you have made—the United Nations' release of the Observers' Report. At the bottom of Page 1 they do say: "although the language limitation confined their talks to English-speaking persons"—which I think is the national language of Nigeria—"representatives of the federal forces were only present during interviews when requested to assist in interpretation". So that would seem to indicate, would it not, Mr. Brewin, that at least one of the points which you made in fact has been met that interviews do not take place generally. They say: "only when federal forces were requested to assist in interpretation" but that generally or as the normal rule Nigerian soldiers are not present when the investigations are taking place.

• 1005

Mr. Brewin: It all depends on whether or not most of the people were English speaking.

Mr. Roberts: Then again, on Page 3 I notice they say:

On every occasion when the Observer arrived in a village or market place, in almost all cases unexpected and unannounced but accompanied by a military escort, the people continued to go about their business and showed every sign of friendliness.

Does that not also meet one of the criteria which you established that they not go to pre-arranged or places that were pre-warned?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): "Accompanied by military escort" might have some meaning in that statement.

Mr. Roberts: I think the word "unexpected" is the crucial one there. I should have thought it was not all that easy to cover the signs of mass atrocities or genocide in 15 minutes. I can understand your great concern in coming back with the events so fresh in your mind and that you should be concerned about these problems, but it does seem to me that you have shot from the hip—not implying anything in terms of motivation—in really criticizing the activities of the observer group before you actually knew how they were operating. If I may say so, it seems to me to be irresponsible.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It may be, but the thing that strikes me is that we can examine the individual arrangements of the commission; whether or not they were in the presence of military personnel and how much warning may or may not have existed before they arrived in a community to inspect the possible situations of genocide. But I would not rest my major criticism on that situation so much as the over-all structure of the Commission itself. The fact that it was very much invited and authorized by one side of the dispute, there seemed to be to date at least, no attempt to have this Commission acceptable to both sides of the dispute. I would think if the Commission were coming in to make determinations in a civil war on such major questions involved as genocide, even before it began its work it would have attempted to be credible to both sides involved in the dispute rather than simply to be completely credible to one and to treat the other as if it really did not exist.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I have not fully understood your point, but it seems to me that in a situation where time is of the essence the basic question is the integrity, honesty and objectivity of the Commission. Admittedly, we would have preferred if one had a lot of time to make sure that it was acceptable to absolutely everyone everywhere in terms of—

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, no, no. Wait a second. There were only two disputants basically and we have only had the Commission accredited to one side of the dispute. That is the basic—

Mr. Roberts: But surely the important thing is their reliability and objectivity. It seems to me that is what it would be hard to attack on the basis of the credentials of these people, but it is the thing which is open to misinterpretation as a result, I think, of some of the things that you have said.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is not the credentials of the individuals, it is the very framework on which the thing is being operated that I would be so concerned about.

Mr. Brewin: I would add one thing. As has already been pointed out, in the report made by the representative of the Secretary-General, facts are stated without conclusions and, rightly or wrongly, it is certainly my view that when the other observers added to their report conclusions having really only heard one side, however objectively they were intended to be, they were not producing a proper report.

Mr. Roberts: With respect, Mr. Brewin, the report of the observer group does expressly indicate the limitation of the area in which they operated. What they said does not seem to me to vary a great deal from paragraph 5 in which the United Nations' Observer says:

Federal troops gave every impression of being alert and well disciplined. The officers showed clear indications of attention to discipline and a good understanding. . .

Mr. Yewchuk: Mr. Chairman, what is the purpose of this Committee? Is it to discredit witnesses or to get information?

The Chairman: I think we should restrict ourselves to questioning the witnesses with regard to their statements or relating to the report, which is the basic purpose of this Committee.

• 1010

Mr. Yewchuk: It sounds like a Magistrate's Court, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Roberts: But with respect, Mr. Chairman, all I am trying to do is to try to establish the validity of the activity of the observers and what they are undertaking to do on the basis of what they have done and on the basis of the witnesses' comments about it. I do not feel that to be an improper procedure.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I would agree, Mr. Chairman, with the two on the other side

who are objecting that the witnesses could not have seen an awful lot in the matter of a few hours compared to the Commission.

The Chairman: I wonder if we could continue then with your question, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: I was dealing with the question of the distinction between the way in which the observers were operating and the way in which the Report from the UN Observer Team was presented. I was pointing out that in paragraph 5 the observer says, among other things:

The officers showed clear indications of attention to discipline and a good understanding of the 'operational—' issued by the Commander-in-Chief, which calls on all members of the armed forces to observe high standards of conduct and respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention. From all appearances, the officers endeavoured to communicate this to NCOs and men. The reaction of those Ibo who had either remained behind or returned to their villages in the area visited by the Observer, seemed to reflect confidence in the conduct of the federal troops.

They go on in paragraph 9 to describe:

widespread practice for the army to undertake feeding for two weeks after entering a particular place before handing over the responsibility for relief action to the Red Cross...

But particularly in paragraph 5 it seems to me that given the fact that no doubt the observers are operating under pressure, they have indicated limitations under which they work and that the comments are basically the same. I do not see a great deal—Admittedly the word "genocide" itself is not used in paragraph 5, but the indications are really exactly the same.

Mr. Brewin: Let me point out to you a conclusion in the summary of the observers' original report of October 3. First of all they say there is no evidence and perhaps I should satisfy Mr. Anderson and read the first sentence:

In summary, in the areas of the First Nigerian Division that the Observers visited they found: (A) *Genocide*: There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified.

Now I take that to be a conclusion, a conclusion arrived at after a partial investigation under limited circumstances where the people who are alleging genocide have not been heard. I think it is premature for the Observers Team to make that sort of conclusion. And I note the same conclusion is not contained in the report of the observers for the United Nations. Whatever you want to draw from that, whether you think my conclusions are justified or unjustified, that is one of the reasons we have been critical of the observers.

Mr. Roberts: Was it not also premature of you to be so critical before you established in fact what the procedures of the commission are and the way in which they operate?

The Chairman: I think we are getting into arguments with regard to methods of procedure and methods of interviewing witnesses. Could we not proceed with the questioning?

Mr. Roberts: I think you are right, Mr. Chairman. I apologize.

I would earnestly hope that the two witnesses—if I may be permitted one expression of opinion—would try guardedly not to cast any more doubt upon the role of the observer group, which I think they will agree in its area at least performs a useful function, until we have had some chance to cross-examine them.

Mr. Brewin: I am afraid that I cannot agree.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think it really is a commission that is heavily loaded and this is one of the things that continues to disturb me. Until the commission seeks to set itself as an impartial inquiry respected by and acceptable to both sides, I cannot help but think that it continues to be a very loaded kind of commission.

Mr. Brewin: Speaking for myself, as long as I think it is fair and justified, I intend to be critical of this commission. If they satisfy me that there is no basis for such criticism then I will certainly not criticize them any more. But, I reserve complete freedom to criticize the commission. There is nothing sacrosanct about four or five military gentlemen no matter how fine and gallant officers they may be.

Mr. Ryan: But what about the way they are backed up by the UN observers?

The Chairman: Excuse me, gentlemen. Have you finished your questioning, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Yes.

The Chairman: The next questioner on my list is Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, that was from your former list.

The Chairman: Is Mr. Penner here?

An hon. Member: He is not here.

The Chairman: Mr. Alexander is not here.

An hon. Member: Mr. Chairman, is that list from yesterday?

The Chairman: It is yesterday morning's list. Do you want your name put on the list, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I wanted to make a point of order, actually, rather than ask a question. I agree that the line of questioning has not been in order because we have been questioning the witnesses on something about which they do not have any knowledge at all, that is to say the report by this commission. I think we have established that they are out of order in commenting on it because it deals with a different part of the country than they saw, and therefore I do not see that it should enter here at all. If we want to question the report of the commission, then we should do that when General Milroy is here. These witnesses cannot give us any information for or against that report, because they do not know anything about that part of the country.

• 1015

The Chairman: I feel they are reserving their right to be critical of the report, in view of the fact that the observer group had merely been in one area and the observer group made it quite clear they were only in that one area. I think the two witnesses, in fairness to them, feel there may be refugees in the Biafran area who might have evidence to give which might be of some assistance in determining whether—

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): But it is all conjecture, it is all "might", it is all something they do not know about, so how can we question them about it?

The Chairman: Well, possibly so, but I do think they were within their rights. They

were acting properly in reserving their right to be critical of the observer group until such time as the observer group had heard evidence from refugees who might have left the occupied area and moved into Biafra, because conceivably they could, or might have been able to present evidence which would be relevant. I do not think they are going any further than that. Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I hope I am not out of order. I have a couple of questions too, but slightly different. Really our purpose here, I believe any way—but being a freshman M.P. I may be wrong—is to find the facts and to decide what action Canada can take in order to assist these people. In today's *Globe and Mail* as I mentioned earlier, although I did not really know the source, a Reverend Kevin Doheny, a Holy Ghost priest who I gather is in Biafra, is reported as saying:

...there is widespread and deliberate bombing of churches and hospitals and markets. The Biafrans are convinced it's genocide and you'll never make them change their minds. I'm not prepared to say it's genocide. But I say there should be an international committee of observers...

So it appears if I am right, this priest, this Holy Ghost father in Biafra—I may be wrong on that point, because it is not made explicitly clear here—personally is not convinced that it is genocide. I think whether it is or it is not a relevant problem, because I have the impression that your approach to this whole matter is based on the pretty firm belief that if there is not genocide, there is a very real possibility there will be genocide. Is that a fair assessment?

Mr. Brewin: I would say that the priest's statement precisely corresponds with the view we have tried to present. He goes on from what you say:

But I say there should be an international committee of observers and they should come to the Biafran side. Let them talk to the foreigners here—doctors and missionaries—and then let them tell the world what's really happening.

Mr. Cafik: Right.

Mr. Brewin: And he goes on to speak of the Biafrans' fear of massacre.

Mr. Cafik: Right.

Mr. Brewin: These are precisely the views that we have tried to convey and the reasons that we have talked to foreigners, doctors and missionaries and we have tried to convey as fully and frankly as we could exactly what they told us.

Mr. Cafik: Right, Mr. Brewin, I will not argue with that. Yesterday in questioning Mr. Sharp I asked if we could get an observer team into both sides and I think it is an excellent suggestion. I am not questioning that at all; I am only pointing out that this one priest is not prepared to say it is genocide. I want to ask both of you this very direct question: Are you prepared to say it is genocide?

• 1020

Mr. Brewin: No, we have tried to make it clear that our idea of genocide means the destruction of a race with the intent of destroying the race or group or part of it, because of their race or group. It involves the question of who you are accusing of genocide. Certainly it would be genocide if the government, or a substantial portion of the government, were encouraging the slaughter of groups of people because of their race. We are not saying that we have any evidence of the intent of the Government of Nigeria to destroy the Biafrans or the Ibos, but things are happening which no doubt are connected with race in which perhaps individual units out of control are destroying people. They have created the fear of genocide. I think the Pope, after listening to people from both sides, put it very well when he said "there are genocidal implications". I think he meant that although a government should not be charged with genocide—and we are not doing so—acts are taking place in the context which are genocidal in nature.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Now to pursue that a little further, Mr. Brewin, I gather then that you do not really suspect the Federal forces or the Federal Government in Nigeria of perpetrating genocide, but that you suspect that possibly some of the troops or people in the fighting area are, in fact, doing something that would at least come close to genocide.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This is an impression that has been growing with me, at least. There is this distinction between the actual government and the forces that are in the field.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Do you think then that possibly some of these forces might have got out of hand and performed acts that might be termed genocide—at least in the broadest sense?

Mr. MacDonald: It seemed to be the case.

Mr. Brewin: We have heard of more than one illustration of where that has seemed to happen.

Mr. Cafik: Right.

Mr. Brewin: And we notice that Mr. Taylor draws precisely the same conclusion from his observation.

Mr. Cafik: All right, I agree with that. But can you state quite clearly that you feel the Federal Government itself is not committing genocide?

Mr. MacDonald: I do not think we are prepared to make a statement one way or another at this point. I think our position would be that there seems to be a distinction between what the Government generally sanctions and what happens with the military from time to time. Now what the actual intent of the Government is, I do not think we could say with any assurance.

Mr. Cafik: Now of the seven witnesses, of which both of you are two, that have appeared before this Committee, five of them—in other words all except yourselves—seem to be pretty clear on the point that in their opinions genocide is not a factor. Now I think that is pretty weighty evidence when you consider the Red Cross is involved and everyone else. I am not drawing any conclusion from it. I have not been there. I have not even the benefit of the direct experience that you two gentlemen have and that of course is your value to this Committee.

Mr. MacDonald: I might just say at this point, midway through the hearings, that the number of witnesses for or against a certain subject likely does not say too much. Even the number of witnesses for or against it will depend really on how the whole thing hangs together after we have completed our testimony. I am not saying what that position will be but I think that until we have heard a full range of witnesses, and some perhaps who have a definite involvement in the situation and a view on both sides, it would be difficult for any of us to arrive really at any kind of a firm conclusion.

Mr. Brewin: I wonder if I might comment on that just to show our point of view. I would say it corresponds exactly with Mr. Taylor's on page four of the *Toronto Globe and Mail* where he says:

No one who visits Biafra tours the battle areas and speaks to missionaries and relief workers can have any doubts that the Biafran fears of massacre are largely justified.

and that is about the position that we have reached.

Mr. Cafik: That is a pretty straight forward conclusion, of course. There is one here who I gather has been there for some time and he does have doubt, so he must be wrong in that statement. There are certainly some people who have been in the area that doubt it.

Mr. MacDonald: I think what he actually said was that he was not prepared to say it was genocide, whatever that would mean.
1025

• 1025

Mr. Cafik: I would think that he did not think that he had any justification in saying it was genocide. I hate to push this thing too much, but the fact that the Federal authorities are willing to allow food into that area now occupied by the Biafran troops surely must indicate to some of us at least their willingness to see these people live?

Mr. MacDonald: We hope so.

Mr. Brewin: We certainly hope so. And we remind you that until fairly recently Mr. Sharp has indicated the extreme difficulty in making arrangements. Of course to be fair, he said the difficulty lay on both sides. But there was very great difficulty and certainly we are much encouraged by the fact that the Government of Nigeria certainly appears to be ready to let food go in in substantial quantities to help the people in the Biafran-held area.

Mr. Cafik: Because it would be quite a contradiction for a government to be bent on destroying a people on one hand and then trying to feed them on the other. That is a pretty hard position to reconcile.

Mr. MacDonald: I do not think you would say they are trying to feed them. That is overstating the Nigerian case. When they are permitting other agencies to operate relief efforts that is not trying to feed them; that is

perhaps allowing them some kind of minimal means of support, which I would say is a different thing altogether.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Prud'homme: I just have one question for Mr. MacDonald. You said a moment ago that the report of the observer team is heavily loaded. Would you say the same about the first report of the representative of the Secretary-General?

Mr. MacDonald: I have only glanced at it. I do not think I would want to make any comment on it until I have looked at it very carefully.

Mr. Prud'homme: I completely disagree with the conclusion of my colleague, Mr. Lewis, because I too read the report, very attentively and I came to the exact opposite conclusion. If you read paragraphs two, five and nine, you could easily come to the conclusion that the representative of the Secretary-General does not see genocide. On the contrary, he says that the troops show a friendly attitude toward the local population which seems quite unafraid once they know that they are not this and that. I do not know how you came to the conclusion that you did.

Mr. Lewis: Since my name has been brought in, I did not, for one moment, suggest that the Secretary-General's observer was making any other finding of fact than that.

Mr. Prud'homme: No, but he does not say there is genocide.

Mr. Lewis: The only point I was making was that it seems to me that what Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald were objecting to was the general statement there is no evidence of genocide. I think the United Nations Observer was a little more careful in giving us the facts and has allowed us to draw our own conclusions.

Mr. Prud'homme: Yes, and it is a very good report. May I ask the same question of Mr. Brewin? Perhaps you have had time to read the Report of the Secretary-General?

Mr. Brewin: I am a little bit confused by the backfire between yourself and Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Prud'homme: Mr. MacDonald said that as far as he is concerned the report—and I think you concur in this—of the military observers is quite heavily loaded.

Mr. Brewin: I did not of course use that particular expression about it being "heavily loaded".

Mr. Prud'homme: Would you concur with him that the military report is heavily loaded?

Mr. Brewin: I am not quite certain what he means by that. I have already expressed my views on it in some detail and I do not want to repeat myself. I expressed the view that the military observers were not in a good position to get all the facts because they had not heard the accusers and because of the conditions under which they operated.

Mr. Prud'homme: Would you say that the same applies to you, that you have not had an opportunity to hear those who were accused?

Mr. Brewin: Oh certainly. We are not saying that the inferences we have drawn are the final and proper inferences. We had only a very limited experience. I think you have noticed that we have not said that we have come to a final conclusion whether or not there is genocide; we are inclined to think that probably it is the wrong expression to use—certainly as applied to the Nigerian Government. We are a little critical of what we have seen so far of the observers' reports because it seems to spring to conclusions. We are critical of the framework in which it operates because we think it is almost inevitably hearing only one side of the story. It may be an important story but it is only one side of it.

• 1030

Mr. Prud'homme: Have you read the report of the representative of the Secretary-General?

Mr. Brewin: I glanced at it, I would not say I had read it all.

Mr. Prud'homme: I am very surprised because these reports are very important. You seem to have read every article of Mr. Taylor and every newspaper, even the latest ones.

Mr. Brewin: I have read a lot of things. I am an avid reader, Mr. Prud'homme, I have read a great many things, and I have read the United Nations Observers' Report. I was just covering myself by saying I would not guarantee that I know every phrase in it by heart.

Mr. Prud'homme: I am quite surprised because even this morning's paper carried almost three pages of the Secretary-General's report.

Mr. Brewin: I can assure you that I have read a great deal of material.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions, Mr. Prud'homme?

Mr. Prud'homme: No, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I do not have anyone else on the list. Mr. Stewart, did you have any further questions?

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I have just one question to ask. Although I do not have the printed evidence yet, Mr. Anderson this morning asked Mr. Brewin about the objectivity, fairness and impartiality of their report. It took a while but he finally said yes, that he felt that their report was impartial—objective at least.

If we look back to an answer you gave at your first appearance before the Committee, did you not say at one time in replying that your trip there just confirmed the opinion you had before you started? Can you really be objective, then, if your opinion was really formed before you left?

Mr. Brewin: Well, it really was not formed.

Mr. Laniel: Well that is not what you answered that day.

Mr. Brewin: Let me explain; you have asked a question. I think before I went to Biafra I had some knowledge of some of the problems that existed there. I had discussed them with people and asked questions in the House. I had become extremely interested. I believed in the importance of international aid. Several general ideas I got from the knowledge I had acquired up to that time. When I got there, these impressions were very much strengthened by what I was able to see.

Now, we are all human and perhaps we tend to see those things that confirm our previous opinions, but I would not say that I was lacking in objectivity in what I had seen and heard; and going against what I had heard before that I would have continued to hold my prior opinion. The exact reverse happened; the enormous nature of this problem and the urgent need for action about it was tremendously strengthened by what I actually saw. I heard people were starving; I found, beyond doubt, that this was true on a very large scale. I had heard some of these things and I found that these impressions were confirmed.

I do not know whether that is objective or non-objective. I am just telling you my own process of thought.

Mr. Laniel: It is not a reproach; probably anyone would feel the same way. But we could go around the world right now and visit some countries and see things that are happening and . .

Mr. Brewin: If you want to put it this way, let me say this: we are all human, we take sympathy with the people we are very close to and see. I think if you are in touch only with the government of Lagos you would undoubtedly absorb, without being intentionally biased, the point of view that is natural for people in that situation.

We were in the situation of relief workers and priests and others in the Biafran end and we unquestionably would tend to look at it somewhat from their point of view. You absorb their point of view; that is what we went to do.

So, if you mean by "objective" were we not influenced by our circumstances, of course we were not objective in that sense.

• 1035

Mr. Laniel: Were you ever invited to Berlin by the West German government and really came back from the trip with the impression that they were well-organized? They wanted to give that impression publicity-wise. That might have happened too in Biafra, because Biafran authorities are supposedly—anyway, from what we hear—spending quite a bit of effort not only on the war, but on the publicity and on public relations and so on. They are using that approach very much also.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would examine that very carefully because it was mentioned to us in New York by one of the Nigerian representatives that \$5.5 million had been spent in Canada on public relations for Biafra. I do not know where this \$5.5 million has gone. If it has been spent it has been very poorly used because certainly no evidence of that \$5.5 million has been obvious to me, at least. I think that while obviously there is a degree of propaganda generated in a conflict by both sides, how much propaganda has been generated by the Biafrans outside their own country?

Mr. Laniel: Well, at this point, Mr. Chairman, my opinion is quite formed anyway. I deplore many things and I hope Canada can do as much as possible. I do not want to go too much into the report.

The Chairman: Dr. Yewchuk?

Mr. Yewchuk: I think we accept the fact, generally speaking, that what one sees is in the eyes of the beholder. I am saying this because I was wondering whether you felt you went there with an open mind or whether you had some preconceived ideas that you were simply trying to confirm. What do you say?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not know what an open mind is. I think both of us had spent a lot of time in discussing this problem with many people who were involved. We had read as much as we could get our hands on in terms of available material, most of it material that had been carried in the popular press over the last year.

I suppose we had certain views. I could not say how much such views predetermine what you actually conclude; I tend to think that they may give you a bit of a framework, but whether they predetermine it is not too likely, perhaps because you are moving into such an entirely different situation from one that you are normally familiar with. Therefore, in spite of the fact that you have sort of preconditioned your mind with a good deal of information, what you see, I think, tends to make up the basic impression and inasmuch as it makes sense with your basic impression you may then bring in facts that you have known from previous experience.

Mr. Yewchuk: Well, the fact that there were observers only on the other side might tend to make one choose sides and go with the idea of supporting the Biafrans to get their side of the picture.

Some of the members on the other side of the room indicated that you had tried to discredit the official observers, and so on. Do you want to make any comment on that?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not think this has been a great *cause célèbre* for us; at least it has not been for me. It is just that, having seen and heard what they did in Biafra and in the neighbouring community nearby and the intensity with which it made itself felt to me, I found it very difficult to accept at face value the report that appeared almost simultaneously with our return to this country.

Mr. Yewchuk: Mr. Sharp indicated last night that the official Team is only on the Nigerian side because so far as he is concerned no other side exists, or he cannot

recognize any other side, and that is why we are not observing on that side.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, I think it is a little more than that. To be fair to Mr. Sharp, I think his view was that if genocide is to be seen surely it is to be seen where the Federal troops are operating and therefore this is the right place for the commission to be.

Mr. Yewchuk: Well, when he was questioned about why the observers are not on the other side, the reply was that if we had negotiated with that side to send observers there it would mean we were recognizing them as an existing group or nation.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not think that was his main argument against observers going there, because actually it would not be a matter of our negotiating necessarily; it would be a matter of perhaps some international agency like the UN making the arrangements for such a trip. I think his basic feeling was that it really was not necessary. I do not agree with that feeling of his, but I think his own feeling was that from their point of view you will see genocide by seeing the Federal troops and moving in the areas within which the commission have been moving behind Nigerian movements.

● 1040

Mr. Yewchuk: Now that you have been questioned over such a prolonged period of time, do you have any recommendations so far as this observer group is concerned?

Mr. Brewin: I suggest that the principle of having observers is an excellent one, but to be effective it must first, be very much expanded so the people can be in the areas concerned and second, by some means or other the observers, to be useful, must hear what the people say who are, in a sense, the victims or claim to be the victims of what is going on in order that they may know what to look at in the areas concerned.

Without those two things I am afraid that the world may be given a mistaken and false impression of what is actually happening.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you, Mr. Brewin.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I should like to draw the attention of the two witnesses to paragraph 8 in the United Nations' observer's report,

which at the end, after having described their experiences, says:

This tends to confirm the impression that in these areas at least, the Ibo had not experienced wanton destruction of life or maltreatment at the hands of federal forces. Troops showed a friendly attitude to the local population, which seemed to be quite unafraid.

Would you say, then, that in the northern area—that is, the area in which the UN observer visited—it would be right to say, assuming those facts are true, that the use of the term “genocide” would not be justified?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not think I could draw that conclusion. I notice on the previous page, in paragraph 6, an interesting statement.

Many senior traditional leaders had not returned to their villages and there were few indications that middle class, educated Ibo were coming out of hiding or had remained in their homes.

I would like to have that statement pursued at greater length to know exactly what has happened to these people, why it was they had not returned, or in fact if they were alive to return.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brewin: Could I say in connection with that Mr. MacDonald has said that we were told in the Calabar area that it was precisely the educated people who were the victims of hostile action or massacre or whatever you want to call it.

The Chairman: Are you replying to Mr. Roberts' question?

Mr. Brewin: Yes.

The Chairman: And then Mr. Barrett.

Mr. Roberts: I wonder, Mr. Brewin, if you have noticed the report in the *Globe and Mail* indicating that the team had gone to Calabar and found no evidences of destruction nor genocide? It is in this morning's *Globe and Mail* which you seem otherwise to have read thoroughly.

Mr. Lewis: On the same page 4.

Mr. Brewin: There is a lot on page 4. I will probably get to it.

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Barrett?

Mr. Barrett: There is a comment in report indicating; From our discussion with military men in Africa... "Who would the military men be and what would their ranks be"?

Mr. Brewin: Well, he was the Portuguese Governor. What his military rank was we do not know because he was occupying a semi-civilian post and was known as His Excellency.

Mr. Barrett: And if you are quoting him directly why would you not suggest that instead of just saying "military men"? Was there any reason for this?

Mr. Brewin: Well I think we did discuss it with some of the officers, people who had had military experience who were attached to the airlift. But I think the main source of that information is the Portuguese Governor.

Mr. Barrett: Why would there be such influence put on the Portuguese side of the question?

Mr. Brewin: Why?

Mr. Barrett: Yes, why?

Mr. Brewin: Well, because he is the person we spoke to. That is why.

Mr. Barrett: Would you assume they may have some other areas to explore themselves that could possibly change their own thinking?

• 1045

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Where are you in that report?

Mr. Barrett: On Page 6, down at the last paragraph—just about four sentences down on page 6.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, right. What is your point?

Mr. Barrett: I just want to know who the military men were and what you based your conclusions on. I am just wondering what was the background of the people you were speaking to.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This man had been a military officer I think for 25 years in Africa and was now the Governor of Sao Tome and had taken a very real interest in the military side of the problem and how a cease-fire might be policed. He was quite

graphic as a matter of fact in pointing out to us on maps the present lines of troops and whether or not a relatively small peacekeeping force could not be situated in such a way as to keep the combatants at arm's length until they might be able to effect some kind of a political settlement.

Mr. Gibson: On a point of order, it is now 10:45 and the House sits at 11 o'clock. Some of us I am sure do not know whether this Committee is adjourning at 11:00, and if it is I suggest that we spend some of the 15 minutes time left discussing when we are meeting next week, what time we are going to convene next week, and what the procedure will be.

The Chairman: Well it has been outlined. We do not have any definite cut-off time, but I think I am pretty well out of questioners and so I expect we will be adjourning almost immediately. I could give you the proposed routine for next week, individually.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you sir.

Mr. Prud'homme: Mr. Chairman, could we ask that next week—there be a little bit more interest? I notice we are 16 Liberal members, 2 Conservatives and that is all.

The Chairman: I am sure we will have a more representative group next week.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We appreciate the large turnout of government members this morning.

The Chairman: Order please. Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson:

...we believe that an international force of moderate size would effectively police a truce and enable international relief operation to be undertaken.

Now that was on the basis of your conversations with the Portuguese Governor.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And other conversations; it was backed up by other conversations.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. "From our discussion with military men in Africa..." basically however as you just stated, the Portuguese Governor.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): That is right.

Mr. Anderson: The thing that worries me is that from what I have read of Portuguese activities elsewhere in Africa there is a determination on their part—perhaps that is too strong a word—at least they would have some interest in a tribalization of Africa which would make their colonial operations in Angola and Mozambique much easier.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think that is an oversimplification.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I know it is but I have read that; I have heard it.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I do think this is raising issues other than the one we are called upon—

Mr. Anderson: The question is this. The witness for 25 years has been a military man, a Portuguese military officer, and I would just like to know—I am quite willing to accept that he is a humanitarian—how did you get that opinion? How are you so sure that he is not reflecting a Portuguese Government view?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, I am not sure that he is not reflecting a Portuguese Government view and I am not sure what that view is and I do not think very many people are sure, but in terms of this particular individual not only our own impressions which were—we are not as you may know terribly disposed towards either the Portuguese Government or their efforts in their colonial empire but that should be taken into account, I think, in terms of our own views of this particular gentleman. We had heard, before we went to see him, that he was a very remarkable man; that he had taken the tragedy of this war very much to his own conscience and was attempting in his own way to do what he could to try and bring about peaceful solution. Certainly from talking with him at some length we had the impression which others had received, very much bolstered. So I think we made the statement on that basis.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, we thought his particular insight, with military background in Africa, introduced an important element into our thinking at any rate, namely that a UN operation was by reason of the physical and military circumstances a feasible operation. He pointed out the contrast between that and the situation in the Congo where through lack of the right physical contours it was almost impossible for the United Nations to stop

tribal wars in which very many people were slaughtered. We thought this was an interesting contribution to the—

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I can understand that. The point I was trying to make is that the Portuguese may wish, for their own political reasons, to prove to the world that Africans are unable to manage their own affairs and thus the colonial tutelage is in some way justified. He has made a statement, talking of an international force going in to separate Biafra and Nigeria...

Mr. Brewin: I think they would be very unwise to help the Biafrans, if that is their intention because the Biafrans have probably, amongst all the African nations, the nation most likely to be able to show, if they were free from war and its tragic aftermath, that they can manage their own affairs pretty well. Everybody seems to agree they are very keen about education and highly competent in many ways.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: It is 10 minutes to 11:00 so I will be very brief. I just wanted to ask the two witnesses if during the course of their stay in the region of Biafra, they never talked personally to anybody who was involved in the difficulties of two years prior in terms of some of the massacres and some of the atrocities that were committed?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, we had conversations with people who had been living in Nigeria through that period. I will not say that this was the major subject of most of our discussions because we were more concerned with the immediate problems that faced the situation. We thought there was perhaps some value in recounting the history. And the history was recounted for us in very much detail on at least one occasion—

• 1050

Mr. Forrestall: By somebody, who had some reason to have been involved?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, in fact by two individuals who were involved in some of the negotiations that had taken place in these various attempts to hold the Federation together. One of them was the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Mojekwu and the other was the Chief Justice himself who had at one point actually intervened in a potential break-up of the Federation some years ago. So they

gave us the background that had been involved.

Mr. Forrestall: Then there was nothing to indicate to you that there had been a lessening of the fear of genocide in October of 1968 as opposed to the period two years ago; that is to say having gone through something that is fresh in your mind and you are pretty startled by it. The passage of time tends somehow to ease the starkness of that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We had the impression that their fears had been fortified, rather than lessened during the period.

Mr. Forrestall: Thank you very much.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask two questions. In your news release dated October 6 there was something that was a bit confusing to me. In the first paragraph you talk of a small city of 26,000 people where 900 died of starvation, and regardless of how big the city was, 900 people are many people, and we have to be concerned about them. But later on in your testimony you indicated that in your opinion the city to which you were referring really was Umuahia.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, no. Uli. It is not in the testimony, but I said the other day in questioning that I think it was Uli and not Umuahia.

Mr. Cafik: Oh, I am sorry, I thought you had said quite the contrary. That city of Uli then, what is its population now? Apparently it must be more than 26,000 with the pressure of the population being squeezed into a small area.

Mr. Brewin: In this minor detail I have to dissociate from Mr. MacDonald because I never heard that it was Uli, but he may be perfectly right. I just did not hear that.

Mr. Cafik: No, I am sorry. The question is not that relevant, but I had the impression that it was the other city and it had a population of one million.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, that is right, more than a million.

Mr. Cafik: Which would shed a different light on it.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It was originally 30,000.

Mr. Cafik: Umuahia?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes.

Mr. Cafik: So if it was 30,000 and this one was 26,000, it might be up to a million now, too.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I do not think it has grown nearly that much. I do not really know, and I do not recall any figure being mentioned to us.

Mr. Cafik: Right. Now getting back to this great fear that the Ibo people have of being done in, as it were, done away with, I suppose it is quite natural really at any time during wartime, if you are anywhere close to fighting lines, and I gather the whole area is pretty close to the line. It has now shrunk to such an extent with such a great population, I would believe that almost anybody would have a fear of extermination under those circumstances, would they not? They would be afraid that they would either innocently or directly in some way get involved in the fighting and get killed as a by-product of it.

Mr. Brewin: I am sure they would, but I think there is a little more than that fear, with this long history starting with the massacres in 1966.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, it may have deeper-rooted fears than that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am not greatly familiar with other wars, civil or otherwise, but it does seem to me to be very unusual that the vast majority of the population keeps withdrawing inside the perimeter, even large groups of people that are not Ibo, for instance, and we have had references here to Ibos as being somehow or other the people of Biafra. It is my understanding that there are large numbers of minority peoples who continually withdraw inside the perimeter as well, and that may say something more than the usual kind of civil war situation.

• 1055

Mr. Cafik: Mind you, the story got around that they were exterminating everyone. I think that, if you had the slightest suspicion that they might be, I think you would take your chances on the other side, whether it was justified or not. But I am under the impression that a large part of this is possibly a campaign to create resistance to the federal troops. That may or may not be true. But I have not seen any evidence to indicate that it is not likely to be true.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, I do not know. Referring to the *Globe and Mail*, I think that Charles Taylor has been writing some things that would give a very strong credence to that situation.

Mr. Cafik: Is it not true that in every war-time situation the warring powers usually have a public relations machine going in order to wind the people up and give them sufficient reason to go and risk their lives to fight, and so on? You found that at all times, and I do not find it an unusual situation in Nigeria, or Biafra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Ryan): Gentlemen, before I entertain Mr. Stewart's motion for adjournment I would just like to thank Mr. MacDonald (Egmont) and Mr. Brewin very much for their fine effort. I would like to impress upon you all the importance of having a quorum here at 9.30 Tuesday morning next. We have a very important witness, one who has had a lot of experience in this matter. The witness is Dr. Johnson of the World Council of Churches, so you will be doing everybody a favor by being present.

6

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE
No. 6

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1968


Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

Dr. E. H. Johnson, Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada; Mr. G. Gordon Riddell, Head, Africa and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs; and Mr. Romeo Maione, Director, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
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OTTAWA, 1968



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Anderson	Mr. Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Mr. Marceau
Mr. Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Mr. Mongrain
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Hymmen	Mr. Nesbitt
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Laniel	Mr. Ouellet
Mr. Carter	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Prud'homme
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Legault	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Gibson	Mr. MacDonald	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Harkness	(<i>Egmont</i>)	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Macquarrie	Mr. Winch
		Mr. Yewchuk—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

¹Replaced Mr. Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*) on October 15, 1968.

²Replaced Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*) on October 15, 1968.

CORRIGENDA

Issue No. 4—Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence

Page 148 Second column Line 20—the statement attributed to Mr. Sharp should be attributed to Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*).

Page 162 Second column Line 36—the line should read “they have a lot to say about *Nigeria* that”.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, October 15, 1968.
(9)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9.40 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Perry Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Gibson, Harkness, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, Lewis, Macdonald (*Egmont*), Macquarrie, Mongrain, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch, Yewchuk—(24).

Also present: Messrs. Alexander and De Bané, M.P.'s.

In attendance: Dr. E. Johnson, Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and Mr. G. Gordon Riddell, Head, Africa and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman introduced the principal witness for this morning's sitting, Dr. E. H. Johnson of Toronto.

Mr. Lewis noted a newspaper report of this date which mentioned that the first of the *Hercules* flights may not be destined for Biafran territory. Mr. Gordon Riddell made a statement on behalf of the Department of External Affairs, to clarify the subject raised by Mr. Lewis. He promised to advise the Committee if there is any change in plans concerning the flights of Canadian aircraft.

On motion of Mr. Cafik, seconded by Mr. Hopkins,

Resolved,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Dr. E. H. Johnson of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and Mr. Rom Maione of The Canadian Catholic Organization For Development And Peace, who have been invited to appear before this Committee, on Tuesday, October 15, 1968.

Dr. Johnson made an opening statement, addressing the Committee at some length concerning his knowledge of conditions on both sides in the current Nigerian conflict. Members questioned the witness for the remainder of this morning's sitting.

The Chairman read a statement from Mr. Riddell concerning the present position of Canadian *Hercules* flights. Mr. Riddell provided additional information to the Committee during the questioning of Dr. Johnson.

The Committee was informed that Major General Milroy will return to Canada on Monday next. It was agreed that he should be invited to appear before the Committee on Tuesday morning, October 22, 1968.

It was agreed that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure should be asked to consider the desirability of calling Mr. Stephen Lewis as a witness.

On motion of Mr. Roberts, seconded by Mr. Gibson,
Agreed,—That the following document be printed as an Appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

NIGERIA
REPORT OF THE
OBSERVER TEAM'S VISIT TO THIRD NIGERIAN
MARINE COMMANDO DIVISION
SIGNED BY GENERALS MILROY, RAAB AND ALEXANDER
AND COLONEL OLKIEWICZ

(*See Appendix J*).

On completion of the questioning, the Chairman thanked Dr. Johnson for his able presentation and his patience in answering questions.

The Committee adjourned at 12.50 p.m., until 3.45 p.m. this day, when the witness will be Mr. Romeo Maione, representing CARITAS.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(10)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 4.50 p.m. this day, with the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Anderson, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, Macdonald (*Egmont*), Macquarrie, Marceau, Mongrain, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Yewchuk—(20).

In attendance: Mr. Romeo Maione, Director, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace.

The Chairman opened the meeting with an attendance at 14, on the understanding that as soon as a quorum was present, he would call for a motion to incorporate the evidence taken thus far.

At 5.00 p.m., a quorum being present, on a motion by Mr. Macdonald (*Egmont*), seconded by Mr. Cafik,

Resolved,—That the Evidence taken thus far during this afternoon's sitting be incorporated as part of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Romeo Maione, describing the recent positions which he has held. Mr. Maione made an opening statement in French and in English. He mentioned, in particular, the kinds of aid supplied by CARITAS International to both sides in the Nigerian conflict.

Members questioned Mr. Maione for the remainder of this afternoon's sitting.

The Committee agreed, unanimously, to the following corrections in the Evidence (*Issue No. 4 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*), as suggested by Messrs. Stewart (*Cochrane*), and Prud'homme respectively:

Page 148 Second column Line 20—the statement attributed to Mr. Sharp should be attributed to Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*).

Page 162 Second column Line 36—the line should read “they have a lot to say about *Nigeria* that”.

The Chairman thanked Mr. Maione for his testimony on behalf of *CARITAS*. At 5.45 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3.45 p.m. on Wednesday, October 16, 1968.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, October 15, 1968

• 0943

The Vice-Chairman: I see a quorum. I call the meeting to order.

Our first witness today is Dr. E. H. Johnson. He is Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

Since 1955 he has had oversight of the Presbyterian staff in Nigeria and has visited both eastern Nigeria and Lagos ten times in all. He visited Biafra and Lagos in January of this year, and Biafra again in August. In his work towards a peaceful settlement he has been closely in touch with the International Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, Caritas, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and other concerned groups.

Back in March of this year, the then sub-committee for External Affairs considered Dr. Johnson to be the most knowledgeable Canadian on Biafran affairs and he was invited to appear before the main Committee. He did so on Thursday, March 14th, and his evidence can be found in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 15, in the Second Session of the Twenty-seventh Parliament.

Unless there are opening questions I will call upon Dr. Johnson to make a statement.

• 0945

Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: There is a matter I want to read, Mr. Chairman. The other day in the press, and again this morning, there is a suggestion that the *Hercules* planes that Canada is making available will not go to Biafra. In this morning's *Globe and Mail* all I have seen is a short sentence saying:

It seemed quite certain the planes will not operate into Biafra, where starvation is most widespread.

Something is happening, the nature of which I do not understand. It seems to be that this Committee ought to make sure that we hear from someone in the Department of External

Affairs or from the Department of National Defence, if the latter is responsible, to find out what really is happening and why the impression is abroad that the planes will not go into Biafra.

If, in fact, they will not, there really was not very much purpose in all the fuss about finally getting the government to agree to send planes for relief purposes, and certainly not much purpose in the news which the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced, with some satisfaction, that he had got Nigeria to agree that the planes could go to Biafra. Without loss of time we ought to find out what in heaven's name is happening and why the planes are not going to get to Biafra, if that is the fact.

The Vice-Chairman: Is there any further discussion on this?

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to prolong this discussion, but I do recall—as a matter of fact, I have the words before me—that the Prime Minister, in answer to questions in the House as recently as Thursday, made it quite clear that it was the intention of the government, provided the Red Cross were willing to do it and supervise it, to send the planes not only to Fernando Po, from which the Red Cross would be operating the airlift into Biafra, but from São Tomé where a group of churches, as this Committee has heard, are now operating an airlift into Biafra—an airlift incidentally which urgently needs the assistance of *Hercules* planes. The Prime Minister made that very clear.

This report may be based on some misunderstanding, but the quicker it is cleared up the better. I hope we will be able to invite someone from the Department of External Affairs, which, I presume, is responsible for arranging this, to say why three planes should go to the area which is not being blockaded and none at all to the areas where we have been told thousands of people are dying daily.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Chairman, I also suggest that it was made quite apparent last week that the arrangements to get these planes in could take several days. This is a military operation of some complexity and requires extremely detailed planning.

I suggest that all we need to do is to inquire of the Department of External Affairs if there has been any change. It is quite obvious they have the planes there; and it is obvious they have to consult the Biafrans. In my opinion the reasonable approach would simply be a straight check, yes, or no. . .

Mr. Lewis: By all means, let us have a reasonable approach; I would not suggest anything unreasonable. But we ought to know what is happening. This is not the first time that there have been reports in the newspapers—and last night over the air—that our planes will not go to Biafra. Let us find out about it, and whether that is the fact; and if it is the fact, what are the reasons, if any.

The Vice-Chairman: Perhaps we should put this before the subcommittee.

I call your attention to the second paragraph in the *Globe and Mail* account by Mr. Geoffrey Stevens this morning. He talks about the three *Hercules* going, and then down at the bottom he says, "Then they will proceed to Lagos or to the Island of Fernando Po, or both". Where is the particular part that disturbs you?

Mr. Lewis: It is the next story, "Charge of Lagos genocide again denied by observers". There you will find the sentence I quoted. I assure you I read it word for word.

The Vice-Chairman: Is it agreed that we refer this to the Steering Committee?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): May I ask Mr. Lewis if his son is still in that area?

Mr. Lewis: My son arrived home last night and if he is wanted by this Committee, he is very anxious to appear.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Fairweather, did you have a question?

Mr. Fairweather: No, I did not.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacDonald?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think something that would save a lot of time would be for you or the Clerk to contact somebody in External Affairs and have them appear before the Committee and make a short explanatory

statement some time during our sitting today. I think that would clear up the matter quite quickly.

The Vice-Chairman: Is this agreed by all?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Maybe we can take care of it right now.

Mr. Gordon G. Riddell (Head, Africa and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs): Mr. Chairman, if you want us to try to clear it up now we should be very glad to do so.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Riddell, from the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Riddell: Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that an aircraft is on its way now to Fernando Po, to Santa Isabel to engage in the airlift into the Biafran area but, as was explained by the Minister before, it can go as far as Santa Isabel. There is no problem about that; we have clearance for the aircraft. In fact, Guinea became independent on the twelfth and Canada has recognized equatorial Guinea and we have got clearance through the Red Cross for the plane to go there. What we have not yet received is the clearance from the Biafran authorities for it to go on, but it is on its way so there is no delay so far as the Canadian government is concerned. The aircraft is on its way through Ascension to Santa Isabel and just as soon as the clearance is obtained there is no reason why it cannot be used on the Red Cross airlift into the rebel-held area.

There is one other thing that I might mention at the moment and that is that certainly on the news this morning there is a report that no Canadian supplies were going in. As General Winch pointed out, the Canadian government shipment of 2,700 tons of high protein food that is going by sea is being allocated in accordance with the distribution arranged by the Red Cross. Three-sevenths of that will be going to Santa Isabel and the remainder to Lagos.

That is the division that has been made by the Red Cross according to its own requirements for the Nigerian area and the rebel-held area. So three-sevenths of those supplies, the proportion set down by the Red Cross, are going in to the Biafran-held area. But so far as the aircraft is concerned, the arrangements are going ahead.

Mr. Lewis: May I ask Mr. Riddell a very simple question? Are the reports in the press and over the air—and I am quoting again—that it seemed quite certain that the planes will not operate into Biafra where starvation is most widespread erroneous; are they wrong; are they false?

Mr. Riddell: The only reason which would make that a correct statement would be if the Biafran authorities refused permission for it to go in. As I say, I do not know. We have not had a reply on that, but provided they agree there is no reason why the aircraft cannot do it.

• 0955

Mr. Lewis: Have they been asked?

Mr. Riddell: Yes, they have been asked through the Red Cross but we have not had a reply yet.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether this is a correct report, but I believe I saw in the press I think last Thursday—I cannot pinpoint what newspaper—a statement attributed to Col Ojukwu, the so-called head of state of Biafra, that the supplies would be welcome.

Mr. Riddell: If that is correct and it is confirmed by the Red Cross, then that is fine.

Mr. Lewis: Somebody seemed to suggest, Mr. Riddell, that perhaps the airstrip or airport at Uli—Annabella I think they call it—may not be big enough for a *Hercules*. I understand from some people that it is.

Mr. Riddell: I think the answer to that, Mr. Lewis, is that in fact the Red Cross is operating a C-130 *Hercules* aircraft belonging to the Swedish Red Cross from Fernando Po into the rebel-held area. That has been operating there and presumably if one *Hercules* can get in there is no reason why the airport cannot take another.

Mr. Lewis: Then all these reports, so far as your Department is concerned are, at the moment, false?

Mr. Riddell: Yes, I know of no reason except the question of getting clearance from the rebel authorities—the Biafran authorities—to allow the Red Cross to use this particular Canadian plane.

Mr. Lewis: May I take another moment? This is from memory but I am sure it is accurate: My first concern—and I think I

asked the Prime Minister a question about it when the Secretary of State for External Affairs was away last Friday—arose out of a story that came allegedly out of Geneva where somebody speaking—so this story went—on behalf of ICRC said that these planes would not be used in Biafra. I asked the Prime Minister that, and my memory tells me the Prime Minister said so far as he is concerned that was wrong; the intention is that it go on both the Lagos and Biafran sides of the fighting. Then there is this story dated Lagos. Now, I cannot help but wonder whether the International Red Cross is involved somewhere in keeping these planes on one side rather than the other side of the fighting.

Mr. Riddell: Mr. Chairman, I know of no reason. The Red Cross obviously is operating on both sides of the line. It is carrying out relief on both sides of the line. It has night airlifts into the rebel-held area from Fernando Po. As General Wrinch pointed out in his testimony, *Hercules* are required and so far as the Red Cross is concerned they are obviously delighted to have this and are making every effort to work out the arrangements that will enable it to be used.

Mr. Lewis: Finally I ask, if there is any change in plans, whether Mr. Riddell or a colleague in his department will be sure to inform the Chairman of this Committee so that the Committee can know exactly what is happening.

Mr. Riddell: Yes; certainly, Mr. Lewis.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lewis, have you finished? Mr. MacDonald?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I just have two questions to put to Mr. Riddell. There is a fairly large group going into operation—71 personnel I think—and there is discussion in the reports today about the establishment of a base camp from which the operation will be carried on. However, no specific location for this camp is mentioned. Mr. Riddell, do you know where it is to be located?

Mr. Riddell: It is fairly clear, since two airlifts will take place, that there will have to be some sort of facilities. Now, whether it is going to be possible to do a certain amount of pooling I do not know, but obviously there will have to be personnel on Santa Isabel and there will have to be personnel at Lagos because they are operating two separate airlifts. I mean, politically one cannot marry

these two airlifts and have people fly direct from Lagos.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): There will be two base camps, then? Is that what you mean?

Mr. Riddell: Well, yes. I am not fully aware of the details and whether they are going to be able to do some pooling, but there will have to be at least some base facilities in both places.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I have another question. You said that only three-sevenths of the material on board the ship leaving Halifax actually will be landed at Santa Isabel for Biafra.

• 1000

Mr. Riddell: As General Wrinch made clear to the Committee, there is a problem of relief supplies required both in the Federal-held territory and the rebel-held area. The allocation based on the assessment of the need has been made by the Red Cross and the needs happen to be three-sevenths at Fernando Po and four-sevenths in the Lagos area. This depends on the rate at which they are getting food in, it depends on the requirements, it depends on the stocks they have, and so on. In this particular shipment the Red Cross asked that they be distributed in that proportion and that is the proportion in which the aid will be distributed. This is a decision that is made by the Red Cross and the Canadian Government is simply following the advice of the Red Cross. Of course, what has to be remembered is that this ship is only one shipment that is going in. There are shipments of relief supplies coming from many areas and at the time this particular ship reaches the area this is the proportion in which they want to have the relief distributed for an optimum distribution. Someone else may have sent it and it may arrive a week earlier and it may be slightly different, but this is the—

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): —continuing criteria.

Mr. Riddell: No. This is the proportion on which these relief supplies are being distributed for that particular ship, because that is the way the Red Cross wants it done.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: If there are no further questions, I would like to thank Mr. Riddell

on your behalf. I am sure you all feel he has been the right man at the right time.

Before asking Dr. Johnson to speak to us, there is a matter of housekeeping that I would like to have attended to for the Clerk's sake. I would ask for a motion along the following lines:

That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Dr. E. H. Johnson of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and Mr. Romeo Maione of the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, who have been invited to appear before this Committee, on Tuesday, October 15, 1968.

Mr. Cafik: I so move.

Mr. Hopkins: I second the motion.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, may I speak?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: I do not know if it is part of this motion or a separate motion, or just a question of information. Now that we are at the beginning of a week, I wonder if we could be given some rough indication of the witnesses who may be available later in the week. I know of Mr. Charles Taylor and Mr. Stephen Lewis. I think we are most anxious to have General Milroy, if that is possible.

The Vice-Chairman: We still have not had any word on General Milroy. Mr. Charles Taylor will be called. Mr. Bezanson and Mr. Alan Grossman are definitely scheduled.

Mr. Brewin: Oh, yes.

The Vice-Chairman: In connection with Mr. Stephen Lewis' name, I think we would have to put that to the subcommittee. It has not been put there yet.

Mr. Brewin: I wonder if I could urge—it may take some time to arrange—that every possible effort be made to get General Milroy here, if it would not interfere with his many duties. I do not think the Committee, which I believe would like to report soon, can possibly report without having had General Milroy here.

The Vice-Chairman: We will try to have some word on the likelihood or not of his attendance when we meet after lunch at 3.45 p.m.

Mr. Thompson:

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have a question in regard to the motion. Is it not customary for the Committee to cover the expenses involved for witnesses who appear before the Committee as they are approved?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, it is.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Without having a special motion of this type?

The Vice-Chairman: Apparently the custom is to have the motion.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): If that is so, could we not have a blanket motion that would cover all witnesses that we might call for this particular hearing without singling out any particular person?

• 1005

The Vice-Chairman: I am advised by the Clerk that it is customary to name the witnesses when it is firmed up in this way. I suppose it is for the accounting division's purposes as much as anything else.

Are you ready for the question? All in favour of the motion?

Motion agreed to.

The Vice-Chairman: I now have the pleasure of asking Dr. Johnson for his opening statement.

Dr. E. H. Johnson (Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am again happy to have the honour and privilege of testifying before this Standing Committee on External Affairs. I was before the Committee in March of this year and since that time I have again been in Biafra and am very happy to have the chance to share some of the observations which I was able to make.

I have been correctly introduced as the Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and have been spoken of as representing the World Council of Churches' interests, one of the church representatives. Perhaps this is not so much my credential for this Committee as the fact that up to two or three weeks ago I think I was the only person from Canada—press or church, or of any other kind—to have been in and out of Biafra not only twice, but even once. At that time we spoke of this war as the forgotten war, and certainly that has been one of the aspects of it, that this has happened in that country, and as far as our

Canadian news sources have gone we have had almost no direct reports about what has been going on.

My contact with it has been in ten fairly extensive visits during the past 12 years in visiting eastern Nigeria, which is now Biafra, and always visiting Ibadan and Lagos over in western Nigeria. During that period I have become familiar with the countryside, having travelled a great many hundreds of miles on very, very doubtful roads and have become acquainted with a good many of the political figures, not in any political capacity that I have but in my connection with them as a representative of the Church and in terms of the concern which we in the churches have, not only with the ecclesiastical development but with medicine, education, political developments and the whole welfare of the country.

When I went into Biafra in January I was one of the first outsiders to go in. As you know, there has just been a very tenuous lifeline that Biafra had maintained with the outside world, which at that time was through Lisbon. No one was then able to inform me how to get in. I was welcomed as a person from the outside who had come to at least listen to these people in the midst of their trouble and concern. At that time I then went to Lagos. I had to go back up to Europe and then down to Lagos by commercial airline and I spoke there with a great many of the government people, including General Gowon, and I also travelled widely and was sent out by General Gowon to see some of the war fronts.

This was in August and again there was some difficulty in getting in. I had to go down by the tenuous Lisbon route, where I not only had to fly at night but it was a very fly-by-night operation with ancient chartered planes. I do not mention this to tell of the journey, which in many ways was a very interesting one, but to indicate again the way in which that part of the world has been cut off from the outside world. There has been a blockade not only in a military and economic sense but also a blockade of news. One of the great things about this present moment here in Canada is that for the first time in the fourteen months of that very bitter war we are beginning to get quite a flood of information. One feels deeply grateful to the members of Parliament who were ready to take the risk, to go in and bring this matter to public attention, and also to Charles Taylor and Stephen Lewis. In my view, knowing these areas well,

may I commend their articles to you as being a very accurate report on the situation within Biafra, and they bring out the actual facts of the starvation and something of the mood and thinking of the people. This has been a very complex and difficult matter on which to get an accurate view, and it is most important, if there is to be a peaceful settlement, that we get true facts and true information because certainly we can make no just or durable peace on the basis of false information or misinformation.

• 1010

We have been continuously connected in our church, both with Lagos and with Biafra, and our own church has relief workers on both sides. As a matter of fact, at the present time, we have more workers in Lagos than we have in Biafra. The man who heads up the Christian council relief program in Lagos is one of our men—a young pharmacist, a very gifted pharmacist—who left Regina and went out to head up the whole pharmaceutical and drugs aspect of the relief program on the federal side just a month ago. Some time next week one of our ministers from Toronto will be flying into Biafra to work with Dr. Middelkoop and the Protestant and Red Cross relief programs and relief administrations. A young couple from our church went in just a week ago and these people are doing it, as you know, against the hazard of bombing that has taken the lives of some of the workers and against the hazard of invasion. The two Red Cross people and the two World Council of Churches personnel who were killed last week by the Federal troops when they came into the area are people with whom I met about six weeks ago when I was in Biafra.

I have said this because the Prime Minister has challenged church agencies, if they are concerned about this thing, to take the risks and get into the relief work. There has been a large group of church people and relief people who were in the midst of this situation who have taken the risk and who are carrying on the work. I think we owe a real tribute to them.

As I said, until the past three weeks I was almost alone as one from the outside who had been in and out. That fact was brought home to me last week when I got home from work at 6 o'clock and the telephone rang and the caller said, "This is Tom Gould of CTV. I am on my way to Biafra. I would like to know something about Lisbon and Sao Tome". I was very happy indeed to give him informa-

tion about it because I had been trying since I was there in January to get Canadian television and news people to go in and bring out the information for us here in Canada. I had no sooner hung up than the telephone rang again and it was a man from CBC. He said, "Can you tell me how to get to Biafra"? I did not mention to him that CTV were already on the way, but I again spent a half hour telling him everything I knew because I think it is of great importance that we get accurate and true reporting about the situation if we are to play the important part which Canada can play. The payoff came when I was awakened in the middle of the night—when I was sufficiently awake to look at my watch I found it was 2.00 a.m.—by the editor of Weekend Magazine in Montreal, who said, "Can you tell me how to go to Biafra"? So, in the dim dark, I gave him the information.

I have mentioned this to underline two facts: One, that there is a very great concern here in Canada to get information on an area on which we have had almost none and, secondly, that up to the present time, I had been almost unique in Canada as a person who had been in and out. I say this not to present myself as having information, but simply to stress the fact that we have not had independent sources of information and, therefore, it has been very difficult for us, as a country, to understand what our part might be.

• 1015

In coming to the Committee today, I want to attempt to give some objective information because I believe that objective and accurate information is essential if we are to move to a peaceful settlement.

During the past year in which I have been giving most of my time to this matter—not on one side, but in terms of the total problem—I have been closely in touch with the International Committee of the Red Cross, with Arnold Smith and the Commonwealth Secretariat, with the World Council of Churches, with Caritas—the Roman Catholic Agency—and with many persons in government, including our own External Affairs Department and people in Britain, New York and Washington, seeking to share this first-hand information about Biafra which is essential.

I plan to use the term "Biafra" at this point because it seems to me the least political term one can use. If I were to speak of the Repub-

lic of Biafra I think there would be a certain political recognition in that. I must say I find myself a little disturbed by our official government's use of the terms "rebel", "rebel territory" or "rebel route", because I think they are terms which have political connotations and do accept a judgment about what is the matter at issue in Nigeria and Biafra at the present time.

May I say, for your information, that the word "Biafra" is a geographical term. The Presbyterian Church of Eastern Nigeria, when I first contacted it in 1955, had only a very short time before that been known as The Presbyterian Synod of Biafra, which was a geographic term applying to that area. I think this is one of the least loaded phrases which one can use in discussing the issue.

I would like to make a second general comment, and that is the size of the conflict and that what is happening there may perhaps be the most important single event in Africa at the present time and may affect the peaceful development of African states more, perhaps, than the matters of Rhodesia or South Africa—the racial matter to which rightly we are giving major attention—because this is the question of how one gets changed in states which were set up in a colonial time.

If you get into this discussion as I have in Lagos, Europe and Britain, you will hear again and again that if secession is allowed in Nigeria this could set a chain reaction going throughout Africa. I do not think anyone would question the seriousness of casual or mischievous secession. By casual I mean secession of a group of ambitious politicians who may want to lead out a section of the country for their own purposes, or of mischievous secession of some outside commercial interest. One had the feeling in Katanga that this had its meaning, not as much within the Congo as it did in Belgium and in other European countries. Certainly easy secession would be a disaster for Africa.

I think this event in Nigeria also leads one to question whether there is not a more serious and more dangerous precedent being set at the present time, that is the extent to which a federal government has the right to carry on a war which is leading to the destruction of a minority group—a substantial minority—that desires to have a different kind of political structure. I think it would be a very great disaster for Africa and for the world, if a precedent were set that any government because it is an internal affair can do whatever it wishes with a group within its rule.

● 1020

The third general comment I would like to make is that this is a matter of world concern and not simply of African concern. There has been some tendency to say, "Let us leave this matter to the Organization of African Unity because it is an African affair". Let me say, Sir, that it is my own conviction that it would be very serious for any outside group to attempt to resolve or determine the political structures of that event. I am entirely in accord with Arnold Smith, whose testimony I read, who said, "It is not for us to make a resolution or a determination of the political issues in that area." At the same time, his testimony is also very positive in saying that outside countries can render an important service in advice, in offering good offices and in bringing this matter into discussion at the right places. I would agree with him and would agree with Mr. Sharp, the Minister, that this is a matter which should be reviewed in some international tribunal and not by some single country from outside.

It is a matter of world concern and not simply African concern because it has not been left for resolution in Africa. You do not get into much discussion on that in Biafra, in Lagos or in Europe without the feeling that the decisive factor in this conflict has been the support of Lagos by Britain and by Russia, and that without that support it might have been decided in Africa simply by the forces of political discussion, at which the Africans are particularly good. But with the overwhelming support which has come from Britain particularly—because this has been an infantry war—and the very expensive air support, which Russia has given by way of Egyptian pilots the war has tended to move decisively and the free political discussion has therefore been stifled because it seemed as though the final offensive were coming.

As one thinks back on the history, it was originally the purpose of the Lagos government, with the support of the British, to end the war with a two-week police action. Then a more realistic assessment said it would take two months to bring the "rebels" to task. Then Major General Gowon set March 31, the end of the fiscal year, as the deadline by which the war must be concluded. When I was in Lagos in January this had just been proclaimed in an address. Later it was thought that the war would take a few months longer and the British position was stated by the Rt. Hon. George Thomson, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, in the

House of Commons on August 27. The position at that time was that the war should be carried forward to, first liberate Port Harcourt and then to put a ring around the Ibo land, as it was called. At that time the British continued their supply of arms on condition that the Federal Forces would not move in. Then they saw that that led to the policy of mass starvation and 50,000 people a week, mostly civilians, women and children, were dying of starvation.

When I was through Britain in August, on my return from Biafra, the policy had changed to what some people speak of as the "quick-kill theory" or, rather, a final military offensive. It was felt that it would be more merciful to let an offensive go through and complete the war and then a full-scale relief operation could be carried forward. In part of that final military offensive program the observers were sent in, and I think it was because the British people have a very bad conscience about this whole thing. They said, "You must go forward and complete the military offensive but observers must be brought in." Thereupon Lagos invited military observers to accompany the armies to see that the military offensive was carried on in a nice clean way without any unnecessary killing. One of the things that disturbed the Biafran people very deeply at the time I was there was the distinction between "necessary killing" and "unnecessary killing". Presumably the task of the military observers is to see that there is no unnecessary killing after the formal military actions have been carried through. That final offensive was set up on the belief that there was a military solution and that within two or three weeks the war could have ended. The time of that decision is now almost two months away, the war is still going on in a very vigorous way, and some of us who have watched it very closely for a great many months, from the beginning and prior to that, are convinced that there is no military solution. To put one's faith in a final offensive can result only in a long continuation of a war which will become deeper, more involved and more complicated internationally, as that war is now becoming. It may turn into not only a disaster for Biafra but a disaster for the Federal Military Government in Lagos, a disaster for peaceful development in Africa, and in many ways a disaster for much wider areas because of the increasing involvement of outside powers in an area where that kind of thing had been absent in earlier years.

• 1025

When I made my visit in August I did it because it seemed to me a very critical time. It did appear that the final offensive might move in and close the country off. The relief situation was very terrible. We were getting then, as you recall from the beginning of July, pictures of starving children some had suggested that these were contrived pictures of propaganda effect, we were getting terribly disturbing statistics—about 2,000 or 3,000 children a day dying because of hunger and protein deficiency—and it looked as if the country would be sealed off. I made a visit because I wanted to get hard facts. I had in mind at that time three objectives: hard facts about the actual relief situation and what was being done; hard facts about the morale and whether these people were about to surrender; and some hard facts about their thinking in regard to the possible future of the war on that side.

What I am trying to do today, sir, is not to express my own opinions on the events but to give some observations in those areas. First, and very briefly, the relief needs have not been overpainted. In spite of what my friend, Okoi Arikpo, said in the United Nations about contrived pictures, they are not contrived. One could find this situation in any village or any relief camp through Biafra at that time, and I understand from relief workers who are there now that the situation is the same or worse. I have, from my own camera, a great many pictures of that kind. You do not have to look for a child whose ribs show, whose stomach and ankles are swollen, whose hair is turning yellow and falling out, with matchstick arms and legs; you can find this in every third or fourth child in any village within Biafra.

There has been some discussion whether one could ascertain firm figures. I must say I was somewhat disturbed about the statement that perhaps there was some malnutrition in Biafra but there had always been malnutrition and that it was impossible to assess these firm figures. It think it is impossible to establish the exact figures. I think it is impossible to establish the exact figures because you cannot add up the death certificates at the close of each day, but it is possible to establish a firm estimate. In extended conversations with Protestant, Roman Catholic and Red Cross relief workers in the central committees, and also by visiting many of the camps and villages to check just what was happening,

you can get what I think is a firm kind of estimate. That is to say, you would get a general figure of about 6,000 from someone like Dr. Middelkoop the head of the Protestant work, and then you would begin to check how that figure is arrived at. You know there are 800 camps and you check with camp workers and find that five or six children a day are dying in each camp, and you arrive at a rough figure of 3,000 or 4,000. Then you check the villages, find that they are worse off than the camps, and you get a higher figure. It is very conservative to state that the death rate is running at a minimum of 6,000 a day. While that is not an exact figure it is a firm and reliable estimate.

• 1030

When I came back I shared these facts with our Department of External Affairs, with Mr. Sharp himself, with British government people, because I felt it was something on which we needed hard facts.

The second comment I would make on the relief situation is that the Biafran Government itself has done a remarkable piece of work in dealing with refugees in spite of its extremely difficult and impossible situation under siege. They had set up these 800 refugee camps with almost a million refugees in them—this on top of the million refugees who had flowed back into Biafra after the massacres in the north in 1966. They were giving priority to relief needs in both food and gasoline, two of the rarest commodities. All the protestant, Roman Catholic and Red Cross relief workers were high in their praise of the co-operation they received.

Any suggestion that Colonel Ojukwu or the Biafran government is holding out food because they want to accentuate the pitiable condition of the people could not be more wrong. The reverse is true in an almost impossible situation. The government has given this priority and there is in the country, both in the government and through the voluntary relief agencies, one of the most competent relief distribution systems that I have seen. I say that as a person who has seen something of the relief program in India and the relief we had in East Asia a couple of years ago.

The only problem for Biafra is that the country is blockaded and there are simply not enough basic carbohydrate foods at the present time and there is a total absence of high-protein foods, because they used to get all of their protein either from herds of cattle

that came in from the north or stockfish that came in by ship and both of those are cut off by the blockade, both in terms of protein deficiency, which is being met by the voluntary relief agencies, and in terms of the carbohydrates, things that are grown locally.

May I add a comment on that? When I was there in August they had a very good crop indeed of yams and cassava, an evidence again of the country's determination to do everything it can, but that crop is just not adequate because it is not one of the richer crop areas of Biafra and the area has been reduced to a very small size. Also the population has swollen to many times its original size and there is simply not enough carbohydrate food in spite of these very good efforts.

The second area on which I made notes was the morale situation. When I was there in August I noted it. When I was there in January I had noted that the morale of the people was amazingly good. I should have thought that by August, with the pressure on them, morale would have fallen away. I was amazed to find that these people still are quiet and confident. I had expected to find panic, confusion and chaos but found instead an orderly kind of government going on, and right down to the front lines where I visited life was going on with order and dignity and self-discipline.

One of the great problems in Biafra and one of the reasons, I think, for their bitterness against the British supporting the other side is because the Biafrans are, perhaps, the most British people in Africa. In the midst of this terrible suffering—life goes on with self-discipline and with resolution and with a kind of dignity. I do not know whether it was Charles Taylor or Stephen Lewis who used this word but it is one that has come into my reports in these two visits I have made.

One does not find a lot of military police keeping order; you can move about that country as freely, almost, as you can move about Canada except for the formal road blocks along the road, but order is kept simply by the inner integrity and industry of the people. You find that from the government leaders right down to the children in the villages, the old people and the women, they are one in their determination to continue to fight the war even though they know they may die.

Again and again I was able, because of my long missionary connections, to get quite outside the Government range and talk with educational people and medical people, nurses

and preachers, teachers and many ordinary people, and everywhere I found the same feeling. Many of their relatives have died but they carry on because they believe that it would be suicidal for them and for their hope of having free expression to surrender. This is very much a people's war and a people's movement. This is why the idea of a quick military offensive is fallacious because that is based on the idea that if you get rid of these political leaders that area would immediately come to terms with the Federal Government. If the leaders were to propose any kind of surrender, they might not remain in their leadership positions very long.

It is an amazingly democratic kind of structure in which Colonel Ojukwu is dependent on his advisers, and the people and the leaders together work in mutual support.

I think it was quite remarkable that when the Addis Ababa peace meeting was convened, Colonel Ojukwu and many of the top leaders were able to leave the country and go to that conference knowing that they could go back and be received. There was no thought that if they were out somehow or other people might rise up against them. I think it was strong evidence of the identity of leadership and of the strong morale at every level.

When one asks these people whether they are ready to resign and get their conscious thinking about surrender, there is no intention of surrender. There is a plan and a hope that after this first phase of the war on the hard surfaced roads and in the towns is completed, one which is almost impossible for the Biafrans to win because you cannot meet a Saladin armoured car with a hand rifle they will go into guerrilla warfare which would widen out into very much more than the area which is now described as Biafra.

At this time I should like to make one comment on the size of the situation for information, Mr. Chairman, if I may point to the map. I think one of the facts that is a little misleading is this map because one looks at the great size of Nigeria; then the former Eastern Region is this area here and within the Eastern Region the present territory under the control of Biafra is outlined, I think quite accurately, by this smaller black oblong. Actually, that is a little deceptive because it seems to suggest there is nothing left.

I think one might think about Canada where we have a vast country. If you were to circle the area from Quebec City to Windsor

you would have a very small circle within the map of Canada but you would have a fairly substantial part of the population of Canada. To get this truly in perspective one needs to remember that. The contrast is not quite that sharp but there are 8 to 10 million people in this area out of a total population of perhaps 50 million. This is one of the most concentrated population areas in the whole of Africa.

I think another way in which the map is deceptive is that it indicates the perimeter of the area in the present fighting, but as you go out you find that what is controlled by the Federal Government in these other territories to some extent is a matter of the towns and the hard-surfaced roads. When I was in Biafra in August I met with the Protestant Red Cross Relief Committee here in Umuahia and one of the men who was reporting reported on clinics that he was holding twice a week up here, right up just outside of the university city of Nsukka, so that a Biafran control runs out in the back roads which, in that area, are almost as significant as the hard-surfaced roads.

Here is Onitsha, which has long been in Federal hands. Two of the formal refugee camps of the Biafran government are up just about where I am pointing fifteen miles north and east of Onitsha. Some of the church workers with whom I spoke were having regular contact with congregations right up into the border and the danger is that if this war carries on into a guerrilla phase then it may widen far beyond that present small perimeter. At present the Biafran government is concentrating on the hard surface road war and on the town war, but it could widen into very extensive guerrilla activity. People ask the question: why has there not been guerrilla warfare in these areas? Why have there not been attacks on Enugu? I think the answer to that is the extremely limited amount of equipment which the Biafran Government has had available. They either have to hold it for the more formal head-on warfare in this area or, if that war is completed, then it could possibly move into this long-term guerrilla activity which would be a very tragic and unfortunate thing. I think it is important to recognize this in view of the present theory that there should be a final military offensive. I think, if one is being realistic, that is not very likely and could only lead to continued disaster. Therefore, of course, it makes it more urgent that there be some attempt to get a cessation of hostilities and a political negotiation rather than the present attempt,

which seems to me perhaps blessed in some ways by the Observer Team, to find a military solution.

• 1040

In conclusion, what is our Canadian role in this? One cannot overemphasize the unique position in which Canada stands in this affair that both the Lagos leaders and the Biafran leaders do have confidence in Canada. This is quite unique. The British Government has had the longest connection but the British Government, of course, is involved in the whole military activity of Lagos. There is some fear of the American Government's getting in because of the cold war with the Russians. However, Canada has had good connections partly because of our first High Commissioner, Tom Carter, who was very widely known through the country and who established very good connections and rapport, and partly I think through the work of various church groups that have been at work on both sides in Nigeria. Both sides do look to Canada as a country which might extend its good offices and help bring about a peaceful settlement.

It seems to me that this opportunity does give Canada a very unique responsibility. Surely to be in that position and not use it to the full would be a serious betrayal of our responsibility as a nation that believes in a just society, I hope for the world as well as for our own nation.

It is, therefore, of great importance that we bring relief to both sides in this conflict. In many ways Biafra has the greatest need because it has been blockaded. The Federal Government and territories do have the opportunity of buying food or getting food from outside and the areas held by the Federal Military Government do have airports and seaports through which they can bring in food. This is not true within Biafra. If food is not brought in from outside it is simply not available. I would hope that perhaps a major part of our Canadian concern could be for the people in that area.

I hope, sir, this will be true for the use of the *Hercules* planes. There are some eight or ten flights a night going in from Sao Tomé and I believe a similar number from the island of Fernando Pó under the Red Cross. Each of those flights now carries nine or ten tons. With *Hercules* planes each flight could carry 25 tons without any greater difficulty or any greater danger; actually with less difficulty, less danger and greater facility because

these are freight planes equipped to load and unload, whereas most of the present transport are converted passenger planes and the food has to be handed in and out of narrow passenger doors.

• 1045

The second matter in which it seems to me our Canadian Government should play a role is in continuing to bring this matter before the UN or other suitable international agency for enquiry. I do not think it is our task as a government to make accusations, but certainly when half a million people are dead and it looks as though another half-million civilians could be dead before the end of the year, it is a major matter of world concern which merits a fair enquiry by the United Nations or some other world body. The United Nations have sent their observers to Federal Nigeria; they have not sent an observer into Biafra. If one is going to ask about atrocities or about unnecessary killings, surely the place to ask is the area on the receiving end of the war. What did happen in the bombing of the civilian areas of the city of Umuahia?

In the *Globe and Mail* of this morning there is a brief note on the destruction of a leper colony at a town called Uzuakoli. I know the people there well; it is a Methodist leper colony and hospital. There is no military establishment of any kind in that area, but it is reported this morning that 47 people are dead and 102 people are severely wounded. I believe a report of that kind is true because I saw something of the same kind when I was in the area where one of our historic Presbyterian leprosy hospitals was destroyed by wanton bombing. The observers should be at this place, where the actual effect of the war is being felt, or there should be observers, let me put it that way.

I think one of the functions we could well serve is that of fact finding, simply to know what the situation is. Not that we are appointed judges of this; this is not our task. But when a problem of this kind is abroad and we have an opportunity to know about it, to simply look the other way would seem to me a failure in responsibility.

I was most interested in the excellent statement by Stephen Lewis which appeared in the *Toronto Star* on October 10 in which he quoted Colonel Ojukwu as welcoming official observers or people of high standing. On the question of a visit from prominent Canadians associated with government the Colonel had this to say—I assume here that he means

"more prominent Canadians" because I do not think there is any comment on the Canadians associated with government who did visit. He says:

I would welcome these men in my country. They can have complete freedom of access to any area, any situation, any information which they might desire. They can engage in discussions with anyone at any level.

I have talked with a great many reporters, British, American and Canadian, who have been in that country and they have underlined the amazing freedom they have had to move anywhere, to talk with anybody and to report freely.

And then these words:

If only they would come to make a thoughtful, independent assessment of what really exists, I am prepared to accept their judgment.

This is invitation "to make a thoughtful, independent assessment of what really exists". I feel that perhaps by taking advantage of our opportunity to find something about it, we could serve a very important role in this very tragic conflict which could have much more bitter and tragic consequences in the coming months.

• 1050

I would hope, sir, that perhaps one of the outcomes of this Committee's work would be a recommendation that a more official or semi-official group might go to pay a visit simply to get information; not to make accusations but just to be observers on the scene.

I am sorry to have taken this long, but it is a very complex and very important matter and I wished to share with your Committee some first-hand observations—I hope they are objective—of what is going on there.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Johnson. I am sure you would be pleased to accept some questions from members of the Committee, doctor?

Dr. Johnson: I will accept them.

The Chairman: I have a list here of those who would like to ask some questions: Mr. Roberts, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Thompson and Mr. Gibson, in that order. I will take further names but I will now call upon Mr. Roberts to ask his first question.

Mr. Roberts: Dr. Johnson, I must apologize for missing the first ten minutes of your very informative talk; I had to be elsewhere.

I wonder if I could ask you several questions in perhaps three areas. First of all, I think we have all been impressed throughout the testimony—and you have re-emphasized it today—that no matter how grave the situation is at the present time, within the next five or six weeks the situation is going to become really horrendous. We were told at one stage that the probable estimated need of supplies would become something like 3,000 tons a day in comparison now to perhaps 200 tons. Is it not going to be impossible to move that amount of relief supplies per day by any kind of airlift, no matter how well organized?

Dr. Johnson: I had some talks with Commissioner Lindt in Geneva when I came back in August. If it were possible to get permission for a daylight lift onto an airstrip exclusively for relief supplies—and at that time such an airstrip was being built—he thought it would very soon be possible with only a few planes to establish an airlift that would take in 500 to 600 tons, and within two or three weeks to establish an airlift that would take in 900 to 1,000 tons a day.

I do not think it would be impossible to take it in by air, and taking it in by air would avoid some of the extremely difficult military problems which are encountered on any kind of land route. May I say, though, that on a land route Colonel Ojukwu has indicated a number of routes which would be acceptable and I think the ones which have been turned down were turned down for necessary military reasons. However, I think it is possible for an airlift to bring in a very substantial amount of food without very great difficulty or the involvement of a very large number of planes.

Mr. Roberts: Up to 3,000 tons a day?

Dr. Johnson: Perhaps with the use of more airfields this also could be attained.

Mr. Roberts: I wonder if you could perhaps be a little bit more precise about what you think the Canadian Government should do. I notice you said that some international body, whether the United Nations or another, should make some attempt to get an inquiry established into the situation. I gather you would not suggest that the Canadian government, through Canadian planes or getting crews, should ship arms into Biafra to counterbalance the efforts of the British and the Russians on the other side?

Dr. Johnson: No, I would not suggest that we should be involved in any way with the shipping of arms.

Mr. Roberts: If we were to ship a great deal of food and supplies in, would this simply not free the capacities that the Biafrans are now using to bring in food and supplies to bring in arms and guns?

Dr. Johnson: I do not particularly think so. Actually, the Biafran capacity for bringing in anything has been very limited. At the time I was there in August it was still almost nonexistent, so I do not think it affects that. It does affect the general welfare of the people, and the food which has been sent in has gone to the relief camps. In that sense it is keeping the people alive, as against what has possibly been a starvation policy; to make life so uncomfortable that people would be forced to surrender. I think that would be the objection from the military point of view which one might have to the shipping in of food.

I think the answer to that, of course, is that we would not have very much sympathy to the military method, which is primarily aimed at the starving of women and children.

• 1055

Mr. Roberts: I ask questions along that line because you emphasized that you did not feel there was a policy of deliberately letting people starve in order to arouse world sympathy. However, we have heard evidence to the effect that there has been a willingness to allow children to starve, given the necessity of maintaining a fighting force. Therefore, the food has been channelled to the fighting forces, which indeed makes a great deal of logical sense. There have been various comments made that what the Biafrans need is not food but arms; that their emphasis is on arms and not food. So, they must be getting arms from someplace. I wonder if there is not a danger in bringing more and more food for humanitarian reasons and simply freeing other sources of supply for the shipment of arms and therefore leading the Nigerian authorities to interpret our humanitarian efforts as really an effort which would enable the Biafrans to collect more arms and maintain a stouter resistance.

Dr. Johnson: I suppose precisely the same comment could be made about our support of the federal side in food, because one of the problems of the Red Cross in the federal side, of course, has been the preempting of Red

Cross planes for the transport of troops. The taking over of the food supply to the eastern areas from Lagos could do the same thing.

I do not know of any time or event or incident—and I know the Roman Catholic and Protestant and Red Cross relief workers very well—in which the Biafran government has taken advantage of this flow of supplies and diverted them for military or other purposes.

Mr. Roberts: This is the first time I have heard the comment that the Nigerian authorities are using Red Cross planes for the shipment of troops. Could you give me some details on that?

Dr. Johnson: At this point let me quote the *New York Times* of a couple of weeks ago, where it was reported that a plane with Red Cross markings on it had crashed near Port Harcourt with 55 Nigerian soldiers. I do not know whether our Department of External Affairs has examined into the facts behind that, but this was reported in the *New York Times* about ten days ago.

Mr. Roberts: It was not clear whether it was a Red Cross plane with soldiers in it or a military plane that had been disguised with Red Cross markings.

Dr. Johnson: One would have to examine into the particular incident.

Mr. Roberts: There is just one other area in which I would like to ask some questions. One of our difficulties in this Committee, of course, is in getting objective information. We have heard various reports of propaganda efforts by both sides. I believe there was a statement by the Moderator of the United Church that something like \$5 million had been allocated by the Biafran authorities for propaganda purposes including the promoting of the idea that genocide was taking place. In the *Ottawa Journal* of September 25 Dr. McClure was reported to have said that something like \$5,200,000 was being used in the Biafran propaganda campaign. I wonder if you have encountered any evidence of that or if you can give us some idea of the kinds of efforts the Biafrans are making in that regard, because that would undoubtedly tend to cloud some of the information we are getting before the Committee.

Dr. Johnson: I have only heard Dr. McClure's statement by way of hearsay and I have been wanting to speak to him about it to find out his source of information. I think

both sides have, of course, invited journalists in at various times and tried to make this information available. On the Biafran side, of course, you could only get in by the Biafran airlift, so that the journalists were a little more dependent on the government than they were in Lagos, where any journalist could simply buy a ticket to Lagos on BOAC or some other commercial airline. But I do know that on the Lagos side they have invited groups of journalists down at government expense, and I think this possibly has happened on the Biafran side. In answer to that, I think the most impressive fact for me, as I have tried to get information continuously during these many months, is the testimony, without exception, of all the journalists who have been in—British, French, American and Canadian. They are given complete freedom to see what they want, find out what they want, to report what they want, and their reports have gone out uncensored. The reports which they have given have been almost unanimous. If you take the reports of Charles Taylor and Stephen Lewis, in which there was no collaboration, I do not think you would find any variation. If you put beside those the reports of Lloyd Garrison of the *New York Times*, who has been inside many times and has been thoroughly familiar with Africa for many years, you would find no variation. If you take some of the British journalists who have been in in recent months you would find the same thing is true, that there has been a unanimity of reports, not unsimilar to the testimony which I have tried to give this morning. Whether or not the Biafran Government has had their own propaganda instruments the free-reporting reporters have had a very consistent view and I think a very accurate one of the situation.

● 1100

Mr. Roberts: Do you think that the co-operation of the Nigerian authorities is an essential prerequisite to organizing the massive relief effort that is going to be needed, or could such a relief effort be organized in spite of their opposition?

Dr. Johnson: I think your question should be in two parts. I think the voluntary agencies have been right in setting in motion a relief organization without getting permission from Lagos or without even discussing it with them. They have simply set up, largely on the island of Sao Tomé, an air transport system which flew in. Actually, at the time I was there that was totally cut off for four days by

the threat of anti-aircraft fire. When I wanted to come out of Biafra on August 9 I went to the airport and only one plane came that night because of the threat of cut-off. The next four nights no plane came or went into Biafra. Then a Swedish crew had the courage to break the blockade. The Protestant and Roman Catholic relief agencies have just flown in at night under threat of anti-aircraft fire and very difficult conditions. The Red Cross, on the other hand, sought to get permission from Lagos for day flights but some of their plans were unacceptable both to Nigeria and Biafra, and they have been flying in at night with, I think, a kind of limited permission. However the question of government planes does introduce some other factors.

Mr. Roberts: Is the answer then that the massive relief effort would not ultimately be possible without the co-operation of the Nigerian authorities if you are talking in terms of a day airlift or a land corridor?

Dr. Johnson: This is right. They would have to judge because they control the skies.

Mr. Roberts: Would we not be wise then to avoid actions that would make them hostile to any kind of relief effort we might wish to organize?

Dr. Johnson: I would think that it is important to keep friendly contacts if we can, with Lagos. How long one should wait and how many people should be allowed to die while one seeks to get official permission is a delicate question and one on which the Canadian Government has to make a decision. It was July 1 that the Red Cross and other agencies tried to get permission from Lagos for day flights. It was thought at that time this would come very early but now, towards the end of October, that has not officially come except for one particular proposal which, for very specific reasons, could not be acceptable to the Biafran Government.

Mr. Roberts: So at least the maintenance of friendly relations or the co-operation of the Nigerian authorities is a very important factor in providing relief supplies in the situation.

● 1105

Dr. Johnson: I would think so. I myself have tried to do this because, through the church, we have done relief work on both sides. I try to maintain contact with the federal people because, whatever the outcome of

the war, a Nigeria of some kind will continue. But I think we also need to look at the other side. There are ways that governments have of seconding planes to relief organizations which are carrying on the work. We in Canada seem to be in a strange position—I do not know much about planes—of having quite a number of these Hercules planes, which are essential, and if this Scandinavian-organized group which is now operating on Sao Tomé had two or three Hercules they could do a tremendous job without any more danger or anymore difficulty than they now have in running DC-6s, Super Constellations and DC-7s which are not really very adequate for this sort of freighting.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I could just ask one last question. I apologize for taking so long. I asked questions along the line I did because it seemed to me that one of the things that you suggested, going to the UN or before a special tribunal, has been one of those things which the Nigerians have indicated they would react very hostilely towards and this therefore might have a counter or a negative effect on ultimately providing more relief to the people who are going to need it so badly. Is there not a danger of that in the proposal you make?

Dr. Johnson: We in Canada, you know, have made a great deal of use of the words "humanitarian concern". Now I do not think one can use the word "humanitarian" and be concerned only about delivery of relief because, ultimately, there are people being bombed and destroyed by the war. The only real answer for that area is some kind of a peaceful settlement and, therefore, if we do have a humanitarian concern we cannot be unconcerned about political negotiations which would lead to a satisfactory outcome. I think it is very difficult for us here to form a judgment about the situation and the group that ought to be looking into it is an international and, preferably, a world group. I myself went to the United Nations and pressed them. I did not see U Thant but one of his aides on the political side said he was very glad to hear that the Secretary-General has his personal representative in Lagos. I think it is terribly important that he is investigating this quietly. However I think his personal representative should also go into the Biafran side because you cannot understand a situation of conflict like that without looking at both sides. I still hope that the Canadian Government would press the UN to

make an inquiry as to what is going on, and in the light of that there might be a decision as to what appropriate action could be taken in this very complex affair. I am under no illusion that there is a simple answer to this but I am deeply opposed to our simply sitting aside and the world saying, "This is an internal affair, we can have no concern in it."

Mr. Roberts: Thank you very much, Dr. Johnson.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Dr. Johnson, I would like to congratulate you because your presentation this morning has been complete and has given us a much better insight into the whole problem. From the beginning of these inquiries it has been of concern to me that we have had always one side of the story. We received reports from the Federal side, we received reports from the Biafran side, but we have never received a report before which covers both sides. This is why I have been giving a great deal of thought to this. In view of your suggestion this morning that Canadians are well regarded, perhaps better than other people are, by the people of Nigeria, would you not agree that it would be of value to the whole world and to Canada in particular if a group of parliamentarians were to visit all sides of Nigeria for the purpose of observing and also with a view to seeing first hand what is being done with Canadian aid?

Dr. Johnson: Personally, I would be very happy indeed to see a plan of that kind. I like a number of things that you have said, Mr. Stewart, one of which was that there should be a visit to both sides. If it is a matter of an inquiry, simply to visit one side alone is not adequate. I think that such a visit might also concern itself with the relief needs and the approval of our government to send relief to both sides. I think it is of great importance that we should not pretend to be the people who can solve the problem but only people who are deeply concerned, and seeking to understand what is involved, because I believe that for an outside government to intervene in this affair is not our task or our responsibility; and that outside governments should be concerned and seek to secure accurate facts in an area on which there has been very little information.

• 1110

You see, this is the role I have had. I have taken the information I have had on Biafra to the Nigerian authorities because I think the opportunity to be inside and see what is happening and make observations and know this is important for them as they seek to define the course of the war. I would welcome our Canadian government's setting up some kind of rather informal fact-finding group that would go, not with the aim of solving the conflict, but with a desire to understand it and see whether there are any other actions we might take that would contribute to a peaceful settlement.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): There have been suggestions in the press that the mentality of the Ibo tribe is such that they might be willing to sacrifice children rather than adults. Would you say that there is truth in this?

Dr. Johnson: I think that report came out of a New York *Times* reporter in Lagos who was commenting on anthropological observations about Africa and made the comment that when, in tribal life, a tribe is under stress they let go the least valuable members. I do not think this applies to the Ibos any more than any other group in Africa so that I felt that was applied in a rather wrong way in saying that these people are prepared to sacrifice children in favour of the war.

I think you could say that not only the government but the people generally are accepting this terrible sacrifice as part of the price of having a security from this kind of thing again. Whether or not you think it is right, this is the position they are taking: "We must accept this now in order that we may have security to live and some freedom to carry on our economic activities". The people and the leaders together are accepting this as the price they have to pay for freedom.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Would you say that the relief food goes directly to the children, or does someone else get a priority?

Dr. Johnson: I would say the children get priority. I say this from my own observation and from knowing personally Dr. Middelkoop, Ronald McGraw, one of our Canadian men who was in, and many of the other workers and having seen it happen. I have never seen a relief organization so carefully organized that anything that comes in the top of the funnel goes down through very compe-

tent distribution channels. Within 24 hours of the time something comes in at Uli airport it is probably in the hands and in the mouths of the people in the camps. It goes down with great effectiveness and impartiality.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Would you say, Mr. Johnson, that the family is a closely-knit organization?

Dr. Johnson: Yes. Of course, in Africa what they call the extended family, groups of 50 or 80 people, has been one of the factors that has helped these people survive through this terrible situation.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Are they very fond of their children? That is what I am getting at.

Dr. Johnson: Oh yes; in some ways more so than we are. This is a very, very bitter thing for them. Children are taken care of and accepted by the wider family.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Of course, the children are always the ones to suffer and in this instance this is no exception, and I think many of our concerns should be to how we are going to help the children. Perhaps this is something that could be explored with your help but outside the Committee.

• 1115

Dr. Johnson: Part of the tragedy is that almost a whole generation has been destroyed. Those who are not already dead, the doctors fear, will suffer serious kinds of physical and mental retardation through extreme undernourishment at this critical younger age.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

The Vice-Chairman: I wonder whether we could not have a break for about five minutes now and let Dr. Johnson have a cup of coffee like the rest of us, and resume at 22 minutes past 11 o'clock.

(After break)

• 1130

The Vice-Chairman: Since we have interrupted our proceedings, I think now would be the time to bring you up to date in respect of a few matters.

First of all, we now have printed sections 4 and 5 of the current Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of this Committee and they

have been distributed to your offices, so you will have them for this afternoon.

Mr. Roberts: No, they have not reached my office.

The Vice-Chairman: There may be a hitch in a few cases.

Secondly, we expect the Second Observer Report of the Milroy team will be available for the Committee at our afternoon session.

Thirdly, I have received a bulletin from Mr. Gordon Riddell of the Department of External Affairs which I think I should read at this time.

The present position re Hercules:

1st Hercules is in Lagos.

2nd Hercules left Canada yesterday for area for use by Red Cross on airlift from Fernando Po into the Biafran held area.

—will go via Ascension Island where it will arrive tomorrow. (i.e. 48 hours after departure).

—it will be put on the airlift from Fernando Po when Red Cross will have made necessary arrangements, including obtaining permission of Biafran authorities.

3rd Hercules is taking spare parts, personnel and ground-handling equipment to enable 1st and 2nd aircraft to operate respectively on the Lagos and Biafran sides.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you for bringing us up to date. What about General Milroy?

The Vice-Chairman: We are still awaiting word in that connection.

Mr. Fairweather: It becomes more important than ever to have General Milroy here and any thought that this Committee could make final report before his appearance would not find favour with our group.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think the terms of reference of the Committee stated that was part of the job that this Committee was charged with. So for a final report, at least, we have to wait until we have had a—

The Vice-Chairman: I hope to have word, Mr. MacDonald, before we rise at 12.30, as it is now estimated.

Mr. Anderson: Are you awaiting word simply on the date on which he is going to appear before this Committee, or whether he will appear or not?

The Vice-Chairman: It is on the decision whether or not he will come, I take it.

Mr. Anderson: In other words, no decision has yet been made that he will come?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Riddell, would you let the Committee know what you have on this.

Mr. Riddell: General Milroy is at present completing the third tour that the observers are doing and as soon as that is completed he is expected to come back on Monday afternoon. I think he will be available after that.

The Vice-Chairman: Monday of next week?

Mr. Riddell: Yes.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Cafik has a question.

Mr. Cafik: Well, then, Monday of next week, apparently, is the earliest that we can anticipate General Milroy's testimony?

Mr. Brewin: I do not think we should try to urge him to come here the very day he gets back. I think, from personal experience, a little rest is helpful. I would suggest Tuesday.

The Vice-Chairman: I am glad to see you are taking a humanitarian view.

An hon. Member: A very humanitarian view.

Mr. Brewin: Don't count on it.

The Vice-Chairman: Is this everything now, Mr. Riddell, or is there something further?

Mr. Riddell: I think that it would be advisable. He will have had a very long flight and I would think that it would be the humanitarian thing to do to give him until the following morning.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Riddell. Can we continue now with the questioning by—

Mr. Anderson: I have one question. Stephen Lewis is in Canada now. Is he scheduled to appear between now and the end of the week?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Anderson, he is not yet scheduled, but we will be having a subcommittee meeting probably immediately after this meeting and we will then determine whether he will be invited to appear as a witness or not.

• 1135

Are there any further questions?

If not we will go back to the questioning of Dr. Johnson. Mr. Thompson is the next questioner.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Johnson, as one who knows the area about which you have been speaking this morning, somewhat at least, I must say that I believe your testimony is of particular value and I am very grateful for your willingness to appear before this Committee and to express yourself so freely and openly as you have, although I am sure that if more time were available, there would be much more that you could say.

Obviously you speak from an in-depth experience in the area with its people and first-hand knowledge of the problems, and this is of much use to us in the Committee. I really do not think there is much that we can add to your testimony by questioning you except, perhaps, to clarify one or two questions that might be of use to us as we continue our deliberations in the Committee.

One thing I am concerned about this morning, Dr. Johnson, is the charge that the Biafrans have mounted a massive propaganda campaign to draw their plight to the attention of the world. In fact last night on television, the Minister said something to the effect that it was one of the best cover jobs done in regard to presenting one side of the story as, the Federal Government have done very little to bring their side of the story to the attention of the world.

What is your thought in regard to this charge? Has there been, or is there, a propaganda attempt that would have as its motive public opinion, or is this attention that has been focussed through the news media something that has come out of the fact that voices like yours have been speaking about the facts of the situation?

Dr. Johnson: I think, Mr. Chairman, that Colonel Ojukwu's comment which Stephen Lewis quoted, that if people would come to make a thoughtful, independent assessment of what really exists, is what he wants. Because Biafra is blockaded, it is extremely difficult to get into the country. When I went in in January nobody could tell me how to go. I had to find out and discovered there was a Biafran office in New York city and that if I went to Lisbon I would get in somehow. I had no idea

how I would get in. At that time, either you walked ten, twenty miles through a forest trail from the Cameroons or you went to Lisbon and went down on a supply plane of some kind. I did not know about it. There has been a news blockade. I do not know whether it has been the intent of Lagos to keep this matter quiet up country, but certainly it has been the effect of their blockade. The only way you can get into Biafra is through the good graces of the Biafran Government, because you cannot go to Air Canada and buy a ticket to Umuahia; it is not on any commercial airline. The Biafrans have, I think, made some effort to get journalists to visit. Now, whether or not that is a vast propaganda campaign depends, it seems to me, on how you judge Charles Taylor. They were very happy indeed to have a person like Charles Taylor visit it. After I was there in January, I tried to get the *Globe and Mail* to send him; I tried to get other papers; I tried to get the CBC to send teams in simply to report the facts. Now, if an honest, objective reporting of fact is a serious propaganda campaign, then it seems to me this is true, because the Biafrans had been concerned to get people—newspeople—to go in and the only way that could happen was when they set up certain arrangements.

• 1140

May I say that the Federal Government has also done the same thing. When I was in London in April and May, a very large group of British and other European journalists were in Lagos at the invitation of the Federal Government, and at the expense of the Federal Government, but actually their reporting backfired because a good bit of it turned out to be somewhat negative to the situation as they saw it at that time. It seems to me one needs to try to uncover the intent of that charge that there has been an attempt to build up a picture by a propaganda machine. I would have questions about that because all of the newsmen that I know who have been in—I have talked to most of them because I have tried to search out—have spoken of the freedom they had to report that they wanted to report. The only help has been the facility for getting in; that had to be arranged because of the blockade situation.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): The second area of concern that comes out of your report and out of the news reports before us this morning is the second interim report of the Observer Team, and it relates this time to

the Port Harcourt-Calabar area. From the reports of the heavy fighting that took place there only in recent weeks and months and from reports that have come to us through the press and here in the Committee of the massive suffering taking place, and not only suffering, but starvation in the Port Harcourt-Calabar area, could you throw any light on this report that says that the Federal army is to be praised for its efforts to get relief supplies into this area and obviously, according to this report, there is no massive starvation?

Dr. Johnson: I find myself at some difficulty in reading the report of the Observer Team because the reports that we have had from Roman Catholic, Red Cross, UNICEF, and other relief agencies would indicate that there is very great hunger and need, some of the worst in the area, and that not a great deal has been done about it. Now, these reports are not within the last two weeks. When I was young and had to go to a party, I had to put on my Sunday suit, and it seems to me that with the observers in the area, this is the situation. They say actually in one of their reports that within the last two weeks the situation has improved. I take it that could well mean has improved in the areas which they are visiting. But one would like them to investigate the news story that came out at the time Port Harcourt was taken that several hundred wounded soldiers were bayoneted in the hospital in Port Harcourt. I think they should investigate some of these things that happened at the time when the army came through and not the kind of thing which they may see some days afterwards when they are determined on the final offensive and when Britain and Lagos are both very eager that a good image should be presented to the world.

We did hear those reports at that time, and I would be very interested to have an impartial group like this Observer Team get hard facts about that story.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It might be of interest also to note whether their report mentions the massacre that took place just the other day and I think was reported in the press on Thursday and Friday in that same area.

Dr. Johnson: This also was near Port Harcourt, the machine-gunning of the villagers at a village market which both Charles Taylor and Stephen Lewis reported in some detail. My problem with the Observer Team is that they do not seem to be in a position to investigate things of this kind. I hope that if

they continue, provision will be made for them to get to these places where we do hear stories. I would like to know what their comment is on the Uzuakoli leper colony, which was destroyed two days ago.

• 1145

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): A question that has been coming to mind as we have listened to testimony from the various persons who have been in Biafra centres around the fact that there is only one airport available. There has been some suggestion that a second airport is under construction. Would it not be possible for the Biafrans to improvise a second airport that could be used solely for the purpose of bringing in medical and relief supplies and that would be adequate to handle such aircraft as the C-130 *Hercules*?

Dr. Johnson: There was an airport constructed at a place called Obilagu near the town of Okigwi which has now been taken by the Federal troops, it was offered by the Red Cross as an airport which should be used exclusively for relief supplies, nothing else, under the international supervision of the Red Cross and an outside team. But the Federal Government of Nigeria turned that down at the time, saying it was on one of their invasion routes and therefore they could not approve it. I think the Red Cross, in co-operation with the Biafran Government, could with international help get an airport operating fairly quickly. Commissioner Lindt said this would not be difficult with the kind of link matting which they have used in the Viet Nam war. This is the kind of effort that the Canadian Government could help with—airport equipment, radar and some kind of portable control tower. I would think that an airport exclusively for relief goods would be a very valuable contribution to meeting the relief needs without running into some of the political and military problems which are involved with the one all-purpose airport.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You have answered the second phase of the question I was going to ask. Do you not think that the construction of such an airport under the controlled direction of, shall we say, the Red Cross or other international agency, would be one of the efforts that Canada could well undertake at this time in addition to the supplying of two, or three, or four aircraft?

Dr. Johnson: I would think that this is something which might very well be explored

by the Canadian Government because it is equipment which I am sure our Air Force has available and could lay out as a temporary airport, and provide it with temporary equipment so that it could get into operation at an early date.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My last question, Dr. Johnson, is political. I realize that our basic concern and your basic concern is on the humanitarian side and on our obligation of rendering aid and relief which is necessary in this crisis area. But your experience and your background in this I think might give us some information on the other side that would be helpful, and therefore I would ask if you might explain in a little more detail what you meant when you said that military action was not the answer; that there was going to have to be another solution to this whole problem. What, in your opinion, would that be? Again I mention that your comments, if you would not mind commenting on this, would be helpful to us.

Dr. Johnson: All right. Just a further comment on my belief that a military solution cannot be found. The present final offensive, which seems to be blessed generally, is based on the assumption that you can get a quick military victory, and a final military victory. I think it cannot be quick because of the resistance. The paper this morning notes again that as the Biafrans are shoved into a smaller area, their defence becomes easier in a sense because the front is never far away and they are not pulled in many directions at the same time. So that it may well be that the taking of the remaining hard-surface roads and the remaining towns will not happen as quickly as we expected. When I was in Biafra in August they thought it would be another couple of weeks before this might happen. It has not happened now. I think if it were to happen, it would not be the end of the war, but simply the beginning of another and a worse phase of the war which could continue beyond the six months which was suggested by Dr. Arikpo, which I believe is a very optimistic estimate of the time required to finish off guerrilla activity. It might go on for many months and many years beyond that. This would be a very tragic thing. Therefore I think that the final offensive, which sounds very plausible and is intended to get the war over with and the relief and reconstruction begun, is based on two false premises. If that is not so, then what is the answer to the political question? It seems to me the Organi-

zation of African Unity has nailed this down. They said: "The cessation of hostilities. We want everybody to work for the cessation of hostilities," and I think if you examine the Organization of African Unity statement very carefully you will find it is not only cessation but it is, then, political negotiations which will achieve some kind of peace and unity. That Organization does not define the particular structure of the unity which might be in the area.

• 1150

Let me make one final comment. If the military campaign could be successful within a short time, it could achieve not the one Nigeria which the Lagos government originally hoped for, but might achieve a single political unit of Nigeria in which a major area exists as part cemetery and part concentration camp; that is, a group of people who are resistant to government and are brought into that Nigeria only because of military power. Therefore, it would be hard to see that there could be any economic or political stability or any happy development of that kind of Nigeria.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Then what you are saying is that if Canada does have a role, due to her good will that exists on both sides of this problem, it would be towards bringing this up on the agenda of some international organization such as the UN with the object of trying to bring about a cessation of hostilities?

Dr. Johnson: Then, I think, a political discussion which does not rule out ahead of time any of the possibilities. The problem of previous political discussions was that Lagos said they cannot go forward unless secession is given up first. In other words, Lagos must not have a discussion that excludes the possibility of an independent Biafra, nor should Biafra go into it with a conviction that rules out the possibility of some formula for unity. That ought to come out of negotiation, not out of power factors.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Thank you very much, Dr. Johnson.

The Vice-Chairman: I ask the Committee to give its permission to have the Observer Team's third report distributed in English alone. Apparently there will be a delay of a couple of hours before the French copy is ready, but it may be that the Committee would like to have this as early as possible.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: There is no objection? Then I ask the clerk to see that this is distributed forthwith.

I should also like a motion at the same time to have it included in the Committee's Proceedings as an appendix.

Mr. Roberts: I so move.

Mr. Gibson: I second the motion.
Motion agreed to.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Johnson, you are obviously a dedicated and extremely well-informed Canadian. Speaking as others have I wish to express my gratitude to you not only for coming here but for the tremendous job you have done in this field.

It has been strongly rumoured that arms are flowing in to Nigeria from Britain, Russia and France. I ask you, sir, whether in your opinion the importing of arms into Nigeria is, by itself, interference in the political realm?

Dr. Johnson: Yes. It has certainly affected the course of the war fundamentally. Over the last 14 months, had there not been that dependable flow of British arms I think the Lagos government would have been in very great difficulty. I must say that I have always been one of those who said that the cessation of flow of British arms would have been one of the keys to the end of the war within a few weeks. It does represent, in a sense, a political decision.

• 1155

Mr. Gibson: What I find difficult to understand is that we are being told to keep out of the political realm because of interference with the development of a foreign power. What I do not understand, sir, is why U Thant, as Secretary-General, has not publicly or privately—or perhaps he has done both, but I do not think he has—taken a stand with respect to importing arms into this country at this time. Are you aware of anything on that subject?

Dr. Johnson: Into —?

Mr. Gibson: Into Nigeria. U Thant has apparently said nothing publicly. Do you think he is exploring it privately?

Dr. Johnson: I am afraid I do not know what he is doing privately.

Mr. Gibson: When you spoke to the official in U Thant's office, did you raise the subject of arms specifically?

Dr. Johnson: I understand that the Secretary-General has a certain discretion to explore areas of trouble and he has sent his representative—I think it is Mr. Nils Gussing—to Lagos to explore that fact.

I have been to the United Nations twice and talked with some of the senior officials, not with U Thant himself. At that time I asked whether it was not possible for the UN at least to launch an inquiry to find out what is happening. I did not deign to make specific proposals but did suggest that it is an international affair and the comment which I received both times was that the United Nations was standing aside while the Organization of African Unity, which is the regional group, was dealing with the matter.

My own feeling is that that may have happened for a number of reasons. One, of course, is the problem of Viet Nam into which the United Nations have not been able to move, and when they got into the problems of the Congo it was a very difficult and complicated piece of work, and I think it was partly reluctance to take up a matter in Africa and some respect for the Organization of African Unity. What I pressed then I have pressed here. Inasmuch as Britain, Russia, and Egypt to some extent were involved, it looks now as though other nations, possibly France, are getting involved. It is becoming very much a conflict in which not only African nations but perhaps outside nations could have a quite decisive and increasingly complicated and dangerous part. Therefore, it seems to me to be a matter that is worthy of an inquiry by the United Nations.

Mr. Gibson: I have one more question. Do you think we should persuade the Secretary-General to send a peace settlement force—not a police force but a peace settlement force—for discussion of a ceasefire?

Dr. Johnson: This might be one of the means that he would see fit to use, having studied it. My own feeling first of all is that it is a matter that calls for study. This is why I feel, from our own concern, we could send a fact-finding group. I think for the United Nations some inquiry about what is happening is the initial step before one determines what are the appropriate actions that might be taken. But possibly this has been talked about. As you know, a number of months ago

in Canada the Commonwealth Secretariat talked of a possibility of a peacekeeping group. Now there is more talk about an observer group that might go in. These are some of the possible means, but it is such a complicated matter I think it would need a very careful inquiry first of all which must include, I think, some look at both sides.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you.

Mr. Yewchuk: The question I wanted to ask has already been touched upon. Dr. Johnson, there have been many comments on whether the observer group down there now is really as effective as it could be because of the fact that it is under the directorship of the Federal Military Government. It observes only one side and it usually gets to the point of action well after the difficulties have taken place. What would you suggest as an improvement in the effectiveness of the observer group in order to give us what one might consider a more accurate picture of what really happened?

• 1200

Dr. Johnson: I suppose part of the basic problem of an observer group—and I am not speaking now at all about the competence of the men; as far as I know they are men of great competence and integrity, I do not think one should question that—but it seems to me that the initial problem in the set-up is that this is an observer group invited by the Federal Military Government—invited by one side—to observe its actions and given, I understand from the terms of reference, fairly large measures of freedom theoretically, because practically they are very dependent presumably on facilities for getting about and authorities of the Federal Military Government. If there were an observer group of that kind it would be very much better if it were an observer group not invited by Lagos, but responsible perhaps to the United Nations and making observations on both sides of the conflict. Then one would have much more confidence in the total validity of their report. Personally I do not question this. As I have read the reports I think they are very careful statements within the very great limitations of such an observer group. It would have been much better to have had an international group responsible to an international organization and able to move about on both sides of this fight.

Mr. Yewchuk: Do you think it would be more useful if they were present in places of

action at the time of action, say at the front lines and so on? Because apparently when most of the atrocities take place is when the Nigerian soldiers come into a village and, as reported previously, kill many people who are not involved in the war.

Dr. Johnson: That is right. I have read the very interesting report about the Red Cross workers who were killed which I think you have in the second report. The report said about that:

(a) Federal soldiers deliberately and without provocation by the persons concerned shot and killed two Red Cross officials and two W.C.C. representatives: they wounded three other Red Cross officials. Several rounds were fired at a distance of 3-5 metres. The officer-in-command, who has not been identified, was present at the site of the shooting but was either unwilling or unable to prevent it;

Now this is, of course, what the Biafrans fear. They say: "It is all right to have a good intention in Lagos, but we face this. The things that we fear will happen long before the Lagos observers come on the scene to give us protection." This seems to me to be the problem. If you do not have observers on both sides of the line, you do have an essential problem in the usefulness of their report. I do not question its integrity within the limitations of what they saw.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. De Bané?

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: I had the impression, listening to some of the testimonies, especially Mr. Arnold Smith's, that this is an extremely confused situation and it is difficult to know the extent of the tragedy that is taking place there.

I would like to ask you what are your comments after Mr. Smith's testimony for instance, despite all the information that he has, he refuses to go very far and to say that there is a large tragedy and disaster. You quoted 500,000 people who would have died, it would be a million by the end of the year.

Do you not think that some people tend to minimize the extent of the tragedy? For instance, I am thinking of Mr. Smith's warning to be careful and not to let our feelings of sympathy take over reason?

[English]

• 1205

Dr. Johnson: I am very glad you have asked this question, because I have a very strong conviction that this is a matter on which we need hard information. This was largely the reason that I went again to Biafra in August. I must say at that time I was suspicious of the pictures of suffering children and the statistical estimates of the death rate because of hunger. We were launching a large Nigerian-Biafran relief fund in Canada and I being personally closely connected with that and initiating it, wanted to be sure that we went out with hard information about the situation. Also, in terms of the political question involved, this cannot be dealt with in sentimental terms or in partisan terms, but I think in terms of information. I would say there has been, some very dangerous work done by those who have tried to say that the story of suffering is exaggerated by the Biafran Government and that there has indeed not been a great loss of life.

I think it was back in March or April that I received from the Nigerian High Commission here in Ottawa figures showing that the deaths through the war up to that time were estimated conservatively at 150,000 or 200,000. That is deaths from the war and deaths of civilians and others who had died because of it. If one takes the estimate which I established when I was there in July, and which has since been corroborated by others who have pressed this very hard, of 6,000 people a day which runs to 40,000 people a week and carries it across a 12-week period, there are another 400,000 or 500,000 people who have died. So this is a tragedy of very large proportions for Africa and I would challenge anyone to dispute these figures. I do not know any more reliable witnesses to these things whom you can call than Dr. Middlekoop, Father Prendergast of Caritas and Heinrich Jaggi of the International Committee of the Red Cross. I depended not only on these figures, but on many individuals, I was up-country and into villages and I continually asked questions about what was happening. Everywhere the story was the same, people were quietly dying all over the land, we are facing a situation of massive proportions.

I have communicated some of this to the Nigerian Government through the High Commission here in Ottawa, because I think it is extremely difficult for people in Lagos to realize the extent of the war. I had a letter

yesterday from one of our men who is working there and he said. "We sometimes feel here as though no war is going on; it seems like a very small thing, very far away." I recall when I was in Lagos in January, having just come from Biafra, that I had not been there a week before the war began to feel like something no bigger than an ashtray, away over in the far corner of the land. But when you go into the country as I did and as two of the members here did, and as a number of the press people have, you suddenly discover that this is a tragedy of major proportions.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: I do not know, Doctor, what your reaction is to this warning that was extended to us on many occasions to be very careful so that our feelings of sympathy... of generosity do not jeopardize the solution of the problem.

Personally, I have been very surprised by this warning: "Be careful, do not take unfortunate responsibilities or attitudes because you have a sympathy towards the situation".

In other words, I have the feeling, due to this warning and to the fact that no one can tell us what is taking place there, that there is a tendency to minimize the tragedy. Do you also have the same feeling and why should there be such an intent to minimize the situation?

• 1210

[English]

Dr. Johnson: When I was in Lagos in January, one of the very able members of the Nigerian government told me he had just come from the United States and he had said to friends there: "You may be sympathetic to Biafra, but please do not give them any encouragement because you will simply extend the period of their suffering. We are going to crush the rebellion and therefore any encouragement to those people just delays the final military solution and therefore the moving in of relief." I must say I am a little surprised at some who more recently have said that same thing, that to show a concern and an interest in Biafra may cause the loss of many thousands of lives. It looks as though people who take that position have moved to the position of the quick kill, of the final military offensive, and therefore the sooner that is over the more merciful. It may be rough in the doing, but at least it ends the suffering and relief can go in. My problem

with that position is that it does not accord with the facts within Biafra. I do not know anybody who has been in Biafra who would take that position, because the thing that strikes you is just unmistakable. Our two parliamentarians who were there for just a brief time found this and this is why just a little exposure to the fact that these people are determined to fight on is of tremendous value. Also, that they are much more resourceful. That little map gives one the feeling that perhaps the thing is finished.

I must say that before I went out in August I wondered if it was not, and part of my reason for going was to find out just what was happening. Then you discover that the people have a tremendous resolution to fight on rather than to surrender, which they think is suicidal, and there is a very considerable little country left. When I was out in August it was a country the size of Holland with about the same population, which we do not despise in Europe, and although it is smaller now it is still six to eight million people, which is a fairly sizeable country.

These people have a great resolution. If the military solution is not going to come, then, what is the way to end the suffering? Surely it is to take every step we can, through international and other ways, to work for a cessation of hostilities. I would be very dismayed if Canada were in any way to support the Federal government of Nigeria or the British Government in this final offensive activity. I think we must stand apart from that and continue to throw light on the situation and try to get action at an international level for a cessation of hostilities and a political settlement.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: Doctor, I see that we both had the same reaction to this warning that was given to us, and that you had a similar attitude.

I would like to ask you a last question. The argument that any interference in the matter could set afire the entire African continent because the recently independent countries are former English, French, Spanish or Portuguese colonies, is this argument an argument which applied entirely to the problem of the Biafran people?

Dr. Johnson: I think that any direct intervention by Canada in that war would be very ill-advised. Neither the Biafrans nor the Nigerians would appreciate it if we thought we could tell them what their political solu-

tions would be. I am also sure this is true of other countries in Africa.

At the same time, I think there are many countries in Africa that are members of the Organization of African Unity that would welcome having this matter dealt with at an international level. This was stated very clearly by the representative of Zambia in his address to the United Nations, where he said in a very forthright speech that this is a matter of world concern and he hoped that some international body would therefore take action on it.

• 1215

I think this would be true of many more of the African states than it would appear. The Organization of African Unity, of course, has its own problems and there are many reasons why it came to the decisions to which it came. This general question, if you get into it, if you read *Newsweek* magazine report and if you talk with many people in the United States they will say if this secession succeeds we will see the balkanization of Africa. Personally I do not accept that. I think you need to look at each problem of secession. From the Biafran point of view it is not a secession, it is a war of independence, a war of freedom. You need to look at each problem in its own light. The people there do, and the thing that dismays me in Africa, as I have already said, is that a precedent might be set here that there are no limits to which a federal government can go in order to keep the unity of a country, even to the almost total destruction of a population. I think this is a precedent under which no minority in Africa would feel safe if the world stands by and sees a thing of this kind happen, so that while we should not intervene directly as the Canadian government, if we can raise this in an international court and throw light on it so that hostilities can cease and negotiations begin, this could be a useful function.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps just to give us a physical assessment, could you describe, Doctor, the length in miles and the width of the oblong-shaped, cordoned-off, area where the Ibos are now placed? Perhaps you could give it in miles, just about the length and the width, in mentioning about the eight million population?

Dr. Johnson: At the present time that area from north to south would run perhaps 60 to

70 miles. From the Niger River over to the Cross River on the far side would probably be something like 80 to 100 miles, I would think. That is a very rough guess at this time. But to get from Umuahia up to Okigwi is about 40 miles. To get from Umuahia over to the airport at Uli is about 60 miles. The run over this other side to Isuofia where I visited is perhaps 40 miles. So, it is roughly that kind of thing; perhaps 60 miles by 80 to 100 miles.

Mr. Legault: And it is within that area that we have between six to eight million people?

Dr. Johnson: This is the rough estimate that is given at the present time, because the refugees and the Ibos have been moving back as the advance line of the Federal armies has moved forward.

When I was there in August the line ran about here at this time. I think they estimated the figure fairly accurately because I got this corroborated by many people as eight to ten million, and they probably lost some of that in the retirement because everybody has not been able to move.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much, Doctor. This is my second question. You have had the opportunity of discussing the particular difficulties with officials from both sides. Mr. Arnold Smith's testimony has led us to believe that there is still hope of a political settlement. Do you feel in discussing this with the officials on both sides that this possibility is real or is it just wishful thinking?

Dr. Johnson: Arnold Smith's testimony, of course, did add the word "rigid". He said, "At the point of giving up secession the Federal Government was quite rigid that this would be the starting point of conversations".

If one talks with those on the other side they are almost as firm on the point, that they cannot see the possibility—particularly now after the sufferings of 14 months of war—of having the security and the freedom which they want within a unified political structure but they are interested in some forms of association.

• 1220

One of the interesting things in talking with both sides is that the leaders on both sides are very gifted and able men, and many are men of great integrity. They are the presidents of universities and the top lawyers and officials, and all of them worked together formerly within the single Federation of Nigeria.

There is a continued exploration to find a formula. I think the encouraging thing from Arnold Smith's testimony is that as recently as two weeks ago he did have approaches at that point from the Biafran side, looking for some kind of a compromise formula. So that I think the thing is not closed, while the official positions of the two sides at the moment cannot be reconciled.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Doctor. A while ago you mentioned the danger of giving the authority to a federal state to have the last say which could bring about the complete destruction of an area or of its people. Do you believe that there is such a move, as we have discussed in previous meetings, toward intended genocide on the part of the Federal troops?

Dr. Johnson: I think when you introduce that word you introduce into the discussion elements which are very difficult to define. I think I would answer your question in a different way and say that a great deal of massacre, whether it be because of Lagos policy or whether it has been the activity of military commanders on the scene, has marked this war in which large groups of people have been literally massacred. In the taking of Benin and Asaba every male Ibo above the age of 10 was taken out and shot, in the taking of Port Harcourt the patients in the hospital were bayoneted, and there has been a great deal of that kind of thing. What disturbs me about the present position is that Lagos has said that they are on the final offensive, that they are going to move in, that they are going to win the war and crush the rebellion no matter what it costs.

When you go to Biafra, as did Charles Taylor, Stephen Lewis, two Canadian Members of Parliament, myself in January and again in August, you find that these people are determined to fight to the death rather than surrender which they believe is suicidal. Well if those two things meet the only outcome is just a major kind of massacre. Guerrilla warfare particularly is very costly in terms of loss of life because you really cannot separate between soldier and civilian once that stage is reached. So that the determination of the Lagos government to force the giving up of secession, plus the determination of the Biafran people not to give it up because they believe that life and freedom hang on their success, is going to mean there is going to be an unbelievable loss of life during these next months if the military solution is pursued.

And whether or not there is an intent of genocide, to destroy a race, certainly there is an effect on massacre and loss of life which is very large indeed.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much, Doctor.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Howard, you are next.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Dr. Johnson, we have all been extremely interested in your testimony here today. I think it must be evident that there is a tremendous interest on both sides of this Committee hearing. There is even perhaps an agony of decision in determining the correct course of action that we should take. Was it the intention of your church, in its decision to send representatives to Africa, that they be selected from only one side of the House. If so, would it not have been more effective had they come from both sides?

• 1225

Dr. Johnson: Might I, Mr. Chairman, first of all correct the suggestion that it was a decision of a church. It is really a personal matter. The two men who were selected or who went happen to have been personal friends of many years standing. The fact that they belong to a different political party from the one for which I voted last time did not rule them out. I am one of the supporters of Donald Macdonald, the President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. He is my member. I must say I found it somewhat difficult to have access to the government side and that is one of the reasons that I have been very glad to have this matter aired more fully. These two men were also of the wrong church connections; I am a Presbyterian, Andrew Brewin I believe is an Anglican and David MacDonald is United Church. This matter was a personal one. These men, whom I have known for many months, have been deeply concerned about this affair and it was because of personal friendship and the knowledge of their competence and integrity that they went. There was some feeling whether we would arbitrarily have had someone from the other party, but I had no personal friend of long standing or similar connection with it, so that it is completely apolitical.

I am not sure whether the government would have approved sending a representative to an area which they believe is non-existent by their refusal even to use the word "Biafra"—only the term "rebel leader". This was not explored with any political implications but purely on a personal friendship basis.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You mentioned that you had some difficulty in getting through to the government on this. Do you feel that you could have received better sympathy from the government in your contacts?

Dr. Johnson: I have had an opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I must say that Mr. Riddell and Mr. Scrabec here have been in very close touch with their office for very many months and prior to that, have always had an open door—and have had conversations with Mr. Sharp about it. I have had some feeling that my testimony perhaps was considered as being pro-Biafran, or that I was a spokesman for Biafra. My own concern is not that but for a peaceful settlement in that area. I think that perhaps the way in which I differ from some others is that I have had the opportunity of seeing that side at first hand and that changed my thinking as to what might be the possible outcome.

I would like very much to have shared my observations with Mr. Trudeau because I believe this is a matter of very great importance for Canada and an area in which Canada could give creative leadership in helping settle what is a very great tragedy, and the fullest information we can have on the facts is important.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In another area, could you tell me what you believe are the objectives—what you believe are the objectives of the United Kingdom and the USSR in supporting the Federal state?

Dr. Johnson: I would not deign to hazard a guess on that. I find myself very perplexed as to whether they are continued economic controls in the area, perhaps maintaining a control on the very important oil resources which there are not only in Biafra but on the other side of the Niger River. The United Kingdom at the present time has, I understand from Lord Shepherd, some 18,000 British citizens living in Federal Nigeria, many of them having taken the place of posts formerly occupied by the Biafrans when they were scattered and working through the whole of Nigeria. I find it very hard to know what is the position of the British and I expect there will be some very interesting debates when the British Parliament meets again. It is most unfortunate that the British House of Commons has not been meeting at this critical time in the development of the conflict.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): On the other side, what are the motives of those authorities who are supplying the Biafrans with arms and equipment?

• 1230

Dr. Johnson: On the question of motive you will have to ask the man who is really concerned. I think there are many people in the world today who are profoundly disturbed simply about the humanitarian question, that if the people have fought for this length of time and been prepared to suffer so deeply and are prepared to suffer now, there must be more than shallow political reasons for that kind of resistance. I would comment to you President Nyerere's statement, which is a fine statement, as to why they support it, Mr. Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast made a great statement at the time of their recognition in which he said they believe in unity, yes, but a unity of the living and not a unity of the dead, a unity in love and not a unity in hate, and I suspect that some of those factors are involved certainly. It is hard to determine what particular economic factors are involved because some of the nations involved that are reputed—and nobody knows exactly what the support is—to be giving help to Biafra are nations that have also had very substantial interests on the Federal Nigeria side and might stand in danger of losing those present resources for a somewhat uncertain risk. That is a very tangled one on which no authority that I have been able to find can give clear information on exactly what the support is and what are the motivations and connections.

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The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. I understand Dr. Johnson has to catch a plane at 2.15. We have two remaining questioners and as it is now 12.30, I should think that. . .

Mr. Fairweather: I only have two short questions.

The Vice-Chairman: Then we have three remaining questioners? Can we keep it short then with the expectation of rising, I should suggest, in another 15 minutes. Would that be agreeable? All right, then your friend Mr. MacDonald, Dr. Johnson.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): If this question has already been raised, because I was out for about half an hour, tell me so that we will not go over it again. We have had some testimony here, and it was our own finding while we were there, that within a very short period of time the whole problem of relief is going to become much, much greater than it is even at the present moment because of the present food supply—native food supply—being exhausted. Has there been any discussion here this morning, Dr. Johnson, about this problem, specifically with regard to the use of a land route? It was stated in Committee that at one point there was a land route proposition made by the Federal Military Government and that this proposition had been turned down by the Biafran authorities. Is there any possibility, or do you think it is likely, that some arrangement could be made? Perhaps you could elaborate a bit more on why the Biafrans turned down the suggested use of a land route to bring in many more supplies than would be available by an airlift.

Dr. Johnson: The question was raised as to whether it would be possible to airlift 3,000 tons a day into the country. My answer to that is that with the provision of further air facilities this would not be impossible, as far as I know from talking about it with Commissioner Lindt of the International Red Cross and others who know the factors. If a sea or a land group could be set up that was politically and militarily acceptable to both sides, this would be preferable, but as soon as you get into that you get into very difficult military questions. The particular land route for which the finger was pointed at Ojukwu again and again as holding up the flow of supplies was one that anybody with the most elementary knowledge of that country would say would have been quite impossible for them to accept from a military point of view unless they had decided they were going to surrender. Some of the proposals in regard to a day-time airlift, it seems to me, present the same problem. If you have only one link with the outside world and have not reached the point where you are ready to surrender, you cannot make the kind of deal that would endanger the use of that link for various purposes besides

relief. But there have been other suggestions of land routes and water routes which the Biafran Government has made; patrolling them and setting up patrols by an international commission, of course, is difficult from a technical point of view. The airlift is much more simple and the suggestion has been made that perhaps a function of the Canadian Government would be to help in setting up an emergency airfield which could multiply. With an emergency airfield and a larger number of *Hercules* aircraft, supplies could flow in, almost sufficient to meet the present need.

• 1235

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you think, just in following up one of the things you mentioned a moment ago, there might be some possibility of a land route being established that could be patrolled by some independent countries such as Canada, for instance, and that they might in some way, as an international authority, operate a land relief operation, particularly as we get into December when the whole relief picture is going to be very drastically heightened?

Dr. Johnson: I think everybody who has been concerned with the delivery of goods has felt that the two things should be pursued: the development of maximum airlift capacity now, and the exploration of a possible land or water route. One of them is up the Niger River and through some of the canals, which seems to be one of the easier ones to set up a patrol or screening operation for, and I expect that this continues to be explored. Mr. Riddell, of External Affairs, or others would know about it, but I think that the International Red Cross continue to explore this possibility.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Thank you, Dr. Johnson.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Alexander?

Mr. Alexander: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, I, too, am certainly grateful for the contribution that you have made here this morning. I am sorry that I was not here earlier, and perhaps this area has been explored.

First, it seems to me that you have implied that there would be support, contrary to what has been stated, if leadership were given by any particular country through the United Nations' intervention on the humanitarian aspects. Is this so—after your having explored the area, having discussed the matter with those who should know? Do you feel

that if this problem were brought before the United Nations it would be given support or not? I am under the impression, on the other hand, particularly with the Organization of African Unity, that they perhaps do not want this matter brought before the United Nations. What are your feelings on that?

Dr. Johnson: This is a matter on which I would not question the integrity of our External Affairs Minister in saying that he has explored it with various groups at the United Nations, and at that time did not get support for a proposal to bring the matter before the United Nations. I do not know what the particular terms of the exploration were, except for having seen his letter to U Thant and U Thant's reply. I also noted that Mr. Sharp indicated there would be a continuation of exploring ways of finding some peaceful solution, and I feel this is a matter of such general concern, as all of you here are witness to. People would like to know if there is some way of finding a solution, and it is a matter for an international agency. If the particular formula which has been explored with the United Nations is not viable, perhaps there is another formula. In my mind it would be in the area of inquiry; not of inquiry of charges of genocide but simply inquiry. Whether it is genocide or not, we know that over half a million people are now dead in a very bitter war and it looks as though that kind of thing is going to continue. This, it seems to me, merits an inquiry from the highest international court we have, and in the light of that, appropriate action would have to be formulated.

I do not see how we can now stand back and let this tragedy just take its course because it is going to involve people more deeply and more deeply, across many years, and it may be, when people have a mind to move in later, it will have become so complex as to be not only an internal question of Nigeria or a fighting question within Africa, but a major matter of international division in the European and wider scene.

• 1240

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Dr. Johnson; now just one other question. I feel that the growth of a community can depend only on the leadership of the educated. I do not think much has been said by the several witnesses we have heard on this particular area. Have you any idea about what is happening to the educated as far as Ibos are concerned? Is there any systematic plan which would affect

them? Without them the masses in turn would have no one to lead them.

Dr. Johnson: The Ibo people themselves are very much aware now, as they have been historically, of this factor. One of the reasons they play such a very important role in that area, and in Africa, is that they have gone to great pains through the family system to give their men top leadership and top training and they have continued this. It has been very interesting to watch their encouragement of many young men and women who are abroad to continue their studies. They have brought back most of their senior men. It is surprising how many people you run into in Biafra who you discover were the High Commissioner for India or the Nigerian Ambassador to Tokyo. Most of the young men who take you around from the Foreign Office are men who were in the Nigerian Embassy in Washington or in some other area. These men have gone back and are giving leadership within the country but they have encouraged a remarkable number of their students to continue in training, knowing that this leadership of educated people is of great importance for the constructive development of their people and their country in the coming years.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Dr. Johnson.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: Have you been surprised, Dr. Johnson, by the rather extraordinary lack of reporting on the Nigeria-Biafra war by our public broadcasting system?

Dr. Johnson: I have been disappointed that there has not been more. I tried back in February to get a CBC team to go to Biafra and this did not happen. When I came back from Europe in July there were some CBC television men whom I had met in Britain who were eager and ready to go at once. May I say that anybody who goes into Biafra takes a very great risk. If I can make this comment in passing, one reason that I encourage only some of my personal friends to go and take that risk is because I would hesitate to urge a stranger to go. I have known these friends long enough that as friends they are expendable, if they are willing to take the risk. There is a very great risk. I do not know whether, on the part of the CBC, it is because of the personal risk and uncertainty for their staff or because they are in agreement with the policy of the Canadian Government, which seems to have been the non-recognition even

of the existence of Biafra as an entity. It would be hard for me to say what is the reason. But it is only in recent times, and I understand from my telephone calls that a good many of the program people in the CBC are either on the way or planning to go. I welcome this heartily because it is of great importance that people get first-hand, accurate, factual information.

Mr. Fairweather: Do you think that the implications of a public broadcasting system avoiding fact-finding, because it might be contrary to the policy of the government of the country, is extremely grave?

Dr. Johnson: I am really testifying here as an expert on Biafra rather than on the CBC and its policy. I might say that, as an individual, I would like to see the CBC and the public agencies, I would like to have seen them, very much more active in bringing in this information which was available, because I think it does help our people to form right political and relief judgments and therefore to play the most effective role that we can in helping to find a peaceful answer there.

• 1245

Mr. Fairweather: It will be up to us to disabuse the nation that this is the case, will it not? In the last question, it has been put to us by the Minister the other night as an explanation for Canada's not raising the issue in the United Nations that the foreign ministers of other nations—and we were given a précis of their speeches—did not raise it. Do you find.

Mr. Brewin: Except for one.

Mr. Fairweather: Except for one. Yes. Do you find this as bitter a rationalization for the United Nations as I do?

Dr. Johnson: I have read the précis which the Department of External Affairs were obliging enough to give me and I have also read Kaunda's speech in the United Nations reports. One does find that a number of them—at that time Tanzania, which is one country that had recognized Biafra—had not reported. Kaunda's speech was not, I think, in that précis but I saw a copy of that later—this is Zambia. And Gabon—all of them made fairly strong statements in regard to the matter in the hope that it would come before the world body. Regarding the other nations, it seems to me there are two things in their

non-dealing. I find myself very disappointed in the somewhat almost casual references or pious references to this great problem about which we are so disturbed. I think one is simply a matter of information. As I have said repeatedly to this testimony, very few people have had the opportunity to see this thing at first hand and to see both sides of the conflict and that is why I think it is important that the United Nations should take steps to make it known. I think, secondly, it is a difficult matter within Africa, and the United Nations has many problems already and therefore was content to leave this thing to the Organization of African Unity and the states in that region.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: That is the last of our questioners, then. Dr. Johnson, I am sure that the spontaneous and hearty applause that you received at the termination of your opening remarks was an indication of the warmth with which your words were received this morning. I want to thank you on behalf of the Committee and on my own behalf for your most able presentation and for the patient way in which you have answered all our questions.

Gentlemen, just before we adjourn, there can be no subcommittee meeting. There are only three of us here present out of nine at the moment and we are adjourning until 3.45 p.m. We may be able to have a subcommittee meeting for a few minutes then or we may have to wait until we finish later in the afternoon.

This afternoon we have Mr. Romeo Maione as our witness and we now have Messrs. Grossman and Bezanson in town. Mr. Grossman will be called if we finish early with Mr. Maione.

Adjourned until 3.45 p.m.

AFTERNOON SITTING

• 1650

The Vice-Chairman: Well, gentlemen, I think possibly we should proceed. We have good hopes of obtaining a quorum in a few minutes. I think we should proceed on the understanding that we cannot pass any motions or do anything in an official way. We cannot have any votes until we do have a quorum, and I submit that we have a motion later on to incorporate the proceedings when we did not have a quorum into the *Proceedings* officially.

With that understanding I shall introduce to you our witness for this afternoon, Mr. Romeo Maione. Mr. Maione is at my right. He was the President of the Young Christian Workers, a world organization, for the period between 1957 and 1961. He was stationed at Brussels and had occasion to go into Africa as well as other parts of the world in connection with his work at that time.

In 1962 he became the Assistant Director of the International Affairs Department of the Canadian Labour Congress and in that capacity had occasion to travel frequently abroad. Then he became the President of the World Assembly of Youth for the period 1964 to 1966. Of course, in that capacity he was very active internationally.

Today, he is a Director of the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace.

Now, your subcommittee wanted to bring before the main Committee a witness from Caritas but there is just not anybody tied in to the Caritas organization in Canada and Caritas, therefore, nominated Mr. Romeo Maione as being the best possible person to fill us in on the Caritas picture and the work that Caritas is doing in the Nigerian-Biafran situation.

Before I call upon Mr. Maione to present his opening remarks, I now see a quorum and I ask that our proceedings so far be ratified and put in our formal record. May I have such a motion?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I so move.

Mr. Cafik: I second the motion.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.
Motion agreed to.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Maione, I now ask you to proceed, if you will with your opening statement.

Mr. Romeo Maione (Director, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace): Thank you. May I make a few preliminary statements, Mr. Chairman? I am not an official spokesman here for Caritas International nor of the Roman Catholic Church. The Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace is something that is aside from the official Catholic Church in this country.

The second thing I would like to say is because of the lateness of being asked on Friday to appear here, just before Thanksgiving Day, my secretary had already gone off

and so I had to spend Thanksgiving week end thinking about Nigeria-Biafra, preparing some notes here. The notes are in both French and in English because the documents I had from Caritas were in French and English. I did not have time to translate them so I will try to give them in both languages.

The other thing is that in a sense I am a very poor witness as I told the Clerk of this Committee over the phone. I think the last time I was in Nigeria was back in 1960, long before Nigeria was independent or Biafra had even appeared on the scene, so all I will be relating here is reading into the record some of the things that Caritas has done during the last year vis-à-vis the humanitarian problem brought on by the civil war in Nigeria and Biafra.

With that said I will go into a few notes and then if you want to ask any questions I will try to answer them.

• 1655

The first part is in French.

[Interpretation]

The objective of Caritas International as the privileged tool of Church charity as it was so labelled by Pope Paul VI—is to help those in need. Now, none is in greater need of this help than the victims of the Nigeria-Biafra war.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman: Will you hold it just a moment, Mr. Maione? There does not appear to be any translation. Are you all right now, Mr. Mongrain? Is everybody satisfied they can get a translation?

Mr. Cafik: I do not know. We have to try it.

The Vice-Chairman: All right then, would you just continue on.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Maione: Caritas Internationalis without taking side in the conflict, tried and helped the victims, whether they are from the East or the West.

From the 15th of December, 1967, to January 13, 1968, Mgrs. Conway from Ireland and Rochau from France, have travelled in federal Nigeria, bringing financial help in the zones controlled by the Federal Government.

From February 3rd to 9th, Mgr. Bayer, stayed in Lagos where he met with Mr. Timothy Undondek, secretary-general for the

Nigerian Red Cross, as well as many people engaged in social work.

From the 7th to the 22nd of February Mgrs. Conway and Rochau went to Biafra to see what the refugees' situation was like, after which they decided to airlift medical supplies and food to Biafra.

In February, Caritas Internationalis sent to the Nigerian Red Cross on behalf of the Holy Father three trucks for the transfer of food and drugs to war areas.

In the same month, the Holy Father sent to Caritas Internationalis \$80,000 to launch a help fund. The Roman Catholics of Canada participated by giving to the annual collection of the Pope's charities.

Between April 16 and May 16, there were six flights of 60 tons to Biafra. On April 7, the first ship of food and drugs reached San Tomé. On May 8, an agreement was signed with the owner of chartered planes, who agreed to make six flights for the price of five, that is \$19,000. On May, the 16th, at night both planes carried a load for the government of Biafra. Then they flew three times to carry the rest of our help. One day later, the airport at Port-Harcourt fell into federalist hands.

Furthermore, as the situation worsened, the executive committee of Caritas Internationalis, under the pressing request from Bishops on both sides, met in Zagreb, Yugoslavia on May 1st and asked for an additional \$300,000. Mission posts across the country and the facilities given by the authorities enabled us to distribute help to the most needy in both camps.

Nevertheless, the help is far from sufficient. According to a Red Cross estimate, to reasonably help Biafra refugees, you would need 200 tons of food per day, which means 20 planes loaded of 10 tons each. At the end of May, the total number of freight planes reaching Biafra was only 32, 18 from Caritas Internationalis, 10 from the Red Cross and 4 from the World Church Council.

[English]

The rest is in English.

From May 28 to June 10 there was another six aircraft of ten tons each.

• 1700

May 29: The food situation remains critical. There are over 608 refugee camps at present. It is impossible to get accurate figures of the number of refugees but one can safely say

there are over 3½ million refugees at present in Biafra. The death rate in the camps is over 300 daily.

June 1: Some of the plane crews are quitting. Nigerian authorities have threatened to execute any flyer captured.

June 9: Little or no fighting is going on in Biafra just now. The policy of the Nigerian Army seems to be to encircle the Biafrans and force surrender.

June 13 to June 20: Another 63 tons were delivered. The food situation is deplorable. One can see starving children with match-stick arms and legs after flies and seeking out worms to eat just like hens seeking food. One camp buried 11 refugees in one day last week. It was obvious that the other members were not far from death. They had no food for three days.

July operations: This month of July the ferrying of supplies for the starving people, especially mothers and children, has been seriously affected by transport difficulties and the increasing activity of anti-aircraft units. The situation is becoming disastrous, especially among the starving children. We can hope to be able to increase the amount of mercy relief in August.

July 15: A meeting in Zurich with the World Council of Churches to sign a contract for two DC-7s reserving the use of these planes to our relief supplies. The Nigerians are now using radar-controlled guns on land and sea. They are shooting with good accuracy. The pilots refused to fly because of the danger. No flights left Sao Tome for five days.

July 20: The head of the Federal Government of Nigeria specifically referred to the mercy operations of Caritas International "that the food meant for civilians in the rebel-held areas of the East Central State would be diverted by Ojukwu to his troops." Monseigneur Charles Bayer Secretary-General of Caritas answered: "The supplies are carefully watched and supervised. They are directly distributed to parish priests and sisters who immediately take them to the starving people in camps, hospitals and villages. Caritas International is also co-operating with the Nigerian Red Cross and other voluntary relief agencies operating in Nigeria to help war victims in the territories controlled by the Federal Government."

Efforts to date: Realizing that whatever is done is insufficient, our hope therefore is that a cessation of hostilities in the near future would permit national and international

organizations to shift from emergency aid to a long-range program of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Sept 10: Fortunately Caritas International's appeal received a very favourable response. Total income amounted to \$2.3 million. This amount is exclusively cash. It does not include the value of commodities purchased and collected by various national agencies. For example, the Catholic Relief Services in the United States has sent 2,500 tons of food valued at \$1.3 million to Lagos. Since the negotiations in Niamey and Addis Ababa brought no results for a mercy corridor, Caritas International has continued to use the airlift.

The Scandinavian Church Agencies, uniting themselves as Nord church aid, joined Caritas operations at Sao Tome and signed a special charter contract with Swedish Trans Air.

Thanks to this arrangement and the devoted service of the Swedish crews, it has been possible to step up the mercy flights considerably during the past weeks. By September 27, 283 successful landings had been made by church organizations from Sao Tome to Biafra. Together with Red Cross flights, this means that about 150-200 tons of supplies are getting through daily.

Finally I just want to show, through the expenditures of Caritas International, where the help has been going in the conflict.

In the January-February part of the conflict in 1968, approximately \$46,000 was sent to Lagos and \$79,000 was sent into the Biafran region. In April-May \$24,000 went to Lagos and \$201,000 went to the Biafran region. In July-August \$35,000 went into Lagos and \$679,000 worth went into Biafra. Up to September 23, \$55,000 has gone into Lagos, mostly in vehicles and transportation to get food around, and \$176,000 has gone into Biafra.

So generally what Caritas International has been trying to do, in a very difficult political situation, is to fight starvation on both sides of the frontier, often being accused by both sides of trying to intervene in a war, which I think is always the position of those who are trying to do humanitarian work where there is very great military and political problems.

• 1705

Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: I have three who have indicated that they would like to ask questions. They are Mr. Mongrain, Mr. Guay and

Mr. Brewin. Mr. Mongrain, would you proceed.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Mongrain: Mister Chairman, I would like to ask our witness whether he has information to the effect that before this civil war, there was a situation of hunger in Biafra and Nigeria or whether this has started only since the hostilities?

Mr. Maione: I believe, according to all the reports we have and generally speaking, there was no real starvation before the war. Since the war started, there has been a blockade of Biafra, who used to buy most of their meat from the North—considered as the Texas of Nigeria and also because Port Harcourt, the only sea harbour was captured by federal forces. There was a blockade in a way, because the Biafran area or the Ibol land could not produce enough food. They had to import their food and war stopped all imports.

Mr. Mongrain: Mister Chairman, could the witness tell us whether there is cooperation between Caritas International or other Church movements and the International Red Cross, or whether these organizations operate independently in their own sectors?

Mr. Maione: The experience in Nigerian-Biafra has had the result that all church organization and voluntary agencies have worked together. On the Nigerian side, Caritas, the Nigerian Red Cross and the World Church Council worked closely together in San Tomé. On the other side the Red Cross send food from Fernando Po. Although not closely connected, they do work together.

Mr. Mongrain: Then, there is no duplicating. For example one cannot say that the Red Cross will help one sector and that the churches will intervene in the same area.

Mr. Maione: Generally, we work together.

Mr. Mongrain: I would then conclude that with the help of the federal government the aircraft will be only for the use of the International Red Cross and they won't be used by the Church Council.

Mr. Maione: I hope that the planes that the Canadian government send for assistance will be available for all voluntary organizations. I hope the International Red Cross will work together with Caritas and their Church Council.

and that food for San Tomé will be transported by our Canadian planes.

Mr. Mongrain: My last question. I wonder whether within the last year, amongst people working for Caritas and other organizations who were helping you to distribute food, were any of them killed or wounded due to military actions?

Mr. Maione: I do not believe that any of the staff of Caritas or the Roman Catholic organizations have been involved in any incidents. It is the same thing with our priests or our sisters but those who died during the war have suffered a lot.

Mr. Mongrain: Thank you.

[English]

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Could I just say a word at this point? We did run into one representative—

The Vice-Chairman: If I could add here, Mr. MacDonald, that the tone has been set by the Chairman. I am just acting Chairman, and with a large committee of 30 we have pretty well have a policy of not having supplementaries. If we were a smaller committee—

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is not a supplementary, it is merely a point of information in answer to the question Mr. Mongrain raised.

The Vice-Chairman: On a point of information, then.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Because we did encounter one priest in particular who was working for Caritas who had unfortunately been captured by the Federal forces, tortured, sent out of the country and then returned at a later date to carry on the relief operations for Caritas. So occasionally I think it does happen that even some of the priests and others get directly involved in the hostilities and some of them, I think, have actually left the country and not returned, but in this case this priest did return the country and was continuing—

Mr. Maione: I am working here from a very specific one from Caritas and more than likely they do not mention that kind of an operation because they want to be free to work on both sides of the frontier, so they said very little in their official documentation that tends towards taking positions on the political question.

[Interpretation]

• 1710

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mister Chairman, the replies given to Mr. Mongrain have answered most of my questions.

[English]

At the same time I would like to ask the representative today, in view of the fact that he spent a considerable amount of time in the area in 1960 or prior thereto, if possibly he might be able to enlarge on this particular subject in trying to compare the situation as it existed then to what it is today with what he reads in the newspaper. Also, my next question is what was the death rate then? Was it abnormal or was it excessive, if you were to compare it with other areas, to what it is today?

Mr. Maione: Do you want me to sum up? I think, in very few words, to compare the situation in 1960 when I was there and today you would have to say that it has sort of gone from hope to despair, because in 1960 hope was really flying high because independence was coming on and Nigeria was going to be the great country of West Africa. In fact, it was the hope of that whole region that in the middle of all these little small states you would have one sort of large state, united, and it would be able to be the fulcrum of the development of that whole area. Now reading from the newspapers I would imagine it is completely the other way around. Practically total despair has crept in.

On the question of the death rate, well, I am competent on a few things but I do not think I am competent enough to tell you what the death rate was in 1960 as compared to today, but coming up on the train I was reading Hauphouet-Boigny, the President of Côte-d'Ivoire, who was saying that there have been more deaths in the war in Biafra and Nigeria in the last ten months of that war than there has been in the whole of the Viet Nam war, so that I do not think we can hide and figure that the death rate was the same. I think the death rate has been very much uplifted because of the war and the famine conditions.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface) Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Maione, I would like to preface my question by saying in your presence what was said on other occasions, and I think the work of Caritas International and

the other church organizations has been really a remarkable effort. It was all started by Father Byrne of Caritas, as I understand it. They did not ask everybody's leave, they just saw an urgent need and went in and filled it in, I think, a very heroic manner, and I would like to say that. I just have one or two questions about it.

As far as the airlift taking the supplies in is concerned, the system of distribution both for the supplies taken in by the Red Cross and by the Caritas International and the other church organizations, it is in the hands of the Caritas and the other churches, is it not?

Mr. Maione: That is right. It is the missionaries, the sisters, the parish priests and the hospitals. This is the whole network of the distribution of what comes in.

Mr. Brewin: And they have recruited teachers and others who cannot teach any longer to help them with this job?

Mr. Maione: That is right.

Mr. Brewin: So that you might say the people who have been teaching the children are now feeding the children.

• 1715

Mr. Maione: That is right.

Mr. Brewin: And you mentioned—I think you were questioned about this before—that there is the very closest co-operation, is there not, between the Protestant and the Catholic and the other organizations concerned?

Mr. Maione: Well, it is close enough that they are buying planes together, or leasing them together, and when you can get churches sort of agreeing on getting planes, I think that you are coming pretty close because you are uniting pocketbooks.

Mr. Brewin: I think this has been brought up before, but just to clarify a point I would like to make, the International Red Cross have hitherto been operating chiefly—at least as far as Biafra in occupied territory is concerned—out of Fernando Po. Is that right?

Mr. Maione: That is right.

Mr. Brewin: The Spanish islands, and the church Caritas operation has been operating out of Sao Tome. I would like to ask—I do not know whether the Caritas or the churches have given any thought to this—have they intimated to the Canadian Government, if

there are transport planes, the *Hercules*, to be made available by the Canadian Government, if they would be willing to bring that under the inspection of the International Red Cross to ensure that somebody does not ship arms shipments in when they are supposed to be sending relief.

Mr. Maione: On the question of the *Hercules*, as I said in French, I hope very much that the Canadian *Hercules* will also help the trans-shipment of food from Sao Tome into Biafra. Generally, I think we in Canada have worked very closely, because the unity of churches on the international level has had a repercussion in Canada. This summer the churches have worked very closely together with the Red Cross to launch a Nigeria-Biafra relief fund, where the Red Cross, in a sense, is generally responsible for the operation. We hope that the same happens on the use of the *Hercules* and that somehow the Red Cross will also allow the church organizations to use this service to transport their food and medical supplies.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Maione, perhaps I also could take the opportunity of expressing, through you, my admiration for the work that Caritas International has been doing in the area.

I have just two questions that I would like to ask you. Has Caritas International been engaged in discussions or conversations with other interested groups, perhaps including even governments, to undertake the task of providing relief over land or through a land corridor? We are hopeful that sometime soon this dispute will come to a peaceful resolution. A great aid effort is going to be needed. The figure that has often been mentioned before the Committee has been 3,000 tons of material a day. This seems to many of us to indicate a need for a land-based relief operation. Has your planning gone so far as to actually envisage the infrastructure that would be required for that?

Mr. Maione: We were hoping against hope, both at the Miami meeting and at the Addis Ababa meeting, that a land corridor would have been established by both sides. The fear I have in this situation is that I think both sides are rather using the whole question of famine as a ploy.

Mr. Roberts: As a propaganda weapon?

Mr. Maione: I am not too sure whether it is a propaganda weapon. It is a nice, old-fashioned military weapon, when you have the enemy to cut off their food. This is as efficient as nuclear warfare. If you can blast a guy with a nuclear bomb you kill him; and you can also starve him to death. The whole political problem is involved here. If Biafra decides to go through Nigeria to get a land corridor this means, *de facto*, that Biafra is recognizing Nigeria; and if Nigeria puts through the land corridor, then there is *de facto* recognition of Biafra. It is a real political problem. This is why I am afraid that both sides are using the matter of famine.

Mr. Roberts: It is difficult to disentangle the humanitarian and the political situations?

Mr. Maione: Very difficult; and in actual fact this is why I think, as I say in the last part of my statement, that the real crucial thing is to end the war. It is really rather nonsense to sort of be going around patching people up and then blowing them up the next day. This is the real crucial question that we have to be asking ourselves.

Caritas International and the Red Cross and the World Council of Churches can continue patching up people and feeding people, but as the conflict is coming more and more to a head we just can not hope that the humanitarian aspect is going to continue unless the war is over.

There is all the discussion, for example, on genocide; what is genocide and what is not genocide; and if one is carrying it out or is not carrying it out. It is a difficult question to answer. There are two kinds of genocide, I feel. There is genocide by planning the murder of all the people, and there is also genocide where you get people so fearful that they are willing to commit suicide—what I call genocide by suicide, if there is such a thing. Although our efforts, should be aimed at increasing the humanitarian help as much as we can, we also have to tackle the political question, or humanity will go down the drain, at least in that area.

• 1720

Mr. Roberts: For the kind of relief operation that is ultimately going to be required is not the co-operation of the Nigerian authorities really essential to make that operation effective?

Mr. Maione: I really do not see any other way of doing it unless you continue what you

are doing now, which I do not think is enough, or start parachuting material in, in which I am not a military expert and which is a rather rough system of doing it.

Mr. Roberts: I am afraid the need is going to escalate faster no matter how active your kind of organization is.

Mr. Maione: There is a blockade, and whenever there is a blockade situation food is not getting through. To me that is the cardinal thing. We have to break the blockade. I do not want to praise Caritas in any way, but when they started they threw all the red tape down the drain. All the niceties of diplomacy and the nation state and everything went out the window. We had to get food through. In the beginning Caritas International was looked upon as rather putting their nose into business they had no need to. The nation state was the nation state.

I also want to bring up here that the Roman Catholic Bishops' meeting in Winnipeg in August came up with what I thought was a very interesting statement. They reminded people that sovereign rights are not absolute rights; that there are rights above the sovereign rights, which are human rights. This meant that they would not intervene directly in Biafra and Czechoslovakia but they were saying that we should learn from these examples. We see, for example, the sort of paralysis of the United Nations in this issue, because there are no rights above sovereign rights even in the United Nations.

This is a very ticklish problem that I do not want to discuss, but I think it is a problem that we will have to face in future situations.

Mr. Roberts: My point is that we are really trying to find a practical means of dealing with what is already a grave problem of human suffering which, in the next few weeks, is likely to become an enormous and tremendous problem of human suffering.

Is it really not essential to have some kind of co-operation by the Nigerian authorities as well as by the people in Biafra? We are really going to have to mount an effective means of dealing with that situation—a situation which is going to balloon, given what is happening to feed crops. We are looking for practical ways of helping as many people as we can. This is going to require the co-operation of what are now the two opposing sides in the civil war.

Mr. Maione: I think there has been increased co-operation on the part of the Nigerian Government within the last month or so. Previously they were actually trying to shoot down aircraft going across. I could read little letters from Father Byrne telling us how the old *Constellations* and DC-7s were staggering through radar controlled gunfire. They were not fooling around. They wanted to shoot them down.

Lately, I think, because of the pressure of international public opinion, they have moved back from that position. Whether they will go as far as to allow a full land corridor, I am not exactly sure, because it is a war. It would have been very interesting to know whether, in the last war, when the Germans had the blockade on England, one could have come to an agreement to allow a sea corridor for food to England when the actual policy of the Germans was to starve the English out. This is a real war, and civil wars are even worse than wars between nations. Whether one allows this kind of operation before peace is established is a matter of speculation.

Mr. Roberts: If one could be arranged, a land corridor would be the most effective way of bringing aid into the area?

• 1725

Mr. Maione: This would be the most effective way. Although many of the bridges are down one could bring it over the rivers, I suppose and with the infrastructure of a transportation system a great deal more could be delivered, than by flying.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Brewin has asked the question that I was concerned about, but I will pursue it just a bit further to see if our witness can give us any further details.

I am interested in the relationship between the International Red Cross and Caritas and the other church groups and their distribution centres. Is the Red Cross, for example, supplying food to Caritas and to other distribution agencies set up by the churches?

Mr. Maione: I do not think that at the present time the agencies are collecting into a co-ordinated pool. As I understand it, what the Red Cross are receiving is going to Fernando Po, and from there usually most of it was going into the Nigerian area; but lately

there has also been an airlift into the Biafran area from Fernando Po.

Mr. Forrestall: By the Red Cross.

Mr. Maione: By the Red Cross; this is as I understand it; but most of the church agencies—the Catholic Church has been in Sao Tome and that has been directly going into Biafra. The help that the Catholic Church has been giving to Nigeria has been coming in by boat directly to Lagos. For example that \$1.3 million from the Catholic Relief Services from the United States was delivered by Caritas right into Lagos and distributed then into the area from there.

Mr. Forrestall: Into the area held by the Federal troops?

Mr. Maione: That is right.

Mr. Forrestall: But not into the area still held by—as the Minister so fondly terms it, and I suppose he has to—the rebel-held area.

Mr. Maione: Yes, well that is rather harder to say than Biafra. I do not know, but most of the help that has gone into Lagos has gone into the federally-controlled areas of Nigeria, and the material going into Biafra has come from Sao Tome by plane.

Mr. Forrestall: The International Red Cross in fact up until very recently had not been doing any work whatsoever in the Biafran...

Mr. Maione: I mentioned somewhere that at the end of August, out of 32 flights 18 were Caritas 12 were Red Cross and the rest were the World Council of Churches. I give this in the statement there. But there have been some Red Cross flights going into the Biafran region.

Mr. Forrestall: Well, that is good. When the Red Cross gets into the Biafran region with food how are they distributing it, through agencies set up by themselves?

Mr. Maione: I am not sure. I would imagine that they must be using the network of the churches in the area because this is a network that is existent through all the hospitals, schools and camps that have been set up.

Mr. Forrestall: That is fine, thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman, that is all.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Perhaps I could preface my first question by just elaborating

a bit on the question Mr. Forrestall was making to Mr. Maione that it was our impression, I think, that the supplies that were coming in were pretty well grouped together and that the Red Cross and the various church agencies were actually handling this together. The Red Cross, I think, was operating some of the feeding stations, but there was very close liaison between the Red Cross in Biafra, and the churches, is that your impression of it, too?

Mr. Brewin: Not quite, I thought the churches were doing the distribution.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): There is some—

Mr. Forrestall: It is fairly important I think, Mr. Chairman. The point I was getting at, without stating it, is a fairly serious one.

Mr. Maione: Well, I want to make it very clear that on the Nigerian side, in the federally-controlled area, there is a joint committee made up of the Red Cross, Caritas, and the World Council of Churches to distribute the food in the Nigerian-controlled area. I am not too sure if this same operation exists in the Biafran region. I would imagine that most is channelled through the church organizations that have...For example, I think we have about 364—I cannot find it here in my notes—feeding places in Biafra and in this kind of moving situation a lot of these places have to close up shop and move when the area is occupied. So, they have to move the whole kit and caboodle and they work very much with the church network in the Biafran region.

• 1730

Mr. Forrestall: In other words...I am sorry, I just wanted to clear it up.

The Vice-Chairman: I know, but maybe you could come in after Mr. Fairweather, the next questioner. Would you mind withholding the question?

Mr. Forrestall: No.

The Vice-Chairman: We are trying to get along without supplementaries.

Mr. Forrestall: Well, it was not a supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Or related questions then. If you do not mind for the sake of order.

Mr. Forrestall: I do not mind.

The Vice-Chairman: We will put your name down again.

Mr. Forrestall: Do not bother.

The Vice-Chairman: Are you finished Mr. MacDonald?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No. Really I certainly agree wholeheartedly with the substance of what you said a few minutes ago when you said that the real issue here is the political one, that of trying to get the fighting stopped so that matters directly related to relief can take place in a much larger way than they have to date. But I would like to go into one area that I am sure you are very familiar with, and that is the extent to which the Canadian churches, and the Canadian Red Cross have been involved in this operation. You referred to it a few minutes ago. I wonder if you could be a bit more specific. There is a lot of comment, and the Prime Minister himself raised this, to the effect that it is one thing to expect governments to take responsibility in these matters, but also there is real interest in the country surely private agencies such as the churches and, say, the Red Cross should be doing what they can. There has even been some criticism that perhaps the churches and the volunteer agencies have not done enough to play their role in assisting this relief operation. Could you comment on that?

Mr. Maione: I would think that what the voluntary agencies are doing, if I may say, is practically a miracle. I mean the effort that they have made during this year is just fantastic. The only problem is that the problem of transportation is a little beyond the churches. I think buying up *Hercules*, or if they bought up old *Constellations* for \$19,000—you know, *Constellations*—I think I stopped flying them about 1949. I would not say I would like to go up in one of them now. I think they have made a tremendous effort, and I think here poses the whole...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am not referring to it generally because I think we have heard quite a bit about the Europeans, I am talking about specifically the Canadian effort.

Mr. Maione: Well the Canadian effort of the Canadian voluntary agencies began last July. On July 12 we came up and saw the Minister, Mr. Sharp, and we discussed the issue with him. It was at that time that the Minister then announced a million dollars worth of food aid to Nigeria in general, and then we

launched the Nigeria-Biafra relief fund, which has not come up to our hopes. I think it is because of the mixed up public opinion in the country where you heard all kinds of stories saying well what is the use of sending food, it is not getting through.

My argument—this is why I started off with this thing—is that the food is getting through. All these flights that are bringing food from Sao Tome—63 tons to this date—has been getting through, but this has not got through public opinion, and public opinion has sort of been paralysed between what is the use of sending them any food because it is not getting through, it is rotting in the warehouses in Lagos and everything else. You know public opinion on some of these things, my feeling is that the public is always wary of anything that is happening outside their own country. They are always wondering if there is not corruption involved and I do not think there was really a united effort on the part of government and of the voluntary agencies to really put the story across to our people. To top that off was that it was the month of August when the relief fund was launched, and as you well know in Canada in the month of August even the politicians go off on a holiday so there was not much hope for getting a relief fund really off the ground.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, in light of the increasing demands, perhaps increasing as much as five or ten times in the next two months, will there be an accelerated appeal to the Canadian people during the period between now and Christmas, say?

Mr. Maione: Well the voluntary agencies are in a difficult situation. We are in the situation where a lot of the agencies have their normal campaigns during the fall months. For example we would not be in a position to launch another campaign, we have to deliver funds from our ordinary budget. Twenty per cent of our funds are set aside for emergency relief so we are going to have to continue digging into that emergency relief fund. But let us not kid ourselves, if this thing gets much bigger I do not think the voluntary agencies have the strength to be able to carry on this kind of operation for months to come. Governments are going to have to support it and here I would like to put in a little pitch that in Europe a lot of the aid that a lot of the European churches are delivering into Nigeria-Biafra is being helped by their proper governments. It is not just purely the churches.

• 1735

Mr. Brewin: West Germany for one.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: My question has been mainly covered except for this aspect of the ceasefire. You have given I think, some helpful comments on the political aspect. Some people feel, for instance, that one of the major problems is the fact that Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. are supplying arms, and I would like to hear your comment on what could be done by this country, or through the United Nations to stop this?

Mr. Maione: Well the United Nations is in a very difficult situation because the Organization of African Unity has taken a position to keep it out of the United Nations practically. This is one of the phenomenons that are happening in the world, that the regional bodies are starting to have a little more influence than the international body is having; each area wants to keep it within the family. I think that I had proposed in a letter to Mr. Sharp on September 2 that if the OAU could not come to an accord that they should bring it up at the United Nations, but it looks like the OAU itself is stopping the thing from coming up in the United Nations.

On the other question of course as long as you have large powers supplying armaments to both sides the war is going to continue going on. I am sure with the frame of mind that exists in Biafra at the present time, as long as they can keep getting arms the war is going to continue as long as they have arms. So now how do we stop the powers from supplying arms? I think this is a very serious political problem. I do not know if the Canadian Government wants to take a position on that or not. As long as arms are going in the war is going to continue. This is definite.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you.

Mr. Anderson: Sir, I would like to congratulate your organization for the tremendous work it has done. I think I can express the views of the whole Committee on this; we have been very impressed.

Could you give us some indication, perhaps, of how much food may be needed in December to feed the people of Biafra in the Federally occupied areas behind the Federal lines?

Mr. Maione: If I can find it—it is in here somewhere. Caritas International has outlined that for October-December 1968 they are looking for about half a million dollars worth of funds most of which is not in food itself, but in money to buy trucks, automobiles, tools, hire nurses, expenses for personnel and supplies for medical teams, additional personnel and field representatives for the welfare department. This is on the Nigerian side. On the Biafran side where, by the middle of September, 372 feeding centres had been set up by Caritas International—missions, a hospital, camps and villages—providing 185,000 meals daily, they are asking for flight operations, \$450,000; feeding centres, \$700,000; stranded refugees, \$20,000; stranded Biafran students in Europe, \$24,000; children's project in Sao Tome because the planes are bringing out refugee children into Sao Tome, \$124,000; children's project in Gabon, \$122,000, for a total of \$1.5 million.

Mr. Anderson: My problem is this: up to now we have had the figure expressed in terms of tons of food. I wonder if you could give some estimate of the amount of food that will be needed. This is related, of course, to the aircraft that we supply and the carrying capacity of these aircrafts. While the dollar figures are very interesting I wonder whether you would have a figure in terms of tons of food?

Mr. Maione: I do not have the figure on food. What they are saying is that 200 tons per night now would be sufficient and I suppose maybe it will be sufficient for months to come. The problem is will they be able to keep delivering this amount of food throughout unless they have a land corridor and peace develops? To me it is not the amount. A couple of governments decide that they are going to supply a boatload of food into the area once every two weeks; there is enough food going through, but the problem is, are we going to be able to continue getting through where it is needed? I do not think it is the amount of food that is the question.

• 1740

Mr. Anderson: So the whole thing then depends on stopping the war as soon as possible. You mentioned that and made it very clear. Do you think that the increase in the supply of arms in the last few weeks, in particular, by air from Libreville, Gabon has reduced the chances of arriving at a military situation—a political situation—where it would be possible to take care of the starving

people there? Do you feel that this has been an unfortunate development?

Mr. Maione: I am not an Ibo man to say it is fortunate or unfortunate. I mean, if those people decide that they are going to fight to the end—I think they have made that decision—and they do get arms, the war is just going to be prolonged. It is a whole nation that is at bay—women, children and everything else. I think it has delayed the ultimate that is going to happen in this war. I do not know who is going to win, but it surely has delayed it and as long as they get more armaments the war is going to continue.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: That concludes the list of questioners unless there is someone else?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I would like to correct—

The Vice-Chairman: I will come to that. I have you on my agenda, Mr. Stewart, if you do not mind. I would just like to thank Mr. Maione on behalf of the Committee and to express to him our gratitude for giving us the benefit of his wide experience in Biafran-Nigerian affairs and world affairs. You have filled in, by your answers to our questions, many a blank in the whole picture. We appreciate your assistance very much, indeed.

Now, there are one or two items for consideration. First of all, Mr. Stewart, you have an important correction to make, I believe?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The correction is rather important because Mr. Sharp has been attributed with a statement instead of me and since the remarks were not those that should come from a Minister of the Crown I think we should make note of it officially. On page 148 in the second column on the right of the Minutes and Proceedings of October 10 after an hon. member says: "Who is going to go?", there is a statement that I made which is attributed to Mr. Sharp. Should I repeat that statement?

The Vice-Chairman: No, I do not think that is necessary. I have been assured by the Clerk that this was a mistake. He checked it out and there is no question about it; the correction should be made. I take it that the Committee would be in complete agreement with that being done?

An hon. Member: If the member has checked on it, that is all the assurance we need.

The Vice-Chairman: That was on Page 11, and will be taken care of.

Mr. Prud'homme: May I make a correction?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, Mr. Prud'homme.

Mr. Prud'homme: On page 162 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 4, fifth paragraph, replace the word "Viet Nam" with "Nigeria". It makes more sense.

The Vice-Chairman: I imagine that will take care of it. We will have a subcommittee meeting immediately following this meeting. We have enough of the members of the subcommittee or substitutes for the members to stay on. Would those who can stay kindly indicate that you would be able to do so by raising your right hand. Mr. Fairweather and Mr. Brewin would you be available? That is two. Mr. Macquarrie will be three. Mr. Prud'homme?

Mr. Prud'homme: It will be quick, eh?

The Vice-Chairman: Well, we will have six out of the nine. I think that will be a quorum. So unless there is something further—

An hon. Member: Will there be a meeting tonight?

The Vice-Chairman: No, there will be no meeting tonight. Mr. Grossman is in town, but I think he will prefer to be our first witness tomorrow at 3.45 p. m. There will be no meeting in the morning, of course, due to the caucuses of all parties. There being no further business, I will adjourn the meeting until 3.45 p.m. tomorrow.

APPENDIX J

October 15, 1968

NIGERIA

REPORT OF THE
OBSERVER TEAM'S VISIT TO THIRD
NIGERIAN MARINE COMMANDO
DIVISION SIGNED BY GENERALS
MILROY, RAAB AND ALEXANDER
AND COLONEL OLKIEWICZ

With the arrival of the Polish representative and the representatives of the Organization for African Unity, there were more observers available to cover the ground of the Third Marine Commando Division. The group split into two teams, one visiting the areas Aba, Owerri and Port Harcourt, the other Calabar, Uyo and Ikot Ekpene. The visit lasted from the 5th to the 10th of October. In addition to visiting hospitals, camps for displaced persons, etc., as enumerated in our first interim report, we saw and interviewed a number of internees, prisoners of war and some educated Ibos.

The group received excellent cooperation from the military authorities, civilians and volunteer workers. We were free to question detainees, prisoners of war and displaced persons in private. We arranged our own programme and visited forward areas.

It has become more apparent that the future efficacy of observers will depend largely on their continued presence throughout the whole area and their ability to visit, without undue delay, the places where incidents are reported as taking place. It will also depend on good communications both in the matter of air and ground transport and wireless. These are lacking at the present time. The group is not constituted to be able to follow the method of operation suggested above. We therefore recommend that the organization of the group should be changed to enable it to have certain of its members permanently on the ground in each divisional sector. We consider this matter to be urgent and would be happy to discuss it with the Federal Government at an early date.

State of Civil Population

We did not see as many Ibos as in the north since a large part of the area is populated by Rivers people and minority tribes. Most of the Ibos who were working in places such as port Harcourt fled with the dissidents.

In addition, towns like Aba and Owerri are still close to the fighting line. It is the pattern in such areas that the local inhabitants either flee with the dissidents or take to the bush. Very few stay in the fighting zone. Over half the people we saw in camps, either Rivers people, Ibos or minority tribes, were in a fair state of health and well cared for, but a large number, including small children, are in a state of malnutrition. It is also apparent that the aid on the ground, e.g. army, Red Cross, missionaries, etc. does not exist on the same scale as it did in the area of the First Division, except in the Calabar area. For example, there is a great shortage of doctors. We took note of the fact that the Nigerian Red Cross is beginning to operate in the Port Harcourt area. In the Calabar area the cooperation between the army, the Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission seemed excellent. If the numbers coming out of the bush increase, as appears to be the case, the army, the civil administration and voluntary agencies could be overwhelmed. At the moment not many Ibos have come out of the bush, but already relief resources are overtaxed.

The Military Situation

There has been more fighting on this front than on any other, at any rate recently. The Divisional Commander's primary aim is to defeat his enemy. Therefore everything else takes second place to this his main object. This factor has had an effect on the civil population. The noise of fighting, heavy expenditure of ammunition and the aggressive military tactics of the troops appear to have instilled more fear into the Ibo population than is the case on the northern front. The Ibos have therefore been slower to come out of the bush and slower still to return to their villages.

The troops are aware of the code of conduct and their military discipline appears good. Their officers are in firm control.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement

At present there does not appear to be an overall policy for resettlement of inhabitants back in their villages, the matter being handled individually by sector commanders. The efficiency of the process varies with the personality and operational task of the individual commander. We believe that there should be an overall policy for resettlement laid down by the Divisional Commander in conjunction with the civil administration. Unless people can get back to the villages and to their land, a crop will be missed. This will further accentuate the food problem. We suggest that the Commander considers declaring areas ten miles or more behind the fighting line as white or clear of dissidents. Villagers, after rehabilitation in displaced persons camps should be allowed to return to these areas and restart village life. The forward areas to be declared red and closed to all civilians on security grounds. When feasible, control of the white areas should be handed over to the civil administration and in particular to the civil police. This would constitute a visible sign that conditions are returning to normal, apart from relieving the military of the responsibility which, due to intensive operation activity, they are finding hard to execute. We understand that such a policy is already under active consideration at divisional level.

Relations—Military/Ibos/Rivers People/Minority Tribes

Discussions indicate that the relationship between Rivers people, the minority tribes and the Ibos is at present strained. The Rivers people and minority tribes appear to have no love of the Ibos and it is reported that they settled many old scores when federal troops moved in. In Port Harcourt some Ibo leaders are advising their people to stay in displaced persons camps until after the war is over. Their reason for doing so appears to be that if the war is not finished soon and the federal forces suffered any reverses, Ibos outside protected camps might be in danger. The federal government allows Ibos to remain in these camps if they wish to do so. In Port Harcourt they live as family units.

It is impossible for us to generalise as a result of isolated incidents. However, we did report to the Divisional Commander a case of a Regimental Sergeant-Major maltreating an Ibo who had been picked up in the front line dressed in civilian clothes, a practice often followed by dissident soldiers before surrender. This practice is said to be the reason

why federal troops are suspicious of all Ibos of military age, however dressed. Despite this, as many of the federal officers themselves pointed out, Nigeria has to live as one when the war is over and maltreatment of suspected persons is not going to make this task easier.

Ibos in displaced persons camps have a healthy respect for the troops but mutual contact appears to be gradually dispelling the fear that has undoubtedly existed. Due to the intensity of military operations, contact between villages and the military is less than in First Divisional area and therefore the process of dispelling fear is slower.

Prisoners of war and internees appear to be in good health. However, there are points which should receive early attention by the military commanders. For example, the prisoners do not appear to be given any constructive work to do; no exercise. Accommodation is inadequate. They have little to read and some appear to have been kept in custody unnecessarily. Internees and many Ibo displaced persons have no money and are therefore unable to buy anything to supplement the issue ration. We consider that prisoners, internees and displaced persons who are unable at present to earn their living should be given a small weekly allowance in addition to the initial payment most of them receive. It is also important that a record be kept of money and personal possessions taken from prisoners/internees, so that these can be returned to them when they are released from custody. As is customary, the Red Cross should be invited to visit prisoners and internees. These points have been drawn to the attention of the Divisional Commander.

Deliberate Destruction of Property

We saw evidence of destruction of property, particularly in villages along the route of advancing federal forces. Most of this we assume is the result of the fighting and cannot be ascribed specifically to either side. We did see and hear evidence of looting. From the evidence we have heard we consider that this looting has been carried out by the civilians and the military of both sides.

Deliberate Destruction of Life

We neither saw nor heard any evidence of deliberate wholesale destruction of the Ibo people by the federal troops. The basis for this statement includes private discussions with a number of educated Ibos who spoke good English. There is evidence that some of

the civilians received fairly rough treatment from the troops of both sides and that there is some apprehension amongst a number of Ibo people now behind the federal lines. Practically all Ibos testify to the fair treatment they receive from officers, but some assert that on a number of occasions they have been insulted by other ranks. We therefore consider that selection of army personnel to look after prisoners, internees and displaced persons should be very carefully done. We did see seven dead bodies in Owerri Hospital. As these people had been dead for some time and were in an advanced state of decomposition, it is impossible for the observers to draw any conclusions.

Summary

In summary, in the reas of the THIRD Nigerian Marine Commando Division which the observers visited we found;

(a) That we had unrestricted freedom of movement.

(b) *Conduct of Federal Troops*—The conduct of federal troops appears to vary between sectors, as does their attitude to the civil population. The degree of positive action taken to obtain the confidence of the local Ibos depends at present on the attitude of the sector commander. The troops appear to be under the firm control of their officers.

(c) *Conduct of the Civilian Inhabitants*—The Rivers peoples and the minority tribes who are the main inhabitants of the areas visited are returning from the bush in increasing numbers, and once out have no fear of federal troops. Those Ibos who are now behind federal lines are apprehensive and some prefer to stay in displaced persons camps where they feel safe rather than return to their homes before the war is over.

(d) *Rehabilitation*—We believe that a clear policy for allowing people to return to their villages in the rural areas should be put into effect. The policy of declaring red and white areas could be a solution.

(e) *Genocide*—There is no evidence supporting the allegation of genocide by the federal forces against the Ibo people.

There are a number of Ibo people alive and well behind the federal lines. This speaks for itself. However the majority of the Ibos who lived in the area have not yet returned.

(f) *Food and Medical Assistance*—The majority of work in this connection is being carried out by the army assisted in the Calabar area by the Nigerian Red Cross, the International Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission. The civil administration is very short of doctors. The Nigerian Red Cross has just arrived in Port Harcourt. This latter constitutes a move in the right direction. The supply of food is adequate but will not remain so unless a more rapid return to villages can be arranged. The supply of drugs and medical assistance varies from sector to sector but overall is inadequate.

(g) *Destruction of Property*—Some property, that is houses and public buildings, has been seriously damaged. Such damage as has occurred took place during the fighting in towns and villages beside the roads. The damage was probably inflicted by the armed forces of both sides. There has been considerable looting, some by the dissidents during their retreat, some by the civil population and some by federal forces. Most property is completely unguarded and it is surprising that more looting has not taken place. Undoubtedly there will be a large amount of moveable property within the Ibo heartland once the fighting is over. It is therefore necessary that strict orders are applied to the troops. There is also a need for civil police to move up behind the forward troops.

(h) *Administration*—The Divisional Commander requires to be relieved of administration responsibility in the rear areas.

Future Action

(a) It is proposed to make our next visit to the area of the Second Nigerian Division.

(b) We would like to discuss a certain reorganization of the observer group in order to carry out our future task more efficiently.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

7

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

Government
Publications

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE
No. 7

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1968

Respecting
The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESS:

Mr. Alan Grossman, Ottawa Bureau Chief, *Time Magazine*.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

^s Mr. Alexander	Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Mongrain
Mr. Anderson	Mr. Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Mr. Nesbitt
Mr. Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Mr. Ouellet
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Hymmen	Mr. Prud'homme
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Laniel	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Carter	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Legault	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Lewis	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Gibson	^t Mr. MacLean	Mr. Winch
Mr. Harkness	Mr. Marceau	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

^sReplaced Mr. Macquarrie on October 16, 1968.

^tReplaced Mr. MacDonald (*Egmont*) on October 16, 1968.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
TUESDAY, October 15, 1968.

Ordered,—^(a) That the names of Messrs. Ouellet and Hymmen be substituted for those of Messrs. Stanbury and Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

*Ordered,—*That the name of Mr. Ouellet be substituted for that of Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

Attest:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

^(a) NOTE: That portion of the motion substituting Ouellet for Stanbury was corrected by the second paragraph above.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, October 16, 1968.

(11)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:55 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Barrett, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Mongrain, Ouellet, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch, Yewchuk—(24).

Also present: Messrs. Guay (*St. Boniface*) and Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), M.P.'s.

In attendance: Mr. Alan Grossman, Ottawa Bureau Chief, *Time Magazine*.

The Chairman opened the meeting and

Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*) moved, seconded by Mr. Cafik,

That the Government of Canada take whatever steps are necessary to obtain permission from the appropriate authorities to permit a delegation of Canadian Parliamentarians, taken from the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence to visit all parts of Nigeria, including the rebel-occupied territory of Biafra, for the purpose of observing and reporting all facts as they exist for Canada and the World. The team is to gather information as to the best ways of sending relief and it will ensure that supplies sent from Canada are distributed as Canadians expect. The team will also recommend further ways that Canada can help in its humanitarian work.

It was agreed, unanimously, to amend line 5 of the Motion by deleting the words "the rebel occupied territory of".

Following a discussion by several members, it was agreed, unanimously, to stand the amended motion of Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*), seconded by Mr. Cafik, namely,

That the Government of Canada take whatever steps are necessary to obtain permission from the appropriate authorities to permit a delegation of Canadian Parliamentarians, taken from the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, to visit all parts of Nigeria, including Biafra, for the purpose of observing and reporting all facts as they exist for Canada and the World. The team is to gather information as to the best ways of sending relief and it will ensure that supplies sent from Canada are distributed as Canadians expect. The team will also recommend further ways that Canada can help in its humanitarian work.

The Committee agreed to refer the motion, as amended, to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedures. It was asked, along with Mr. Stewart

(*Cochrane*) and the Department of External Affairs, to consider the motion as to form and the method of implementation. The Subcommittee was also asked to consider the question raised by Mr. Yewchuk, as to the desirability of increased Canadian membership on a UN observer team.

The Chairman announced recommendations of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure concerning the calling of additional witnesses and the scheduling of meetings.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Alan Grossman, Ottawa Bureau Chief of Time Magazine. Mr. Grossman made an opening statement. Members of the Committee questioned Mr. Grossman about his knowledge of conditions in Nigeria during the present conflict.

The Chairman announced that a meeting of the Subcommittee would be held immediately after the Committee adjourned.

At the conclusion of the questioning, the Chairman thanked Mr. Grossman for his kindness in appearing before the Committee and for his expert testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 6:25 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Wednesday, October 16, 1968

● 1555

The Vice-Chairman: I see a quorum and call the meeting to order.

Mr. Stewart, you requested permission to make a motion?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Mr. Chairman, I had hoped that you would have the full Committee here, because I have what I think is a very important motion to propose.

The Vice-Chairman: Would you like to stand it until later, or would you prefer...

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): No; it is all right.

Since the beginning of the Committee, of course, every member of the Committee has been anxious to get as much information as possible so that the Committee could make some kind of decision as to what we want to do and what would be the best ways for Canada to help in the humanitarian work in the Nigerian situation.

Since the beginning of the hearings we have heard many, many conflicting reports and yesterday we heard a very valuable witness who again said what so many others have said, that Canada and Canadians are very well viewed in Nigeria; that perhaps we are even better than an international body as far as helping, for observing and this kind of thing.

With these things in mind, I think it is inevitable that we will have to agree, and the government will eventually have to agree, that a group of Canadian parliamentarians should visit Nigeria and be able to report on all aspects of what is going on. As a result I should like to make a motion and I have a copy for the Chairman, if you wish.

I move that the Government of Canada take whatever steps are necessary to obtain permission from the appropriate authorities to permit a delegation of Canadian Parliamentarians, taken from the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, to visit all parts of Nigeria,

including the rebel-occupied territory of Biafra, for the purpose of observing and reporting all facts as they exist for Canada and for the world. The team is to gather information as to the best way of sending relief and it will ensure that supplies sent from Canada are distributed as Canadians expect. The team will also further recommend ways that Canada can help in its humanitarian work.

Mr. Cafik: I second the motion.

The Vice-Chairman: Does anyone wish to speak to the motion?

Mr. Lewis: I object to a term in the motion, Mr. Chairman. Aside from the merits of it I see nothing to be gained by talking about the rebel-occupied territory of Biafra, and for those of us who are insisting on staying out of the political argument that is one way of getting into it, because you are certainly loading your political position by that term. If the motion is to be considered and passed, I would like to ask Mr. Stewart to consider dropping that and just simply saying "all of Nigeria including Biafra."

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I have no objection at all to that if it is offensive to anyone. Certainly there was no intent there, and so I have absolutely no objection to the word "rebel" not being included.

Mr. Yewchuk: That is a very good suggestion.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, then, shall I put the motion as amended? It reads:

I move that the Government of Canada take whatever steps are necessary to obtain permission from the appropriate authorities to permit a delegation of Canadian Parliamentarians, taken from the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, to visit all parts of Nigeria, including Biafra, for the purpose of observing and reporting all facts as they exist for Canada and the world. The team is to gather information as to the best

ways of sending relief and it will ensure that supplies sent from Canada are distributed as Canadians expect. The team will also recommend further ways that Canada can help in its humanitarian work.

All in favour of the motion?

Mr. Mongrain: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Mongrain on a point of order.

Mr. Mongrain: Do we leave in "including Biafra" or just take it away?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We just took out the word "rebel".

The Vice-Chairman: The words taken out by me were "the rebel occupied territory of", so it now reads "including Biafra", instead of reading "including the rebel-occupied territory of Biafra."

• 1600

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): That was a good suggestion made by Mr. Lewis.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be picky, but since we do not have it to read and it is rather long may I ask you to read it again slowly because it is, after all, something of considerable importance.

The Vice-Chairman: All right, I would be glad to do that.

Mr. Lewis: Before you do that, Mr. Chairman, is this to form part of the report that this Committee will make to Parliament, or is it a request from this Committee to the government?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I do not think...

Mr. Lewis: The motion reads "that the government of Canada take whatever steps are necessary". I do not often go into procedural matters, but it just does not get you very far.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The reason I put it that way is because the government has to get permission from Nigeria for a delegation to go.

Mr. Lewis: I appreciate that, but I think we ought to decide what it is we are moving. It is one thing for this Committee to make a request of the government which does not

form part of its report to Parliament to see what they have to say, and it is another thing if this motion is part of the report which...

The Vice-Chairman: It is a good point and it is well taken.

Mr. Roberts: May I speak to the point something along the same lines? Of course, I do not pretend to be nearly as experienced as most of the gentlemen opposite. Surely since the Committee is a creature of the House it would have to report to the House and then ask the House to do what is necessary, rather than itself making a direct request to the government. Is that not so?

Mr. Lewis: Again I suggest if we really want something done that the proper way is to ask the steering committee to consult with the government in whatever appropriate way it finds for ways and means of implementing this desire of the Committee. Then, when those discussions have taken place and we know where we are, we can make whatever report to Parliament may be required for authority to do it.

I do not want a motion that is just passed and then gets hung up procedurally about half a dozen times along the way. I suggest that perhaps a better approach would be for us to instruct the steering committee to discuss with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, who is obviously the minister involved, the possibility of having a team from this Committee go for the purposes indicated.

Mr. Yewchuk: What would this team do that the Observer Team that is already there could not do? Let us assume that they were allowed to travel and were enlarged; they might be able to achieve this better than a team from here.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Chairman, I suggest it is very important that we send observers from this Parliamentary group to supervise and make sure that there is proper distribution of the mercy supplies.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Stewart, did you want to say something now to the Committee or were you just carrying on a private conversation?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I was trying to clarify a point.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: I just bring up one point. I have the impression that somewhere in the motion it says that we are going to supervise, we are going to oversee the distribution, and I think that is not really what we have in mind. Does it imply that we would go down there with certain powers and that we would be able to look at the whole thing and decide it was not being done properly and change it? I do not think that is the intention of the motion, is it, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): That is not exactly the intention, although the intention is to see how supplies are being distributed.

Mr. Cafik: Yes; that is different from supervising the distribution.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Yes, otherwise we would have to stay there forever and a day.

Mr. Cafik: That is right and I think that is what the motion implies. Perhaps it could be adjusted in that respect.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Fairweather? Then Mr. Yewchuk is next.

Mr. Fairweather: You know, I think we had some very interesting evidence yesterday—I am speaking to the motion and its merits—of an expansion of the Observer Team. I will speak for myself. I wonder, really, whether 30 people—representatives admittedly—are going to help in a very difficult situation. You know, I just am not sure enough of my own ability. I do not mind going if...

The Vice-Chairman: It does not mean all members. The motion is for a delegation to be taken from the membership.

Mr. Fairweather: Do you suddenly load up a plane with 30 people from this Committee?

The Vice-Chairman: No, that is not the intention.

Well, I think Mr. Lewis' point is well taken about this motion being directed to the Government of Canada. I should think it would come from the Committee to the House of Commons and it would be the House of Commons that would make the recommendation. That looks to me like the weakness in it and it may be that it should stand, Mr. Stewart, for further consideration and we maybe could bring it up tomorrow morning.

• 1605

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The problem is the niceties of parliamentary language and so on. If there is an expert who would like to look at it and fix it up, that is fine. But the point is that something has to be done. This motion proposes that we do it.

I have the impression that everyone in this Committee is in favour of the motion. Now, if we are going to hang it up for procedural reasons in the same way as we get caught for hours on end in the House of Commons, then I suggest that this urgent matter is not going to be treated urgently. I think if it is not worded correctly, let us have it worded correctly by somebody who knows how to do it, but the intent is there and I think it should be proceeded with as quickly as possible.

The Vice-Chairman: Maybe we could run off a copy for everybody in the Committee and take it up tomorrow morning. Would that be too long a delay for you, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): If there is a question as to the wording now, there may be a question of the wording again tomorrow.

Mr. Lewis: I am not worried about the wording any more. I really am trying to understand what the motion is after and I appreciate the good faith of the motion, let no one misunderstand that. But what it seems to suggest to me is (a) that the evidence we have had is insufficient for us and evidence that is to come will be insufficient for us, (b) that the International Observer Team which is already there and whose operations we now hope will be extended so that they go on both sides of the line, that that is not quite to be trusted to enlighten us sufficiently, and (c) that there are half a dozen or seven or eight of us in this room who are more capable of observing and bringing back objective and accurate information than those who have already been there as well as the Observer Team. All of which it seems to me are assumptions that we ought to question a little.

Surely Parliamentary committees cannot decide to go on the spot and if I am not one of those who is going—I may well not be if this is passed—then I would have to assume when this group goes that it will come back with a unanimous report, which I doubt very much, or does the committee that goes from this Committee then become witnesses before us with divided opinions and all the political implications that go with it?

I am raising these questions with all the good faith that is behind the motion. I would be much happier to support it without reservation if we had not had evidence and are not scheduled to have evidence from people like Taylor, Stephen Lewis, the gentleman who is now before us, General Milroy and, I understand, Mr. Shepherd from Scotland including the evidence we have already heard.

It seems to me that there is involved here a not very large expense, but some expenditure that we ought to feel is thoroughly justified before agree to it.

Now, to go back to what I said before. If, at this stage, this is an instruction to the Steering Committee or the Chairman of the Committee is enough really—Chairman or Vice-Chairman as far as I am concerned—to discuss the suggestion with the government to find out what can be done and to obtain more information as to when the Committee could go, how many, how these arrangements could be made and so on, then perhaps we would have a little more information to deal with the motion.

At the moment, without being, in any sense, partisan or obstructionist I do not see the value of the proposed visit unless we assume that all the evidence we have heard and are likely to hear is inadequate, insufficient, unreliable and that we ourselves have to go there on the spot.

Mr. Yewchuk: I also appreciate the intention of this. I think it certainly sounds like a good idea to be able to go and see for ourselves because of the fact that we have heard so many conflicting reports as to what is actually happening down there. But I wondered how large a team is proposed to go and, secondly, as far as the distribution of supplies is concerned, I think the International Red Cross is the responsible body and that we should be able to show good faith in their judgment that this will be done without us going down to supervise that particular function.

• 1610

I also wonder whether the sending a group of this nature, representing the Canadian Government, might be construed as really a form of interference in the internal affairs of another government which has agreed to let an international group of observers go. How would they look upon a group of, say, Canadian Government observers?

The thing that really worries me most is the safety of the group. You see, if they plan to travel throughout all of Nigeria, which would include Biafra, and if they want to make observations, as we discussed before, at the scene of action which is really where the atrocities are taking place—not before the action has taken place or after the action has taken place—in order to really be more effective than some witnesses we have heard who have been there, they would have to be at the front lines observing the conduct of the troops as they overtake a village or come in to a market place and then, presumably, carry out what they have been accused of carrying out—atrocities. This then would involve some considerable risk, to my way of thinking, to our Parliamentarians and I certainly would not like to see some of them go and not come back, even if they are of the opposing parties, we like them here, anyway.

The Vice-Chairman: We love it. Is that it, then?

Mr. Yewchuk: That is my main worry, really.

The Vice-Chairman: You are next, Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: I was just going to say a word on the subject that Mr. Lewis touched on towards the end of his remarks. I think that really there are two questions wrapped up in this motion, if I understood it correctly, and the first one is to find out whether such a proposal might be feasible or not. I think in that connection, perhaps, the first motion should be instructing our Steering Committee to find out the information that is necessary as to whether or not it would be possible for a committee from this Committee to go, as the motion suggests. Then, depending on what the answer to that is—what the information is—and with that information before us, we would then take the second step of deciding whether or not we, as a committee, want to send such a group if it is possible so to do.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, the observations of Mr. Lewis, I think, were very good, indeed. I do feel enough has been mentioned already on this subject for us to perhaps turn it over to the Steering Committee with Mr. Stewart and they could discuss it, otherwise I think we might continue discussions of this nature which could prevent us from hearing a

witness who does have first-hand knowledge and information which we would like to hear very much.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of spending some six weeks in Nigeria in 1963. On my return to Canada I made certain statements and prognostications. I was damned all across this country, by the United Nations and by my own party at that time because of what I had said, but what I did say turned out to be completely true. I will just use that as an introduction.

We have heard many witnesses; we are under certain terms of reference. Quite honestly, I do not believe that even sending a delegation from our Committee would serve any useful purpose. The lack of time required to cover the areas to be examined would result, I am afraid, in their coming back with divergent reports. It is my personal belief that the witnesses whom we have heard—authoritative, authentic—should lead us to being able to reach a conclusion.

• 1615

I want to add something else, too. I may be wrong, Sir, but it involves public relations. A few days ago it was decided to send all-party government representatives to Mexico. It was cancelled within two days for economy reasons. For economy reasons, that which had been established was cancelled when they had already had their tests and got everything through. I want to draw to your attention, sir, that this was cancelled by order of the government and the Treasury Board.

Now if we on this Committee, important as it is, were to then ask for money to go to Nigeria and Biafra, well, damn it, we would be criticized on that basis too. I would be quite prepared to say, let us go ahead, if I thought anything could be gained by sending a committee of this Committee to Nigeria and Biafra. Personally I do not think they would come back with any more information than we have received and will receive. So I suggest that we consider very seriously the idea of sending a committee to Nigeria, unless they are prepared to stay about six weeks.

An hon. Member: Or longer.

The Vice-Chairman: Is that it, Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Yes.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay?

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Mongrain: Mr. Chairman...I am surprised by the attitude of our colleagues of the Opposition who—if my memory serves me right—were the first to claim...

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Mongrain, the next speaker is Mr. Guay.

Mr. Mongrain: Excuse me, I am sorry.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I was going to mention, Mr. Chairman, that although we have heard a lot of evidence, much of it has been from the two members who were in the area for a very short period of time. Even Mr. Brewin's colleague today said that if you are not there for a certain length of time it would not be much good. I think these two members who went on their own to seek certain evidence—which I feel they should be commended for doing—did not have sufficient time to get the appropriate evidence.

I am also prompted to speak at this moment because I noticed in the newspapers yesterday that many newspapers are requesting that the government include some of their reporters on the plane. These newspapers want appropriate information so they can keep the public well informed and I noted the number of these reporters was somewhere around 64 or 43. However, in the same article the government recognized that at least some 40-odd of these people were legitimate and possibly should be given consideration.

It also is a fact, I understand, that the government over there would welcome any observers such as members of this Committee or the government. The safety factor was also mentioned and I think that we, as Parliamentary representatives, should not be any more concerned about our safety when we are fact finding for the people whom we represent than when we had to go on other missions a few years ago for similar purposes. I think our safety would be a secondary matter if we could provide appropriate or additional information to this Committee.

We are discussing a point now Mr. Chairman when we have not as yet finished hearing the delegation. I understand that Mr. Grossman is here today and I have not heard from him. I do not really know his experience in this particular field and possibly I would like to hear what he has to say.

I would not support, as someone mentioned, a committee of 30, but it would certainly not do any harm for the government, which is spending quite a bit of money and

sending planes into that area to find out where the money is actually going, just as in any business. I am sure that if any businessman were investing a lot of money in one particular area he would have somebody representing his board of directors or his company to investigate the matter and to find out what was being done with the money being spent and what it was being used for. For that reason I would support this particular motion, and at the same time I would like to hear the other witness that we have here today.

• 1620

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you Mr. Guay. Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Well, Mr. Chairman, I spent a good deal of time in Nigeria and I have some ideas, I think, of the complexities of the situation that exists there, but I have been very impressed with some of the witnesses that we have heard. Obviously they are talking from experience; experience that has seasoned their observations now to a greater depth of understanding than a visit by anyone who goes there for the first time and who spends two, or three, or four, or five, or six days visiting the country under very difficult circumstances. I would suggest that no decision be made on this motion until we have heard from General Milroy. I think he is a key witness in these hearings and we should not consider such a trip as a pleasure jaunt or just as a fact-finding trip when already those facts are available here before us.

The real basis for approving or requesting such a trip should only be if we are not satisfied with the evidence that has been represented. I would suggest, with due respect to the remarks that have been made, but in agreement with some, that we should await any decision on this motion until we have heard from General Milroy.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. That is the last speaker to the motion that I have. Go ahead Mr. Mongrain.

Mr. Mongrain: Mr. Chairman, I will repeat what I said earlier: I am surprised by the attitude of my colleagues sitting today on my right but usually on my left. They were the first ones to ask for all the details on the situation in Nigeria and in Biafra and even two of them went there to see what was going on. Of course, they didn't stay long enough.

One has raised all sorts of arguments stating that the country could object to an intervention from members of a foreign Parliament. It is easy to distort. If we add to Mr. Stewart's proposal that this committee of five, six or seven would go only if the External Affairs Department believes that the journey is possible. This means that the Department would have checked before if the country or the countries concerned—if we believe there are two do not object to it. They don't seem to object since they have said again and again that they would be open to any inquiry made by anybody. But the details of this journey should be arranged by the External Affairs Department. Then, we can see if it can work out or not. This would settle the problem of foreign intervention.

Now, I was struck earlier to hear Mr. Lewis and others say that this seems to put a doubt on the testimonies of the witnesses we have convened here. I don't believe this is true Mr. Chairman. Even if this was true, we noticed that there has been contradictory testimonies. We also have to take notice of the new, changing and very fluid situation in Nigeria.

For instance, Canada sent three planes with staff and equipment and we have spent quite a lot of money there. We are justified in wanting to know what is going on over there and see how this money is spent. But even the political and the military situation is changing every day. Then we would have first hand data, very recent data.

We were told earlier—and I think that this was also said by Mr. Lewis—that there would be a report containing divergent opinions. I would presume that the delegates sent there would be members of all parties represented here, and that they would go and check figures, facts, and not judge the political situation. They would check and see the facts: if it is true that people are starving in certain places, how much our planes cost, whether our staff is well protected, has good accommodations.

• 1625

These are facts, and figures which can be checked and which can't lead to divergent opinions, at least I don't see any. Once more, I don't want to cast any doubt on the reports of our witnesses, they told us very interesting things.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Stewart, after hearing all the discussion would you not con-

sider standing your motion *sine die*? We will consider it very thoroughly in the Steering Committee, in conjunction with yourself and the Department of External Affairs. You can bring it on any time you like if it is adjourned *sine die*.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): That is agreeable to me. However, as I said a moment ago, I do not want to see it hung up. I think it is urgent; I think it is important.

The Vice-Chairman: I think we all agree with that.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Perhaps I am a little dismayed.

The Vice-Chairman: It is a motion well worth considering, but I am a little worried about it in its present form; although that could be corrected very easily.

Mr. Yewchuk: Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, Mr. Yewchuk.

Mr. Yewchuk: If this motion is going to be considered could the Steering Committee consider at the same time the possibility of enlarging the number of our observers with the international group and the possibility of their having more leeway in where they can go? In my thinking this might be very useful.

The Vice-Chairman: We will certainly consider that suggestion.

Mr. Yewchuk: So that there would be no restraint.

The Vice-Chairman: I suggest that we move on to the business of the day. First of all, I have another short report to make to you. It is from the Steering Committee on Agenda and Procedure. We met last night and it was affirmed that this afternoon we hear Messrs. Alan Grossman of *Time Magazine* and Mr. Keith Bezanson of CUSO and that Mr. Charles Taylor of the *Globe and Mail* be invited to appear on Thursday morning.

We were to have had Dr. Cline Shepherd of the World Council of Churches tomorrow afternoon, but we have been unable as yet to locate him in Edinburgh. We therefore have asked Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A., of Toronto, to appear tomorrow afternoon instead of tomorrow evening and he is agreeable to that proposal. We are endeavouring to have Mr. Maxwell Cohen here tomorrow evening to take Mr. Stephen Lewis' place.

That is as far as the Steering Committee has gone on the determination of our witnesses.

Have you a question, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Is Mr. Maxwell Cohen the Montreal lawyer, or another lawyer?

The Vice-Chairman: He is from New York, as I understand.

Mr. Roberts: He is the legal adviser to the Biafran authorities; is that right?

The Vice-Chairman: I believe that is the connection.

It is now my pleasant duty, gentlemen, to introduce to the Committee Mr. Alan Grossman. His first name is spelled "A-l-a-n" and he is not to be confused with the Minister of Reform Institutions of the Province of Ontario. Mr. Grossman, our witness today, was the West Africa Bureau Chief of the *Time-Life News Service* in Lagos, Nigeria, from May 1966 to June 1968. He is a Canadian who has lived a good part of his life in the United States, and has returned to Canada.

He formerly worked for certain Canadian publications, including *Time* as a reporter, and as an editorial writer for the *Globe and Mail*. He is now *Time Magazine's* Ottawa Bureau Chief. Without further ado I will ask Mr. Grossman to give us his opening statement.

• 1630

Mr. Alan Grossman (Ottawa Bureau Chief, Time Magazine): If I may, I will begin with a statement mainly describing the recent life of the Ibos in Nigeria. I am doing this because I had the feeling last week that certain Members may not have been disposed to accept similar testimony for various reasons, such as that the witnesses' stays in Nigeria were brief, that they were on one side, or perhaps overly-dependent on Government propaganda. Therefore, I want to describe something of what has been going on during these past few years in Nigeria.

In May of 1966, a week after I arrived there, the first of the Ibo massacres of that year occurred in the north of Nigeria. It was followed by a far more savage outbreak of violence in the fall and by smaller scale Ibo hunts in Lagos and elsewhere. I was present in the northern region during both of these events and want first to describe what they were like, with special reference to the second event in the fall of 1966.

I know there may have been some fairly rosy conclusions drawn from a few descriptions that have been given here of the conduct of Federal troops. I remember one, with some bitter amusement, that described them as "alert, cheerful and well disciplined"—that was a phrase used—but, despite that, those events in 1966 were beyond any doubt outbreaks of savagery which were led by Federal soldiers joined by large numbers of the northern population. In these events many thousands of Ibos were slaughtered in towns and villages across the north, and hundreds of thousands of others were blinded, crippled, or maimed, or, in the majority of cases, simply left destitute as they attempted to flee to the Ibo homeland in the eastern region.

Some of the fleeing refugees did not make it home. On one train that arrived in the east there was the corpse of a male passenger whose head had been chopped off somewhere along the line. Another group of Ibo refugee men, women and children, whom I happened to see—I would say about 100 or more of them—were waiting in the railway station in the city of Kano, the largest city in northern Nigeria, for about three days, with no security guard, for the arrival of a refugee train and a Land Rover full of FMG soldiers came and mowed them down with automatic weapons.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Did you see that yourself?

Mr. Grossman: Ask me later, will you? Or is that customary?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, I think we can defer that.

Mr. Grossman: I would like to go into that in some detail.

Killings such as that were repeated elsewhere by soldiers and by civilians.

At Kano International Airport, shortly after the arrival of a VC-10 flight from London, a detachment of FMG soldiers went after the Ibo customs men in the immigration shed. Those of the customs workers who fled into the airport bar or on to the roadway outside the terminal were pursued and shot down.

In another northern town the Ibo executive assistant of a regional government official was hauled out of the house and hacked to death in front of his boss' family.

In still another place a prominent Ibo woman merchant was stripped and impaled with broken glass then beaten to death.

Again, I do not want to exaggerate the slaughter. But in some sense, it was general; and so was the destruction of Ibo property. Ibo shops and Ibo hotels were ransacked and looted while blocks of non-Ibo businesses were carefully left untouched.

In the city of Kano alone the numbers killed in a weekend exceeded a thousand; most people felt it was possibly double that. Either way, it was a lot of people. No one will ever know how many thousands were slaughtered that fortnight in the north, or how many hundreds of thousands fled home to the east.

Whatever the number, those events speak for themselves; and it should be remembered that they seem to have bitterly convinced many Ibos—I was not told this by Biafran officials, but have spoken to hundreds of Ibos myself in the last few years—that the northerners are bent on wiping them out.

• 1635

You should understand that today there are very few families in Biafra who have not had a relative killed, maimed or at least made destitute by what happened in 1966. And considering what subsequently occurred in Lagos and elsewhere, it seems to me slightly ridiculous and perhaps slightly vicious for members of the Committee to seem to suggest, as one or two have, that the Ibo fear of destruction from the Federal side is either not well-founded or is attributable to Ojukwu's wicked propaganda. There has been a lot of propaganda—I would account for at least a million dollars worth of it abroad—but propaganda was not the source of what has been happening to the Ibos in 1966, 1967 and 1968.

Now violent tribalism of this sort is certainly not new in that part of the world, but perhaps the worst part of it is the extent to which these tribal feelings have been shared, though of course in a more civilized and less violent manner, by official and professional people in the other tribes of Nigeria who, while deploring the violence and the damage it has been doing to Nigeria's image, are in many cases apparently happy—and I base this again on a large number of formal interviews and informal conversations over a period of several years—to see the Ibo cut down to size, and hope to keep them cut down to size after the war is over.

I think from all this that it is entirely reasonable to expect that most of the Ibo elite will, at best, live for at least a generation the lives of second-class citizens in any united Nigeria. And this plight of the Ibo elite is

perhaps one of the most tragic aspects of this war because this Ibo elite are, again, quite possibly the most developed, competent and educated bank of human talent on an underdeveloped continent which is surely in need of human talent.

In this connection you may not be familiar with some of the events that accompanied the northern army coup in July of 1966. That violence burst out of army barracks and acquired the character of something far more ominous than an orthodox military coup. Guided in some instances by non-Ibo civilian officials, that weekend and for some weeks to come the soldiers pulled a number of prominent Ibos out of their homes, out of their automobiles, even in some instances, off international airline flights to Europe, and killed, beat or harassed them, occasionally in front of their families, more often during incarcerations in army barracks and in prisons. There was even some evidence that it was not the Army alone who were behind these activities. This is purely subjective but it did sometimes seem to a large number of observers that certain elements of the non-Ibo establishment of Nigeria had in effect decided to eliminate the cream of Ibo brainpower whose domination of government jobs, university scholarships, commercial trade and other fields of activity they had for so long resented. In any case, no Ibo of any prominence felt safe in Nigeria and virtually all of them—civil service mandarins, high ranking diplomats, Nigeria's two most prominent novelists, the Chief Economic Adviser of the Federal Government and others—all fled back to the Eastern Region like a horde of miserable war refugees, which, in effect, they were. These bitter and very determined men—determined above all to have nothing further to do with the Nigerians who in their opinion drove them out of the country—now form the backbone of the secession and of the Biafran Government's apparent determination to fight on, if necessary to the point of national suicide.

• 1640

If, after the massacres of 1966, there was ever much margin for doubt that the less educated Ibo masses would support the revolt and the secession engineered by the Ibo elite—and I myself had some doubts at the beginning—I think now that the margin of doubt has been removed, or at least whittled down close to the vanishing point, by the conduct of the Federal Army during the course of the war so far. Unlike the military observers' first interim report, I and other

correspondents who have entered Ibo areas occupied by the FMG encountered more or less ample evidence of intent to destroy Ibos and to destroy the Ibo properties, both by soldiers and by non-Ibo civilians. Bodies of women, some of them mutilated, were found on roads. Hospital patients were found murdered in their wards. In one large town soldiers shot hundreds of Ibo men and actually competed among themselves, according to eye witnesses, for the honour or fun or whatever it was of shooting them. I myself drove through Ibo villages where, months after the fighting had passed by, not a single adult male was visible anywhere. In one of these villages, actually a small town, where there had been no fighting for about three months, a young lieutenant escorted me through the streets, which were mainly populated by hundreds of drunken Federal soldiers—it was Saturday afternoon so I guess that is forgivable—to a patch of bush where this lieutenant showed me what he said was the mass grave of about 500 wicked local Ibo men.

Even in areas of what remains of Biafra that have never seen Federal troops the violence has been further projected onto the civilian population by the sustained raids of Nigerian Air Force jets on civilian targets. When I last visited Biafra in late spring the FMG and, unofficially, the British were calling these raids a figment of Ojukwu's propaganda. Despite this, during raids that went on twice daily during the entire week I spent there I never once saw—they may have done this but I did not see them do it—the planes damage or even approach a military target. What I did see was the rockets drop on and near clearly visible groups of civilians at schools, church yards, market places, road junctions and town residential areas. I saw the bodies and the mashed pieces of bodies of hundreds of civilians—children, women, men—scooped up off the streets with shovels and on pieces of cardboard and dumped into garbage trucks to be taken away to the morgues.

Deliberate civilian bombing, I suppose in certain circles of the world may be considered, in some sense, to be a legitimate weapon of warfare. But the fact that it has taken place is not exactly reassuring as to the FMG's intentions toward the Ibo population nor for that matter is the mass starvation which has been created or at least aggravated by the federal shipping blockade that was imposed on the Eastern Region by the Lagos

Government before the war and, I believe in fact, before the secession.

So, as I see it, there is not terribly much point any more, and I do not know if there is even any justification, for trying to convince the Ibos that they are not fighting a drive to, in some manner, exterminate them. And there is little realistic expectation of any sudden Biafran surrender under the present circumstances. At the same time, from what little I know of relief operations on the Federal side and the conduct of African wars in general, I am not especially hopeful, and I do not think many people are, that an adequate relief effort can be mounted as long as the war continues.

All this, to me, is one very central element of the situation in Nigeria. Another is that the immensity, or perhaps the impossibility, of the task of pacifying the Ibo population within Nigeria, is if anything increasing further every day that the war continues.

• 1645

If I might, I will end it there, but I would like to just read to you the words of a very prominent Nigerian who has made the same point far more eloquently. He is considered by some to be Africa's best English-Language playwright. His name is Wole Soyinka and again he is a Yoruba, if you will a Federal Nigerian.

Before the war started he wrote and published in a Nigerian newspaper the following statement:

Every Ibo man, woman and child believes today that he is fighting a last-ditch battle for his home and his dignity. I know it is all too probably a futile fight and that the East can be militarily overrun. But what concerns us here is that the Ibo as a people will never accept defeat. And here is what that means in practical terms to the nation: the Federal Government is faced with a choice of wiping out the entire Ibo race or administering a nation which has built into its flesh a core of implacable hatred.

This hate will manifest itself in guerrilla and other terrorist activities for generations to come. It will be terrible and it will be bloody... There will be no victory for anyone, only a superficial control that must one day blow up in our faces—and blow the country finally to pieces.

If there are any questions I would be happy to answer them.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes; there are some questions. Mr. Winch? Has he retired? Mr. Laprise.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Gérard Laprise: Mr. Chairman, the witness, Mr. Grossman, has just drawn a rather dark picture of the events which preceded the present civil war.

My first question will be to ask him if to his knowledge there have been other slaughters preceding those that he just described to us, that is before the July 1966 slaughters. Were there occasional fights between certain tribes in that part in Nigeria?

Mr. Grossman: Before 1966?

[English]

Yes, there were, occasionally—but not on that scale. I believe there was a fairly major one in the fifties, which I am a little bit sketchy about, but I believe on a smaller scale.

Things like this are not new in Africa, or in a number of other parts of the world. A new element here is the fact that what is going on now involves modern weapons of warfare, whereas these things usually do not, have not in the past.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Have you yourself witnessed or only heard of the movement of Ibos going back to the actual province of Biafra?

[English]

Mr. Grossman: I was there and saw it.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Now, it is said that at the time the Ibos went back, they wanted to bring a large number of non Ibos with them. I don't know for what purpose, but it is said that they even... tried to induce, perhaps a million non Ibos to go with them to the Biafra province.

[English]

Mr. Grossman: No; neither I nor anyone else I know of has ever come across anything to indicate that that would be correct. In fact, I think the whole tenor of the movement would indicate the contrary, in that what they were doing was going back to their own homeland and closing themselves in from the rest of the tribes of Nigeria.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Now, I have another different question. Have you heard that the Ibos could have bombed either Lagos or other federal cities at the beginning of the hostilities or later on?

• 1650

[English]

Mr. Grossman: Yes, they did in fact fly perhaps a couple, in a rough way—one, two or three missions—or perhaps more—over Lagos. Also over certain areas of northern Nigeria.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: You mentioned one plane?

[English]

Mr. Grossman: No; that is...

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Would the Biafra air force be as limited as this at that time?

[English]

Mr. Grossman: No, I did not say one. Are you talking of missions or of numbers of airplanes?

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: I thought that you said one plane.

[English]

Mr. Grossman: You mean one attempt by one plane to bomb Lagos?

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: It makes no difference if...

[English]

Mr. Grossman: No, more than one; I said "in a rough way, a couple". Say, a couple of missions over Lagos, and there were others in the north.

May I, Mr. Chairman, add here that I have inevitably been one-sided in what I have been saying and that I am not in any sense denying that questionable acts have also been committed on the other side. This, again, is another reason for everyone wanting to end this war.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Mr. Chairman, I would like to come back, if I may, to the statement that Mr. Grossman just made when he mentioned

the atrocities that were carried out by the Nigerians on the Ibos.

Has he witnessed the fact that the Ibos seemed to be on the defensive at the time, or were even counter-attacking?

[English]

Mr. Grossman: I do not quite understand the import of your question. Perhaps—stop me if I have it wrong...

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: What I would like to know is, at the time of the slaughter in July 1966, and even later, did the Ibos try to defend themselves?

[English]

Mr. Grossman: By and large, no, according to all accounts they did not effectively try to defend themselves. They more or less submitted to what was happening or, I should say, attempted to run away from it. In 1966, of course, we are talking about atrocities, if you will, against unarmed civilians. There was no question of formal military warfare here so that the means by which they could defend themselves, or "take the offensive" in any immediate sense, was rather limited.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Grossman, may I express my appreciation for your testimony which has been interesting and moving although very sombre.

I gather that you believe that there will be no real solution to the problem of starving people until the war or the dispute, is brought to a conclusion. Am I also right in inferring from your remarks that in your opinion the humanitarian efforts will have very little success or effect until the dispute is brought to a conclusion?

Mr. Grossman: On your first point, by and large, in a general way, I think that is fair to expect, yes.

Mr. Roberts: What I think the Committee has really been looking for are practical steps, steps that it can recommend the government to take, to relieve the suffering. Your testimony has been in a sense negative, in that you have described the difficulties and

the tragedy in the situation. Could you expand a little on what you think it would be practical for the Canadian Government to do to try to bring about the result that we all desire?

Mr. Grossman: Yes. If I may go slightly beyond...

Mr. Roberts: Yes; take that as a jumping-off point.

• 1655

Mr. Grossman: ...direct relief, beyond the question of food and medicine, I think one of the very few encouraging or hopeful developments since the war began—and again it is a limited thing, but it is something—has been the introduction of this military Observers Team to the scene. I would go even beyond what Mr. Sharp said last week when he called the presence of this group “soothing”. Such an outside presence in my experience—and this is why it is always difficult to get eyewitnesses to these events that occur—has often had a braking effect on the toleration of atrocities by army officers, for instance. I wish that this team could be expanded as much as possible. That is one thing.

I do not know what else I can say. Some have the theory that you can stop the war by supplying weapons to Biafra thereby achieving a stalemate and forcing the Nigerians to settle by negotiation. I think it is obvious that the Canadian Government is not in a position to supply arms and military assistance to Biafra. It appears that another government, the Government of France, has taken this course of action, presumably through an agency which resembles the American CIA, which did, by most accounts, very roughly the same sort of thing in the Congo at one time. Now this is a possibility but obviously not one which Canada would be involved in.

Mr. Roberts: Well there have been some other suggestions which look attractive immediately, at first view, but which I suspect—and of course it is only suspicion—might be counterproductive.

There have been suggestions, for instance, of an international inquiry of some kind, the matter being raised at the United Nations or the United Nations' presence or intervention. I wonder if you could say from your experience of living in Nigeria, and your discussions with Nigerian officials, whether that kind of activity—an attempt really to make what they regard as an internal Nigerian

situation into a matter of great public concern—would simply get the backs up of the Nigerian authorities. Or how would they be likely to react to efforts of this kind?

Mr. Grossman: Extremely negatively if they were carried on in that way. For instance, this limited agreement which the Canadian Government apparently achieved a week or more ago with the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, Mr. Arikpo, was to me a very major accomplishment. Not necessarily on an official level but on a private level, very important members of the Nigerian Government, most of them but not all in uniform, have from the beginning regarded even relief efforts as a form of assistance to their enemy and have regarded relief organizations and relief workers with an almost pathological suspicion and sometimes hatred. So it was, to me, a notable development that this agreement was achieved. It remains to be seen when Mr. Arikpo gets back to Lagos whether what he agreed to will be carried out by his government.

Also, on the question you asked, I have spent these two years in another country of West Africa also, and talked to a number of African leaders and government officials about the situation in Nigeria. I would again quite fully, from those conversations, back up what Mr. Sharp said about talking to a stone wall, in effect, when you try to get African support to get this into the United Nations or to interfere. I am not saying that something could not perhaps be done by certain countries, probably including Canada, in the sense of lobbying in Africa with the African governments, many of whom, while they do have this hands-off attitude, also have a certain significant degree of sympathy with the Ibo people and with the doing of what they can to stop what seems to be happening to them, as long as it does not openly violate strongly-held principles of political non-interference, particularly by the former colonial powers.

• 1700

Mr. Roberts: So in your opinion the most hopeful way to proceed would be to push for an expansion of the role and the effectiveness of the Observer Team or teams?

Mr. Grossman: No, but this would help in a limited way. I suppose that awful thing known as “quiet diplomacy”, both in African circles and with powers such as Britain which have been supplying arms to Nigeria, if it

were undertaken by enough countries might conceivably help.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you very much, Mr. Grossman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Anderson, you are next.

Mr. Anderson: Is it correct that the atrocities which you described mostly took place in the Northern Region around the town of Kano, or were these general throughout Nigeria?

Mr. Grossman: Those particular ones which I described at the beginning took place in various parts of northern Nigeria which is by far the largest area on that map; it is a very vast region.

Mr. Anderson: On a question of information, are the other tribes of Nigeria as spread out as were the Ibo? For instance, are there as many northerners and westerners in the Iboland as there are Ibos elsewhere in Nigeria?

Mr. Grossman: No, there are not. There were a certain number of them before these events occurred; I cannot estimate how many but certainly in much smaller numbers than the Ibos in other regions of the country.

Mr. Anderson: The Nigerian Government has claimed that a great number of Ibos have remained with them. As an example of this, they have mentioned the Nigerian Ambassador to Brussels and also to New Delhi, both of whom are Ibos and who are still serving the Nigerian Government. Do you think this is at all significant?

Mr. Grossman: No, I do not think it is terribly significant at all. Firstly, they did say Ibos and not easterners?

Mr. Anderson: Easterners.

Mr. Grossman: Accepting that they are Ibos, I do not think it is terribly significant because both of these men being ambassadors are not living in Nigeria and therefore are not subject to the conditions in Nigeria and to the direct and potentially violent resentments of their non-Ibo colleagues.

To my knowledge, when I left Nigeria—and I think this is far more significant—before all this happened, a large number of the high officials like Permanent Secretaries, which is their equivalent of our Deputy Ministers, were Ibos, were easterners; and I

may be inexact on this but I am almost certain that just about none of them were Ibos at the time that I left Nigeria. There were of course a substantial number of Ibos living in Lagos at the time, 17,000 or possibly more, but the majority of these people were stewards, houseboys—largely with European families, where they had at least that protection—elevator operators, clerks and that sort of thing. The point here I guess is that you were asking about high government circles or government circles.

Anyway, I think if they cannot find you any more than two ambassadors there is not much of a case for the contention that the Ibos are still living and functioning as previously as first-class partners in the governing of the country.

Mr. Anderson: Further on the same point, do you have any indication from your knowledge of the area we see there on the map of how many Ibos are now behind the Federal lines and would be now under the control of the Federal Military Forces?

Mr. Grossman: No, I do not. I would think that it is a fairly substantial number, just inevitably; not everybody, I guess, could fit into that shrinking dot known as Biafra.

• 1705

But the only direct evidence I can give you is that when I was last in FMG-occupied areas which have heavy Ibo populations—and this was late last spring—in some cases there were not any people; in other cases there were not any males, they had disappeared into the bush had been killed or gone off with the Biafrans.

Again, one question you might ask General Milroy since they made quite a point in their first report of saying there were Ibos there and that they were “happy” Ibos from what they could see, nowhere as far as I can see do they mention the number of Ibo civilians they encountered, nor do they compare that number with the number that had been living there before the Federal occupation.

Mr. Anderson: Now that you have mentioned General Milroy’s report, do you feel that perhaps the first report might have been the result of a lack of knowledge of Nigeria and that we can expect more accurate reporting in the future? I notice you have also added that you think we should send more observers. Well, there is a bit of a contradiction here, I think.

Mr. Grossman: Well, first I did not, I think, at any point say or mean to say that this is factually an inaccurate report. I think it may, however, be a misleading report and, depending upon how you read it, perhaps an unreal report while this again, I think, in no way questions the veracity of exactly what they said as applied to where and when they said it.

I think one thing you might want to ask General Milroy when he comes is whether any of the members of this mission have had any previous experience in Africa because there are things about what people tell you there and what you see, at least in my experience, that you do not even begin to understand until you have been there for a while.

For instance, I find it odd, and I forget whether it was in the military report or the UN representative's supplement to it, to find their saying or implying that the Ibos they spoke to spoke to them freely and honestly. In my experience it is very difficult, especially for a group of white men in military uniforms who arrive in the company of soldiers, or even, say, for me or any European—and here again I am talking about, if you will, the bush Ibos, not government officials but the people they hear and are talking to and judging—to get these people to speak freely to you. They have a great tendency to tell you what they think you want to hear, and things like tribal violence in Africa are things that are not intended for the eyes or ears of Europeans.

Mr. Anderson: I gather from what you said you feel, then, that the value of the observer teams is not so much in the accuracy of their report but in the inhibiting effect their very presence has on Nigerian forces.

Mr. Grossman: Yes, very definitely so.

Mr. Anderson: So the more we can put on the ground the more chance there is. . .

Mr. Grossman: Sure. This occurred with European journalists on a number of occasions. The fact that they were somewhere prevented some soldier from doing something to some civilian. This, perhaps, is an idiotic way of approaching things, but I think a sizeable international presence of any kind there is going to prevent at least some small portion of what is likely to occur as this thing goes on. And again I would say this is a pretty notable achievement, the fact that even this team was accepted.

• 1710

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I would agree here. Could you give us any indication of the amount of food that might be required, say, in two months from now for relief purposes? I ask this question because as far as we can gather it will be impossible to deliver the required amounts of food to Biafra and the Federal occupied areas of Iboland by air. A land corridor will become essential.

Mr. Grossman: No; quantitatively I cannot give you any idea of the amount of food that is required.

Mr. Anderson: How about the second part; do you think these flights by Canadian aircraft are an acceptable substitute for a land route?

Mr. Grossman: Well, Mr. Anderson, I do not even know how much good land routes would do at this time. I think from what I saw very vaguely of similar problems and how they were approached in the Congo, for instance, that air is always preferable. Again, of course, if you get into a situation like this it may no longer do any good, but where the amount of food being brought in is in any sense manageable, air is always preferable because the longer you are on the ground the more transport, logistic, tribal or military problems you run in to.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you very much, Mr. Grossman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to pick up a thread strated by Mr. Anderson and go back just a little to the summer months and the fall of 1966 and through the early months of 1967 and ask the witness, Mr. Chairman, if he can tell us whether or not there was any suppression of news coming out of Nigeria to the outside world about what was going on and in periodicals and newspapers such as the *New Nigerian*, which, of course, were for home consumption. Was there any obvious or apparent deliberate attempt to suppress accounts of some of the atrocities in the northern region?

Mr. Grossman: Let me first take the part of your question dealing with news as it goes abroad as opposed to news published within Nigeria. To use "suppression" in a very general sense, oh yes, there was quite a good deal of it. I would go beyond 1966 and apply

this also to political events that occurred following the physical events. There was, for a long period of time, in intention at least and usually in effect very strict censorship in Nigeria.

For a long period of time it was necessary for me and for other correspondents who were living and working there, as opposed to those who would come down for a few days and fly back to Europe, to write, to either telephone our dispatches to Europe or to the United States or, as was generally the case, to file these dispatches from other countries which involved, sometimes every day or second day, getting on airplanes and flying to other countries in West Africa, and on many occasions smuggling them out with airline passengers, and this sort of thing.

A number of, to most people, pretty reputable correspondents were expelled from Nigeria because of what they filed. Others including me, were at times in prison for brief periods; not prison, I am sorry—under arrest, so in this sense there was suppression. I think, perhaps, if I may throw this in, the more hurtful kind of suppression we encountered was the suppression which resulted from some of the misleading things which a few of the diplomatic people there and others whom one would expect to be, at least, honest about these things, were attempting to get into the stories we were writing.

• 1715

Mr. Forrestall: Why do you think there was suppression?

Mr. Grossman: I pass.

Mr. Forrestall: All right, I will accept your pass on that one. The reason I raised it, of course, is because there have been very strong suggestions that many of the accounts that have come to our attention, a lot of them second and third-hand, have been generated by the Biafran officials for propaganda purposes.

One of the things that first came to my attention about Nigeria was their "Crisis" Series, Vol. 3, the *Nigerian Pogrom*. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. Grossman: Yes, I am.

Mr. Forrestall: You have seen it? Do you think that it is authentic? Have you read it?

Mr. Grossman: Yes, I have. I am even alleged to have written some of it, which is not true.

Mr. Forrestall: That is why, of course, I asked you. Without dealing with it in great depth because it stands as a document, I suppose, on its own merits, but in connection with the effective propaganda, which is the point I am getting at or trying to, there is one part on page 7 in the left-hand column, where the writer indicates and I quote:

There are several eyewitness accounts of pregnant women of Eastern Nigeria origin who were ripped open and their unborn children hacked to pieces; and accounts (most of them given by the actual victims themselves) of women, some of them pregnant who were forcibly held down by Northern soldiers. . .

and it goes on and on—

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I notice that Mr. Brewin, Mr. Forrestall and the witness today have a red book—I do not know what it is. I am just wondering—Mr. Lewis has one also—what the book is and if it is available to the other members of the Committee.

Mr. Forrestall: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I should have identified this book a little bit more.

Mr. Lewis: It is not a secret document.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): No, but it is good to know.

Mr. Lewis: I received it in the mail.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I thought it might have been another newspaper or something you might have had.

The Vice-Chairman: Let us have the identification of it for the record.

Mr. Forrestall: The title of the book is *Nigerian Pogrom* the subtitle is "The Organized Massacre of Eastern Nigerians". It was published by the Publicity Division of the Ministry of Information, Eastern Nigeria; it is part of the "Crisis" series; it is Vol. 3 in the series; There were six similar, not all in shape and design—seven altogether, I am sorry. This was printed at Enugu by the Government Printer in 1966 and I would gather this particular edition some time in the fall of 1966.

Whether it is available in the library or what, I do not know. Mine was given to me by the last Canadian to leave Nigeria last summer.

However, getting back, again, to what I am wondering about on page 7—the quotes that I just read—Mr. Chairman, whether or not this type of thing was used, in your opinion, for a specific military purpose or with a specific military end in view by the Biafrans themselves? In other words, was this printed to whip up the Ibos themselves to a point of absolute conviction in their own minds that they could not in any way give up their struggle for independence or, from your knowledge of this, is this simply an independent—as independent as it could be under the circumstances—setting forth of some of the accounts—some of the eye witness accounts—of the atrocities that did occur?

Mr. Grossman: Partially both, Mr. Forrestall. This particular book was part of a series of books which were published by the Biafran Government. They are very slickly and expertly produced books which—

• 1720

Mr. Lewis: I just want to point out, Mr. Chairman, it was Eastern Nigeria rather than the Biafran Government.

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Lewis, I think you can hold this—

Mr. Grossman: Yes, this was before the war and before the secession. These were published not to whip up Ibos because the very, very vast majority of Ibos would never see these books. They were published to whip up foreign sympathy or if you want to put a better construction on it, foreign understanding of what had happened and why they were going to do what they were going to do. On the internal level, books like this had their counterpart in incessant broadcasts to the Ibo people by the Eastern Region authorities; reciting and, in some instances, exaggerating what had happened: posters and this sort of thing to keep them whipped up. Many Biafran—sorry again—then Eastern Region officials would quite easily admit as much, you know, admit the fact that they were keeping people whipped up and explained it in terms of the need to keep people alert to what they regarded as a foreign menace to the Ibo people and to keep them united for what they regarded as the future and inevitable confrontation that was going to occur with the people they call the “northern vandals”.

Mr. Forrestall: Do you think the full impact—the full story—of these atrocities that did occur will ever actually be known?

Do you think there is enough evidence from military records and from first-hand accounts, such as yours, at some point in the future to piece together—I am not talking about for historical purposes, I am talking about perhaps for our own immediate purposes over the next few months—some accurate picture of what has happened there in the last two years or will we have to wait until history deals with it?

Mr. Grossman: I do not even know if history will be able to deal with it with any accuracy because, again, this is an area of the world where things like this occur beneath very, very deep shadows. For instance, it is impossible to confirm or deny, if you will, the figures which have been bandied about, that 30,000 Ibos were killed in the northern massacre and 1.8 million, I think it is, refugees returned to the east. It is impossible to say much about these figures because, to begin with, nobody knew how many Ibos there were in the north before these things occurred. The last accepted accurate—semi-accurate—census of Nigeria dates back to the 1950s. There has been considerable population movement since and people who are regarded as expert observers have given estimates of the number of Ibos in the north ranging from I think, 500,000 to 3 million. So, you know, when you do not know how many people there were to begin with, it is pretty hard to tell how many of them were—

Mr. Forrestall: Just to conclude this line of thinking and again you touched on it a bit earlier, would you say that the presence of correspondents in increasing numbers, particularly in recent months, has had an effect on the prosecution of the war by getting down into the level of troops where perhaps it is a little difficult in this type of warfare to control? Do you think there has been an impact, for example, on the sergeants and the lieutenants to exercise much firmer control over their troops in local actions because of the presence of correspondents, because this, of course is what it was just up until recent weeks?

• 1725

Mr. Grossman: Not to any meaningful extent, no. Let me give you two instances. A colleague of mine—the correspondent of the *New York Times*—was in a certain area of the Midwest—excuse me, I might be wrong on that. Let me just say that a colleague of mine from an American newspaper was in a certain area of the Midwest when some of this shooting of Ibos by Federal soldiers was

going on, and he came upon a scene where it appeared that a soldier was about to liquidate this Ibo in front of him. This was stopped and the soldier said, "Oh, all right, you go, you go", and he said to another soldier, "Take him away to the camp" or something of this sort. The Ibo and the soldier went down the road and the NCO, I think it was, said to the correspondent, "Well, you see, we do not kill Ibo men; we just deal with them otherwise". Then when the correspondent and the group he was with themselves drove away they drove down the road and found the body of that same Ibo with some bullet holes in it. So there you are.

I think there is an incomparably better chance of preventing a bit of this stuff with people wearing military uniforms—people who have some international standing which Nigeria is aware of and to some extent respects such as a UN or other such sponsored group of military officers.

Mr. Forrestall: Let me just change abruptly to another area of questioning. Very obviously, as the Biafran district or that eastern region has been compacted recently, there have been some very fine properties up for grabs. What has happened to the physical real estate, for example, of the wealthy Ibos in the areas that are now under Federal Military control. Do you know?

Mr. Grossman: If you want to go back to the North, the many areas of the Sabon Garis or strangers' quarters of northern cities, which were vacated by the Ibos in 1966, a lot of them were destroyed or ransacked, but those that were not or at least what remained of them was put under padlock by the Federal Military Government. Again, this is just an impression, but from diving through these places I would say there has not been, in the ones I saw at least, any extensive subsequent occupation of them by others. I think in fact that you ought to direct your attention, if I may say so, less to Ibo property that has been left behind and more to things like jobs and positions in society and in government. I think these are the things which we cannot really expect them to come back to and occupy in the near future under any imposed settlement.

Mr. Forrestall: My next question was going to be whether or not there has been an apparent deterioration because, I understand 70 to 80 per cent of these jobs were filled by people from the eastern regions.

Mr. Grossman: Which jobs are those?

Mr. Forrestall: In government, in the universities, in hospitals—professional people. For example, I understand there is getting to be a fair scarcity of dentists in certain parts of Nigeria. Who on earth is doing that type of work, or is it just not being done?

• 1730

Mr. Grossman: Let us start with cable office workers, railway locomotive drivers—all this sort of skilled labour. These positions were occupied by Ibos. Take the North again. What happened was that in the first instance a lot of these positions were occupied on a temporary basis by Europeans, or by non-Nigerians. For instance when the Ibos were forced out of the North they had provided I think the bulk of the locomotive drivers for the Nigerian Railways. I think Nigeria had to go off and hire East African and British locomotive drivers. In hotels and businesses where Ibos were clerks—say, they had a European manager—the European manager got his wife to fill in for a number of months. But eventually in the longer run the drift has been toward the replacement of Ibos in such positions by indigenous people of the region. And here again, a very important factor is the attitude of the Northern population to what happened up there. One previous witness said that everyone regretted and was ashamed of all that had happened. Northern people would tell you that for the first five minutes, but I find that a very superficial portrayal of their attitude. They seemed in fact quite happy to get rid of the Ibos, and with some justification from their point of view, because these were foreigners who had come up to their homes, to their regions and had taken the jobs which they, the northerners in this instance, and the same applies to westerners, felt they were equally qualified for. The hotel jobs, service jobs, clerk jobs, office jobs vacated by Ibos in the North were taken over by less competent, if only because they had had no experience or training. Northerners who, I presume, are gradually acquiring these skills. In other words, the Ibos, at many levels of Nigerian society, were regarded as "colonialists," as colonizers, and what many of the other Nigerians were in effect doing to the Ibos was driving out the colonizers, and at this level I do not think they want them back.

Mr. Forrestall: It is not permissible for me to ask you that question or to allude to it, but

I think it is pretty obvious that this is probably what I was driving at—whether or not the other provinces in Nigeria itself are now able to sustain themselves as a going nation and to look after and run their railways, their telegraph, their means of communication, their hospitals, their schools and so on and so forth. There was an awful lot of argument put up, for example—and I will suggest it—that without unity, without the level of professionalism that had been attained by the Ibos in their role in the general communities, that the country itself might find it very very difficult to get back on the rails.

Mr. Grossman: There were difficulties; there were some serious difficulties which in the first instance were made up by hiring foreigners to do these jobs on a temporary basis and which the Nigerians hope in the longer run will be made up by the training of other Nigerians for these jobs, and I think they will get along without the Ibos if they have to. But on the other hand it again is a tragic shame to waste the talents of these peoples.

Mr. Forrestall: Thank you very much for coming and taking so much of your time this afternoon. I appreciate it and I am sure all the other members do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, we have five more questioners on my list and we have at least another witness to call today.

Mr. Fairweather: I think that the other witness should be number one tomorrow. We have kept him all afternoon. We had an argument for the first half hour. I move that Mr. Bezanson be the first witness tomorrow morning.

The Vice-Chairman: The problem is we have called two witnesses for tomorrow.

Mr. Fairweather: They can be second and third.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, it has been brought to my attention by our group that a number of committees are organizing tomorrow morning. We are going to be very busy and we are hoping that this Committee would adjourn until tomorrow afternoon.

• 1735

Mr. Cafik: I think it is going to be tough for us all to absent ourselves from the organization meetings.

Mr. Lewis: They are just committee organization meetings that meet five or ten minutes.

Mr. Cafik: It is a matter of getting the ten minutes for three or four consecutive meetings.

The Vice-Chairman: What time is the organization meetings called for tomorrow?

Mr. Cafik: I do not know.

Mr. Hymmen: 10.30.

The Vice-Chairman: We will be meeting at 9.30 a.m., and we may be able to carry on for a few minutes if certain of our members have to leave us at 10.30 a.m.

Mr. Cafik: I do not know. Tomorrow I am on four committees that are being organized. I do not know why. That would seem to tie me up for a little while. I would like to be here.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, I was told by Mr. MacDonald, who was here some time ago, that most of the members would be away. He was the one who asked me to bring it to your attention.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Donald MacDonald, our House Leader?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): No, the other one who was here.

The Vice-Chairman: David MacDonald?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): He brought the message from Mr. Donald Macdonald.

The Vice-Chairman: Perhaps we can have a break at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow to give these organizing committees a chance to get their quorums.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that 10.30 a.m. would be satisfactory because some of these committees are being organized at various other hours.

The Vice-Chairman: Can we have a list of the hours?

Mr. Legault: I have not got a list but I believe they start at 9.30 a.m.

The Vice-Chairman: About 9.30 a.m.?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, it might be possible to meet at 11.00 a.m.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, I think that would be...

Mr. Cafik: If that time were set I believe it would satisfy all of the members.

Mr. Fairweather: As long as Mr. Bezanson is first at 11.00 a.m. we have no objection to that. I thought it was a mistake to have two witnesses on a short day, and this has been proved right.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Perhaps it would be wise for us to carry on without them tomorrow, even if it means sitting twice tomorrow afternoon, or even later on tomorrow night.

The Vice-Chairman: Is it agreed that we adjourn the meeting until tomorrow at 11.00 a.m.?

Mr. Lewis: That we meet at 11.00 a.m.

The Vice-Chairman: That we meet at 11.00 a.m. We have to send notices out.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Again, of course, and I am only speaking for myself now, I have an organizational committee meeting at 11.30 tomorrow morning, but I would also like to be in attendance here. I am concerned about it.

Mr. Fairweather: We all have that problem. Let us carry on.

The Vice-Chairman: Let us leave it to the Steering Committee. We will consider it, and you will get a notice later. We will take the matter up with Mr. MacDonald, who has asked us to consider it, and the Steering Committee will decide. You will probably then receive an amended notification of the meeting.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I understand how busy they are, too. I am speaking for myself at the moment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Guay. Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Grossman, despite the hour, I have three or four lines of not too lengthy questioning. First of all, I would like to investigate with you a very simple fact. Were the massacres in May, July and in the fall of 1966 in a number of places simultaneously?

Mr. Grossman: I do not know if I would in all cases use the word "massacres," but acts of violence were committed against Ibos and easterners in general in a large number of spots throughout the northern region.

Mr. Lewis: Did they happen within the same period of time?

Mr. Grossman: Several periods of time. To take the one in the fall of 1966, the outbreaks occurred in a large number of spots in the north.

Mr. Lewis: Would it be right to conclude, then, that there was some organization behind it, or some plan behind it; that they were not spontaneous outbreaks?

Mr. Grossman: This cannot be proved, but it is the suspicion of a large of number of fairly objective observers, who studied the matter, that such might have been the case. For instance, one asked why, when communications among these villages and towns are so sparse, this would all happen in a two-week period in all these places. One possible partial explanation of this was the broadcast, by the Northern Region Government Radio Station, of a report which claimed, I think correctly, that a number of people of northern origin had been victims of violence in the Eastern Ibo Region. The decision to broadcast this obviously inflammatory report was made at a fairly high government level. One wonders what was the intent in making the decision to broadcast it.

● 1740

Mr. Lewis: I am being brief, Mr. Chairman, so as not to take up all the time that remains.

On the question of relief, if I understood what you have said, you mean that relief would be required on such a huge scale that one cannot solve the problem of food and medicine for the people by any relief action that might be organized; but that we are not to conclude from that that the relief is not of great value to those who happen to be fortunate enough to receive it?

Mr. Grossman: Not in the least; any crumb of bread that can be got over there should obviously be sent.

By the way, Mr. Lewis, on this point, a few witnesses you have heard have suggested, if not said, that the problem of starvation should be down-played a bit in that it is a fairly normal thing in what they call "that area of the world". I disagree with this very strongly. I, and most people, have never seen real starvation in Southern Nigeria. Yes, there has been protein deficiency; there has been malnutrition; but what we are talking about here is starvation to the point of death.

I put this assertion, by the way, to a man who works for UNICEF in New York a few days ago, and he agreed with this, if you will rejoindered to it. He dug up a survey that had been made by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1965-1966 of a number of Nigerian cities on the incidence of kwashiorkor, the main protein deficiency disease which people have been talking about in the last few months; and in the two Eastern Region cities of Port Harcourt and Nsukka and one Ibo city in Mid-West Asaba—which, of course, was a very selective, small-scale sampling—the incidence of kwashiorkor was zero. Now I take it, thousands of people are dying of it.

Therefore, any implication that anybody would make that it is always a problem and therefore we should not become too disturbed about it, is complete nonsense.

Mr. Lewis: Therefore, that increased relief, although it cannot solve the ultimate problem, is certainly something that we ought to be concerned about?

Mr. Grossman: Certainly.

Mr. Lewis: I now come to my next line of questioning; and then I will come to a partial argument with you, perhaps, or at least make a suggestion to you that you are leading me, as one member of the Committee, to a position of complete despair and helplessness. But let me come to that in a moment.

You talked about the braking effect of the the military Observer Team, which makes simple logic—simple commonsense—to me. Would it not be even more effective if it were a team set up by the United Nations—by the world community—rather than being a team invited by the Nigerian Government?

Mr. Grossman: I do not necessarily think it would; in fact, I think one characteristic of the team which is of very great value is their uniforms—their military background—and the very fact that they have been invited there and are there with the sanction of the Nigerian officer command. This makes it much easier for them to move around and to have some intercourse with the military authorities in the areas in which they are moving. Your average Nigerian officer is far more predisposed to listen with some amount of sympathy to the words, and to take into account the presence, of other military officers.

On the other hand, some would say who they are perhaps decreases the value of the

information they give us. This is quite conceivable. For instance, the Biafrans would certainly not accept the word of the British officer. We had a British officer on the Team. They would cast this man off as a biased criminal of the British Government.

There is again, however, the aspect that from the point of view of saving a few lives perhaps, by their presence, the presence of a British officer is a salutary presence.

• 1745

Mr. Lewis: But you do have the contradiction that these military observers are perhaps of greater value in impressing the military of the FMG. On the other hand, as you have said, they are of less value in obtaining information from the average villager about what really happened.

Mr. Grossman: Yes, I would say in a general way—again without knowing the background of the gentlemen involved—that the value of their testimony in this regard probably would be less than that of a trained civilian observer with a long background at African experience. Obviously their two functions are in conflict. This is quite true but, you know, you have to choose which you think is the more pressing function.

Mr. Lewis: Unless you have both.

Mr. Grossman: Unless you can have both, yes.

Mr. Lewis: You have military observer teams serving the purpose that you suggest they can serve and some kind of international team serving the other purpose of obtaining information for the world.

Mr. Grossman: Yes, that seems sensible, sir.

Mr. Lewis: Now, this takes me to the final point that I find in your testimony very disturbing; it may still be right. If I am not summarizing your testimony accurately do not hesitate to tell me so; I am sure you will not. What you have, in effect, said to us is that relief can never solve the problem; the Ibos are in a spot with regard to their future, not only their lives, but those who remain alive with regard to their positions; that to speak about unity of Nigeria is pretty meaningless because of the position in Biafra and the justification of the Biafrans, particularly the Ibos, in feeling that they have to defend their lives and their future in society, and

that none of these problems can be solved so long as the war is on.

On the other hand, you tell us that you are persuaded, as other witnesses have been and as one recent witness of Biafra who is somewhat related to me has told me on the phone, that the Biafrans, particularly the Ibos, are determined not to give up and that even if the ordinary military action should be lost by the Biafrans the guerrilla war or some form of it may go on for many years.

Then you end by telling us that in your view any steps by the non-African nations or by the United Nations as a whole would probably receive a negative response from the Nigerian authorities and, therefore, are probably unwise. You leave me, as one member of the Canadian Parliament, in a situation where I just have to throw up my hands and say: I can perhaps help to send a few tons of food and medicines to save a few lives but in the end there is nothing the international world can do to end this conflict.

I am just not prepared to accept that, Mr. Grossman. It seems to me that even if—and I put it to you—action by the UN of some sort, some public discussion at the United Nations—I am not talking about quiet diplomacy only—should provoke a negative response from the Nigerian authorities or, indeed, from other authorities in Africa, it is impossible for the world to sit still and let this thing go on in the kind of hopeless way in which you have painted that it will go on.

Is it your considered opinion that Canada or any other country ought to refrain from trying anything at the United Nations for the reasons you have given?

• 1750

Mr. Grossman: I am not especially qualified to answer that but in an impressionistic way I would say that neither Canada nor any other country should refrain from doing anything it feels might help to bring this war to an end. However, to that I would add that I have not yet heard exactly what it is that Canada should do, which it is not doing, which would bring this war to an end or which would have a good chance of doing so.

Bring it into the United Nations? Perhaps; but I do not know. Perhaps you have a more favorable opinion of the effect of world opinion on the course of events than I do. Again, perhaps this may do some good.

Mr. Lewis: I do not blame you, Mr. Grossman, for being a little cynical about it. The

events in the world make all of us a bit cynical, but what I have in mind is very simple, perhaps, and that is that Canada seek to place before the United Nations a resolution requesting a ceasefire in Nigeria and the presence of international observers to see that the ceasefire is observed, and to promote the re-beginning—because it has been done before—of political discussion for the solution of the problem.

Mr. Grossman: Well, say Canada were to put this into the UN; say it were to get into the UN; say it were to be passed by the UN, there would then be the question of enforcing it. To carry this to its logical conclusion perhaps you, or others in favor of this might advocate the sending, with or without Nigeria's permission or sanction, of a United Nations armed force to enforce this resolution.

Mr. Lewis: I am sure, Mr. Grossman, I am not simple enough or ignorant enough about international affairs to suggest anything like that, but the fact is that in situations not entirely dissimilar like Cyprus, like the Middle East, for a while, you know, the international effort and the international opinion has accomplished something. It broke down in the Middle East, sure, but for 10 years there was something. It has not yet broken down in Cyprus and perhaps the time has come there where the action may not be as necessary as it was before. While I was very concerned about it, by the almost categorical way in which you suggested that any action at the international level is probably worthless...

Mr. Grossman: Mr. Lewis, if I may interrupt you, I did not suggest, or at least did not intend to suggest any such thing, or to make any judgment on whether such action on the international plane is wise or unwise. In fact, I think it should be quite clear to everyone that the international community bears a great responsibility and some would say a great guilt for what has happened in Nigeria.

The shipping blockade, for instance, which accounts for some of the starvation—certainly for the protein starvation to some extent—could not have been enforced had the shipping nations of the world not enforced it. The war in its early stages, from what I observed of it, was quickly coming to a stalemate and had it come to a stalemate it is quite likely—if not necessary, at least quite likely—that Nigeria would have been forced to sit down and reach a political settlement. The war was tending toward a stalemate in the early

months and I think this was changed by the massive injection of modern weapons of warfare by such powers as Great Britain.

So, certainly all along the line I agree it is nonsense to say that the international community bears no responsibility for what is happening there and the only question is how the international community can most effectively exercise this responsibility.

I think you would agree with that; I think Mr. Sharp agrees with it. But where do you go from there? I do not know.

Mr. Lewis: In my opinion you try whatever is possible. If it succeeds fine; if it does not, O.K.

Finally, may I ask you this? Do you happen to have talked to people at the United Nations recently about this if you were in New York?

Mr. Grossman: Do you mean Africans or...

Mr. Lewis: Africans and others.

Mr. Grossman: Not very recently. I did talk to quite a few Africans up to and including the early part of this summer about it.

Mr. Lewis: So you do not know what the chances are at the UN from your own knowledge? I am not blaming you.

Mr. Grossman: Not really, but from what I know of the attitude of the Africans and of the great powers, until quite recently anyway the chances did not seem very good. Some have found cause for a flicker of hope in a couple of events such as the apparent sending of support by France to the other side; the recent reported visit to Nigeria of the American—I believe it is Assistant Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Palmer, who some say is going out there because he or, perhaps, the State Department may not be quite satisfied with the reporting that they have been getting from the field. They might be in the process of re-examining their own policy in this regard. If the Biafrans can hold out a few months longer, I do not know if Britain, again, might be under some pressure to re-examine its policy.

• 1755

Mr. Lewis: This government in Britain is under some pressure from its own party at the moment about the arms.

Mr. Grossman: Yes, it has been, but it seemed to have ridden out this pressure at an earlier stage where the cutting off of arms would have done some good.

Mr. Lewis: I will not take any more time.

The Vice-Chairman: I have Mr. Fairweather, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Alexander and Mr. Ouellet on my list. Mr. Fairweather, we do not have much time.

Mr. Fairweather: If Mr. Grossman is in town he might come back. Mr. Grossman, do you know Colonel Adekunle?

Mr. Grossman: Not intimately, Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: I do not think anyone would want to know him.

Mr. Grossman: I have run across him.

Mr. Fairweather: What command did he have?

Mr. Grossman: He was one of the divisional commanders, which makes him one of the three or four top field people.

Mr. Fairweather: Does military government or the troops under his command insist in the disbursing of relief supplies? What is the attitude of the government toward relief supplies?

Mr. Grossman: With the preface that I am not an expert on this matter—the handling of relief supplies and the relief questions—the impression that their handling of it made on me was negative.

Again, on an impressionistic basis, I recall one instance—this was shortly after the capture of the eastern region or Biafran port of Calabar in the far east of Nigeria—of a city which was partially destroyed where the population was really in a bad way; they needed these supplies very badly—the indigenous population was not even mainly Ibo in that case—and they attempted to get a Red Cross vehicle on to a ship which was going from Lagos to Calabar to carry military supplies. They had permission from supreme headquarters to put this vehicle on. One of the officers involved happened to come down and saw it on the ship and ordered it taken off, which indicates a pretty negative attitude.

I have also seen Red Cross trucks, or what would appear to be Red Cross trucks, being used in war-affected areas to carry around beer for the troops, which again does not seem to be a very encouraging use of—

Mr. Lewis: Red Cross trucks carrying beer?

Mr. Grossman: Well, what would appear to be Red Cross trucks—trucks with red crosses on them—which were being used to carry beer around for the soldiers.

The Vice-Chairman: Does that answer your question, Mr. Fairweather? I do not like to interrupt while you are asking questions, but some of the members are leaving now.

We are going to have an emergency Steering Committee meeting and I would request that the following members of the Committee stay for a few minutes after adjournment: Messrs. Guay (St. Boniface), Hopkins, Legault, Cafik, MacLean and Lewis. Thank you.

Please proceed, Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: Do you propose finishing?

The Vice-Chairman: And Mr. Fairweather, too.

Yes, I think we can take a few minutes. We have the NATO dinner at 6.30 in the Railway Committee Room.

Mr. Lewis: For those who are going to it.

The Vice-Chairman: I have to be there. I think we could continue for another 10 or 15 minutes.

Mr. Ouellet: Mr. Chairman, does Mr. Fairweather intend to have a long questioning period?

• 1800

The Vice-Chairman: There is not only Mr. Fairweather, but there are Messrs. Cafik, Alexander and Ouellet—the four of you.

Mr. Fairweather: I will pass and come in later. We will ask you to come back. You are in town, are you not?

Mr. Grossman: I am in town.

The Vice-Chairman: We are getting into a squeezing situation here.

Mr. Alexander: I only have one question. I think this ground has been explored in great depth and to assist the Chairman and members of the Committee, I just want to ask one question.

The Vice-Chairman: You are third man on the list, Mr. Alexander. What about Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: I have about three questions. It will take me about 15 seconds to state them and perhaps a bit longer to have them answered.

The Vice-Chairman: What about Mr. Ouellet?

Mr. Ouellet: I have two questions.

The Vice-Chairman: Perhaps we can get through. I do not know; perhaps Mr. Fairweather has a lot of questions. That is the only problem.

Mr. Fairweather: I only have three or four.

Was there ever a unified country known as Nigeria or was it a paper country, that is, just a constitution?

Mr. Grossman: You should ask an African expert that, but I would describe this country as having very grave built-in tribal difficulties standing in the way of unity, difficulties which have obviously been exacerbated by the events in the past few years.

Mr. Fairweather: And the only present way to preserve this is by force of military might as far as we have learned from you and other witnesses?

Mr. Grossman: Yes, it would seem so.

Mr. Fairweather: In other words, the paper is secure, but the unity is not secure?

Mr. Grossman: Well, as General Gowon said in his first press conference when he came to this high office, "There is no basis for unity in Nigeria", a statement which he later denied making, but which he did make.

Mr. Fairweather: How did he come to his high office?

Mr. Grossman: Through a military coup. On the other hand, even in their innermost souls some of the Ibos in the very, very long run do see some basis for unity, but that the only way it can be achieved is by the parties drawing apart for the immediate future until these hatreds have cooled down and, hopefully, some day have gone away.

Mr. Fairweather: The attitude of civilian and military Nigerians toward the Ibos and the attitude of the civilian and military Ibos toward the Nigerians are pretty deeply rooted?

Mr. Grossman: Yes, they are extremely deep-rooted and are bound to remain so and

get even more deep-rooted as long as this war goes on. On the civilians, I will never forget, for instance, one morning during these northern massacres after they had calmed down a bit when the Ibos were being taken in by humanitarian workers and policemen who were much better disciplined in this regard than the army, in trucks to the railway station, peering out of the bars of the trucks with their great scared eyes and driving through the streets of the northern city of Kano. There were large numbers of people—northerners—standing there laughing and jeering at all this.

• 1805

I have spoken to scores of northerners since and I have never detected any sense of contrition or guilt about what happened. The general attitude seemed to be that the Ibos had it coming to them.

Mr. Fairweather: But the Ibo people were citizen people—citizens of the military state of Nigeria—were they not? I mean technically. We are dealing in immense technicalities.

Mr. Grossman: If, let us call it, a constitution existed yes, they were. But, on the other hand, remember that Colonel Ojukwu, who was the regional governor of the east at the time the northern coup took place, never did and never has recognized the legitimacy of the Gowon government which was brought to power by the coup. So, in that sense perhaps, they were out of it from the beginning.

Mr. Fairweather: Just one last question. I think you were very helpful about your observations about the Observer Team. How do your views square with what the Observer Team saw? Have you read all three reports?

Mr. Grossman: Yes. The first report seemed to be on a slightly different world than the world I have lived in, which again is not to question the accuracy of the specific observations in that specific time and place. It is interesting to read these descriptions of Federal troops in Report No. 1, "alert, cheerful and well-disciplined", then to pick up Report No. 2 which was a few days later, perhaps, and read about how the troops in the same army perpetrated what the same observers describe as "unprovoked and inexcusable killings". I think as the reports keep piling up that there may be a somewhat different view in them than was read into the first one.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Grossman, I found your testimony in your opening statement to be quite illuminating as far as myself and my function here is concerned.

I have two or three rather short questions. First of all, I am not sure whether you were in Nigeria in January, 1966; were you?

Mr. Grossman: No, I was not.

Mr. Cafik: Fine; you went in in May. Is that correct?

Mr. Grossman: That is correct.

Mr. Cafik: Now, concerning the atrocities that took place against the Ibo people by the Nigerians in May, I think, and in the spring and again in the fall of that year, to what extent do you think they may have been provoked by the counter-coup of January 1966 and do you think they may have been spontaneous uprisings of the people against the Ibos who they may have considered to be responsible, as I think they were, for the assassination of the Prime Minister and 150 or so other important people in the government?

Mr. Grossman: Well, all these elements were involved. In the eyes of many Nigerians there was ample provocation for violence against the Ibos. I am told that in the months immediately following the first military coup which, in effect, brought the Ibos into power, Ibos living in the north went around doing things, such as bars where they used to drink that play high-life music records, a sort of jazzy African kind of music, included records one of which had lyrics which were anti-Hausa—the major northern tribe—that were accompanied by a background sound of rifle fire.

I was told that Ibo traders in the markets would go around with pictures of the Ibo General Ironsi. When there was a commercial argument they would sometimes hold up the picture and say, "You settle it my way or this man will take care of you".

There was this sort of provocation. There was, I suppose, provocation of years of domination in various economic and other spheres by Ibos but still, you do have to judge whether these or any other conceivable actions would be considered provocation for...

Mr. Cafik: I am sure nothing would justify that kind of massacre but I just wondered whether, in your view, it could be conceivable that these massacres were a spontaneous uprising by the common people as opposed to

an organized movement to cause his massacre?

• 1810

Mr. Grossman: I think the conclusion of those who are more qualified than I to make that judgment tended to be that all this—and I certainly saw nothing to contradict this—could not have taken place without a popular base of hatred against the Ibos, but it also probably could not have taken place without at least some degree of organization or of encouragement by people in official or quasi-official positions.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Grossman you were here earlier when a motion was put about sending a group from this Committee to Biafra and Nigeria. Relating that to the observations that have been made as to the beneficial effect of having Observer Teams in Nigeria and, hopefully, some time in the future in Biafra, do you think it would be of some advantage to have Parliamentarians down there for a period of time making observations and overlooking the situation? Do you think that in itself could have a beneficial effect and save lives and, perhaps, be useful?

An Hon. Member: Stick your neck out.

Mr. Cafik: I am only asking your opinion of that.

Mr. Grossman: It could. It could in the sense that every person who goes to that place and sees what is happening there and comes back and tells people—perhaps not with full accuracy because of their limited access to seeing events—that what they hear is really happening makes the world, I guess, that much more aware of the situation and that much closer perhaps to finding something to do about it.

Mr. Cafik: Do you think it might have a salutary effect on the events that are happening in that country?

Mr. Grossman: Where are these people going? To Nigeria or...

Mr. Cafik: Well, the proposal is to go to both the Federal area and the Biafran area.

Mr. Grossman: Do you mean a salutary effect in the direct sense of...

Mr. Cafik: In the same ways that the Observer Team has, but perhaps even more so, in that it is an official delegation from a

friendly country, and there has been a lot of mention as to how friendly Canada is with this area. We are supplying Hercules aircraft; we have good relations I gather with the Federal area. I gather from what I have heard that we are pretty well respected by the Biafran people. Now, if we were officially there would this have some beneficial effect?

Mr. Lewis: Let us not endanger their respect by going there.

Mr. Grossman: Well, what kind of beneficial effect do you mean; beneficial effect on what?

Mr. Cafik: On the course of the events, for instance.

Mr. Grossman: While they are there?

Mr. Cafik: Yes, while they are there.

Mr. Grossman: I do not see that it would have any effect whatever in any direct sense on the course of events were they on the Biafran side, and also in any direct sense I do not see that it would have more than an extremely marginal effect on events on the Nigerian side. They might happen to be in a certain spot where one or two or three people might have been chopped, as the Africans say, had they not been there, and the fact that they were there prevented, or more likely just postponed, the chopping. I think any effect their presence would have in that very direct sense would be very marginal.

• 1815

Again, I think the value of this Observers Team is that they are wearing uniforms, that they are army men, that the Nigerians in some sense want them there and are talking to them.

Mr. Cafik: All right. I have one last question. There was some mention by you and others of indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets and hospitals, and so on, in Biafra itself by the Federal authorities. Do you think there is any possible way that Canada, as a nation, could do anything to eliminate that or anything that we could propose that might restrict the area of bombing by the Federal authorities?

Mr. Grossman: Well, like what?

Mr. Cafik: For instance, if Canada were to propose that these areas be marked in a specific way, perhaps the Federal authorities

might agree that if they were so marked and supervised no bombing attempts would be made in the areas.

Mr. Grossman: If I catch the drift of what you are saying I would say it is most unlikely. For instance, in the earlier days there were attempts to mark certain buildings with red crosses. Whether this was a warning off for Egyptian pilots is perhaps questionable, but this was done and these red crosses were ignored, and the explanation was that the Biafran soldiers were using red cross marked buildings as soldiers of course do—schools, and so on—as headquarters and therefore they were military targets.

As long as the war is going on I think it is accepted in many quarters of the world outside Africa as well that such bombing will be used in warfare. I think it goes on.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Alexander?

Mr. Alexander: Mr. Chairman, I would preface my remarks by stating that I too am grateful for the involvement of Mr. Grossman. It appears that most areas have been explored very adequately not only by members of this Committee putting questions but by Mr. Grossman's answers. I would just like to follow the questioning that was started by Mr. Cafik.

Is Mr. Grossman in a position to say that he could or could not recommend the action that has been suggested by this Committee, to send parliamentarians to Biafra and to Nigeria of course.

Mr. Grossman: I just do not know.

Mr. Alexander: I have just one other question. It appeared to me, after having discussed the situation in terms of community intervention by way of the United Nations, that there seemed to be much sympathy expressed by many countries in terms of wanting to assist the Biafrans in this particular matter but that no one seemed to want to take the lead by going to the United Nations. Is it a question perhaps that these countries are looking for leadership in that regard, because it appears to me that if the military government does not intend to cease in its efforts and the Biafrans do not intend to give up then one of the only logical means of attempting to assist in this matter would be through the United Nations in terms of the world community becoming involved.

Are these countries waiting for leadership in this regard and, if so, will they follow by climbing on the bandwagon?

Mr. Grossman: I do not know if they are waiting for leadership. I think that there are some countries in the world—and from what little I know as an outsider Canada might just be one of them—which would like very much to provide what you described as leadership in this regard, but do not know how to do it.

• 1820

Mr. Alexander: After having discussed this matter with these many nations would you not agree that one of the solutions is United Nations intervention on the humanitarian aspect of it.

Mr. Grossman: What do you mean by intervention?

Mr. Alexander: Well in order that the world community can become involved I think that someone has to project this involvement through the United Nations.

Mr. Grossman: In what way, what sort of involvement, what sort of intervention?

Mr. Alexander: I think perhaps that what we are trying to attain is the cessation of hostilities. I think there has to be more involvement in terms of the world community rather than be sympathetic as such—giving it more voice from a podium of some consequence.

Mr. Grossman: Well I guess the real question there is, how can the world community most effectively do something to...

Mr. Alexander: You can put it that way, yes.

Mr. Grossman: ...bring hostilities to halt. And this may change in a few weeks, it may change in a few months, but right now, and again I am not really qualified to say this, it does seem to me at the present moment and given the present circumstances that pressure, or which is not really the right word, action with or to ward the African countries and Nigeria is a more promising method for getting things further along than directly through the United Nations. Again this is a foggy and inadequate answer but I do not know what it is that you have in mind for the United Nations to do which would conceivably be done by that body in the present situation.

Mr. Alexander: I do not think that I can pursue this matter any further.

The Vice-Chairman: One question has gone quite a long way.

Mr. Alexander: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I will now give the floor to someone else. Thank you, Mr. Grossman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Ouellet.

Mr. Ouellet: I have only a point of clarification. It concerns the series of seven volumes? Did you say previously that you participated in the preparation of one of the volumes?

Mr. Grossman: No. I said I had been accused of doing so. This was a reference to the fact that the volume you have there includes a reprinted article from *Time* magazine, which I work for, which was reprinted in that volume simply because it was I believe one of two eyewitness accounts that was available to them from the foreign newspapers. I had nothing to do with the preparation.

Mr. Ouellet: Is this reprint accurate?

Mr. Grossman: Of the *Time* magazine article?

Mr. Ouellet: Yes.

Mr. Grossman: What appears in the booklet you have is an accurate reprint of what appeared in *Time* magazine.

Mr. Roberts: Let us not go too much further than that.

Mr. Grossman: I have no intention of doing that.

The Vice-Chairman: Is that your last question, Mr. Ouellet?

Mr. Ouellet: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Forrestall: Just for the record, because we have left our witness hanging by the threads, perhaps he should explain what happens between a typewritten piece of copy and its final appearance in *Time*.

Mr. Grossman: I do not think that has very much to do with the Biafra or the work of this Committee, if you will.

The Vice-Chairman: Order. I would just like to say to you, Mr. Grossman, that on behalf of the Committee and myself personally we very very much appreciate your kindness in coming and particularly in giving us the benefit of your wide experience and knowledge of these tragic events in Nigeria and Biafra. Thank you very very much.

• 1825

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

The Vice-Chairman: This meeting is adjourned. There will be a subcommittee meeting.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

Government
Publications, 8

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 8

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1968

Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

Mr. Keith Bezanson, former C.U.S.O. Official and Mr. Charles Taylor,
London Correspondent of the *Globe and Mail*.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

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Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

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Mr. Anderson	Mr. Howard	Mr. Ouellet
Mr. Barrett	(<i>Okanagan-Boundary</i>)	Mr. Prud'homme
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Hymmen	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Laniel	Mr. Stewart
Mr. Carter	Mr. Laprise	(<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Legault	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Lewis	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Gibson	Mr. Marceau	Mr. Winch
Mr. Harkness	Mr. Mongrain	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, October 17, 1968.

(12)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 4:15 p.m. this day, with the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Harkness, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, Marceau, Mongrain, Ouellet, Roberts, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch, Yewchuk (24).

Also present: Messrs. Buchanan and Guay (*St. Boniface*), M.P.'s.

The Chairman announced sittings of the Committee at 9:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on Friday, October 18, 1968 to hear Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A., at 3:45 p.m. on Monday, October 21, 1968 to hear Dr. Clyne Shepherd, if he can be here, and on Tuesday, October 22, 1968 to hear Major General Milroy.

On motion of Mr. Forrestall, seconded by Mr. Yewchuk,

Resolved,—That the following document be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*see Appendix K*):

Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide, Lake Success, December 9, 1948 (together with a list setting out the parties to the convention and the dates of their adherence).

The Chairman introduced the witness for this afternoon's sitting, Mr. Keith Bezanson, a former teacher with the Canadian University Service Overseas, in Nigeria. The witness delivered an opening statement, including historical background about Nigeria in recent years.

During the questioning which followed,

On motion of Mr. Thompson (*Red Deer*), seconded by Mr. Yewchuk,

Resolved,—That the following documents be printed as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Statement By The Minister of State For Foreign Affairs, Mr. C. Y. Mgonja on Tanzania's Recognition Of Biafra, Saturday, April 13, 1968 (see Appendix L).

Copy of Nigeria 1967 *Aburi Report* (without pictures or advertisements) (*see Appendix M*).

It was agreed, unanimously, that newspaper clippings used by Mr. Bezanson during his testimony be copied and made an Exhibit in the Committee's records (*Exhibit No. 1*).

With the questioning of the witness continuing, at 6:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(13)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:15 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Mongrain, Roberts, Ryan, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch and Yewchuk (20).

Also present: Messrs. Buchanan, Groos and Guay (*St. Boniface*).

In attendance: Mr. Keith Bezanson, former C.U.S.O. official and Mr. Charles Taylor, London Correspondent of the *Globe and Mail*.

Members of the Committee remaining on the list of questioners at the close of this afternoon's sitting, agreed to forego further questioning of Mr. Bezanson.

The Chairman, on behalf of the Committee, thanked Mr. Bezanson, for his useful testimony and the witness retired.

The Chairman introduced the next witness, Mr. Charles Taylor, London Correspondent for the *Globe and Mail*. Mr. Taylor made an opening statement, dealing especially with information he had obtained during his recent stay in Biafra.

The Chairman then introduced the Deputy Speaker of Kenya, Mr. Fitz De Souza, who was in the audience as a guest of the Deputy Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons, Mr. Hugh Faulkner.

Members of the Committee questioned Mr. Taylor at some length, concerning his knowledge of conditions on both sides in the Nigerian conflict and suggestions he had made regarding types of assistance which Canada might provide at this time.

The Chairman referred to a communication he had received from the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, dated October 15, 1968. Mr. Robinson enclosed a copy of a statement on the situation in Nigeria by Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Washington, on September 11, 1968. A press clipping from the *Washington Post*, dated October 5, 1968, was also enclosed. The Committee agreed to file these documents as an Exhibit (*Exhibit 2*).

At the end of the questioning, the Chairman thanked Mr. Charles Taylor for his helpful testimony and his useful suggestions in connection with the Committee's Order of Reference.

The Committee adjourned at 10.25 p.m., until Friday, October 18, 1968 at 9.30 a.m., when the witness will be Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A., of Toronto.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, October 17, 1968

• 1616

The Vice-Chairman: I see a quorum. I will now call the meeting to order.

At the outset I should advise you of our prospective list of witnesses. Today our first witness will be Mr. Keith Bezanson and likely this evening our witness will be Mr. Charles Taylor. Both are present now in this Committee room. Tomorrow at 9.30 a.m. it is planned to hear Mr. Stephen Lewis. The Committee will sit from 9.30 a.m. until 11 a.m. and if necessary from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. or 4 p.m. or whatever time may be necessary to complete his testimony. On Monday we plan to have Dr. Clyne Shepherd as our witness at 3.45 p.m. This is a tentative arrangement. All we have so far is a cable going to where we have located Dr. Shepherd in the office of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh. We do expect a favourable reply. On Tuesday we anticipate hearing General Milroy. With respect to Mr. Cohen, he has been unavailable for today, tomorrow or Monday; therefore we are not clear on him.

With the compliments of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, we have received the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was agreed to at Lake Success on December 9, 1948. It was signed by Canada on November 28, 1949. It is in both French and English. We also have from the Department a list of the signing countries and some explanatory notes. At my request the Clerk has prepared 50 copies of these three documents and I would like to have the agreement of the Committee to distribute the necessary 30 copies to members of the Committee. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

• 1620

The Vice-Chairman: I was not planning on asking the Committee to annex the explanatory notes to our Minutes of Proceedings. I think they are simply to assist members individually in considering the Convention. I

would, however, like to have authority to annex the Convention itself and the list of signing countries as appendices to our Minutes of Proceedings of this day. Would this be agreeable to the Committee?

Mr. Forrestall: I so move.

Mr. Yewchuk: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The Vice-Chairman: We have extra copies and I think we can supply the press who are present with copies of these three documents. Is this agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Now it is with great pleasure that I introduce to the Committee Mr. Keith Bezanson. He was formerly a CUSO volunteer. He is presently completing his Ph.D. in international development at Stanford University in the State of California. He was in Nigeria from 1964 to 1966 as a CUSO volunteer. He was teaching in a secondary school in Western Nigeria and I think he can be most helpful to us in our deliberations. Without further ado, I would ask Mr. Bezanson to make his opening statement.

Mr. Keith Bezanson (CUSO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like to make an extensive opening statement, if I may, and then entertain any questions which you might have.

It is a privilege and one for which I am grateful to have been afforded the opportunity to address this Committee today. From the outset I should like to make very clear that I speak not only for myself, but rather for a group of Canadians who worked in Nigeria under the auspices of the Canadian University Service Overseas. It should also be noted that in no way do I, or the group which I represent, represent the CUSO organization, either officially or unofficially. We are simply returned volunteers, individuals who have lived and worked in Nigeria and who since returning to Canada have followed events in Nigeria with a very deep concern. I must also

note in all fairness that our experience in Nigeria, if you take it collectively, would add up to some 40 years of contact in the country of Nigeria.

Over the past week you gentlemen have heard information and asked questions of several persons well qualified to talk about what is now happening in Nigeria or Biafra. What impressed us as outsiders who were following these proceedings was that many of you raised questions regarding the historical aspects which led to the present conflict. It also impressed us that many of these questions involving the history which led to the war were left unanswered. Since we lived in Nigeria during the critical years which led to this war, as well as during the time the war has been conducted, we hope to be able to provide you with assistance in your deliberations by providing you with some of the necessary background information which led to the war.

I must emphasize that what we are going to present are facts, facts to which you can refer for your own corroboration. Conclusions which we have drawn are based entirely on these facts. It is always a temptation for one to express personal sentiments and views which go beyond facts. We have, however, attempted to eschew this and to stick solely to the facts of the Nigerian case. If you should, however, wish to know what our opinions are, and specifically my opinions, then I would be only too pleased to provide you with these during the question period.

It is very difficult to select a point at which to begin a discussion of Nigerian history, but I think that if we begin with the events which immediately preceded Nigerian independence in 1960 we may be able to trace the sequence of events which led to the present war.

The progress of Nigeria from colony to nation was largely the result of pressures and actions resulting from Southern Nigerian intelligentsia. For the most part, people in the north were not terribly anxious for independence. The movement was led by southerners. Many of them went to jail, spent time in prison, wrote in underground journals, urging for independence. This was a characteristic movement of the south which finds no counterpart in the north. The north for a variety of reasons wished to delay independence. As a result the two southern regions, Eastern and Western Nigeria, became independent, that is, self-governing, I should say, in 1957; and the north, in accordance with its own wishes in 1959, two years later.

• 1625

From the very beginning the area of Nigeria which Britain had carved out of Africa was threatened with fragmentation. As early as 1956, before independence was ever achieved at a conference in London, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a leader of the western people, the Yoruba, threatened that the West would secede from Nigeria, if the actions which were not taken at that conference did not accord with the territorial and personal wishes of the people of Western Nigeria.

In that same year in 1956, when Nigerians were attempting to find a constitutional base for independence, the northern representation, that is the representation from Northern Nigeria, offered an eight-point plan that would, in effect, have made Nigeria into a loose confederation, not a federation of states. This loose confederation would co-operate only in matters of revenue and matters of defence. Political parties which developed in pre-independent Nigeria found their political base along regional lines rather than along national or integrated lines.

In the West, the political party which arose was the action group led by Chief Awolowo, predominantly a Yoruba based party. In the East, the NCNC was the party which was the creation of Doctor Azikiwe, who was a freedom fighter and who was one of the men largely responsible for Nigerian independence. In the North, a party known as the NPC was formed. It was led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, former leader of Northern Nigeria, also the Sardauna of Sokoto. The Sardauna is a term which involves both religious and political leadership. It is fair to say that he was also the spiritual leader of the Moslem people of the North.

These political parties then drew their support from the predominant tribal groups of the three major tribes, Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa-Iulani respectively. This led to an issue which was to become a dominant theme in Nigerian politics, the case of the numerous minority tribes of Nigeria. Nigeria has some 250 tribes, all of them distinct, all of them different, most of them having a different linguistic base, and the fear was that these minority tribes might suffer in any constitutional arrangement which did not recognize their integrity and their territoriality.

In preparation for independence, Nigeria's first national election was held in 1959; the three major parties competed. The North, which has a larger population than either of the two Southern regions, won the election by

virtue of its larger population. It, however, won only a minority government which became a coalition. Kenneth Post, who was the historian of this election, has concluded that the election was relatively fair and I should like to quote from Mr. Post, who says as follows:

"Only where administrative and legal structures were already open to political pressures, that is, the Native Courts and Native Administration of the North being the most obvious examples—were there abuses."

But this, in Nigeria's first national election, was to become the seed of election-rigging techniques which were to flourish later in Nigeria.

On October 1, 1960, Nigeria became an independent nation. Under the constitution which had been arranged the transition to a republic was rather automatic and did occur in 1963.

In 1962, Nigeria experienced its first coup. This coup was a political rather than a military coup. The action group party of the Western region was a regional as well as a federal party. At the federal level, the party was yet led by Chief Awolowo; at the regional level by Chief Samuel Akintola. The party voted unanimously at one of its meetings to remove Chief Akintola both from the deputy leadership of the party and from the premiership of Western Nigeria, which he then held. Akintola, a brilliant political operator, was not to accept defeat. When the Governor of Western Nigeria refused to comply with his request that he not be removed from office, he staged a physical brawl in the House of Assembly. Chairs were thrown, ministers were attacked and beaten and representatives were injured. Police had to use tear-gas to disperse the scuffling.

• 1630

Walter Schwarz, who lived and worked in Nigeria as correspondent of the *Guardian*, the *Observer* and the *Economist* respectively, commented as follows and here again I quote:

"It was soon clear that there was method in all this madness. Realizing that the parliamentary party was against them, Akintola's supporters had sought to have the House dissolved in disorder. They had succeeded. The Federal Parliament was summoned in emergency session and the government declared that a state of emergency existed".

With this state of emergency the Western Assembly was dissolved. Immediately following this there was an inquiry into corruption—political corruption—in the Western region. Following on the heels of the corruption inquiry, Chief Awolowo was tried for treason in an alleged plot to overthrow the federal government. It was very strange that after only one brief outburst in the Western House a state of emergency was declared. Equally strange was the fact that the commission found that public funds had been misused for political reasons. The accusation included the national leader of the party, Chief Awolowo, who was found guilty of these misappropriations of funds. Strange, though, that the then regional leader, Chief Akintola, was innocent, his name having never been mentioned in connection with these illegal appropriations of government money.

Awolowo was found guilty of treason and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. The treason trial was fraught with many irregularities which are too numerous to list here. However, the upshot of this was that Akintola maintained his premiership in the West, while Chief Awolowo went off to prison. Akintola immediately formed a new political party of his own creation, the NNDP, Nigeria's fourth major party. This party was to remain the ruling party until Akintola's violent death in 1966.

Whether or not Chief Awolowo was guilty of the appropriation of funds or of treason is not the question here, but what is clear in retrospect is that Akintola's rise to power and his consolidation of that power was a shrewdly engineered political coup. His new political party became quickly alive with the NPC, the Northern based party, and the same NPC party which was then the controlling party of the Federal House of Nigeria. This was a power struggle which culminated in linking the governments of the North, the West, and the Federal. There can be no doubt but that Akintola and his new party lacked a popular base and were largely unsupported by the peoples of Western Nigeria. Democracy, however, was not the consideration—power was.

In 1964, a second political crisis erupted in Nigeria. The official census which was delivered at that time recorded that Nigeria contained 55.6 million people. The 1952-53 census, when the last count had been taken, reported a figure of only 30.4 million. If you look at this mathematically what it means is that there had been an increase in population

of over 6 per cent per annum, which, of course, would seem to break all records.

I should like again to refer to Walter Schwarz who records as follows:

"It was not the overall figure which upset people but that, out of 55.6 million, almost 30 million people were reported to live in Northern Nigeria. As seats in the federal house were allocated according to population, this seemed to dash the long standing Southern hopes that the new count would end the North's numerical predominance and indirectly, Northern political control."

The census figures were accepted by the North—by the Sardauna of Sokoto—and Akintola, who owed his political life to his alliance with the NPC in the North, also accepted the figures on behalf of the West. The newly created mid-western region which was created in 1963 rejected the figures as incorrect. Dr. Michael Okpara, leader of the ruling NCNC party of the East, categorically rejected the figures as "inflations of astronomical proportions".

An hon. Member: Sardauna had four wives, you know.

• 1635

Mr. Bezanson: That is the official quote. He may have had 34.

This census, gentlemen, had dashed one major hope of southern politicians of challenging northern hegemony. However, federal elections were due in 1964 and a crucial regional election was due in the West in 1965; and I should point out here that the West was the only region in which the opposition stood a real chance of gaining the political ascendancy. The party which Akintola had created, the NNDP, had not yet been challenged at the polls. The aspirations of southern politicians once again centred on elections, the census having now ruled against them.

Both elections produced crises which nearly split the Federation of Nigeria. Both ended in bitterness for the Southerners. Again I would like to cite Schwarz who concludes as follows,

The 1962 Western crisis and the census controversy had already indicated that the North was not going to yield power readily. The course of the election controversies of 1964 and 1965 was to confirm this to the full.

The federal election was characterized by violence rigging, accusation and counter-accu-

sation. The two major Southern parties, the NCNC which was Ibo dominated, and the Action Group. Yoruba dominated party, formed a coalition believing that this coalition stood a chance of breaking northern hegemony. This coalition was formed under a party known as UPGA, United Progressive Grand Alliance.

At one point during the election campaign reporters were provided with copies of no less than 65 sworn affidavits detailing malpractices in Northern municipalities or constituencies. Representatives were returned unopposed in constituencies where the opposition simply could not get their candidate registered. In the end, the Southern Coalition became so convinced that the election would be a total fraud that they urged an election boycott.

Only in the North did the federal elections proceed smoothly. With the boycott it was an overwhelming victory for the northern-based party, the NPC and its affiliated small parties. A crisis resulted. It appeared for a time that the President of the Republic, Dr. Azikiwe, would refuse to assemble a government. In his diary, Azikiwe claims that the East then threatened to secede as early as December 26, 1964.

After much negotiation, resulting in much bitterness, a compromise was reached and the break-up of Nigeria was averted in 1964.

The 1965 election in the Western region was the first election to test Akintola's political support now that Awolowo had been ousted. The election results swept Akintola into power, but through a process which again almost led to the break-up of Nigeria. This election was blatantly rigged. Akintola did not have support from the electorate, yet by controlling the election, kidnapping candidates, appointing electoral officers who refused to accept the nomination of opposition candidates, Akintola was elected.

Open insurrection followed as the Yoruba people rose up to protest what they knew to have taken place. Much of the West took on a wartime look; armoured cars and riot police roamed the streets. The West was in open revolt and the Eastern government took a stand as follows: What has happened in the West is

• 1640

...an attempt to impose an illegal and undemocratic government on the people of Western Nigeria.

There can be no doubt about the corruption through which Akintola was elected. This is

well documented and I can refer you to a variety of sources if you are so interested. The Federal electoral official who attempted to oversee the election publicly admitted that the election was a fraud. He unfortunately was powerless to see to the conduct of the election since regional elections are controlled by a regional electoral board; but his report is a striking testimony to the manner in which this election had been conducted.

The West was in open rebellion, a rebellion which was to continue for several months, up until the first military coup of January of 1966. Many Northerners living in the West were attacked and killed. I witnessed this first hand. Police and soldiers broke up demonstrations with fire power. Hundreds of people were killed. I know of this from first-hand witness. It is impossible, however, to determine how many people were killed between August of 1965 and January of 1966. Estimates have been given, official and unofficial. Dr. Arikpo, presently of the United Nations, cites a figure of 800. It appears that a figure of 1,000 is no exaggeration.

There was strong pressure then on the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Balewa to act in this situation. His critics quickly pointed to the fact that he had been very quick to declare a state of emergency in the West after only a few moments of disorder in 1962. Yet now that the West was in open chaos, in open insurrection, in open revolt, he did nothing.

Akintola flew to the north to confer with the Northern leader, Sir Ahmadu Bello. It was rumoured throughout the West that when he flew to the North plans had been laid to suppress the rebellion through military means by the mass importation of soldiers. I can again refer you to Dr. Arikpo who admits this in his book.

Akintola returned to the West on the evening of January 14th. Within a few hours the first military coup occurred and Akintola, Federal Prime Minister Balewa, the Northern leader, the Sardauna, were all dead. The first Republic of Nigeria had come to an end.

The first coup was organized and led by five junior army officers. The coup as they had planned it proved abortive, but it did succeed in transferring rule from the civilian to a military government under Supreme Commander J. A. T. Aguiyi-Ironsi.

The new regime was greeted with delirious enthusiasm in the South and with optimism in the North. Again I can refer you to the historical account by Dr. Arikpo and to many

other accounts if you so wish. Nigerian newspapers and journals bear witness to the fact that the new order was seen as one that would eliminate corruption, graft, bribery, nepotism, political greed, etc. I have copies of the most popular Nigerian newspaper, *The Daily Time*, representing about two weeks following the coup, which demonstrate conclusively the enthusiasm with which this was received; that it was seen as something that would eliminate a political scar that existed on the face of Nigeria.

Very soon, however, it became apparent to General Ironsi, who was an Ibo, that he had a very difficult road to walk. His pronouncement that the country must be unified, that regionalism and tribalism must be eliminated, increasingly began to appear to Northerners as an Ibo plot to remove control from the North and to take control of the entire country.

This raises the very crucial question whether the first military coup was an Ibo coup; whether it was within the power of the Ibo who controlled the coup? On this point there really are no conclusive documents to which one can refer. One thing is certain, that Northern people did participate in the coup; that Western people did participate in the coup; and that Eastern people did participate in the coup. Whether it was entirely Ibo-led is something that I doubt that even history will be able to confirm or deny. If you wish to you may refer to Schwarz's book or Dr. Arikpo's book and especially to the quotations of the leader of the coup, Nzewgwu, who was reported to have been the official leader.

• 1645

At any rate, Northerners increasingly began to regard what had happened as an Ibo plot. To move slowly, Ironsi, the Supreme Commander, could only incur the disappointment and wrath of Southerners who wanted him to move quickly. He made attempts to remain impartial. He tried to avoid the impression that his, was an Ibo regime. At that time he appointed Lt. Col. Gowon as Army Chief of Staff and he depended on Northern soldiers for his own personal protection—a move which, in fact, in all probability, was later on to cost him his life. It is a fact that during the first coup mainly Northerners had been killed, including the Sardauna and the Federal Prime Minister, Balewa. The young army officers who had engineered the coup were in prison or under house arrest but no move had been made to

try them or to convict them. To Northerners the fact that this had happened, that these people were still unpunished, constituted something that made them criminals and they should be punished. To the Southerners, they should be released and enshrined as political heroes for having been successful in eliminating what they regarded, and I think rightly so, as corrupt political leadership. With these conflicting forces Ironsi did very little. When he finally decreed on May 24 that the civil service was to be unified, rather than regionally based, under a single public service commission, the Northern reaction followed very swiftly. Within days hundreds of Ibos had been killed in the North. In Kaduna demonstrating civil servants carried placards saying, and I quote, "Let there be secession". If you wish to refer to the *New Nigerian*, a northern-based publication under date of January 1, 1967, you will note that the paper urges on behalf of the North that the North should secede from the Federation, that they were dealing with an Ibo-based government and that was to them incompatible with their wishes. However Northern leaders met and demanded that the Ironsi decree be revoked or the North would insist upon secession. It was an open threat of secession by the North at this time. Assurances were provided by the Ironsi Government and for a brief moment it appeared that the crisis would be avoided.

Colonel Ojukwu, at that time the military governor of Eastern Nigeria, broadcast an appeal to Ibos who had left the North following these first massacres. He informed them that matters were now under control and that they could now safely return to their work in the North. Assurances were also given by the military governor of the North at that time, Katsina. Ojukwu was later to experience grave feelings of guilt over having sent thousands of Ibo civilians back into the North and to their deaths.

On July 29 the second coup, or counter coup, occurred. Ironsi was killed, as was the military governor of the Western region. Along with these at least 200 Ibo army officers were killed. This figure is indeed conservative; some people estimate it as high as 500. These are army officers, not just soldiers. The influential magazine, *West Africa*, published in London, suggests that there was strong pressure from the North for secession at this time and that there was support in Lagos for a proposal that the West and the North should unite and secede together. When the military coup was ended, Lieutenant

Colonel Gowon emerged as the new head of state. His first public broadcast to Nigeria has been interpreted by many as a statement that the country could no longer remain one. Gowon later said that he meant only that a unitary form of government could not prevail in Nigeria. Whatever the case is, it is certain that initially the North did have secessionist plans. There were meetings of the "Leaders-of-Thought"—these were committees that were set up in the various regions where the leaders of the various regions were to get together and make proposals or propositions for the creation of some kind of new relationship between the respective parts of Nigeria—and these "Leaders-of-Thought" submitted proposals to the Federal commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gowon. Both the East and the North submitted proposals which proposed only a loose association amounting to something like a confederation. Further, the Northern Memorandum which was submitted at that time insists that any member state in Nigeria should have the right to secede unilaterally. Soon after its memorandum arrived in Lagos, the North quite suddenly and quite remarkably changed its mind. A significantly different set of propositions was submitted insisting that there be an effective form of central government and that the secessionist clause be dropped. Only speculation exists as to the reason behind such a drastic change. Opinions have been offered but these are unsubstantiated by evidence.

• 1650

A conference was held to discuss the Constitution. It had only just begun when the terrible massacres of September and October erupted in the North. There is no agreement on how many civilians were killed except that the estimates all seem to fall within the 10,000 to 30,000 range. Although exact figures are not available, the nature and extent of the atrocities committed is well-documented. You heard accounts of it yesterday. One aspect which differs significantly between the two massacres, that is the May and September-October massacres, is that in the second the Northern police, army and Government participated actively. I cannot substantiate a claim although I have been told it by several people who were in the North, including one Northerner, the other people being Westerners who happened to speak Hausa, that the Public Broadcasting System based in Kaduna, government-owned and government-operated, urged for days that the Hausa people should

go to the streets and rid themselves of the Ibos. I cannot personally substantiate this but it is something which has been reported. It has been stated by the Federal Government that Northerners were slaughtered in the Eastern region and that what they did was simply in retaliation. Albeit that this may be true, it does not have documentation. The massacres in the North certainly do. Moreover the Eastern Government under Ojukwu made arrangements for the removal of persons of Northern origin from an Eastern region. What reliable documentation there is here informs us only that this was a well-engineered movement by a well-disciplined Eastern Government police, and army. Northerners, Ojukwu stated, could no longer be protected by his Government, therefore they must be removed. They were removed by the army and police and allowed to return to their region.

Another fact which cannot be overlooked is that the Federal Government made no statement or no official attempt to stop the slaughter in the North until three full days of massacres had passed. At that time General Gowon went on national radio with the following message, and I quote:

I receive complaints daily that up till now Easterners living in the north are being killed and molested and their property looted. It appears that it is now going beyond reason and is now at the point of recklessness and irresponsibility.

If his statement was designed to appease the fears of Easterners it did not have that effect. Appeals were sent out from the East to Easterners living in other sections of Nigeria requesting them to "come home" for only there could their safety and security be guaranteed. Analysts have suggested that the motive behind these massacres was to drive the Ibo out of the North, perhaps out of Nigeria itself. Schwartz again makes the following claim and I quote:

Ironically the North was to quickly change its mind and was to go to war to keep the Ibo in Nigeria

By this time, Easterners appear to have decided that their only safety lay in their own region and the only agreement that could be worked out would involve some sort of loose confederation. This failing, secession to them seemed to be the only viable alternative. The Federal Government of Nigeria has claimed that what occurred in the North has been greatly exaggerated for propaganda reasons

by the Ibos; that is, that not nearly so many people were killed and that the nature of the atrocities has been greatly exaggerated. This claim in no way conforms to what Western observers have seen and have reported. Indeed, an eminent Yoruba, Tai Solarin, took it upon himself to visit the East before secession was declared. He visited hospitals, schools and villages. Tai Solarin came back with the report that Ibo claims could not possibly be exaggerated.

• 1655

After the massacres Ojukwu refused to attend any further discussions with Federal officials unless his personal safety could be guaranteed. After some weeks of delay it was arranged that the two sides should meet at Aburi, Ghana in January 1967. The conference was fully recorded and its entire proceedings are available. The whole conference was tape-recorded and every statement that was made there has been written up and is available. In effect, at Aburi Ojukwu argued that the recent history of Nigeria made it necessary for the East to move farther apart from the rest of Nigeria, in other words that some kind of loose confederation must be arranged. This point was conceded to Ojukwu by the Federal representatives. Indeed, at one point Lieutenant Colonel Hassan stated as follows:

If the East does not recognize the federation, I think you had better secede and let the three of us join together.

That is, the North, Mid-West and West. It was further agreed that the Federal Government would provide the salaries for the civil servants of Eastern origin who had been forced to leave their jobs after the massacres. The structure within which the various parts of Nigeria were to relate to the whole was to be as follows:

(a) At the Federal level, there was to be neither chairman nor supreme commander but a commander-in-chief and head of the Federal Military Government;

(b) Each region was to have an area command with responsibility for internal matters, and finally;

(c) the concurrence of all was to be necessary for any decision affecting the region or the country as a whole. I have with me a copy of the Aburi report and I think it is a document with which everyone should be familiar.

The conference ended and Ojukwu insisted that the Federal Government must now carry out the agreement which had been made.

When the Federal Government did not follow through on these agreements, Eastern secession became imminent. On May 30 at 2.00 p.m. Ojukwu announced the creation of the sovereign state of Biafra. On July 6 Federal troops moved into Biafra and war began. You have already discussed events of the war itself with many qualified individuals, many of whom have only just returned from the war zone and are able to give you first-hand accounts. I understand, also, that you will be hearing from other similarly well-qualified persons.

My purpose is not to try to detail the events of the war itself, except to make the following observation. As the war has progressed, wherever the Federal Forces have gone shocking stories have followed. Many of these stories may be unfounded. Undoubtedly, however, many of them are true. We have letters from missionaries and relief workers who have witnessed either first hand, or the immediate results of, the Federal advance. These accounts would indicate rather conclusively that the Federal army is conducting itself in a manner similar to the conduct of Northerners during the September-October massacres. Charles Taylor will be speaking to you in a few moments and I assume that he will be able to report to you information from the war zone itself.

Another issue which I should like to mention very briefly is the conduct of negotiations for relief aid to the starving and dying. Until very recently, those of us familiar with the terrain and communication network in Nigeria have been appalled at the relief routes proposed by the Federal Government. The routes which the Federal Government has insisted upon are the longest and most impassable of a number of alternatives which are definitely available; alternatives which could result in expediting the provision of needed food and medical supplies to the starving and dying.

The historic facts of the case, which I have very briefly tried to cover, indicate conclusively, it appears to me, that both before and following independence any concept of the oneness of Nigeria has been more a tower of Babel about to come crashing to the earth than it has been a political reality. The facts further plead that, given the events that have characterized Nigeria, there is little prospect of creating any truly viable political integration in that land, at least any unit which would involve both the Eastern and Northern peoples. From the very moment that Nigeria

embarked on her road to independence, it would appear the factors which we have been dealing with, namely political, as well as factors which we have not had time to deal with, namely social, religious, economic and cultural, have militated strongly against the creation of a nation state along the lines that we think of as a nation state.

• 1700

The facts of Nigerian history do demonstrate that despite the power struggle which has been waged since independence, there were some abortive attempts to see to the survival of Nigeria. Many of the compromises were made by the South from the very beginning, following through the elections and the census crisis which I have tried to convey briefly to you. The word "brinkmanship" has been used by political scientists to describe Nigerian post-independence political growth. The brink of disintegration had been reached on several occasions but for some years the fatal leap itself was avoided. Now that leap has been taken. Given the history and these facts of the case, does it seem possible to you that a real political unit can be created out of the present morass? If you conclude that it can be done, then the question which is begged is how? And especially the question, how can it be done by force, by the present policies that are being pursued?

As I see it, the task which lies before you gentlemen involves an awesome responsibility. Fundamental to your deliberations must be the question of genocide. But this question, unfortunately for you, does not stand alone. It is not a simple matter of saying whether "x" exists or "x" does not exist on the basis of a few candid camera shots of what is presently occurring in Nigeria. There are the difficult and ticklish questions which follow, involving the causes of action or inaction and, of course, the implications of every action and inaction that has been taken and that may be taken. Further, if any person chooses to argue from the territorial integrity position, and many have chosen to do so, then it must be acknowledged that that person is working from a particular set of values and from a particular political model; that model centres around the concept of the nation state. From this must arise the entire issue of self-determination as a legitimate and competing concept with that of the nation state.

Finally, if the argument is to be offered that what is now happening in Nigeria is an African matter—and this has been argued—

one must take account of the motives of African countries in following a given course of action. It is quite one thing to say that any number of African nations have said, in effect, hands off, or have said, in effect, we do not recognize Biafra.

On this point one must also take account of Tanzania's motives for recognizing the right of the people of Eastern Nigeria to divorce themselves from Federal Nigeria. The statement by the Tanzanian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs is contained in a release of April 13, 1968. In this statement Tanzania acknowledges that it has nothing to gain by recognizing Biafra. Indeed, Tanzania and Africa have everything to lose by doing so, for this sets a precedent, a precedent which may follow in other African countries since many African countries, indeed most, are faced with the same tribal factions, with the same tribal divisiveness which has existed in Nigeria. The April 20 edition of the *London Times* concurs that Tanzania can gain nothing by recognizing Biafra. In fact, it states, "Tanzania can only lose". It appears that Tanzania has chosen to operate from considerations other than the considerations of a nation state, namely, humanitarian considerations.

In reaching conclusions on what is happening and has happened in Nigeria, I think all of these considerations must be made. I do not think meaningful decisions can be arrived at unless the historic events are considered; unless you consider not only military aspects of what has happened but political, social, economic and indeed cultural aspect. For I think only then can we begin to arrive at an honest assessment of the Nigerian-Biafran predicament and what courses of action or alternatives are available. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bezanson. The first questioner is Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: First of all I think we have been given the benefit of an extraordinary statement. I find it deeply moving to have a person whom I can classify as a young Canadian, who had a couple of years there as a volunteer, who must have taken a monumental amount of time and energy to prepare such an impressive statement. I would like to thank him and also draw to the Committee's attention a very modest person in the back of the room, his wife, who has also been in Nigeria.

• 1705

I would like to have you expand on the inactivity or the inability of the Organization of African Unity to bring this war to a conclusion.

Mr. Bezanson: It is an extremely difficult question to answer, Mr. Fairweather. Let us go back in history.

The creation of countries as we now know them in Africa has been described by both cultural anthropologists and historians as artificial creations; that is to say, in the beginning there were no unifying features to bring the various peoples who are now involved in various nation states together. The way Africa exists today is the result of a colonial and imperial carving out of Africa, which occurred in a massive way and very quickly in the period surrounding the turn of this century, when there was what historians describe as the scramble for Africa. When African nations achieved independence they achieved it as countries with boundaries which had been established during this colonial age. I think one then began to see the results of their having carved Africa in this manner.

Most countries in Africa are faced with what is called tribalism; different groups of people speaking different languages, having different cultures, having different social organizations and having, indeed, different intellectual orientations to the world itself. Nigeria is, of course, a classic case. In the North you have a largely Muslim population and in the South a largely Christian population. In the West you have a split, approximately 50 per cent Christian and 50 per cent Muslim. The East is strongly Christian.

Mr. Winch: How strong are the pagans?

Mr. Bezanson: Fairly strong. Those figures are extremely rough. There are no statistics which one can turn to, but the reported demographic figures would lead us to that type of conclusion. I think they are, of course, generally true. Whether or not they are entirely accurate is not really to the point. But all countries in Africa are faced with this tremendous problem and this great threat that various groups within their country will decide upon secession, will decide to create different entities.

Kenya is faced with it today. Certainly other countries are as well. Ghana, with the Ashanti people, was faced with it and may still be faced with it. It is a very bad prece-

dent for African countries to say to Biafra, "Yes, we recognize your right to self-determination, we recognize your right to your territorial integrity, to the preservation of your own way of life or for your own protection to live in your own land as an independent land." It is a bad precedent inasmuch as if they recognize them, if this same problem arises in their own nation, there is then that precedent that they have recognized the existence of a secessionist movement in another nation.

I think this consideration is paramount in the deliberations of many of the African countries. I think it has been paramount in the deliberations of the Organization of African Unity. I think that all of you should read the statement by the Tanzanian Government. As I said, they confess from the outset it is the worst thing for Africa to have divisiveness, to have secession. Nothing could be worse. What Africa needs is unity. It needs unity within its countries and it needs unity of the continent as a whole. It needs this unity for economic viability. It probably needs it for political solvency, but the Tanzanian report goes on to say that there comes a point when other considerations become more important, and the report concludes that what has happened in Nigeria-Biafra legitimately necessitates that Biafra become sovereign and independent.

I would be willing to pass this around if you would like to look through it.

• 1710

Mr. Fairweather: I think there is a better method. If you could leave that as well as the Aburi report with the Secretary we might get copies made and if—

The Vice-Chairman: Is the Committee interested in having these...

Mr. Bezanson: Could you return this to me?

The Vice-Chairman: ...included as appendices to the record?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I so move.

Mr. Yewchuk: I second the motion.

The Vice-Chairman: Moved by Mr. Thompson, seconded by Mr. Yewchuk, that these two documents referred to by the witness be appended to the record.

Motion agreed to.

Mr. Bezanson: I would also be prepared to submit these copies of Nigerian newspapers which, as I say, bear testimony to the enthusiasm, the almost ebullient enthusiasm, with which the first coup was received throughout the country. I think this is something which might also assist, if you so desire.

The Vice-Chairman: This looks rather bulky. I just wonder if perhaps we could table these and keep them. The Clerk could keep them as part of the document that we have.

Mr. Bezanson: Yes, indeed.

The Vice-Chairman: Unless it is the Committee's wish to put them in as appendices. No.

Mr. Fairweather: I just have one other question. I am sure there are many others. What action do you think Canada can take to bring to an end the supply of arms to the competing forces, France to Biafra and Britain and the Soviet Union to Nigeria? Do you think Canada should take an initiative here? We are the second best friend Nigeria has, according to the Minister.

Mr. Bezanson: Yes, I have heard that. You have a penchant for asking extremely difficult questions.

Yes, I think Canada should take action. My problem is in trying to say what kind of action.

Mr. Fairweather: I can understand your problem, too.

Mr. Bezanson: Right. I confess that I am not familiar with the manner in which Canada's relationships are conducted between the Soviet Union and Canada, or how Canada relates to Britain in terms of diplomacy and decisions and what amount of urging is considered legitimate and what amount of urging is considered interference, but I will try to answer your question.

I think that several countries in the world have expressed a very deep concern for the tragedy that is now taking place in Nigeria-Biafra. I think many countries have expressed this concern in humanitarian ways. Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, and there are perhaps others, have definitely by their actions shown that they are deeply concerned with what is now happening in Nigeria-Biafra. I would therefore think that it would be desirable for these countries, if they could be approached, to urge as a collective

body that a cease-fire be declared immediately.

While you gentlemen have been sitting for the last week and a few days hearing testimony on what is happening in Nigeria-Biafra, by a very conservative calculation 40,000 children have starved to death and you have only been here for a few says. I think the question has to be raised as to what can we do to stop this now?

Perhaps this collective urging by a number of countries saying that it has gone far enough and that a cease-fire is necessary and that Canada together with these countries or, indeed, Canada alone is prepared to offer a forum—if Canada is. Nigeria's second best friend then I would think Nigeria would not look upon this with a great deal of disfavour—for the further attempt at negotiating some kind of settlement, together with an urging to Britain, France and the Soviet Union that at least while these deliberations are taking place there be an embargo on arms to both sides and that during this period every attempt be made that relief and medical supplies are supplied to both sides of the war zone.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you.

Mr. Bezanson: That is an opinion. As I say, it is only an opinion.

The Vice-Chairman: Before I call the next witness, Mr. Bezanson, I would like to straighten out what we have here as appendices and what we have as exhibits. In Appendix L, we have the statement by the Commissioner for External Affairs.

• 1715

An hon. Member: For Tanzania, right.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes. Was Appendix M to be the Aburi report?

An hon. Member: Yes, the Aburi report.

The Vice-Chairman: I would then like to say to the Committee that in these circumstances it is going to be pretty difficult to have these photographs reproduced and get our reports out in the timely way we have been getting them out; that is, pretty well the next day after the hearing. This will cause a great...

Mr. Brewin: I think we are interested in the written part, not in the photographs.

The Vice-Chairman: May we then dispense with them?

Mr. Winch: Dispense with the photographs.

The Vice-Chairman: That is agreed?

Mr. Barrett: One picture is worth a thousand words, so they say, and I wish we would show more pictures around here.

The Vice-Chairman: We could put it in as an exhibit only, that is the alternative, and not...

Mr. Barrett: You are not going to send it through the mail.

The Vice-Chairman: This is quite a lengthy appendix.

Mr. Barrett: When?

The Vice-Chairman: It has many pages and it is in fine print. It may be that the Committee might like to reconsider and put it in as an exhibit.

Mr. Mongrain: Mr. Chairman, why do we not table only one copy? It could be passed around.

Mr. Bezanson: Provided it is returned to me, you may keep it for some days.

Mr. Mongrain: We can make our own copy with pictures, and all that, but only one.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, it is not practical nor is it our practice to include pictures.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes. Apparently it will be practical...

An hon. Member: I was thinking of the written report.

The Vice-Chairman: I am advised by the Clerk that apparently it will be practical to make an appendix of this if we dispense with the photographs.

Mr. Fairweather: We do not need it tomorrow.

An hon. Member: Or even the day after.

Mr. Winch: Our photostat machine is very good.

The Vice-Chairman: Then is it agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: That straightens that out. The exhibits are the newspaper reprints. Was there something further?

Mr. Bezanson: There are a great many things which I could leave.

The Vice-Chairman: May be we should identify them just a little better.

Mr. Cafik: Do we need the newspaper items? I do not think they are that relevant, are they?

Mr. Bezanson: No.

Mr. Cafik: This is the testimony and I think we believe the testimony.

The Vice-Chairman: These exhibits would not be reprinted. They would simply be tabled and kept with the committee records.

Mr. Alexander: Mr. Chairman, may we have the name of the witness?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Keith Bezanson.

What is the Committee's wish with respect to these newspapers?

Mr. Barrett: Does he have a title, sir?

Mr. Bezanson: I do not believe in titles.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that these documents be photostated and kept in the Committee files, but I do not think they need to be attached to our report.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes. Was it just these newspapers or was there something else that we dealt with earlier?

Mr. Bezanson: Not really, I do not think.

The Vice-Chairman: Then that is what we will do. We will just have them photostated and filed as exhibits with the Committee's records. Is it agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: The next questioner is Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to waste time on complimenting the witness but I agree with what has been said and I think we should all be grateful.

Mr. Bezanson, do you know a publication called *Africa Report*?

Mr. Bezanson: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: Is it a reputable publication?

Mr. Bezanson: Yes, I believe it is quite reputable.

Mr. Brewin: Yes. Do you know a man by the name of Stanley Diamond?

Mr. Bezanson: No, I do not believe so. Can you tell me what he has written? I might be familiar with that.

Mr. Brewin: He has written an article on what he calls "The Biafran Possibility", and it comes from *Africa Report* of February 1968.

Mr. Bezanson: Yes, as a matter of fact I have read his article.

Mr. Brewin: You have. I just want to ask you to comment on one paragraph in the article. I found the whole article very interesting, but he says:

• 1720

Politically, economically, and socially, Biafra has the potential to become the first viable state in Black Africa and the crystallizing center around which a modern Africa could build itself. The reasons lie in the history of the Ibos' relations with the British and with their African neighbors, and above all in the character of the Ibos themselves.

I just wondered whether you or your associates would care to comment on that statement.

Mr. Bezanson: I may say that this statement has been made by several people including Walter Schwarz, the editor of a very recently published book called *Nigeria*, who does state that Biafra can be viable.

Historically speaking, Biafra has not been agriculturally viable, which accounts at least in some way for the present level of starvation. Biafra has imported food from other parts of Nigeria, but the land area in Biafra is quite small considering the type of agriculture which is practised. So, I think the question of agricultural viability is one that would have to be looked at and perhaps the opinion of an agricultural specialist requested.

In terms of manpower, I think Biafra is definitely viable, extremely viable. In attempting to deal with the process of economic development, a number of experts have stated that economic growth cannot occur until you have a skilled manpower base for it. They have gone so far as to say that a nation or an area cannot absorb physical capital unless it has the human capital already there.

I think that is an extremely important point, Mr. Brewin, and I think it is true in Biafra. The Ibo has been described as the Jew of West Africa. In this sense it is meant that he is an entrepreneur, he is outgoing, he is a very hard worker, he learns quickly and willingly, he is skilled and talented, he is in fact very close to being what we might describe as industrialized man.

I was interested in some reports that have come out of Biafra recently where the mercenaries who were fighting with the Biafrans have apparently claimed that never before have they seen what they have seen in Biafra. Some of these people apparently fought in the Congo as mercenaries, "But here", they say, "you have a people who are able to keep the transportation system going, the telecommunications system going, the marketing system going, they are able to keep the civil service functioning, they are able to keep the country going; they do not need the white man." I think in terms of manpower it is viable. I think in terms of physical resources it is potentially viable. The oil that was being produced in the Delta area of Eastern Nigeria was really exceeding all expectations and was expected to just continue to snowball for years to come. So I think there is an economic base there.

But if you wish to take human talent simply as a basis for development and a basis for viability—which some economists would argue, Schultz among them, who talks about human capital—then definitely I would think that that statement is no exaggeration. In fact, I would think it is absolutely correct.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, but I want to switch the subject. From your knowledge of the facts which you have recounted and your knowledge of the country, do you think that whatever the precise course of the war may turn out to be, that a handful of observers are in a position to adequately assess what is likely to happen or do you think in order to prevent certain situations arising that you would need a fairly large group of observers?

• 1725

Mr. Bezanson: I am not sure that I understand the import of your question.

Mr. Brewin: The United Nations and certain countries, Britain, Canada and Sweden, have a group of military observers—I think there were originally five or six—to report on conditions arising out of the war. I think this commission itself has indicated that it does

not think it can do an adequate job with so few people to do it. I am asking you, from your knowledge of the background and your knowledge of the terrain and the country, whether you think that is right. Do you think such a group could be adequate?

Mr. Bezanson: One can come back from visiting any country with general impressions. I think that a European coming to Canada for the first time, taking an extensive tour across the country, going where he wished and seeing what he wanted, would come back with specific impressions of Canada. He might, indeed, gather a great deal of statistical data to support these impressions but I do doubt that even the most qualified observer could get to understand the whole sequence of events in Canada.

I think that societies are terribly complex; that the way political units function, although described in one way in text books, can be quite different from the way things are actually carried out and I find it very difficult to know how an individual could really get to understand and gain all the information in a short trip.

On this point, I think of tremendous relevance is the fact that anthropologists will go to a particular village in a particular place and will spend in that particular little village, with its two or three hundred people, one or two or three or four or five years before they feel competent to write a basic ethnography of the way these people live, of the things that are important to them, of their social pattern, of their economic pattern and of the way political decisions are made. I do not think that observers can come back with very much other than impressions.

Now, these impressions can be correct and they can be adequate as far as they go, but in your question you seemed to indicate you wanted to know everything and if that is the case then I think what would probably be necessary is a team of a couple of million trained and qualified anthropologists to go into every area of the country, to spend the next year or so there, taking very detailed notes on events, and then to come back with a report that consisted of the bringing together of everything that they had seen and experienced.

Mr. Brewin: I did not propose anything so extensive as that. However, I do want to—

Mr. Bezanson: It would cost money.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, I think so. I do want, however, to ask you about the impressions of

two observers—or some of their impressions; I will not go through the whole thing—which appears in Appendix E to the *Minutes* of this Committee for October 10. I am not going to ask you to review everything. These observers were Mr. MacDonald and me and admittedly we had a very brief and, perhaps, superficial observation although we did talk to a lot of people. I want to ask you about one or two of these points. If you look at page 117 the report reads:

Much has been written about the causes of the war and the rights and wrongs of the conflict. In particular, the federal cause has been justified and the Biafran cause denigrated, upon the grounds that the breakup of a federation is on principle to be deplored and that the secessionist state is, by definition, rebellious and wrong.

Aid, military and otherwise, is therefore to be channelled to those who seek to maintain the federation denied to those who seek to set up an independent state.

We believe that this approach is oversimplified and, indeed, wrong; and it cannot be applied without reference to the facts. A situation may develop...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, is this going to be long?

• 1730

Mr. Brewin: No, I was coming to the point if you will be patient. I think I am entitled to question the witness.

The Vice-Chairman: Do you have that page?

Mr. Bezanson: No, I have not but I am listening to him very carefully.

Mr. Brewin: I want to come to this question and we say here:

A situation may develop when the maintenance of a federal structure is no longer possible or desirable...

I would like to ask whether the result of your study of the matter and your friends comes to the same view as that.

Mr. Bezanson: I think, as I have said in what I reported before—it is difficult listening to yourself—that Nigeria was a questionable political entity from the outset, that events which have happened both previous to independence and subsequent to it have, in fact, reinforced the view that certainly Ni-

geria, to come back to Mr. Fairweather's question of yesterday, was more a paper political entity than it was a reality.

Mr. Brewin: Then I would like to ask you next...

Mr. Bezanson: Yes. Therefore, I would conclude that what you have stated there is correct. I think if you couple this with the fact that several million Ibos now believe—whether this is true or not it seems to me does not matter, but they believe the way people believe, the way people feel, the way people reach decisions—that the only way they can live is divorced from the rest of the country.

They believe that to go back to other parts of Nigeria means certain death for them. They believe, in fact, that death is preferable to relinquishing the status they have attempted to gain by the declaration of secession. I do not think, given the fact that people feel these things and feel them so strongly that they are prepared to die, other than realize some kind of political alternative that analysts or interested persons might suggest, can do anything other than plead mightily and almost finally that there can never be a Nigeria as it was before.

The very maximum one could hope for, given the events of history, is for a very loose confederation, the type of which had been pleaded for at various stages of Nigerian history, and if that cannot be arranged then it seems to me the only viable alternative, the only realistic alternative, is in fact to recognize that secession is necessary for the Ibo people.

Mr. Brewin: I wonder if I could ask you about the next sentence.

At one time the Biafrans were the leading exponents of a federal structure for Nigeria and the leaders of the northern regions, the exponents of separatism...

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. Bezanson: It is correct and I think my testimony substantiates this.

Mr. Barrett: Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask a question.

The Vice-Chairman: Are you speaking on a point of order?

Mr. Barrett: Yes, please. It seems rather strange to me, Mr. Chairman, that a witness is quoting himself now and asking whether he was right or whether he was wrong. It seems rather strange that he moves himself from

the witness stand and then sits over there asking the questions and being redundant. I do not know whether it is correct or incorrect. I am just raising the point.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, may I speak on a point of order?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: The point of order is that I should not seek to get from this witness confirmation of the observations which were made by me and someone else when they are in testimony before this Committee, and what I seek to do, it is being pointed out by some of the members sitting opposite...

An hon. Member: Maybe you have some doubts.

Mr. Brewin: ...that our observations were brief and opportunities were short and therefore our conclusions may be wrong, and I seek to strengthen the conclusions which we made by getting the opinion of this witness. I would like to know if there is anything wrong with that and I would like to know why some of the people opposite do not want us to bring out the facts.

The Vice-Chairman: Now just a moment. What are you quoting from there?

Mr. Brewin: I am quoting from Appendix E...

An hon. Member: His own comments.

Mr. Brewin: ...which is a statement made by me in which we gave evidence and I am trying to get a statement. If all the members opposite say they accept my statement without question I will be very happy to discontinue, but as some of them have cast doubts on these statements, I am trying to get from this witness confirmation of these facts.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Brewin, could you do it by saying simply, "Would you agree with me?" and let us have it that way, rather than refer to your own comments? It is rather self-serving, that type of...

Mr. Brewin: It is not self-serving; it is corroborating evidence.

The Vice-Chairman: In a peculiar way, I may suggest. I think it would be more...

Mr. Brewin: There is nothing peculiar about it. What is peculiar is your objection.

Mr. Gibson: May I speak, sir?

29001-2½

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Gibson, to the point of order.

● 1735

Mr. Gibson: On a point of order, I submit that if these witnesses are going to rehash their own testimony with the next witnesses we are never going to conclude these proceedings. I submit that the proper function is for the witness to give his evidence and to be questioned on his own evidence, but if it is going to be rehashed in this manner I submit that it is going to cause interminable delay and prohibit the rest of the members of the Committee from questioning the witnesses. Therefore, I submit that it is clearly out of order; it is irrelevant.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I think, Mr. Chairman, I would really like to come to Mr. Brewin's support on this point. It seems to me that all of us repeat ourselves in various ways in asking witnesses various questions and I do not think we should unduly limit the way in which questions are asked. It seems to me that Mr. Brewin has made quite a valid point. He has given testimony. He is now seeking to corroborate it as a member of the Committee.

That seems to me to be fair and I am sure Mr. Brewin will agree that he would not want to read his whole testimony, and with some limits to the process it seems to me that there is no objection in theory to what he is doing. I would have thought he has a valid point in trying to substantiate what he has said to the Committee.

Mr. Mongrain: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this Committee is the one that should draw the conclusions. I think the witnesses should table their testimony and then when it is all over this Committee will be the one that will draw the conclusions. We cannot afford to do that every time there is a witness.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that you make a decision on the strength of all these representations. I think we have heard for too much from both sides about this matter.

Mr. Yewchuk: I think we should proceed with the question period because we are wasting a lot of time just with this conversation.

Mr. Brewin: I think I would have been finished by now if I had not been interrupted.

The Vice-Chairman: I would just like to say that this is not a court of law and there is a wide latitude granted, but I do think that Mr. Brewin can put it more directly. I think he should have the latitude to...

Mr. Brewin: I think I know how I want to put it, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: ...support his own case, if he can, through this witness, but I do think that he should not read from an appendix. I think he should refer to it to refresh his memory but not...

Mr. Brewin: I propose to read from an appendix even if you direct me not to, Mr. Chairman. I propose to read from it.

The Vice-Chairman: I suggest you look at it to refresh your memory but not to put it...

Mr. Brewin: Well, I propose to read from it and ask the witness about it. If you rule that I cannot do it...

The Vice-Chairman: I decide that point against you, then, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Yewchuk: Would you do an appendectomy on that book?

Mr. Brewin: I am not going to continue the questions if I am to be stifled in the way I wish to put questions. I do not think you, as Chairman, have the slightest right in the world to dictate to me how I am going to ask the questions.

Mr. Bezanson: If I could make a statement I might be able to answer. I have read what you stated here previously, that is, I have read the testimony which you delivered. I think what you have observed and what other witnesses whom you have already heard have observed: I think the reports of individuals who have been to Biafra: I think the reports of missionaries, relief workers and other persons who have been to Biafra, all, in general, lead to the conclusions which you and Mr. MacDonald offered when you returned to Canada.

Now, I think in this context that observations are necessary. I find it rather heartening that the observations of an incredible number of people who have been there all converge around the same type of conclusions: the nature and extent of the suffering; the conduct and atrocities that have existed; the need for some kind of immediate action; and I would be prepared to corroborate what you have said on those points, Mr. Brewin, to the

full. I do not think you need my corroboration because everything that has been said by virtually everyone who has visited the war zone shouts strongly that what you have stated is, in fact, corroborated, is, in fact, true. You do not have to be a cultural anthropologist to look at dead bodies. You do not have to be a psychologist or physician to see starvation. You do not have to be terribly intelligent to see atrocities. I think that all these reports do speak very loudly in one direction; and I concur.

• 1740

Mr. Brewin: I have just one further question, Mr. Chairman. I will rather unwillingly defer to your ruling and ask it directly rather than quoting from this.

The suggestion has been made on a number of occasions that we in Canada should be extremely cautious about any sort of dealing with, or any encouragement of the creation of a separate state of Biafra because there is a parallel with conditions in Canada, where we have a federal state and where, I think, most of us would deplore any form of secession. I want to ask you if you see any parallel whatsoever between the situation which you have observed and recounted in Biafra and any imaginable situation in Canada?

Mr. Bezanson: I see only a very academic and very tangential parallel, one which I think is a little like raising green elephants or pink elephants. I do not think you get much mileage out of that type of argument.

To look at this another way and to answer it by analogy, I would hope, Mr. Brewin, and I say this to every Canadian, that if the day ever came in Canada when thousands and thousands of French Canadians were massacred—French Canadians who had been living in the other provinces of Canada, if English-speaking Canadians decided to rise up and slaughter these people; if police and the Canadian Armed Forces participated in this; if these people were retired for their own security into the Province of Quebec; if with the military might that we have in Canada we attacked these people, if...

The Vice-Chairman: Pardon me one moment...

Mr. Bezanson: May I finish my statement?

The Vice-Chairman: The French translation is not coming through. Is that the problem?

An hon. Member: There is no translation.

The Vice-Chairman: Would you try again, Mr. Bezanson, please?

Mr. Bezanson: If the day were reached when hundreds and thousands of French Canadians had been slaughtered in a war, if they were starving at the rate of 5,000 to 10,000 people per day, I would hope that other nations would shout to the skies that this was an atrocity; that other courses of action must be taken; that this cannot continue. I see very little distinction, except an academic one, in arguing from the fact that we may have in Canada potentially something which is vaguely similar to what is happening in Nigeria-Biafra today. I think people who argue from that position are being almost vicious because they are not taking cognizance of the extent of the suffering and of the extent of the human misery that is occurring in that African land.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you very much. I am through.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Bezanson, if we could deal with the United Nations aspects for a moment, please. You, I think on the final page or two of your talk, made reference to this concept of the nation state and I also think you made reference to the fact that several African countries had been questionable from the viability point of view from the outset. What concerns me is how, when several of these other countries feel that their situation is somewhat tenuous, when the membership of the United Nations is made up of nation states who are very concerned with boundaries and with their prerogatives within their boundaries, one is likely to get support for interference within the boundaries of an existing nation state whether it is a logical nation state or not?

• 1745

Mr. Bezanson: In an attempt to answer your question, I would like to refer to a statement made at the United Nations by Dr. Arikpo, who is the Nigerian representative at the United Nations. I will have to paraphrase because I do not have the exact quote with me, but Dr. Arikpo said that never has so much concern been engendered by an internal matter; never have so many people been, you know, so incredibly concerned and appalled by what is happening and how very unnatural this appears to him. If this statement is true—I am not sure it is—then I find it very heartening. I find it very encouraging that

perhaps we are beginning to depart from diplomatic niceties; that we are prepared to take positions which may, in fact, violate the structure of the world as we have known it in the postwar years where people are prepared and nations are prepared to say that issues of right and wrong are involved; that there are issues of self-determination involved whether these compete with other issues or not. I would find that very heartening whether Dr. Arikpo's statement is correct or not.

But to come to your question, following that I think there is no question about the efficacy of the United Nations, historically and to date since its creation. It was born of a vision of a great ideal, of the idea that there would be no more war. Here you have an international consortium where there would be justice for all. Written into the Charter of the United Nations are all of these ideals.

The United Nations may in fact be incapable, given its present structure, of dealing with what is happening in Nigeria and Biafra, but there are a number of considerations to be made. First of all there is a genocide clause. Now unfortunately genocide, by its very nature, is something that you cannot prove until it has happened. It is after the fact only that you can demonstrate genocide. Certainly Hitler could have argued in the middle years of the war that he was not committing genocide against the Jewish people of Europe. He could argue that only some of them were being dealt with, but not all of them, and genocide surely implies all. The very definition of the word is "deliberate extermination of a race or people".

However, if any nation chose to invoke the genocide clause, then the issue would come to the attention of the United Nations, because to my understanding only one nation need invoke this clause to legitimize a discussion of events. The likelihood of that I cannot say, but I think that there are other paths that we can take. I think the Third Committee of the United Nations, which was specifically created to deal with the question of human rights, should be looking at this matter right now.

This does not mean that you need a two-thirds majority or a three-fourths majority or unanimous decision by the Security Council. What this means simply is that a number of nations have to introduce the motion that the human rights issue must be discussed by the Third Committee of the United Nations. Not the First or the Second, a special political committee, but the Third Committee. I do not know how many nations are required in order

to make this motion viable, but to my understanding, and I will stand corrected if I am wrong, it takes only a few. I think these nations can be found. I think the express concern of Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada and perhaps others, could, if Canada were to take the initiative, provide sufficient support for this to see that it was in fact tabled by the Third Committee and discussed. I would think that would be the most viable alternative, Mr. Buchanan. I do not see it getting the necessary majority to become an issue on the floor of the General Assembly.

Mr. Buchanan: If you mention the fact that possibly the member states of the United Nations are coming to the point where they are concerned with the rightness and the wrongness of a situation rather than just the territorial boundaries, here again is it not a touchy area? For instance, the Africans rather resent the white nations of the world saying, "This is wrong and you should not be doing it and we should have determination of peoples" and yet, where for instance powerful nations of the world, such as Russia in Czechoslovakia, are involved, these considerations seem to fall into the background. Again it is the colonialist mentality. Is this not where a great deal of resentment comes as far as the African nations are concerned?

• 1750

Mr. Bezanson: Yes, I think so, but there is interference in Africa every day. There is interference by nations who desire particular benefits from African countries. I do not need to document this for you, gentlemen. I am certain that you are all convinced of it. Aid in itself can be a form of interference in the very lifeways of a nation. I think Operation Camelot, an American venture which is now well documented, bears striking testimony to the fact that aid and indeed research can be a direct interference into the integrity, the political integrity of a nation.

But surely if nations can interfere, if nations can be in a sense neo-colonial with African nations in order to glean particular economic benefits or political benefits, surely when the question of hundreds of thousands, indeed millions, of people are dying or living is at stake, whether or not this is regarded as some kind of interference becomes dwarfed by the more major consideration that human lives are important.

Speaking for one person, and speaking only for one person, I myself would be impressed, delighted and thrilled if one nation would

stand up and say this has got to be discussed in the United Nations. Something has to be done about it. If the African nations are appalled by that, if they regard it as a colonialistic gesture, then I would simply have to say that that is a hard political reality with which we must live.

I am not sure all of them would, Mr. Buchanan. I think that many of them may be doing what they are doing because there is a feeling of solidarity with other states in the Organization of African Unity. But I really wonder how many would stand up and accuse a nation that took what seems to me necessary steps of being neo-colonialistic. I would think that many of them, in fact, would be very pleased. I certainly can say that Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon and the Ivory Coast would be very pleased.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you.

Mr. Mongrain: A short question, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask our witness—I understand he has been in Nigeria as a volunteer for CUSO—in which part of Nigeria he operated while he was there. Is it what we now call Biafra, or somewhere else?

Mr. Bezanson: No, I worked in Western Nigeria, primarily with the Yoruba tribe.

Mr. Mongrain: But there were Ibos there at the time?

Mr. Bezanson: There were Ibos there, but they were very few.

Mr. Mongrain: Were the leaders in that community?

Mr. Bezanson: No, indeed they were not.

Mr. Mongrain: They were not.

Mr. Bezanson: This is due to a very special case which I could convey to you in private, but it would take me a long time to explain why there are not a great many Ibos in Ijebuland.

Mr. Mongrain: Now after your experience, Mr. Bezanson, between 1960 and September 1966, did you have the opportunity to notice, either by yourself or by hearsay, that some of the nations were supplying the Biafrans or the Nigerians with munitions or arms or things like that?

Mr. Bezanson: No, I cannot say.

Mr. Mongrain: In the skirmishes that happened.

Mr. Bezanson: No.

Mr. Mongrain: None that you know of.

Mr. Bezanson: None that I know of.

Mr. Mongrain: It all started in September 1966.

Mr. Bezanson: I cannot say that.

Mr. Mongrain: Later; later at least.

Mr. Bezanson: It is impossible for me to answer your question with any authority. I could say it is my impression that this is true, but that is simply an impression and that is all I could say.

Mr. Mongrain: Another question which is foreign to what we have been talking about up to now, and it is a hypothesis. Suppose that this government—Canada—would decide one of these days to have an emergency immigration program to help the Biafrans as we have done for the Czechoslovaks. Do you think these people, or some of them at least—the most intelligent or cultured or professional—would be interested in emigrating to Canada? Do you think they could adapt themselves to our way of life over here? Your attitude would be a good answer.

• 1755

Mr. Bezanson: It is a terribly difficult question. Let me try to answer it by making one sort of academic differentiation. I would think that the more educated people of the Ibo tribe, those who have been working in the cities, living in the cities and who have had contact with "western ways" for some period of time, would make a much easier transition than an agrarian farmer who had spent all his life in a small village following village ways and village social structure. You see, when we send volunteers or aid personnel over to Nigeria we think it necessary to give them a program of introduction. We think it necessary to give them an orientation so that when they go they will be prepared for things, they will be able to see things correctly and in perspective. What we talk about—and this is something that psychiatrists have thrown around—is the concept of culture-shock, where you walk into a culture that is totally alien to you and suddenly the shock is so great that you in fact suffer some kind of psychological imbalance. Of course, we do have cases where individuals, who have gone from our western, industrialized society to a more agrarian, unindustrialized society, do end up having something that can be called

culture-shock. If this can happen to well-educated, well-informed Canadians, who are also well-trained and well-introduced, I think that if you brought people from villages with a farming or fishing way of life, many of whom have only seen a few automobiles, and put them in the centre of Toronto you might expect something rather drastic in terms of psychological imbalance.

Mr. Mongrain: I am not thinking of those. I am thinking of those who are better educated.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Yewchuk?

Mr. Yewchuk: For clarification I want to go back into the history a little. Three days after the start of the massacre of 30,000 people, or somewhere in that vicinity, the Military Governor issued a statement. Did this statement produce any immediate cessation of killings? Was any method of enforcement carried out or was there a follow-up on this statement at that time?

Mr. Bezanson: I was not in the North at the time and I cannot answer that question with the authority of other people. You might, in private, address the question to Mr. Grossman who was there at the time. Yesterday—and I was actually scheduled to speak yesterday—a number of people were here who had been in the North and who could have answered your question. I cannot with any authority.

What I can say in response is that certainly, to my knowledge, no measures to punish the people involved in the atrocities have been taken; that no attempt has been to see that the individuals who either were involved in, or who organized, these mass killings of Ibos were punished for this action.

Mr. Yewchuk: Do you know of any similar action taken in the Eastern region against the Northerners who live there? I mean action by Ibos to exterminate Northerners in response to this?

Mr. Bezanson: As I say, the Federal Government has claimed that people of Northern origin were killed in Eastern Nigeria, and that after this had occurred there was a retaliation in the North. Now, there is almost no documentation that this in fact occurred. In Port Harcourt, which was then a thriving Ibo industrialized community, it is known that some people of Northern origin were killed. I do not know how many. I might say a handful, but that is just an estimate.

● 1800

Mr. Yewchuk: Was that before or after the Northern killings?

Mr. Bezanson: Again, that is now known.

Mr. Yewchuk: I see.

Mr. Bezanson: The apparent source of information for this was Radio Dahomey. Dahomey is a neighbouring country that borders on Nigeria. It apparently had broadcast that some Hausa had been killed in Eastern Nigeria. That is really all I know about it.

Mr. Yewchuk: From your experience there do you know whether any of the Ibos who left the Northern Region have been compensated for their loss of property?

Mr. Bezanson: They have not been compensated. In fact, as you heard yesterday, when they were actually trying to leave for the East—when they had given up; they could not stay; their lives were at stake—they were killed on trains that were carrying them to the Eastern Region. They were dragged out in the airport and shot with machine guns by soldiers.

When I was in Nigeria I saw a lorry load of Ibos who had come down from the North through the West to get to the East. This lorry—a lorry is a big truck—contained men, women and children, some of whom were mutilated. Some of them were still holding cloths to their arms which had been severed by a machet; some of them had had kerosene put on them and a match put to it.

These are the types of atrocities which I have seen; and to my knowledge—and indeed, I think, to the knowledge of people who have been living there since—no compensations have been made.

In this connection, I should point out that in the Aburi agreements it was agreed by the Federal Government that civil servants who had been working in other parts of Nigeria, and who had to leave their jobs as a result of the massacres, would be compensated out of the Federal Treasury. This was agreed in Aburi, and I have tabled that—the Aburi Report. In fact, these compensations were never forthcoming. Ojukwu made the claim, and the Ibo motto was, “On Aburi we stand”—there can be a one Nigeria that is a Confederation if we stand on Aburi. The compensations were never paid. Ojukwu said that if they were not, measures would be taken. They were not, and measures were taken. The compensations were never forthcoming.

Mr. Mongrain: Mr. Chairman, may I point out that it is 6 o'clock.

Mr. Yewchuk: I have almost finished. I have a couple of questions and then you can start.

The Vice-Chairman: While we have this break, I may mention that I have four other names: Messrs. MacLean, Legault, Barrett and Cafik, in that order; and I would appreciate it if the questions and the answers were kept crisp.

Mr. Yewchuk: Mr. Bezanson, having lived in Nigeria for a couple of years have you any figures, or idea, on starvation rates prior to this war?

Mr. Bezanson: No. The claim has been made—I have read the testimony to date—that the figure of Nigerians dying, or of Biafrans dying, at such a rate is to be expected because 50 per cent die anyway. In fact, this is simply not true. I cannot even begin to understand why the statement was made. Certainly the death rate in Nigeria, especially of children, is much, much higher than we know in the Western world; and that is a fact which cannot be disputed. You can look to the UNESCO reports on disease in the tropics; and you can look to UNESCO educational reports. This will confirm it. But mass starvation, never.

What we are talking about now is death by starvation, not death by malaria, or death by bilharziasis, or death by some other tropical disease. We are talking about death by starvation. The figures I have, or which you have, have been submitted by medical people working in Eastern Nigeria and Biafra, and by Red Cross personnel. The figures have gone as low as 4,000 per day to as high as 10,000 per day. I am told by reports I read that more supplies have been getting in recently and that this accounts for a halting in the death rate that was then rising.

However, what is known is that Biafrans are now subsisting by eating not only food which comes in as relief but mainly their own food crops—yam and cassava. They are eating not only the crops produced but the seed crops as well, which they would normally plant for next season. This means that in the next agricultural sequence there will be virtually no food in Biafra. International Red Cross says—and I can almost quote here that if something of monumental proportions is not done nothing will prevent a massive starvation really unequalled in history.

● 1805

Mr. Yewchuk: I am happy that we have this report from the Convention at Lake Success which contains a definition of "genocide" None of us had that so far. I say that because part of our terms of reference is to determine whether or not genocide exists.

Mr. Bezanson: I would like to say a word in that regard, if I may. If you are going to deal with the question of genocide you have got to define it. I gave you only one definition. I do not think that you should adhere religiously to that definition. There are many forms of genocide. Economic genocide can, in fact, be realistically interpreted as a form of it. When a people are in fact cut off from the opportunity of meaningfully earning a living that is, in effect, economic genocide, if it is practised against a whole people.

What I will say is that whether or not the intent of genocide exists today, whether or not the Federal forces of Nigeria are practising genocide today—and I do not know whether or not they are—certainly the events of the war to date would suggest that they indeed have been. On record is the fact that when the Federal forces entered Port Harcourt, they went into a hospital. The only Ibos who remained, apparently, were people too sick to be moved. These people were shot in their beds.

Now, I was very interested in one of the reports by the military commission that is now there which stated that they saw a concentration camp and things could have been worse. Of course, there were mainly women and children. Genocide can be simply killing men; if you eliminate the men you can be damn sure that you are not going to have any posterity.

I also would like to point out with regard to General Milroy's group—and I think this is something you should bring up—to that my knowledge I do not know that any of them have had previous contact with Nigeria or with Africa.

Mr. Anderson: We will be questioning General Milroy.

Mr. Bezanson: Right. Might I just interject for a moment, Mr. Anderson, and finish my statement?

Mr. Anderson: On a point of order, for the last hour we have carried on with only three members of the Opposition and now the Liberal ranks, too, are rather depleted. It is

past 6 o'clock and some of us do have engagements. As we are meeting at 8 o'clock anyway, could we adjourn until that time, perhaps hear another witness and then later on in the evening continue with this? We no longer have a quorum so in fact we really should not be meeting at all.

The Vice-Chairman: Could we finish with the questioning by Mr. Yewchuck?

Mr. Anderson: Fine.

Mr. Bezanson: May I finish that statement, Mr. Chairman?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, continue.

Mr. Bezanson: I think also one of the things that is terribly important, Mr. Anderson, is that it has been reported by this commission that they talk to Ibos in Calabar. Traditionally Ibos have not lived in Calabar. It is a minority area in Nigeria; Efiks, Ibibios and Calabaris people. Now, it is indeed possible that some of them are there, but I think a terribly important thing is being able to differentiate between Ibo and non-Ibo and I wonder, in all sincerity, whether this commission is able to make that differentiation if they have had no previous contact with Nigeria.

I wonder, in fact, if on sight they can make the differentiation. I wonder further if any of them can speak Ibo in order to determine whether people are, in fact, Ibo or whether they are a minority group or someone else. I do not think that point can be overlooked. Indeed, I think it is terribly crucial to any type of deliberation or any type of report that is going to come out of Nigeria.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Yewchuck, have you finished?

Mr. Yewchuk: I just wanted to bring up the idea of the definition of genocide which is here and I think we should use it as a reference in future.

The Vice-Chairman: There is some merit in what you say, I think, because this Convention is signed by Canada.

Mr. Yewchuk. Yes.

● 1810

The Vice-Chairman: Probably we will have to have a good hard look at it.

Messrs. MacLean, Legault, Barrett and Cafik are still on my list. Will you all be available this evening for your questions?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Mr. Bezanson can appear before this Committee immediately at 8 o'clock and dispose of these three or four questions and then go on to the next witness.

Mr. Anderson: We do have other witnesses who have come from Toronto, I believe, to testify before us this evening so we should at least get their statements on the record.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Charles Taylor is our witness this evening.

Mr. Anderson: That is right; he is from Toronto.

An hon. Member: We will be cutting into his time tremendously.

Mr. Cafik: I think one of the problems, with all due respect, is that in asking specific questions the answers—and they are very good answers and I do not want to discredit them—go on to areas that we are not really questioning and everyone would have had an opportunity to participate if the answers had been kept somewhat shorter.

Mr. Anderson: But the fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, that we no longer have a quorum so I do not know on what grounds we are taking evidence.

The Vice-Chairman: I wonder whether we could have a subcommittee meeting now and adjourn the main Committee until 8 p.m. Is it agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Adjourned.

EVENING SITTING

Thursday 17 October, 1968

• 2014

The Vice-Chairman: I call the meeting to order. Are there any opening questions?

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, I understand that Mr. Taylor who has come from London is leaving for Toronto this evening and since it is now 8.15 p.m. I wonder if we could perhaps adopt the procedure of hearing his testimony now, if other members of the Committee are agreeable, so that we could have some chance to talk to and question him. Then perhaps we could continue with our other witness tomorrow morning or some

time when the Committee reconvenes. I would so move if you are prepared to entertain that motion.

• 2015

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, I will certainly entertain the motion. Is there a seconder?

Mr. Anderson: I second the motion.

The Vice-Chairman: There is only one consideration I think we should have before us and that is that Mr. Bezanson was kept all day yesterday too, as well as to...

Mr. Gibson: I suggest that we have had the benefit of his message and that we release him.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, what about the four members who still had questions they wanted to put to Mr. Bezanson?

Mr. MacLean: As far as I am concerned, I will pass.

Mr. Cafik: Well, Mr. Chairman, my name is on the list and I am willing to forego the questioning.

The Vice-Chairman: That is two out of the four. Mr. Legault and Mr. Barrett are the other two.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, if that be the case, rather than hold back Mr. Bezanson I will forego my questions.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Barrett is not here.

Mr. Mongrain: Howard told me he would be absent.

The Vice-Chairman: Then I wonder if Mr. Bezanson would come forward?

Mr. Roberts: To express the Committee's thanks?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Bezanson: Mr. Chairman?

The Vice-Chairman: On behalf of the Committee, Mr. Bezanson, I want to thank you very much for your able efforts on our behalf. You have made a great impression upon us. You have certainly done a lot of background work there and filled in a great need for the Committee. We very much appreciate what must have been a tremendous effort on your part. Thank you.

Mr. Bezanson: I enjoyed very greatly having the opportunity to be here and I hope that what I have had to say will be of some assistance to you in your deliberations. Thank you, very kindly.

The Vice-Chairman: I now call Mr. Charles Taylor.

Gentlemen, Charles Taylor is the London correspondent of the *Globe and Mail*, that great Toronto and Canadian newspaper. He was the African correspondent of the *Globe and Mail* in 1967 and in the early part of the year 1968. He has just recently returned from Biafra so I think we are in for—I cannot call it a treat under the circumstances—some very good recent information from Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Charles Taylor (London Correspondent of the "Globe and Mail"): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I am, of course, very honoured to be here tonight.

I would like to preface what I think will be a rather brief series of remarks by saying that I do not have the qualifications that many of the other people who have spoken to you have in terms of lengthy experience in Africa and lengthy experience in Nigeria and Western Africa in particular.

I would like to go, first of all, into my experience in a bit of detail because I think it is relevant to what I am going to say to you and because I believe my brief time in Africa, and the sort of chronology of my brief time in Africa, is only relevant to my changing impressions about the Nigerian-Biafran situation.

As the Chairman said, I was the *Globe and Mail's* correspondent in Africa for nearly a year. My first visit to Nigeria was to the Federal side, to Lagos especially, just under a year ago. About 11 months ago I was in Lagos and I also visited Calabar in the first press party into Calabar after it was taken by the Federal troops under Colonel Adekunle, of whom I am sure you have heard.

My second direct encounter with the Nigerian situation was at the Kampala peace talks last spring where I had quite a prolonged exposure to both sides.

My third and most recent exposure to the situation was eight days in Biafra which ended last Wednesday night—just a week ago.

I would like to speak briefly about my impressions of what is happening in Biafra today and, if you will permit me, I would also like to make a few tentative suggestions

as to what I think Canada might be doing in this situation.

I went into my background at a bit of length because I should start by confessing that I have been wrong on the Nigerian situation. I have been wrong in print. Some other journalists—not all journalists but a great number of journalists—have also been proven wrong in print, and I suspect that a great many diplomats from a great many countries and a great many politicians from a great many countries have also made the similar mistake.

• 2020

Eleven months ago in Lagos I wrote on the benefit of very extensive conversations I had had with Nigerians on the Federal side, with foreign diplomats from a wide variety of countries, and from many of my colleagues. I summed up the situation by saying—and I quote myself exactly, "Time is running out for the Ibo rebels" and I now regard that as one of the most serious journalistic mistakes I have made in my career. I think I was honestly briefed by all these people. I think these were honest mistakes. I would like to think so, anyway. As a Canadian I think I had a subjective impulse, of which I was not aware at the time, to support a federation to be subjectively against any separatist movement. The parallel is not a neat one. It is hardly a parallel at all, but I think subjectively this was an influence upon me. As somebody who has spent some time in Africa, I was well aware of the dangers of tribalism and separatism in Africa and the danger that a successful Biafran secession would in fact encourage these in other parts. I think I also felt that it is a bad principle to interfere in what seemed to be an internal situation at that time. I think this was the advice that a lot of governments were getting at that time. I think this was what a lot of other journalists were writing at this time, and I think we were all wrong.

I began to suspect that we were wrong when I was at the Kampala peace talks, where I ran into the Biafrans for the first time and saw what I thought was an incredible stubbornness on their part. They came out of Kampala bad in a PR sense. They were the stubborn ones. They were the ones who eventually broke it up and walked out. They were not flexible one whit. The Nigerians, on the other hand, seemed more reasonable, more open to compromise, more open to alternatives, and so on. At that time it worried me. I

thought these people are rigid. I do not understand. Here they are losing. Here they are with their backs to the wall, and all this, and yet they are being so stubborn and uncompromising. Why? And when I went to Biafra two weeks ago I think I began to understand why.

I would describe the situation in Biafra today, the situation of the Biafrans, the attitude of the Biafrans, as one of really extraordinary resilience and resourcefulness, and of equally extraordinary will to resist and to maintain their independence against all the odds. The odds are, have been and still are extremely formidable. The military odds—I am sure you are well aware of them—they are drastically outnumbered and even more drastically outgunned. I am quite prepared to go into any detail such as I can in answer to questions on any of these points. The economic odds are equally formidable because of the blockade, because of the influx of millions of refugees and because of the resulting starvation situation. The diplomatic odds are also formidable; the fact that only four nations have recognized the Biafrans to date, the fact that they have only had every sort of middling gestures of support from other nations, most notably France, and yet you find this incredible will to resist. I cannot state that it is universal because I do not think any man can state that it is universal.

There is some indication that there are some—to use the contemporary jargon—doubts in Biafra or amongst representatives of Biafra abroad. We keep hearing stories which are never sufficiently documented of consultations taking place, of some people urging Colonel Ojukwu to more or less lay down arms and sue for peace on federal terms. There is absolutely no evidence in Biafra that these people have prevailed. There is some evidence that it has at some point or is at some point currently being taken to a decision, and the decision is going very strongly against the people who would say "Give up". Everything I have seen in Biafra would suggest that not only the senior people in the government and military circles are behind Colonel Ojukwu and his policies but also, as far as anyone can judge, the vast majority of ordinary people in Biafra.

The next question is why is this so? I am not as expert on the historical background as other people you have heard, so I will not go into that in any detail at all but it is certainly true that they feel, rightly or wrongly, that to put it mildly they were not getting a fair deal

within the federation as it existed. But I think anybody who comes to Biafra today is aware of a much greater and more immediate pressing emphasis, which explains why they are so determined to resist, and that is their fear of extinction.

I do not say and I have never said that this is a situation of genocide, but I do say very strongly that the Biafrans have very good reason to fear that they are going to become extinct unless they resist. You have heard very detailed testimony about the massacres in the North in 1966. Whatever the truth there—and I cannot speak as an eyewitness—there is no doubt that the great majority of Biafrans regard this as the first crucial proof that there was no physical safety for them within the Federation of Nigeria.

• 2025

More recently there is their experience of the war itself. I have no doubt from what I have seen and from the people to whom I have spoken, including foreign missionaries and relief workers who seemed to be men of considerable experience and integrity, that there has been a systematic and sustained bombing campaign against civilian centres in Biafra against marketplaces, refugee camps, hospitals, and churches in particular. I am not saying that this is an act of genocide. I am not saying that it is not a legitimate act of war, whatever a legitimate act of war might be, I am only saying that these bombing attacks on civilian centres take place on a systematic and sustained basis and that they are a very important explanation of the feeling of the Biafran people, that they are faced with extinction if they are conquered.

There are also various cases of atrocities on the grounds that occur when Nigerian troops move into areas they have just captured, Biafran towns and villages. These are harder to document. I took considerable trouble to try and document one case recently—it took place ten or eleven days ago—on the basis of talking admittedly only to Biafran sources, but if you have been a reporter for a long time you find out ways of checking out stories and you trust the tricks and devices we all use to make sure we are not being fed a story. I am utterly convinced that this particular atrocity took place in which at least 500 civilians, by a conservative estimate, were killed in a town which the Nigerians took and there were no Biafran soldiers in the town and they were just machine-gunned down in cold blood. I do not tell this as an example to support any contention that there is genocide.

I do not believe for a moment that orders for such an action were given at a high level in Lagos, but I state that I am convinced that this and other acts of atrocity have taken place and that they are a very real and pressing factor in the minds of every Biafran today and that they are a very real explanation—and in my view a totally understandable one—of their remarkable resistance.

Their fear of genocide, even if the genocide itself does not exist in any legal, technical term, their fear is very real and it is very evident to anybody who is in Biafra today. I am not making any reference here to anybody in Canada or any Canadian, but it has been suggested by a lot of people, including many in Britain who are friends of Nigeria, that Biafrans should lay down their arms and trust in General Gowon's assurances that there will be nothing but a peaceful reconciliation. I am afraid that I can only regard this as a totally irresponsible and callous attitude. Whatever we tell them, whatever anybody tells them, they are going to go on resisting. They are going to go on resisting whether it remains a conventional war or whether it goes into a guerrilla stage.

I would like to make this point very strongly. The war will not be over soon. I am convinced of this. I may be proven wrong, as I have been wrong before on Nigeria, but I do not think anybody again can go to Biafra today and feel that it is going to be over very soon. We have all heard predictions—some of us have predicted ourselves—that it is only a matter of weeks or months. All of these predictions have been made since the beginning sixteen months ago, and it still goes on. In the conventional war I would even hazard a guess, if I were given odds, if this was a situation one could honestly and decently bet on, that in the conventional war as it exists now the Biafrans might still turn the tide. They have been getting arms in much greater quantities over the last three weeks. They are not only holding the Feds but they are turning them back in a couple of key areas. I suspect that they may be preparing a sizable push on possibly the southern front. They are certainly looking for such a dramatic victory because of its political and diplomatic implications for them. I think the conventional war is far from lost, although the odds are still against the Biafrans.

• 2030

But even if the conventional war is lost, even if their remaining large town, Umuahia,

is overrun, even if they lose the airstrip at Uli, which is their last major airstrip, their only real effective one, or even if Uli is cut off from Umuahia, then there will be a guerrilla warfare. Last Friday the External Affairs Commissioner of the Federal side spoke in New York to one of my colleagues on the *Globe and Mail* and said he thought that the guerrilla warfare would be over in six months and that at that same time there would be considerable reconciliation and that most of the Biafrans would have come to terms with the Federal authorities. I think Dr. Arikpo is a sincere man. He is an easterner himself from a minority tribe. He is a very eloquent federalist and I have been very impressed by some of his writings, but I think that is a totally unrealistic assessment of the situation. This is going to go on. The dream of an independent Biafra is alive within these people and because of all the history about which you have heard it is not going to be extinguished just because Nigerian forces overrun the last of the major towns. This leads us to what is your main concern, I gather, the humanitarian aspect; and however you look at it, this is horrendous and appalling.

If the current stalemate in the conventional war continues it is bad enough. The current relief supplies according to the best information I could get, are only about half of what is needed in terms of medicine and high protein foods. This situation has already drastically improved. By this I mean the situation where now there is about half of what is needed which at an optimum estimate is 200 tons of high protein food a night getting in, but it is only about half of what the relief workers say they really need to stem the starvation and turn it back. All it has done is sort of stabilize the situation, if you can speak of stabilizing a situation in which thousands are dying.

And, as I think you have heard also, every relief worker you speak to in Biafra says that the situation by December and January is going to be truly calamitous because then it will not only be a case of high protein foods that are needed, but a case of bulk foods. One estimate I got from a World Council of Churches representative who seemed to be one of the most reliable people to whom I spoke was that 3,000 tons of food would be needed to be flown to Biafra every day, and I remind you that the present total is apparently about 160 to 200 tons.

This is the situation if the war continues in its roughly conventional sense with the airstrip open. If it goes into a guerrilla war situation in the next few weeks I cannot see how it is going to be anything but drastically worse. If the airstrip goes, there is no way of getting food in to the Biafran side. I do not want to make allegations against the Nigerian authorities that I cannot support with first-hand evidence, but I would say that there must be, from all that we have read and heard, a very reasonable supposition that the Nigerian Federal Authority, whatever their intentions in Lagos, are less than efficient in distributing relief supplies in the areas of Biafra they now control.

In a guerrilla situation with a fluid military situation with no lines, no areas under firm control, I do not see how anybody could possibly organize the relief that will be needed in those months of December, January and on into next year—on ad infinitum—until you get a normal situation where people can grow their normal crops.

Therefore, I think we all have been—I should not say all—I think many journalists, many governments, many politicians and many diplomats have been highly unrealistic to say all along that, well, it is all going to be over fairly soon; we do not like the suffering that is going on, but soon it is all going to be over; Biafra will collapse; the Federal authority will be re-asserted in the Eastern Region and then we can organize normal relief supplies and can be really effective in organizing an end to the starvation. Some people have advocated that position sincerely, but I think it is totally unrealistic and just does not correspond with any appreciation of the situation in Biafra today and the situation in Biafra that is bound to prevail in the months ahead. This is a situation of tremendous catastrophe, and I think it demands measures that are perhaps outside the normal ones that might commend themselves to gentlemen like yourselves on more normal occasions, which leads me to my second point: what can Canada do?

● 2035

I take it our aims are mainly humanitarian. We are concerned with ending the human suffering and human misery. Obviously, as any nation, we must have political aims and I would hope that on the part of the Canadian Government these aims would be directed mainly at political stability in this part of the world. I would hope that they would not be

concerned with following—mainly or even partly—along the positions of our allies, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom. I hope that we have the determination to follow, as I believe we do, an independent foreign policy.

What we are already doing is well known. We have supplied a certain amount of money for relief supplies. We are now sending *Hercules* to the area and we have an observer team on the Federal side. I think all of these are helpful and all of them are useful, but I do not think they are enough. I am very much aware of the strenuous objections which can be made—legitimately made—to Canada as a nation, as a government, doing anything more. The legitimate government which we recognize is in Lagos. In traditional diplomatic terms this is still an internal affair, an internal question. We also have to acknowledge, as we have done, that there has been a total—almost total—lack of response from the Organization of African Unity. Only four African states have shown a real concern for Biafra for reasons which you were well told about earlier today. We have also been told that there is a lack of response in the United Nations and that it would be divisive for us to raise the question there. All of these are very weighty reasons. One does not lightly start throwing one's weight around as a middle power when everybody tells you it is not going to have any effect, it is going to do you more harm than good and that it goes against all the diplomatic rules. But I submit that this is a situation in which the normal diplomatic rules should not and, in fact, do not apply.

If we are sincere and serious in our questions, in our supply of relief and in our offers of relief, we have to be serious in our determination to make that relief effective; and it will not be effective unless we take, at the same time, political action.

I think this is not a normal situation. It is not an internal situation because I think that the Biafrans through their own suffering and their own bloodshed have earned their right to independence.

I have a few proposals. They are not ringing proposals. I do not put them forward with any degree of certainty that they would work. I think, first of all, we have to make sure that our *Hercules* are used effectively. I can think of all sorts of circumstances which might arise in which they would not be used effectively and I think it should be a legitimate concern of the Canadian Government and the

Canadian Parliament and the Canadian newspapers to watch closely and make sure that full use is made of these planes and that the relief does get to the people who need it most.

I am aware that there was some discussion here yesterday about sending a delegation of some sort to the Biafran side. I have not had time to read the testimony and I do not know all the implications of the discussion yesterday, but I do feel that it is not enough to have an official Canadian observer on the Nigerian Federal side alone. The Biafran comments on this, of course, are highly scornful, but I think they have a point. If we are concerned about the suffering and the bloodshed; if we are concerned to act as a deterrent; if we are concerned that we should establish the truth of the situation, we have to have some official observer on the other side. This, again, may be diplomatically difficult. It may not be according to the rules, but I think it is absurd, however qualified our observers on one side may be and however diligent they may be, to expect that they can give a full report on a situation which has two sides. I think that short of diplomatic recognition—I suspect that eventually Canada is going to recognize the independent state of Biafra, if not this year, if not next year, some time—which we should be prepared for, we should make much clearer, as a government, as a people, as a nation, our sympathy for the Biafrans. I would not suggest the form of words; there are experts to do this. But I think Canada's attitude as expressed by Canadian spokesmen has not shown sufficient sympathy.

I think one of the more practical things we could do is to use our influence as strongly as possible, publicly and privately, on the United Kingdom to stop the flow of arms. It is incredible today, even at this stage, how the Biafrans are holding on with arms supplies that have only very recently increased. I do not believe entirely what they tell me. They say that if the arms were cut off, if Britain's arms supplies were cut off tomorrow, the war would turn just like that. I do not believe that, but I accept that it would make a remarkable difference. I feel, whatever the justifications in the beginning for Britain's continued supply of arms to Nigeria, in the present situation they are not justified and the most effective thing we could do might possibly be to use our influence in concert with other countries who also have influence with Britain to stop that flow of arms. I think if there is a more equitable balance in the

arms situation there is a real chance for a military stalemate which will lead to political concessions which will eventually lead to a political solution.

• 2040

I think we should also use our influence, such as it is, with Lagos. I do not know how great it is, but I think we should use it to try to tell them that we are appalled at what is going on, and to try to restrain them, even to try to get them to declare unilateral ceasefire. I think our goal in all these methods should be to achieve a military stalemate which would at least have a cooling-off effect which would possibly lay the groundwork for a political solution in which the Biafrans were not required to announce their secession absolutely.

As I said, these proposals are not neat and clear cut; they are open to all sorts of objections along lines of traditional diplomacy and even along lines of political reality, but I submit in conclusion that this is not an ordinary situation. This human death and human suffering in Biafra today is on a really horrendous scale and I do not think it behoves us to be cautious in our response or too calculating about our own image in the world or our own political interests. We live in an imperfect world with imperfect institutions, but I do not think this is any excuse for not trying to rise above those imperfections when we are confronted with human suffering on such a scale; when we are confronted with the necessity of acknowledging the situation and doing something about it. The calamity is such already and will become so much more calamitous that I think we have no choice but to be more active, and more outspoken, and even more daring than we have been to date. Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Taylor. If the Committee will permit an interruption at this point, I note the presence in our midst of the Deputy Speaker, Hugh Faulkner, and his guest and Canada's guest, the Deputy Speaker from Kenya, Mr. Fitz de Souza. Mr. de Souza, would you stand up. Thank you. Our first questioner, Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: For long periods of time when the process of decolonization was going on in Africa it seemed generally, at least by the world community, that self-determination was a great virtue and that no group of people wishing to determine their own future should be held in subjugation by any other

country or any other group. Why has this point of view suddenly gone out of style all over the world in this case? Even with the Nigerian Government itself, the previous witness seemed to indicate that at one point the secession of Biafra from Nigeria would have, perhaps, been at least considered as a possible solution, but at the present time the Nigerian Government seems to be going to great lengths to forcibly keep Biafra as part of Nigeria in subjection. What, in your judgment, is the reason for this?

There are of course other facets of the same thing. Why should Russia and Great Britain, one of whom was urging decolonization over the years and the other ridding itself of various dependencies as rapidly as possible, now be supplying arms to Nigeria in order that they might keep a segment of their country, which apparently is intent on separation, in the confederation?

• 2045

Mr. Taylor: To answer the second part of your question first, in terms of foreign powers supporting the Federal Government, I do not think it is necessary to impute—and you were not—sinister motives to them. I think they all expected it would be over very quickly, that it would be a short, sharp police action. They have been proven wrong in that. The motives on the Federal side, I think, are complex. I do not think it is necessary to make them into evil men; there are many dedicated and sincere federalists on the Nigerian side who really believe in one Nigeria and are very eloquent and devoted on this subject.

I think there are also lesser motives, of perhaps more important economic realities. They did not want the oil of the East to be lost to them. There is probably an element in the escalation of bitterness and conflict that had gone on at the political level over the years, cumulating almost inevitably in this conflict. I would hesitate to subscribe any single motive to the Nigerian side as being the dominant one.

Mr. MacLean: Would you agree that when people such as the Ibo are so determined on separation and on independence this objective over-rides economic considerations and the viability that may be theirs from an economic point of view and all these things? Surely self-determination, the right of self-determination, should be the over-riding factor in this situation.

Mr. Taylor: I would hesitate to make that a general rule, but in the case of the Biafrans I think they have demonstrated very conclusively that this is the over-riding factor in the situation, their sheer determination at a tremendous cost to themselves to survive as an independent entity; and this is the over-riding political factor in the situation today.

Mr. MacLean: With this set of circumstances, do you think that there will be a recognition of the Biafran Government by other nations in the near future? And whether you do or not, do you think that other nations, including Canada, should at least give serious consideration to recognizing Biafra?

Mr. Taylor: The first part of your question I think I can best answer by quoting Colonel Ojukwu himself who, I thought, gave a very realistic answer when we asked him this at a press conference two weeks ago in Umuahia. We said, "What about France? Is it going to recognize you?", and he said, "I would like to think so, but I have to answer realistically. The odds are against it at the present time, but the situation could change within six to eight weeks." Now that would be five to seven weeks. "If we have a decisive"—I cannot quote him exactly on this—"if the military situation turns decisively for the better, if we have a few victories" is what he was saying. He linked it directly with the military situation. I think this is realistic. I think this is what they are aiming for, a couple of decisive counter attacks that will convince other countries that Biafra is a going concern and that maybe they had better think about recognition. And of course the Biafrans themselves are thinking of France as the key nation that might turn the tide, diplomatically, for them. In terms of Canada, I do not think that we can recognize Biafra now, because I do not think Biafra has enough claims to control enough of what it calls Biafra to recognize. This would probably be premature. I do not think the Canadian Government is going to do it anyway, but we should be seriously considering the possibility because the situation could change fairly rapidly. It all depends on arms supplies. I am not a hawk in any aspect; I am not a militarist, but when you are in Umuahia, arms are much more important than relief, and arms will save more lives in the long run.

Mr. MacLean: I pass. I am finished.

• 2050

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Taylor, I have two or three rather quick questions that I would like to ask. I find something that does not add up in what you have stated here. You say that we need more observers, and we need them in Biafra so that we can see both sides of the story. You indicate that we should at the same time use our influence with Lagos to have them, if necessary, declare unilateral ceasefire. You say that we should express our sympathy as a nation for the Biafran cause. Now if we were to simultaneously try to do all of these things, then the one would preclude the possibility of the other two.

Mr. Taylor: Yes, that is quite a legitimate criticism. I was aware of this possibility. I think I made clear I was not presenting a coherent or clear-cut program; I was trying to indicate areas in which we might be more effective. Obviously, one could cancel out the other. I did not, for instance, mention the United Nations because I would like to think that might be an area where we could be effective, but I do not see at present that it necessarily will be.

The crucial contradiction you identified in what I said was the fact that we might do all these things and at the same time try and influence Lagos. Your implication was that if we did all these things we would lose our influence in Lagos.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Mr. Taylor: Right. Well, we have experienced diplomats, we have experienced members of the government. This does not have to be presented overnight as sort of a take it or leave it package. The Prime Minister does not have to get up and state everything at once. Obviously this is a process, although there is an urgency involved, of moving out to new positions and if one does not work, you try another.

However, I would say this: if other actions I have suggested imply that we lose our influence in Lagos then I would say let us lose our influence in Lagos because the British analogy here is a very important one. The British have said all along, as you are aware, that if they stop their arms supplies to the Federal side they will lose their restraining influence on Lagos.

I doubt very much if anybody who has been to Biafra has ever seen or heard of any evidence that there has been much restraint

on the Federal side. I do not know. It is conceivable they could have been more active in their military endeavours, including their military endeavours against civilians, but it is very hard to see any evidence of restraint in response to British influence. Therefore, I say we may not have influence in Lagos. We should see if we do. But if we do not, we should not hesitate to try all these other things.

Mr. Cafik: Do you think there is some advantage in our pursuing our humanitarian objectives? One I would think is achieving a ceasefire wherever we can or if it were possible. We could play some role in doing that and feeding the hungry and trying to help the people generally. Do you see some advantage that Canada might have as an independent nation who has, I think, good relations on both sides at the moment? Should we not try to pursue every avenue to help these people on both sides, perhaps, using these good offices at the moment rather than becoming like a bull in a china shop and destroying our good offices and then finding out we can do nothing? Perhaps we should pursue the position we are in at the moment to the greatest possible extent before we arbitrarily and publicly show any evidence of support for the Biafran cause.

Mr. Taylor: I would be inclined to agree with you in almost any other situation which we might be discussing tonight except this one, because I do not think our humanitarian efforts—especially our relief efforts—are going to be successful, are going to be anything more than a drop in the bucket unless there is a considerable political change, and I think the time has long passed when we can sort of observe the diplomatic niceties and edge around both sides, and so on, and try to follow the normal diplomatic patterns. This is a drastic situation.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Taylor, it is suggested, and I believe it is true, that perhaps 6,000 to 8,000 people are dying every day and later on there might be many, many more thousands, but if the relief activities that are going on at the present moment are saving the lives of perhaps 8,000 or 10,000 people a day, even though that is a drop in the over-all bucket it is a pretty big drop. If it is important that 8,000 are dying a day, it is equally important that 8,000 are not dying a day because of the relief activities.

• 2055

Mr. Taylor: I quite agree and all the more important to stop the 6,000 or 8,000—nobody knows the figures—who are dying a day from dying. All the more important to prevent the thousands more a day who will be dying in December and January from dying.

Mr. Cafik: Right.

Mr. Taylor: I do not think we can just sort of sit back and say, we are saving a few; let us be content with that.

Mr. Cafik: No, of course not.

Mr. Taylor: You were not suggesting that, I know.

Mr. Cafik: I am not suggesting that and I know you are not. All right. Now, to pursue this thing a moment further and looking at it in practical terms, the sympathy in your testimony and in many others seems to be,—and I am not saying it is an improper sympathy,—with the Biafran cause.

The thing that has bothered me intellectually in this whole problem is the practical effect of secession there and its effect on other African nations. Is it really, in your view, a realistic assumption that we will unleash wars of independence or self-determination in other areas in Africa that might offset the advantages of jumping in here with both feet at the moment?

Mr. Taylor: This is a very real fear on the part of many African governments—probably a majority of African Governments. Therefore, we have to take it seriously because these people surely know the threats they face. I do not think there is an automatic cause and effect relationship here. I see an analogy to plunge into another controversial subject with the so-called “falling domino” theory which has been advanced for areas of South East Asia and the Far East. I think this is one of these nice sort of intellectual arguments which really, when you get out on the ground, do not have all that much relevance.

As we know, virtually every African country has some problems, and in many cases serious problems, which we lump together as tribalism and I use that word in no pejorative sense. Some of them have latent or even semi-active secessionist movements. So this is a very real threat, but I cannot see why there is an automatic cause and effect relationship here. Africa just does not quite work that way; it is not so neat. I cannot see that if

Biafra succeeds, suddenly a great wave of secessionist movements will grow up elsewhere.

If I might draw a parallel, if our guest from Kenya will not object to this, I think a much better way of looking at this situation is the situation that prevails in East Africa where the British, possibly through force of circumstance, were possibly wiser than they were in West Africa, because instead of creating an artificial federation which we now see cannot hold together, through very different political and historical reasons they eventually gave independence to three separate states, Kenya, Uganda and, as it then was, Tanganyika which are now, as independent states, slowly and painfully, with a great deal of heard political bargaining, coming together to form a larger economic, and perhaps in the distant future, political grouping.

They are doing this as independent states and are bargaining very hard and the jealousies are very real, but it is something that is genuine that has not been imposed upon them and perhaps this is a more hopeful parallel for what might happen after the present Nigerian crisis. Possibly then there could be a gradual coming together in Nigeria. I have slightly digressed from your original question.

Mr. Cafik: Well, that is fine, I think it is a good answer; it is what I was looking for. Now, I have one other question. You suggested that we should use whatever influence we can to stop Britain, or to bring whatever pressure on Britain that we can to deter them, from supplying arms to the Federal area. You did not mention anything about France. Do you think we ought to do the same thing in terms of deterring France from supplying weapons to the Biafran area?

Mr. Taylor: I would be in favour of anything that brings about a quick end to the war. I think the fastest way to bring an end to the war is to achieve some sort of parity in the military situation. Therefore, if we are starting to lean on people, I would lean much more heavily on the British than the French.

For the record—I believe I am right in this although I stand to be corrected—the French have officially denied that they supply arms to Biafra. The British, of course, say they do; they acknowledge this. It is part of their commercial background, and so on; they are a traditional source of supply. There are French arms on the Biafran side. Nobody, I think, can say for sure that the French government supplies them or that the French

government gives them money. There is a supposition here, a very strong supposition, but there is no proof. I am quibbling, possibly, but I think we should not automatically equate the French and the British in this.

I am not evading your question; I say, by all means we are all for stopping the war but the most effective way is to get a parity on arms. Then you will get some sort of military stalemate and in that situation of military stalemate it becomes more realistic to talk of a political compromise and the best way of getting a military stalemate is to lean, first of all, heavily on the British.

Mr. Cafik: I am just drawing a conclusion here that I am sure is not justified, but you would not suggest that if we could not stop Britain from supplying arms that we supply arms to Biafra in order to get that sort of military balance, would you?

• 2100

Mr. Taylor: I would not suggest that because Canada, as a nation, is not in this sort of business, and I do not think we should. I think this would go against all sorts of very important elements in Canadian foreign policy that are agreed upon, I think, by all parties. I would only say that one could argue logically, devoid of all political circumstances, that this would be the fastest way to end the war, but I would not for a minute suggest that Canada should do this.

Mr. Cafik: Right. I have one last question. I mentioned earlier in this Committee that there might be some merit with Canada's good offices on both sides of this unfortunate and terrible war—perhaps Canada is in a unique position—where as an individual nation we might in some way go down to Lagos and to Biafra with a diplomatic mission of some kind to try to sit down and talk and be a third party in negotiations towards a ceasefire, as opposed to approaching it through the United Nations with all its political implications and difficulties. Would you see any advantage in trying to do this or would you think it an advisable course to attempt?

Mr. Taylor: You are rather trapping—not trapping—but you are almost letting me lure myself into a contradiction because I did say: "I think we have gone beyond the stage where traditional diplomacy should apply." But I will qualify that in answer to your question by saying that I do not think there is

any point sending a sort of unilateral mission to both sides unless both sides have indicated in advance they would welcome it.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but I am presuming that we would try to get their agreement for us to do this and, providing they both agreed, of course, then we could pursue it and try to serve a useful purpose in that respect by using our good offices. Do you think that is a reasonable proposition?

Mr. Taylor: I think it is one of several things that might well be tried in this particular case. I would point out that the Commonwealth Secretariat and the OAU—especially the Commonwealth Secretariat—have tried to act in this sort of mediatory role of bringing both sides together with great diligence, devotion and skill without any success.

I think before anybody acts as a mediator between these two sides the political situation that surrounds the war has to be changed. That is why most of my proposals were not directed towards direct compromise between the two sides. I think you have got to create a situation which does not exist at present in which both sides are convinced of the need to compromise.

Mr. Cafik: So you say really that the first thing is to get a stalemate?

Mr. Taylor: Yes, to get a military stalemate with the resulting political openings up.

Mr. Cafik: Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Taylor, I gather from what you have said that you do not feel that Canada should recognize Biafra at the present time. That would be premature.

Mr. Taylor: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: And I gather also you do not feel that Canada should ship or transport arms to Biafra?

Mr. Taylor: Oh, most definitely not; no.

Mr. Roberts: Has there been a development in your thinking in this regard? I did see statements attributed to you in which you were quoted as saying that you did believe that Canada should, if not send, transport arms to Biafra.

Mr. Taylor: No, sir, I believe I quote myself accurately—I might be subject to correction if a tape were produced—but I think I

only said that the logical solution, in theory the fastest way to achieve a military stalemate, would be to supply arms to Biafra on the assumption that this could be done more quickly than one could cut off arms to Nigeria. This is an argument in logic. This is an argument also in military practicality, but it is not a politically relevant argument.

Mr. Roberts: You do not think that Canada should follow that fast and logical process?

Mr. Taylor: No. I was trying to make the point that it is not sufficient to think purely in humanitarian terms; that our genuine humanitarian concern in Canada for what is happening in Biafra has to take account of political and military realities and that we have to make our aid effective within the political and military situation to the extent that is consistent with what we, as a nation, feel we can do.

•2105

Mr. Roberts: I find what you have just said surprising because at one point in your testimony tonight you did say that we should not allow ourselves to be limited by political reality.

Mr. Taylor: We should not allow ourselves to be limited by some of the traditional—I may have said political but I think I was really putting the emphasis on traditional—considerations of diplomatic protocol which inhibit us especially from dealing directly with the Biafrans whom we do not recognize. But I would not say we should do anything that goes completely against the grain of Canadian sentiment as well as Canadian foreign policy, which is to get into the arms business. That would be an irresponsible suggestion.

Mr. Roberts: This leads to the point that puzzled me about your testimony because I think all of us here share the disgust, really, at the dying that is going on in Biafra. I think that over the weeks—almost two weeks—of testimony we have had now there has been enormous concern, not only about the present situation but about what is going to happen in three, four, five or six weeks. But the problem really is, as one noted political commentator said once: "What is to be done?"

You have mentioned three or four times that you do not think the normal rules should apply or that we should be governed by diplomatic niceties or the normal diplomatic rules of protocol. But I suggest in a way that

may be setting up a bit of a straw man to knock down because the real question is: what can we do in a practical way and what can we gain and what can we lose, perhaps, by breaking those diplomatic rules, which have been established not because they are part of the rules of the game, but because they correspond to certain realities in international political life?

So the real question is: what practical steps—this is coming back to Mr. Cafik's questioning—can we take? I think some of the things you have suggested are very useful, but some of them also tend, it seems to me, to advocate a kind of public diplomacy which may be exactly the contrary of effective in the situation in which we now find ourselves.

This has been a bit of a preamble, really, to the question I want to ask you. Let us not consider it in terms of political niceties or rules of conduct, but let us consider it in terms of the practical, political, real world out in Nigeria. If we ignore the point of view which is taken by the Nigerian authorities to the extent of outraging their sentiments and what they consider, rightly or wrongly, to be an internal affair, are we not going to risk being able to do very much in a humanitarian way? Do we not risk losing their co-operation, which is essential to accomplish humanitarian objectives that we have in mind?

Mr. Taylor: This is a very, very real danger and I think anybody who argues on either side of this question cannot do it with any degree of certainty and must do it with a great deal of hesitation because we are talking in terms of maybe cutting off relief supplies and maybe causing thousands of more people to die than are dying already. This is a very grave matter and I admit in my own mind grave areas of doubt corresponding to your own.

I would only say that if we play the game exactly as Lagos would want us to play it, on the basis of the federal government's previous performance and continuing performance in terms of aid supplies, our aid will not be nearly as effective as it should be or could be. I think we have to be very firm on this, that if our planes are going to be used and if our relief supplies of any sort are going to be channelled through, it has to be effective. We have a certain amount of leverage here because the Federal Government is a very proud government and a very difficult one to

deal with, but they are not totally unconcerned with their image abroad—with world opinion.

This has been shown on occasion. There are at least certain influential people in Lagos who are very concerned about response abroad. It is an open question whether the continued operation of the airstrip at Uli is only to be attributed to the incompetence of the Egyptian pilots of the Mig's and Ilyushins or whether some restraint has not been exercised in Lagos for political reasons that they do not want to offend world opinion. I do not know the answer, but it is a question that is asked by people on the scene.

I think we have some influence there. I agree with you. It is a very dangerous matter. We have to play it delicately, if necessary, at times, but I do not think we should be in a position of running to Lagos every time to clear absolutely everything with them and not arguing back with them. We may have been doing this; I am not saying we have.

Mr. Roberts: You are not suggesting that necessarily we have been doing that?

Mr. Taylor: No, I have not because I do not know. I have been on the other side. I do not know. I have not been in Lagos recently. I have not been briefed here by anybody and if I had I could not talk about it. I just do not know.

Mr. Roberts: But knowing some Nigerian officials, the kind of people they are—you mentioned a proud people—and having talked with them do you think our leverage could be most effectively exercised in a public way through public declarations of policy or through the traditional processes of quiet diplomacy?

Mr. Taylor: Oh, I think the traditional processes, if they are effective. But I think if we run into brick walls, if we are not getting anywhere, then I think in this situation we should resort to public demonstrations of what we think should be the case.

Mr. Roberts: There are two statements in your testimony which caught my ear. One was that the Biafrans had earned a right to independence and the other was that we should make clear where our sympathies lie.

I wonder if perhaps that might not be bitterly resented by African nations and by the Nigerians themselves in the sense that Canada would be appearing to set itself up as some kind of judge as to the proper work-

ings-out of an African situation; whether it might not be resented, if I can use a parallel—although it perhaps is an unfair one—just as Canadians resent the apparent willingness of General de Gaulle to come to judging decisions about Canadian affairs.

There is a risk, especially with a proud people, that this will look like a holier-than-thou kind of neo-white missionary colonialism almost, in our readiness to pronounce as a moral authority on situations which concern them.

Mr. Taylor: I agree that would be the reaction in large parts of Africa. I reject the parallel between the Nigerian situation and President de Gaulle in Quebec. I would accept it if there were a civil war situation and if, say, a Canadian federal army was encircling and blockading secessionist Quebec and that thousands were starving and civilians were being bombed, and so on. In that case I would think anybody would have a right to speak out.

Mr. Roberts: I did not mean to say that there was a parallel; I just used it as an example of how people sometimes look on outside comment as an inflammatory gesture.

Mr. Taylor: Yes, I agree, but I will stick to my point because I think this shows that we have to be aware of this tremendous qualitative difference between what is happening between Nigeria and Biafra, and between normal cases of interference by one state in another state's affairs.

I think we have to talk frankly to our African friends and we have to ask them whether they object to our speaking out about this horrendous situation or do they want us to remain silent when, say, in 10 years or 20 years time there is an insurrection in South Africa and the white South African army and police start putting down a black uprising. Do they want us to remain silent then when there is an equivalent amount of bloodshed and conflict within the boundaries of what has been regarded as a sovereign nation?

Mr. Lewis: Or even now.

Mr. Taylor: Possibly even now, but I do not think we should be entirely at the whim of any sort of current international mood on this. It will be unpopular in Africa for any European government to speak up.

Mr. Roberts: Well I was not thinking simply in terms of popularity; I was thinking in terms of what one can do effectively.

Mr. Taylor: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: If we take an action which looks, say, to the Nigerian authorities on whose co-operation we will have to depend for our humanitarian efforts—it is not a question of popularity; it is a question of being able to maintain certain good relations with them in order to be able to do what we want to do, which is to deal with the humanitarian problem. It is not a question of popularity.

Mr. Taylor: No, I agree. We are getting back now to our relations with Lagos; before we were on relations with all the rest of the African governments.

Mr. Roberts: But surely our relations with Lagos are a very important factor in this situation because it is on the maintenance of effective—I do not say good or friendly—relations with them that we are going to be able to make the humanitarian effort that I think all of us in the Committee want to make.

Mr. Taylor: Yes, but I get back to one of my original points and that is that in the existing political and military situation our aid, important as it is, can never be effective enough really to stop this tremendous starvation that is going on and it is going to get worse.

Mr. Roberts: Would it require a land corridor, really, to deal with the problem of starvation that is going to arise?

• 2115

Mr. Taylor: I think it would require a military stalemate, either a *de facto* stalemate or a ceasefire or even a political solution.

Mr. Roberts: I know you said that our humanitarians would not be successful unless there was a political change.

Mr. Taylor: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: I would accept that. Would you accept, conversely, that the humanitarians will not be successful unless we are able to maintain or unless we are able to create the co-operation of the Nigerian authorities in dealing with the humanitarian problem?

Mr. Taylor: I would say that ideally we should have the co-operation of the Nigerian authorities and there could be grave difficulties if we do not have that co-operation, but I think it would be despicable—and I do not believe any Canadian government for a moment would let this happen—if the Nigeri-

an authorities dictated the course of our aid and limited our aid in any way because of certain political and strategic considerations. I do not think we should let this happen.

Mr. Roberts: If I may comment at first to explain the question, I would agree with you if those were the terms; but that is really a moral judgment. What I am asking is a question of a fact. Is it possible really to mount an effective humanitarian effort to relieve the suffering which is going to be even greater in six week's time without the co-operation of the Nigerian authorities? It is not a question of morality, it is a question of fact.

Mr. Taylor: All right; if we run into trouble with the Nigerian authorities—I hope this does not happen but if we do, or if we run into trouble with the IRC—let us loan our *Hercules* to the church organizations on Sao Tomé and let us also give them on the Biafran side—let them carry in on their first load—not some food, but some aluminum planking and a couple of fork-lifts so they can extend their parking bays and unload more effectively. This is not an accurate figure, but I assume from what I am told we could probably, in a few weeks, double the amount of food that is getting in.

Mr. Roberts: Should we do that anyway then?

Mr. Taylor: Well, the government has decided, and maybe there are other implications that make this necessary, to work through Lagos and to work through Fernando Po and the IRC. That may be a very legitimate approach, but if we are balked in that we have alternatives.

Mr. Roberts: I do not quite see what alternatives we would have aside from what would really be interpreted as military action.

Mr. Taylor: I am suggesting the alternative is the church route from Sao Tomé which is taken by the World Council of Churches, Caritas, Nordchurch aid, the German Lutherans and a host of worthy organizations.

Mr. Roberts: We could not get enough aid in that way. You were talking about 3,000 tons a day; we surely could not get 3,000 tons a day in that way.

Mr. Taylor: I agree and I go back to my original point: our other actions should be geared towards producing a military stalemate situation in which there might be political openings. But if we are balked in our

immediate efforts—this is not contradictory—with the *Hercules* working through Lagos and working through the IRC and Fernando Po, there is this alternative route.

Mr. Roberts: I have taken a lot of time for questions; I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Taylor, you have indicated you do not feel conditions at present are such that a ceasefire could be negotiated. In other words, the imbalance as I take it is such that the overwhelming superiority of the Nigerians with Federal Military Government arms vis-à-vis the Biafrans, would really preclude the Nigerians from entering into a negotiated settlement. Is this a correct statement of your position at this point in time?

Mr. Taylor: It is a correct statement of my position except that I would put it slightly differently; my reasons would be slightly different.

We have had two main attempts at Kampala and Addis within the last five or six months to achieve a negotiated settlement and I do not think the military or diplomatic situation has changed sufficiently since both those abortive attempts to encourage either side to change its position.

Mr. Buchanan: I do not know whether my understanding is correct, but the British have indicated that one of the reasons in addition to the one you spoke of—of maintaining their influence with Nigeria, which I have some doubts about as well—is that there are alternative sources of arms available to Nigeria—for instance, the Russians.

So in effect the net result of Britain's ceasing to provide Nigeria with arms would be virtually nothing. They would just secure the arms from an alternative source.

• 2120

Mr. Taylor: It is possible. I am not a Soviet expert, but I wonder whether the Russians are all that concerned at this stage to step in even more strongly into that situation. I am not a military expert, but I wonder whether such a severe change in the basic armaments and ammunition situation might not create tremendous technical problems for the Federal side.

I also wonder whether any disruption might not be decisive, however quickly there

might be an alternative source, simply because the Federal side has tremendously over-extended lines of communication and very serious, apparently, logistic problems at present. Even despite their superiority there are occasions, according to Biafrans—and this seems to be true as far as any outsider can judge—where they run out of ammunition because they are so over-extended.

I do not know. I do not really believe the Biafrans when they say that if Britain suddenly stopped their arms there would be a dramatic change overnight, but I think it could be very, very decisive and at least it might make that sort of hiatus period in which the Biafrans might really clobber them a couple of times and that might have a—I sound, I know, militaristic.

Mr. Buchanan: To what extent—you mentioned this earlier, too—do you feel that the Biafrans are getting arms? I assume they are coming from Gabon.

Mr. Taylor: They are coming, as far as I have been able to find out, from Gabon and possibly before Gabon, Abidjan and then presumably from airfields in France. I have not traced them down. This is hearsay second-hand evidence. I am told by many, many people—it seems to be reliable—that the arms supplies have drastically increased in the last three weeks.

Mr. Buchanan: You mentioned Caritas and so on and the other church agencies. Just as an aside question, to what extent have Canadian church agencies or other Canadian charitable organizations been involved? In other words, we get the impression there is a great well-spring of urging the government to do something. Are Canadian charitable organizations playing any significant role in Sao Tomé as far as bringing aid to Biafrans, or is it basically European groups that are doing it?

Mr. Taylor: I cannot speak on that, Mr. Buchanan. I just do not know. I passed through Sao Tomé very quickly and I did not have time to do a detailed investigation.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my appreciation for the very candid and forthright remarks which Mr. Taylor has made. I believe that they will add to the very significant testimony we have

been privileged to hear to provide some substantial evidence as a result of our deliberations.

My first question, Mr. Taylor, has been partially covered by Mr. Buchanan's question in regard to the attitude of the Russians in their co-operation with Great Britain in the supplying of arms. Have you anything to indicate to you that the Russians intend to carry on a program of continuing assistance to the Nigerian Federal Government? Are they vitally concerned with what takes place in Nigeria now?

Mr. Taylor: My impression, sir, is that they are not, but I cannot pretend that I am an authority on this subject because I have not been recently on the Federal side in Nigeria and I have not been in the Soviet Union or in touch with Soviet experts on this question, so it would only be hearsay and very second-hand guessing on my part.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You talked to Colonel Ojukwu and travelled widely within Biafra. Did you receive any impression that the Chinese Communists are active or want to be active in supplying the Biafrans with arms or other assistance?

• 2125

Mr. Taylor: I saw no evidence of any Chinese presence in Biafra, be it in terms of weapons, or certainly in terms of Chinese personnel. That is not true.

There has been a Chinese statement of support for Biafra which was highly predictable in terms of Chinese foreign policy because it was an ideal situation for the Chinese. They can make a statement and embarrass at one blow the Americans, the British and the Russians. It is a perfect situation for them. I saw no evidence, nor did I hear any evidence which would suggest that there was even any potential of Chinese practical support.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It has been mentioned a number of times that several of the smaller European nations have made rather significant contributions on the humanitarian side, and that Sweden has really set a very definite pattern which we might follow in rendering a similar type of aid. Did you see any evidence that the four African countries which have given formal recognition to Biafra are extending any assistance or being involved in any constructive way?

Mr. Taylor: I did not. And to be honest with you, I forgot to ask or I forgot to look

for it in my time in Biafra. I could only say, thinking about it, that these are basically poor nations, and I doubt if they have much that they could offer that would be of practical use in Biafra today.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I believe you said that in your earlier experience on the Federal side you were able to observe something of the government's ability or willingness to distribute relief supplies. What was your impression of the ability of the Biafran administration to distribute on any equitable basis what must be a rather sizable amount of relief coming in, even though in terms of the over-all need it is small?

Mr. Taylor: My impression was basically a very favourable one. I talked to many relief workers. They would not have any interest in giving me unfavourable information, of course. These are men of integrity and I talked to enough of them over a lengthy enough period of time to convince myself that they probably were telling me the truth.

They say that the aid gets through remarkably efficiently and remarkably fairly under the circumstances. They handle the distribution themselves. They handle even the off-loading themselves. There is very little chance of pilferage. They will tell you stories about individual Biafrans who have tried to purloin certain relief supplies or get special favour or so on, but they will tell you these as the exceptions to prove the rule.

Their only limitations in terms of distribution, not really human limitations, are those imposed by their very serious shortage of transport and their very serious shortage of gas. They have trouble getting out into the more remote areas of Biafra with the relief supplies, but where they do manage to reach them I am convinced from my own experience and in searching that it is fairly distributed.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You have been one of the few Canadians in Biafra in recent weeks who have had the opportunity to interview Colonel Ojukwu directly. What is your impression of him as a man and also as far as his own ambitions are concerned?

Mr. Taylor: He is a most remarkable man. He is one of these political leaders who is a presence as well as a personality. I would put him, tentatively at least, on the level of a Julius Nyerere or a Kenneth Kaunda, I think, which in my terms is the top level of people anywhere. He is a man who has tremendous

physical presence and tremendous intellectual powers. He listens carefully, does not answer quickly, chooses his words very carefully after thinking, and then they come out with tremendous precision and effectiveness. As far as I could ascertain he is the head of his people in every sense. He seems to be a genuinely popular figure, as far as any outsider can judge.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): You made very little mention in your suggested approaches that might be taken of the United Nations. Would any useful purpose be served, in your opinion, if the Nigerian-Biafran situation could be on the agenda of the UN?

• 2130

Mr. Taylor: I do not know. I am hopeful that we would consider trying, and start to explore all sorts of means. Possibly I should have mentioned that if it is going to be divisive at this time, possibly, but I am not sure, we are well advised not to bring it up. But I do not think we should regard U Thant's advice on this as necessarily decisive or binding for the weeks ahead. I think we should be consulting with some of our friends of similar persuasion, such as the Scandinavian powers, to explore all these avenues, the UN, the Commonwealth. We should be talking to the Tanzanians and the Zambians to see if there is anything we can do in concert with them. I think we should be, perhaps we are,—I am not suggesting that we are not—doing all these things, but I just say I think we should be doing all these things and if at any stage the UN became a viable thing then we should speak up there.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It has been suggested—this will be my last question Mr. Chairman—by some of the Scandinavian countries that if the Red Cross could be accredited as an official UN agency, that not only would their ability to service the relief organization on both sides of this problem be enhanced but it would be a way of getting it on the UN agenda. What would your comments be on that?

Mr. Taylor: I had not heard of this suggestion and I do not think I can give you an honest comment because I just do not know enough about the UN situation to know the technicalities involved in that one. If it is promising, let us explore it. That would be my basic attitude, but I do not know the details that would be involved.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Yewchuk.

Mr. Yewchuk: From your conversations with Colonel Ojukwu and other government people in Biafra did you find any evidence that they had the desire that we put this matter before the UN General Assembly?

Mr. Taylor: They have already publicly appealed, I think, to all the member states of the United Nations to take action under the terms of the United Nations Genocide Convention. I cannot remember whether they particularly called for action through the General Assembly but they have clearly called publicly for action in terms of the United Nations Genocide Convention, which would imply in some way action through the United Nations.

Mr. Yewchuk: As far as you know, did Colonel Ojukwu suggest to you that Canada put this before the United Nations?

Mr. Taylor: He did not to me personally. He may have to others.

Mr. Yewchuk: From your presence in Nigeria about a year ago, was there any evidence that the Nigerians thought this should go before the United Nations?

Mr. Taylor: Oh no, just the opposite. They, of course, have always said this is an internal matter.

Mr. Yewchuk: Do you know any other place from which arms are coming besides Gabon and possibly France—any African nations or any other nation?

Mr. Taylor: None that I know of. I did not say coming from Gabon. It was only in the sense of coming through Gabon as a staging post.

Mr. Yewchuk: Yes, I see. You mentioned Egyptian pilots in the Nigerian war. Was there any evidence of any other country's military personnel there?

Mr. Taylor: There is a great deal of second-hand hearsay evidence. I have no direct evidence of foreigners on the Nigerian side. I have seen a few white mercenaries on the Biafran side. The Biafrans claim that there are considerable numbers of British service personnel on the Nigerian side. The British deny this. I have no direct observations on that.

Mr. Yewchuk: What sort of arms is France presumably providing?

Mr. Taylor: I did not say that France is necessarily providing them. It is one thing to provide; another thing to supply the money, another thing to allow transport through your country or the activities of commercial middlemen, and so on. I do not think one can be too precise on this matter.

Mr. Yewchuk: What sort of arms are they getting from outside, wherever they are coming from?

• 2135

Mr. Taylor: So far, as far as I know, it has been mainly small arms and ammunition. One now hears reports that they are getting things slightly larger. I was on the Northern front near Okigwi and I asked one major about his armament situation and he said, "Well, we have now got some bazookas". It is the first and only time I had heard they had bazookas. I do not know if it is true or not. He might have been telling me this because he thought it was good propaganda, I do not know. Maybe it is true. I did not see a bazooka.

Mr. Yewchuk: Have you any figures as far as you have heard on the monetary value of the arms that Britain is providing to Nigeria?

Mr. Taylor: Oh, no. There is a famous statement by George Thomson on this and at this hour of night I do not know whether I can rack it up from my memory, but it is in *Hansard*. It was his statement on July 21, or something like that, where he said that they were not more than something per cent in value, which has to be highly qualified. It was a very political answer, if I may say so. I think it was something like not more than 15 per cent in value. Then he made another statement about the—

Mr. Fairweather: Fifteen per cent of what?

Mr. Taylor: I assume 15 per cent of the total in value, but the total presumably includes a lot of Migs and Ilyuschins, which the Nigerians do not use nearly so effectively in military terms against military targets as they use their Saladins and Ferrets. He also made some other statement about the amount of small arms and ammunition, which was in the nature of 50 per cent, and I think that was a more revealing statement. I cannot quote him exactly on that but it is a matter of public record.

Mr. Yewchuk: Is it 50 per cent of the total arms?

Mr. Taylor: He used the word "half"; either just slightly more or slightly less than half. I am sorry, it is a matter of record and I just have not got it in my head.

Mr. Yewchuk: Does that mean half of the arms that they are getting from outside from all sources?

Mr. Taylor: I think he was talking of small arms and ammunition. I stand to be corrected on that but that is my memory of it.

Mr. Yewchuk: I wondered, again from your conversation with Colonel Ojukwu, whether he showed any signs of still wanting to belong to a federal union in any possible way. Not necessarily a stronger union than before, but some sort of a union which could be construed as a spark of hope that they might still negotiate?

Mr. Taylor: Everything he said to us was consistent with what they said at Addis and what they said at Kampala, and that is that their first must be recognition of their independence, their right to secede, and that after that they are willing to discuss—I have forgotten now how they phrased it in their documents—forms of co-operation with the government in Lagos, but they are adamant, and Colonel Ojukwu was adamant in his conference with us, on the priority of their independence being recognized.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: I have six more questioners listed: Mr. Alexander, Mr. Legault, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Hymmen, Mr. Gibson and Mr. Howard, in that order. Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Taylor, I am under the impression that in July of this year, as indicated to the Committee by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, that Nigeria had indicated to Canada that in the event that they did sanction the use of planes either directly or indirectly that this would almost be placing us in a state of war. We have since seen that this attitude has changed, by the Nigerians now agreeing that we can have planes sent to Biafra. Can you give me any idea of why there has been this sudden change in attitude. Is it perhaps as a result of world opinion?

Mr. Taylor: I would speculate that it is a result of world opinion but I must remind

you, sir, that I have not been in Lagos for 11 months so I cannot pretend to be a reliable interpreter of the Federal Nigerian point of view. I can only say I think it might be as a result of world opinion, and I certainly would hope that would be a factor.

• 2140

Mr. Alexander: But you are aware of the fact, though, that there were diplomatic letters written to the effect that we should not become involved with airlifts?

Mr. Taylor: I had not been aware of the exact letter to Canada but I was aware that this was the general Nigerian attitude at that time, yes.

Mr. Alexander: In other words, perhaps we could agree then that the attitude of the Federal Military Government is softening somewhat because of the fact that they are now prepared to allow us to send planes?

Mr. Taylor: I think this is a hopeful sign that it may be softening. I will remain somewhat sceptical until we see the airlift with the Canadian *Hercules* in effective operation and see just how it is operating.

Mr. Alexander: I note, and correct me if I am wrong, that you seem to conclude that the only rational conclusion we can think about now is that someone has to take the ball and indicate there should be a ceasefire. Is this your first priority right now?

Mr. Taylor: No, sir, because I hesitate to name one priority and that is why my exposition has, as I admitted, been somewhat hit and miss. Because I think we have to try various things that may have internal contradictions I do not put out a neat order of priorities.

I think the only safe thing to say as a priority is that we have to try to end the suffering as effectively as possible. From there I go to this statement: that this can best be achieved by some sort of military and/or political stalemate; then we have to try all the possible means that are open to us and are legitimate that might induce that sort of situation.

Mr. Alexander: I see.

Mr. Taylor: But I apologize, I have no clear-cut program because I do not think that there is a possible clear-cut program.

Mr. Alexander: No, I did not want to lead you into thinking that I thought you had a

program. I know you offered some very splendid suggestions, but it seems to me, after hearing several witnesses, that the Nigerians are forthright in their pursuit for victory and the Biafrans are insistent on hanging on. I just wonder if perhaps the first priority should be that leadership should come in terms of some nation saying, "cease fire".

Mr. Taylor: Yes, I think if this is an effective way we should try it, but I think it would be more effective if we should do this in concert with other countries...

Mr. Alexander: Yes.

Mr. Taylor: ...in that one voice is not as effective as several voices. I think this might be an element in an evolving situation. I think it is an option that should be open to us.

Mr. Alexander: I know we are all concerned about the non-intervention theory. I think it has been well expressed here, but have you noticed that because of a crisis such as this, which is certainly peculiar and stands alone, as you have indicated, perhaps we are breaking away or in other words, not taking such a firm stand on the non-intervention theory but rather, if internal squabbles cannot be decided, we can no longer be so insistent on stating that non-intervention must be the policy, and that nations are now starting to soften a bit in this regard? Have you had that feeling at all?

Mr. Taylor: I have had this feeling and I put it forward with considerable diffidence because I see this as a legitimate objection to those of us who would like a more active Canadian initiative, that this is a very dangerous precedent to establish if we all start interfering with each other's internal affairs. My qualification in this case was that it is such a God-awful calamity that it is beyond precedent, as it were.

Mr. Alexander: And yet on the other hand, though, Mr. Taylor, you indicated that perhaps we should not be too concerned at this particular time about diplomatic niceties and repercussions.

Mr. Taylor: That is what I was saying, yes. In this particular case that is exactly what I am saying, though I am normally conscious of them as a diplomatic reporter.

• 2145

Mr. Alexander: Mr. Taylor, there was, and still is, a feeling within this group that perhaps members from this group could play some role by becoming non-military observers in going to Africa and, in particular, to Nigeria and Biafra, in order to see for themselves and come back and report—by that I mean parliamentarians. Do you see anything significant in such a role? Can there be any significance to it?

Mr. Taylor: Oh, I think automatically there inevitably would be significance if a parliamentary delegation from Canada could appear on both sides. I have not read the way the suggestion was phrased in your deliberations yesterday, or whatever might have been said about it, so I am really sort of thinking off the top of my head here.

Mr. Alexander: Well, in short—if I am wrong, I think my colleagues will check me—it was very simple. For the simple reason that we seem to have received information that came from observation from one side only and then another side only we found it quite difficult in putting the pieces together and, therefore, in the Committee's wisdom—it has not been decided yet—they thought perhaps we should go there as Parliamentarians only, in a non-military role, and then come back and report what we had seen. Can three or four Parliamentarians play a significant role in this particular area?

Mr. Taylor: I think you can.

Mr. Alexander: In what way?

Mr. Taylor: By going. I am just trying to think of any possible objections. As long as you went to both sides; as long as there was a rough balance in your movements; as long as you took sufficient care to make sure that neither side hoodwinked you, as I am sure you would do, yes. It would be significant I would suggest, with all respect to your powers of observation and so on, not so much for what you discovered but for the indication of interest and concern that such a visit would signify. I was told in Umuahia that Mr. Brewin, Mr. MacDonald and then Mr. Stephen Lewis were the first parliamentarians from any country to have visited Biafra. I do not know whether that is true, but I certainly have not heard of any others and that is what the Biafrans told me. This was a political factor in the situation for them.

Mr. Alexander: And what did the Federal Government think about it?

Mr. Taylor: I have not asked. I can imagine, though. I am not being facetious by any means. I have not heard anything if they said anything, privately or publicly. I do not know, though I can imagine they were opposed.

Mr. Alexander: I see. Has there really been a legitimate effort on the part of the Federal Government to supply aid to the Biafrans?

Mr. Taylor: I cannot speak directly to that because I have not seen with my own eyes. I was only in Calabar just after the Federals took it at the end of last October and it was too soon to judge the relief situation in all fairness to the Federals. They were just moving in; Biafrans were sniping on the outskirts of town, and so on. It was a very chaotic situation. They took us in quickly and took us out again just to show us they had it. I have no direct observations. Any information I have is second-hand, for what it is worth. A great many of the missionaries and relief officials of various organizations and church groups in Biafra who have their colleagues on the other side and are in contact with their colleagues on the other side report that the situation on the other side is far from adequate in terms of the fair and efficient distribution of food supplies, but I am sure you could find better witnesses than me on this question.

Mr. Alexander: No, you are very good; there is no question about that.

As I understand it now the educated Ibo is running into the bush and is not being treated too sympathetically by the Military Government. Has there been a systematic plan to do away with the educated elite?

• 2150

Mr. Taylor: On the part of the Federal side?

Mr. Alexander: Right.

Mr. Taylor: I have never seen or heard any evidence of such a plan, if you are implying a plan that has been systematically drawn up at the highest level in Lagos by responsible authorities. I have never seen any evidence of this. There is no doubt that atrocities occur and there is no doubt that there is a widespread universal fear. I would say, among Biafrans that such a plan, in fact, does exist.

That is quite different from saying that it does.

Mr. Alexander: Could you answer this, then, Mr. Taylor? In what you have seen and what you have heard, could we say that the atrocities have been effected upon the educated more so than upon the uneducated?

Mr. Taylor: I never thought of that. I do not really know. I am trying to think what factors would apply here. I do not know. For the one atrocity I took some time to try and investigate, I talked to people who were school teachers and to some people who had difficulty expressing themselves in English and were obviously quite poorly educated, and I found resentment and terror and fear and horror on all their parts. I would not try and qualify it amongst the different levels.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Legault.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, just a few short questions and one which had been intended for Mr. Bezanson. Mr. Bezanson certainly related a wonderful picture of the situation, going back quite a few years as to how this was brought about. It was brought to our attention that some years prior to the war the Northern and I believe perhaps the Western Regions had thought of seceding, and bringing this matter out and separating, and now we have the inference that they are the ones who will not permit the Eastern section or the Ibos to secede. In your discussions has this particular question ever been brought out with officials on either side?

Mr. Taylor: Yes, and the tendency, no matter with whom you are talking, is always to say that the other side was the real divisive influence; it is all the other side's fault, which is a natural reaction. My own opinion, for what it is worth, is that all three major groups in Nigeria must share the blame—I would not apportion that share—but must share the blame for the failure of the Federation, if you take the history of the Federation as a whole.

Mr. Legault: From your own opinion, could you tell us why perhaps the Northern Section and the Western Section, or these areas, have changed their minds about this secession and today will not permit the exact set-up they had intended in the first place?

Mr. Taylor: I wish you had asked that of the previous witness because he has been in

the West in a way that I have not. I do not think I am qualified to answer that.

Mr. Legault: A second question. Necessarily you have brought some suggestions which I find a little drastic, but the situation is drastic, and it has been referred to quite a few times by some of the members who have questioned you, about doing away with the traditional diplomatic rules.

On the one hand you do accept the fact of the wisdom of most of the African countries who are part of the Organization for African Unity who have, according to their own assessment of the whole thing, suggested hands off, no intervention. This is their suggestion, which certainly we have to consider very seriously. But on the other hand you would suggest that we should do something more drastic. Do you not feel that perhaps we should abide by the advice being given by those who fear a similar situation in their own country?

• 2155

Mr. Taylor: I think we should acknowledge that their fears are real, but the situation is such that we should not be inhibited or deterred by their reluctance to see non-African powers get involved in African affairs. I think this is, as I said, such a serious situation that a lot of the normal deterrents just should not be allowed to operate.

I think I have indicated a reasonable answer to these African nations which need not be put in any polemical or public sense, but we should ask them quietly how they differentiate between this situation and the situation that may arise in South Africa in a certain period in the future, when they will definitely expect our intervention, just as they would like to see it now in Rhodesia.

Mr. Legault: The last question. We were talking about trying to press our actions and a few things were suggested that perhaps Nigeria could or would not accept. Were you aware of the statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs referring to a message from Nigeria that any intervention or anything which had not been accepted by their government would be interpreted as a grave condition or intervention which would not be viewed very lightly?

Mr. Taylor: Yes.

Mr. Legault: The reason I want to bring that out is just to bring out the fact that this avenue had been explored.

Mr. Taylor: I was aware that this was the Nigerian attitude and it is an entirely understandable attitude, but I do not think that this should be the final arbiter of Canadian foreign policy in this affair. I think it is something to be taken into high consideration. But I do not think they should hold us over a barrel as far as our *Hercules* go, for a start.

Mr. Legault: Yes, but do you not believe that negotiation with the Nigerian or the Federal Military Government is a better solution at the present, such as suggested by Mr. Alexander, where their position is softening somewhat and we are gaining ground in that respect, not to endanger that particular position where we are improving the situation?

Mr. Taylor: I have tried to suggest that this, in my view, would be the ideal solution if we could really be effective in the humanitarian and political sense because the one requires the other, in my view, with the full co-operation of the Nigerian Government, and that we should always attempt to do this. But if the Nigerian co-operation is not sufficient, in our view, to make our relief as effective as we think it should be, then we should consider doing things even if they annoy the Nigerian Government.

I think it is a delicate thing. We have to judge our influence in Lagos. If we are getting anywhere with it, then we use it; we play ball. But if we are not getting anywhere through our influence in Lagos, then we should think of other activities which might lose us all influence in Lagos, but an influence that had already proved not very effective.

Mr. Legault: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Taylor, the statement you first read to us that you said very humbly was incorrect—this was the statement I think you had written yourself...

Mr. Taylor: Oh, yes.

Mr. Anderson: Was that before or after the first group of atrocities against the Ibos which I believe took about 30,000 lives?

Mr. Taylor: Oh, this was after that. This was after the outbreak of the war. The big atrocities in the North you are referring to were in 1966 and this was in 1967.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. Now, later on you said that the Ibos had good reason to fear geno-

cide or at least considerably greater atrocities because of what had occurred then...

Mr. Taylor: And subsequently.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. Could you tell me how you were so badly mistaken, why this slaughter of 30,000 people was not taken into your account when you wrote such a report?

Mr. Taylor: It was. I should have perhaps made the context of that remark more clear. I was referring to the military situation, and this was just after the fall of Calabar. I said that with the fall of Calabar and the Federal assault on Port Harcourt which was expected any subsequent day the vice was closing—this sort of thing—that time was running out. I was speaking of the military situation. My failure was to take into account sufficiently such things as the massacre of the North in assessing the Ibo will to resist.

● 2200

Mr. Anderson: You do not have any real reason for failure to assess it? It was just overlooked?

Mr. Taylor: It was lack of experience in the Nigerian situation and partly misinformation which was fed to me in all sincerity by various people, and partly my own bad judgment.

Mr. Anderson: My next question, sir. You are now living in Great Britain, I understand, and you probably have been there long enough to have some understanding of the British political system. Do you feel that representations by Canada to the British government to stop the shipment of arms will have much effect in the light of the fact that the British Labour Party itself has been unable to change the Prime Minister's mind?

Mr. Taylor: It would be one factor among many. There was the resolution at the Labour Party Conference at Blackpool which the Labour government—I think rightly, in political constitutional terms—took no account of, as it has taken no account of various other resolutions passed at that conference. But that is only one pressure. There is the pressure of public opinion. All public opinion pools in Britain indicate that the arms supplies are an unpopular measure and that there is a significant, even a majority, degree of support for Biafra. Pressure of the newspapers; the *Times* and *The Guardian* and others have advocated an end to the arms shipment. There is the hostile feeling on the continent against Britain.—I stand to be corrected here, but a Bri-

tish trade fair somewhere recently, I think it was in Switzerland, had to be closed—I am speaking very much off the top of my head here—because of hostility to Britain's policy over Biafra. These are all pressures that in a fluid situation who knows what more pressure might just tip the scales, because the British have indicated reservations about the arms supplies. There is George Thomson's very qualified promise to break them off, that they would be broken off—I will not quote him exactly on this, it is on record and I do not have it in my head—if the situation arose where it seemed they were being used for more than what might be regarded as a legitimate suppression of insurgency.

Mr. Anderson: No, my point is this. I think that perhaps if the roles were reversed and Britain was advising us to do a thing like this, we would be more inclined to say that we were not interested in British advice and they could keep it, rather than accept it.

Mr. Taylor: I think I used the phrase—or if I did not I should have—"publicly or privately". I do not know because I am not a member of the government. I do not know what we have already said privately. Again I think, as I have said in other situations, if traditional quiet diplomacy fails, then this is such a horrendous thing that it is one of those cases where we have to try public statements.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. You mentioned earlier the logic which compelled you to come to the conclusion that arms shipments would save more lives than food shipments. You suggested, for instance, that we cut supplies to Britain. Would you take it just one step further, because I am afraid, your logic compels me to take it one step further, and say that we should also put pressure on the French to increase their supply of arms to Biafra.

Mr. Taylor: No, because the French will say they are not supplying arms and I honestly do not know whether they are.

Mr. Anderson: But nevertheless if it is not France, the nations who are supplying arms should be—

Mr. Taylor: No, no, I am sorry. You and your colleague, David, have tried to trap me into extending my logical statement into a statement that will discredit my whole position, and I will just not do this. I regard it as totally—what is the adjective for anathema?—wrong in terms of traditional Canadian policy to get involved in the arms race.

Mr. Anderson: But not in terms of logic.

Mr. Taylor: All I am saying is a simple, logical proposition and I do not regret stating it because I do not regard it as an embarrassing statement. As a simple, logical proposition, the shortest way to end the starvation in Biafra would be to increase the arms supplies to the Biafrans because this would achieve a military stalemate faster than anything else. I regard this as a totally unrealistic thing to suggest that Canada should get involved in.

Mr. Anderson: I can see your point. I certainly agree with you, Charles.

Mr. Taylor: May I make the point. I am not trying to be clever, or anything. What I am trying to do is to bring home the point that all of us who are legitimately concerned with humanitarian causes in Biafra in our thinking have to take into account the political and military realities, and that it is not enough just to say that we are going to ship them aid and then not worry about the consequences or the effectiveness of that aid. I feel so strongly on this that I would be prepared to make these sort of statements even if you can use them to sort of embarrass me.

Mr. Anderson: I am not attempting to use them to embarrass you, if I could interrupt.

Mr. Taylor: This is the point I am trying to make.

• 2205

Mr. Anderson: I am not attempting to use them to embarrass you. I think you are quite right that we cannot simply look at the humanitarian aspect in isolation. My only point in bringing it up is that in terms of logic you have stated a certain position and the logic, I think, holds to the statement that I made. If it does nothing more than perhaps encourage discussion on this point it may be useful. I am not suggesting that I am trying to trap you into advising the Canadian Government to do anything. I am merely saying in terms of logic. I prefaced my remark by saying that.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Would you feel the same way about Viet Nam?

Mr. Anderson: So in terms of logic, Charles, I do not think we are very far apart logically. I think you have made a very sound statement and I was only exploring the logic of it.

Mr. Taylor: Logically I agree with you but, again, I would not advocate that as Canadian Government policy.

Mr. Anderson: Certainly I am not suggesting that you have.

You also stated that perhaps the influence of world opinion has persuaded Lagos not to attack the airstrip, or at least to allow the airstrip to continue.

Mr. Taylor: That is a possibility which was originally put forward to me by relief workers on Sao Tome who could not explain the fact that all their flights were getting through and that the aircraft fire was so ineffective.

Mr. Anderson: Do you accept it yourself?

Mr. Taylor: I do not know. I really do not know. I think it is a possibility but I am not sure. I mean, they have in recent days strafed and I am told even more recently bombed the airstrip in the daytime. So there appears to be a consistency here.

Mr. Anderson: There is a curious problem for someone who has never been there, and that is that the Nigerians have aircraft which are flown by experienced pilots—admittedly they are not Nigerian, they are Egyptian, but they are flown by good pilots—and yet they make no attempt to fly at night and they make no attempt to cut off that airport.

Mr. Taylor: Yes, and they make very little attempt to attack military targets.

Mr. Lewis: They have made attacks.

Mr. Brewin: They wrecked quite a few of their planes trying to fly at night, that is one of the reasons. I would just like to give you that information.

The Vice-Chairman: I wish, for the sake of order, that the member would state his point. It is either a point of personal privilege or a point of order or a point of information. If we do that we will have a far more orderly meeting.

Mr. Lewis: We have been good boys.

The Vice-Chairman: You have been pretty good all evening, I will admit. Let us not have a debacle now. There are only three more witnesses.

Mr. Anderson: If I can go back to this point of aircraft. It seems to me, as someone who knows nothing about the situation not having been there, that there has been a decision

taken not to attack the aircraft flying in at night. Would you agree that this may be the case or there is some possibility of this?

Mr. Taylor: I think there is some possibility. I would not call it a probability because I just do not know and I do not think anybody knows outside of the higher circles in Lagos.

Mr. Anderson: Turning now to the question of observer teams. Do you feel that observer teams really do have an effect upon reducing the atrocities by inhibiting the Federal government's forces?

Mr. Taylor: I have not been on the Federal side with the observer team so I have no direct feeling on that, but from what I have read of their reports and from what I have read of my colleagues' accounts, who have travelled with them, at least in the areas where the observers are, that I think it stands to reason, they would have acted as a deterrent.

Mr. Anderson: So you would be in favor of increasing them regardless of whether they can only go to the Federal side?

Mr. Taylor: No, I did not say that and I do not think I would say that. I would first like to see a parity. Before we increase on one side I would like to have some equivalent mission on the other side.

Mr. Anderson: Right. Say that it is impossible to achieve the parity you suggest, do you nevertheless feel that more observers on the Nigerian side would act to inhibit atrocities committed by Nigerian troops?

Mr. Taylor: They might well indeed, but I do not see why it would be an impossibility. The Biafrans would accept this, as far as I know. They have said they would welcome almost anybody from Canada.

Mr. Anderson: True, but we might be faced with the possibility, Mr. Taylor, of the Nigerians refusing to allow observer teams to go there, if we send observer teams into Biafra. Faced with that situation, we want to know where the observer teams will do the most good.

Mr. Taylor: I would only accept that as a starting point for one of these situations where we have to bargain with the Nigerians just to see how much influence we do have, and how much we can hold over them in terms of the effects on world opinion if they take such a course, and that might be very

decisive. Then if that fails we have to decide where to go from there. I am not sure, but perhaps we underestimate our bargaining power with Lagos. I do not know, but perhaps we do.

Mr. Anderson: You have mentioned this, and I think it is an interesting point because I am beginning to have a feeling that perhaps there may be a breakdown in communication between our people in Lagos and Ottawa. We have heard too many witnesses here suggest that we are not getting the right story from Lagos and if they tried harder there they might be more effective. Do you know anything about our mission in Lagos which would indicate that they are not doing enough to influence the Nigerians.

Mr. Taylor: No, because I have not been in Lagos for 11 months. When I was there I had a very good impression of our people there, but I have no direct evidence on what they have been saying or doing recently.

Mr. Anderson: You suggested that what we should be attempting to achieve would be a military stalemate. Do you feel that the situation now is more or less a stalemate? The reason I ask that question is that there does not appear to have been much change in the front—as far as I can see—over the last few days, if not weeks.

● 2210

Mr. Taylor: Over the last two to three weeks we have had a different situation, as far as anybody can judge, which apparently relates to increased arms supplies reaching the Biafrans, I would not call it a stalemate except in the sense that possibly the total area involved is roughly the same. What you have had is Federal troops coming in and taking a town like Okigwi and then you have had, within a few days, the Biafrans pushing them out. You have had a similar fluid situation along the southern front. In that sense it is a stalemate.

Mr. Anderson: Let us say, for instance, the Biafrans acquired more arms. What sort of stalemate do you envisage would allow political development? Do you envisage double the territory they have now, triple or the whole of the Eastern region?

Mr. Taylor: They, of course, want the whole of the Eastern region. What I envisage is a different political and diplomatic situation that will arise if the Biafrans not only

just more or less hold their present lines, which are very fluid and shifting lines, but also shove back Federal troops in one or two key places and possibly retake one or two key towns. In that case, I would expect that some countries, including France, might reconsider their official diplomatic position. The Biafrans think this is the case and I suspect they may be right.

Mr. Anderson: Then you think that diplomatic recognition by a number of countries would be decisive in this war?

Mr. Taylor: Yes. Let me put it this way. I think the Biafran strategy is a combined political and military one which is any country's strategy in any war, and that is to push for a sort of military turn of the tide, as it were, which is sufficient to bring political and diplomatic rewards.

Mr. Anderson: Yes.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Taylor, we have been sitting for over two hours and I have only two questions which I hope will be brief. I do not want to appear to minimize in any way the importance of these deliberations which I believe represent the views and the sympathies of the Canadian people. Canada, of course, is a unique country, but are we unique? Are you aware of any other parliament—any other government—that is as concerned about Biafra as we appear to be?

Mr. Taylor: Yes, sir. I am not specifically aware of any other parliament that has a committee meeting as this one is, although that may exist, but certainly there is concern in terms of public opinion which presumably parliaments reflect in these countries and from what I read in almost all the western European countries—I have not visited them recently—there is tremendous ferment especially in Scandinavia and Switzerland. I am told this also exists in West Germany and to a considerable extent, in France. This is all hearsay evidence, but I believe it could be easily documented.

Mr. Hymmen: The reason I asked the question was to get back to the suggested motion that a Parliamentary committee from Canada visit the area. I am very much aware of the contribution of West Germany because in conversation with a very important Parliamentarian from West Germany I understand their contribution is in the neighbourhood of \$6 million. Is there more direct representation on behalf of the Scandinavian

countries, the West German Government and others in the area than we have? Part of our concern is that we are working through the International Red Cross and there is, let us say, no direct representation in the area.

• 2215

Mr. Taylor: Certainly not in Biafra. As I said, I believe that Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald were the first two Parliamentarians from any country; I may be wrong, but that is what the Biafrans told me.

Mr. Hymmen: Now, to get back to my question. I feel that if a group of Parliamentarians from Canada visit Biafra, I think some of the countries who are contributing a great deal more to the effort might resent this. Is this possible?

Mr. Taylor: I had not thought of that. I do not see necessarily why they should nor do I see why this necessarily need be entirely a Canadian initiative and why other parliaments could not be involved.

Mr. Hymmen: Now, to get to another line of questioning. Yesterday, I believe, the witness was asked the direct question of what aid would be required by December or January and you very nicely answered this one in your statement. Yesterday we were told that something like 200 tons per night was a minimum that was required and you have stated that this could be 3,000 tons per day or per night.

Mr. Taylor: That would be by December.

Mr. Hymmen: By December or January, yes.

Mr. Taylor: That is the estimate of one relief official. I would have to check my notes. I believe it was Dr. Middelkoop of the World Council of Churches, but I would have to check my notes on that. But definitely that figure is the figure I was given by a reliable authority.

Mr. Hymmen: But you also mentioned that in addition to the high protein food which is now being supplied bulk foods would be necessary.

Mr. Taylor: Yes, the 3,000 tons includes the bulk foods.

Mr. Hymmen: As a layman, bulk foods are wheat, cereals and flour. Is that correct?

Mr. Taylor: Yes, including rice and that sort of thing.

Mr. Hymmen: That is something that Canada could be supplying and loading a ship with right now.

The Vice-Chairman: For your information, Mr. Hymmen, there have been hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Africa in the United States. We have been furnished by the office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs with a copy of the record there. If any member wants it for inspection it will be left with the Clerk. That is the only other investigation that I know of at the moment.

Mr. Brewin: May I ask something on that point? Is it not true, Mr. Taylor, that the British House of Commons has had at least two or three debates on this subject—very protracted debates?

Mr. Taylor: I believe the House was to have reconvened yesterday or the day before—I have lost track of Britain—but they certainly have had debates, including the famous one in which George Thomson, sometime in June or July, made his statement on the arms supplies. The last time was the occasion when they reconvened—it had not happened since 1938 or 1939—during the summer recess in August to discuss the Czechoslovakian crisis. The next day, a Tuesday, they discussed the Nigerian-Biafran situation. There was a sort of turmoil on the floor when the whole thing was talked out without a vote and the Speaker imposed an end to the session, but a lot of people were on their feet demanding a vote which they assumed would go against the government on the question of arms supplies.

Mr. Lewis: Do you have any more questioners?

The Vice-Chairman: Two more questioners, Mr. Gibson and Mr. Howard.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Taylor, if we discard traditional diplomatic practices, as you suggest in dealing with this matter, is there not a grave danger of creating a situation somewhat similar to that which exists in Viet Nam?

Mr. Taylor: I fail to see the in between stages in that.

Mr. Gibson: A foreign power intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state.

Mr. Taylor: Oh, I think that is a very sweeping statement which can be applied in

all sorts of ways. I do not see any analogy except on a purely technical level between trying to intervene peacefully and diplomatically in all sorts of political ways to stop the war in Nigeria and the U.S. intervention in Viet Nam. However you justify it, whether you are for it or against it, it is a military involvement. I do not see any parallel at all.

Mr. Gibson: Did the Americans not start with observers and then did it not mushroom into a war on their part?

Mr. Taylor: Yes, that is true, but I just do not see any parallel between Nigeria and Viet Nam. Anyway, the Americans, for the record, would say that they are not interfering—that they have been invited there by the South Vietnamese Government. I do not accept that explanation, personally, but they would make that distinction.

The Vice-Chairman: Are you finished?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Mr. Chairman, as the hour is late I am sure you will be glad to hear that most of my questions have been cleared up by the discussion so far. I have one question, though, on which I would like to get some information. Biafra is a very small breakaway state. It is blockaded; it has its economy in ruins; it has never had a chance to build up any state treasury; I do not imagine they sell war bonds. Where does their money come from to wage this war, even if things are given to them in great quantities, that they are carrying on?

• 2220

Mr. Taylor: I do not know, but I would like to amplify a bit on your statement. I would assume they have stocks of money because they are buying arms and as far as one can tell they are buying them through commercial dealers in the normal way one goes about buying arms. Now, where does that money come from? Possibly from foreign governments; the government of France has been suggested as the obvious one. I do not know; I have no evidence of this.

They had some warning of this, you know. Trouble was building up; they took precautions in many forms. Possibly they made some arrangements, financial and otherwise, before the conflict started. This is an area of high speculation. I cannot speak about it with any authority. Your guess is just about as good as mine on this.

I would like to qualify one implication in what you said by stating that it is remarkable

29001—41

what they are doing within Biafra with very little resources. In other words, they are holding on often through ingenuity and improvisation. It is remarkable what they are doing with so very little in terms of obvious things like oil and cars and that sort of thing. They have a tremendous ability to improvise. They are maintaining a state with most of its normal functions but on a very minimum amount of revenue coming in to the government.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Fairweather?

Mr. Fairweather: Did you speak to the Canadian High Commission when you were last in Lagos about their prognosis about the war, if so, were they among the diplomats who led you to believe that it was almost over?

Mr. Taylor: Mr. Fairweather, I spoke to numerous diplomatic missions in Lagos including the Canadian High Commission. I am not evading the question but I will make two points. I could not at this stage, without consulting notes that I do not believe I have any longer after 11 months, differentiate between the off-the-record opinions I was given at various diplomatic missions, including the Canadian High Commission, in terms of normal briefings that they give to journalists.

My second point is that since these were confidential briefings—I realize this is a committee of the Canadian Parliament—I do not think it would be legitimate to reveal them even if I had a perfect memory.

Mr. Fairweather: Did any diplomat in Lagos indicate to you that a long war might result?

Mr. Taylor: In all fairness, as far as I can remember, some might have had qualifications and within any embassy or high commission you would detect differences as you would in any situation, normal or otherwise.

The over-all impression one got from talking to diplomats in Lagos at that time was that the war would be over if not in weeks, within months, but there were undoubtedly people who thought it was going to last longer than that, but that was the general impression one got at that time.

Mr. Fairweather: So did the world

The Vice-Chairman: Well, Mr. Taylor, I thank you on my own and the Committee's behalf for your very useful testimony and

particularly for your suggestions which I think will be found to be helpful. appreciation of everyone when I say, thank you.

Your past and your current experience have made your assistance to this Committee most valuable and I am sure I express the
Tomorrow our witness at 9.30 a.m. will be Mr. Stephen Lewis. Adjourned until 9.30 a.m.

Appendix K
CHAPTER IV. HUMAN RIGHTS¹

1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
*Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 9 December 1948²*

Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII.
Registration: 12 January 1951, No. 1021.
Text: United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 78, p. 277.

State	Signature	Ratification, accession (a), notification of suc- cession (d)	
Afghanistan		22 March	1956a
Albania		12 May	1955a
Algeria		31 October	1963a
Argentina		5 June	1956a
Australia ³	11 December 1948	8 July	1949
Austria		19 March	1958a
Belgium ⁴	12 December 1949	5 September	1951
Bolivia	11 December 1948		
Brazil	11 December 1948	15 April	1952
Bulgaria		21 July	1950a
Burma	30 December 1949	14 March	1956
Byelorussian SSR	16 December 1949	11 August	1954
Cambodia		14 October	1950a
Canada	28 November 1949	3 September	1952
Ceylon		12 October	1950a
Chile	11 December 1948	3 June	1953
China	20 July 1949	19 July	1951
Colombia	12 August 1949	27 October	1959
Congo (Democratic Republic of)		31 May	1962d
Costa Rica		14 October	1950a
Cuba	28 December 1949	4 March	1953
Czechoslovakia	28 December 1949	21 December	1950
Denmark	28 September 1949	15 June	1951
Dominican Republic	11 December 1948		
Ecuador	11 December 1948	21 December	1949
El Salvador	27 April 1949	28 September	1950
Ethiopia	11 December 1948	1 July	1949
Federal Republic of Germany ⁵		24 November	1954a
Finland		18 December	1959a
France	11 December 1948	14 October	1950
Ghana		24 December	1958a

¹ For other multilateral treaties concluded in the field of human rights, see chapters V, VII, XVI, XVII and XVIII.
² Resolution 260 (III), see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I* (A/810), p. 174.
³ In a notification made on accession, the Government of Australia extended the application of the Convention to all territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations Australia is responsible.
⁴ In a notification received by the Secretary-General on 13 March 1952, the Government of Belgium extended the application of the Convention to Belgian Congo and the Trust Territory of Ruanda Urundi.
⁵ In a note accompanying the instrument of accession, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the Convention would also apply to Land Berlin.

<i>State</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Ratification, accession (a), notification of suc- cession (d)</i>
Greece	29 December 1949	8 December 1954
Guatemala	22 June 1949	13 January 1950
Haiti	11 December 1948	14 October 1950
Honduras	22 April 1949	5 March 1952
Hungary		7 January 1952a
Iceland	14 May 1949	29 August 1949
India	29 November 1949	27 August 1959
Iran	8 December 1949	14 August 1956
Iraq		20 January 1959a
Israel	17 August 1949	9 March 1950
Italy		4 June 1952a
Jordan		3 April 1950a
Laos		8 December 1950a
Lebanon	30 December 1949	17 December 1953
Liberia	11 December 1948	9 June 1950
Mexico	14 December 1948	22 July 1952
Monaco		30 March 1950a
Mongolia		5 January 1967a
Morocco		24 January 1958a
Netherlands		20 June 1966a
New Zealand	25 November 1949	
Nicaragua		29 January 1952a
Norway	11 December 1948	22 July 1949
Pakistan	11 December 1948	12 October 1957
Panama	11 December 1948	11 January 1950
Paraguay	11 December 1948	
Peru	11 December 1948	24 February 1960
Philippines	11 December 1948	7 July 1950
Poland		14 November 1950a
Republic of Korea		14 October 1950a
Republic of Viet-Nam		11 August 1950a
Romania		2 November 1950a
Saudi Arabia		13 July 1950a
Sweden	30 December 1949	27 May 1952
Syria		25 June 1955a
Tunisia		29 November 1956a
Turkey		31 July 1950a
Ukrainian SSR	16 December 1949	15 November 1954
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	16 December 1949	3 May 1954
United Arab Republic	12 December 1948	8 February 1952
United States of America ...	11 December 1948	
Upper Volta		14 September 1965a
Uruguay	11 December 1948	11 July 1967
Venezuela		12 July 1960a
Yugoslavia	11 December 1948	29 August 1950
Jamaica		23 August 1968a
Spain		13 September 1968a

Declarations and Reservations^a

ALBANIA

As regards article IX: The People's Republic of Albania does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions of article IX which provides that disputes between the Contracting Parties with regard to the interpretation, application and implementation of the Convention shall be referred for examination to the International Court at the request of any party to the dispute. The People's Republic of Albania declares that, as regards the International Court's jurisdiction in respect of disputes concerning the interpretation, application and implementation of the Convention, the People's Republic of Albania will, as hitherto, maintain the position that in each particular case the agreement of all parties to the dispute is essential for the submission of any particular dispute to the International Court for decision.

^aFor objections by certain States to some of these reservations, see pages 61 and 62.

CANADA

TREATY SERIES, 1949

No. 27

CONVENTION
ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

Lake Success, December 9, 1948

Signed by Canada, November 28, 1949

RECUEIL DES TRAITÉS 1949

N° 27

CONVENTION
POUR LA
PRÉVENTION ET LA RÉPRESSION
DU CRIME DU GENOCIDE

Lake Success le 9 décembre 1948

Signée par le Canada le 28 novembre 1949

OTTAWA

1950

CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME
OF GENOCIDE

THE CONTRACTING PARTIES

HAVING CONSIDERED the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (1) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world;

RECOGNIZING that all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and

BEING CONVINCED that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,

HEREBY AGREE AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

ARTICLE II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

CONVENTION POUR LA PRÉVENTION
ET LA RÉPRESSION DU
CRIME DU GÉNOCIDE

LES PARTIES CONTRACTANTES

CONSIDÉRANT que l'Assemblée général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, par sa résolution 96 (1) en date du 11 décembre 1946, à déclaré que le génocide est un crime du droit des gens en contradiction avec l'esprit et les fins des Nations Unies et que le monde civilisé condamne;

RECONNAISSANT qu'à toutes les périodes de l'histoire le génocide a infligé de grandes pertes à l'humanité;

CONVAINCUES que, pour libérer l'humanité d'un fléau aussi odieux, la coopération internationale est nécessaire;

CONVIENNENT DE CE QUI SUIT:

ARTICLE PREMIER

Les Parties contractantes confirment que le génocide, qu'il soit commis en temps de paix ou en temps de guerre, est un crime du droit des gens, qu'elles s'engagent à prévenir et à punir.

ARTICLE II

Dans la présente Convention, le génocide s'entend de l'un quelconque des actes ci-après, commis dans l'intention de détruire, en tout ou en partie, une groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, comme tel:

- a) Meurtre de membres du groupe;
- b) Atteinte grave à l'intégrité physique ou mentale de membres du groupe;
- c) Soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d'existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

ARTICLE III

The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide;

(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;

(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;

(d) Attempt to commit genocide;

(e) Complicity in genocide.

ARTICLE IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

ARTICLE V

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

ARTICLE VI

Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

ARTICLE VII

Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

ARTICLE VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of

d) Mesures visant à entraver les naissances au sein du groupe;

e) Transfert forcé d'enfants du groupe à un autre groupe.

ARTICLE III

Seront punis les actes suivants:

a) Le génocide;

b) L'entente en vue de commettre le génocide;

c) L'incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide;

d) La tentative de génocide;

e) La complicité dans le génocide.

ARTICLE IV

Les personnes ayant commis le génocide ou l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l'article III seront punies, qu'elles sient des gouvernants, des fonctionnaires ou des particuliers.

ARTICLE V

Les Parties contractantes s'engagent à prendre, conformément à leurs constitutions respectives, les mesures législatives nécessaires pour assurer l'application des dispositions de la présente Convention et notamment à prévoir des sanctions pénales efficaces frappant les personnes coupables de génocide ou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l'article III.

ARTICLE VI

Les personnes accusées de génocide ou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l'article III seront traduites devant les tribunaux compétents de l'État sur le territoire duquel l'acte a été commis, ou devant la Cour criminelle internationale qui sera compétente à l'égard de celles des Parties contractantes qui en auront reconnu la juridiction.

ARTICLE VII

Le génocide et les autres actes énumérés à l'article III ne seront pas considérés comme des crimes politiques pour ce qui est de l'extradition.

Les parties contractantes s'engagent en pareil cas à accorder l'extradition conformément à leur législation et aux traités en vigueur.

ARTICLE VIII

Toute Partie contractante peut saisir les organes compétents des Nations Unies afin

genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

ARTICLE IX

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE X

The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.

ARTICLE XI

The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950 the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.

Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XII

Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

ARTICLE XIII

On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

que ceux-ci prennent, conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies, les mesures qu'ils jugent appropriées pour la prévention et la répression des actes de génocide ou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l'article III.

ARTICLE IX

Les différends entre les Parties contractantes relatifs à l'interprétation, l'application ou l'exécution de la présente Convention, y compris ceux relatifs à la responsabilité d'un État en matière de génocide ou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l'article III, seront soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d'une Partie au différend.

ARTICLE X

La présente Convention dont les textes anglais, chinois, espagnol, français et russe feront également foi, portera la date du 9 décembre 1948.

ARTICLE XI

La présente Convention sera ouverte jusqu'au 21 décembre 1949 à la signature au nom de tout Membre des Nations Unies et de tout État non membre à qui l'Assemblée générale aura adressé une invitation à cet effet.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratifications seront déposés auprès du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies.

A partir du 1^{er} janvier 1950, il pourra être adhéré à la présente Convention au nom de tout Membre des Nations Unies et de tout État non membre qui aura reçu l'invitation susmentionnée.

Les instruments d'adhésion seront déposés auprès du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies.

ARTICLE XII

Toute Partie contractante pourra, à tout moment, par notification adressée au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, étendre l'application de la présente Convention à tous les territoires ou à l'un quelconque des territoires dont elle dirige les relations extérieures.

ARTICLE XIII

Dès le jour où les vingt premiers instruments de ratification ou d'adhésion auront été déposés, le Secrétaire général en dressera procès-verbal. Il transmettra copies de ce procès-verbal à tous les États Membres des Nations Unies et aux non-membres visés par l'article XI.

The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

ARTICLE XIV

The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.

Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XV

If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

ARTICLE XVI

A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

ARTICLE XVII

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in article XI of the following:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XI;

(b) Notifications received in accordance with article XII;

(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with article XIII;

(d) Denunciations received in accordance with article XIV;

(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV;

La présente Convention entrera en vigueur le quatre-vingt-dixième jour qui suivra la date du dépôt du vingtième instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion.

Toute ratification ou adhésion ultérieurement à la dernière date prendra effet le quatre-vingt-dixième jour qui suivra le dépôt de l'instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion.

ARTICLE XIV

La présente Convention aura une durée de dix ans à partir de la date de son entrée en vigueur.

Elle restera par la suite en vigueur pour une période de cinq ans et ainsi de suite, vis-à-vis des Parties contractantes qui ne l'auront pas dénoncée six mois au moins avant l'expiration du terme.

La dénonciation se fera par notification écrite adressée au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies.

ARTICLE XV

Si, par suite de dénonciations, le nombre des Parties à la présente Convention se trouve ramené à moins de seize, la Convention cessera d'être en vigueur à partir de la date à laquelle la dernière de ces dénonciations prendra effet.

ARTICLE XVI

Une demande de révision de la présente Convention pourra être formulée en tout temps par toute Partie contractante, par voie de notification écrite adressée au Secrétaire général.

L'Assemblée générale statuera sur les mesures à prendre, s'il y a lieu, au sujet de cette demande.

ARTICLE XVII

Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies notifiera à tous les États Membres des Nations Unies et aux États non membres visés par l'article XI:

a) Les signatures, ratifications et adhésions reçues en application de l'article XI;

b) Les notifications reçues en application de l'article XII;

c) La date à laquelle la présente Convention entrera en vigueur, en application de l'article XIII;

d) Les dénonciations reçues en application de l'article XIV.

e) L'abrogation de la Convention, en application de l'article XV.

(f) Notifications received in accordance with article XVI.

ARTICLE XVIII

The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

ARTICLE XIX

The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

Here follow the names of the signatories for: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Liberia, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

f) Les notifications reçues en application de l'article XVI.

ARTICLE XVIII

L'original de la présente Convention sera déposé aux archives de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

Une copie certifiée conforme sera adressée à tous les États membres des Nations Unies et aux États non membres visés par l'article XI.

ARTICLE XIX

La présente Convention sera enregistrée par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies à la date de son entrée en vigueur.

Suivent les noms des signataires pour: l'Australie, la Bolivie, le Brésil, le Canada, le Chili, la Chine, la Colombie, le Danemark, la République Dominicaine, l'Equateur, l'Egypte, le Salvador, l'Ethiopie, la France, le Guatemala, Haiti, le Honduras, l'Islande, l'Israël, le Libéria, le Mexique, le Norvège, le Pakistan, le Panama, le Paraguay, le Pérou, la République des Philippines, les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Uruguay, la Yougoslavie.

Appendix L

TANZANIA HIGH COMMISSION
NEWS SERVICESTATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF
STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MR. C. Y. MGONJA

ON TANZANIA'S RECOGNITION
OF BIAFRA

SATURDAY APRIL 13, 1968

The declaration of Independence by Biafra on the 30th May, 1967 came after two military coups d'état—in January and July 1966—and two major pogroms against the Ibo people.

These pogroms, which also took place in 1966, resulted in the death of about 30,000 men, women, and children, and made two million people flee from their homes in other parts of Nigeria to the tribal homeland in Eastern Nigeria. These events had been interspersed and followed by official discussions about a new Constitution for Nigeria, and also by continued personal attacks on individual Ibos who had remained outside the Eastern Region.

The basic case for Biafra's secession from the Nigerian Federation is that people from the Eastern Region can no longer feel safe in other parts of the Federation. They are not accepted as citizens of Nigeria by the other citizens of Nigeria. Not only is it impossible for Ibos and people of related tribes to live in an assurance of personal safety if they work outside Biafra; it would also be impossible for any representative of these people to move freely and without fear in any other part of the Federation of Nigeria.

These fears are genuine and deep-seated; nor can anyone say they are groundless. The rights and wrongs of the original coup d'état, the rights and wrongs of the attitudes taken by different groups in the politics of pre and post coup Nigeria, are all irrelevant to the fear which Ibo people feel. And the peoples of Eastern Nigeria can point to too many bereaved homes, too many maimed people, for anyone to deny the reasonable grounds for their fears. It is these fears which are the root cause both for the secession and for the fanaticism with which the people of Eastern Nigeria have defended the country they declared to be independent.

Fears such as now exist among the Ibo peoples do not disappear because someone says they are unjustified, or says that the rest

of Nigeria does not want to exterminate the Ibos. Such words have even less effect when the speakers have made no attempt to bring the perpetrators of crimes to justice and when troops under the control of the Federal Nigerian Authorities continue to ill-treat, or allow others to ill-treat, any Ibos who come within their powers. The only way to remove the Easterners' fear is for the Nigerian authorities to accept its existence, to acknowledge the reason for it, and then to talk on terms of equality with those involved about the way forward.

When people have reason to be afraid you cannot reassure them through the barrel of a gun; your only hope is to talk as one man to another, or as one group to another. It is no use the Federal authorities demanding that the persecuted should come as a supplicant for mercy, by first renouncing their secession from the political unit. For the secession was declared because the Ibo people felt it to be their only defence against extermination. In their minds, therefore, a demand that they should renounce secession before talks are begun, is equivalent to a demand that they should announce their willingness to be exterminated. If they are wrong in this belief they have to be convinced. And they can only be convinced by talks leading to new institutional arrangements which take account of their fears.

The people of Biafra have announced their willingness to talk to the Nigerian authorities without any conditions. They cannot renounce their secession before talks, but they do not demand that Nigerians should recognize it; they ask for talks without conditions. But the Federal authorities have refused to talk except on the basis of Biafran surrender. And as the Biafrans believe they will be massacred if they surrender, the Federal authorities are really refusing to talk at all. For human beings do not voluntarily walk towards what they believe to be certain death.

The Federal Government argues that in demanding the renunciation of secession before talks, and indeed in its entire 'Police Action', it is defending the Territorial integrity of Nigeria. On this ground it argues also that it has a right to demand support from all other Governments, and especially other African Governments. For every State, and every State authority, has a duty to defend the sovereignty and integrity of its nation; this is a central part of the function of a National Government.

Africa accepts the validity of this point, for African States have more reason than most to fear the effects of disintegration. It is on these grounds that Africa has watched the massacre of tens of thousands of people, has watched millions being made into refugees, watched the employment of mercenaries by both sides in the current civil war, and has accepted repeated rebuffs of its offers to help by mediation or conciliation.

But for how long should this continue? Africa fought for freedom on the grounds of individual liberty and equality, and on the grounds that every people must have the right to determine for themselves the conditions under which they would be governed. We accepted the boundaries we inherited from colonialism, and within them we each worked out for ourselves the Constitutional and other arrangements which we felt to be appropriate to the most essential function of a State—that is the safeguarding of life and liberty for its inhabitants.

When the Federation of Nigeria became independent in 1960, the same policy was adopted by all its peoples. They accepted the Federal structure which had been established under the Colonial system, and declared their intention to work together. Indeed, the southern States of the Federation—which includes Biafra—delayed their own demands for independence until the North was ready to join them. At the insistence of the North also, the original suggestion of the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (the Political Party which had its centre in the South) that Nigeria should be broken up into many small States with a strong centre, was abandoned. The South accepted a structure which virtually allowed the more populous North to dominate the rest.

But the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria was broken in January 1966, by the first military coup. All hope of its resuscitation was removed by the second coup, and even more by the pogroms of September and October 1966. These events altered the whole basis of the society; after them it was impossible for political and economic relations between the different parts of the old Federation to be restored: They meant that Nigerian unity could only be salvaged from the wreck of inter-tribal violence and fear by a Constitution drawn up in the light of what had happened, and which was generally acceptable to all major elements of the society under the new circumstances. A completely new start had to be made, for the basis of the

State had been dissolved in the complete break-down of law and order, and the inter-tribal violence which existed.

The new necessity for a new start by agreement was accepted by a conference of military leaders from all parts of the Federation, in Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967. There is a certain difference of opinion about some of the things which were agreed at that Conference. But there is no dispute about the fact that everyone joined in a declaration renouncing the use of force as a means of settling the crisis in Nigeria. Nor does anyone dispute that it was agreed that a new Constitution was to be worked out by agreement, and that in the meantime there would be a repeal of all military decrees issued since January 1966 which reduced the powers of the Regions. There was also agreement about rehabilitation payments for those who had been forced to flee from their homes, and about members of the armed forces being stationed in their home Regions.

The Aburi Conference could have provided the new start which was necessary if the unity of Nigeria was to be maintained. But before the end of the same month, General Gowon was restating his commitment to the creation of new States, and his determination to oppose any form of Confederation. And on the last day of January, the Federal military authorities were already giving Administrative reasons for delay in the implementation of the agreements reached at Aburi. It was the middle of March before a Constitutional Decree was issued which was supposed to regularise the position in accordance with the decisions taken there. But unfortunately this decree also included a new clause—which had not been agreed—and which gave the Federal authorities a reserve power over the Regions, and thus completely nullified the whole operation. Nor had any payment been made by the Federal Government to back up the monetary commitment for rehabilitation which it had accepted in the Ghana meeting.

In short, the necessity for an arrangement which would take account of the fears created during 1966 was accepted at Aburi, and renounced thereafter by the Federal authorities. Yet they now claim to be defending the integrity of the country in which they failed to guarantee the most elementary safety of the twelve million peoples of Eastern Nigeria. These people had been massacred in other parts of Nigeria without the Federal authorities apparently having either the will or the power to protect them. When they retreated to

their tribal homeland they were expected to accept the domination of the same peoples who instigated, or allowed, their persecution in the country which they are being told is theirs—i.e. Nigeria.

Surely when a whole people is rejected by the majority of the State in which they live, they must have the right to life under a different kind of arrangement which does secure their existence. States are made to serve people; Governments are established to protect the citizens of a State against external enemies and internal wrong-doers. It is on these grounds that people surrender their rights and power of self-defence to the Government of the State in which they live. But when the machinery of the State, and the powers of the Government, are turned against a whole group of the society on the grounds of racial, tribal, or religious prejudice, then the victims have the right to take back the powers they have surrendered and to defend themselves.

For while people have a duty to defend the integrity of their State, and even to die in its defence, this duty stems from the fact that it is theirs, and that it is important to their wellbeing and to the future of their children. When the State ceases to stand for the honour, the protection and wellbeing of all its citizens, then it is no longer the instrument of those it has rejected. In such a case the people have the right to create another instrument for their protection—in other words, to create another State. This right cannot be abrogated by Constitutions, nor by outsiders. The basis of Statehood, and of unity can only be general acceptance by the participants. When more than twelve million people have become convinced that they are rejected and that there is no longer any basis for unity between them and other groups of people, then that unity has already ceased to exist. You cannot kill thousands of people, and keep killing more, in the name of unity. There is no unity between the dead and those who killed them; and there is no unity in slavery or domination.

Africa needs unity. We need unity over the whole continent, and in the meantime we need unity within the existing States of Africa. It is a tragedy when we experience a setback to our goal of unity. But the basis of our need for unity, and the reason for our desire for it, is the greater wellbeing, and the greater security, of the people of Africa. Unity by conquest is impossible. It is not practicable; and even if military might could force the acceptance of a particular authority,

the purposes of unity would have been destroyed. For the purpose of unity, its justification, is the service of all the peoples who are united together. The general consent of all the people involved is the only basis on which unity in Africa can be maintained or extended.

The fact that the Federation of Nigeria was created in 1960 with the consent of all the people does not alter that fact. That Federation, and that basis of consent, has since been destroyed. Nor is this the first time the world has seen a reduction in political unity. We have seen the creation of the Mali Federation, the creation of a union between Egypt and Syria, and the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. And we have also seen the dissolution of all these attempts at unity, and the consequent recognition of the separate Nations which were once involved. The world has also seen the creation of India and Pakistan out of what was once the Indian Empire. We have all recognised both these Nation States and done our best to help them deal with the millions of people made homeless by the conflict and division. None of these things mean that we have liked these examples of greater disunity. They mean that we recognise that in all these cases the people are unwilling to remain in one political unit.

Tanzania recognises Senegal, Mali, Egypt, Syria, Malawi, Zambia, Pakistan and India. What right have we to refuse, in the name of unity, to recognise the fact of Biafra? For years the people of that State struggled to maintain unity with the other peoples in the Federation of Nigeria; even after the pogroms of 1966 they tried to work out a new form of unity which would guarantee their safety; they have demonstrated by ten months of bitter fighting that they have decided upon a new political organization and are willing to defend it.

The world has taken it upon itself to utter many ill-informed criticisms of the Jews of Europe for going to their deaths without any concerted struggle. But out of sympathy for the sufferings of this people, and in recognition of the world's failure to take action at the appropriate time, the United Nations established the State of Israel in territory which had belonged to the Arabs for thousands of years. It was felt that only by establishment of a Jewish homeland, and a Jewish National State, could Jews be expected to live in the world under conditions of human security. Tanzania has recognised the State of Israel

and will continue to do so because of its belief that every people must have some place in the world where they are not liable to be rejected by their fellow citizens.

But the Biafrans have now suffered the same kind of rejection within their State that the Jews of Germany experienced. Fortunately they already had a homeland. They have retreated to it for their own protection, and for the same reason—after all other efforts had failed—they have declared it to be an independent State.

In the light of these circumstances, Tanzania feels obliged to recognize the setback to African unity which has occurred.

We therefore recognize the State of Biafra as an independent sovereign entity, and as a member of the Community of Nations. Only by this act of recognition can we remain true to our conviction that the purpose of society, and of all political organization, is the service of man.

APPENDIX M

ABURI REPORT

Meeting of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria held at Peduase Lodge, Aburi, Ghana, on the 4th and 5th of January, 1967.

FIRST DAY'S MEETING:

WEDNESDAY, 4th JANUARY, 1967

THE MEETING STARTED AT 1 P.M. NIGERIAN TIME

PRESENT: Lt.-Col Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government.

Col. R. A. Adebayo, Military Governor of Western Nigeria.

Lt. Col. C. Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria.

Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Military Governor of Mid-Western Nigeria.

Lt. Col. Hassan Usman Katsina, Military Governor of Northern Nigeria.

Commodore J. E. A. Wey, Commodore Commanding Nigerian Navy.

Major Mobolaji Johnson, Military Administrator of Lagos.

Malam Kam Selem, Inspector-General of Police, Nigeria.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Nigeria.

Lt.-Gen. J. A. Ankrah: Gentlemen, firstly I would like to welcome you all to Ghana on behalf of my Colleagues of the National Liberation Council, myself and the people of Ghana. It is a very great pleasure for me today to see that our brothers have consented to come to Ghana and to be with us to resolve most of their differences. I am only here with you as a brother Officer and I am only trying to address you today as a brother Officer.

Secondly I would like to thank each and everyone of you for agreeing to come because it would have been very difficult and it would be a greater problem if one of you refused to come and this meeting will never be on. Also, the willingness which you expressed when my letters came to you to come here is commendable.

BROTHERS

You are all aware of the situation which is facing both your country and our country. Nigeria and Ghana had been brothers all the years and as such it has really been difficult

for either Ghana to be alone or isolated or Nigeria to be isolated without Ghana. We have all been watching the interest of each other except for a very brief period when Nkrumah was on and could not bring up better understanding which had previously existed between the two countries. It is the utmost desire of everyone to see a very good unification in Nigeria as well as in Ghana.

We both have the same difficulties or troubles which can easily be resolved through patience, understanding and respect for each other.

I will not like to dwell rigidly on any point whatsoever because I feel this is a domestic affair of Nigeria and, as I have always said, it is not difficult for military people to understand each other. It is a saying that if Generals were to meet and discuss frontiers, wars or even go into the details to forestall war, there will never be any differences or discrepancies but unity and understanding.

There will be no war because the two old boys will meet at the frontier and tell each other—"Old boy, we are not going to commit our boys to die, come on let us keep the politicians out"—and that is the end. I am quite confident that having met here today, you will continue and achieve what you are here for.

What I want to stress is this, that through the annals of history we have not seen failures with military statesmen and when military personnel do take over the reins of Government they have proved their worth and, I am sure and confident that the military regimes that have been saddled with the onerous responsibility of rebuilding and reconstructing the various countries in Africa will not let us down.

STATESMEN

You are aware that in Nigeria now the whole world is looking up to you as military men and if there is any failure to reunify or even bring perfect understanding to Nigeria as a whole, you will find that the blame will rest with us all through the centuries. There is no gain saying this whatsoever.

Whatever the situation, we are soldiers, and soldiers are always statesmen not politicians. They deal with a little bit of politics and diplomacy when the time comes but they are statesmen.

The people first and they themselves second but if you think like the politicians do that they want fame or they want to be heard of and neglect your people then, of course I am quite sure that we as soldiers will live to regret, even our future generations will live to regret. They will be blaming us whenever our names are called or mentioned.

Here in Ghana we are saddled with many difficulties, financial and so forth. Fortunately in Nigeria your finances had not been disrupted and brought to rock bottom as we had, it is only as I termed it "few misunderstandings" between the various factions and this can easily be resolved.

Everyone of you takes things seriously but rely on each other, trust each other and co-operate to think that you are the architects who have got to build Nigeria with its vast population of over 56 million people.

Gentlemen, I am quite confident that the atmosphere with which you have agreed to come here and seeing the serenity around you, you will have the patience to determine the future of Nigeria. You will disagree on many things but disagree to agree and finally you will agree on the principles which will lead Nigeria to better heights. Nigeria's name has been in the limelight all through the years, and we do not expect that these few problems of Nigeria will soil the prestige which you have gained for so many years.

It is the wish of my colleagues in the Council, the people of Ghana, to implore you to request you to bury all the differences of the past the past is gone, things that one can feel probably sore at, the things that one can remember with torture in his heart should be left to flow into oblivion.

Let us look into the future because your population of 56 million within the next ten years may be 70 million.

With 20 million new issues who have joined, will there be a spirit of antagonism, a spirit of victimisation, a spirit which will allow one to look at the other with hatred? No. I am very optimistic about this and I am confident that with the help of God you will probably leave this place in oneness as one country, as one Government and one people.

PATIENCE

Gentlemen, I will not like to waste your time, I am expecting and we are hoping that it will not take you long at all and with patience you will be able to resolve any of the differences you have.

Please, I implore you to forget the past. You are on a round table and we always say a round table because we do not want "head" or "tail" There is no head or tail around here and we can feel when we finish from here that we shall have no cause whatsoever to regret.

Thank you, Gentlemen.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Shall we all say thank you together?

Thank you very much indeed.

Lt.-Col. J. A. Ankrah: Gentlemen, if you want us to excuse you we will be relaxing down there on that side and leave you to talk but remember that by two o'clock your bellies must be filled.

JOINT-CHAIRMEN

I will leave you entirely; we will be relaxing so that you can talk and air your views. This is purely domestic unless probably if you like I can still sit here but I will not talk.

I am sure no tempers will rise because I have put a lovely bowl of flowers here with God's grace in it. Satan has disappeared from the flowers leaving this place as clear as paradise for us.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Gentlemen, for this meeting we have no chairman, we are all joint-chairmen. Can we start on our agenda? Are there any comments on the agenda?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: If I can comment on the agenda. I can see there is an amendment to the main agenda, therefore, the agenda is completely acceptable to me.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Can we take the items one by one?

Gentlemen, there is one point I would very much like to bring up even before we go into any discussion. This point is a very simple one but would appear to have bedevilled every effort which we have been making sincerely to solve the various issues halting the orderly progress of our country. It do not think any useful purpose could be served by this meeting if we use this meeting as merely a cover for an arms build-up in our country. There have been allegations, there have been counter-allegations, we are not in any position to determine the authenticity of these allegations.

I have been accused of purchasing arms, I have accused the Federal Government of pur-

chasing arms. Prior to their departure in deed, a week before that departure I got into my hands complete documentation and documents of the Major Apollo deal outside the country in which he went out, perhaps not on the direct orders of the Federal Government but certainly, bearing documents from Lagos to purchase 2,045 rifles, 500 machine guns, to purchase 2000 rounds of 105 ammunition and many more others.

He got into some difficulty because a number of countries would not let him have them.

Finally in Italy he got a certain quantity, this quantity together with the purchases of arms and ammunition which officially, if I might say so, the Federal Government have been purchasing and not sharing out to the other regions.

Having got these he chartered six planes, I have the names of the pilots. I have the identification marks of the planes to take them to Kaduna.

And the money certainly £1 million of it was paid from Federal Government coffers to the Ambassador in Paris. Subsequent to the bank transfer, there were other transfers direct to the firms that supplied these weapons.

I know this will be denied and I am going to give everyone of you copies, the latest stage of all these documents but this is not the important fact. Indeed, I have in fact objected to the Ambassador of Italy. There is a chap too, the Alitalia representative in Lagos who went out with them on this trip and one Mr. Papadopoulos in Lagos who was also on that trip.

I contacted his embassy and told them what he had done and forwarded photostat copies of the transaction so that they can evaluate. Be it denied or not, the fact is that there is great danger in Nigeria today if we continue this sort of thing.

SUSPICION

Even the suspicion of it is bad for the country, so, I would seek the assurance from all of us here, particularly from all the regions, that they will publicly renounce the use of force for the settlement of the present crisis and it is most essential that this is done before we go into further discussion.

If we do agree then I would suggest that we agree on a resolution immediately on the use of force in the settlement of the Nigerian crisis and when we have done this then, certainly tension will be relaxed within this con-

ference hall and I think we can face the other issues with more equanimity.

I think that would require an answer.

Here I will be speaking from my personal knowledge of any arms deal as far as the Federal Military Government is concerned. I was Chief of Staff before my present appointment and as Chief of Staff I was dealing with purchase of arms and ammunition.

I knew that we had shortfalls of arms and ammunition generally and, in fact, orders were to have been placed for them before July 29. The orders were placed around March.

The shortage was so much that something had to be done and the General Staff Officer naturally asked me. He said there was shortage of arms and ammunition and with the present security threat in the country the ones we had would not last for long.

I was requested to authorise the purchase and the total expenditure was about £2 to £3 million. I had been dealing with financial matters and knew we had no money so I had to go through the list one by one in order just to get enough of what is required to meet up our short-falls all around.

As far as I know the orders were for about £ $\frac{3}{4}$ million, that is for some rifles, some m.g.s. and some rounds of ammunition.

Under normal circumstances I would not have sent for these things because our Defence Industries should have started production by now and these things we would have got from our own production.

Since this was not available I had to send for them from abroad and definitely this went under my authority, there is no question of denying this.

LETTER

I saw your letter about this only a few days ago. It came on New Year's day but I refused to read it on New Year's day—I said I would not spoil my New Year's day.

However, I did read it on the 2nd and I intended to give you a reply as far as this was concerned. I wish I had given you a reply on this one before now but definitely this is the answer as far as the question of arms and ammunition is concerned.

If this is in connection with the letter you sent to me, this is the answer to it.

Apollo did go because, as you probably know, they went around June, Apollo,

Minakachi, Haruna and one other person. They went out to Europe to visit various arms and ammunition factories in order to look for some of these things before we purchase them.

They went out and they came back in August. Sule Appolo was in fact the one who knew the contract and he was with me and I said "Right you can go on the Federal Military Government authority in order to get some of these things for us."

As far as the purchase of arms and ammunition is concerned this is correct but I do not know about the figures you have just given.

The other day you accused me of purchasing arms to the tune of about £8 million. When I saw this I said to myself—"Goodness gracious, here is an ex-Q.M.G. who knows every thing about this thing saying we are spending £8 million on arms". This was definitely an error.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: On whose part?

Lt-Col. Gowon: It is all right but when you got the information you did not check with me. I knew I signed a cheque for £80,000; this was about April as Chief of Staff as payment for the arms and ammunition we bought.

Our Defence Budget is nowhere near £8 million; we were only able to get £1 million released for all contingencies as far as the Military is concerned. These arms did arrive and the honest truth about their going to Kaduna is this.

As you know yourself, you normally authorise a lot of these things, every year so many thousands of pounds of ammunition are dumped into the sea because of lack of proper storage facilities. This is what everyone of us knows.

In order to safeguard this sort of thing there is a new Ordnance Depot built in Kaduna which has got all the modern facilities for maintenance of these things and so these things were sent there in order to safeguard this sort of wastage.

Prior to this one there was definitely a move to do something of the sort in Kaduna. It was because of this one that this thing had to be done this way. I do not think there is any secrecy about this. It arrived only about two weeks ago and they have not been taken out of their crates yet.

On the question of the sharing of military stores to the Regions you know how they are normally issued. They are taken on charge

and of course, they will be issued as and when required. You are an expert on this.

ARMS PLANE

There is another consideration as far as the question of distribution is concerned. If you say nothing has been sent to the East, you yourself know that the East has certainly been accused several times of arms deal. One has got reports of arms coming into the East aircrafts crashing at the border and from all indications it was destined for the East.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: I thought we said there would be no accusations of this nature. It is, of course an accusation because this question has never been resolved. The pilot said he was going to Kano, Kaduna and perhaps he will be going to Enugu and Port Harcourt.

Lt-Col. Usman: The Cameroon Government is solving that problem, they will find out.

Lt-Col. Gowon: I am not accusing anybody. You brought the question of arms and ammunition and I thought this should also come out. For that reason the situation was really tense throughout the country. There is no doubt about this.

Even if you have arms and weapons in the East, I can assure you, you will only have more rifles in your hands and before you know what is happening the situation would have got out of hand and I do not think the people of the East would be better off for it.

The whole country would be worse off. This is the situation and I think we should not start losing tempers on this one.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: I have not lost any temper.

Lt-Col. Gowon: I have only made an allegation. I did not say this is what you have done. Whether you agree to it or not, this is the honest truth and it is not for any back-hand business. As far as I am concerned, they are for the whole army, the units in Enugu are part of the Nigerian Army this is part of their arms and if the situation is absolutely normal, everybody would share out of this purchase.

Before I go to the other major point you made about all Regions renouncing the use of force, I think Hassan has something to say. Now watch it, no accusations.

RESOLUTION

Lt-Col. Usman: I am not going to accuse anybody. I am going right to the bottom of

his suggestion. He raised this point so that we can agree on a resolution. As you have already pointed out, these weapons will be divided accordingly by the Army and we can send our representatives to decide on what to do with them.

We have always accused each other of having so many arms. The other day a radio station announced that Hassan was training about 10 million people in Zaria. We better forget all these and make this resolution and it will be binding on all sides.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: May I make a suggested Resolution, therefore. Gentlemen?

Lt-Col. Ejoor: I will not go back into the pros and cons of what you have said. In making the Resolution we would like to know how many weapons are being held by each individual unit in the army?

Lt-Col. Usman: We cannot say this now.

Lt-Col. Ejoor: This will be included in the Resolution and we Governors would like to know how many weapons are being held by each individual unit within the Regions, and that would be made available to everyone of us and we will know how many new ones have arrived.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: I have a suggested Resolution which we can start on unless somebody objects seriously to it.

It reads—We the Members of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria meeting at Accra on the 4th of January, 1967, hereby solemnly and unequivocally:

1. Declare that we renounce the use of force as a means of settling the present crisis in Nigeria, and hold ourselves in honour bound by this declaration.

2. Re-affirm our faith in discussions and negotiations as the only peaceful way of resolving the Nigerian crisis.

This probably would be open to question.

3. Direct that a copy of this declaration be deposited with the Secretariat of the Organisation of African Unity.

Col. Adebayo: I wholeheartedly agree with your 1 and 2. For the reason I gave when we met privately and since we all know that this is a Nigerian affair, I think we must delete the third one. We have got honour which we must hold ourselves as senior military personnel and since we are responsible for the affairs of Nigeria today we should abide by 1

and 2 of the Resolution and delete the third one.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: If we are all agreed on 1 and 2 in deleting the third as you suggested I would make a counter proposal that we write the full substance of this Resolution into our communique.

Lt. Col. Gowon: I was about to point out that the question of renouncing the use of force is a very important point which must definitely come out in our communique. We shall discuss the problem fully when we come to discuss the communique.

Col. Adebayo: The third point we might add to the Resolution is that every weapon available in Nigeria should be officially declared.

Lt. Col. Ejoor: Officially declared and made available to all the Governments.

USE OF FORCE

Lt. Col. Gowon: The question of renouncing the use force: I think we have individually included this in our statements from time to time and I think this is the sort of thing a lot of people in Nigeria would like to hear. If we all agree not to resolve our problems by force it would have been a different story by now in Nigeria.

I quite agree that the question of renouncing force should be put in the resolution.

As I said, it is for us to make the thing work, the United Nations has a lot of Resolutions on the use of force but we all know the number of wars we have had after the Resolutions.

Lt.-Col. Usman: We must all see that this Resolution is implemented because we can all say we are renouncing the use of force and when we get back we change our minds. It is our responsibility as Governors to see that there is no more use of force in Nigeria.

Col. Adebayo: I think we are all agreed on that now.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Can we go to the next point?

Lt.-Col. Usman: I think we have forgotten something—that a Committee of Army Officers should go round with the Q.M.G. and see to this matter of arms and ammunition.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Nobody from my area can go to certain parts to look.

Lt.-Col. Usman: The Army Headquarters in Lagos can work it out and distribute copies to the Governors.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I do not think it requires going round. Of course, we know what will happen, the only ones you will not be able to account for are the smuggled ones.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: There is another point which perhaps whilst we are talking about this we might agree on. The situation in the country is such that any importation of arms which would not be equitably distributed does not help the solution of the crisis. So that whilst we are here we must determine that no more importations until we resolve the issues.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Supposing we get an invasion from outer-space?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Our friends the Ghanaians will save us.

Lt.-Gen. Ankrah: We will be too glad to send you the whole of the Ghana Armed Forces.

ARMS RACE

Col. Adebayo: One thing we might add here but it does not necessarily have to go into the communique because of rumours and counter rumours in every region that arms are being built up in each area. I think we should agree here to set up possibly a small Committee to go round the units to see the ammunitions and weapons in each area.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: This is what Hassan suggested which I said would bring us into difficulty because it is quite plain that none of my Army Officers would go to the North. They would even find it very difficult to go to Lagos.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Shall I do it for both of you?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It would help but our chaps would find it very difficult to believe him.

Commodore Wey: Gentlemen, I would like to say that now that we have met we should have confidence in each other if anyone is dishonest the truth will come out. I hope you know that preparing the list is a security risk and whoever receives it should be very careful.

Col. Adebayo: We will not go into detail.

3. REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NIGERIA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO—(a) Organisation of the Nigerian Army, (b) Implementation of the agreement reached on 9th August, in regard to the disposition of Army personnel.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think all of us have at one time or the other discussed the situation in the country with regard to the re-organisation of the Army. With reference to 3 (b)—the implementation of the agreement reached on 9th August—this is on the disposition of Army personnel that they should go back to their region of origin.

This recommendation was made by the Ad Hoc Committee which consisted of Secretaries to the Military Governors, advisers and representatives of Regional Governors. They did not have any mandate to decide anything other than to come and express their feelings and make recommendations.

Their recommendations, of course would be considered by the Regional Governors. I think the recommendation says:

"It was accordingly agreed that as far as possible the army personnel should be posted to barracks in their Regions of origin with immediate effect as an interim measure. Having regard to its peculiar position, the question of maintenance of peace and security in Lagos should be left with the Supreme Commander in consultation with the Military Governors".

This question of movement of troops to their Region of origin arose from the fact that at the time there was so much misunderstanding, so much clash and killings between troops of Northern origin and troops of Eastern origin.

I discussed this on the telephone with Emeka and I told him that—"Honestly, my consideration is to save the lives of these boys and the only way to do it is to remove the troops back to barracks in their Region of origin."

CLASHES

Emeka also told me that there were a number of threats to his life and any moment the troops in Enugu of Northern origin could mutiny and his life and the lives of the people of Eastern Nigeria would be in danger.

I agreed with him and said the best thing we could do was to send them back to their Region of origin and some of the boys were already escaping from their units. We agreed to repatriate all troops of Northern origin

from the East and those of Eastern origin particularly Ibo speaking from the other major units because the clashes were severest within the major units.

As far as I was concerned I did not think the problem was in other units because the feeling at that time was that it was the Northern versus Eastern boys as a result of some things that had happened in the past which had been with us for a long time.

If you remember, Emeka, you said something about the boys in the services returning and I agreed to this reluctantly but as far as the major units were concerned, I thought that was necessary.

If we can mix up a little now this will certainly be a good basis for future coming together. If we separate totally we will sort of probably get further and further apart and each Region may have an independent Army.

I think I have said enough as far as the review of the current situation with reference to the organisation of the Army is concerned and the implementation of the agreement of 9th August.

I think we can now discuss this point and later on come to some sort of agreement on the subject.

Col. Adebayo: I think I better come in now because I am the one who is really hit at the moment. I know we told our advisers or our officials to meet in Lagos in August on the request of the Supreme Commander.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I think we better—

Major Johnson: Sir, before we go on if I may say something. I am happy we have got to this point again. I had wanted to take this Conference back all along because as my people say—"If you still have lice in your head there will still be blood on your fingers."

May I ask one question? Gentlemen, is there a Central Government in Nigeria today?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: That question is such a simple one and any one who has been listening to what I have been saying all the time would know that I do not see a Central Government in Nigeria today.

Major Johnson: Thank you, gentlemen, I think this is the crux of the whole thing and I think if I can take you back this can be a personality clash or something.

I am saying here today that this is the backbone of our problem. As far as the Governor of the East is concerned there is no central government in Nigeria. You say,

Supreme Commander, but as far as he is concerned there is no Supreme Commander.

I think this is where we must start from, gentlemen. Why is he not accepting that there is a Supreme Commander and we accept that there is a Supreme Commander.

This brings me to this conference that was held in August. As was rightly said, this committee was a Steering Committee. We are all Military personnel here and we know one thing.

We have all been pointing accusing fingers at politicians that they used to take military decisions without military men.

PERSONALITY

The main problem now is that as far as the East is concerned, there is no Central Government. Why? This is what we must find out. I mentioned something about personality clash. I remember that there was a long letter written by the Governor of the East sometime ago referring to the hierarchy in the Army, the policy on seniority and things like that.

He said among other things in the letter that if even Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon is Supreme Commander is he not right to ask whether it is for a period or something.

For all the East knows the former Supreme Commander is only missing and until such a time that they know his whereabouts they do not know any other Supreme Commander. These are the points that have been brought out by the East.

Gentlemen, we said this morning that we have come with open minds and we must hit the nail at the head: The East should tell us now what are their views, what are the conditions they want to demand before they can say that there is a Central Government in Nigeria.

For all we know now, nobody has seceded, the East is still part of Nigeria, the West, the North and we know Nigeria as a Federation.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: The Midwest please.

Major Johnson: And Lagos, Nigeria is still a Federation and in a Federation there is a Central Government. Where is this Central Government and who is Head of this Central Government.

Gentlemen unless we clear this one all what we are discussing will not be good enough. What are the conditions the East demand before they can recognize what the rest of us recognizes as the Central Government.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I agree with you in essence on what you have just said Bolaji but the last bit is badly put. If you will forgive me its not—"What conditions do they demand before..."

BACKGROUND STORY

If the problem is that we are trying to see how to solve the problem of Government in the centre then I will come in. I will seek your indulgence as I go a little bit back into what a number of people would perhaps wish to call history.

At a certain stage, we all accepted General Ironsi as the Supreme Commander and Head of the National Military Government. During his regime we met or rather whilst he was about we met as often as it was practicable and sat and jointly discussed and took decisions.

When the decisions were good we all shared the kudos. When those decisions were bad it is only natural that we should all share the blame.

On the 29th of July, whilst he was visiting the Governor of the West he was said to be besieged in that residence in Ibadan and later kidnapped, further abducted.

Subsequent to that it appeared in his absence the normal thing was whoever is the next senior person to manage the affairs of this country until such a time as he reappeared; or it was necessary he was deposed or if he had suffered certain accident, until such a time as the circumstances were made known.

Whichever is the case, the question of the headship of the Government and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces would normally be subjected to a discussion and agreement unless, of course, one party felt he was strong enough to push everybody aside and get to the seat.

When this affair of the 29th July occurred, I remember for certain, the first 24 hours, nobody thought it necessary to contact the East from Lagos. I made contact later and I know the advice I gave Brigadier Ogundipe at that time, I said to him, "Sir, the situation is so confused that I feel that somebody must take control immediately.

Also, I would suggest that you go on to the air and tell the country what has happened and that you were taking control of the situation." Then I was told about concern for the whole country.

I knew that if this thing resolved itself into factions we would get ourselves into so much trouble that we would never or we would find it difficult to get out.

I maintained and still do that the answer would have been for the responsible officers of the Army to get together thereby trying to get the Army together to solve the problem that we had on our hands.

I said to him—"As soon as you have made your speech I guarantee you within 30 minutes, I needed time to write my own, in 30 minutes I would come on to the air in the East and say that I, the entire Army in the East and the entire people in the East wholeheartedly support you."

Forgive me, David, that I have never said this to you, but I told him too that I was sure that within fifteen minutes you would say the same in the interest of the country as a whole.

He told me that he thought it was a good idea but it did not seem likely that it would be accepted by the faction.

OBJECTIONS

Very soon after, I had occasion to talk to you, Jack, I did mention amongst other things, two things. The first one was this question of solving the problem and I thought the Army together should solve it.

I said also that any break at this time from our normal line would write in something into the Nigerian Army which is bigger than all of us and that thing is discipline.

How can you ride above people's heads and sit in Lagos purely because you are at the Head of a group who have their fingers poised on the trigger.

If you do it you remain forever a living example of that indiscipline which we want to get rid of because tomorrow a Corporal will think because he has his finger on the trigger he could just take over the company from the Major commander, of the company and so on.

I knew then that we were heading for something terrible. Despite that and by force of circumstance as we did talk on the telephone, I think twice, you brought up the question of supreme command and I made quite plain my objections, but despite those objections you announced yourself as the Supreme Commander.

Now, Supreme Commander by virtue of the fact that you head or that you are acceptable

to people who had mutinied against their Commander, kidnapped him and taken him away.

By virtue of the support of Officers and men who had in the dead of night murdered their brother officers, by virtue of the fact that you stood at the head of a group who had turned their brother officers from the Eastern Region out of the barracks which they shared.

Our people came home, there are other circumstances which even make the return more tragic.

Immediately after I had opportunity to speak to you again, I said on that occasion that there had been too much killing in Nigeria and it was my sincere hope that we can stop these killings.

RECOGNITION

I said then, and have continued to say that in the interest of peace I would co-operate with you to stop the fighting, to stop the killing but I would not recognise.

I would not recognise because as I said we have a Supreme Commander who is missing. I would not recognise and to underline the validity of that claim of mine you appointed another Officer, be he senior to you, Acting Governor in the West presumably acting for the Governor who was then abducted and that I saw no reason why your position would not then be acting.

From there I think we started parting our ways because it was clear that the hold on Lagos was by force of conquest.

Now, these things do happen in the world, we are all military Officers. If an Officer is dead—Oh! he was a fine soldier—we drop the national flag on him, we give him due honours and that is all. The next person steps in.

So, the actual fact in itself is a small thing with military men but hierarchy, order is very important, discipline are *sine qua non* for any organisation which prides itself for being called an Army.

So, the mutiny had occurred, the mutineers seemed in control of the North, the West, Lagos.

By international standards when that does happen then a *de facto* situation is created immediately where whoever is in a position get a *de facto* recognition of himself in a position over the area he controls.

In this situation, Nigeria resolved itself into three areas—the Lagos, West and North

group, the Mid-West, the East. What should have been done is for us to get round to discuss the future, how to carry on in the absence of our Supreme Commander.

We could not get together because of the situation so we sent our accredited representatives, delegates of Governments and personal representatives of Governors to Lagos to try and resolve certain issues on bringing normalcy to the country. They met and unanimously agreed on certain points.

Bolaji, I think in fact from this, if nothing else you do know what I consider went wrong. Perhaps at this juncture I might stop for others to contribute otherwise I would go on and tell you what I consider to be my solution to the problem even now, irrespective of the amount of water that had gone under the bridge.

I think there is still a solution provided we are honest with ourselves and we are really very serious about solving this problem.

I agree with you it is vital, it is crucial without it I do not think we can really go anywhere.

I leave it for the time being.

Col. Adebayo: I think Emeka has narrated what happened on the 29th July and thereafter. We have all agreed and I am sure you still agree that what we are looking for now is a solution for the future. I do not want us to go into the past anymore, we want a solution for the future.

I will suggest with the permission of the other members here that we ask Emeka to give us his solution. Thereafter there might be some others too who would have their own solution, then we can make a compromise from the solutions we get.

PEACE

Lt. Col. Hassan: Gentlemen, General Ankrah told us not to go back into the past if we are able to go back into the past we will sit here for two months talking. Let us forget the past and I agree with Robert that we ask the East to tell us their solution.

If their solution is quite acceptable then we adopt it, amend or whatever we think is good for the country for peace.

We are not going to say ourselves what efforts we have put in individually, let us find peace for Nigeria. This is the major issue unless this is done whatever we are going to discuss is not going to work out well.

Lt. Col. Ejoor: I believe that before we start suggesting solutions we must examine certain principles vis-à-vis the Governors. To me, we should not go too far into history but there is one valid point which must be considered and that is the coups we have had so far.

MAIN POINT

The January 15 one was a failure and the Army came in to correct it, the one of the 29th I personally believe was a mutiny to start with but it has now turned out to be a coup. If it is a coup we have to ask ourselves—is it a successful coup or is it a partial one?

I believe it is a partial one, it is not a fully successful one. This is the main point which has brought us here, trying to negotiate as opposed to receiving orders from the Commander.

I think we must bear this in mind in reaching a decision or a Resolution affecting the re-organization of the Army. Today, the Army is faced with four main problems.

Firstly, the problem of leadership;

Secondly the crisis of confidence amongst Officers and amongst the soldiers;

Thirdly, the chain of command is badly disrupted and

Fourthly, we can not now have any Nigerian from anywhere serving in the same unit as an effective unit of the Army.

These are bare facts and whatever solution we evolve must go to solve these main problems.

I leave these basic principles and what solutions offered should be considered alongside these problems.

Lt. Col. Hassan: David spoke on re-organization but the current topic is on Bolaji's point which Emeka narrated. I think this is the major point.

Lt. Col. Ejoor: When you consider leadership you have to tell us what happened to the former leader.

Commodore Way: Gentlemen, I think I have been properly placed in this issue from the 15th of January up till now. Unfortunately, I do not put them down because I think I can carry quite a bit in my head.

The whole issue is unfortunate, it has happened and it has happened. The truth now is that we want to repair, we do not intend to point accusing fingers at anybody.

When the trouble of the 29th July started I was present, you came in and joined us, therefore, I can tell any other person better. I was there when you phoned Brigadier Ogundipe and I knew what you said. At one stage, it was even said that I carried him in my ship and took him out to sea.

I must say one thing that it is impossible for any man to expect to command any unit which he has not got control over. Bolaji would bear witness, he was there. He started it. He was the one who went out first and came back to say that a private refused to take orders from him; it all happened in the Police Headquarters.

CONTROL

The Inspector-General complained. I went into it and I said if they cannot take orders from an Army Officer like themselves they will not take from a Naval Officer. I retired and called Brigadier Ogundipe.

He went out and if an ordinary Sergeant can tell a Brigadier—"I do not take orders from you, until my Captain comes," I think this was the limit and this is the truth about it.

Therefore, it would have been very unfair to Ogundipe or any other person for that matter to take command and there is no point accepting to command a unit over which you have no control.

It was after that negotiations started I do not know what conversation went on between Ogundipe and Jack. On the long run I was consulted and what I have just said now was exactly my advice.

Bob was with me, I went out and we did not finish until two o'clock in the morning.

Jack then came into the issue, how he got there I have got the story; he himself has never told me I have been doing private investigations myself. I knew how he got into Ikeja and how it came about.

I want to repeat that if we did not have the opportunity of having Jack to accept God knows we would have been all finished. If you remember you dragged me out things changed. I do not think people can appreciate the difficulty we were in therefore if any body accepted to lead them candidly, I doff my hat for him. I accept it purely from the point of respect.

If 55 million people can be saved let us forget everything about position and for God's sake because of our 55 million people

let us forget our personal pride. Whether it was a coup of a mutiny let us forget it. If this man comes out and everybody accepts him please let us accept him.

One thing I would like to repeat I am a sailor and I want to remain a sailor. I do not see why you soldiers should not remain soldiers. We were not trained to be politicians, let us run the Government draw up a Constitution hand-over to the politicians and we get back into our uniforms.

FEELINGS

Whatever people may say. I think I will take this advantage to tell you here that when all of you were appointed Governors I was one of those who sat and appointed you Governors but right does not come into this at all; please let us forget personal feelings. I know my rank but if it is the wish of the 55 million people please let us put our hearts into our pockets and forget our personal pride.

Personally, I am 100 per cent in support that we should mention the whereabouts of Ironsi even I have advised on this. When that has been done, he is a Head of State and he should be given the proper honour; thereafter who-so-ever is in the Chair now let us help him to run the country peacefully, no more bloodshed we have shed enough.

We cannot create, why should we destroy.

If we can help to save please let us do so but we must say the whereabouts of Ironsi. He is a Head of State and we should give him his due respect as a Head of State.

It is temporary issue, four, five years maybe I would have retired by then.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: It is all well and good. Gentlemen, but I will be vehement on this. The point is that if a room is dirty you do not sweep the dirt under the carpet because whenever you raise the carpet the dirt will be there.

It is not so simple as all that. Indeed, on the very principle that you have enunciated here, it is a question of command and control. I like to know who will stand up here and tell me that he commands and controls the Eastern Army or the Army in the East.

Lt. Col. Hassan: You alone.

Commodore Wey: I can tell you also here now that you are doing it illegally because when we had the first Government no Govern-

nor was supposed to have the command of any Army.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: You have started on the basis of the principles of command and control. If you control a group who will take orders from you according to you, everybody doffs his hat well done. Right, that person you doff your hat to cannot command and control those under him and indeed those of the East. What do you do to that?

Commodore Wey: That is why we are here.

Lt. Col. Hassan: This is why we are here to solve the problem. You command the East. If you want to come into Nigeria come into Nigeria and that is that.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: I am not out.

MUTINY

Lt. Col. Hassan: This is the problem but if we are to go into the basis of coup and mutiny we will be here for months. I have seen an Army mutiny in Kano and if you see me trembling you will know what a mutiny is.

You were the first I rang and for two good days I saw a real mutiny when a C.O. of Northern origin commanding soldiers of Northern origin had to run away.

Please, we have all come not to raise issues of the past, let us forget the past and come to the problem. Say what you want to say, let us go into the matter and discuss it.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Before we ask Emeka to give a solution will it not be advisable that somebody should say what happened to Ironsi?

Major Johnson: I support him fully.

Alhaji Kam Selem: If I may say just a few words, I am not a military man, but at that time it was just impossible for anybody else to take command of the country. As far as I know even the present Supreme Commander had to be persuaded to take over the Government.

RE-ORGANISATION

The senior officers you are talking about could not possibly accept the leadership of the country at that time. What could we do in a situation like that and the country was kept for 48 hours and nobody knew what was happening.

As far as I know he has no ambition to remain in this present post.

As soon as the situation in the country returns to normal and the problems are solved he will resign.

I associate myself with all the Governors who said we should give the present Supreme Commander the respect he deserves. I was present through the whole trouble from January 15 and most of the things took place in my office.

As other speakers said, if the Governor of the East has a solution let us hear the solution.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Beore we hear the solution we want to know what happened to Ironsi and Fajuyi.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: If a public statement is required I am prepared to make one now. I have never been afraid to make a public statement anywhere.

Left to me it would have been announced the day I knew about it and immediately I took the people that should know into confidence. I have explained this to my colleagues in absolute sincerity and honesty.

ANNOUNCEMENT

I had wanted to make the announcement before this meeting but unfortunately I was unable to do so. In any case, I want to make this announcement very shortly, and if you require it now I will say it. If you wish I can give the information in confidence and we can work on that.

Alhaji Kam Selem: I think the statement should be made in Nigeria so that the necessary honour can be given.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: This was what happened after the January coup. We agreed to announce the names of all the Senior Officers killed but there was fear all over. Let us combine the whole story ready, do the whole thing respectively and solve the problem.

Commodore Wey: Gentlemen I would like to suggest this. I do not think there is anybody sitting on this table who would say that until today he did not know about the situation. In short it is a public statement that is required and now we are going to have it in the scribe's book. We know the position and an announcement will be made as soon as we get back home.

DETERMINATION

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this question of announcement and as you have all diagnosed a

lot depends on the public statement. The longer it is kept everything would remain uncertain, so that it is necessary to determine here how we are going to make this announcement. When?

Col. Adebayo: The best thing is to tell us here now what happened to Ironsi then when we get home and we issue our communique, we can make the public statement.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: There is a Head of State and at the moment we are all assuming something serious or tragic has happened to him. He is a Head of State we cannot just sit down here and discuss it. As I said, it is my responsibility to make the announcement in due course and I will make it in due course.

I have already made up my mind that this would be done within the next week or two.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I am not trying to be difficult on the issue but perhaps you will agree that this issue affects the area I am governing more than any other area.

Is it in due course that the announcement is going to be made I would respectfully suggest that a statement would be in due course. Let us decide, if we want the Secretaries to move out they can move out. If we want everybody out, let them go out for five minutes, the microphones can be taken away or we can move down there.

Gentlemen, even the circumstances mean quite a lot; we can move away from this table have a quick chat and come back to continue.

Commodore Wey: I support that.

Sitting suspended: 2.40 p.m. Nigerian time.

Sitting resumed: 3.05 p.m. Nigerian time.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think we can now go to the question of the organisation of the Nigerian Army. There was a Committee that was set up in August or September to think on the re-organisation of the Nigerian Army and I think they produced a paper which we sent to all Military Governors to comment upon and from that we will work out the question of re-organisation.

This is something on a nation's security and I think we should be very careful about it. This is the truth about defence in the world today.

FEAR

If I can say something about my idea for the re-organisation of the Army. I will be

very brief. I think that the Nigerian Army today probably would not be able to remain exactly as it was before January 15 or July 29.

There has been so much fear generated between ourselves as a result of events since the beginning of 1966 that there is something to be said towards the modification of the present stand. There are two extremes on this.

One sort of saying that we remain exactly as we were before January 15 and the other which says we go completely on Regional basis. I think those are the two extremes.

In the middle of course you have got the possibility of having an Army predominantly people of that Region in their Region.

PHILOSOPHY

If I can express my own view or if you like you can call it my philosophy. As far as the Nigerian Army is concerned we cannot get everybody to where he was before January 15 or July 29. If we want to go to the other extreme of having Regional Armies we are trying to have the beginning of the arms race which is what we are trying to do away with.

These Regional Armies will turn into private armies and before we know what we are doing we will start having internal troubles within the private armies and, of course, the whole country will be in flames.

My thinking is that I do not feel that the basis of trust and confidence has been completely broken, it has been disrupted, it has been shaken but with little mixing and mingling we have got between people. I am quite convinced that it would form the basis of probably a more realistic mixing together in the future.

If every Region wants to go its own way and think one day we will meet again, I feel that it may not work properly.

The other day when I was explaining this case of the Advisers to the Military Governors in Lagos they were saying that we should have it the way they have Regimentation on the British Army. They spoke with authority on Regimentation until I told them that in the British Army they started as private armies.

For example the Bolderers and such Regiments we know how they all started. When they have a Standing Army they are all brought together under one command. When such a situation continued for economic reasons they had to sort of reduce the Army and decided to amalgamate.

You all know the problem they had. Some Officers felt very strongly about this but I told them, "Not in my life, I would rather resign."

We were brought up as a family for over 100 years and I think we have grown up as that, although, unfortunately, during the last year that basis was badly shaken and it continued in July, August and September.

PRIVATE ARMIES

It is my strong feeling that in our case it would be probably wrong for us to start going back to this stage where a lot of people started and then build up into one.

We should try to keep up whatever we have with realistic modifications where necessary but keep the Army's oneness as much as possible otherwise, what would happen is that we would start having private armies; we would have prisons and we start going through the division of the country.

Once you get into position, you can say—All right, I do not want to join you any more—and anybody can start the arms race which we have agreed earlier on that we must certainly do everything to stop.

This is in a broad outline the way I have been thinking and I think I have argued it with all my Colleagues. Any member who wants to say something is at liberty to do so but we have got to remember that we still have about 8 items, some of which are not on the Agenda. Either we say this should be left for further discussion later or we talk about it now.

Lt. Col. Hassan: I think we had a report on this but you said the East was not represented on the Committee and the report should be sent to the Governors for further comments. Can we say we discuss this later?

Col. Adebayo: There are two ways to the Army problem. One is the immediate problem and the other one is the long term re-organisation. The immediate re-organisation is what we have to decide here the long term re-organisation is the Working paper given to us when we met in Lagos and we said all Regional Governors should comment on that paper.

On immediate re-organisation one would like to see first of all proper command and control. Secondly, we all agreed that most of the soldiers in each Region should come from that Region.

The East and the Mid-West are lucky they have all their people there unfortunately in the West. I have not got enough Westerners in the place and the people in the West are very afraid now because a lot of their own people were killed during January, July and August.

I have tried to clear the fear from them but still they insist on having more Yorubas than they have at the moment. I know there are not enough Yorubas in the Army and those who are there are mostly tradesmen.

WEST PROBLEM

I do not want to disrupt other units, but from what I said when we last met in Lagos, we can find an immediate solution to the Yoruba problem. That is, try and continue on the normal quota basis which we started in Zaria and as a crash programme we should use Abeokuta area as a crash programme training centre for Westerners, for Mid-Westerners who cannot go to Zaria and possibly for the Easterners who cannot go to Zaria at the moment.

I still feel very strongly about this. This is the only way to clear the problem of the Yorubas and this is the only way we can get the confidence of the people of the West because they feel they are the only people now being helped because there are not enough Yorubas in the Army.

POLITICS

The moment we can clear this side and we get command and control properly established, I do not think there will be any more problem. That is the immediate re-organisation which I would like now but the long term one is on the paper given to us by the Committee which was appointed. It is a very good paper and I am still commenting on it.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: I am in a rather confused situation right now. We started off talking about a Government. We reached a point and we said until we know what happened to the Supreme Commander we could not go on with the question of a suggested solution to the present impasse in government.

We came back, very well, thanks to our host and we now turn to the problem of the Army.

May I respectfully submit that the Army problem no matter what we like to say about it is mixed up very closely with the political problem, the question of Government.

It depends really on what form of Government you have for you to decide what sort of Army should serve that Government. If you do it otherwise it becomes putting the cart before the horse or in military terms ass before teeth.

So I would like us to go back to the question of Government.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: On this point I think you can go on straight to the suggestion you promised.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On the question of Government I had said how difficult it was for the East to accept what has now been considered a *de facto* situation in Lagos.

If our interest is to put that right then I beg leave for us to look perhaps at our host country. They have found out workable solution certainly to all intents and purposes it appears to work.

Our whole problem as we have said does not resolve itself on personalities if it did, our own result is that it should not be a question of personalities, so I think it is a question of powers.

As I said here, I represent as you know 14 million people who have been treated very shabbily and would find it extremely difficult or indeed impossible to be very close with them in the future. I think therefore that we might consider since this is indeed an Armed Forces thing or a Military thing that we have a Council like they have here and decide on a Chairman and decide on what powers to give to that Chairman and what limitations to impose on his initiative and actions.

REGIONAL POWERS

In so doing, we must take full cognisance of the fact that there are regions and full cognisance of certain autonomy which those Regions have. More cognisance of the past events and the suspicion of those entities.

If we do this the pattern that will emerge is a Council composed almost as we are today. Then, we find a Chairman and certainly limit the powers so that he cannot do things affecting the Regions without the concurrence of the Regions.

I think that the powers of the Regions which had been whittled down in a genuine attempt to build up unity, and this attempt for which so much has happened which you all know, I will not go into gory details.

I think immediately those powers should be vested back in the Regions. That is a whole

list of items which should have been repealed with Decree No. 34 as suggested in one of the meetings. If this could be done with the limitations to the powers of the Chairman I think we would have gone a long way to reducing tension and finding a *modus vivendi* until we can make more permanent arrangements.

Commodore Wey: From what you have said I think there is a very good point in this that as Decree No. 34 has been repealed then we look into the whole thing and say—these other items should go with the Decree.

As for the creation of the Council, candidly I do not see what is wrong with our present Supreme Military Council which is exactly what we have been doing all along. It is only unfortunate that it was not possible for us to meet before this time and I think that this Council is competent enough.

In the past, Governors come in, we discuss these things generally, take decisions and they are implemented. Once you consult the Supreme Military Council and you are given the okay you can go and start with an Edict and then the Decree comes.

It is only unfortunate but perhaps after this meeting we will meet regularly say about twice a month.

This Council has been working well, I do not think there is any problem.

CENTRALISATION

Lt. Col. Gowon: I personally think Decree 34 is worth looking into. I agree that the Supreme Military Council should sit on this. I think even in one of my addresses I said I would do away with any Decree that certainly tended to go towards too much centralisation and if you feel strongly about this, very good, they can be looked into. I think we will resurrect this one when we go back home and take decisions on them.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: We will not discuss the details but I am anxious that we find solutions. Whatever we do here we set a time for because there has been so much going on.

What I am bringing up at this meeting are the things which generate the sort of suspicion we are trying very hard to avoid. If we can set a time limit, I would be agreeable that all the parts of Decrees and Decrees that assume over centralisation will be repealed.

Commodore Wey: Will be looked into, suppose it is a good one?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Centralisation is a word that stinks in Nigeria today. For that 10,000 people have been killed.

Commodore Wey: I am sure you do not know the number, you imagine it is 10,000.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I do not imagine it is 10,000. Maybe there are people in the country who do not know but in the East we know exactly who has died and who has not.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: We are not going back on the question of Government. I think we better make it clear what form of Government because up till now Emeka has been saying he does not recognise the Federal Government of Nigeria. This is the main point.

Let us make it clear, is the East agreeing to the present Federal Government?

If not what is the East thinking should be the form of Federal Government?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I have said that a Government by a Council run perhaps the same as we have today with a Chairman with limited powers and we limit the powers here.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: We cannot limit the powers here because we have to go through all the Decrees.

THE QUESTION

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: There are certain things we can do now. I suggest matters affecting Regions should not be taken unilaterally outside without the concurrence of the Regional Government.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: This has been going on.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: No, it has not.

Lt. Col. Gowon: I suggest you give one example.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The last Decree that I found in the pages of newspapers, was it referred to me and you wrote in it—"This has effect all over the Federation."

Lt. Col. Gowon: Are you not part of the Federation?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: All I say is that I must be consulted before that sort of thing that is likely to affect the East—

Lt.-Col. Hassan: How many times during the last year did you pass anything even through the Council in Lagos?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: That is precisely what causes our trouble and this is precisely what we are trying to avoid for the future.

Major Johnson: He did it, it is assumed he knew it was wrong.

REVIEW

Col. Adebayo: I do not think we should flog this thing too much I think quite rightly a lot of powers of the Regions have been taken from them by centralising most of them this was by some of the Decrees made by Lagos before July 29. I think this must be looked into the Decrees repealed and the powers must go back to the Regions.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Why not use the word reviewed. We can hold a meeting when we get back home and review these Decrees.

Col. Adebayo: Can we then say that all our Solicitors-General get together and discuss these Decrees?

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Let us go through the points we know, we know we had a Federation before January 15, the powers go back to the Regions and from there we try to put things right. All this talk about review, review and for the next six months they will not be reviewed.

Commodore Wey: As far as I am concerned this Government is known as the Military Government and all the Decrees produced so far were produced by the Army therefore, let us not blame ourselves, let us look into the Decrees and find the ones we can send back. You were in the Council when we made these Decrees.

Alhaji Kam Selem: I think the point he made is good but it is not a matter for us to decide. We have to look into these things. Let the Solicitors-General meet, bring their lists and put up recommendations.

DATE

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: The "legal boys" have looked into it and said—repeal. If some "legal boys" in some regions refuse to work it is not my fault. These are the things that cause a lot of trouble.

Col. Adebayo: Let us give them a date when they should meet.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: We know all the Decrees passed from Ironsi up to the present date. Any new thing in it has been pointed out and it is a question of taking them up.

Commodore Wey: It is agreed but let the "legal boys" who drew these things up look into it.

Major Johnson: That is the exercise they are going to conduct now, to take them up. The "legal boys" are going to take them up and we are going to repeal them but they must be taken up first.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Give a date.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Why not say a week from now the "legal boys" will meet at a certain place and review the Decrees affecting the Regions.

EXPERTS

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: They must be repealed a week after that meeting otherwise we are just prolonging this.

Mr. J. W. K. Harlley: Gentlemen, if I can give you the benefit of our experience here. Sometime ago when we decided that certain issues should be investigated by our experts, they dilly-dallied about it and it took them a long time. In the next one we gave them an ultimatum that they should do it within seven days and it worked.

Lt. Gen. Ankrah: The principle should be agreed upon. To repeal an Act or a Decree definitely needs referring it back to the "boys". Give them a time limit and say we want these things done within a week or a fortnight and we want results.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Review and resultant repeal within two weeks.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Shall we say they meet at Benin?

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: The Governors should go back and tell their men to meet at Benin on a certain date.

Lt. Col. Hassan: The Ministry of Justice in Lagos—

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: He will give the instruction in Lagos and I will give the instruction in Enugu.

Lt. Col. Hassan: Lagos is the one to say let us meet at such and such a date.

Col. Adebayo: We are giving them instruction from this meeting.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: It is not Lagos. This is the crucial point about this Government.

Lt. Col. Hassan: Let us take this question honestly, the East has not recognised the Federal Government. I think you better secede and let the three of us join together.

Lt. Gen. Ankrah: There is no question of secession when you come here.

Col. Adebayo: What he is saying is that let this meeting decide on the date they are meeting somewhere and when we get back home we will tell our Solicitors-General that they are meeting at such and such a date.

Major Johnson: We can take a date here but I see what Lt.-Col. Hassan is getting at. Usually anything you do in a Federal Government instructions come from the nerve centre and that nerve centre for all we know is Lagos. It is Lagos that will tell the Regions—you send your Solicitors-General to meet at Benin at so and so date.

CHAIRMAN

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Your explanation has succeeded in confusing it even more. The nerve centre of our Government is the Supreme Military Council. May I suggest, therefore gentlemen, that the Solicitors-General meet on Saturday, the 7th for us to have a decision promulgated by the 14th.

Lt. Col. Gowon: These things should come back to us for consideration, you may be visiting the Kkalagu Cement Factory.

Col. Adebayo: Let them meet on the 14th if they meet on the 14th we can meet on the 24th to consider their report.

On the second part of your statement about having a Chairman as they have here, I would not like us to go back again.

Personally I feel we have a duty to the people, we should forget about ourselves at the moment. We must put behind our minds that we are all soldiers and we are all likely to go back to the Army after this. All we need now is to find a solution to the problem of Nigeria and that solution must be a sincere one.

Personally I think the present set-up should continue. I accepted to be a Governor because I wanted to serve my people and will continue to serve my people until we go back to the barracks.

May I say right now that after this job I will go back to the Army. So if we all think that way and we think that we are really serving our people let us support Jack Gowon and let him continue as the Supreme Commander.

Let us forget our own personal prestige. I have forgotten my own personal prestige for

the moment but I will revive it when I go back to the barracks.

We are serving our people and the people are waiting anxiously for what we are going to do for them.

As was explained by Commodore Wey and the Inspector-General, the situation on the 29th July or thereafter was so bad that Ogundipe was not in any position to take over the same thing with me. I could not take over anything because the situation was very confused and we knew what was happening.

NORMALCY

We knew that if either Ogundipe or myself were to take over none of us could have lasted 24 hours. Since Jack Gowon took over he has done his best as far as I know, at least he has kept us together a bit.

Now that we are all anxious to bring normalcy to the country we should support him wholeheartedly and forget about our ranks until such a time that we return to our normal work.

I know the Ghana system is working well; if we had started with that system from the beginning it would have been a different thing.

There is nothing wrong with our own system, only the timing is bad, it will be bad if we change it now and I think we must make our own organisation workable.

I will sincerely appeal to everyone of you here that you should copy a little bit of example from me and Commodore Wey with all due respect and let us support Jack and let us find a solution to the problems of our country.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: I have to come in again. I do not agree with 90 per cent of what you have just said. I have used the analogy of sweeping dirt under the carpet. I again used the question of the ostrich posture burying our heads in the sand and hoping everything is all right. The fact remains that in the year 1966 Nigeria has gone through a turmoil and as Jack himself said, the basis for real unity in this—

GOVERNMENT

Lt. Col. Gowon: Unitary system of Government, please not the question of unity.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: You made an important and realistic declaration in which you said—

“Our difficulties in the past have been how to agree on the form which such an associa-

tion should take and the task of my Government, meaning yours is to provide facilities for the widest and fullest consultations at all levels of all vital matters of national interest before a decision is taken.

"In the past we have been too presumptuous and have acted on such presumptions. Too often we presume that we know what the people desired.

"In one or two cases hasty decisions were taken without sufficient consultation."

Based on that and knowing what has gone, therefore any government set up now in Nigeria that does not take into cognisance Regional loyalties is complete eyewash. The Federal Government or support of Gowon or support of anybody, or of Emeka, whatever it is, is neither here nor there.

What we want is that certain things were wrong what are they let us put them right.

When I said Chairman, you can call him Chairman and still call him Governor. The fact still remains, it is really a nomenclature on functions and this is the crux of the matter.

On the basis on which he assumed the position in Lagos, it is not possible for the East to accept blindly the leadership from Lagos. For this we have fought, we have struggled for in the past few years.

For this the East will continue to struggle and fight if necessary, but thank God we have said there will be no force.

TRAP

Lt.-Col. Gowon: You can thank God but your attitude is what will say.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: The point I am making is that this Council of ours whoever we decide should sit on the Chair would have limited functions and only act with our agreement. This was what caused the last downfall.

We all know it, there were so many times that we quarrelled about this, argued about this, a number of things went down and not fully understood elsewhere. Afterall, we were all there when Decree No. 34 was made.

The point was, amongst the Governors and Senior Officers, we knew, and we saw it and left it. The people did not; they felt it and reacted so we are told.

If we are not going to fall into that trap again let us here agree that whoever sits on the Chair can only act after consultation and his action would, of course, be limited by our own agreement.

Lt. Col. Gowon: It is 5 o'clock Nigerian time and it is certainly time for us to be thinking about when we should leave.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Can I suggest that the Secretaries go out now and try to draft a communique whilst we continue on what we have agreed?

Alhaji Kam Selem: Unfortunately one of the most important points about a Government has not been resolved.

Lt. Col. Gowon: As far as I see it, his point is that he does not recognise any Government until such a time that an announcement is made on the whereabouts of the former Supreme Commander is told to the nation. Am I right?

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: That is one point we have cleared outside here, what we are trying to talk about now is the form of Government that the country should continue with.

Lt-Col. Gowon: I think that is the question we should talk about first next time. Honestly, we have got a number of points we have to discuss and time is against us. Can we say until our next meeting?

Alhaji Kam Selem: If this question is not resolved and the Governor of the East does not change his attitude, we go back and the same kind of thing continues to go on and people will say this our meeting is a failure.

Col. Adebayo: I will rather suggest that we all take his point and think about it because I was not looking forward to it before I came here and that we should meet within the next fortnight and discuss the matter again.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: This creates difficulties, how do we meet, where do we meet?

Alhaji Akilu: If I may come in, Sir, if we want to keep this meeting secret there is no point in leaving it until a fortnight because the people will know today that we held a meeting in Accra. Why not do it tomorrow?

Lt. Gen. Ankrah: Gentlemen, this is one of the most important and crucial points which must be decided and if you say you are going and thinking about meeting in a fortnight's time you will be dragging your feet all the same. There are very many implications to be considered in what you are saying.

We had it very easy forming our own National Liberation Council of which in fact I am Chairman Mr. Harley is the Vice-Chair-

man. Simply because we have one Government and not a Federation.

Secondly, we all live in Accra and, therefore, it is not like yourself where one is living in Kaduna, one at Ibadan, Enugu, Benin and Lagos. You have not a Parliament as such or even a Constituent Assembly or any of those things which in fact will be carrying out the Executive Functions until the Supreme Council meets or before you meet again as Council with a Chairman or any leader amongst you.

That requires serious thought at the moment.

REMARKS

What you have now is a Supreme Military Council dealing with the affairs of the whole country and this will entail some point where the dissemination of orders or instructions should be as you have got it in Lagos.

If you want to consider other points in relation to where it will be, how you will meet and how you can form up the new Council and things, I feel that you must go and have a rest, sleep over it, think very clearly over it, the place is open and we are ready if you want to meet for a week.

We will send you up and down as quickly as we possibly can until you resolve it. This is very important and once you get over this hurdle I am quite sure the whole point will be clear.

If you like it is 5 p.m. Nigerian time and 4 p.m. Ghana time, we can take you back and tomorrow we make it that you arrive early, we should be too glad to wait for you and bring you up here again tomorrow morning to carry on and finish up with it.

In this instance, I am happy that you may even have a little bit of time to consult and confer with your people but as I said, you are soldiers not politicians and do not listen to the politicians.

The affair of the whole of Nigeria is on your heads and in your hands and not in the hands of the politicians, they will push you as they have often pushed us here and when the time comes they will see you go into the battle alone and lose your own head and your life.

If you agree, we can adjourn, the aircraft will take you there, wait there and come back tomorrow morning.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: I will get here, Lagos should get here earlier.

Lt. Col. Gowon: The important thing is for the meeting to take place and it has started.

A COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED ON THE DAY'S MEETING.

Lt. Col. Gowon: The meeting is adjourned until 10 a.m. Nigerian time tomorrow morning.

The meeting adjourned at 5.05 p.m. Nigerian time.

Meeting of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria held at Peduase Lodge, Aburi, Ghana, on the 4th and 5th of January, 1967.

SECOND DAY'S MEETING:

THURSDAY, 5th JANUARY, 1967

THE MEETING STARTED AT 11 A.M. NIGERIAN TIME.

PRESENT: Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

Col. R. A. Adebayo, Military Governor of Western Nigeria.

Lt. Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria.

Lt.-Col. David Ejoor, Military Governor of Mid-Western Nigeria.

Lt. Col. Hassan Usman Katsina, Military Governor of Northern Nigeria.

Commodore J. E. A. Wey, Commodore Commanding Nigerian Navy.

Major Mobolaji Johnson, Military Administrator of Lagos.

Alhaji Kam Selem, Inspector-General of Police, Nigeria.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare Deputy Inspector-General of Police Nigeria.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Gentlemen, welcome back again. When we left yesterday Emeka you were talking and I think you better continue this morning.

NONE RECOGNITION

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Yesterday we talked partly about the re-organisation of the Army and partly about the Government, the form of Government arising from the fact of my non-recognition of a Central Government in Nigeria.

I am not absolutely certain where we should start today in view of those two points although on the agenda which I see we should really be on Item 3(a) which is the Organisation of the Nigerian Army. When we

were on that point I think it was David who enunciated four or five principles and that was cut short and we transferred to the political problems. I think perhaps it might be a good starting point today if we can have a re-enunciation of the principles and see whether we can, in fact, follow the agenda as it stands so that we can really get the skates on and get something completed.

Col. Adebayo: I think you yourself said that we should discuss Government and you made the preamble of your speech about the Government yesterday. I think it would be proper if you continue on the Government and set it out before we go to the Army.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: Let us discuss the form of association we are going to have.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The question of Government, Gentlemen. It would be entirely unrealistic not to take into full cognisance what has happened in the country. There was a mutiny in the Army on January 15. Army leaders from all parts of the country got together halted it and set up a Government. Until May there was a massacre which the Army leaders in their entirety regretted. Based on the good faith generated by the realistic way in which the Army or the Armed Forces tackled the problem, it was possible for populations to continue to go back to their areas of domicile and continue living side by side with one and other.

Come July there was another mutiny in the Army as a result of which Jack assumed the title Supreme Commander. This title certainly is contrary to my own views as a member of the Supreme Military Council. Subsequent to that date slowly Easterners were being attacked in Lagos in the North, piecemeal, murdered in cold blood and this bedevilled in a way all efforts at co-operation in order to put an end to this and try and sort out our differences. By September the molestations and the killings of Easterners had assumed such large proportions that Easterners everywhere outside the East lost complete faith in a Federal Government that could not offer the basic need to their citizen that is to offer the citizen protection. The citizens from the East therefore, sought that protection within their ethnic groups in the East. Contrary to sentiments and all advice everybody thought the East was going to revenge.

CIVIL WAR

I will say this here because it is no boast that but for my own personality in the crisis

the East would have thrown itself completely into a revenge. I halted it because I foresaw that anybody that started an inter-tribal civil war would never be able to control it. I was absolutely certain that one we get into civil war it would take us at least 25 years to sort out.

Contrary to all expectation I sent our delegates from the East to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference. During this, contrary to what should have been indeed the Military Government's way of doing things, I think a genuine mistake, politicians found themselves for the first time in the forefront of national discussions and, as usual instead of facing the problem before them, sought to gain personal triumphs and advantage. The East at the conference was not doing very well the molestations continued, the gory details I will spare you.

Three weeks after the meeting started they decided to adjourn and sort out what agreements they had reached unanimously. Whilst the delegates were still in Lagos in the North broke out a systematic annihilation of the people of the East resident in the North in which so many thousands were killed. The details of this again if I went into it would cause so much controversy and would delay the proceedings here but suffice it to say that this last pogrom was such that physically drove all Easterners out of the North. The effect of this was that Easterners elsewhere other than the East became completely unsure of their safety outside and began in their groves to come back to the East so that today over and above the normal 14 million people you have in the East an increase of 1.5 million refugees super-imposed on the economy of the East by forces which were entirely not of their own creation and certainly beyond their control.

POSITION

So we find ourselves in a position where there has been a mass population movement, the basis of oneness, therefore, was destroyed and I submit to this meeting that people from the East today, no matter what promises we make here indeed no matter what results we make here, the people of the East will not go back to any part of Northern Nigeria.

In the South it has been slightly different, people were afraid, indeed in some places they were molested. These people perhaps based on certain agreements would feel safe enough to go back to areas of the south. In the course of this, because of the vehemence

with which we noticed these people coming back had on people not easily identifiable with the certain measures were taken in the East.

These measures were of course bound to be misunderstood, by their very nature they were bound to be misunderstood. I asked people not of Eastern origin to leave the East to avoid bloodshed in the East. I knew what security forces I had and I knew that once a large scale rioting broke out in the East it would be extremely difficult for me to control and rather than face that I decided to prevent the source of such necessity. We have the first point on and that is that there has been a population movement which we must take into cognisance. Secondly in the Army our Officers and men serving elsewhere in the country had been killed, again in cold blood promises made for their safety were not kept. Instances abound where they were given assurance, based on the assurance they took in good faith they moved to their work and got mowed down by machine gun fire. They did try to stay but it became quite impossible for them to stay other than to stay in their graves there.

These men came back, again there is nothing new in history; it is possible I suppose to find a solution, but in finding the solution we must recognise the fact that here it is not a matter of warfare where you fight today, some politicians make an agreement and then you become peaceful and embrace each other the next day. No! The essential difference in this is that here, or rather in war your enemy is essentially a faceless enemy. You do not know him, he is not Jack, he is not John, he is not Bill. He is the enemy, faceless. When that happens and you settle, then your enemy, of course, seizes to be anybody, it is just that terminology—enemy goes—you can then move in and become friends as individuals.

SITUATION

In this case unfortunately, Gentlemen, Officers and men of Eastern Nigeria origin who had moved from other parts of the country know the names, the faces of individuals who perpetrated these atrocities. Mention a name we know who killed him, mention one-body we know who at least hounded him out of his barracks. So, Gentlemen for as long as that situation exists men from Eastern Nigeria would find it utterly impossible to stay in the same barracks, feed in the same mess, fight from the same trenches as men in the

Army from Northern Nigeria, they would find this impossible because we know it.

My policy has been that of ensuring the prevention of further killing. If we do not take cognisance of all these and we put our men together and mix up we write in Gentlemen, vendetta into our armed Forces and once it becomes vendetta it becomes extremely difficult for us to solve because they will stay by force in the same barracks but each Commanding Officer will never be sure when his day will come. You wake up in the morning, you go round the barracks where you will find four or five dead bodies, nobody will know nobody will be able to say who killed them and this will continue on and on.

For these basic reasons, separation of the forces the separation of the population, I, in all sincerity, in order to avoid further friction and further killing, do submit that the only realistic form of Government today until tempers can cool is such that will move people slightly apart and a Government that controls the various entities through people of their areas. It is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move closer and perish in the collision. Therefore, I say no single one person today in Nigeria can command the entire loyalty of the people of Nigeria. People can command loyalties of various groups and therefore, to save the suspicion, to enable us settle down, it is essential that whatever form of Government we have in the centre must be limited and controlled by a consensus which we all agree. It is easier for people at the top to be reasonable, it is a different thing for people lower down and it is that that makes me say that Nigeria wide content should be at the highest possible level until such a time as tempers have cooled and tensions have come down. This is the basic principle, if we are agreeable on it then we go into the matters of detail.

PRINCIPLES

Lt.-Col. Hassan: I do agree basically with the principles that have been mentioned by Emeka, but starting from May, I think in his statement and in what you mentioned earlier, we that are here today know what we have done and we know what we have been doing to console and to stop the killings of the people of the East.

On the other side, you may not know that all of us here on this table have done so much also, risking our lives and, as you mentioned, the whole thing is at the lower level. If you know how much it is at the lower level and

how much we have tried to console the people to stop all these movements and mass killings, you will give me and others a medal tonight.

However, I do agree that at the moment the confidence at the lower level has to be restored and it will take time to get confidence because it is a known fact that the confidence now both in the East and in the North is not yet there. We have tried our best to see that the ordinary man in the street understands the difficulties as already mentioned by Emeka that may face the country, a complete civil war. However we have done our best and we will continue to do our best but all the same I agree that whatever form of association we are to discuss has to be at the top; to make me believe that tomorrow a Northern soldier will stay in the same barracks within the next few months with an Eastern soldier, the confidence is just not there. With the civilians I would agree because there are so many that have written to us we have so many from the East who still want to come back but I cannot really say to them—it is true, go and reside in such and such a place—because if he comes back and something happens to him I will have the feeling that it is my responsibility to save the life of that individual and I told him to come back and he has been killed.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: The Easterner who wanted to come back to the North I tried actively to stop because I know the Easterner. I know what he is going to do when he goes back to the North and I would be grateful if you discourage him.

RESPONSIBILITY

Lt. Col. Hassan: I encouraged some and discouraged some because I feel it is my responsibility. This was what made me face the mutiny in Kano, soldiers were ready to shoot me but all the same it is my responsibility to save lives and I did it. However, I feel that on the civilian side we can do it gradually but at the Army level that will give us great difficulty. I feel we should concentrate now on the form of association we want at the higher level not promises that an Eastern soldier and a Northern soldier can mix together tomorrow, the chances of their mixing together is about 35 per cent but not up to 45 per cent yet I think that the form of Government that we should have should be discussed at the higher level and then we can try within our territories to bring confidence back gradually.

We may say that the confidence is there but right at the bottom it is not there and I am sure Robert will agree. Even right now we have divisions within the Regions in the North, the West, the Mid-West, even in the East the Rivers people want to go. Therefore we better try to keep the big groups together at the moment and gradually we start mixing together.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I do not think I will recount the details which have been mentioned but the salient point which we want to consider is that since there is no one person that has absolute control of the Armed Forces it is now difficult for us to accept one authority and I think this is the main point which Emeka has tried to make.

WAYS

We can tackle it in two ways. First, by removing the subject of objection in the lower group, that is by separating the soldiers in the mean time to build confidence until we can bring them together.

Secondly, since we are working in good faith among ourselves we have to repose the responsibility for each group of the Army on those personalities until we are in a position to merge together. With this progression from a Federal set up it only means that we have to look very closely into the central powers which are supposed to be those of the Supreme Commander and see how best we can limit these in such a way that the actions are acceptable to the various Regions.

I would like this body to be maintained, the Supreme Military Council must be maintained but we have to reconstruct the duties or the powers of the Supreme Military Council in order to give effect to the other functions that will restore confidence within the various Regions and then in general.

I do not think our answer here is to start re-organising the Council but to look into the functions and to specify very definitely what it can do and what it cannot do. If we do that we would go a long way in restoring confidence within the Regions. When this is restored we hope gradually we shall build up, it will be a matter of time and it will come automatically but we will want a strong centre.

That is the kind of principle that I will like to emphasise in the mean time because we are still on the Government level and I do not want to go into the other details yet.

Col. Adebayo: I think I should come in here. Two points have been made one on the Government side and the second which is inter-related to the Government side, the Army. This is a Military Government or Military rule and as such we are military people and must get ourselves together first. If we do not sort ourselves out I cannot see how we can confidently rule the country. I agree entirely with Emeka, Hassan and David. I think it will be simpler on the Government side if we can restore the confidence of the population which we have not got at the moment. Even in the West the Yorubas are afraid of moving around with the Northern troops because they feel—Well, they have done something to the Easterners maybe it is our turn next. I try to talk to them every time that we hope it will not be anybody's turn next, that we will never have it in Nigeria anymore but still there is a limit to what I can tell the population and since one has been talking about this since July, I think I would agree with the majority here that our association should be tightened up at the top and see whether we can bring that association down to the ground when the time comes, when the troops have more confidence in themselves.

As Jack and myself have always said, we do not want to break the Army completely into pieces because it will be very very dangerous to any one of us if we break the Army into pieces.

If we can tighten up the Army on top then those who are on top will gradually have the confidence of the troops back but I agree entirely that we must separate these troops.

If there are areas where some people can work together we can go into detail on that but in general I think one should agree that there should be separation from the bottom but not on top.

On the Government side the problem has been all resolved: We agreed yesterday that our Solicitor-General should get together on the 14th and see what part of the Decrees we can repeal later on and submit their recommendations. I think if we can go back as at 14th January 1966, I think half of the problem on the Government side is resolved. Then if we want to go through the functions of the Supreme Commander, and see what the Regions can take on it will be all right. But, personally I would say we only repeal those Decrees that were passed after 15th January, 1966 but I think we should revert to what the country was at 14th January 1966, that is Regional autonomy.

Lt. Col. Ejor: On that point, the implication is that the Civilian Government will have to come back.

Col. Adebayo: What we are doing is that we are trying to get a solution for us Military people to rule, the question of civilians coming back is a different exercise altogether. You repeal all the decrees made that affected some of the powers of the Regional Governments.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: That assumed centralisation.

Col. Adebayo: In fact Decree No. 1 is one of them, there are certain parts of Decree No. 1 which should be repealed. I have gone through the Decrees myself. We can go through all the Decrees that have been passed that will solve our problems and bring the Regional powers back to the Regions. I think we agreed on that yesterday.

If we agree on that I see no reason why we should go through the functions and the powers of the Supreme Commander because at the Supreme Military Council a joint decision is always made but unfortunately we could not meet since July 29 and there are areas in which the Federal Executive Council in Lagos could meet without the Regional Governors but on things affecting the Regions. The Regional Governors must either attend the meeting or be consulted before passing it into law.

If we all agree that we repeal Decrees that affect Regional powers and leave the Supreme Military Council to continue and the Federal Executive Council to continue I think half of our job is done.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Again whilst I agree with Bob I think what he has said has not gone far enough. It has not gone far enough in that before January 15 certainly the Armed Forces were one.

These are crucial to whatever we decide to do and, therefore whilst I agree that the Supreme Military Council should stay I feel that here we must write it down in our decisions quite categorically that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government shall be vested in the Supreme Military Council because previously it had been vested in the Supreme Commander.

Col. Adebayo: No.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: The actions have been such.

Col. Adebayo: Actions, yes.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: If we are not going to get ourselves into another friction, I think this must really be spelt out so that, what I envisage is that whoever is at the top is a constitutional chap, constitutional within the context of the Military Government. That is, he is the titular head but he would only act when we have met and taken a decision.

CONFIDENCE

It is in fact for that reason that I suggested yesterday, so as not to get it confused ever again, that whoever we choose should be the Chairman of a Military Council.

Indeed, I have gone on to say or rather I would like to say that he should again be a Titular Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and that he shall perform such functions as are performed by a Constitutional Head of State.

By so doing we have limited the powers, by so doing our people will have the confidence that whatever he says must at least have been referred to us all and that we are doing it in the best interest of the entirety rather than saying that this chap is there he is a Northerner and suspect every action of his, this chap is there an Easterner, he must be pushing only Eastern things for the Eastern good. If we spell it out as I have just said I think we would go a long way.

I will go further and I will give you the papers of what I suggest...

(Papers passed to Members of the Supreme Military Council) Lt.-Col. Ojukwu reading from the paper he passed round . . .

"That the legislative and executive authority of the regions shall be vested in the Military Government of the regions."

Then I added a fourth...

"That the following appointments must be approved by the Supreme Military Council, Diplomatic and Consular posts Senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police, Superscale, Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation posts."

Major Johnson: Before we go into the details of this, I would like to add one or two points. I always say that somehow we always get a bit beclouded by the expressions of the people with us and people around us.

With this now, I am making particular reference to the word economy.

Before now, when people were referring to Nigeria as the giant of Africa, firstly, they were talking about our political maturity which has been disrupted now, secondly, it is because of the economy of our country—people say it has got fantastic resources which can be fully developed. But, side by side, I put something down here which I call—social.

It might be from my own interest in social studies. I believe that your economy is nil, your society is not healthy.

If we listen a lot to what our friends, the people around us, the people who have invested in our country say we will be making a great mistake.

The main interest of the people who have invested in our country is the economy of the country which affects their own business. We all know that quite well. The East remaining alone cannot achieve much from its resources, the North cannot do the same the West cannot do the same.

Nobody can really see the natural resources and things like that we have got in our separate Regions, except we get together we cannot get the full benefit; and, before we can get the full benefit we must be sure first that our people are together.

This is what we have been discussing since morning. We must first of all face the social problems in our country.

DECISIONS

What you have just enumerated, I am sure, in principle has been the intention of the Federal Military Government since January. General Ironsi, all of us will remember, used to say—"Look, it is easy to be a dictator but it is not easy to try not to be one." There are several occasions when he would say—Look we all take these decisions—even at Council meetings and putting his hand down he would say—any comments.

I am sure this has been the genuine intention of everybody in the Military Government, nobody wants to be a dictator. I know there could be technical hitches, that in practice we have deviated from it but from what you have said I am sure it is the intention of every military member here, nobody has got any personal aspiration, we are all just longing to get this country back on its feet.

So, the decisions being taken jointly I am sure is everybody's welcome.

The nomenclature now is something different. Again, I tie this one up with social. This is why I believe, let us remain with the nomenclature we have got.

Supreme Military Council, Federal Executive Council, Regional Executive Council, these are what we are talking about but it is within us.

We have said now that we must start this thing from the top. If we know we want unity eventually which we know cannot be built now it is from the top and if we do not show the genuine intention right from the top I do not see what we are going to pass on to the lower people.

Those of us here now should know how we want it to be functioning. We know we have agreed, we are going to put it down there that Supreme Commander you will be the man in Lagos to do normal day-to-day things that were done by the Ministers and this should be carried out with Members of the Executive Council in Lagos.

He never takes any decision by himself for all I know although there could be some hits as I have said and things to include the Regions the Regional Government will come in and if it is not important they send a memo for them to comment.

We say this is what we have agreed upon and it goes on, I do not think we should deviate from this.

He said as he said jokingly the other day that he wants to remain afloat, he has said he will go back to the barracks any day. I am still a soldier, I am just over 30 now and I will still be a soldier.

SERVICE

Gentlemen, it is not anybody's intention to remain head-up in Nigeria it is not anybody's ambition that he wants to be Governor. It has come on us and we are doing national service now for our country. When they talk about the history of Nigeria because after all 10 years in our lives is a long time but in the life of a nation it is a very small time.

We are going to pass away one day but what are we going to give to posterity, that is what we should think about now. Personal ambition, what this man should be or that man we must forget it.

I welcome what Lt.-Col. Ojukwu said, we take a joint decision, that is what we have been doing but the nomenclature I say let it remain.

We can later on discuss what functions we must continue having in the Regions so that we can put confidence back into the people we are governing and what are the things to

put in the centre. I see nothing wrong with it at all.

Col. Adebayo: I think I should come in again, I have gone through the paper given to us by Emeka. This morning at the airport I jokingly mentioned to you that before we can get Nigeria right, I can say it again here, let us see on top how the Military leaders can work together.

As Bolaji has just said, I do not see anything wrong in the title as we have it at the moment, the Federal Military Government, the Supreme Military Council, the Federal Executive Council and the Regional Executive Councils.

I do not think there is anything wrong provided the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council do not go into things affecting the Regions without consultation with the Governors.

The only thing I would like to add is, because of the state of the Army itself today I would like to see an effective Commander of the Army. I would like to have an effective Commander and on top of that I would like to see that we break the command of the Army into area commands.

COMMANDS

I hate to use Regional commands, I would say Area commands and have effective commands on the Area commands and then an effective command for the Army itself. That will assist the Supreme Commander himself from going into detail on Army matters. He can still be the Head of the Armed Forces but that will assist him in going into detail on Army problems.

I do not think personally that the Chief of Staff (Army) is effective. He is the Staff Officer, I was Chief of Staff, you were Chief of Staff and you all know that we want somebody who can really command, go to the ground everytime and see that the Officers and the troops are doing the right thing.

That is what I would like to add to what I said before but I think the nomenclature should remain.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: I will object completely to that last one. We started by agreeing that nobody can effectively command the entire Army.

Any attempt to put somebody and say he commands the entire Army is—eyewash—it does not work not in the present circumstances.

Therefore, we must accept that the Army would be regionalised whether we like the name or not we all understand what we mean by that.

I do not think what we need at the moment is a Supreme Commander because Supreme Commander does involve commanding. I think what you need is a Commander-in-Chief who is just titular so that people will take orders from people at least they have confidence in.

Whoever you put in Lagos, I say this, will not command the loyalty of the East if that person is not acceptable to the East, this is the fact of today. So many things have happened and we do no longer trust each other.

Lt. Col. Hassan: This is taking us back on the whole issue of Nigerian history.

Col. Adebayo: Do you agree with the principle of Area Commands, you can call it Regional Commands but let us call it a Military term.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: What I have said is that the Army should be commanded on Regional basis, we know what Regions are.

Col. Adebayo: As a matter of fact it is on Regional basis but we as Senior Military Officers do not want to say Regional commands but we can say Area Commands to give it a good Military term so that it does not give the public a different meaning all together.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Let us give it a name and stop confusing ourselves and the public. If it is a Regional command that is what it is.

Col. Adebayo: We are both saying the same thing but not the same name. If we have those Regional commands do you not want somebody on top to coordinate?

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: I said there should be a co-ordinating group to which each Region would send somebody but just for the facade of Nigeria there should be a titular Commander-in-Chief not a Supreme Commander which involves and which means somebody who commands over and above the various entities. Perhaps, after we have created and generated certain confidence we could again have a Supreme Commander but it is not feasible today, this is what I am saying.

HISTORY

Lt. Col. Hassan: With respect, to summarise the whole thing the Eastern Region will not recognise whoever is the Supreme Command-

er in the form of association we are now in and it means a repetition of the whole history of Nigeria when the politicians were there, to strive to put either a Northerner or an Easterner at the top.

It must be an Easterner for the Easterners to believe or a Northerner for the Northerners to believe. To summarise, the Eastern people will not recognise anybody in Lagos unless he is an Easterner.

Col. Adebayo: I do not think we should put it that way.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: I would like to make a statement. I would like to request with respect that we adjourn to private session and iron out this matter because there is a lot involved in it.

We cannot sit here on this round table and divide Nigeria because the talks are moving towards Regionalisation of everything and I do not think it is safe and we are right to divide Nigeria up on this table.

If we retire into private session we might be able to thrash it out there. We will be able to say everything in our minds and then come back with a Resolution.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: If that is agreed we can retire then.

Sitting suspended: 12.15 p.m. Nigerian time.

Sitting resumed: 1.15 p.m. Nigerian Time.

COMMANDER

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: The reorganisation of the Army has been agreed upon and it is going to take the following set up. The Army will be governed by a Supreme Military Council and the Head of the Supreme Military Council will be known as Commander-in-Chief and Head of the Federal Military Government.

There will be a Military Headquarters with equal representation from all Regions the Head of which will be the Chief of Staff.

In every Region there is going to be a body known as Area Command and the man in charge of the Area Command will be known as Area Commander.

All matters of policy affecting the Military will be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council. This also will include appointments and promotions of top executive ranks affecting the Federation.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I think the last point has not been added. During the period of Military Government the Regional Governors will

have control over the Area Commands for internal security.

Major Johnson: I think this is a point which we must touch on further because I can see the development of this later on if we do not clarify it here. We have said here now that it is assumed that areas will be according to the size of the Regions.

Let us take the West, what are we going to do in the case of the West. I think I overheard somebody when we were discussing just now say Northern Area Command Eastern Area Command then the West in which case—

Col. Adebayo: You mean we have not mentioned Lagos.

Major Johnson: Right now the West extends as far as Ikeja.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Ikeja was built for Lagos there is no argument about that.

Col. Adebayo: Shall we say Lagos Garrison then.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We have not discussed the question of Lagos Garrison yet.

DETAILS

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: We can say Lagos Garrison including Ikeja and discuss the details later.

Col. Adebayo: What we want to add is that there will be a Lagos Garrison and will include Ikeja.

Alhaji Kam Selem: I want to bring a point about 4 (b), the Police. We have the Police Service Commission and in the appointment of Commissioners and above Military Governors are now consulted.

In the past the Premiers were consulted but now it is the Governors and in principle the Governor must consent to the appointment of the Commissioner before he is appointed. This is laid down in the Constitution in the past it was the Prime Minister but now the Head of Government.

All these appointments are by the Police Service Commission which is also set up under the Constitution. Are we now going to dissolve the authority of this Council or deprive them of their powers?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It is a question usurpation because all powers in Nigeria emanate from the Supreme Military Council today so it is a

question of what we give the various groups. The way I see the Police indeed a lot of appointments in the Federation have caused a lot of friction over the years and the new set up is one to build confidence.

I would hate for anybody after our meeting to start suspecting that somebody is striving for the control of the Police or things like that. So, I think that as far as the Police is concerned the same thing as we have suggested for the Army.

Alhaji Kam Selem: I feel the ranks should be stipulated if we have agreed on the point.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The ranks would be as we said in the question of the Army a matter of detail that we will consider at a later stage. We are talking in generalities at the moment.

COMMISSION

Lt.-Col. Hassan: I think the Police Service Commission should remain.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: When we come to detail we will decide how it is going to be done. I said the following appointments, Diplomatic and Consular posts, Senior posts in the Arm Forces and the Police, Superscale Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation Posts.

This is general when we get down again, this is not the last time we are going to meet we will then think in detail and say in the case of the Police, this, in the case of the Army, this, and all that sort of thing.

Col. Adebayo: When the details come we will have to determine what ranks will go to the Supreme Military Council.

Commodore Wey: Shall we say those appointments which originally had to receive the approval of the Prime Minister will now go to the Federal Executive Council? In principle there is no argument about this.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We are going to get into confusion. I think we should look at it with the Inspector-General in more details. Let us agree in principle that senior posts will go to the Supreme Military Council. When we are talking in detail the Inspector-General will be there and marshal together all the arguments and say, not this but this, not that but that.

Alhaji Kam Selem: Even when we meet at a later date I will just stick to what I have just said.

3. (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON 9TH AUGUST,

1966, IN REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF ARMY PERSONNEL.

Col. Adebayo: I made a statement yesterday and I just want to make a short statement because the West is the most affected at the moment.

At the moment, I have mixed troops in the region, even in Ibadan itself the Headquarters of the Government, three quarters of the troops I have are Northerners and we have tried as much as possible to bring more Westerners to the West and because of their duties within the Army itself we find it impossible to bring every Westerner into the region because most of them are tradesmen.

I think today we have just over 100 Westerners in Ibadan itself and do not forget we have Abeokuta again within the West.

TROOPS

As a matter of interest, we all know that Westerners are not many in the Army. I am not particularly keen on sending all Northerners home because we said we want to keep a little bit of the Army together during this present crisis but I think we should all agree that majority of the troops in the West must be Westerners.

Lt.-Col. Gown: As I said yesterday, this is the principle but the question now is on detail and implementation. The Army is a place in which you do not rush things and you come and regret later. I think it should be done gradually.

The point I would like to reiterate, honestly, is that any troops that can live together I think we should encourage them and this is where we on top can help a lot.

I know in fact that a lot is being achieved and it depends on the Commanders and Officers there. When I was at Ikeja during the early days of this crisis I think practically every Region was represented in the group.

There were people from the West the North and the Mid-West and they lived quite happily with each other. I was very encouraged by this and I said with that sort of thing we must not break the tie.

TRUST

My hope for the future is that one day we shall be able again to come back and have absolute trust and confidence in one another.

We have really hit and damaged ourselves during the last year but I am quite convinced

that if we continue to keep the little tie we have got with each other, this would really help.

I hope you will not ask me to send you the little number of Easterners we have at the Army Headquarters because they have been living together now for five months and I think this will help the confidence we are looking forward to in due course.

I think this is why I will really appeal to each and everyone of you, you may be Governors, you may be Unit Commanders that we must keep a bit of that mixing up.

If it is not possible at the moment because of the situation at present we hope that in due course this fear and lack of trust and confidence in each other will be forgotten.

I would like honestly to leave this issue.

Col. Adebayo: While I agree entirely with you that we must have that link but one must look at the position of the population in that area especially in the West. The fear is still there amongst the population as I said yesterday and I will continue to say it until something is done.

RECRUITMENT

I know we have not got enough G.D. Westerners in the Army but I think if you will agree to the suggestion I made a fortnight or three weeks ago that we step up our recruitment of Westerners and that we should have a second depot so that we can have majority of Westerners trained at Abeokuta if we convert Abeokuta Garrison into a depot that will facilitate the training of more Westerners.

Westerners will still go to Zaria to train and other people can come to Abeokuta to train with the Westerners and I am sure it will have a good access to Mid-Westerners who cannot go to Zaria and possibly Easterners who cannot go to Zaria at the moment.

I think we should have a crash programme for Westerners and this will instil more confidence among the various groups.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We stated before we started this meeting that this is a crisis of confidence and we are here trying to do everything possible to generate that confidence. The present situation in the country again, I will spare you the details, Easterners have been treated most shabbily by their fellow soldiers, brother officers, they have had to move out of their barracks.

When the Easterners came back what you say for the West perhaps is more so for the

East in the question of technicians versus G.D.s. We had an influx of service personnel into the East. Nobody has talked about that and the need for the East to balance up with G.D. personnel.

So, the question of recruiting which you mentioned in passing is one which the people of the East feel very much about.

It was decided that the West had not sufficient troops so the West was allowed to recruit in order to build up, it was agreed that the Mid-West had not sufficient troops for that same reason they were allowed. For some unfathomable reason it was agreed that the North should continue to recruit.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: North to recruit technicians.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: By that same logic let us agree now that the East will recruit D.G.S.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: We have been told you have recruited 10,000 G.D.s. It is an allegation.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: If we have been recruiting G.D's then let us take a decision to legalise it but the fact is that we have not been recruiting.

Lt. Col. Gowon: The question of size areas and responsibilities come into it. You will be surprised to know the figures that exist and what proportion each Region should have.

Commodore Wey: May I suggest that this point be agreed to generally. I remember that Bob has been talking about this for a very long time but I would like us to agree that he should be allowed to go into a crash programme and Abeokuta should be used as a second depot for training of Westerners and Easterners.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: You cannot say that, not even on the question of using Abeokuta for East.

Commodore Wey: Nnewi perhaps.

Lt. Gen. Ankrah: You cannot decide the future strength.

Col. Adebayo: I am sorry, General, we are not talking of the future strength we want to make up the present deficiency.

Lt. Gen. Ankrah: You have now agreed to have area unit formations, therefore, you have to divide your present strength.

BATTALIONS

If you have nine battalions you have to know where they are, how they are spread then you can say, now with each Region or area you need two battalions plus certain number of arms and then you can make up and then you all can give your returns as to the personnel you have within these establishments.

When you have done that then you can say "Okay, you are deficient of G. D. personnel, you do 600 and you recruit 800 sappers" and then your armament compliments which you have to work out. I doubt very much if you are saying that.

You have to think of the present Armed Forces and he tells you that his Army in the North is to recruit technicians and service personnel. How do you know the number of service personnel you need for that area.

Now that you have agreed on the command structure you must have a return of what you have now and then with that you decide between yourselves what each Region should have.

If it is so much you have then you can say—"None of you can have reconnaissance squadrons, the reconnaissance squadrons will probably be as agreed by you under the Lagos Garrison, you will have support weapons of light automatics and medium automatics and so on.

You can divide it and say each of you will have transport units, companies and so much, otherwise I cannot see how you can merge it up properly and by the time you realise I will be recruiting 10,000 troops and he will be recruiting only four.

Col. Adebayo: Thank you General. While I agree with your statement and I think one has a duty here I feel we should give a time limit that we are going to work out the detail.

Major Johnson: I must say this is something I have been calling for since August. I said we must do the detailed study. We must know how many drivers, how many nursing orderlies, how many technicians are in particular units so that if we have these things we will be able to place them. This exercise must start immediately.

Commodore Wey: For the paper to come before the Council not later than two weeks.

Col. Adebayo: There are two things we want. On the present strength we want to

know our deficiencies either in non-tradesmen or in tradesmen.

Lt. Col. Gowon: The Nigerian Army was a one Army affair and right from the beginning people selected where they go for their training. Usually you find that most people from the South go in for the technical side and most people from the North go into the G.D. side.

Today, we are faced with a problem whereby most of the technicians have had to go back to their Region of origin as a result of the present crisis and the G. D.s are within their own region so you have got places where you have got a preponderance of technicians and the ones with preponderance of G.D.'s.

The numbers are quite interesting really and the division does not bear any relationship to the size.

You have got to decide on the size you require for the country and the area concerned before you can really decide that you will have so much technicians and so much G.D.'s. Of course in the Army if you have surplus tradesmen they can become G.D.s. if you cannot afford to increase the size of your Army.

SIZE

We have got to decide later on the size of our Army, our security commitment and the demand. It is only then that we can probably say—"I think in this Region you will want one Brigade or in this Region two Brigades or in that Region three Brigades."

It should be according to the size and commitment that you have in that Region.

Lt. Col. Ejoor: I think at this stage I have to commit to the Council the work of the Officers that assembled to consider the re-organisation.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I must object to that being laid here because the whole thing was done without consultation with the East and we dissociate ourselves completely from that paper.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: It will form the basis of further discussion in re-organising the Army if you want the thing quickly.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: The point on this paper is this. I had to appoint a number of Senior Officers of all the Regions and I know for certain that the chap from the East was prepared to come.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I know for certain that that very person is not prepared to come.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think they should meet and discuss on this so that we have the representatives of all the regions there and they can work out a paper which will form the basis of our future discussion. I think two people were absent from the meeting, Col. Mohammed and Col. Nwenzon.

Later I spoke to you and you said unless the notice came from you, you will not allow anybody to go.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: What we are saying is that we must first of all work out the organisation before we start asking for requirements.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Therefore, we ask Governors to nominate people to meet in a place acceptable to all of them to go into the details of this but we will not accept this paper.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: As far as we were working at that time it was one Army. Nobody passed instructions through units and they did not have to pass through Governors.

PAPER

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: This is the fact of the day. A Governor appoints somebody to go and meet with others appointed by other Governors to go and discuss the details.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: We agree on this that each Governor sends an officer and also there should be somebody from the Army Headquarters.

Col. Adebayo: My own nomination will even come from the Army Headquarters.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Whilst we are on this I think the thing that has bedevilled completely the question of finding a solution to the Army problem—

Col. Adebayo: The Commander-in-Chief and myself agreed—

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: No, we have not appointed anybody Commander-in-Chief.

DATE

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: I think we will fix a date for the first meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

Col. Adebayo: Can we not appoint a Commander-in-Chief now?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We will see about that later. Let us get on with the agenda.

A point which arises out of this trying to find a solution to the Military problem, the point which has bedevilled us throughout is the inability of the Eastern troops to serve side by side with those who pushed them out of their barracks and killed a number of their friends.

All this talk about unity certainly would have been easier if something had been done about those who perpetrated these atrocities. Major Johnson: Right from the word go.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: From January 15.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: But as long as these people are to stay in the Army, as long as they are going to be considered not criminals not rebels then equity does demand—

1. That those involved in the January 15 incident should be treated likewise.

2. That a certain separation must be maintained otherwise we might find ourselves faced with vendetta.

These are the two points.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: For example in the case of the Kano mutiny we knew the people who did it and we arrested them and we are dealing with them.

Can you tell me who did the July mutiny? We arrested those of the January incident but nothing has happened to them and there are many still at large who took part in the January incident. If we are to discuss this and go back then all we have been discussing is a complete washout.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: That is the reason why I say for equity sake if one group is to remain serving we are now trying very hard to come together the other group should be given equal treatment. Up till now these people have been in jail for 11 months.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: We said they should be dealt with. Who are you blaming for not dealing with them.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: One would have thought that this will be a matter to be discussed by the Supreme Military Council when we get back because we are taking some far reaching decisions here to bring peace to Nigeria. I think if we leave this out until we all meet again and take a decision on this.

MEETING

Col. Adebayo: I think we should try and meet on this separately when we go back to Nigeria.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Do we give it a time limit too?

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: If we space it out a bit it will help. The meeting on Military organisation is next week the other one on the 18th, I think we should put something to February.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: These people have been in jail for more than a year theirs should be decided first.

Commodore Wey: A decision has been taken on the boys of 15th January, you were in the Supreme Military Council then. They were to be dealt with in August but later on it was shifted to October.

Are we to follow that decision or review that decision. Since we are pressed with allaying the fears of the public I think we should treat that first.

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Precisely, allaying the fears of the public. Whether you like it or not the public in the East want to know about this.

It is at the bottom of all this if we are thinking first things first that should be our first consideration because for as long as these other people remain at large it will be very difficult no matter what you say, it will be very difficult to bring this sort of feeling you want to generate.

PROBLEM

Commodore Wey: Should I give a time limit? Last week in January it can be the last day.

Lt.-Col. Gown: In respect of this one we have already taken a decision on some of the other ranks who took part. We thought it was the Officers who really misled these troops to do what they did to create this problem for us.

I think the Police have in their earlier investigations come to the conclusion that probably some of them have got no hand and they were only obeying pure and simple orders. Some of these boys are already going back to their units.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: There is another point, whilst we are not sure of the requirements in the Army of various Regions, and I am saying this particularly vis-a-vis the East and the North that recruitment must be stopped forthwith because whilst the North continues to recruit technicians you are creating an impossible situation in the East where Easter-

ners believe that the North is arming whilst we are just sitting on our fat asses doing nothing.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: And the Northerners believe the East has armed itself to the teeth and they want to pass out now.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: In the meantime no further recruitment.

Major Johnson: We have all agreed that in some cases the position is very glaring but we have all agreed now that in the meantime we should all go and work out the details of this new formation we want.

I know he is sitting on a keg of gun powder. The boys in the West will say—"Look here, what are you going to work out when there are only so many of you in the Army.

SACRIFICE

As I have said before this is the time for sacrifice and this is the time when every minute counts. If we have waited for six months I see no reason why we cannot wait for two weeks but let us see everybody working, so that we can get something out as soon as possible.

In which case, we may have to agree on his that until when we can work out something no recruiting or that any number you recruit should just be for the West. At least, everyone of you knows exactly what the West has got.

Lt.-Col. Ejor: It only means we should reorganise and get the figures quickly.

Col. Adebayo: I am quite prepared in the West to stop recruiting if there is a guarantee here that we are going to decide on the full implementation in a fortnight's time.

4. RESUMPTION OF TALKS BY THE AD HOC CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE. ACCEPTANCE OF UNANIMOUS RECOMMENDATIONS IN SEPTEMBER, 1966.

Major Johnson: Gentlemen, if I can start talking on this one, please do not think I am taking undue advantage. Quite honestly I think we all know what brought this country to where we are today and while talking yesterday Emeka touched on a point of how due to the situation, the politicians got what they have been wating for to come in.

POLITICIANS

While I very much welcome this Item 4 and while I know that definitely we are not

going to be in Government forever, I will like to say that, please for the next six months let us leave everything that will bring the politicians back into the limelight out of the question.

Let us go on on to all these things we have been discussing since yesterday because this is on the basis at which we can get our country back on its feet. Once we can get the papers on these things out and we see them working then we can call the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee to come and discuss but for now they are just going to confuse the issues more if you bring them out to come and talk anything again.

I will say let the Military Government continue for now and after working for six months and we see how far we can go before we start thinking of calling these people back.

Commodore Wey: One hundred per cent support what you have said. Candidly, if there had ever been a time in my life when I thought somebody had hurt me sufficiently for me to wish to kill him it was when one of these fellows opened his mouth too wide. I think we should let them stay where they are for the moment.

It was simply because we could not get together and handle our affairs.

Now that we have established the basis under which we can work please let us leave them where they are and let us try and see how far we can work.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this statement, Gentlemen, a lot depends on what the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee is. I agree indeed that regarding other Regions it was indeed a platform for politicians, to it but be it as it may, if we say we are going to continue then we must obviously get quite satisfied the terms of running this thing properly.

We have got to be able to meet and I said it outside and I repeat it here, I, as the Military Governor of the East cannot meet anywhere in Nigeria where there are Northern troops.

Furthermore in view of the previous Northern troops, who left the Western Region then and for whom I still have not got the confidence and went to the prisons in Benin and acted without instructions and against Easterners, I find it difficult, in fact, I find it impossible to meet in Benin for as long as there are Northern troops in the West.

Lt. Col. Gowan: When you say West, do you include Lagos?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Lagos is not West and it has never been.

Col. Adebayo: It was West.

Major Johnson: I must say that the exercise we have been conducting to bring back normalcy since yesterday, thank God, we are getting somewhere.

I wish we continue to make progress and not go back. I was getting delighted when you just kept it to where Northern troops are but now I think we are going further back.

We all know what the statements of the troops were, then perhaps you have not heard the full story as to how they got into Benin. Let us leave that one outside it.

The General when he was talking to us said one thing, we must ensure his confidence and trust: we talked of re-organisation and things like that, we have all agreed that we must work hard and we can do it, it only remains for us to give ourselves that confidence.

Before yesterday, tell anybody he could land in Benin they would say—Good Lord, impossible—but we landed in Benin and they even gave him a guard of honour.

Yesterday, you were guest of the Governor of the Mid-West for a good part of an hour this was not possible before.

Gentlemen, it is getting better and I see no reason why we cannot make it better still. If these are possible we should tell our soldiers and the public that things are getting better.

HEADACHE

Lt.-Col. Hassan: I am glad you said that because if you were there to see the headache I had in getting the soldiers of Northern origin from Enugu and Ibadan to understand the situation and in getting them to be disciplined you will know what we have done.

The troops that are now in Ibadan and Ikeja are quite different troops and those that returned from Kaduna are quite different.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: When was the last act of indiscipline in Ibadan, the killing of an Ibo photographer?

Col. Adebayo: Two months ago, the first week of November.

Alhaji Kam Selem: From what we have said here today and what we saw yesterday, I think it would be quite safe for you to come to Benin. I have very great confidence in that.

Col. Adebayo: I am sure we are going to improve on the security of Benin whenever we meet.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: For example, people expressed fear in the North when I accepted to go to Benin, they thought that the East would attack as soon as they hear that I am in Benin but I know nothing will come to Mohammed so I agreed to go but the ordinary man in the street in the North will not agree.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: That is all well and good, gentlemen, but my situation in the Nigerian crisis has not been anything like yours individually. Over the period, I have been considered the only stumbling block by the Northern soldiers preventing them from fulfilment.

Throughout I have been the symbol of resistance in the country, even in the pages of newspapers it is still precisely the same, that I am opposing the Gowon Government in Lagos from functioning.

These things, apart from anything else have made the Easterner believe that I stand between him and slavery, between him and certain death.

It will take some time for the sort of confidence we all hope for to be generated sufficiently for me to go to these places. I cannot do otherwise than what I have told you.

LT-GEN. ANKRAH ADDRESSES THE CONFERENCE

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: As I said before, we are trying very hard to generate confidence, confidence goes both ways, confidence in ourselves, confidence in our people. These things must be taken into consideration.

Firstly, we talked about the possibility of insulating Lagos which is in fact one point of my own suggestion some months ago when this thing was on.

Unfortunately, a factor which has not been considered is this, if we take a census of all the arms in Nigeria today, visible, in the Armed Forces, you will find that those we do not know where they are, are much more.

With these people, therefore some of them probably have three or four weapons and removing one of the four from them in itself does not really mean that they are disarmed.

LT-GEN. ANKRAH CONTINUES HIS ADDRESS

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Sir, the basic factor as I see it is that because of what has happened

this suspicion does exist, because of what has happened the individual only feels protected within his ethnic area, because of all these we have tried to make certain re-organisations in the various Regions.

The Easterner still thinks that if Hassan comes to me and I give him full protection or I promise him full protection and something happens the North would act.

The individual too would make sure of his safeguards, but not having yet implemented this, to expect what is natural caution to be thrown to the winds is not feasible or practicable.

If this question comes when the things we have decided here have been implemented to our satisfaction there are many things we can do.

I have been crying about this for a long time that there were necessary gestures that had to be made in order to make people more confident.

Right now none of these gestures are forthcoming. There has been none at all to show that there has been a change of heart.

What I have seen is that the leaders now want to work together but overall it has never been the leaders.

Certainly and I can swear on anything that is brought before me today in my heart. I know that Hassan never ordered anybody to do anything to an Easterner. I can swear to that here or anywhere.

HAPPENINGS

If somebody tells me that, I know it is not true.

Unfortunately even in our dealings with Lagos so many things have happened from the time we started talking, that is why when you hear the Easterner talk on this issue you will really feel there is a psychological thing involved. The Easterner only has the suspicion now he has been founded out completely from everywhere.

Alhaji Kam Selem: Although I am not in the Army but as far as I can see tempers have cooled down a bit and I think you can also help the situation very much if you change your attitude, for example, your utterances and so forth.

Your people are writing in the papers and everywhere that you should not attend meetings anywhere in Nigeria.

You have seen all your colleagues here, you must have formed your opinion about their

sincerity or otherwise, and I feel they are sincere, but you are now in a position to judge.

If you can after this meeting, after we have issued our communique, return home and change your attitude tell your people what we have achieved here I am sure that will help us not only in the East but throughout the country.

As the General has just said if it is a question of meeting in Lagos although it is a matter for the Army, if the Army men are disarmed we shall be able to provide the protection.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It was before for Benin but that was not acceptable to you.

In fact, we suggested it not acceptable to me because I knew what action the Police took during the riots elsewhere in the country.

So, when we are talking about all these things, what I am saying to you is whereas it is possible provided from now on we continue being genuine to ourselves and implementing first these things, it will take some time.

I am only being honest, there is no need coming here to talk and say it does not happen.

It will take some time before I come to Lagos. It will take some time before I go to Benin for as long as there are Northern troops in the West.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: Apart from the stories you might have got from the other side you do not know I will not talk of myself in the North. What all of us here have done and are doing as contributions to this gesture. We are now to work out a programme for all the refugees and make a general statement.

For example if I say anything in the North the people will say "Look are Easterners the only people incapacitated!" During the mutiny in the North many Northerners were killed, all these things have got to be considered. As I told you as far as the North is concerned I have done my best and I am sure the confidence is getting better.

Again, you are now talking of arms. Nobody in the whole of the North will ever believe me if I go now and say the Easterners have no soldiers of their own or they have no arms of their own. The same thing applies to the East all these are not there. You and I know that.

It is time now that we should do our best to create that atmosphere. I agree with you in

principle it is true the layman has not got that confidence but we have to create it. Let us send somebody to go and inspect the whole country.

EVENTS

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I would like to come to the aid of the East here. The incident at Benin hurts me most very much to the home. It did not happen in the way we are looking at it now.

Soldiers came to Benin to bury somebody who died, they came from Ibadan to bury a brother that died in Benin hospital. These soldiers happened to be part of those who were in Benin during July when the incident happened.

After the burial I gathered somebody mentioned to them that—"Oh! there are some prisoners in the prison whom we want."

At that time I had only six Mid-Westerners in Benin who had just come, they had no arms, in fact they were just civilians and there were no troops in Benin at the time but we only had the police to keep these people who came for the burial under surveillance. When they finished they left and we thought that was all.

It was when they had gone half way to the boundary of the town that they went back, went to the prison and removed these people. They came, broke the prison, and before we could alert the police they had gone.

I just explained this because it hurts me but we can now say that the situation is not as serious. I do not think when we meet at Benin people will come all the way from Ibadan to snatch anybody at the conference and go.

I deplore the action but I do not think a similar thing is going to happen whenever we meet at Benin and that if Northern troops are not moved from Ibadan it would be impossible to ensure the safety of people in Benin.

VENUE

I am only pleading with you that I do not think we should take that as the main reason why we cannot meet somewhere in Nigeria.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: All I am saying is that the venue should be mutually acceptable to all of us. The answer is a venue to be agreed upon mutually.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Within Nigeria.

Commodore Wey: Gentlemen let me appeal to you come to Benin so that we can expedite all our actions, all, let us use Benin. Please you will be quite safe.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this question I say a venue to be mutually agreed upon.

Alhaji Kam Selem: Within Nigeria.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I will accept within Nigeria.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think Item No. 6—Arrangements for future meetings of the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council, is now cleared since within Nigeria from now on, we have agreed to meet.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We missed one point which I think perhaps we might take now.

It is true that we have agreed that the Supreme Military Council would have vested in it legislative and executive powers there are certain things, because of the distance from various parts of the country to Lagos, we cannot all be present at or at certain times we cannot even meet before these things come out.

Yesterday when we were talking we did say there would be certain limitations, this is the term of our agreement and I think this is where we must now determine what those limitations are.

For example, I would immediately suggest that the Federal Military Government should take no legislative action on matters affecting defence without our meeting.

Commodore Wey: I think even that example you have given is not a good one because all things about defence is the responsibility of the Supreme Military Council. Everything about defence must go to the Supreme Military Council.

EXAMPLE

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: There have been instances, for example the Ogbu benefit, a change in the regulations for pensions and gratuity which was taken quite recently which again affects the whole country such things should not be taken.

Col. Adebayo: I think Bolaji made the point yesterday that most of these things should have gone to the proper Central Executive Council but because we could not meet, I think the point has been noted, in the future

anything affecting the whole Federation all the Governments must be consulted.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: Their memos do come to us and we should make comments if we cannot attend.

Commodore Wey: I think this is a fair one, anything that affects the whole country all the Governors should meet.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I like it written down that on these matters Governors must be present.

Commodore Wey: Let us accept as a general policy that anything that affects the whole country all the Governors must be present.

Col. Adebayo: What we have agreed upon now is that anything affecting the whole of the Federation must be discussed at the Supreme Military Council.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: If it is not physically possible for all the Governors to be present the papers must be sent to the Regional Governors for comments.

PRACTICE

Lt.-Col. Gowon: In any case this is really the practice and the Decrees we have had so far are on general things which do not affect the Regions at all. They are things common to everybody.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Since you took over the seat we have not received any of the papers and we never received the minutes. Even the meeting we held we have not got the minutes.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: Even in the past we complained about this at the Supreme Military Council.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Gentlemen I take it that we have now agreed on Items 3 (b) and 4.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: I do not think we have taken a decision on Item 4—Resumption of talks by the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee; acceptance of unanimous recommendations of September, 1966. There are two suggestions on this:

Bolaji says we leave it for six months but there is a suggestion from Emeka that we can have it but not with politicians.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: If I can modify that I believe that the answer is for us to get together and give directions quickly, once this thing has started, for the Ad Hoc Committee to start meeting.

What we are doing today and what we did yesterday was a sort of interim arrangement to enable us to carry on.

Col. Adebayo: I think we should agree that we carry on with the re-organisation and reconstruction and the Ad Hoc Committee should meet as soon as we find our feet.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: But there is still one school of thought about the politicians. We know we cannot do away with some of them but Bolaji wants us to add that if there is anyway out for them not to meddle in our affairs again let us try and do that.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I think when you are deciding the future of the country you are deciding for the people and you cannot exclude any particular person from taking part in deciding his future politicians or technicians.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think as I said in my speech of the 30th November, we all accept that they started very well until they ran into this difficulty of not being able to meet again. I think there are some points they have unanimously agreed to and some they have agreed to generally but not unanimously.

With the good start they had made previously we can postpone it indefinitely and as soon as we are able to sort them out they can decide.

One of the things Emeka would like us to agree to is the question of where they are going to meet. I think when we have been able to meet in the country without any fear probably the Ad Hoc Committee at a suitable time can be asked to resume and please continue from where they left.

The next point now is the second part of Item 4—Acceptance of unanimous recommendations of September, 1966.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I think we can leave that until one of our next meeting.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: We have now agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume as soon as practicable.

5. PROBLEMS OF DISPLACED PERSONS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO (a) REHABILITATION (b) EMPLOYMENT AND (c) PROPERTY

MAJOR SHARE

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think the person with the biggest problem on this today is Emeka. He has got more people than any other Region in

his respect. We are all agreed that whatever assistance that can be given the East should have the major share; probably they can tell us more about rehabilitation.

I think at the Federal level we have said that the Federal Government is to take the initiative in giving this rehabilitation problem a Federal outlook instead of at the moment a Regional outlook.

It was in this spirit that we made an immediate grant of £½ million for distribution; of course it is too small.

The idea is as soon as the Government has enough money or whatever money we can get, to give the money to the Regions in proportion to their responsibilities.

We are working out a Rehabilitation Committee to be headed by one of the businessmen in Lagos who would accept donations et cetera and we want international assistance in this respect.

When this happens and we have some money there will be experts from the Regions and they can sit down, work, and agree on the distribution of funds and I think the Regions would co-operate to be able to really do the work of rehabilitation.

We can have further discussion on this before we go to the next item.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: Things did occur. This is most pressing problem today in the country. We have talked a lot, we have talked of confidence, we have talked of suspicion but eventually what is going to really make us feel at ease is when people who are displaced, dispossessed find it possible to settle down.

With us we say we have the worse problem, each Region does claim they have their own problems. It is not likely one Region would go to the aid of the other nor since this is a question of confidence in a way is it really fair to expect only the Federal Government to bear the cost of rehabilitation.

Whatever the regions can do, whatever the Federal Government can do there is something called for from the region where these things did occur. This is necessary one as a preventive and secondly as a way really to demonstrate that what has happened is really regretted and avow that it will not happen again.

A number of things I have mentioned in the course of other discussions, the question of population, Easterners have left the North and Northerners have left the East.

HAPPY

I think each side is happy that the other has gone. Each region now has the whole responsibility for rehabilitating its own displaced people, civil servants, employees of corporations, commercial establishment, businessmen, students, teachers, traders and so on.

These changes have directly affected the resources of the regions concerned particularly the East.

The Federal Government has failed to cope with the situation and we know that it is not through a complete lack of the intention to help but the basic fact is that the Federal Government has not got the wherewithal to help. £350,000 has been given the number at the moment about 1.5 million they grew up to 2 million the amount of loss you cannot pay for.

These people cannot even collect the ruins.

It is for this reason that in the East we feel that a completely changed situation has occurred in the country. The basis of jointness has been on the knowledge that whatever goes into any part of the country can be directly beneficial to anybody who lives in that part of the country whether or not he comes from that part. This is no longer so.

It is for this reason therefore, that I would suggest, since we are now coming to the end of the financial year that here at this meeting we go back and direct our Permanent Secretaries to prepare and to meet over this issue, but very quickly, possibly again as we said before we will give them a date here.

So that whilst the legal boys are talking the finance boys can be talking and perhaps at the end of the month we will get out a recommendation which we can consider.

The point is we cannot really go into the details now.

Lt-Col. Gowon: I know that they have held a meeting and we will ask them to continue.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: The urgency of it.

Lt-Col. Hassan: All my officials and myself know very well how much the East is affected on refugees, property, employment, et cetera. On the economy side we know very well we have been hit. We know what we lack in the North but we are doing our best.

We held a meeting and we spoke about this gesture but the layman in the North if he hears that the Northern Government for example has given £3 million to the East will

not understand. We want to help the people who have returned to the East from the North and those who have returned to the North from the East but the time factor is what is worrying us.

Added to this problem is that the information media in the country are mixing things up. The ENBS, Radio Kaduna, New Nigerian, Nigerian Outlook are all adding to the problems and it is not fair to both sides.

The East has been hit harder than the North to be honest and we are willing to assist both sides. The rehabilitation Committees in the North and the East can meet and discuss their problems together. One side can say to the other, "This is my problem in which area can you help."

FACTS

Again, all these suggestions are good but what of the timing and the fear. I strongly support what Emeka said that these people should meet but they should not meet only on finance.

The Permanent Secretary Ministry of Finance from each Region can bring with them a member of the Region's Rehabilitation Committee who is more in the picture than the Permanent Secretary himself.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I think the Regions should send in three people each.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think we can agree mutually on a Central Rehabilitation Committee that is one way of getting over the issue.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We are missing the issue a bit even on this question of Rehabilitation Committees; the amount one is likely to get from Rehabilitation Committees is very minimal. This is not the point, the point is really to go into it and see how to enable the Regions to resettle their displaced people.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: That is the duty of the Permanent Secretaries but the Officers of the Rehabilitation Committee would be able to help them on the facts.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think it is agreed, three people from each Region and the Centre.

5 (b) EMPLOYMENT.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think every Region has got one problem or the other on this one. Here again I think the greatest number is in the East because right from the beginning they had the greatest number within the services and the Corporations.

TIME LIMIT

For that reason they have got the greatest number of people probably unemployed who were in the employ of the Government or the Corporations.

There is tied up with this one the question of people who have left their places of work because of the situation in the country and there was a date or time limit when people should return to their places of work, when we think they are safe enough. I think the dateline is 31st December in a lot of cases.

There are a lot of people who have transferred or are asking for transfer to their Region of origin but I think Lagos is now one of the safest places in the country. Up till now people are just leaving and I think honestly we cannot continue to pay them and not getting any service from them.

In some cases they have been employed and they are still getting their pay in their other places of work. As far as we are concerned Lagos has been safe for quite long time.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: The Ministries in the North and the East are always writing to each other to ascertain if people have been employed and so on.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: The truth is that we cannot take up every problem individually because the number is pretty great.

When the Advisers to the Governors met me I told them I was prepared to consider an extension within a reasonable time in order to at least relieve hardship to some of the people affected.

I know it is not good for one to keep on changing his decision on things but this is where human feelings come into it and this has to be considered.

I am prepared to reconsider the extension to at least the end of this financial year. I think on the question of employment if anyone has anything to say he can say it and we discuss it.

Col. Adebayo: On the question of employment for displaced persons as far as it concerns the West, we said we should forget the past but nevertheless on this I have to refer a bit to the past.

PROBLEM

Simply because we all said we must keep this country together, I made a public statement that non-Westerners should remain, that

was after the Governor of the East had made his statement, according to him because of safety reasons.

I had this problem in my plate, a lot of Westerners came from the East, those of the Civil Service we understand have no problem because they were given leave indefinitely, they are being paid and would probably go back when the time comes but there are people from Federal Institutions in the East and in the North and in some Corporations in the East and some who are working for Industries or semi-industries who have arrived in the West. I have been able to give jobs to some of them but there is a limit to what I can do.

What is more, there are still some non-Westerners in some of my Industries and some of the industries which do not belong to the Regional Government. We cannot drive these non-Westerners away and the Federal Government is not helping as such to employ some of these displaced people.

I think they made a ruling in Lagos not known to us before the ruling was made that all daily-paid people should be terminated where as they were employed by the Federal Government in the other Regions where they were displaced and the same Federal Government said they should be sacked.

DAILY-PAID

In the Region which these people have come to we are still employing non-Westerners on daily-paid basis. I have got about 1,500 people not employed now who were displaced, they were either in Federal Institutions or Corporations and some of them were in some other Industries not owned by the Federal Government.

I have just been told that we now have no more problems with the Corporations. I think the last one was the E.C.N.

The question of Corporations has been solved by the Federal Government but I am now faced with self-employed people who were told to leave the East. They could not take the materials they work with them and they are now lying idle in the West without any equipment to continue their work.

There are other people who were employed by say, Kingsway, Chemist shops and some sort of semi-commercial people who are now with me in the West and I hope they would be allowed to go back to where they were before in view of our meeting now, that is if

they decide to go and if they do not decide to go I wonder what we can do for them.

Although we have set up the Rehabilitation Committee in each Region and I am doing my best to assist them in that but I leave it to this Council to view the whole situation. We will come to property later on.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On the question of employment we have a bigger problem, a peculiar one of course. I do feel immediately that whilst we are trying to do all these, the answer would be for the Federal Government to continue to bear the burden until such a time as we get the solution to the financial problems.

HURRY

In this case we are trying very hard to get it down by the next financial year this is one added reason why we must hurry. There is nothing that is likely to bring friction other than termination of appointment, mass sacking or things like that. This is on those we know governmentally.

On the question of commercial ones, I believe this one is a problem of today, this is what I mean by the changed circumstances in the country. For security reason, I have said certain people cannot come back to the East.

I am constantly reviewing it but then I must minimise the problem this gives to my Colleagues particularly in the West and the Mid-West. I am all the time aware of this.

I have asked them to accommodate the East in this but certainly if they cannot I will understand that they are only doing this because they cannot and if the people of the East in those areas come back it becomes another of our problems that is all.

But whilst the military situation is not yet implemented and not settled I am not anxious to have an internal security problem on my hands which I cannot control.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: In the Mid-West we have a very peculiar problem. Some of the people who have been displaced, civil servants employees of Corporations have come home and we have not got those services or Corporations in the Mid-West to absorb them. In fact we have not absorbed up to .5% of those people who have come home.

POLICY

In the private sector it is even worse because in most of our private concerns about 6% in each of them come from the East and

because I had pursued a policy of bringing the country together and not wishing non-Mid-Westerners to leave we have tried to accommodate the Easterners to the extent that the Mid-Westerners who came back had to more or less revolt and I had to use the Police against them to maintain law and order.

This situation has not changed, they have merely tried to obey my orders and, at present, I cannot put them in any private sector and I had hoped that by this time probably it would be easy for the East to recall all the Mid-Westerners that have been driven away.

Since it is not possible may be first we may say that some of these Easterners would have to leave in order that Mid-Westerners who have been displaced would have a place at least we can settle a portion of the people we have. At present I have not been able to absorb anybody.

I have to ask Emeka what he can do because I cannot keep all the Mid-Westerners out of job while I maintain about 6% of the Easterners employed in the private sector.

This is a constant problem, everybody is agitating and it looks as if I have not got the interest of Mid-Westerners at heart although I am trying to help resolve the overall issue of maintaining the country. I do not know what Lagos can do in this one.

I want us to consider this point, if I should ask the Easterners, those employed in the private sector, not those who are self-employed to go. We have to assess whether it will affect what we are trying to do but at the same time it is the only thing that will give me a chance of resettling some of the Mid-Westerners.

As you know I have only got 40,000 to help me do this. At present I have in the register 14,000 heads of families, the overall total is about 80,000 displaced persons and in comparison to our population we have been hit harder than any other person.

PRIVATE SECTOR

First on the population basis, secondly lack of services into which they could be absorbed and thirdly, the number of Easterners employed in the private sector.

I would want you to help me on this point: either you are prepared to accept that the Mid-Westerners you have driven out from the private sector should go back, that will help me reduce the tension in the Mid-West and perhaps it will help a great deal in our rela-

tionship and will foster other things or we have to go the other way.

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: Whilst wanting to foster intercourse within the regions I have said on this issue that I can only do what the security situation allows me to do and I did say that if my colleagues find it impossible I would understand. It is a fact of the Nigerian situation today.

Col. Adebayo: In view of this our meeting here, one would not like to do that because we want to make progress for the future. As such if you can lift the ban earlier than you anticipated because it will not be right having agreed on a lot of points and a week later we start sending people back to their regions.

PROBLEM

Lt-Col. Ojukwu: Well, it depends on the urgency. I can see David's point; at the moment he cannot live probably another week with this problem and I know that I cannot lift this ban within a week because there are so many things to be done yet.

Major Johnson: Gentlemen, I think I am going to touch on a very delicate issue and believe me when we start discussing the future of the country political wise it is going to be a difficult point. We have all been talking about the regions and things like that.

I know how people feel about the question of Lagos but I am telling you that notwithstanding anything we say here are some people born and bred in Lagos who have no other claim to anywhere; they cannot go to the North, they cannot go to the West, and they cannot go to the East or Mid-West.

WEAPONS

There are several people like that who have come back to Lagos now and many people do not realise this because of the feeling that "Oh! Lagos is the Federal Territory, it belongs to everybody."

I am telling you, gentlemen I do not want us to discuss this question now but it is a delicate issue it is hitting us right in the face now. There is nowhere they can go, they all came to Lagos and that was when I drew the attention of the Government to the problem.

I go the Federal Ministry of Labour and also I spoke to Mr. Ejueyitchie that we should have a Rehabilitation Committee too in Lagos. That was how we came by a Rehabilitation

Committee in Lagos. With this I would like to tie up what we discussed earlier on extension.

Lagos as most of you know has been the capital territory for some time now, most of the services you have here are Federal services; it has never been a region for some time now although some of the commercial houses have their offices here.

VACANCIES

The implication in this is that people who have left Lagos now, some of them were not officially posted we are still paying them and if we continue to pay them it means we are still telling them that some day they can come back.

This means that these people who have been displaced and who are in Lagos you cannot tell them that there are vacancies which they can fill and at the moment these people are in Lagos without jobs.

Not that the vacancies are not there but because of what we said about unifying the country Lagos now does not want to fill these places, we are still extending and extending the date, we are now moving to March.

These places are vacant but they cannot be filled because we say these boys would come back one day. Let us give them until November, let us give them until December let us give them until March but there are several families suffering and yet looking at empty jobs.

I can tell you that it is more headache seeing a job and people telling you that there is no vacancy this is the problem we are having in Lagos.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: This is happening in the whole country, even in the North.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Lagos on one side is quite different from the Federal Government and there has been a constant confusion in your statement.

Major Johnson: It is because Lagos as you all know it now is not a Region and even the Lagos City Council which is supposed to be the City Council there is under the Government. You cannot dissociate Lagos from Lagos the capital territory.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: Gentlemen, we are having the same experience in the North. For example we have many vacancies in the P. & T., ECN the Railways et cetera.

People keep on writing to me and even last week I received a letter from a man in Zaria accusing the Government that there are vacancies in the Railways but they are not allowed to go and fill them.

This is the general situation all over the country. The people in Lagos should be looked after by the Federal Government.

Commodore Wey: I have given advice on this matter and I do know that extensions have been granted from time to time purely on sympathy and appreciation of the difficult situation in which we found ourselves.

ADVANTAGE

I am fully aware and I do know that a lot of people are now taking advantage of the situation. People who had no cause whatsoever to leave their places of duty are now going back to the East, they know they are not going to be employed, they do not even approach the Rehabilitation Committee, they still send us papers that they are on sick leave they sit at home and draw their money.

I did make a suggestion sometime ago that we should look into the case of the people from the North to the East and people from the East to the West as a separate case by itself and let us look at the people who left Lagos and these other places on the pretext that they are going on leave or sick leave and stay put also differently.

There are even some people who for no just cause just leave their places of business I know this because it started affecting my services. As you know, the Navy has kept out as much as possible. I must say the boys are doing very well.

I have got two Senior Officers who left for Enugu. I think I sent their letters to you, and obtained sick reports, officially they are sick but I know these boys are not sick, people have seen them in the East.

HOUSE

One of them before he left Lagos cleared his whole house so that he left with the full knowledge that he was not going to come back.

As all of you know, nothing has happened to us in the Navy we have been living together, helping as much as we can but these Senior Officers, Lieutenants, for that matter, who are equivalents to Captains in the Army left and they expect us to pay them.

I am still paying them, but for how long can we continue with this.

I know this is happening in other services but I would like us in giving consideration to whatever decisions we would take here to please look at the people from the North and the East from different angles altogether, compared with people who left their places of duty intentionally or with falsehood.

I think there is another category of people, these are people who have got jobs and yet are still drawing their pay in Lagos. Some of these people have covered themselves with sick reports and their Ministries cannot stop their pay and information has reached their Ministries that they are working in the East.

I would like to say that while we are looking into the whole matter we should think of the cases differently because some boys are taking advantage of the situation.

While appreciating the problem they have in the East I would like to recommend to the Governor of the East that he should reconsider at least the position of the people in the private sector who were graders, goldsmiths, carpenters etc. who are non-Northerners.

They can be allowed to go back and then others can follow. I think that would help to sort of re-impose confidence because I know some private men who are goldsmiths, photographers, lawyers who are not Northerners who want to go back. They can go back and the people in the Federal Services and Corporations can be considered later.

SALARIES

Lt.-Col. Hassan: There are some Yorubas from the North too who are now in the West and who are getting their salaries for doing nothing. They know they will be paid monthly so they just get their pay and do nothing.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: To say that these people left their jobs with no reason at all is really not looking deeply at the problem. You have said this at least four times to me and I have tried to explain the situation to you.

There is fear in Nigeria, no matter how illogical that fear might appear to some people the fear still does exist. As long as that fear exists, the only way you can handle it is to try as much as possible to generate confidence in the person.

When our child wakes up in the middle of the night screaming and says there is a bogey man in the bedroom you do not start off by explaining to him that you locked the door

therefore there is no bogey man in the room, he could not have entered.

You get hold of him and say—Okay, do not worry, daddy is here—and he gets confidence again. The people who left the North certainly we all agree were scared away and they moved.

Yesterday, in the course of our discussion it was brought to our notice that a certain Head of State on hearing of what happened in Nigeria, an innocent record was being played on the wireless, he was afraid, he thought it was a signal that he was to be the next and he arrested the whole broadcasting station.

The point I am trying to express here is that these people who left Lagos and the West were afraid we have been together as a country for a longtime, we have never had this phenomenon before, people do not suddenly say, go away.

They packed their loads because they think perhaps if they make it known that they are running away they might be accosted. Is it wrong for an individual to save as much of his property as possible?

And, when he comes home a chap trying to see which way he can be absorbed tries of course to help on for as long as possible to what he had before.

We all regret the incident that brought us to that position in Nigeria and until that confidence is restored any firm action on this matter would only destroy what we are trying to build.

I have gone a longway today in suggesting that at least for the purpose of this meeting that we accept the end of the financial year only because I am hoping that the Permanent Secretaries and whoever they are meeting at Benin as we have said could find an equitable solution to this problem.

The people are coming back, I can go up North and shout myself hoarse, they will not go back.

In May after the Supreme Military Council meeting, after the May incident General Ironsi shouted, "Go back" and nobody listened. Then I went on the air and told the Easterners to go back and they went back.

Not so long after that these people were killed, a lot of them. Gentlemen, I am only a human being, it is a thing of my conscience and it will always remain there.

I get letters, at least 150 daily, out of these at least 60% are from wives without husbands, children without fathers, families

without bread winners saying—"You Ojukwu told our bread winner to go, now that he is dead what can you do."

SENSES

Normally on the surface everybody says he is in a strong position in the East, there is quite a lot underneath, so many people hold me personally responsible for the death of their people who went back. For that reason I cannot go up again and say, "Go back."

I hope this thing as we generate confidence people will start going back. You know, this thing called stomach has a funny way of bringing people to their senses.

We go back we make an announcement they feel all right and say "let us watch." they watch for a week, two weeks nothing happens then they will say, "Oh it is nearly all right."

They make across to Asaba and run back and before you know where you are slowly they will go back, not expect anything dramatic on this issue. For this reason again I implore you, the answer for us at the moment is to keep on to the end of this financial year helping that these people will work out on acceptable solution.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: We realized this position in the North and we put it at 31st March, we were even to write to Lagos suggesting that this announcement of the 31st December should be extended but we quietly have it on our records that we could keep these men up till 31st January and then reconsider the matter again.

SUGGESTION

I will suggest that since all the Permanent Secretaries are going to look into the problem we should extend the date line to 31st March. By that time we may be able to find a solution or get the factors and work on them.

We know many people left on no grounds but all the same we should discourage those who left on no grounds and the genuine cases we help them up to 31st March.

Col. Adebayo: We have not cleared the private sector side.

Commodore Wey: Gentlemen, I would like to support him, but it should be on merit, I know some people whose pay here have not been stopped and yet they are working in the East and getting another pay.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I am sorry to this but I do not agree because there is an instruction from my Government that nobody starts work unless he has left the other services.

We have in the form a column which reads—Where were you last employed—and the Public Service Commission gets in touch with his former employers and ask for a transfer. Nobody just like that.

Commodore Wey: What about somebody who is on sick leave or does not come to work at all, do we continue to pay him? How do we know that he has not gone to seek employment elsewhere and should we pay a person like that?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: This is fraud. If the chap is receiving pay elsewhere and starts receiving pay in another place, once you find out certainly he will be prosecuted.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: There are cases like that, these are cases which would probably not come to you.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Certainly I will make sure that I am not paying somebody you are paying.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: That is true, we have had letters from the Permanent Secretaries saying—"This chap has started work with us, stop paying him."

RIDER

Lt.-Col. Gowon: For Government employees and corporations I think it is agreed that we should extend the time to the end of the financial year but I think I would like to add a rider here, gentlemen, some of them have got to be on merit. There are some that are clear-cut but I think there are others that really need investigation.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Whilst I agree that there are people who are fraudulent in this, the question of merit is a different thing. For you sitting in Lagos to say that Lagos is safe does not cover the chap who left Lagos and says—"Lagos is not safe."

There is the whole problem I have been talking about we are now trying to move forward, let us generate it, the necessary confidence will come eventually and the timing will make them want to go.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think the problem is that in some Departments in Lagos they have employed new people to keep the work going

but the Personal Emoluments vote cover only for a specified number of persons which means they have to get the money from somewhere.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: For example we have employed into the Civil Service in the East about 80 per cent of those who have asked for transfer. That does not mean in any way that our Personal Emoluments vote envisaged these people but these people were super-imposed because of the situation in the country.

GRATUITY

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Just a rider to this one, in my case there are a number of people who have been terminated, they may be daily paid workers especially in the I and T and there is another lot coming from the Railways. Some have even been terminated already I will want this one reviewed.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think there is already a regulation on this either in peace or war time if you cannot absorb them you have got to retrench them. We have got to be careful about that.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I would like to ask that where somebody is terminated if he is not a daily-paid worker on the grounds that he had left a particular area he should be compensated.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: How do you expect it to be done, one month's pay in lieu of notice?

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: One month will be too small.

Col. Adebayo: I do not think we should go on the gratuity yet, some of these people were displaced because they did not want them in that area whereas the indigenes of the area that displaced them are still working in my own Region how can we terminate them? Why should a daily paid man suffer as against a salaried man.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We agreed on the 31st March to enable us work out this thing.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: We have to give directions to the finance people.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Has anybody got an answer to the problem of the private people and the self employed?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I have told you that I am going to try but trying does not satisfy David it does not satisfy you and it cannot satisfy

anybody. Even myself saying it, I do not like to repeat it.

The point is I am sure that when these things we have decided immediately get implemented there will be sufficient confidence in the country to enable me do it and this is what I want us to do. We should put our skates on and start working.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: I do not know really whether we cannot do something about these self employed people. These are people who have lived in the East for months, years, they have lived together peacefully until they were asked to go.

We did not hear that they were fighting and I am sure that as a mark of good gesture on the part of the Governor of the East. I feel he can go back and say that—In view of the decisions reached at the Supreme Military Council Meeting held in Ghana on the 4th and 5th of January, I will now welcome back non-Easterners but not of Northern origin who engaged in private business.

FRACAS

Lt.-Col. Hassan: He cannot commit himself by saying people not of Northern origin, I do not agree on that side, it will be misunderstood.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Why I said that is this. We have known that there has been fracas between the North and the East but we do not hear of any fight between Mid-Westerners or Yorubas with the people. If you want to spell it out say, people of West and Mid-West origin who are self-employed can now return to the East if they want to.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: If I can make this point Mr. Omo-Bare I thought I made it before but I do not like to go into detail.

Let us take the West for example. When the Easterners came back from the North, they knew there were not many Northerners in the East but really what sparked off trouble was the attempt to start molesting the Westerners.

The reason for that was that, I can understand it though I was not there, when this thing was happening in the North an Easterner ran from his house usually in the same Sabongeri, the houses are mixed, the Yorubas got themselves together and just sat tight—Thank God this is not affecting us at the moment. The poor Ibo man would rush in and say. "Afolabi, I will come to your house"

but the Yoruba man would say: "No, no, do not bring your problem to me.

This is precisely what incensed the Easterner on coming back he says—these people let us down. If I were a Westerner I am pretty certain I would say, "For the time being, take your trouble go." How do you explain this to somebody who in that run lost two children who in that run saw his father clubbed down after he had just been pushed out this is the problem.

Col. Adebayo: I agree with you but do not forget that some Yorubas got killed for harbouring Ibos.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I agree, incidentally my own sister was saved by a Yoruba man.

Mr. Omo-Bare: My fear is this that if the Governor of the West and the Governor of the Mid-West should go back and say "Since I have not found employment for these self-employed I will have to eject people of Eastern origin", then our meeting here today is not successful.

Col. Adebayo: I have a meeting with my own people tomorrow.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Can some sort of gesture, give and take on both sides be done? I know it would be additional problem for Emeke.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Let him just announce it. I am not expecting they will rush back tomorrow. If he announces it it will help to lower the tension and then it will give me time to negotiate with them.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I said very recently that one of the painful decisions I had to take during the year was that requesting non-Easterners to leave the East temporarily. This action has unsurprisingly been misinterpreted by people.

I repeat that I took the decision both in the interest of those concerned and in order to avoid indiscriminate action on the part of Easterners which could seriously injure the good relationship existing between the Eastern Region and other parts of the South.

I appreciate the natural unpleasantness which this action has caused amongst our friends of the West and Mid-West.

TROUBLE

I am prepared to put up with this temporary unpleasantness rather than risk worse and deeper wounds which would have resulted

from personal injuries and possible loss of lives of those affected.

I regret the great inconvenience caused to those concerned and assure them of a warm welcome back amongst us immediately conditions become more normal.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: The fact is that some of these people came back and they were not allowed to remove their properties, to be living with a portmanteau is not very easy.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Can they be allowed to go and take some of their things?

Lt.-Col. Hassan: On this question of security which I am supporting him on, immediately he goes on the air I can assure you the ordinary man in the North would say—"The Mid-Westerners and the Easterners are going to team up to fight again."

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Supposing tomorrow there is a riot in Benin what do I do.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The point is, I think actually the question of coming to take things and the security during that period the Commissioners of Police from various Regions could on instructions from the Governments go and discuss this and find a way of doing it which would minimise the trouble.

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: It is true but I think it is unrealistic because I know what pressure they are bringing to bear on the Governor of the Mid-West. The people will say when we have Easterners here in our home working we cannot get work to do and we cannot go back. If he says they may come back that means if they want to go back they may do so.

Col. Adebayo: Most of the shops in Ibadan are now being taken by Easterners whereas in the East, Westerners are not allowed to remain in their own shops.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: The problem is I am stuck here, I have held on for so long and I do not think I can hold on any longer.

PROPERTIES

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: I have a suggestion and it is that the Federal Government should give the West and Mid-West Governments sufficient money to employ these people until such a time they are able to go back.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I will not like to jeopardise what we have done so far but at the same

time I have this security problem in my hands when it comes it will affect you all.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: Can the three Commissioners of Police meet?

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: That is for the removal of properties, when they remove their properties and come home that does not mean they have got employment?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I am not minimising David's problem at all Gentlemen, apart from being close to him I know what he gets everyday, I know what reputation he nearly got as a result of it too but I am afraid the situation is such right now that rather than jeopardise everything perhaps the answer is to get these boys working fast, of course, I will do my best to see that it will not take long to get these people back.

Alhaji Kam Selem: Are you thinking of any day when you are likely to make this announcement?

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: No but you see these things probably work in a sort of geometrical progression, you throw one gesture, an agreed thing—Oh, they have implemented this—very soon you find confidence just coming.

A few of these things we have discussed today, I cannot go back and think the security position has changed until they have been implemented. As soon as we implement certain things there will be tendency towards coming together again.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Those employed by private concerns will have to go.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Fair enough.

Col. Adebayo: I will have to do the same thing in the West but if I can help it I will not do it.

5 (c) PROPERTY

Lt.-Col. Gowon: On property I suppose it is the property of Easterners in the North the property of Westerners in the East, et cetera. I think something is being done but there are not trains to move them.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: We still have some properties in the North, those that are known to be safe and locked up.

PROPERTIES

Lt.-Col. Hassan: In the private sector there are many Easterners who have written to

Northerners to save their things for them, some have even removed their goods. Also, I have been doing my best to see that Administrators and Native Authorities in the North look after properties.

Lt.-Gen. Ankrah addresses the conference.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: We will probably have a very long discussion on this one but we have got something here we would like you to listen to. We felt something like this should go into the communique.

Col. Adebayo: The Supreme Military Council agreed to the setting up of a committee to look into the problems of Rehabilitation and Properties of persons displaced from all the regions.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION MEDIA

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I do not know if I can mention some of the things I have here. This is the question of Railways, Ports, inter-regional trade Customs and Airways. If we can get these things to move at least more than they are doing now it will restore some of the confidence we require.

I want us to give general consideration to these things today and if possible to make some announcements in the communique because it will go a long way to help generally. I have added this one as another subject for us to discuss generally although it is not on the agenda.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I brought up a problem before even I passed round a paper but because it was not on the Agenda—

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: A number of things have been mentioned which are not on the Agenda.

WAGONS

Lt. Col. Ojukwu: Those points I will like us to defer until the next meeting. I would like very much to talk about them but honestly I am not in a position to do them justice now.

Lt. Col. Gowon: The points I want to raise are, for example, if you can release some wagons from the East to work so that they can be used on the other lines. Also the question of using port allowing certain things to move down. Once we give the go-ahead I am sure they will listen and this is all towards the restoration of normalcy.

Commodore Wey: This is just to bring them to your notice, some of these things could be happening without your knowledge.

Most of them I happen to know about, for example, the one of the Railways, the wagons. You may know about that. Also, the Port Harcourt chaps have refused to load ships from Lagos.

Take the Airways for example, the flight from Lagos to Tiko, on its way from Tiko the aeroplane should land in Calabar then to Enugu but now they have got to go first to Enugu for clearance before they come back to Calabar and this is waste of fuel and time.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I can assure you I will look into these things.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: One point I would like to mention is on this question of border dispute. It has been on for about twenty years and the Officials are now meeting.

They met at Benin, they met ten days ago with Administrative Officers from old Nsukka and old Enugu. We are waiting for their report and when it comes I will send it direct to your office for your consideration.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: As you know, one of the biggest problems we have today is in the Railways and if you can release these wagons more people will be able to work and they can earn some money.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Gentlemen, I think we should also put this in our communique that we all publicly and jointly regret what has happened.

Major Johnson: Sir Kashim said it too when he came to Lagos.

Other Members: We all agree.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: On Government Information Media I think all the Government Information Media in the country have done terribly bad. Emeka would you say the "New Nigerian" has been very unkind to the East—

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: And the "Post" which I pay for.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Sometime I feel my problem is not with anyone but the "Outlook."

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: All the other information media have done a lot. When the Information Media in a country completely closed their eyes to what was happening I think it is a dangerous thing.

Major Johnson: Let us agree it is the situation.

Lt.-Col. Ejoor: All of them have committed one crime or the other.

Lt.-Col. Hassan: The "Outlook" is the worst of them.

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The "Outlook" is not the worst the "Post" which we all in fact pay for is the worst followed closely by the "New Nigerian."

PUBLICATIONS

Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Let us make a general statement on all of them, no distinction.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think we are agreed that all Government Information Media should desist from making inflammatory publications that would worsen the situation in the country.

Gentlemen we have got a telegram here. I do not know from where it is but it looks it is from Ghana—MILITARY LEADERS CARE NIGERIAN EMBASSY ACCRA X ACCRA MEETING GREAT RELIEF WE DEMAND ONE NIGERIA WORLD ATTENTION ON YOU

X sitting suspended: 4.05 p.m. Nigerian time. Sitting resumed: 4.30 p.m. Nigerian time. Pressmen invited into the Conference Hall.

Lt.-Col. Gowon: Gentlemen, this meeting has been successful. I want you all to know about this and you will know all about it when the communique comes out.

KINDNESS

I must take this opportunity on behalf of all the Military Governors here, Members of the Supreme Military Council, other Senior Members of the Forces and the Police and the Nigerian people to thank the Chairman of the National Liberation Council, his Colleagues, the Government and the people of Ghana for their gesture, their kindness in offering us Ghana and this beautiful building for our deliberations.

I think the fact that Nigeria at least scaled through the first hurdle or the first phase by coming to Ghana is a very great credit indeed. We are indeed very grateful to you, Sir, and to all the people of Ghana and we are very, very grateful for all you have done for us.

I am sure that the people of Nigeria will be more than grateful to you and I feel we are all indebted to you for all your efforts in this respect.

Gentlemen may I ask you to join me in drinking to the health of the Chairman of the National Liberation Council, his Colleagues and the Government and people of Ghana.

TOAST

Thank you very much, indeed (Loud Applause).

Lt.-Gen. Ankrah: I am at a loss as to how to address you. We are already very late and since Ghana's time is one hour behind Nigeria's and you are striving to get back home, I feel it is not my duty to respond to this very sincere toast. However, it is worthwhile and it is commendable that I should say a word or two to you all.

Firstly, on behalf of my Colleagues of the National Liberation Council who had agreed that this meeting should take place in Ghana, in this venue and to make sure that our brothers in Nigeria would not go to any other place than to Ghana because we are twin brothers of Latona. (Applause).

We should be together and having been together you have succeeded in achieving those which should be yours.

As you realise, we did not interfere. We did not interrupt and this has been a domestic affair of Nigeria itself and thereby all of you had been in the position to declare your views and accept a principle which will be so workable to the betterment of Nigeria.

We are so grateful and we will always remain grateful, grateful that you have been here and achieved this aim.

As soldiers, we believe that what you have achieved here will not be superficial. You are not going under a **seeming fair hysteria** to declare to your own people that you came here and declare (a) or (b) but in your hearts like Satan you are planning a different thing.

I am sure that all of you Governors of the Regions will definitely agree to a central pivot whereby Nigeria will be unified and you will prove to each other that suspicions, unreliability, those tenets or tentacles which brought about those ideas which perpetrated some suspicion amongst you will be buried

here in this Peduase Lodge and when you get back you are going to reunify Nigeria into one entity:

As soldiers you will prove your worth, you will be statesmen and here and there you will conform and actually consult each other so that Nigeria that great continent which barks and which Ghana relies upon will be once more a source of inspiration, devotion and will remain forever a unified country.

Irrespective of what has happened bury your hatchets and look forward to the future and as Army Officers I trust and I am saying it again, I trust you will not disappoint us.

There have not been two distinctions between Army Commanders or Army Generals or even Field Marshals in the field of battle.

They have never disagreed, they disagree on strategy but they never disagree on the operation and the achievement of the objective and this objective, I am sure all of you today will achieve only for one purpose, that is, one Nigeria.

No matter what your Federation will be I say again, one Nigeria and I will ask you to drink for a truly united One Nigeria wherever it may be and wherever it may be found. Thank you, very much (Loud Applause).

Lt. Col. Gwon: Honestly by God's power we will not disappoint Ghana and those who believe in us.

MEETING

Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Mr. Chairman, Colleagues I am truly happy that we have come to this meeting and that we have found in this meeting in Peduase Lodge the basis for future mutual understanding in our country.

I do not wish to add to what my Colleague has said but one little point I thought was missed out is the question of the friendly relationship between Ghana and Nigeria.

I would like us all to drink to the continued friendship, brotherhood and solidarity between the peoples of Ghana and those of Nigeria (Loud Applause).

The Meeting adjourned finally at 5.10 p.m. Nigerian time.

MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS OF NIGERIAN MILITARY LEADERS HELD IN GHANA ON 4TH AND 5TH JANUARY, 1967.

Note—These Officials Minutes are yet to be adopted by the Supreme Military Council at its next meeting

The Supreme Military Council held its meeting in Ghana on the 4th-5th January. Those present were:

Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon
Colonel Robert Adebayo
Lt.-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu
Lt.-Col. David Ejoor
Lt.-Col Hassan Katsina
Commodore J. E. A. Wey
Major Mobolaji Johnson
Alhaji Kam Selem
Mr. T. Omo-Bare

Secretaries

Mr. S. I. A. Akenzua—Permanent Under-Secretary, Federal Cabinet Office.

Mr. P. T. Odumosu—Secretary to the Military Government, West

Mr. N. U. Akpan—Secretary to the Military Government, East

Mr. D. P. Lawani—Under-Secretary, Military Governor's Office, Mid-West

Alhaji Ali Akilu—Secretary to the Military Government, North

Opening:

The Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council, Lt.-General J. A. Ankrah, declaring the meeting open, welcomed the visitors to Ghana and expressed delight that Ghana had been agreed upon by the Nigerian Military leaders as the venue for this crucial meeting. He considered the whole matter to be the domestic affair of Nigeria, and as such, he refrained from dwelling on any specific points. The General, however, expressed the belief that the Nigerian problems were not such that cannot be easily resolved through patience, understanding and mutual respect. Throughout history, he said, there has been no failure of military statesmen and the eyes of the whole world were on the Nigerian Army. He advised that soldiers are purely statesmen and not politicians and the Nigerian Military leaders owe it as a responsibility to the 56 million people of Nigeria to successfully carry through their task of nation-building. Concluding, the General urged the Nigerian leaders to bury their differences, forget the past and discuss their matter frankly but patiently.

2. Lt.-Col. Gowon invited the Nigerian leaders to say a "joint thank you" to their host, and all said thank you in unison in response to Lt.-General Ankrah's address.

3. At this point the General vacated the Conference table.

Importation of Arms and resolution renouncing the use of Force:

4. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu spoke next. He said that the Agenda was acceptable to him subject to the comments he had made on some of the items. (A copy of the Agenda with Lt.-Col. Ojukwu's comments is attached to these minutes as Annex A). Lt.-Col. Ojukwu said that no useful purpose would be served by using the meeting as a cover for arms build-up and accused the Federal Military Government of having engaged in large scale arms deals by sending Major Apolo to negotiate for arms abroad. He alleged that the Federal Military Government recently paid £1 million for some arms bought from Italy and now stored up in Kaduna. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu was reminded by the Military Governor, North and other members that the East was indulging in an arms build-up and that the plane carrying arms which recently crashed on the Cameroons border was destined for Enugu. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu denied both allegations. Concluding his remarks on arms build-up, Lt.-Col. Ojukwu proposed that if the meeting was to make any progress, all the members must at the outset adopt a resolution to renounce the use of force in the settlement of Nigerian dispute.

5. Lt.-Col. Gowon explained that as a former Chief of Staff, Army, he was aware of the deficiency in the country's arms and ammunition which needed replacement. Since the Defence Industries Corporation could not produce these, the only choice was to order from overseas and order was accordingly placed to the tune of £3½ million. He said to the best of his knowledge, the actual amount that had been paid out was only £80,000 for which he signed a cheque on behalf of the General Officer Commanding. The £80 million about which so much noise has been made was nothing but a typographical error in the Customs in recording the payment of £80,000. As to why these arms were sent up to

the North, Lt.-Col. Gowon referred to lack of storage facilities in Lagos and reminded his Military Colleagues of the number of times arms and ammunition had been dumped in the sea. This was why, he said, it became necessary to use the better storage facilities in Kaduna. The arms and ammunition had not been distributed because they arrived only two weeks previously and have not yet been taken on charge. After exhaustive discussion to which all members contributed and during which Lt.-Col. Ejoor pointed out that it would be necessary to determine what arms and ammunition had arrived and what each unit of the Army had before any further distribution would take place, the Supreme Military Council unanimously adopted a Declaration proposed by Lt.-Col. Ojukwu, that all members:

(a) renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis;

(b) reaffirm their faith in discussions and negotiation as the only peaceful way of resolving the Nigerian crisis; and

(c) agree to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunition available in each unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated stores, and to share out such arms equitably to the various Commands;

(d) agree that there should be no more importation of arms and ammunition until normalcy was restored.

The full text of the Declaration which was signed by all members is attached as Annex B to these minutes.

Re-organisation of the Army

6. The Supreme Military Council, having acknowledged the fact that the series of disturbances since 15th, January 1966, have caused disunity in the Army resulting in lack of discipline and loss of public confidence, turned their attention to the question of how best the Army should be re-organised in order to restore that discipline and confidence. There was a lengthy discussion of the subject and when the arguments became involved members retired into secret session. On their return they announced that agreement had been reached by them on the re-organisation, administration and control of the Army on the following lines:—

(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.

(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.

(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.

(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.

(e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have control over Area Commands for internal security.

(f) Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks.

7. In connection with the re-organisation of the Army, the Council discussed the distribution of Military personnel with particular reference to the present recruitment drive. The view was held that general recruitment throughout the country in the present situation would cause great imbalance in the distribution of soldiers. After a lengthy discussion of the subject, the Council agreed to set up a Military Committee, on which each Region will be represented, to prepare statistics which will show:

(a) Present strength of Nigerian Army;

(b) Deficiency in each sector of each unit;

(c) The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;

(d) Additional requirements for the country and each Area Command.

The Committee is to meet and report to Council within two weeks from the date of receipt of instructions.

8. The Council agreed that pending completion of the exercise in paragraph 7 further recruitment of soldiers should cease.

9. In respect of item 3 (b) of the Agenda, implementation of the agreement reached on 9th August, 1966, it was agreed, after a lengthy discussion, that it was necessary for the agreement reached on 9th August by the delegates of the Regional Governments to be fully implemented. In particular, it was accepted in principle that army personnel of Northern origin should return to the North from the West. It was therefore felt that a crash programme of recruitment and training, the details of which would be further examined after the Committee to look into the strength and distribution of army personnel

had reported, would be necessary to constitute indigenous army personnel in the West to a majority there quickly.

Non-Recognition by the East of Lt.-Col Gowon as Supreme Commander

10. The question of the non-recognition by the East of Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government was also exhaustively discussed. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu based his objection on the fact, *inter alia*, that no one can properly assume the position of Supreme Commander until the whereabouts of the former Supreme Commander, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, was known. He therefore asked that the country be informed of the whereabouts of the Major-General and added that in his view, it was impossible, in the present circumstances, for any one person to assume any effective central command of the Nigerian Army. Lt.-Col. Ejoor enunciated four principles to guide the meeting in formulating an answer to the question of who should be Supreme Commander. These were the:

- (a) Problem of effective leadership;
- (b) Crisis of confidence in the Army;
- (c) Disruption in the present chain of Command;

(d) Inability of any soldier to serve effectively in any unit anywhere in the country. Lt.-Col. Gowon replied that he was quite prepared to make an announcement on the matter and regretted that a formal announcement had been delayed for so long but the delay was originally intended to allow time for tempers to cool down. He reminded his colleagues that they already had the information in confidence. After further discussion and following the insistence by Lt.-Col. Ojukwu that Lt.-Col. Gowon should inform members of what happened to the former Supreme Commanders, members retired into secret session and subsequently returned to continue with the meeting after having reached an agreement among themselves.

11. At this point, the meeting adjourned until Thursday 5th January. The Communiqué issued at the end of the first day's sitting is attached as Annex D.

The Power of the Federal Military Government, vis-à-vis the Regional Governments

12. When the meeting resumed on the 5th January, it proceeded to consider the form of Government best suited to Nigeria in view of what the country has experienced in the past year (1966). Members agreed that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal

Military Government should remain in the Supreme Military Council to which any decision affecting the whole country shall be referred for determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination must be referred to Military Governors for their comment and concurrence. Specifically, the Council agreed that appointments to senior ranks in the Police, Diplomatic and Consular Services as well as appointments to super-scale posts in the Federal Civil Service and the equivalent posts in Statutory Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council. The Regional members felt that all the Decrees or provisions of Decrees passed since 15th January, 1966, and which detracted from the previous powers and positions of Regional Governments should be repealed if mutual confidence is to be restored. After this issue had been discussed at some length the Council took the following decisions:—

The Council decided that:

(i) on the reorganisation of the Army:

(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.

(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.

(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.

(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.

(e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have control over Area Commands for internal security.

(f) Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks.

(ii) on appointment to certain posts:

The following appointments must be approved by Supreme Military Council:—

(a) Diplomatic and Consular Posts.

(b) Senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.

(c) Super-scale Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation posts.

(iii) on the functioning of the Supreme Military Council: Any decision affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council. Where a meeting is not possible such a matter must be referred to Military Governors for comment and concurrence.

(iv) that all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on the 14th *January* and list out all the Decrees and provisions of Decrees concerned so that they may be repealed not later than 21st *January* if possible;

(v) that for at least the next six months, there should be purely a Military Government, having nothing to do whatever with politicians.

A statement on the Supreme Military Council is attached as Annex C.

Soldiers involved in Disturbances on 15th January, 1966 and thereafter

13. Members expressed views about the future of those who have been detained in connection with all the disturbances since 15th January, 1966, and agreed that the fate of soldiers in detention should be determined not later than end of January 1967.

Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference

14. The Council next considered the question of the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee and the acceptance of that Committee's recommendations of September 1966. After some exchange of views, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume sitting as soon as practicable to begin from where they left off, and that the question of accepting the unanimous recommendations of September 1966 be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

The Problems of Displaced Persons

15. The Council considered exhaustively the problems of displaced persons, with particular reference to their rehabilitation, employment and property. The view was expressed and generally accepted that the Federal Government ought to take the lead in establishing a National Body which will be responsible for raising and making appeal for funds. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu made the point, which was accepted by Lt.-Col. Katsina, that in the present situation, the intermingling of Easterners and Northerners was not feasible. After each Military Governor had discussed these problems as they affected his area, the Council agreed:

(a) On rehabilitation, that Finance Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each Region should send three representatives to the meeting.

(b) on employment and recovery of property, that civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should continue to be paid their full salaries until 31st March, 1967 provided they have not got alternative employment, and that the Military Governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons. Lt.-Col. Ejoor disclosed that the employment situation in his Region was so acute that he had no alternative but to ask non-Mid-Westerners working in the private sector in his Region to quit and make room for Mid-Westerners repatriated from elsewhere. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu stated that he fully appreciated the problem faced by both the Military Governor, West, and the Military Governor, Mid-West, in this matter and that if in the last resort, either of them had to send the Easterners concerned back to the East, he would understand, much as the action would further complicate the resettlement problem in the East. He assured the Council that his order that non-Easterners should leave the Eastern Region would be kept under constant review with a view to its being lifted as soon as practicable.

16. On the question of future meetings of the Supreme Military Council, members agreed that future meetings will be held in Nigeria at a venue to be mutually agreed.

17. On the question of Government information media, the Council agreed that all Government information media should be restrained from making inflammatory statements and causing embarrassment to various Governments in the Federation.

18. There were other matters not on the Agenda which were also considered among which were the form of Government for Nigeria (reported in paragraph 12 above) and the disruption of the country's economy by the lack of movement of rail and road transport which the Regional Governors agreed to look into.

19. The meeting began and ended in a most cordial atmosphere and members unanimous-

ly issued a second and final Communique a copy of which is attached to these minutes as Annex E.

20. In his closing remarks the Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council expressed his pleasure at the successful outcome of the meeting and commended the decisions taken to the Nigerian leaders for their implementation. Lt.-Col. Gowon on behalf of his colleagues thanked the Ghanaian leader for the excellent part he had played in

helping to resolve the issues. The successful outcome of the meeting was then toasted with champagne and the Nigerians took leave of the Ghanaians.

21. The proceedings of the meeting were reported verbatim for each Regional Government and the Federal Government by their respective official reporters and tape-recorded versions were distributed to each Government.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE
No. 9

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1968


Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESS:

Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A., (*Scarborough West*), Toronto.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Alexander	^e Mr. Groos	Mr. Marceau
Mr. Anderson	Mr. Harkness	Mr. Mongrain
Mr. Barrett	Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Nesbitt
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Mr. Ouellet
^f Mr. Buchanan	<i>Boundary</i>)	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Hymmen	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Carter	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Legault	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Winch
Mr. Gibson	Mr. MacLean	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

⁵ Replaced Mr. Prud'homme on October 17, 1968.

⁶ Replaced Mr. Laniel on October 17, 1968.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
WEDNESDAY, October 16, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Alexander and MacLean be substituted for those of Messrs. Macquarrie and MacDonald (*Egmont*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

WEDNESDAY, October 16, 1968.

Ordered,—That, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public moneys, the items listed in the Revised Main Estimates for 1968-69, relating to External Aid Office and National Defence, be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

THURSDAY, October 17, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Buchanan and Groos be substituted for those of Messrs. Prud'homme and Laniel on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FRIDAY, October 18, 1968.

(14)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:45 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Perry Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Mongrain, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Winch, Yewchuk—(20).

Also present: Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*), M.P.

In attendance: Mr. Stephen Lewis, Member of the Legislative Assembly for Scarborough West, Toronto.

On motion of Mr. Yewchuk, seconded by Mr. Cafik,

Resolved,—That reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A. (*Scarborough West*), who has been invited to appear as a witness before this Committee on Friday, October 18, 1968.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A. Mr. Lewis made an opening statement, describing his knowledge of conditions in Nigeria, based on his recent travel there. He ended his comments with suggestions concerning possible action by Canada at this time.

At approximately 10:25 a.m., members of the Committee began their questioning. With the questioning continuing, at 11:00 a.m. the Committee adjourned until 2:00 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(15)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 2:10 p.m. this day, with the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Harkness, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Mongrain, Roberts, Ryan, Winch—(18).

Also present: Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*), M.P.

In attendance: Mr. Stephen Lewis (*Scarborough West*), M.L.A., Toronto.

The Chairman opened the meeting with an attendance of 14, on the understanding that as soon as a quorum was present, he would call for a motion to incorporate the evidence taken thus far.

At 2:15 p.m., a quorum being present, on a motion by Mr. Cafik, seconded by Mr. Gibson,

Resolved,—That the Evidence taken thus far during this afternoon's sitting be incorporated as part of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

Members of the Committee completed their questioning of the witness, Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A. The Chairman thanked Mr. Lewis for his appearance before the Committee and for the testimony which he had given. The witness retired.

The Chairman mentioned a letter which he had just received from the Nigerian Students' Union, University of Alberta, Edmonton. He noted that the letter will be considered further by the Chairman, who will report thereon at the next sitting.

Mr. Fairweather noted that Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Dr. Arikpo, will be in Canada on October 27, 1968. He suggested that officials of the Department of External Affairs should find out if Dr. Arikpo would like to appear before the Committee. It was agreed that the Chairman will make further enquiries in this respect.

The Committee adjourned at 3:15 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Friday, October 18, 1968.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. Will the meeting please come to order.

I should advise all honourable members of the Committee that we have scheduled Dr. Clyne Shepherd as our witness for Monday at 3.45 p.m. but we are still awaiting word from Edinburgh of his experience. We expect it later this day.

General Milroy is confirmed as our witness for Tuesday morning next at 9.30 a.m.

I would ask for a motion that reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to Mr. Stephen Lewis, a member of the Legislative Assembly for Scarborough West who has been invited to appear as a witness before this Committee on Friday, October 18, 1968.

Mr. Yewchuk: I so move.

Mr. Cafik: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, it is my pleasure this morning to introduce as our witness, Mr. Stephen Lewis, who is the member for Scarborough West in the Ontario Legislature. He is a distinguished son of a distinguished father, being the son of our colleague and member of this Committee, Mr. David Lewis.

Mr. Groos: Which one is the father?

An hon. Member: We will not hold it against him.

The Vice-Chairman: That came from a Liberal member.

Mr. Lewis: I do not know whether he is trying to flatter me or insult my son.

The Vice-Chairman: Well Stephen, the younger, was recently in Umuahia in Biafra for a six-day period from October 6 to October 13. He had a great interest in the area when he was a teacher in Okigwi for six months back in 1960-61. He has been a member of the Legislative Assembly in Ontario

since 1963 and is well-known as a speaker pretty well nationally, I would say. He is a young man, he has a bright future, and I am sure that he will be of considerable assistance to us in this Committee. Mr. Stephen, would you make your opening statement.

● 0950

Mr. Stephen Lewis (MLA Scarborough West): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I much appreciate the invitation of the Committee to offer whatever testimony I might have which would be relevant to the Nigerian-Biafran civil war.

As the Chairman has already indicated, the period of time I spent was only six days. I do not overestimate that time. I think I did as much within the six days as it was humanly possible to do and absorbed as much as it was humanly possible to absorb.

For me, going to Biafra was fulfilling a strong emotional commitment to a country where I had spent some considerable time—I made an African journey in the early 1960s—and for which I had a very profound affection. I think this is congenital of most people who visit the African continent—one maintains a wanderlust and a wish to return—and when Biafra was wracked with the events of the last two years, I was naturally inclined to go back to view the occurrences myself on the spot and to try to draw some comparisons with what had gone before. That is really what prompted me more than anything else to return to Biafra.

I suppose it is relevant to the Committee to know approximately what I did and whom I saw. I spent an hour-and-a-half to two hours in private and, I think honest and very forthright conversation with Colonel Ojukwu, and many hours with Sir Francis Ibiam who was the civil governor of Biafra—of Eastern Nigeria—from 1960 to 1966, when the military regime took over, and is the key civilian adviser to Ojukwu; and, like other members of this Committee and many of the foreign press, with the Chief Justice, Sir Louis Mbanefo and with a Dr. Eni Njoku who headed the peace talks at Addis Ababa and is

fairly familiar; and finally with the sort of resident radical in Biafra at the moment, a Mr. Nandam Anzimiro, a professor of sociology, who is now in the Department of Information and is recognized, I think, within the country as someone who reflects much of the current revolutionary fervour. I want to say something about that shortly.

I lived with Dr. Middelkoop who is the head of the World Council of Churches relief organization in Biafra and that was of tremendous advantage because day in and day out he had reporting to him, of course, his relief emissaries and missionaries spread throughout the country and had very good contact with those on the federal side as well as on the Biafran side. It was also possible to spend a considerable time with Caritas people because the relief relationships are necessarily very close.

I also, happily, was able to see former students and friends and to get from them what I thought was a reasonably balanced view of what was occurring.

Inevitably, in a civil war, imbalance and immoderation tend to creep into one's value judgment and it was good to sharpen that against people I knew and felt I could trust.

I covered the countryside from one end to the other, from morning until night, and spent a considerable period at the front, as well. Both the foreign ministry and the Overseas Press Service were kind enough to provide cars and petrol. I am sure Charles Taylor may have alluded to how difficult it is otherwise to get around Biafra at all.

Let me say this to the Committee, that apart from the anguish which one sees and one feels about Biafra, I suppose what I emerged with was a sense of enormous personal impotence in the face of this collective despair. That is the greatest single impact that Biafra has. The sense that nothing can be done about this human condition is the kind of commentary that is most unpalatable, perhaps one of those terrible real-politik factors in the 1960's.

Let me put the perspective this way. My memory of Nigeria in 1960 is almost exclusively that of a buoyant, vital, happy society and of children of tremendous vitality and enthusiasm. My memory of Biafra in 1968 is inevitably that of children, mutilated and starving, perpetually in tears.

• 0955

I make that analogy at the outset because it is indicative of the transition in the country

in the eight-year period. That a tribe like the Ibos should have been so grossly dismembered, and that the transition in feeling of the country should be so striking, very much unnerved me. One seldom sees in Africa, I want to emphasize, children crying perpetually, and that is the one sound more resonant than any other in present Biafran experience.

Canada and most of the western world are necessarily preoccupied with the relief situation and that is, I grant, a quite natural and compassionate human response to what is occurring; but I want to question before this committee the nature of the relief, what happens to it and what impact it makes. I know that you have had much testimony in this regard. I will try not to repeat too much. At this point in time very often no more than 40 or 50 or 60 tons a night gets into Biafra at all from anywhere, and the requirements, according to Dr. Middelkoop and the Caritas people with whom I spoke and who seemed reasonably informed, is 3,000 tons a night. I want to make the disparity as clear as I can.

Mr. Anderson: Is that now?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: That is now. The reason that it has dropped to 40, or 50, or 60 tons and that probably varies a little from other figures you have been given—is that the aircraft are running out of propeller power and frequently require repair, and they are now having to bring as much petrol and administrative equipment as they are food. In addition in the last week or 10 days the Nigerians have begun to bomb the airport on a fairly systematic basis. For instance last Friday night the tower was bombed and was put out of commission; no contact was possible between ground radio and aircraft at all and not a single flight came in. On Saturday night everyone was sufficiently unnerved about the experience that only 40 tons came in. Sometimes as few as two planes leave Sao Tomé and only two planes leave Fernando Po in any given evening. If the bombing occurs, as is now the habit, between 5 and 6 p.m. it is very difficult to fill the craters before the night flights begin. Therefore, the amount of relief coming in in any given evening is now closer to 50 or 60 tons than to the 100-odd tons that was true perhaps two or three weeks ago; and the situation fast deteriorates. The unloading takes longer, the Sao Tomé end is more laborious, and the Nigerian threat is quite significant.

One of the important things that might be thought about for a moment is what happens

to the aid when it gets to Biafra. It is not only the incredible disparity which is so unsettling, it is the fact that in a situation of near mass starvation the distribution of aid is uncontrollable, so that even what little aid gets through makes almost no appreciable impact on the population at all.

Let me put it to you this way: Suppose you have a feeding centre in Umuahia, as there is, and as I saw, and as Charles Taylor and others saw, and you have 200 servings of garri, the basic native staple and a protein or vitamin supplement that comes on a relief train. You have 200 servings and you have at least a thousand children clammering for those servings.

In terms of ruthless relief work—I am not advocating this; I am simply putting it to the Committee—the logical thing to maintain a society is to feed 200 people one meal a day for five days to try to overcome the kwashiorkor and to reconstitute their physical well-being sufficient to survive. It is a terrible implication that you would then isolate the other 800, but that, in relief terms, is an intelligent use of the food.

In fact, what happens is that it is absolutely uncontrollable and you cannot put that measure on it. The relief workers have tried everything. They have tried giving tags to the children but the tags are stolen and used by others. They say, "Bring a doctor's prescription", but the prescriptions are subsequently forged. They try to bring children and mothers in through a turnstile operation and the entire turnstile collapses under the thrust of human beings against the barrier as they search for food. They have often tried indeed to make quick physical checks on the spot in order to see those who most require the food, and that simply does not work. The upshot is that instead of 200 people receiving one good meal a day for five days 1,000 people receive one meal over the five-day period and that does not reconstitute anyone's physical well-being. So that even the pathetic quantity of aid that comes into the country by way of food relief is dissipated almost entirely and makes no appreciable difference to the population.

• 1000

When that is added to the fact, that I am sure is within the awareness of the Committee, that by December or January there will be no food at all in Biafra, then we will have moved from a period of providing vitamin and protein supplements to a period where

there are no carbohydrates, and we are beginning to talk about a relief operation which involves feeding, from scratch, 8 or 10 million people. There was not a single relief person to whom I spoke who was even prepared to contemplate such an eventuality.

Mr. Chairman, in that context I think it is important that if the situation in Biafra is to be resolved obviously relief is not the answer and that there have to be other political solutions.

I do not think, if I may be so bold as to put it to the Committee, that those political solutions, or any solution, can be advanced without some sense of what has gone on before in Biafra. I admit that this may be a very bald shortening of things, but perhaps I could recapitulate that one of the very great ironies about the present Nigerian-Biafran civil war is Nigeria itself. Like so much of West Africa—British West Africa—it tended to be an artificial creation, a device, a geographic device, of the Imperial régime rather than a natural country. It tended to thrust people together without sufficient respect for tribal divisions, or, indeed, as some would submit, for geographic boundary.

Unlike the situation in East and Central Africa, where Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in one area have been allowed to go their ways, and the break-up of the Central African Federation, allowing Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia go their respective ways, Nigeria was forced into a federation which was not enthusiastically accepted except by the Ibos. That is, of course, the classic irony about the Nigerian-Biafran civil war. The Northern Nigerians—the Hausas—were very reluctant to have a united country at all—to have a Federal Nigeria; they resisted to the last possible moment. The whole thrust for a united Nigeria came from the Eastern region, and throughout the period of 1960-1966, whenever there was the possibility of the Federation falling apart—and may I say, since this was an artificial device this was a frequent possibility—it was the Eastern region, through the Eastern political party, the NCNC, and through the Eastern President, Azikiwe, which made herculean efforts to hold the Federation together.

Historically it has been adequately documented in most of the text-books and most of the news reports that Nigeria was wracked in those years with internal corruption and dissent, with elections which many regarded as rigged, with censures which were in much controversy around the country and with

political parties which, like many African societies, tended to be autocratic and one-party in nature and resulted in excessive turmoil in the country. It is worth remembering, Mr. Chairman, that in 1965 it was the Western region that had significant stirrings towards independence, and even before that the Northern region would have liked to break away.

It was not until 1966, with the incredible slaughter of the Ibos during what is characterized as the pogroms, that secession became real for present-day Biafra. I emphasize that Biafrans were perhaps the most reluctant secessionists the twentieth century has known. Colonel Ojukwu almost lost control to his radicals because they felt he was too moderate in maintaining the Nigerian Federation for as long as he did.

What I am really trying to convey to the Committee is that historically, and paradoxically, it was Eastern Nigeria that believed in a united Nigeria and moved heaven and earth to see that it was achieved. The events of 1966 forced a separation. The Biafrans regard it therefore as a war of self-defence, a consolidation of sovereignty, which they would have preferred to avoid.

• 1005

The Biafrans also see it in one other respect—and I think I can say that this is true of Ojukwu and of Ibiam and of Mbanefo and of all the serious Biafran leaders: They see it not as a Nigerian-Biafran civil war but as a British-Biafran civil war. In terms of evaluating international responses that is rather important. They see it as a British-motivated war. They see it as an effort to maintain a crude economic interest in the oil in Biafra. They feel they have adequate evidence to demonstrate it, at least to reassure themselves. They see it as a military operation on the part of the British; and certainly Western correspondents have confirmed that in the morning British military advisers leave Lagos by helicopter, fly to the front, man the respective Nigerian divisions and return to Lagos at night and that this pattern is a daily occurrence.

The Biafrans feel so powerfully about it that the moderation which was given to men like Ibiam and Mbanefo and even Ojukwu has turned perhaps to extremism. Their language is almost violent—exceedingly strong. That is astonishing when one is on the spot. I remind you that Ibiam, a medical doctor schooled in all the best British traditions, was ranked—if there is such a rank; and there is, apparently—as the world's leading Christian

in 1966, and was fêted as such in Geneva in that year. He is a vice-president of the World Council of Churches and has moved through the world as a Protestant missionary. He is a man given to gentle reticence but his language is that of a violent extremist and his bitterness about the British knows no bounds. That is also true of Mbanefo and it is also true of many of the other leaders.

When trying to understand the impulse about the war I think those things are reasonably relevant. I remember Ibiam saying to me—and I think I can quote him almost exactly—"They conscripted us in 1914 and 1939. They did not tell us it was an exclusively European war. Now they tell us that the Biafran-Nigerian conflict is an exclusively African war when, in fact, we are fighting Britain and the Soviet Union. Why is it not possible, since white nations are involved, that another white nation cannot come to our aid and help us sort it out by way of cease-fire or another mechanism. That is roughly the argument of the Biafran leadership as they gave it to me in no uncertain terms, in exactly that way.

• 1010

The feeling about the conflict, and I am sure that others have conveyed this, extends to all the people. I cannot convey to the Committee adequately the unanimity of opposition in the part of the Biafran people and their absolute conviction that the war will be won at whatever cost, that they will see it through at whatever cost, and that what they are fighting for must be achieved at whatever cost. I think that when Charles Taylor wrote about the determination of the Biafran people it was as eloquently put as it could be and it was entirely and appropriately accurate. Well then, when one measures the Ibo, the Biafran response to all of this and the tremendous resistance they have, there are four factors I think which influence them greatly and I would like to deal with them briefly. The first is the nature of the war itself. I think there tends to be a Western misconception about the war. We make the assumption that when a provincial capital falls in Biafra that the province falls with it, but that of course is not true. What happens is that if the provincial capital falls the Biafrans leave the capital, decamp to the countryside as it were, and the Biafran administration in the province largely continues. And Ojukwu, even now, in some areas of federal-controlled territory has administrators collecting taxes, engaging volunteers for military effort, organizing the

local people for rudimentary government operations behind, as it were, federal lines. Ojukwu admitted, and he is increasingly doing this in private conversation—it may be a strategy and it may be honest, I am inclined to think the latter—that he did want to fight a war around the provincial capitals of Aba, Owerri, Okigwi, Port Harcourt or Umuahia but that in order to satisfy the valued judgments of the entire western world and to give his own cause credibility, in order to avoid being written off entirely, he did fight it around the provincial capitals although it was disadvantageous because the Biafrans are not given to a conventional war—they are given to a guerrilla war—and because obviously the Nigerian armoured columns need the main paved arteries in order to move, and there would be some value in the Biafrans retreating to the hinterland and fighting in unconventional ways. He feels that he is now equipped to do that, that for the first time, as it were, the Biafrans can reasonably wage the war. I think that is of some significance. There is a very strong feeling in the country that it is only now that the war is about to begin, that now that the provincial capitals have been expended—and they regard Umuahia itself as expendable, there is no great enthusiasm for defending Umuahia—there is a very great feeling that the war should revert to the hinterland. So there has been much guerrilla training and every morning and as one travels on the road in the evening one can see large companies of Biafrans in the process of military training and a profound feeling amongst the fighting men themselves that this war must be fought in a guerrilla-commando nature in the bush and not in the main centres. And they feel that in two, three or four years—it may take that in their terms—they can rout the Nigerians, cut off the supply lines, and win the war. I am not a military tactician but I think that certainly the intention to prosecute a guerrilla war, perhaps with the fall of Umuahia, if that occurs, is very strongly held in the Biafran mind. They are of course receiving some pathetic trickle of arms. I do not think that should be overestimated either. Standing at Uli Airport on two or three evenings, there comes from Gabon perhaps three, four or five planes. Assuming that they carry 10 tons each it is not an overwhelming supply to Biafra to maintain this war. Ojukwu claims that the material consists of ammunition, bullets and very small arms. Now in my visit to the front one week ago today, though the Owerri-Okigwi front, for many hours, I must

say that a goodly number of the soldiers were fighting with machetes and clubs, that this is still a war against Saracens, Saladins and Ferrets with very inadequate defensive equipment. It is astonishing therefore that the Biafrans should have held out for 16 months and that the war seems, for the moment, to have ground to a halt in that area around Umuahia. I think that is a reflection of the determination to resist.

• 1015

The second thing which obviously has a real effect on the Ibos is this question of genocide. I do not want to quibble about a word which is given to so much misinterpretation. I would prefer to put it to the Committee this way: I think there is some legitimate evidence of massacre—Urua Inyang is one example—and the Christian missionaries, particularly the Catholic fathers, will give evidence of massacre. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I am sure some of them would come to this Committee, if invited. They indicated to me that they would testify anywhere in the world as to conditions of massacre and indiscriminate slaughter. Certainly the bombing raids on a daily basis are systematized, entirely indiscriminate and directed exclusively towards civilian populations. Now I give you that from direct eyewitness accounts. I visited the bombing sites on days that they occurred. Last Saturday, as a matter of fact, was a good example, when the little community of Uzuakoli was bombed, with some 47 dead and 122 wounded. I was standing in the ward of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, as a matter of fact talking to Ron Collister who had just arrived with the CBC TV camera team, when the bodies of the seriously wounded were brought in from Uzuakoli. I remember going out to Mbaize province to the little town of Arufao and seeing the craters in the market place and the strafing of all the buildings. All of the missionaries testified that it happens on a daily basis, that it usually occurs twice a day, and it usually involves an Ilyushin bomber or one of the two MIG jets. The pattern is absolutely predictable. They find an area of strong human concentration, usually a market place or a feeding station. Everyone is aware that they are populated almost exclusively by women and children. I emphasize to the Committee that there are no military targets anywhere in the vicinity. The planes come fairly low, particularly the jets, and they circle, one assumes, to establish who is in the immediate environs. They have three

methods of attack: the first is strafing, the second is direct bombing, the third is the use of a rocket which fragments on impact into a vast proliferation of shrapnel and does perhaps greater devastation in human terms than the rockets because the most destructive are the most popular. Now when you combine some evidence of massacre with the open evidence of indiscriminate bombing, about which there can be no dispute, with the incredible starvation, then one has a potential genocidal tone or quality to the war. I put that to the Committee. Certainly, and I think this is important in determining what is involved, the Ibos believe that genocide is the objective. What they experience in the pogroms of 1966, particularly at the hands of Northern Nigeria, persuades them that that is what they can expect in 1968. There is nothing better documented, certainly by the British press and observers like Colin Legum than the pogroms of 1966. I think it is also fair to say that the Hausas regard this was as something of a religious jihad for the extension of Islam through Biafra. They have made no particular bones about that and indeed throughout the Federation that has been a factor the Muslim influence in the North and the Christian influence in the South. I am not in a position to comment on the Observer Team. I assume that they are men of integrity and they report what they see or what they do not see. I express to the Committee only a personal bewilderment that a judgment could be made in the absence of being in Biafra itself. That perplexes me greatly because I think that indeed for any kind of balanced view there is value in observing from within Biafra.

The third point I want to make, related to the nature of Ibo resistance, concerns the tribal organization. I will not take long with this except to remind Committee members that the Ibos as a people are almost unique in Africa and this lends its own tragic dimension to the war.

Most African tribes, as the Committee knows, are organized on a chieftaincy hierarchy. The Ibos are an egalitarian tribe, largely and extended family system. Indeed to a Westerner the extended family system of the Ibo is an overwhelming reality. This means they were able to embrace 2 million refugees who fled and returned to the country in 1966 virtually as brothers and absorb them into this family system with relative ease. It means that influences of patronage and corruption are not as easy in an extended family system as they obviously are in a scale of

fealty in a hierarchy chieftainship. In addition to that, it means, I think, a tremendous solidarity towards the war on the part of the Biafrans as a reflection of their cultural organization.

Now, I mention the following because I think it is rather important. When the British wanted to exercise the very famous colonial policy of indirect rule in Nigeria they did it through Northern Nigeria because the chieftaincy system permitted it and encouraged it. They did not do it through Eastern Nigeria, where an extended family system tended to inhibit it.

The final point I want to make about Biafra is that there is in the nature of the struggle a very strong revolutionary thrust which the young Turks on the way up regard as the real reason for the war. They do not see it purely as self-defence, purely as a defence against genocide, or a war of self-preservation alone. They see it as the creation of a new society. I spent a lot of time with these young men who hold influential positions in the civil service and who are on their way up. I spent an evening—I am sure you would all wish me to be specific—at the home of Mr. Eke, the Commissioner of Information in Biafra with eight or ten of his aides, one of whom the Committee might be interested to know is a chap by the name of Major Edward Chikukera. Edward Chikukera holds a doctorate in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Toronto and spent four and a half years at Massey College and returned only in 1966. He was and is a very good friend of many of us in that student generation. I was particularly pleased to re-establish contact with Chikukera because he now holds a significant position in Biafra. He is involved in the science group, that group which produces cannon projectiles out of materials received from West Germany and he is part of the cadre of young men who see the war as the creation of a new society, an independent statehood for Biafra, a non-client state relationship with European powers, and they feel very strongly about it.

• 1020

Well, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to belabour the Committee further. I think these things might be said: that the Biafrans can make a plausible case for sovereignty based on the Nigerian experience from 1960; that the war will be endless; that there is no end in sight to this war or to the slaughter which it entails, and above all that there is abso-

lutely no end to the starvation in this war, only the likelihood of an almost indescribable deterioration in the condition of life as one enters 1969.

Any observer, I think, has to feel at least some frail sense of hope by thinking about solutions, because relief is necessarily peripheral and temporary, however well motivated, even assuming—and I say this advisedly to the Committee—that it is not the expiation of white guilt but it is entirely humanitarian in its motives.

Then there are, it seems to me, three other viable alternatives. The first is a cease-fire. And I am perplexed myself, I must admit, Mr. Chairman, why it is not possible for Canada to attempt to get a cease-fire resolution debated on the floor of the General Assembly of the United Nations and why it would not be the most desirable, most courageous and most important thing that this country could do. I fail to comprehend that.

Second, if it were not possible to have that on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly, then somehow the British must be persuaded to stop the supply of arms to Nigeria because the destruction by those arms is incalculable even in twentieth century terms. I admit to you a certain discomfort personally. It is more than a certain discomfort; it is a personal humiliation that the British Government should be perpetuating the war by the constant provision of arms.

The third thing, which is probably a political fact which cannot ever be embraced by this government but which I put as an alternative in the eventuality that all else fails, is that it may be necessary for certain countries to recognize Biafra and to offer a minimum of military aid sufficient to create a military stalemate. Anyone who has been in Biafra and seen the nature of the Biafran resistance and how little it takes by way of armament to bring the war to a halt would realize that perhaps in humanitarian terms that is as altruistic and compassionate a gesture as the provision of *Hercules* transports. I do not advocate it, gentlemen; I simply say that one must have a sense of alternatives about this desperate business in Biafra and I would put it at the very bottom. I would certainly put cease-fire and an embargo on British arms at the top.

I am sorry to have taken so long, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: The first questioner is Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you. It is nice to be first up to bat, Mr. Chairman. Generally, I am last.

Mr. Lewis, you have mentioned that the airport at Uli is now undergoing systematic bombing attacks. At the same time, is there a concerted attempt to shoot down Red Cross aircraft and aircraft bringing military supplies into that airport?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Not that I know of. There is no systematic attempt at all in the evening to shoot them down. I may say that reading Western reports, particularly *Time* magazine—you can see how frail my reading matter is—one thought there would be radar controlled anti-aircraft fire, which is a phrase that is widely used. Well, there is no radar controlled anti-aircraft fire evident; at least there has not been for the period I was there, and speaking to the pilots there, has not been for a goodly period of time.

They tend to fly very, very high until they reach the airport itself and then in a 20 or 25-minute period slowly circle and negotiate a landing so that there is in fact no firing that one could see at night when the planes come in. There are more planes coming in from São Tomé than from Fernando Po on any given night.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. It was suggested by one of our witnesses yesterday that perhaps world opinion has resulted in the Nigerians not attacking either the airstrip or the aircraft because they are concerned that if they attacked the Red Cross planes and the church planes carrying supplies they would suffer with respect to world opinion. Would you agree with that?

• 1025

Mr. Stephen Lewis: No, I would not agree with that. I would be inclined to think that the Nigerians would be quite pleased to eliminate Annabella. They occupied Oguta, which is on your map there, just a few miles from Annabella, only three or three and a half weeks ago with the obvious intention of moving on the airport. They were turned back by the Biafrans and Oguta was re-occupied about three or four days later. They have strafed the airport. They have now bombed the tower. I would think that in Nigerian strategy they may feel there is more value in bombing civilian populations with the quite evident panic that that engenders than in spending the few bombs or the few flights they are prepared to make each day on the

airport. Certainly the Biafrans feel that the airport is in danger. They have constructed, I am told fairly reliably, an entirely new airport a certain number of miles away which has already had its first test flight.

Mr. Anderson: I mention this because it appears that the Canadian aircraft, the *Hercules*, when they are flying there, will increase—certainly we hope they will increase—the amount of aid reaching Biafra. It would appear that we are sending Canadian service personnel into an area of considerable danger for them. I was wondering if you have any comments on this. Do you feel this would be the case or not?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well from an on-the-spot position I am inclined to think that there is not that much danger if the planes are coming in at night.

Mr. Anderson: The aircraft, as I understand it, will be coming in in daylight.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Are the Hercules aircraft coming in in daylight?

Mr. Anderson: Right.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Then there may well be danger. It depends on Nigerian anti-aircraft fire. At the moment the Nigerians are no closer than 20 or 22 miles to the airport, so perhaps there is no immediate danger, but if they came closer I do not know what the Nigerian position would be.

Mr. David Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I am sure Mr. Anderson will not mind. I am not going to ask Mr. Lewis any questions but my understanding has always been that the only time our planes will fly in the daytime is with the consent of the government of Nigeria, and if that is the only condition for their flying then obviously they are not likely to be shot at.

Mr. Anderson: I would agree, Mr. Lewis Senior, that this is the case, but of course these aircraft are not flown by Nigerians and I do not know what control the Nigerians have over the Egyptians. It is perhaps one of these things that we need to explore a bit more in this Committee. If there is danger to Canadian personnel I am not saying we should not send our people there, but I am saying we should know about it. So we should make a serious decision based on all the evidence we can get about what risks these people are running on our orders.

You mentioned, Mr. Lewis Jr., that the North and the West are very reluctant to enter into federation.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: The North, I said.

• 1030

Mr. Anderson: Oh, I am sorry. You did say though that the Ibos, the Easterners were the most enthusiastic. Can you give me any explanation of why now they apparently have changed their view and why they are now so intent on preserving a federation which only a short time ago they were not very keen on. Furthermore, the interval between the formation of the federation and now has been so difficult for all sides concerned. It would appear to me that there is a bit of illogic there, that they should be quite happy to wash their hands of the Ibo and say good riddance.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well I think that that is partly explained this way: One of the very real reluctances on the part of northern Nigeria to enter the federation was the feeling that they would be outnumbered by the South and have very little say in the ruling of a federal Nigeria. Of course what happened was that through the use of census—and I am not saying here whether the census of 1962 was right or whether the census of 1963 was right—the northern Nigerians were granted a majority population status which effectively allowed them to dominate the federation in a way they had not at all expected, and they were able to enter into an alliance with a portion of the western region with Akintola and a portion of the action group in a way which they felt would be politically and economically beneficial. Although the years 1964-65 were crossed with much hostility—as you yourself point out, it was a very difficult time—the elections in the Western Region in the latter part of 1965 were perhaps more bitter than any other in the history of Nigeria. Nonetheless the Northern Region felt it was now a good thing since they could control it. I am not sure conversely that the Ibos only wanted federation on the basis of their controlling it, because of course they were in the opposition throughout, but I think that may account for it.

Mr. Anderson: You say that the Northerners were dominating the federation prior to the break-away of Biafra. Could you give us some indication of the position that the Ibo held there, because your testimony is in conflict with the testimony of another witness who

suggested that the Ibo had almost all the positions in the civil service at the level of deputy minister. Yours is the first indication that I have had that the Ibos did not enjoy fairly prominent positions.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I do not think that the two are necessarily incompatible. The Ibos, by virtue of very high educational attainments—which I am sure the Committee is aware of—occupied many of the senior civil service posts throughout the country. I am talking about the government. I am talking about the effective operation of a government where the cabinet and the majority of members were dominated by the North and therefore government decision-making which was implemented by Ibo civil servants was nonetheless northern Nigeria in alliance with part of the west decision-making.

May I make this rather interesting little point. In northern Nigeria one had the NPC, which was a political party made up of the Hausa-Iulani group and confined almost exclusively to northern Nigeria in any election. In the Western Region one had the action group, which was a party of the Urhobos confined in almost any election to the Western Region. In the Eastern Region one had the NCNC which ran in the Eastern Region but curiously enough tried to run as well in the North and in the West—in fact they elected some members in the west—because I think it fair to say that the Ibos felt that there must in fact be a national party if a unified Nigeria was to make any sense, if it was not to fragment. So I come back again to my initial point, that on balance the Biafrans very much wanted Nigeria to work. Whenever there was a crisis it was Ibiam, Azikiwe or Mbanefo who was called to Lagos to arbitrate, and I can think of two or three instances. It is very ironic now that they are the secessionists.

Mr. Anderson: It certainly is ironic and it is difficult for us to understand at this distance. Perhaps the Northerners did have the top political posts but certainly the bulk of the educated people working for the government were apparently Ibo. It is curious to me that there should now be such enthusiasm for what you have described as a religious war against the Ibo to expand the area of Muslim control at this point in 1968 when there was not this earlier on.

• 1035

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well that is not exactly so. In 1953 there were historic killings in

Kano, which are now part of Nigerian history, where Ibos were slaughtered in large numbers. The year 1953 was really the beginning, historically. In the modern postwar period there were a number of similar incidents of Ibos suffering considerable atrocity. I agree that they occupied the senior civil service posts, but it is worth thinking back to 1966. It is one thing to occupy senior civil service posts, it is another thing to occupy them from the position of a minority. Throughout northern Nigeria of course the Ibos were in a minority and it was very easy to do 30,000 Ibos in in three months, which in fact is what happened in 1966. I do not know what fervor, religious or otherwise, compels that kind of mass elimination, but it was very quickly and expeditiously done in 1966 and certainly had the effect of frightening 2 million Ibos back into eastern Nigeria very rapidly.

Mr. Anderson: Could I make a distinction here? I cannot say that I fully understand, but say the reason for killing 30,000 Ibos and driving out 2 million was simply to clear the Muslim areas of the Ibo; it still does not necessarily follow that the Muslims would want then to press in and destroy Biafra. They have cleared their own areas of Ibo and I cannot really understand myself, not having been there, why they would wish to follow it up by attacking Biafra when they have already succeeded in what I presume was their objective of clearing their own areas of the detested Ibo tribesmen.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: As a matter of fact, I do not know whether perhaps the war is not a logical extension of having cleared the area that perhaps the animus was not so much to clear the area as to clear the Ibo from the face of Nigeria. I cannot argue authoritatively for it. There are documents before the Committee on genocide which sat in Biafra, which admittedly partial, was nonetheless composed of people who were considered very reputable in the western world. Documents which were filed and made public were never impugned even by the International Commission of Jurists which purported to be part of the organizing program of northern Nigeria and which called for the extermination of everyone but “sucklings in Ibo-land.” Now whether that feeling continues into the war, I honestly do not know, but it would seem to me that the nature of the massacres in 1966 could certainly become an extension of foreign policy and, more important, in the Ibo mind they are. Objectively, one might not

be able to make a case for a calculated government intention. I cannot make that case and I know of no one else who could make that case. But it does permit of acts and behaviour and it does engender in the Ibo a strong genocidal feeling, and that is very real.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I can certainly see that. But there is more than simply a British-Biafran war involved here. There is very definitely a feeling on the part of the Northerners they do want to wipe out the Ibos in Ibo-land.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Yes, and I was not arguing for a British-Biafran interpretation. I am stating that in their own desperation and bitterness the Ibos view it that way.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, well, if we could get back then to aid. You say that 3,000 tons are needed now, and it is very interesting because you are the first witness to say that 3,000 tons are needed per day now. We have heard people say 200 is the minimum but 3,000 will be needed in December.

Do you feel it possible for Canada and/or other countries, and the churches, to supply that amount of aid by air into an area such as Biafra which is so pressed by Federal forces?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: No, I do not. I categorically do not. The figure of 3,000 is the figure used by Dr. Middelkoop. I think it is certainly much closer to the truth than 200, judging the usefulness of 50 to 100 now. But, no, I do not think there is any conceivable possibility of making even a modest dent on the question of starvation. You might be able to maintain the population mortality rate each day at a level of 10,000 to 12,000; that is hardly containing starvation.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. Do you feel there is any possibility of getting a land corridor to do the relief distribution necessary?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Do I think that the Nigerians would consider it?

Mr. Anderson: Yes, or the Biafrans; either one, or both.

• 1040

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I am inclined to think that the Biafrans would do almost anything to get a land corridor; better still, and I assume this is what you mean, the provision of aid via the sea, through Calabar and Port Har-

court provinces, which could be brought in in vast quantities.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I am looking at the map over there and it appears that it would come by sea and then would have to be transported by land.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Right.

Mr. Anderson: So the land corridor would presumably be from Port Harcourt into the territory of Biafra.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Fair enough. I would think that Biafra would be very much in favour of some kind of aid that way.

Mr. Anderson: Assuming, though, as you said, aid can only make a very minor dent into this problem, you have suggested some other alternatives. One is taking this matter to the United Nations, which is something which certainly has interested all of us here on this Committee.

Do you feel that if this matter was brought up to the United Nations, and that if a debate... This would probably be brought up, I might add, over the objections of U Thant, over the objections of the Organization of African Unity, and over the objections of many other countries who have been approached on this matter. Do you feel, under these circumstances, a debate of this nature would serve any useful purpose with respect to aiding Biafran refugees, or do you feel that it would simply put a lot of African nations on record as supporting the position of Nigeria which, at present, they are able to keep silent on?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well, I am not sure they are able to keep silent. I would be the first to admit to you that the Organization of African Unity made it fairly clear, with the exception of four countries, which side they were on.

I do not accept your premises, I am sorry. I have the sensation, based on some things I hear also from the United Nations, there is now a feeling in the United Nations that if some country takes the lead there may be as many as 10 or 12 nations, including some of the African states on the Nigerian side in the OAU resolution, who would support the effort to have a debate on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly.

There is a major distinction between not recognizing Biafra and wanting an end to the war. It may be that Kenya for the Somalia problem, or Soudan because of the North-

South split, may be reluctant to recognize Biafra for obvious reasons. But it may be a quite different proposition to feel that there should be a cease-fire. My own impression is that U Thant would not resist a debate if he felt that there were some countries in the Organization of African Unity which would be prepared to support a resolution on ceasefire.

Mr. Anderson: I would agree with you it appears that slowly there is some greater acceptance of this view and I would hasten to add, though it is painfully slow.

Do you feel then—if we can put this in terms of here and now—Well, I can envisage in the future that maybe there would be enough countries who would be interested in this because simply of the increased publicity, because of the fact that the war is continuing and the suffering is continuing and also because of lobbying by countries interested. While I can see that in the future I cannot see it here and now, and I would not wish this to go before the United Nations if I knew full well or expected that it would fail, and would force a lot of people, who might in the future be in favour of such a move, declaring themselves in October 1968 to be opposed and be in favour of the Nigerian case in this matter.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I have an even greater anxiety. My anxiety is that apprehension dictates failure in these things, and that either one takes the initiative and brings it to the floor of the General Assembly at this point in time, when everyone is aware and exercised, or one perhaps loses the opportunity altogether. One must also think about the course of the war and its toll. Mr. Anderson, obviously your sources are much better than mine, but I have the sensation that if Canada were to be one of the cosponsors or initiators of a cease-fire resolution on Monday morning at the United Nations, there may well be sufficient support to have it put on the agenda and debated, and that if we wait any longer the present feeling will be dissipated and we will never get an answer.

• 1045

I do not impugn the intentions or motives but I do say there is a time at which negotiation and quiet diplomacy ends, and assertive behaviour begins, and it is this time.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I quite agree with you except, perhaps, on the very last words,

which I simply do not know, and those words were at this time. Do you feel then two months ago or three months ago, before this press publicity resulting from your visit, from Mr. Taylor's visit, from Mr. Brewin's visit and from Mr. MacDonald's visit, do you feel that before that time we would have had much support at the UN for such a move, say, for example, in the middle of August or the beginning of August?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Right, I would be very careful to even venture a prediction. I do not really know. I am inclined to agree with your implication that there has been a tremendous acceleration of interest and feeling about it—perhaps this is not your implication—but for me perhaps this is the proficient time.

On the other hand I am not at all certain in my own mind, that if Canada, a middle power like Canada, had not exercised this role which I have always felt was absolutely perfect for Canada—Canada's contribution—if she had not done that in the late summer that perhaps we would have brought things to a head then. One never knows until one tries.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Lewis, do you feel that Canada will add much weight to the arguments to Britain to stop British arm supplies to Nigeria when the British Labour Party itself has failed to change Prime Minister Wilson's mind on this matter?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well, I am inclined to think, because the British Labour Party in conference opposed Wilson's policy, and because the British public seems on balance, by polls, to oppose it, and because the British press, even though they are very nervous about French provision of weapons to Biafra, seem to oppose it, that Canada may just push them over the edge. Surely you would agree, Mr. Anderson, that would be salutary, for the British Prime Minister to be pushed over the edge by the Canadian Government.

Mr. Anderson: Well, I would not want to interfere in British political affairs. However, your third possibility, recognition and the offer of aid; I would like some further elaboration on this because, as Mr. Taylor mentioned yesterday, and you have mentioned today, there apparently is a need for a military stalemate. Yet, you mentioned today that the present situation is pretty much a military stalemate, and yet you both suggest that things might improve from the Biafran point of view if more arms are supplied to Biafra.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well, it is a military stalemate now only in the sense that the Biafrans are retreating to fortress positions, as it were, and will gradually—may I use this term—“wither away” as the war goes on. Whereas the military stalemate that one envisages is an actual saw-off, a complete saw-off, no advance on any front at any time.

I do not want to become preoccupied with the military solution because I do not think it is entirely productive until the other avenues have been exhausted, but I think that correspondents who have been there—I do not presume to speak for Mr. Taylor but certainly I had this impression—would feel that it would not take too much by way of weapons for Biafra to turn the tide. If there is not an overwhelming enthusiasm for the war on the part of Nigeria—there is not much reason why there should be, the men are very, very far from home, the supply lines are very vulnerable, the economy has been adversely affected—then one could perhaps reach a cease-fire internally.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, I have taken a great deal of time but I would like to take one moment more merely to thank Mr. Lewis and also Mr. Taylor for coming before this Committee, and also to congratulate them on doing what they have done to bring this problem to the attention of the Canadian public and to ourselves. I thank them both for their excellent testimony here.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Legault?

Mr. Legault: Thank you Mr. Chairman, I must add my congratulations for the very explicit and practical description of the conditions that do exist. My two questions are somewhat related to the ones that have been put by Mr. Anderson, and I was amazed to find that the immediate need of 3,000 tons per day, instead of for the future, is the condition that does exist at the present. I was wondering if this could not be met with the present services available, that is through the air transportation and what is the alternative as far as the land route is concerned? According to your analysis of this is a land route, say from Cameroon, possible, because it seems to be perhaps a logical one, although I do not know about the terrain there or the roads. Is that country sympathetic enough, on the humanitarian side, to permit the Red Cross to operate from there?

• 1050

Another question would be, and it was asked yesterday, about your interpretation of how Biafra gets its financial support, or where does it get it from at the moment? I am putting three questions now. From your past experience in Africa can you explain why, and you have mentioned this factor, the majority of the Organization of African Unity would not support any intervention whatsoever in this conflict?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: In order, sir, I am not competent to give an opinion on the land route situation. I assume that Cameroon if approached would be a base for distributing aid. Certainly there is a road from what was Biafra, the eastern region through to Cameroon which could be used; it had been widely travelled before the war. However, since in both instances Federal territory would have to be traversed by way of a land route, perhaps it is even more logical to use the very considerable harbour facilities to the south end.

Mr. Legault: One point. I do underline the fact that it would be managed by the International Red Cross.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Right.

Mr. Legault: The danger of the merchandise being poisoned, or the fear that it could be poisoned, when landed in the areas held by the Federal troops would be eliminated because it would only create the corridor and the origin would be in a country which is impartial.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: That may be a legitimate distinction. I must say that I have never accepted the Biafran view that food would be poisoned in vast quantities. I am dubious about that proposition and about any evidence I have seen to justify it. So I am inclined personally to think that either avenue would be legitimate. However, there is of course the alternative too of a parachute drop which people discuss at great lengths and some have devised elaborate schemes supposedly substantial; I do not know of them.

The sources of money I do not know. I know that they must have some money because as I understand it there are less pressures on Biafran students overseas now for foreign exchange than there were six months ago. I am inclined to think personally that the money would come from French and West German sources; that would be my inclina-

tion. Certainly there is much purchase of what little armaments there are from West Germany. I flew from Lisbon to Biafra direct and in the body of the plane were 10 tons of crates quaintly marked "Science Group" and underneath the caption "Ammunition Explosives for Cannon Projectiles". The purchase of material in West Germany is apparently occurring and obviously there are some arms coming through Libreville in Gabon; whether they are French arms as such or Gabonese arms I am not obviously equipped to say, but that is where the money is perhaps coming from. They claim a very severe shortage of foreign exchange and the country is certainly more strapped than one can describe. But if they have any money that would be my guess.

As to the Organization of African Unity, there are the endless factors at work there as everywhere. Kenya and Uganda and Somalia are compromised by internal tribal divisions which make support for Biafra very difficult. There is again the religious factor which cannot be underestimated; the Islamic states viewing Biafra with something less than affection. There is the client state association, and economic dependence on certain foreign powers which might not want to support Biafra and there is a distinction in political philosophy of some particular French West African states and the Biafran leadership. All of these things I think have very strong bearing.

• 1055

If I could add this, sir, as a footnote, what seems to me significant is that the two countries in the OAU who are internationally recognized as being in the vanguard of progressive African developments, both socially and economically, namely Nyerere in Tanzania and Kaunda in Zambia. Those two countries have recognized Biafra and would support General Assembly debate. Certainly Nyerere and Kaunda are regarded even on the African continent as people who have devised political and economic systems in a postcolonial period which are the models for African emergence. There is no little significance to the fact that they support Biafra.

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much Mr. Lewis. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MacLean: Supplementary to the first question if I might. Would there be any possibility at all that a corridor to Cameroon

might be established by the International Red Cross for the use of refugees, women and children, so they can be taken out of this area to somewhere else in Africa where they might be fed on an emergency basis in refugee camps?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I do not know sir. It is an intriguing possibility. I do not know whether they would want to leave. Curiously enough as wretched as the whole affair is the solidarity of the people in Biafra, even the women and children in the most intolerable refugee conditions, is the strongest motif that one senses in the country. They may not even wish to leave given the opportunity.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacLean I did not wish to recognize you on a supplementary, we have not been doing that. But we have not had any questioners from your side of the House and if you would like to continue I think maybe it would be only fair.

Mr. David Lewis: Mr. Chairman, it is two minutes to eleven maybe it would not be a bad idea to adjourn now rather than start with someone else questioning. The school bell will go in two minutes.

An hon. Member: Who is next?

The Vice-Chairman: The list I have before me includes. Messrs. Hymmen, Buchanan, Cafik, Gibson, Groos, Howard (Okanagan Boundary), MacLean and Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: Some of our lads are at caucus and they undoubtedly have questions.

The Vice-Chairman: I would be prepared to alternate Mr. MacLean and Mr. Fairweather on this list. You have no further questions Mr. MacLean? I think maybe Mr. Fairweather should go up the list then.

Mr. Fairweather: No.

The Vice-Chairman: You have no wish to?

Mr. Fairweather: No, no.

The Vice-Chairman: Allright you will stay in tenth place.

An Hon. Member: I am on the list Mr. Chairman, but my questions have been covered previously.

The Vice-Chairman: We are going to adjourn anyway and we could resume our hearing at 2 o'clock. Agreed.

AFTERNOON SITTING

• 1412

The Vice-Chairman: Order. We are two short of a quorum but could we not start and ratify the proceedings when we do have a quorum which we expect in a few minutes? Is it agreed? All right. Mr. Hymmen, you are the next questioner.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Lewis, as the lead-off man this afternoon, may I compliment you on your very interesting and detailed presentation this morning. You have confirmed what I think is gradually taking the form of a consensus in this Committee, that relief of starving people and any assistance given to Biafra can be only a temporary solution and it is not the complete answer.

We have had some conflicting statements in the past couple of days, probably because some of the witnesses did not have the direct experience that you have had, in regard to the amount of aid which is required. We were told yesterday, I believe, that 200 tons per day is the amount that is needed. You stated, of course, that it is 3,000 tons per day because of your residence with the head of the World Council of Churches. Also in a statement yesterday it was mentioned that there was co-ordination of relief efforts in the Federal part of Nigeria, but because of the fact that the sources of relief are coming from various areas there was not any co-ordination as such in the Biafran section.

Now, is it possible by any means to co-ordinate the efforts of various nations and agencies in a better way to ensure that the relief where it is needed right now is provided in a better form in the Biafran section?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well, I am not at all sure that it is not as well co-ordinated as might be hoped for under the circumstances. Certainly there is a pretty good working relationship between the World Council of Churches and Caritas. As a matter of fact, as of last week they are taking alternative evenings by way of shipment; Monday night is devoted to the World Council of Churches and Tuesday to Caritas, and so on.

No longer are both agencies receiving relief each night. That helps greatly with this incredible problem of unloading when you are able to unload only at each end of the airstrip, and with the equally difficult problem of a sufficient number of lorries to take the relief material into the hinterland because

the lorries are always breaking down or without petrol. So certainly Caritas and the World Council of Churches have pooled their resources admirably.

• 1415

I am not as familiar with the Red Cross operation from Fernando Po. There is no doubt that it operates, as it were, independent of the others. There is not the same liaison. I have a feeling that one would wish there were the same liaison. There is the general impression that through the desperate months of June, July and August Caritas carried Biafra; that the World Council of Churches stepped in pretty heavily in September and now into October and that the Red Cross was rather less involved than Caritas or the World Council of Churches would have liked it to be through the summer months and in the early fall, although the number of flights now per night has increased. I think there is something to be said for getting Sao Tome and Fernando Po together; certainly something to be said for Canadian *Hercules* going to Sao Tome as well as to Fernando Po. If one wants to get relief right into Biafra quickly I think Sao Tome is the place to go.

The Vice-Chairman: May I interrupt your next question, Mr. Hymmen?

Mr. Hymmen: Yes.

The Vice-Chairman: We now have a quorum. Will someone move that our proceedings so far this afternoon be ratified?

Mr. Cafik: I so move.

Mr. Gibson: I second the motion.
Motion agreed to.

The Vice-Chairman: Will you proceed now, Mr. Hymmen?

Mr. Hymmen: I have one other question in an entirely different area. When you made your statement this morning—and I do not have the evidence before me—did you say that it is the feeling of the Biafran people or is it your feeling that this was a British-activated war in cognizance of the oil interests in the east? Was this the Biafran feeling or your feeling?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I was putting to you the Biafran view and I was saying that the extremity of language of people like Ibiam and Mbanefo are indicative of the depth of feeling the Biafrans have about what they consider to be a British-sponsored war.

Mr. Hymmen: Do you have this feeling yourself?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I must say to you that what little knowledge I have of African history in the former British territory suggests to me that it is not beyond British policy to support this kind of war for economic interests.

Mr. Hymmen: Have you any direct information to corroborate the suggested evidence that British military personnel were involved on the Federal side?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: The source of assurance comes from relief pilots. I must say by way of observation that one of the things that impressed me, because the world of flying is not my world, is the constant interchanging of information and the relationship between all these various relief pilots who came primarily from the Scandinavian countries and Holland. They would all meet on the airstrips and obviously some of them had been into the Federal side and they had a very considerable flow of information as pilots do standing on airstrips waiting for planes to be unloaded.

They asserted unequivocally that this was the conduct or one of the aspects of the conduct of the war. Again, I emphasize that certainly in the Biafran mind this is very much a British war. If I can just add this, Ojukwu said to me that the greatest error they made was naiveté of thinking that they could persuade Britain to understand the Biafran point of view. The Biafrans are perfectly persuaded now—and all this does is bear upon their conduct, I think, that is of relevance to the Committee,—that if it served British economic interests it would be fine to divide Nigeria into three states; that the unification of Nigeria is not what is involved, it is economic interests and so they talk about the willingness of Britain to acquiesce on Rhodesia but to make sure that Biafra is subdued and that is very much their feeling.

Mr. Hymmen: In the same connection there is, of course, Soviet military assistance. Are there any Soviet personnel involved?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Nothing that one has heard and the Soviet military assistance seems to be, in the Biafran mind again, confined to the Ilyushins and the MIGs. Certainly they are very evident. In fact, they are the terrorizing influences in the war for the civilian population.

• 1420

Mr. Hymmen: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Lewis, I believe all of these speakers have in some way or other stressed the determination, the will to resist, of the Biafrans, yet very little has been said on the other side of the fence. Do you feel it is not a very determined effort on the part of the Nigerians? In other words, you mentioned arms. I think you felt that if they were in short supply at all they would lose heart and sort of back away from the struggle. Is this correct?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Let me put it to you; I am simply not competent to say. My knowledge and instinct tell me that the natural alliance in Nigeria, if there can be such a thing in an artificial country, as it were, is north versus south, not north and west versus east. Inevitably with the Ibos and Yorubas sharing a common cultural tradition, a common religion, and a level of education far surpassing that of the north—and incidentally overlapping political ideologies which was not true of the north—that is where the alliance in theory should lie and again the Biafrans feel that the Yorubas are not enthusiastic about the war. There is much talk in Biafra—I have not read the British press for some time although I saw intimations of it at one point that there are rumblings in the Yoruba camp about the war and about Gowon's leadership, but certainly that does not bear on the ferocity of the fighting on the front which is equally strong-willed, obviously on the part of the Nigerians, or apparently so.

Mr. Buchanan: Are most of the commanders of the Nigerian forces Yoruba? I do not know what Adekunle is.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I am afraid I do not know. I just do not know how the commanders divide themselves. I asked the question about the division on the Okigwi-Owerri front where I was; I asked who they were meeting and they said they were meeting the Yorubas, the Hausas and the Binis from Benin in equal numbers on that particular front. So that is a lot of people a long, long way from home. I can understand they are feeling a little isolated in the war.

Mr. Buchanan: I gather that you feel that the likely long-run solution to this problem

has to be in fact the disintegration of the present state of Nigeria into two or possibly three separate states, maybe tied into confederation, maybe not.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I would be inclined to think that Biafra merits her sovereignty and that there would be two separate states, but that that is a long-run solution.

Mr. Buchanan: Several people have mentioned a land corridor. Do you feel that if in effect a land corridor was developed down in the Port Harcourt area and the Biafrans started to show greater resistance and more determination to fight that the Nigerians really would permit it to go on for a very lengthy period? In other words, it would seem to me that the militaristic aspect from the Nigerian point of view would very soon overcome the humanitarian, if it started to reach the point where it was having a significant effect upon the military capability of Biafra.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: In fact, when I was chatting and thinking about it over lunch, I thought that I might have answered impulsively from the Biafran point of view this morning, that it may not be logical to assume that given the pressures on them they would permit a land corridor if they thought defeat was imminent, or if they thought that their country was ever diminishing in size. There might be reluctance on both sides. But my feeling, from speaking to Ojukwu and the Biafran leadership, was that they are at the point where they would accept almost anything even if only as a gesture of goodwill now. And I do not know about Nigeria. I do not think she has any great love for the war.

Mr. Buchanan: A gesture of goodwill by the other nations in the world or by Nigeria?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: By the other nations of the world, by a willingness of another nation to entertain it publicly at the United Nations, and on that basis Biafra would be quite prepared to probably comply with almost any resolution which was passed, if it was passed collectively—short of surrender.

•1425

Mr. Buchanan: You anticipated my next question. What conditions do you think Biafra would be willing to accept for a ceasefire, and subsequently, hopefully, a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Biafra is fierce about sovereignty and would not accept an erosion

of sovereignty, and I rather doubt that she would accept a diminution in the previous borders of eastern Nigeria. On the other hand, she might well not pretend to extend her sphere of influence into the midwest, or into the north, which was very much a matter of contention before the war, so I think there is an area for concession. Biafra fought very fiercely in the midwestern region and that has been a geographic centre of some contention.

Mr. Buchanan: All that concerns one really is how much willingness is there now, how much give and take, in relation to what was at Addis Ababa and so on, back just a short while ago, and whether there in fact is going to be any flexibility on the part of either the Nigerians or the Biafrans.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: My answer to that, if you will forgive me, tends to be circuitous. I do not know how in God's name one measures it until one takes the initiative. I have a confidence that the extent of despair and the recognition of what is occurring both on the Nigerian and Biafran side has reached the point that if Canada took the initiative on a ceasefire in the United Nations and certain OAU member states now joined her, which is likely, then it might well be possible to effect a cease-fire—and nobody should be defeated about it before the event. I was very much struck by that kind of impression. Ojukwu went so far as to say: If it is ruled that there is an embargo on arms on both sides tomorrow, we do not get anything from Libreville, the Nigerians do not get a thing from the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union—we remain only with what we have and we saw off here, then that will end the war, and I am prepared to accept it. They see it only as perpetuated if the supply of arms continues to flow to Nigeria and nobody takes any international initiative.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Lewis, I have a few questions before I get into the main line of questioning. You mentioned that you had met Ron Collister of the CBC while you were in Biafra, and I wonder if you know by what route he went into Biafra itself.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I must say I do not know.

Mr. Cafik: Do you know whether he flew in on a Red Cross plane, for instance.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I do not know.

Mr. Cafik: The reason I ask the question is that last night, or perhaps it was the night before, on television he indicated that he had flown in on an aircraft that had food on it but in effect it was flying bomb, that it was sort of half food and half arms, I wondered if it happened to be a Red Cross plane or one of the relief planes. Apparently you do not know.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I do not know. There are planes, as you know, that are exclusively Biafran planes that carry a mixture of food and armaments from Lisbon, sometimes stopping at Sao Tome to pick up newsmen. It is possible it was that way.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you. In view of the fact that you have just come back from Biafra how large an army would the Biafrans have in numbers. Do you have any idea?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I honestly do not know, and I am not sure they do either.

Mr. Cafik: Is the army itself suffering from lack of food like the people are, or is it a well-fed army?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: No, it is not a well-fed army. That I do not think can be possible in Biafra. They do not look impoverished but they do not look well-fed. What is really happening is that the villagers, the people in the countryside, are feeding the army at the expense of themselves. There is no question that that is in some large measure true. The army gets its food from the area in which it is currently fighting and the villagers find it and prepare it. This is a drain on the sustenance for the villagers and there is, from just listening around a bit, never really enough for the army. The men certainly do not feel they are getting three square meals a day, but that is what is now happening.

• 1430

Mr. Cafik: Would you have the impression that the villagers are willing to let their own children starve, for instance, in order to feed the army?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I have the impression that the villagers are so terrified of what will happen if they do not win the war, of what will happen to them if they are overrun, that they see the army as the only conceivable method of protection and for that they are prepared to make significant sacrifices. There

is a tremendous resignation about it on the part of the villagers.

You have placed a very good point. I went into villages that had been seriously bombed, and talked to villagers very near the front where the devastation was pretty complete, and I said, quite frankly, "How can you continue? Don't you want an end to this war? How do you keep going?" But you run into a complete dead end; they are absolutely unified in their response which says, "We have to win; if we don't win, we will be overrun".

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Lewis, with all due respect, I would like to know, and I have not had this brought out, what experience you have in what is now the Federal area of Nigeria?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: On this occasion?

Mr. Cafik: No, prior to this occasion.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: All the experience I had was that I travelled very extensively, very widely, in both the Western and Northern regions.

Mr. Cafik: Right. On this particular trip you did not go into the Federal area?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I crossed Federal lines. As the representative from the Department of External Affairs and I were just discussing, the maps tend to be illusory. In fact, if I may go to the map for a moment, the suggestion that this is the boundary of Biafra is simply not accurate and, to be fair to the map makers, it is not possible to be accurate because the boundaries change every day in fairly dramatic ways. For instance, this map does not include Okigwi and Owerri down in this area, which are towns now occupied half by the Biafrans and half by the Nigerians. As a matter of fact, at the moment in Owerri the Department of Public Works and the Shell Oil Station in the Northern half of the town is in Biafran hands and the rest of the town is in Nigerian hands.

This is also a motorized war up the main arteries, so that you can have fighting along the main roads with literally tens of thousands of people in the hinterland untouched or unaffected by the war for a period of time. So that it is possible to move off the main road into the labyrinth of little-beaten paths several miles away and never see "the enemy" on either side. So, to be perfectly accurate, I did cross into Federal territory. I certainly crossed these lines on two or three

occasions. But the lines are not real. Nothing is real about thinking of the war in conventional Western terms.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you. Do you believe that your testimony to this Committee would be more valuable had you gone to Lagos and looked into the Western area? Or do you feel that having been in the Biafra area was sufficient to give you a broad enough base from which to offer judgments on the situation?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I have tried, I hope, to offer judgments purely on what I viewed of the Biafran position and what I heard from them. I make no pretense at having knowledge of the Federal side. Out of curiosity I telephoned the Nigerian High Commissioner some two to three weeks before I left and asked whether it would be possible for me to go to Lagos and to go as far as the front, and he sought clearance from his government which, up to the point when I left, had not come. The day before I left I spoke to the Acting High Commissioner, the High Commissioner then being at the United Nations, and he indicated to me that clearance had not come. I told him that I felt it only proper that I, as a Canadian politician, inform him that I was therefore going to Biafra, the opportunity to view usefully on the Nigerian side apparently not being yet available or approved.

Mr. Cafik: All right. The Observer Team viewed the situation from the Federal area, and bearing in mind that their testimony is based on their observations within a limited area, I think it would be wrong for us to read into it what is happening in an area that they did not visit. However, bearing that factor in mind, do you have any reason to be critical of their report or to consider it to be inaccurate?

• 1435

Mr. Stephen Lewis: No, I have no reason to consider it to be inaccurate. I question the absence of front-line involvement from the Biafran side as well, because that is where the bulk of the fighting is felt. The last report concentrated on the Provinces of Calabar and Port Harcourt, as I recall, and Calabar fell many, many months ago. I do not know of any fighting in the Calabar province. If they were fighting in the Calabar province the Biafrans have achieved a military coup which the world is not yet aware of. In the immediate Port Harcourt vicinity, that fell at least a couple of months ago now, and I am hard pressed to know what fighting or otherwise

there would be there. So, I think there would be some value in the Observer Team going into Biafra and seeing it from that end. But I do not impugn the integrity of these men; I assume they report on what they see.

Mr. Cafik: Right. I am not questioning either on whether they ought to go to Biafra, I rather think they should to see both sides, but I am satisfied with your answer in that regard. Does it not seem strange to you that there has been a great deal of emphasis in the testimony of recent days, in any event, that the Biafrans are so determined to continue this war and not to ever give up and that even if they were overrun and overpowered they would resort to guerrilla warfare? Does it not seem strange to you that there is no evidence at the moment of guerrilla warfare in the territory that has already been taken from them? Would it not seem reasonable that if they are fighting a war of survival that guerrilla tactics behind the enemy lines would be terribly effective and that they would implement that?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I have two observations in that regard. On three occasions I saw commando units, and I might say that the commando units are quite the most impressive part of the Biafran army. I saw them outside Uli airport at the State House on the night I arrived, and on two occasions when I was with the Fourteenth Division a week ago today. It was a commando unit armed to the teeth; all the soldiers carrying submachine guns and eight of them to a land rover, carefully camouflaged, all of them wearing the camouflaged uniforms, moving out for action behind enemy lines, and this is reasonably common knowledge. Indeed, it is one of the aspects of the war which seems to distress Nigeria most. I can understand it. The Biafran guerrilla troops are moving in behind the Nigerians and cutting what are very vulnerable supply lines, vulnerable if for no other reason than that they are so long, from Lagos all the way over to the Eastern Region. This has become a fairly common practice in the war. As to the expansion of this process, I suspect that will come if and when Umuahia falls and all the conventional fighting arrangements are over, and Biafra now sees itself in a straight guerrilla combat in the hinterland.

Mr. Cafik: I have not heard any evidence from any other witnesses who have spent time in the Nigerian area which would indicate that there was any guerrilla warfare activity at all. I have heard it suggested by

those who were in Biafra, but to my recollection no one who gave evidence so far has indicated that in actual fact it exists.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I am sorry that I cannot put the papers in front of you, but I am positive that I have read a number of reports which speak about Biafrans striking at Nigerian supply lines. I am sure I have seen that many, many times in the British press and in the Chicago *Daily News* service. I do not know whether one would characterize that as commando or guerrilla warfare; certainly the Biafrans do. They see that as part of military policy. I will tell you this. I sat with Colonel Kalu, who heads the Fourteenth Division, which is the key division, it is the division which is protecting the Owerri-Umuahia road, which is the final point, and we went over a map together and he said categorically that part of his strategy was to use his commando units on the supply line areas. I think that is perfectly logical.

Mr. Cafik: All right. I would like to go to another line for a moment. You and the witness last night have presented testimony that is very, very similar in terms of its overall approach and the recommendations made. There are slight variations. Both of you have very recently come back from Biafra, and an argument that I think always means a great deal in terms of testimony is the vested interest of the people who give you the information. I do not think we can overlook this. The evidence brought forward seems to be summarized in this way, and I think I am being fair. First, that there is great starvation in Biafra. No one seems to question that, including myself, and we all must do something about it. Second, that there is a great fear of loss of life and property on the part of the Ibos in the event that they are overrun, which is termed by some as genocide. That is now sort of old hat and nobody seems to really think that in the technical sense it exists. But it is a fear, in any event; some say justifiable, others say not. Third, that there is a real determination that they will not give up under any circumstances. That their position in respect to independence is more important than any other single factor and they will not give way for any reason whatsoever. Fourth, that if they are overrun they will adopt a guerrilla warfare policy that will last for years. Last, and this was mentioned more recently by yourself and by the gentleman last night, that there is no real solution except independence for Biafra. That seems to be the message which is being brought here by yourself and by Mr. Taylor.

● 1440

I am not arguing about it or saying it is right or wrong. But it seems to me worth going into for a moment. You came back from Biafra, you have talked to obviously the military authorities in Biafra, you have talked to many Biafran people and, dare say, missionaries who are not Biafrans, and they all give you the impression that this is a fact.

I would submit, not questioning whether it is factual or not, that even if it was not a fact, the Biafran authorities have a vested interest in creating that impression or causing you to believe that it is a fact. Because if you come back believing that it is so, then you are going to present a case here to convince us that it is so and to convince us that we must go to the United Nations, they must become independent and, in effect, that we have to carry their ball or their standard on their behalf. Now, is that a reasonable observation?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well, I am going to try to speak on both arguments you have. Leave Stephen Lewis out of it for a moment, because I did go and I am completely willing to admit to this Committee—I would not for a moment deny it—I did go with a certain partiality to Biafra; that is where I had spent my time. I like to think it did not corrupt my judgment but I do not deny the partiality. Charles Taylor, on the other hand—and I think it is important to recognize that he is an internationally respected foreign observer around the English-speaking world and is respected for what he has written from various continents—came to Biafra largely supportive of the Federal cause. I gather he told the Committee of the material he had written some time ago when he expected the Biafrans to collapse on the “quick kill” policy.

But even more than that, Charles Taylor had been at the Kampala peace talks and had been listening to the contribution of Tony Enahoro, the Federal representative, versus Sir Louis Mbanefo, the Biafran representative. He had come to the conclusion as had many, that the Federal case was a stronger case. And I think it fair to say that when—because I met Charles midway, as it were—he came to Biafra, he was largely persuaded of the other cause. The empirical evidence which he, as an honourable, independent and very resourceful journalist gathered for himself, drew the conclusion that the Biafran position was accurate.

Now, let me say this: that neither he nor I were in any sense of the word restricted. In fact, in most instances the arrangements were ad hoc. You are lucky to find a car from somewhere, and you pick up a driver from somewhere, and you search around for six or eight hours for petrol from somewhere, and you go off into the countryside without any kind of restrictions at all. There is nobody with you who is in any sense official. You have to pass every road block on your own credit or on your own ingenuity.

Charles Taylor did this, I think, and came to his conclusion. I did it with one other advantage, if I may put it to you, Mr. Cafik. I did it with the advantage of being able to go to people whom I had known, particularly students whom I had taught and who I really did not think were disposed to peddling me a line. I went 70 to 80 miles outside of Umuahia to Okija and Ihiala and Nnewi and spoke to a number of students—four or five of them whom I had taught in 1960-61—and the depth of their conviction about the war, the earnestness of the way in which they conveyed it, how they reflected everything else, persuaded me that this was not some kind of dialectic; this was a very real phenomenon amongst the people, and it was unquestionably valid.

• 1445

Mr. Cafik: All right; I do not question that. I am not questioning the legitimacy of your observations nor am I questioning in any way, shape or form that the people do not really believe that all these things are true. I think that is quite self-evident from evidence given. But that does not necessarily mean that it is true, that their fears are really justified. But I will not pursue that any further.

I would like to bring up another line for just a moment, Mr. Chairman, if I can have your indulgence. General Wrinch of the Red Cross in giving testimony here—I think he was our first witness—indicated that the Red Cross was trying to remain neutral in political terms with the Federal area of Nigeria and with Biafra, in order that it may better pursue its humanitarian objectives and get as much co-operation, however meagre, with both sides. He seemed to think that was a justifiable approach in terms of the Red Cross. And I think that it may well have some merit in terms of Canada as well.

I am not saying it is the only thing, but it would seem to me unwise for us to throw

away our good offices with both areas at the moment—and we seem to have respect from both sides at the moment—to dispense with that and throw it away on a proposition that may well not bear much fruit in any event. It does not look as though a United Nations approach will bear fruit. So it would seem unwise to pursue that course when we might be able to do more in having better diplomacy with these two areas.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well, I am not pessimistic as you are about the United Nations approach because, as I say, I cannot judge until it is attempted. Perhaps the Red Cross is right. Perhaps it is the kind of international agency that has to do what it does, and I agree with your evaluation of Canada vis-à-vis both sides.

Colonel Ojukwu said to me: "We are pleased to welcome visitors from Canada because you are neutral." And you will forgive me if I looked at him a little oddly and said: "What do you mean by neutral?" And he said: "Well, relative to everybody else, certainly to the United Kingdom, you are very neutral and we would accept the good offices of Canada under any circumstances because obviously where Nigeria—Biafra is concerned you have maintained a middle road." So I think you are entirely right in that estimate.

I do not think one can, in a case like Biafra—our instinctive tendency to abide by the protocol may perhaps be valid—allow that to prevent the transfer of food to the country. I therefore think there is some argument for using the World Council and Caritas. I cannot imagine that Nigeria would be worried about that kind of international church organization.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Now you suggest that we will not really hurt ourselves by going to the United Nations. I think that is what you really say?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I believe so. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cafik: I certainly do not believe or subscribe to the view that protocol and technicalities ought to interfere with anybody's trying to help someone else who is in desperate need, and I think the faster you can get rid of the red tape and so on that would frustrate the achievement of this the better. But at the same time, technicalities can sometimes also help you do things as well as hinder you from doing them. I do not think it is fair to imply that the diplomatic approach is the thing that is going to frustrate us from

doing good. It may well give us the opportunity to do more good than we would have done normally.

And I would like to know your view. I suggested that Canada, because of its good offices, might be able to do something in a direct way as an individual nation in respect of perhaps negotiating a ceasefire or at least making an approach to it, by talking to the authorities in Biafra, talking to the authorities in Lagos, being a third party without a vested interest in any way, shape or form, a party that has shown humanitarian interest in both sides, and I think we have a lot going for us. And I think really the first step we ought to take is to try to take advantage of that natural advantageous position that we have before we muck it up, as it were, by alienating one side or the other. Does that seem a reasonable approach?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I think it is an admirable approach. I do not disagree with it. It is, in its own way, a significant break with the pattern that Canada has so far chosen. The United Kingdom might not leap with excitement at the idea.

Mr. Cafik: Well, I do not think we care. At least I do not care.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Fair enough. I am saying, then, if that kind of departure was countenanced, that Canada would offer itself as peacemaker between Nigeria and Biafra at the highest level, negotiations perhaps conducted by the Minister of External Affairs himself, if he could think of it in terms of Biafra and Nigeria and not a rebel Nigeria situation, then I think that would be an excellent entrée, a very useful role. If that fails, perhaps the United Nations would be next. I am personally, and as a private citizen, delighted to hear a suggestion that Canada should be an intermediary of this kind at the uppermost echelons. But I have not yet heard it.

• 1450

Mr. Cafik: I am always reluctant to burn bridges and I think most human beings are. I do not like to cut off all my options before I have decided what can be done and figured out how successful it can be. We have heard a lot about task forces for housing and God knows what in this country and I think they are all good, but perhaps we ought to consider a task force for peace in this particular area and get something going along the lines

I discussed earlier. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Lewis, can you tell this Committee how many tribes exist in the area generally known as Biafra?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: The majority tribe is, of course, the Ibos. There is a significant minority tribe known as the Ibibios and there are the Efiks, the Annangs, the Ogoja and the Calabar people. I guess that would make it five or six tribes; five of them fairly significant minority tribes.

Mr. Gibson: Did you discuss these problems with the other four tribesmen when you were out in Biafra?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Oh, yes. The minority tribes have very much intermingled in many of the refugee camp areas; indeed, this is worth knowing.

Mr. Gibson: I have been informed that many of the minority tribes are interested in staying in Nigeria—being part of Nigeria.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: That may also be true. I am reporting that a great many of the minority tribes are still in what is now Biafra. Indeed, some of the Calabar, Aba and Ogojan areas which have been denuded are almost exclusively made up of minority tribes.

Mr. Gibson: I see.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: The massacre at Uruai-nyang was a very sobering minority tribe experience because that dealt with Efiks, as I recall, not with Ibos. It is also worth noting—this has always been kind of interesting about Eastern Nigeria—the number two man in the country is not an Ibo, even in the state of civil war and the tremendous...

Mr. Gibson: Well, that is a very interesting observation, sir, but I would like to get to another question along that line.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Yes.

Mr. Gibson: Do you know the percentage of Biafrans in the Biafra area that are Ibos?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: No, I do not.

Mr. Gibson: Would you not be better qualified to express the opinion as to the feelings of the people of the country if you knew? I am not criticizing you for your lack of knowledge, but do you not think you would be in a better position to know if you knew what percentage were Ibo?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I will put it to you this way. Theoretically, many things are more desirable, but practically, in the context of a civil war, one learns what one can in the given conditions. All I am saying to you is that I spoke to many many minority tribe people—it is impossible to do otherwise—and I got the same information from all. I am not saying that that means there are not minority tribe people who would prefer to be in the Federal region—there may be—but certainly those who have retreated into Biafra are nearer the common sentiment.

Mr. Gibson: Prior to this war getting really hot, would you say the percentage of Ibo was smaller or greater than it is now?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I do not quite follow the question.

Mr. Gibson: Since this war became a really hot war, is it not true that there have been more non-Ibos in the Biafra area than Ibos?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: There were never more non-Ibos than Ibos in Eastern Nigeria.

• 1455

Mr. Gibson: But has the percentage not increased greatly?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Of the Ibos still in the area that remains?

Mr. Gibson: Yes, sir. Due to the pressure of the war have they not shrunk into this area?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well, it depends, again, on what one considers Biafra; you see that is the problem. If one considers Biafra what one sees on that map, then perhaps one could argue that is true because that is the Ibo heartland; but if, on the other hand, one uses the argument that the fall of the capital still leaves the province largely loyal to Biafra, then it is questionable whether the percentages have altered all that much. You are certainly right in your implication. They have altered in favour of the Ibo; how strongly in favour I do not know. It is also an accident of history that the extremities of Eastern Nigeria are occupied by minority tribes, like Ogoja and the Calabar area. Those were the easiest points of access for the Federal troops, so in that sense they were most susceptible to being incorporated into Federal territory from the outset. That also diminishes the percentage.

Mr. Gibson: In no sense, then, was there a historical Iboland as such in Nigeria?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: In the same sense that there was a historic Yorubaland or Hausaland, yes; there was a dominant majority tribe. In this sense, sir, that that was not sufficient justification to impose the Federal State of Nigeria on those people, that may be true.

Mr. Gibson: Yes.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: But in terms of a majority tribe status, I think one could say roughly, Iboland, yes.

Mr. Gibson: What area would that include?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: It would incorporate most of what was Eastern Nigeria.

Mr. Gibson: Yes, thank you very much.

Mr. MacLean: I will pass, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Fairweather will be our last witness, then.

Mr. Fairweather: We have heard a great deal from witnesses during the last few days about the protocols and it must be obvious from my questioning at other times that I am an innocent abroad. But what are these protocols that prevent Canada from taking some initiative on her own?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I assume, in my innocence abroad, that the protocols are first, the suggestion by U Thant that it would be divisive and second, a wish not to offend the Organization of African Unity. I assume those are the protocols which inhibit Canadian participation. I suspect that they are but a small part of an over-all argument.

Mr. Fairweather: I had thought of a protocol as a more tangible thing, like a covenant.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I do not know of any covenant, unless there is a secret covenant between the United Kingdom and Canada on Biafra, which I doubt.

Mr. Fairweather: But then the protocols are the ordinary exchanges of mail and other things between heads of state or a recognized group such as the United Nations.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Yes, I would think that the protocols consist of the predictable pressures on the assertion of foreign policy that come from all sides.

Mr. Fairweather: They are not immutable?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I would not think they are even transient; they are very momentary.

Mr. Fairweather: Why do you suppose the United Kingdom—considering the fact of the present government, you have talked about realpolitik—would put themselves in the position of defending what we have learned of as a paper-state?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I am inclined to the view that it has to do with the maintenance of the Nigerian economy as a given export market and, much more important, with the BP interests in the oil in the southeastern corner of Biafra. I have little doubt in my mind that that is crucial.

Mr. Fairweather: The oil, as I understand it, is about the same in both Biafra and Nigeria. When I say, "about the same", I am being rather rough.

• 1500

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I was of the impression that the potential in Biafra has recently been recognized as to be almost inestimable. Within the last year or so the suggestion has been that Biafra has tremendous potential stores. Even when I was there, in the very early part of this decade, I can remember speaking to the Dutch technicians attached to Shell and the British technicians attached to BP who thought they were upon an oil field that would one day parallel the Middle East. So there is certainly some significance to Biafran oil.

Mr. Fairweather: But like so many things in this war, is there not a paradox here that if Britain wishes a reasonably stable supply of oil, she would not take the side she has?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Except that upon achieving independence—I am now working from memory and my memory is subject to error and I admit it to the Committee—but upon reaching independence—I wish I had the documents but they are public—Biafra made certain requests about the oil. She requested that a significantly larger share of the profits remain in Biafra than had previously been the case and the oil companies, as one recalls, were sorely offended and BP, being very much a British concern, was very offended so I think there was a qualitative difference at that point. Biafra wanted more of the revenue; they wanted more of the income than Nigeria had been asking.

Mr. Fairweather: It is a rather bitter note on which to end, but I do not have any other questions.

The Vice-Chairman: Go ahead, Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: Do you not find it ironic, Mr. Lewis, that it seems apparent at one time Biafrans or the Ibos were interested in keeping the Federation together, whereas at that time they might have gained independence more easily than at present and had they done so as an independent nation they would now have a lot of recognized rights that they do not have because they are classified as rebels in the protocol of international affairs?

For example, if they were a separate country and this were an international war between them and the remainder of Nigeria, there are a great many countries that would not countenance the sending of arms to either side who now do so, sending arms to one side on the theory that this helps to maintain law and order, if you wish. Also, because it is a rebellion or a civil war, it hinders the humanitarian efforts of other countries in getting supplies to both sides.

If Biafra had been a country itself and was at war with another country there would be far fewer limitations on what could be done by the International Red Cross and various countries, and so on, in helping to alleviate human suffering. Am I correct in these assumptions?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Oh yes; it is, in a sense, an ultimate irony. It is one of those things of history. You may recall that at the point at which Nigeria became independent, Ghana had already achieved its independence, France had granted independence to a number of surrounding West African States—to Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Dahomey, and so on—and that all these states were little states, seemingly fragmented states, without much viability economically or politically.

• 1505

There was at the point of the emergence of Nigeria in 1960 a tremendous exhilaration, certainly on the part of the Ibos, that they were going to have the state most populous, most economically productive in all of the African continent, forty to fifty million people incorporating these three great regions, and a sort of social philosophy that underlay that was the influence in 1960 for keeping the

country together. It allowed many feelings about Federation—that it had been opposed, that it was artificial, that it was tribal—it allowed all of those things to be submerged in a sort of common one Nigerian call and gradually the terrible realities of this state became apparent and there were six years of internal chaos. Biafra came to the conclusion—I am inclined to think it valid; many others think it invalid—that she would have to secede, not that she wanted to but that there was absolutely no alternative.

As you say, all the events that we have seen have followed, and her secession may never be consolidated although Ojukwu says with great passion that if it takes 10 years there will be a Biafra and one is inclined, after visiting the country, to think that is probably true although at what cost is simply too much for one's psyche to absorb.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Legault indicated that he might have a further question or questions.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to bring to your attention that we have somewhat understood that the sitting would be until three o'clock.

The Vice-Chairman: We are pretty well finished now. Mr. Cafik has a question.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, a very short question. I meant to bring this out earlier. It has been suggested to this Committee that we consider sending a parliamentary team to Biafra and Nigeria for the purpose of making observations. Do you think this would be a worthwhile thing to do?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Personally? Absolutely first rate. I see no reason in the world why it should not be done.

Mr. Cafik: All right, I have one supplementary question.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I will make it even tougher. I do not mean this to be a political observation, Mr. Cafik, but I think there would be some real merit in members of the government going into Biafra and perhaps Nigeria to see what they would see because I do not think that would frighten the Biafrans for one minute. I think they would welcome it.

Mr. Cafik: All right; now one supplementary to that. I have a feeling that about a three week—and this is a big problem; if you

go over there for six months or for three days or whatever it is—and I have a vague feeling that three weeks might be a suitable duration, say two weeks in Nigeria where the area is larger and one week in Biafra where the facts seem to be more accessible. People go down there for a short period of time and come back very convinced so maybe we do not need so much time there. Would that seem a reasonable length of time, or do you think it need be more or perhaps should be less?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: No, I do not think it need be more. I think that in two or two-and-a-half weeks one could absorb—I suspect even in ten days—a good deal if one worked at it in a disciplined way. I do not mean instant expertise but I mean a disciplined bringing together of facts.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, very much. I am glad to see father against son in this particular issue.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: That happens on occasion.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have heard the representations by the witness; I certainly enjoyed it and I think it was very good, but I would like to ask him whether he feels that possibly it was the Ibo that wanted the control of everything, really?

The Vice-Chairman: Speak into the microphone, please.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Whether they wanted to control the whole area and then, secondly, they thought they did not want to make any concession whatsoever and they thought the best way and the best approach was to remain in their own area and then take full control of it. Would you agree that this is what they had in mind?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: When you say they wanted to control the whole area, do you mean all of Nigeria?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Right.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Well. . .

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Because they did not want to make any concessions whatsoever.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Right.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): They went back and said, well, we will get back into our own area and we will take full control there. This leads me to a second question which is partly involved. Would the oil and the discovery of this vast oil potential, which is certainly something well worth discussing, I think, for just a second, have a meaning somewhat towards this end, towards this war that is in existence at the moment?

• 1510

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I would answer it this way: historically there is no evidence for the Ibos wanting to control it all. Historically, between 1960 and 1966 all the evidence says, we Ibos, Eastern Nigeria, will suffer almost any disadvantageous political arrangement in order to maintain one Nigeria. We are prepared to make every compromise under the sun in order to maintain one Nigeria, and I think that even a Nigerian historian would be inclined to agree with that. As a matter of fact, a Nigerian historian who has written a book on the Nigerian post-independence period has agreed with that.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Why did they assassinate the Prime Minister, then, if that was the case?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: The second part of it is that one of the other great ironies, if one is talking about ironies, is that I have a suspicion the quickest way back to a unified Nigeria is an independent Biafra, because all the Biafran instincts are for a federal state and if this terrible civil war could get out of the way and sort it out one would probably have all the ingredients for a rapprochement. There is not the kind of feeling of vengeance and vindictiveness that one would normally assume, given this kind of civil war. There is a real wish for peace and an appreciation that there will have to be economic and political ententes right after; so that is the other paradox. I would not be surprised if one could find a ceasefire and a return to boundaries and a sort of thaw if, in two or three years time from now one would be talking about a united Nigeria on a federal system with all people participating in a somewhat more amicable relationship based on the pain of this experience. That would not surprise me at all.

The Vice-Chairman: I wonder, Mr. Lewis, if you would describe where these oil reserves are? Do you have another question, Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): No, I asked him a second question about the oil find, whether it had a bearing in regard to this war.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I am sorry; I dealt with what I thought was the economic bearing in terms of the prosecution of the war. Did you mean another bearing?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): My other question was slightly different. I said in view of the large discovery of the oil potential in that area, do you believe in your own way that it had a bearing effect on...

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I see. Was the Biafran design independence with oil? Again I am very dubious because of history. The fact of the matter is that Biafra has access to a sea route at Calabar and Port Harcourt. It has a better economy than the other two sections. It had, at the point of independence, more doctors, more lawyers, more engineers than the rest of Nigeria put together; had the most advanced educational system and was within sight of two universities, and it had already discovered the oil back at the point of independence.

If Biafra wanted to be a separate state that much, the time to do it was in 1960 or 1961 when the battle would not have been terribly bitter and where all the potential was already evident in terms of an autonomous sovereign nation state. She chose not to. She chose instead to be part of an integrated Federal Nigeria, and I cannot help but feel that the independence of 1966 was the most reluctant declaration of sovereignty that Africa has had. That is my own impression.

The Vice-Chairman: I wonder whether you would indicate on the charts where the oil reserves are and describe the area for the record?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Let me see if I can find Ogoja—well, at any rate here is Port Harcourt which has, of course, a fairly good airport as well, and not far from Port Harcourt in this entire area extending north and around it are a large number of oil fields and areas. I can remember going through the plants when I was there as early as 1960. That is the primary oil concentration or oil area as I understand it.

• 1515

Mr. David Lewis: Where is the Rivers area?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: The Rivers area runs right through the Calabar-Port Harcourt southern portion.

The Vice-Chairman: You are indicating the north Rivers area and the southern part of the west central?

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Yes, I am looking for a little town; it is not on the map, but there is a place called Ogoja that is fairly far north, just retaken by Biafran troops about ten days ago which is in itself an oil deposit. They are just now trying to restore it to use, but it is certainly north of the Port Harcourt area and the Rivers area.

The Vice-Chairman: Are there any further questions? Then if there are no questions, Mr. Lewis may I express to you the thanks of the Committee and my own personal thanks for your attendance and your fine efforts today. I think it is quite evident that you inherited the articulateness of your father.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: You are suggesting it was genetic?

The Vice-Chairman: Well, not altogether; apparently there is a little diversity. But your experience and your views have been most helpful to us and particularly we have appreciated your ability to pronounce African names. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fairweather: I wonder if our officials or the Minister would like to determine whether there is any merit in inviting Mr. Arikpo, Foreign Minister of Nigeria at the United Nations, who is apparently coming to Canada to appear before this Committee.

The Vice-Chairman: When is he coming to Canada?

Mr. Lewis: I am informed he will be here on October 27.

Mr. Fairweather: I do not think we want to go till the 27th, but perhaps he would like it.

The Vice-Chairman: We will put it to the Steering Committee, then.


Mr. Fairweather: Perhaps the officials could be asked before it is put to the Steering Committee, so that the Steering Committee can find out whether he wants an invitation.

The Vice-Chairman: We have just received a special delivery letter this afternoon from the Nigerian Students' Union of the University of Alberta, dated October 16. I think we should leave that, because it is a long letter, until our deliberations on Monday when the Chairman will be back in the Chair.

Mr. Stephen Lewis: I have just one thought to pass on to the Committee, Mr. Chairman. There were any number of senior missionaries attached to the World Council and to Caritas who had heard of this Committee's sittings because, curiously enough, news of Canada is very widespread in Biafra. These missionaries would dearly appreciate the opportunity to testify if the Committee ever thought they would like to hear evidence from missionaries on the spot and who have spent several years in the country. I mention this only in passing.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lewis. We will adjourn until 3.45 p.m. on Monday. Thank you.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968



STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 10

MONDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1968

Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESS:

Dr. Clyne Shepherd, Medical Missionary, (Presbyterian),
Edinburgh, Scotland.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Alexander	Mr. Gibson	Mr. MacLean
Mr. Anderson	Mr. Groos	Mr. Marceau
Mr. Barrett	Mr. Harkness	Mr. Mongrain
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Nesbitt
Mr. Buchanan	Mr. Howard	Mr. Ouellet
Mr. Cafik	(Okanagan Boundary)	Mr. Stewart (Cochrane)
Mr. Carter	Mr. Hymmen	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Laprise	(Red Deer)
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Legault	Mr. Winch
Mr. Guay (St. Boniface)	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart
Clerk of the Committee.

⁷ Replaced Mr. Roberts on October 21, 1968.

CORRIGENDUM

(Issue No. 9—*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*)

Page 375 First Column Line 8—the line should read “Edinburgh of his acceptance. We expect it”

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
FRIDAY, October 18, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Guay (St. Boniface) be substituted for that of Mr. Roberts on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, October 21, 1968.
(16)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:45 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Ian Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Barrett, Buchanan, Cafik, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Gibson, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Ouellet, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch—(21).

Also present: Messrs. Allmand, Broadbent and MacDonald (*Egmont*), M.P.'s.

In attendance: Dr. Clyne Shepherd, Medical Missionary (Presbyterian), Edinburgh, Scotland.

The Chairman introduced Dr. Shepherd, the witness for this afternoon's sitting. Dr. Shepherd made an opening statement, describing his knowledge of conditions in the current Nigerian/Biafran conflict.

On motion of Mr. Gibson, seconded by Mr. Barrett,

Resolved,—That reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to Dr. Clyne Shepherd, Edinburgh, Scotland, who has been invited to appear as a witness before this Committee on Monday, October 21, 1968.

At approximately 4:00 p.m. members of the Committee began their questioning of the witness. With the questioning continuing, at 6:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING (17)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:15 p.m. this day, with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Buchanan, Cafik, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Gibson, Groos, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Mongrain, Ouellet, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn and Winch—(20).

In attendance: Dr. Clyne Shepherd, Medical Missionary (Presbyterian), Edinburgh, Scotland.

The Chairman opened the meeting with an attendance of 14, on the understanding that as soon as a quorum was present, he would call for a motion to incorporate the evidence taken thus far.

At 8:35 p.m., a quorum being present, on a motion by Mr. Groos, seconded by Mr. Cafik,

Resolved,—That the Evidence taken thus far during this evening's sitting be incorporated as part of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

The Chairman referred to a letter dated October 9, 1968 from Mr. Hugh Faulkner, M.P. Mr. Faulkner enclosed a petition signed by 1,124 people in the city of Peterborough. The Chairman read the petition to the Committee. It was agreed, unanimously, to file this correspondence and the petition as an Exhibit of the Committee (*Exhibit 3*).

The Committee agreed that copies of the letter dated October 16, 1968 from the Nigerian Students' Union, University of Alberta and addressed to the Committee, should be distributed to members of the Committee, by the Clerk.

Members continued their questioning of Dr. Shepherd, which began at the afternoon sitting. At 9:35 p.m., the Vice-Chairman took the Chair.

The Committee agreed, unanimously, to the following correction in the Evidence (*Issue No. 9 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*), as suggested by the Vice-Chairman:

Page 375, First column, Line 8—the line should read "Edinburgh of his acceptance. We expect it."

The Chairman resumed the Chair and thanked the witness, Dr. Shepherd, for providing so much assistance to the Committee in its consideration of the Nigerian problem.

The Committee adjourned at 10:10 p.m., until Tuesday, October 22, 1968, at 9:30 a.m., when the witness will be Major General W. A. Milroy.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Monday, October 21, 1968.

The Chairman: This afternoon we have as our witness Dr. Clyde Shepherd. He is a medical doctor and went out to Nigeria in 1956. He was sent out there by the Church of Scotland to work with the Presbyterian Church of Nigeria. In Nigeria he has worked in general hospitals and leprosaria and has been Medical Secretary of the Presbyterian Church there for some years. All of his medical work is actually in Biafra. For the past six months he has been Chairman of the Protestant Churches Relief Group in Biafra. He returned to Edinburgh about September 20 of this year and he expects to be returning to Biafra within a few weeks. He has come from Edinburgh to appear and give evidence before this Committee and I know that all of us welcome him here. He is going to make a brief initial statement and then he will be open to questions from members.

Dr. Clyde Shepherd (Medical Secretary of the Presbyterian Church of Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, it is a very great honour to be asked to speak here, and it is especially welcome to speak to a Committee which is taking such an objective interest in the situation in Nigeria and Biafra.

There are one or two points that I would like to make. I am sorry they are not well prepared, because I did not have enough warning to prepare them properly. I know of some of the points that have troubled members of this Committee, and several of these I would like to refer to. People wonder about the statistics of dying people in Biafra. For some months now I have personally been involved with the Chief Delegate of the Red Cross in Biafra in working out these statistics. It is not an easy job. Nobody can have all the information with the country in the kind of turmoil it is. We have been working with an uncertain size of population because of the moving about of large numbers of refugees. We have to take into consideration the basic death rates in the country. We arrived at the figures we have published by taking everything into account. As regards population

size, we have tended to err on the side of being conservative. Where we were not sure of death rates and the mortality, we were conservative. The figures we have produced are obtained from random samples of death rates in villages, refugee camps and hospitals from every province in Biafra. By the end of July 6,000 deaths a day from malnutrition or starvation only was the figure we arrived at. Recently, last month, the Red Cross published a figure of 8,000 to 10,000 deaths. Knowing how this figure was reached, I would agree with it as being reasonably accurate. But all our figures, I would remind you, are likely to be on the conservative side.

● 1550

People have been troubled that the Government of Biafra did not welcome a road corridor. One side of the road corridor question which I do not think has been helped, is that held by the relief workers inside Biafra. The Chief Delegate of the Red Cross was technical adviser to a large trading company in Biafra for something like 15 years. We have our own transport officers, connected with missionary work, who have many years of experience, and it is the case that none of the relief workers welcomed the idea of immediate effort going into a road corridor, because we knew the tremendous difficulties associated with operating this successfully. It was something that was highly desirable and useful and which we knew would take months to get going satisfactorily, especially since it was the wet season in the country. Therefore, in this sense it was not the most efficient or satisfactory means of operating relief. We were with the Biafran Government.

The question of daylight airlift has arisen. I was in Biafra when the Commissioner of the Red Cross, Mr. Lindt, came to inquire about the possibility of an airstrip devoted entirely to the relief operation. The idea was that this airstrip could be used only for relief. It would be situated in a piece of diplomatic territory. There would be five miles of complete demilitarization around the airstrip. For this reason the airstrip operated by the Biafran Govern-

ment at Uli would not have been appropriate. The Red Cross was offered a selection of several other airstrips which were available in the territory at the time. They made their selection at a place called Obilagu or Oтуру. The area was demilitarized. Full details of the agreement, I understand, were given to all parties concerned, and it was at this point I believe, that the Nigerian Government said that only the Uli airstrip was acceptable, and therefore the proposals for this daylight airlift broke down.

These are my only opening remarks, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Shepherd. Before throwing the meeting open for questions, we have the following motion:

• 1555

Mr. Gibson: I move that reasonable travelling and living expenses be paid to Dr. Clyne Shepherd, Edinburgh, Scotland, who has been invited to appear as a witness before this Committee on Monday, October 21, 1968.

Mr. Barrett: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: I have on my list of questioners Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Shepherd, we have heard a great deal of evidence in this Committee, and I think much of it conflicts with other evidence. In view of the fact that your opening remarks have not indicated a number of the things that have already come before the Committee, I would like to ask some questions not based on the remarks themselves, but on other observations which I hope you could give us the benefit of.

The last witness we had, Mr. Stephen Lewis, and the one prior to that, Mr. Charles Taylor, both seemed to feel that in order for Canada to do something of real value to assist the people of Biafra and Nigeria in a humanitarian way, shipping of food and transport to get the food in really was not the answer, the answer lying really in having a ceasefire or a conclusion of the war. Do you feel that we as a Committee ought to confine ourselves primarily to that objective as the major one, or should we concern ourselves more importantly with the supplying of food and transport for that food into the troubled areas?

Dr. Shepherd: It is a very difficult choice to make, sir. I think my answer would be that both things should be pressed with all expedition.

Mr. Cafik: In pressing for the ceasefire, Canada has a rather unique position, we understand, with both the Federal territory of Nigeria and the Biafrans in that we have shown our willingness to supply food and vehicles to get the food in there. Do you think we should do anything at this stage in time that would jeopardize those good offices we presently have by taking the matter to the United Nations and upsetting the Federal authorities? Or should we work to try and maintain these good offices and perhaps in the long run achieve more than we would if we took the bull by the horns and upset one side in this war?

Dr. Shepherd: I believe, sir, that really this struggle between Nigeria and Biafra does rather hinge on the subject of human rights. This is my personal belief. I would therefore feel personally that it would be a good thing to take the risk of seeking United Nations intervention.

Mr. Cafik: Would you think that the human rights are not really one of the major considerations in any war? What makes this war different in this respect?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, I personally believe that the sequence of events from 1966 to date in Nigeria suggests that there has been a deprivation of proper rights to live in peace and security and to make constitutional representations in their own affairs. This has been denied what were the Eastern Nigerians and now the Biafrans.

Mr. Cafik: Do you feel that it is not a matter of interfering in the internal affairs of another nation to take this before the United Nations or to directly involve ourselves as a nation in the conflict?

Dr. Shepherd: I am sure that technically it will be taken as an intervention in internal affairs because the whole territory was one once. But I feel that in this particular situation the moral reasons are much stronger than usual.

• 1600

Mr. Cafik: The Red Cross, also concerned with the humanitarian problems, through General Wrinch who appeared before this Committee, indicated that their approach was

one where they tried to maintain good offices with both sides in order to advance the cause of their humanitarian work. I gather you disagree with their general approach to it.

Dr. Shepherd: Not at all, sir; I feel that it is highly desirable that the Red Cross maintain good relations with both sides, most certainly, and the Churches.

Mr. Cafik: But you do not feel that governments need to do that? After all, we are concerned with achieving the same objective as you are—at least I would hope we are.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, but I think it is much more than the simple humanitarian side involved with government, if we have the record of experiences in other emergent countries, particularly of federations which have proved to be unsatisfactory, and I think even though colonial governments go into federal set-ups with the best will in the world and with absolutely good faith, there are forces which emerge after independence which have to be reckoned with.

Mr. Cafik: It has been suggested that we approach Britain and perhaps even Russia to have them stop shipping arms to Biafra, or I should say to Nigeria. I presume that you agree that we ought to do something along this line?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir, I do agree.

Mr. Cafik: Do you think we should also approach France to have them stop supplying arms to Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir.

Mr. Cafik: So your view is that no arms should go into either side?

Dr. Shepherd: Definitely, sir, that is my view.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Dr. Shepherd, did I get it correctly that in your opinion there are now 8,000 to 10,000 a day dying in Nigeria as a whole?

Dr. Shepherd: Eight thousand to 10,000 dying of malnutrition and starvation.

Mr. Ryan: Apart from war casualties?

Dr. Shepherd: Apart from war casualties.

Mr. Ryan: Are the war casualties very high at present?

Dr. Shepherd: I would say they are high. They are not high by the standard of our own world wars, but they still seem to me high.

Mr. Ryan: Could you give an estimate of the order of casualties in the last few weeks?

Dr. Shepherd: It is difficult to hazard an estimate, not having the figures at my fingertips. When I left Biafra I did not realize I was going to be speaking at an inquiry like this.

Mr. Ryan: When was the last day you were in Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: The 20th of September. In one hospital in Umuahia after an air raid we had about 150 casualties, over 100 dead.

Mr. Ryan: In one day?

Dr. Shepherd: That is in one day, many of the casualties dying, which increases the death toll. A week-end before I left I can remember there were roughly 140 casualties, and this is from the battle front, purely military. These usually are major casualties because we have specialized units for chest and abdominal surgery in Umuahia and these particular casualties are sent there.

Mr. Ryan: In your opinion, what is the greater need at the moment, supplying the FMG-occupied areas with high-protein food, or supplying the beleaguered portion of Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not think there is any doubt that the greater need in terms of the total number of suffering people is in Biafra—the unoccupied part of the country. But in the Federal-occupied country, we have been aware of a very, very great need in the South-Eastern Sector. At one point when the Biafrans had advanced into that sector, I made a visit there myself and found conditions almost indescribably bad.

Mr. Ryan: The impression I get so far from the evidence is that certain feeding depots are set up and the people come to these depots. There is not much effort made to get out into the bush country along the trails to make distribution that way. Is this the situation?

● 1605

Dr. Shepherd: I can only speak for inside Biafra. Every effort is made to get to the remotest areas where people are starving.

Mr. Ryan: And are they able effectively to get high protein food to the remotest areas?

Dr. Shepherd: One thing that has added to the difficulties recently has been the fact that many rural areas have been completely surrounded.

Mr. Ryan: They are cut off then?

Dr. Shepherd: They have been cut off. We know of pockets of people, and these are sometimes in large numbers, where the relief operation is probably not going very well; but some of our workers have been crossing the fighting lines and supplying people behind the lines.

Mr. Ryan: Is this done by stealth, or by agreement?

Dr. Shepherd: It is not done by agreement. It has to be done by stealth. Sometimes it is possible to do it in the daylight, in the more remote parts, but at other times we have an arrangement to leave food at night at a certain point and people come out of beleaguered villages and pick it up and go back again.

Mr. Ryan: That is a secret cache arrangement?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: So far I have been led to understand that the International Red Cross and the churches have been the main suppliers of these relief provisions. I see by *The Christian Science Monitor* of this morning, however, that UNICEF is flying in there with what I believe is a Sikorsky helicopter; it is a large helicopter, apparently. It landed there in the last day or so and took quite a few supplies into the delta area which flood waters, or some other situation—perhaps it was the war situation—had cut off. Is this something new or has this been going on for some time, as well as the church effort?

Dr. Shepherd: It is relatively new for UNICEF to play this part. I think they did give two helicopters to the rescue operation on the Federal side early last month. I believe one was shot down, and this is an additional one.

Mr. Ryan: It is probably the first one actually to do much good, then?

Dr. Shepherd: I think that is quite likely.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, doctor.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Dr. Shepherd, in your opening statement you mentioned something about the possible utilization of a land route. Perhaps I did not hear you quite clearly but it seemed to me you indicated that a land route would serve no useful purpose. Could you elaborate a little on your remarks about the land route?

Dr. Shepherd: I certainly did not mean that it would serve no useful purpose. The land route was mooted relatively early on in the rainy season. Anybody who knows West Africa at all realizes that in the best of times, with no war, there are many transport difficulties in the rainy season. The prospect of bringing relief materials over hundreds and hundreds of miles by route was not at all a pleasing one to those engaged in the relief operation.

Apart from the difficulties of this, in any case, we knew better than the outside world the number of bridges that were down and the roads that had been made worse than usual by the war. We felt, therefore, at that time that the road corridor was not the main thing to concentrate on; that the airlift should have been built up much more rapidly than it was, and that, in the meantime, the very big logistical problems of the land corridor be worked out.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): To the best of your knowledge, and having passed the rainy season, is any work being done to establish a land route that will be acceptable both to the Biafran authorities and to the Nigerian Military Government? It would seem, from some of the projections of Dr. Middelkoop and others, that within a matter of weeks we will be faced with an alarming increase in the number of deaths by starvation, perhaps even more than a well-operated airlift could handle. Do you know whether it would be possible, or whether the steps are now being taken, to establish this kind of land route?

• 1610

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know about steps now being taken; I am sorry. I have not been personally involved with these.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you think it would be possible for such a route to be established, free of the objections, I gather, of the Biafrans, that it would make them militarily vulnerable?

Dr. Shepherd: I think that probably something satisfactory could be done. The land

corridor involves so many difficulties, and the stuff has to arrive in the country anyway by sea originally, that I do not know why some relatively easily-observed route such as a river channel is not used. One that was suggested by the Red Cross, and is agreeable to the Biafrans, is a route up the river Niger to a normally-used peacetime trading terminal at a place called Oguta. This route could be properly and easily observed and the cargo checked; and it would also avoid the suspicion of supplies coming overland from Nigeria. I am surprised that this one has not been pressed more.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): To your knowledge, have the Biafrans been opposed to the use of that route?

Dr. Shepherd: No, sir.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Oh, they have not been opposed?

Dr. Shepherd: No; perhaps they seemed to be opposed to it at the beginning of these negotiations but then they definitely agreed to it.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Are you suggesting, then, that if this possible route were pressed by one of the relief agencies of either the Red Cross or the churches, or perhaps by a government—perhaps even our own—we might be able to open up a route for a large-scale movement of relief supplies?

Dr. Shepherd: I think this is possible, sir, yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you suggest that perhaps our government should consult directly with the Nigerian Military Government on the possibility of opening up such a route?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; well, when so many proposals have been made and fallen by the wayside I think that before the Canadian government took any action it would be desirable to make an up-to-date check on whether it would be acceptable to each side.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you have any suggestions on how governments or the relief agencies themselves are going to deal with the situation that will confront us, say, in early December when it is projected that there will be 25,000 deaths a day by starvation?

Dr. Shepherd: Provided we have the supplies and the transports, I think the relief agencies can do a lot. Our main trouble up to now has been lack of supplies.

Another point that should be made is that the figure of 200 tons of protein a day, which has been referred to in this Committee, was put out, as far as I can remember, about April or May. The need has changed greatly since then. At the present moment I would think that it would be at least 1,000 tons a day of protein, and rising very sharply in this projected period a few months ahead when the death rate will have doubled.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): What you are saying is that the basic need now is for 1,000 tons a day?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And that in future weeks and months it may rise to 2,000 or even 3,000 tons a day?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You mentioned a moment ago that the obtaining of supplies is the basic problem. I presume by that you mean obtaining them in Biafra, because from my own knowledge there was a large stock of supplies at Sao Tome. It was the transportation of these supplies that was the basic weak link. Is that correct?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): To your knowledge, has there been a deterioration in this transport operation over the past week or 10 days?

Dr. Shepherd: I cannot speak for the past week or 10 days, but I can say that just a few weeks ago there was a tremendous improvement in it. At the time I came home, September 20, there had been a great improvement, and I understand, from people who returned from Biafra shortly after that, that the improvement had gone on.

● 1615

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Can you give the Committee any background on why, at the present time, we should be having so much trouble putting our three Hercules aircraft into operation under the Red Cross. We had hoped, some days ago, when these Hercules aircraft moved towards Africa, that shortly they would be operating into the needy areas

in both Nigeria and Biafra, but there seems to have been considerable difficulty in getting clearance. From your knowledge of previous experience in this operation can you shed any light on why we would be encountering these difficulties?

Dr. Shepherd: I cannot, sir; but then I cannot speak for the Red Cross side of the operation, because although we have been receiving some supplies from them most have come from the island of Sao Tome to the group I am working with.

My experience has been of a very great deal of co-operation from the Biafran authorities in bringing these supplies in. The only times that there have been interruptions the reasons have been obvious; for example, the airfield being threatened; and then we have had to reduce what we were bringing in and even call it off for a few days. But normally we get every co-operation.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): In your position and from your experience, if these Hercules aircraft were to be made available by our government to these churches and volunteer agencies that are operating out of Sao Tome would this be acceptable and would they be used immediately; or would there be a long delay in getting some kind of clearance for them?

Dr. Shepherd: I think they would jump at the chance; they would open their arms gleefully and accept. It might be that they might ask for some land transport to be brought in via the Hercules; I do not know. I think they could use many more Land Rovers in their operation.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): To move the relief material around inside Biafra.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): On another tack, entirely, Dr. Shepherd, one of the concerns, quite naturally, is the involvement of Great Britain in this whole conflict, and basically its supplying of arms. The question has been raised by many Canadians why there has been very little concern in Great Britain over Great Britain's involvement in this war.

Perhaps I could ask you a two-part question. Why is there seemingly such little public concern about this and, secondly, is there anything that you would recommend whereby the weight of public opinion might be changed in Great Britain with regard to this situation?

Dr. Shepherd: I am afraid I disagree with you, sir. There has been a great deal of concern in Great Britain. There have been many demonstrations and protests. I am sure the Commonwealth Relations Office is just sick at the number of visits being made by people like myself and letters being written.

This question, more than any other on the international scene, has filled the postbags of MP's. I would not have been at all surprised, had there been a vote on the last debate in the House of Parliament, if the government had been defeated on the supply of arms. I think there is public concern.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you, then, see any weakening of the government's position and a possible change, or perhaps the sending of an ultimatum to the Government of Nigeria over this situation?

Dr. Shepherd: The stance of the British Government has seemed so illogical to me personally, knowing all the pleas they have heard from different sides, that I do not think they are going to change.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): As a final question then, Dr. Shepherd, in light of the difficulty that our government has encountered in pursuing this matter at the United Nations, do you think it might be a useful mission if Canada were to recommend to the other members of the Commonwealth that a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference be held as soon as possible to see what steps the Commonwealth might take to bring about a ceasefire?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; I feel this would be a very good move, sir, especially since some members of the Commonwealth have already demonstrated great misgivings.

• 1620

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you think there will be any danger, as some have suggested, that some of the other countries, particularly the African countries, would consider that we were either interfering or meddling in affairs with which we had no right to become involved?

Dr. Shepherd: I am sure these suspicions would arise. One of the things I feel most in this situation—as I think do all expatriates working in Biafra—having worked for years in Nigeria, is that I do not think there was anybody who wanted to see the Nigerian Federation break up. But events were unforeseeable.

ble. Because we had a natural sympathy with the plight of Biafrans we have been taken to be almost enemies of Nigeria. This is emphatically not true. I would just as gladly work in Nigeria as in Biafra. I think we are faced in this situation with a very serious human problem. I think Nigerians have to face the fact that this is a situation, unforeseeable perhaps, but a very deep one, which involves really not just Biafra but the whole concept of the Nigerian Federation. It will take many years before fears and suspicions are removed from the political scene there.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Thank you very much.

The Chairman: I have the following questioners: Mr. Groos followed by Mr. Laprise, Mr. Guay, Mr. Winch, Mr. Legault and Mr. Gibson. Mr. Groos?

Mr. Groos: Dr. Shepherd, I am sorry; when the Chairman was reading your background I missed how long you had been in Nigeria-Biafra.

Dr. Shepherd: Twelve years, sir.

Mr. Groos: Twelve years; and you left Biafra on September 20; is that right?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Groos: You mentioned that your organization has been distributing food in Biafra. What have been the amounts and the source of the food or aid that you have been distributing?

Dr. Shepherd: We have been receiving food mainly from the world's Protestant churches. They have actually been sent to us mainly by the Scandinavian and German churches. They have done the actual moving of them in; and the main part of the outside work has been done by these churches.

Mr. Groos: The moving of the food in, then, has been done by the Swedish Hercules aircraft, and so on; and it has come in entirely by air?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Groos: What have been your relationships—you just touched on this when you were answering Mr. MacDonald a moment ago—with the Nigerian Government since you have started working on behalf of the Biafrans?

Dr. Shepherd: Our working in Biafra has been more an accident of history than a deliberate choice. It is just that the workers who were in Eastern Nigeria when secession took place have continued to work there. I do not think we could be said to have a relationship with the Nigerian Government because we have been physically cut off from them.

Mr. Groos: This Swedish Hercules that is operating in and out of this air station at night is presumably operating without the blessing of the Nigerian Government; is that correct?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Groos: Would you feel it incumbent upon your organization to get some agreement or approval from the Nigerians to permit a Canadian Hercules to be operated by your organization, for example?

Dr. Shepherd: There have been so many frustrations about getting the approval of the Nigerian Government that I think this bit of diplomatic procedure has probably been overlooked recently.

• 1625

I think this Committee should know that the Red Cross, operating from Fernando Po, offering inspection of every piece of material that was loaded into their aircraft, giving flight times and full flight schedules, still were having their aircraft fired upon by anti-aircraft guns at the time I left Biafra, or at least within one or two weeks of it. So I do not understand this striving for approval at this stage because I feel that their operation is disapproved of.

Mr. Groos: In other words, if the operation were turned over to your organization you would not attempt to get approval; you would just plough ahead anyway.

Dr. Shepherd: I would gladly attempt to get approval—gladly.

Mr. Groos: Well I did not wish to make a special point of this.

I was also very interested in what you had to say about the fact that no relief workers favoured the road corridor, because it was not the most efficient or satisfactory, and therefore they were in agreement with the Biafran Government when that Government turned down the suggestion of a road corridor.

One thing which impresses itself upon me more and more every time a new witness

appears before us is the fact that the witnesses and I think the press in general have tended to underrate the size of the problem that we are facing here. Even in this Committee I do not think we are seized with the enormity of the problem that is presenting itself. Every day the figures get larger. Up to 25,000 persons a day are expected to die in December and the requirements are over 3,000 tons of food a day, which is a bare minimum. It seems to me that it is quite beyond the capability of any volunteer organization to supply these amounts of food and land it were needed. Therefore we have to expand our thoughts on this matter and have some sort of government intervention. Your idea of the possibility of an airstrip for relief only appealed to me and seemed to be a good idea. What happened to it? Even if we wanted to put on a small Berlin airlift type of operation here, using great numbers of aircraft—perhaps some from countries that have not yet participated in the relief of Biafra—and a properly constructed airfield—using the facilities that are available in modern and industrialized countries today—in Biafra that could handle up to 3,000 tons a day, that operation would have to be mounted pretty quickly. What ever happened to that idea?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, sir, during the first week that the Red Cross took over this airstrip under the circumstances which I said—about it being a bit of international diplomatic soil—the runway was bombed three times, and that was the first indication that the Nigerians did not approve of it.

Mr. Groos: But since then would you draw any hope from the fact that the Nigerians have agreed—and this is the first time certainly within my knowledge in history that a country at war with itself has agreed to such an arrangement—to permit relief flights into a part of the territory which is at war. If so, do you not think that we might put this idea forward again?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I think this would be well worth doing.

• 1630

Mr. Groos: You see, I think we are all seeking here, Doctor, to come to some sensible solutions. I liked your idea, for example, about the Niger River route. I wonder if you could point out to us where that is on the map and about how long that route is that you mentioned.

Dr. Shepherd: The map is really very small to demonstrate this.

Mr. Groos: About how far through Nigerian territory does the Niger River flow before it enters Biafran territory?

Dr. Shepherd: The whole of the west bank of the Niger is Nigerian territory, there is a section of the east bank which is Biafran territory, and there is a port which is situated up the River Niger close to the airstrip known as Uli—it is only a few miles from Uli—which has been a terminal of the United Africa Company for many years. At the time I left Biafra I believe it was in Biafran hands actually.

Mr. Groos: We have had witnesses appear before us, Dr. Shepherd, who have suggested in one way or another that perhaps in order to bring about a stalemate the Biafrans should be supplied with arms. In your opinion, have witnesses who have appeared before us and made this type of recommendation, imperilled in any way the success of the efforts of the International Red Cross in their negotiations with Nigeria to furnish relief to Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: I am not clear on your question, sir. This is tying in relief with arms.

Mr. Groos: The suggestion has been made by some of the witnesses that perhaps we could achieve a stalemate in the war if the Biafrans were supplied with arms. Now at the same moment the Nigerians have indicated approval of the International Red Cross flying over Nigerian territory to supply food to the Biafrans. Do you think the fact that certain witnesses have appeared before this Committee and made this sort of recommendation, hazarded in any way the chances of the International Red Cross getting those flights actually approved into Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: Unfortunately I have not heard all the details of this. I actually would have thought not. I do not see why it should have hazarded them any more than they already have been.

Mr. Groos: Did I hear you say that you thought it was a good idea to take this whole matter to the United Nations?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Groos: Where would you stand on the position of Canada supplying arms to Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not really feel I can express an opinion about it except to say that I very much agree with those who say that a stalemate is desirable. This is an area in which I feel the British Government could have been wiser earlier on. I think by careful management they could have induced a stalemate which would have made both sides much more willing to negotiate.

Mr. Groos: Since the size of Biafra has obviously diminished in the last six months, the leverage that the Biafrans had must be less today than it was six months ago. Do you see any possibility of a stalemate today without some international intervention?

• 1635

Dr. Shepherd: Certainly not without international intervention. I think that the Biafrans are very united, very solid in their feelings. I do not criticize them for this and I am surprised at the number of people who speak as if the fears they have are unfounded. I think that they have every reason to believe that they are fighting for existence and that they are going to go on fighting that a Viet Nam-type of situation is likely to develop, and so I feel very much that international intervention before the situation arises is very highly desirable.

Mr. Groos: Thank you, Dr. Shepherd.

The Chairman: Mr. Laprise.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: Dr. Shepherd, since the committee started sitting to study this situation existing in Nigeria and Biafra, we have heard a lot about the possibility of genocide in that area. Do you believe there is genocide on the part of the Nigerians on the Ibos and the Biafrans?

[*English*]

Dr. Shepherd: This is certainly a thing which has given us a lot of thought. I believe that we have to bear in mind the kind of country that Nigeria is—it has so many tribes, religions and cultures—and if I am asked if all the people of Nigeria are united in a genocidal attempt on the Eastern Nigerians or the Ibos, I would have to say no. On the other hand, from some experiences in which I have been involved and also from stories I have heard from colleagues, from my own experience of the way the aerial warfare is being waged, I feel that there may be within Nigeria a group which has genocid-

al intentions. I also have in mind that genocide is not necessarily a situation where a whole race needs to be wiped out but where a selected number of people who, because of their tribal nationality, may be done away with. So I feel that there is some cause to fear this situation.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: Now, on the Ibos' side, we heard lately a declaration according to which there were two hundred and fifty different tribes in Nigeria. What I would like to know is this: whether the Ibo tribe is the most numerous or whether there are more numerous tribes in Nigeria, than the Ibos.

• 1640

[*English*]

Dr. Shepherd: Viewing the whole of Nigeria, although the Ibos are one of the main tribes they are a minority tribe. If one takes the three groupings, Hausa Fulani which is more of a cultural grouping than a tribal grouping, Yoruba which is pure tribe, and Ibo, the Ibos are the smallest of these three, but they are almost the same size as the Yoruba.

Mr. Lewis: Yoruba is western Nigeria?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, the main tribe of Western Nigeria.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: Now, several witnesses said there was fear of genocide on the Ibos' side. Do you know whether this fear is felt by the masses and the peasants, or whether it is only felt by the Biafran leaders.

[*English*]

Dr. Shepherd: I think it is felt by a very large group of Biafrans. It is most keenly felt by all the educated people. There must be some tens of thousands of school teachers in Biafra, some hundreds of thousands of people who had primary school education, some tens of thousands who had secondary school education, and these are the people whom I think are most aware of the situation vis-à-vis genocide. I do not think the peasants would understand genocide very clearly as a legal description of something.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Laprise: Some time ago, we heard that some generals threatened to push the Biafrans to the sea and some apparently said the following: "We must win over these people,

keep them in their place, and never give them back the economic and political supremacy they had." Did you hear anything like that?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I have heard this kind of thing. I believe that this is a quotation from the autobiography of Sir Ahmudu Bello, the assassinated premier of Northern Nigeria, who was in turn quoting an earlier person and this saying has been brought out again.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: Now, we know that the Biafrans receive arms from France. Do you know whether France has been providing arms for a long time?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: Well, I do not know if France has been providing arms for a long time. My feeling would be that it probably has not. All I know is that some arms have been coming through Gabon. Who exactly they have been coming from, I do not know.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: You don't know either, if other countries such as Portugal, have supplied arms to the Biafrans?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know, sir.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: One last question, sir. In your opinion, if the war ended very shortly, how much time would it take to return to a normal situation in the most affected area in Nigeria?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: I would say that to return to the normal situation, nutritionally, is going to take quite a number of years, and particularly the next two years there is a very, very large piece of medical work needed. And it is also worth saying that a whole generation of children has been decimated and what is left of this generation is likely—many of them are likely to have permanent brain damage. So that it is going to take years to eradicate this situation as regards the population; then also there is going to be a terrific amount of reconstruction which will take years. For example, my hospital, the hospital to which I was appointed when the war started, was razed to the ground in an air attack. This kind of thing is going to be only one of the

very many competing requirements. It was the only hospital serving quite a large area. The job of reconstruction will take, I imagine, five to 10 years to bring things back to the stage they were pre-war. The people of Eastern Nigeria, of all tribes, I believe, are very virile and hard-working and they may with help recover more quickly than we imagine.

• 1645

Mr. Laprise: That is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Dr. Shepherd, I took good note of the fact of the number of years you have worked in Nigeria and particularly in the Biafran area, and also of the fact that you have told us, as others have who have come before us, of the numbers of daily deaths that are occurring through malnutrition or casualty. Because of—and I would like to quote you—"serious human problems" that you are quite aware of in the area, and because of the number of years that you have been there, could you give me an indication as to a matter which not too many of us have been discussing, and that is the birth rate as compared to the casualties and the deaths that we are speaking of? Could you indicate to us what the birth rate is?

Dr. Shepherd: I am very sorry I cannot tell you the birth rate.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Have you any idea, then, Doctor, in view of the fact that you have been there so many years, what was the death rate last year, or the year before that, or 1965, for example, or 1964? Just to give us an indication of what is the birth rate in that area.

Dr. Shepherd: Well, the...

Mr. Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I hope Dr. Shepherd understood the question. I do not know whether Mr. Guay did it deliberately or inadvertently, but he talks about the death rate and the birth rate.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes, I did for this reason, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lewis: I did not understand...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I am speaking to the Chairman now. Every witness that has come forth here so far, Mr. Chairman, has mentioned the fact that there are approxi-

mately, and conservatively, 6,000 deaths or more a day. This number could be far more between now and Christmas, but no one has indicated to us at any time the approximate birth rate for the same area, where they are speaking of 6,000 deaths a day which I presume is in Biafra. Certainly I am presuming that because of the doctor's experience in the locality, he could indicate to me the approximate birth rate in the same area.

Mr. Winch: And how many lived...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I beg your pardon.

Mr. Winch: And how many lived of those born.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Probably you could ask the questions when you are asking them. Mr. Chairman, I am asking the Doctor what is the daily birth rate.

Dr. Shepherd: The fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, that there is no accurate register of births and deaths. This is not yet compulsory because it is not yet a practical possibility to record these.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Fine.

Dr. Shepherd: In the rural areas, I can tell you this, that the death rate of children born—of all children born—varies between something like 25 and 50 per cent. The number of areas with as many as 50 per cent is very few now. In Eastern Nigeria, or Biafra, malnutrition was not a main cause of death.

• 1650

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): What was it, then?

Dr. Shepherd: It was a cause.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It was the cause?

Dr. Shepherd: It was a cause, but malaria, dysentery, pneumonia were much commoner causes of death.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I see.

Dr. Shepherd: I can give you one statistic which might clear up the malnutrition situation. I was asked for these figures by a journalist and particularly looked them up. In 1963 the hospital I was working in, in Umuahia, had 20 admissions with a diagnosis of kwashiorkor, that is in the whole year. This question was asked me at the end of July and I looked up our busiest day in July and discovered that on the 1st of July we saw 1,500 children as out-patients. Many, many

times more than usual. Over 1,000 of these were suffering from kwashiorkor so there has been a phenomenal increase in this condition.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): This answer gives us an indication at least of what I was asking. My next question would be this. Also because you have been in the area that many years, you must be quite familiar with the Nigerians outside the boundaries of Biafra. I am making reference now to the prisoners of war, possibly outside that centre where you were. Could you give me an indication as to what is the number of deaths taking place there? Are they dying because of casualty of war, or because of malnutrition?

Dr. Shepherd: Is this question about soldiers being killed in the war?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes.

Dr. Shepherd: I do not have exact figures, but I have no hesitation in saying that many thousands have been killed.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): All right. This is my next question, Doctor. We will take an equal population other than soldiers, outside the boundaries of Biafra. How are they? Are they dying equally because of malnutrition, because of other sicknesses that you mentioned a few moments ago? Are they dying approximately in the same percentages as those within the area of Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: I think this is approximately right, yes.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I see. So then there is also malnutrition; many of them are dying from malnutrition outside the boundaries of Biafra.

Dr. Shepherd: My impression on the whole of Nigeria is that malnutrition itself was not a very great cause of death.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): This is my last comment. Then if that is the case, what we have heard about the death rate in Biafra can be taken generally for the whole nation; that this is going on because of malnutrition, because of other sicknesses and that there is quite a high death rate in the country.

Dr. Shepherd: Oh, yes.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. Shepherd: Could I make a short statement, sir. I am just slightly confused. I want

to make clear that the figure of the thousands daily in Biafra represents those who are dying as a result of the new malnutrition situation. It is not a figure which bears a relationship with the basic death rate. I would like to be clear about that, sir.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes, I understand.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Dr. Shepherd, in view of all your years in Nigeria and having left just as recently as September 20, could I ask whether you could confirm, deny, or bring in any gray area on information that has been given us in this Committee by various witnesses, that in Nigerian bombing raids, villages, market places, hospitals and refugee camps have been bombed although there were no military establishments in the immediate vicinity?

• 1655

Dr. Shepherd: This is very definitely true, sir. There is no question about it. I would say that hospitals and market places have been the principally selected targets. I could not say that refugee camps have been specially selected, but I think it is well known that almost every school is a refugee camp and many schools have been attacked also.

Mr. Winch: And market places?

Dr. Shepherd: Market places, yes.

Mr. Winch: Would you say, in view of what you have just said, that there were in a majority of cases—it is up to you—any military establishments in the near neighbourhood where this bombing has taken place? Or were they deliberately selected?

Dr. Shepherd: Of course, I cannot say that they were deliberately selected. I do not know that. I would say that usually there are no military establishments in the neighbourhood.

Mr. Winch: My second question, Mr. Chairman, has basically been put, but I would like to have it enlarged upon a little.

Dr. Shepherd, I am certain you realize the feelings and the worry of this Committee at the moment in view of the fact that in the past two weeks the Canadian Government has made available three *Hercules*, with a fourth standing by, each of which has an airlift capability of 22½ tons a trip, and they are available and not moving. We were given to understand as late as this morning in the

House of Commons that it is because the International Red Cross has not yet had clearance.

I know you touched on this a little, but did I understand you to say that if there were a change of policy accepted by Canada and these same aircraft were made available to the Church organizations which are now operating and using at least one *Hercules* direct to Biafra, that you feel that if there were such a policy and this were acceptable to the government, you could start within 24 hours, through the Church organizations, using Canadian *Hercules* the same as the present one is now operating? I think it is very, very important to get this in as much detail as possible, as far as you can tell us, in your opinion.

Dr. Shepherd: As far as I can say, in my opinion, that is correct. The Churches would start using it immediately, but I am not in charge of the Church airlift. But I think they would welcome it.

Mr. Winch: And you think they could use it?

Dr. Shepherd: Oh, yes.

Mr. Winch: That there would be no red tape holding it up?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know of any that would hold it up.

Mr. Winch: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Legault.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Dr. Shepherd, can we deduce from the evidence that you just gave that the difficulty in taking equipment and supplies to Biafra is due to a misunderstanding between the federal military authorities and the Biafran authorities to determine the airstrip where this could be sent in the area of Biafra.

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: I presume this is the case. I cannot say definitely that it is, because I have not been in touch with the authorities recently, but I presume it is.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: Thus the places suggested by Biafra are not accepted by the Federal Military Government.

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: That is so.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: You mentioned the question of supplies, that is, of things the Biafrans do not have in big enough quantities to meet their needs. Is this presently the case?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: Yes. Naturally the airlift has to be in keeping with the transport available inside Biafra to distribute it. Right up to the time I left, we were able to cope. We had enough vehicles, we were having to bring in diesel and gasoline to run them and we were coping. We had no problem of stores being overstocked or anything like that. It is possible that with the kind of stepping-up of the airlift which would take place with the use of *Hercules*, we might be a little short of vehicles on the Biafran side or, in time, we might become short. But this should be something that would be quite easily remedied, I would think, because it is possible to bring in vehicles.

• 1700

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: Doctor, the present conditions if I understand, show that you have enough supplies to use the means of transportation available now. What in the future is expected so as to supply the 3,000 tons a day which shall be necessary? Do the organizations receive enough supplies and equipment; where do they come from?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: Are you asking where the equipment comes from which is in use at present? We are largely using existing equipment that was in Eastern Nigeria in prewar times. But the Red Cross have brought in quite a number of vehicles. I cannot give their exact numbers. They have brought in a number of four-wheel-drive vehicles and, I believe, at the time I was leaving they were expecting some articulated trucks.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: I was referring to supplies, that is, to food and drugs which are supplied to meet the needs.

Are these elements supplied by private or independent organizations or are the governments supplying them?

29011—2½

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: I think these foods and medical supplies are coming from all areas. My impression at the moment, though, is that the Churches have actually provided the bulk of these.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: Then we can deduce that the need will be more acute in December and in January. Do you believe that these supplies will be adequately supplied?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: No, the supplies will not be adequate by that time, and I think there is a very great need for governments to put their weight behind their relief operations.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: A last question. What worries me a little bit is that we are talking about the territory occupied by the federal military authorities and that we find there is a starvation situation there.

Do you believe in any evil intent because, if I understand properly, it would be easy to supply food and medicine in those areas if the military authorities would open the roads and to see to it that sufficient supplies are sent there to meet the needs?

[English]

Dr. Shepherd: I think so. The workers in Biafra, who have been aware of the difficulties encountered in trying to make the relief operation effective, the way the air war has gone, have the feeling that this situation is being forced on the people, that it is a deliberate imposition.

Of course, I am not in a position to say that this is being done as definite policy. I can only say that the difficulties that have been encountered, the attacks on hospitals, on refugee camps, the air attacks on this new airstrip being opened up by the Red Cross, well marked with red crosses, make one feel that it must be policy.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: Thank you Doctor Shepherd and I would like to thank you very much for your very clear and very practical statement.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson.

• 1705

Mr. Gibson: Sir, I would like to ask you whether you feel that U Thant has been in error in advising Canada not to get into the political realm in this dispute and to stick to humanitarian relief roles.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I would say so.

Mr. Gibson: Faced with that learned gentleman's view being wrong, in your opinion—and if I may so, there are certainly doubts in a lot of our minds on it—if he is the Secretary-General and we cannot convince him, and we are told that the other African nations adjacent are hostile to the idea of political intervention, what practical idea have you, if any, sir—I say that with respect because I respect you very highly. It is obvious that you have given a lot of thought to this and you have served humanity wonderfully in this field. What practical steps do you think we should take with respect to United Nations action, if any?

Dr. Shepherd: Do you mean practical in the sense of gaining the support of other governments?

Mr. Gibson: In any sense—a cease fire, a mission through the Secretary-General out there, or an attempt to get it on the agenda of the United Nations. We are told that all of these things are frowned on by the Secretary-General. Do you think we should persist? We are not giving up. We want to know what you think would be a good move.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir, I think one should be persistent with the Secretary-General, and I think that you might get support from several European nations in taking this line.

Mr. Gibson: Do you think sir, that there would be any possibility, if we approached the Secretary-General's staff, of their sending somebody to this Committee to let us talk to?

Dr. Shepherd: I think this would be highly desirable as well. But one of the most important things, I feel, is a mission to Biafra because one of the things that has dogged all interested parties all along is the uncertainty of the political side of things which has been so confused by the propaganda of the two sides. I think the only real way to understand the Biafrans' attitude and their claims of genocide is to go in there and hear what the people have to say and judge whether people are speaking honestly and truthfully about

what is going on. So I would rate a mission there very high on the list of things to do.

Mr. Gibson: By a mission do you mean a United Nations mission or a Canadian mission?

Dr. Shepherd: Possibly in the first instance it would have to be a Canadian mission. Obviously, difficulties are going to be encountered at the United Nations level in pressing this. I would say a Canadian mission of all parties, with some legal minds in it, if possible, and some medical minds, because so much of the question of genocide—we expect deaths from war—is whether in this particular situation people have been killed for other than ordinary acts of war. Doctors would be the people to speak to doctors inside Biafra about the experiences they have had. People sometimes frown upon harking back to the events in 1966, when massacres took place. People would have had to pass six other better equipped hospitals to reach the bush hospital I was working in, yet I did treat some of the patients from the massacres which took place in the North. In my district also I had some of the wives and children of officers and ordinary soldiers who had disappeared during 1966. So I have no doubt about the way this thing started off and the very real fears, the very justified fears, that resulted. Also, having lived in the country in the times since then, I realize that at no time has any gesture of any sort been made to allay these fears. This is a thing that worries me a great deal.

• 1710

Mr. Gibson: Thank you very much, sir.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Dr. Shepherd, welcome to Canada. Did you come all the way from Scotland strictly for this Committee?

Dr. Shepherd: I did, sir. I might say that I have a Canadian wife and that I have worked very closely with Canadians in Biafra, so I am especially happy to come.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I think it is very commendable that you would come all the way here for this. It shows that you are extremely concerned about the situation. We are of course very concerned and becoming more and more concerned the more we hear of the sufferings in Nigeria. I am wondering, doctor, how much time you spent in the Federal Territory. I know you have been speaking

mostly about the Biafran side. I wonder if all of your time was spent there or if you also saw the other side of the coin?

Dr. Shepherd: I have not seen the other side since the war started. I have visited the other side several times after the first coup in 1966 but I have never worked for any time in the non-Eastern Nigerian part.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We have before the Committee, perhaps you know, a motion proposing that a delegation of this committee visit all sides of Nigeria to look at the situation first hand and to recommend other ways that Canada can help. You mentioned a few minutes ago that you thought a delegation from Canada would be very useful. Do you think that by going to Nigeria members of this Committee, in a short space of time—10 days or two weeks, or whatever it is—would be able to assess the situation adequately?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I think this is possible, sir. It is not a judicial inquiry I am suggesting, and I think that is the only way that something like genocide might be established. It would be a very big operation to establish and prove genocide as a fact. It would involve, for example, taking to some villages which people like myself might name where we have heard of things taking place—exhumations and so on.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I do not think any of us had exactly that in mind with this kind of a delegation. I do not think we wanted to go to that extent. But I am very anxious in getting your reaction, particularly because it seems that there are some people who feel that perhaps it would be a waste of time for us to go there. Is it correct that you do not think it would be?

Dr. Shepherd: No, I do not, sir. It may not be necessary to stay so long. It depends how good the preparations are for the visit. If you selected from your knowledge of other visitors from here the sort of people you wanted to speak to and everything was set up in an atmosphere like this, and you could spend several days in succession questioning and doing a limited amount of touring—I do not think very much touring is needed—I think you would find it a very worthwhile operation.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): One thing that concerns me more than anything else is the situation of the children. We have seen pictures, and maybe the whole world has, and I

think this is what tears at the heart of humanity more than anything else. We see pictures of children who are dying of starvation and suffering. Children are always the ones who suffer in a war. I would like this Committee to come up with some kind of an idea that could help the children particularly. I thought of a refugee airlift, I even thought of a refugee airlift that would bring children to Canada where they could be looked after by families in Canada, but I have discarded that notion because I understand from the Department of External Affairs and also from Dr. Johnson, who was one of our witnesses, that the population there would not be in favour of allowing their children to go far away from their homeland. But it was observed that perhaps they might be agreeable to an adjacent African country—something like Ghana or Gabon or another place where the culture and climate and so on are not too, too different. I would like to ask you, sir, if you think that such an idea has any merit—that is, an airlift of children and refugees out of this area until hostilities cease and then they could be returned afterwards?

● 1715

Dr. Shepherd: I think it is very worthwhile and, of course, a certain amount of airlifting of this nature has already been taking place. There is an organization, *Terres Des Hommes*, which has been taking children to São Tomé and to Gabon—mostly to Gabon, so I think the principle has been established that Biafrans are willing for this.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Do you think that Canada could play a role in this on a large scale and even take part in the looking after of these refugees wherever they were brought?

Dr. Shepherd: I think the answer is probably, yes. I would just like to view the practical possibilities before saying definitely yes. Skilled help is needed naturally in caring for these children.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): What makes me think of this is that we have planes going in with food and coming out empty. I am just wondering if it might not be practical when they go in with food to bring children out, thereby accomplishing two roles.

Dr. Shepherd: Well, children have been brought out already.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I see.

Dr. Shepherd: ... to Gabon and São Tomé in this way, on the airlift aircraft. I myself do not think that it is a very good thing to carry children a great distance to European or overseas countries. I think it best that they remain in Africa, if at all possible.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I see.

Dr. Shepherd: Although there are some spheres in which particular children may be helped, we have been so hard pressed in the work of relief that quite a number of things have been neglected. For example, there have been children quite badly maimed in bombing attacks. None of them have artificial limbs. Some of them that I know of need plastic surgery. So there may be some specialists' spheres...

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Yes, I see.

Dr. Shepherd: ...in which children could be brought over here and greatly helped.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Good. That clears up that considerably.

We have heard conflicting stories regarding the educated classes. Is there any indication that the educated people are the ones who are being aimed at? Are these the ones they would like to get rid of?

Dr. Shepherd: Well probably it is. I cannot say really personally what is in the minds of people but the educated people are the ones who really understand the events since 1966, who know what the definition of genocide is, for example, and who probably have the strongest perception of fear and doubts for the future.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I am wondering if it is the educated people who are being aimed at more than the others? I am wondering if perhaps they are not the ones who are trying to give the impression to the world that there is genocide. Do they really feel this or are they trying to make us believe this?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not think it is a put-up job at all.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I see.

Dr. Shepherd: No.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I am late for a commitment. May I ask whether the Committee intends to sit this evening?

• 1720

The Chairman: It looks to me, Mr. Lewis, as though we probably will not finish by six o'clock. If we do not and if the Committee agrees, then I think perhaps we should sit this evening, starting at eight o'clock.

Mr. Lewis: I am not suggesting you sit because I have to leave. I just wanted to know for my own information whether you intend to sit.

The Chairman: I still have five questioners in addition to Mr. Stewart, so I doubt if we will finish by six o'clock.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, now that you have entertained other comments, I do not believe that we should hold up Dr. Shepherd either. I think that we should finish up with him and not have to call him back again.

The Chairman: Tomorrow, you mean?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Not tomorrow, even tonight, if possible, if we can finish it off.

The Chairman: Well, Dr. Shepherd has come a long way and I think he would want all members to be given the opportunity to ask any questions they have.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Could I ask you then, sir, how many more intend to question Dr. Shepherd?

The Chairman: In addition to Mr. Stewart I have five more on the list.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, perhaps we could sit until about six-thirty o'clock, if the Committee were in agreement, and finish it off.

The Chairman: Well, we will see how we get along. I may have other names added to the list as well.

Mr. Lewis: Will you have notices sent anyway?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): You were the only one holding the fort and I am sorry to see you go. The other gentleman left.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Winch is still here. I have to go, I am sorry.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, may I sit on the other side then to help him out?

The Chairman: I am sure they would be glad to accept you as an honorary member, Mr. Guay!

Mr. Lewis: I had only a short question.

Mr. Groos: If Mr. Lewis has only a short question perhaps he could ask it now, by agreement.

Mr. Lewis: I just wanted to ask—

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Might I just ask this last question?

The Chairman: We have Messrs. MacDonald, Buchanan, Hymmen, Howard, Alexander and McLean now on the list. Would all of them defer for Mr. Lewis or should I add Mr. Lewis to the end of the list?

An hon. Member: Do we have any choice?

Mr. Alexander: Oh, I do not mind, Mr. Chairman, if he has to leave.

Mr. Lewis: My question had better be worth while.

The Chairman: Is it agreeable that we hear Mr. Lewis' questions after M. Stewart?

Mr. Cafik: We will be glad to give you any help we can to facilitate your departure.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart, if you would finish please, then we will ask Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I have one short question. I do not mean it to be argumentative but I always like to see a little plug put in for the other side. We have heard a couple of people say that by helping Biafra it would do an indirect good in that it would cause a stalemate. Could it not be argued by a person of the other side that by helping the Federal side it would wipe out the war completely in a hurry and thereby establish not only a stalemate but the end of the war in any case?

Dr. Shepherd: Would it not depend on the nature of the help? As far as I am aware, all the relief workers, if it is the relief operation you are referring to, have been able only to treat those with malnutrition and that has been mostly children, the aged, and the other vulnerable group, women of the childbearing age. Now my feeling is that any amount of help could go into this sector without influencing the outcome of the war one way or the other.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Fine. Thank you very much. Dr. Shepherd.

Mr. Lewis: I want to thank members of the Committee. I really just wanted to ask one line of questioning which will not take long, Dr. Shepherd, and I apologize for not being here when you started your evidence.

One of the witnesses the other day suggested that the relief operation is reaching a point, because of the developments in Biafra, where it could become very shortly a mere drop in the bucket, where the loss of life or the threat of starvation in Biafra would be on so large a scale that no amount of relief, no matter how generous, would really be able to deal with the problem. If I may develop that so that you will know what I am talking about, the witness is somewhat related to me but he suggested that from his short experience in Biafra recently the source of carbohydrates as well as of protein is gradually disappearing and that in a few weeks or in a couple of months there would be a complete shortage of both carbohydrates and proteins and all foods for whatever number of millions of people there will be in the territory then held by the Biafran authorities, that therefore, relief cannot deal with the problem which is increasingly becoming more desperate, and that a cease fire of some sort has become an urgent matter for that reason as well as for others. Could you comment on whether that has any validity?

• 1725

Dr. Shepherd: I do not think it has complete validity. Already the relief operation has saved thousands and thousands of lives. It is going to go on doing this. It is true that there is going to be a carbohydrate shortage. Speaking as a relief worker, that simply means to me that the amount of relief needs to be stepped up.

I feel that the two efforts, the relief effort and the cease fire effort, should be pressed with equal speed and vigour and I do not think it is completely valid to say that the situation will get so out of hand that it is not worth while doing very much more in that line as opposed to the political side of it.

Mr. Lewis: I do not think it was suggested by that witness that the relief effort is not worth while. I think what he was suggesting was that the tragedy of the situation was becoming so enormous that we cannot save our consciences merely by relief effort and that further steps in the direction of ending the war must be taken if they are available and if possible. Would you agree with that?

Dr. Shepherd: I would like to explain something practical about this. We have not really had the opportunity of assessing the value of the relief operations. According to our feeling—Red Cross, World Council, Caritas—the conscience of the world has been very, very slow to take up the seriousness of this situation. It is only in the past few weeks that we have been getting between 150 and 200 tons nightly.

When you are dealing with a malnutrition situation, or just say with a malnutrition patient, say in a hospital you have a malnutrition unit, you do not expect to begin to see an improvement until three weeks at the earliest and that would just be the first sign. You still have hard medical work to do, and then in perhaps two months from the time you started you might be able to say that about half of the patients in that unit are really clear.

Mr. Lewis: And the second line, very briefly again, I wanted to ask you: did the church organizations attempt to get any government in Europe other than Sweden, and whatever others are helping, Switzerland, I gather, to assist both in the provision of supplies and in the provision of transport facilities, transport equipment? If you tried did you get refusals, or did you try?

• 1730

Dr. Shepherd: I myself was in touch with the British Government and I gathered that their help be channelled only through the Red Cross organization. I was unable to find out at the time precisely what help they were giving. Actually I do not know if this is admissible as evidence, but in trying to get some child health specialists to go out to Biafra now when the need is great, I have found out that quite likely the government has already some people in mind who may sit by for a month until a military or a political solution is found.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. For clarification, the witness said, "the government has already some people in mind". Is the witness making reference to the British Government?

Mr. Lewis: I undersand him to mean the British Government.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you.

Mr. Lewis: In other words, the British Government is not willing to give any assistance on the Biafran side of the fighting line?

Dr. Shepherd: As far as I know it is certainly willing to give assistance to the Red Cross, and it may indirectly through the Red Cross reach Biafra. I think this happens, although there seems a remarkable shortage or any relief goods from an English-speaking source. Nearly all our medicines in Biafra now are written in German, French and Scandinavian languages. It is a very odd situation, having worked in a country where English was the language spoken by the largest number of people.

Mr. Lewis: The non-African members of the Commonwealth, all of them, with the honourable exception—and my friends across the room will be surprised at my saying—of Canada which has made money available for supplies—if my memory serves me right twice \$500,000, a total of \$1 million—with that exception I gather from you that the non-African members of the Commonwealth have not come forward with assistance?

Dr. Shepherd: We have no direct knowledge of it, and that is all I can say.

Mr. Lewis: But your impression is that?

Dr. Shepherd: My impression is that, yes.

Mr. Lewis: And do you think a country like Canada could play some part in stimulating relief activity by fellow non-African members of the Commonwealth?

Dr. Shepherd: Oh, indeed, very much so. But the increase in supplies would have to be made alongside the increased ability to handle them, and this is a thing in which assisting countries could also help, to ensure that the whole operation would go through and not just the dropping of the relief supplies in an outside depot.

Mr. Lewis: Well, by that you mean airplanes to transport the supplies to Biafra or to needy areas in Nigerian-held territory and also land transportation for the distribution of the supplies?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, and canals if necessary.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Shepherd, during your 12 years in Nigeria, did you always work in the East-Central State, the Ibo state?

Dr. Shepherd: No. I have worked rather more than half of my time in non-Ibo areas.

Mr. Allmand: In which non-Ibo areas?

Dr. Shepherd: The Efik-Ibibio country which is southeast. And also among some tribes, many tribes, in what we call the upper cross river area.

Mr. Allmand: Most of your time was in the Eastern region, but at least half of it is in the non-Ibo territories of the Eastern region.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Are you favourable to the political aspirations of Biafra which is the establishment of an Ibo state?

Dr. Shepherd: It is not the establishment of an Ibo state.

Mr. Allmand: What is it?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, Biafra is a country with a mixture of people in it, not just Ibos. Ibos are the largest single tribal group.

Mr. Allmand: Yes, but is it not true that it is only the Ibos who support the Biafran state?

• 1735

Dr. Shepherd: Oh, I would not say so.

Mr. Allmand: You said that the conditions in the South Eastern region were extremely bad. This is a region where the majority of the people are not Ibo. Is it not true that the people in the South Eastern region have supported the Federal Government?

Dr. Shepherd: I would have to take a few minutes to try to convey my feelings about this. I was in Nigeria from before independence until the present situation. It was four years before independence that I went out there.

There was some agitation, sometimes quite strong, from the people in the South Eastern state, from these years before independence until one or two years after independence, for a separate state. This feeling then seemed to die down. For a few years. Before the first military coup I had not heard any agitation for a separate state. The voting of the people politically showed them to be approximately half—perhaps slightly more than half—aligned with the big central party of the Eastern region.

When secession took place—and I was living in one of these minority areas than—my feeling was that the majority of the people supported secession.

Mr. Allmand: I asked you that question, sir, to get your point of view. I must say that I have recently spoken to some people from the Rivers region, and from the South Eastern region, who gave me the very opposite point of view. They told me that the minority groups in the Rivers state and the South Eastern state were basically federalists and did not support a separate Biafran state which would be dominated by the Ibos. As a matter of fact one of them was the Attorney General in the Eastern region before the separation, and he had left the government of the Eastern region because he did not agree with the President.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; but his brother is in Biafra.

Mr. Allmand: That may be so.

Dr. Shepherd: The brother of the Federal administrator in Port Harcourt is a professor of physiology in Biafra.

I would say that this is the only part of the country in which there is an element of true civil war.

Mr. Allmand: Where—Rivers?

Dr. Shepherd: In some of the minority areas—Rivers and South Eastern. I think they are divided in two. That is why the Biafran proposal that there should be a plebiscite in these areas, seems the fairest way of deciding the issue.

Mr. Allmand: I noticed that in your statement, in answer to a question, you said that a stalemate would be preferable. Somebody asked you whether you would favour the shipment of arms to Biafra. You did not answer that question directly, but you said that a stalemate of some kind would be better. I do not know if you are familiar with the statement of Dame Margery Pelham, who is a historian and an expert on African affairs from Oxford University, which was published in the *Times* of London on December 12, 1967. She considers herself a friend of Biafra, or of the Ibos, and she feels that the only humanitarian solution to the war is surrender by Biafra and acceptance of the federal state.

Have you read Dame Margery Pelham's statement, and what are your comments on it?

Dr. Shepherd: No, I am sorry, I have not read Dame Margery Pelham's statement. I have read extracts of it that have been published. I have not read the complete statement.

If her proposal is that on purely humanitarian grounds Biafra should give up the struggle then it seems to me the weakness of it is in ignoring the strength of the political feelings that exist. This is probably a very exceptional situation, I feel, where people are willing to endure so much hardship. It is fantastic. I do not suppose anything like it has happened in Europe.

• 1740

Mr. Allmand: Yes; but that is why I asked you the original question. It seems to me that the Ibos who are mainly from the East Central state have this attitude, but the people from the Rivers region and from the South-Eastern state, who are not Ibos, do not feel as strongly as the Ibos do; and therefore if you had just an Ibo state, which is the East Central state, it would be a land-locked state, and an impracticality, and would not have the support of the minority tribes; but even if it had part of their support it would be an impractical situation, and perhaps Dame Margery Pelham's suggestion is the only practical and humanitarian approach.

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know. I have a feeling that what you are suggesting is that when people appear to be losing a war they must therefore give up.

Mr. Allmand: If it is going to be in the best interests of the citizens, especially of the children and the old and defenseless people; and if there are guarantees—and the Nigerian Government seems to want to give such a guarantee of the safety of the Ibo people then to me it would seem to be the best solution at the present time.

If they were going to be wiped out then I would agree with you that there is no alternative.

I just want to follow up Mr. Winch's question. He said that if the Canadian airplanes were given to your church groups immediately you could make use of them. Which airport would you use?

Dr. Shepherd: The one we are using at present—Uli.

Mr. Allmand: Could that airport take the additional number of aircraft? In other words, would it be able to accommodate the

present number of aircraft plus these Hercules aircraft airlifting back and forth on a continuous basis, considering the fact that there are also military shipments going in there?

Dr. Shepherd: I think the airport can handle more aircraft if the right amount of organization is done.

Mr. Allmand: If the Biafran Government allowed purely food and medical shipments as opposed to military shipments by these Hercules aircraft?

Dr. Shepherd: I think so; but please also note that if a Hercules brings in 20 tons instead of a DC-7 bringing 8 or 10 tons that is twice the amount of load in one aircraft, which would improve the situation a great deal. With a double shuttle in one night two aircraft would be the equivalent of four of the smaller variety; so it would be a worthwhile improvement.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

Mr. Buchanan: Dr. Shepherd, I had the impression from your remarks earlier that you were skeptical about the likelihood of persuading the British to cease the shipment of arms, or did I misunderstand you?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I am skeptical about the possibilities of changing British policy.

Mr. Buchanan: Why do you feel this to be so? I suppose they have resisted the pressure to date, and perhaps they feel that a military solution is in sight? Is this the . . . ?

Dr. Shepherd: I think it is partly that; but I think it partly must be due to the inexplicability of the British policy right from the start. I think the British Government has reasons of which we are not aware, or which have not been made public, for pursuing the policy it is pursuing.

Mr. Buchanan: Someone was suggesting the other day that they might well be economic. Would that be true or not?

Dr. Shepherd: I think it is probably important economically to Britain; but it may also have to do with the exertion of political influence in that side of Africa.

Mr. Buchanan: If you feel it is unlikely that the British will cease the shipment of arms and as I believe you also suggested that unless there was a military stalemate the likelihood of a negotiated ceasefire was rather remote, one seems to be lead to the conclu-

sion that the only way a stalemate and then a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement is going to be achieved is by the shipment of a greater amount of arms into Biafra. Is, or is not, that a fair statement?

• 1745

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; that would be one way of doing it. On the other hand, one might do what I feel the British Government could have done earlier, and persuade them to reduce the supply.

Mr. Buchanan: If they do not absolutely stop it, if they reduce it?

Dr. Shepherd: If they reduce it to a state whereby they can induce a stalemate. As far as I know it may also mean withholding some financial support as well to the Nigerian Government. This would seem to me a preferable way, because it would demonstrate Britain's goodwill towards Biafra, which has been sadly lacking. As a Britisher in Biafra since before independence, I am very conscious of the personal link that always existed between Eastern Nigeria and Britain. The country was developed, although by colonial administrators, missionaries, and so on, on a very friendly basis which required that local people make their land available, allow their resources to be exploited, and so on. And by bringing these people into the Federation of Nigeria, I feel Britain had a moral responsibility towards them.

Mr. Buchanan: But in view of the developments, what likelihood, do you feel, is there in a reasonably short time, the short run, that the British will enjoy any sort of esteem or acceptance in the Eastern Region at all, unless the Ibos are obliterated?

Dr. Shepherd: I would say that the possibilities are quite good and that British workers as individuals have been encouraged to continue to work in Biafra, so that the Biafrans are able to distinguish quite clearly between a government policy and the feelings of the people.

Mr. Buchanan: So then you would feel, assuming that a settlement is achieved, that there is some likelihood that the Eastern Region would remain in the Federation. Because of the bitterness that has developed as a result of this conflict, what do you see as the long-run situation in Nigeria? Is it going to be able to hang together as one state or not?

Dr. Shepherd: I think Nigeria's problems for the future are immense. I think it was held up as such a model federation to start with that people outside Nigeria were off guard as regards the very deep differences of tribe, religion, culture, political outlook, that exist in the country. I do not think that these differences, which are in all parts of the country, are going to resolve themselves in the near future.

Mr. Buchanan: Of course, this has been suggested by other witnesses, that it is an unnatural nation-state to start with; that it was just a British colonial convenience that it was put together and that maybe it should never have been formed into one nation. Do you agree with that?

Dr. Shepherd: I think it was formed in good faith. I think there were shortsighted aspects of it. For example, the country was so diverse that the regions of the country were given self-government separately. The Eastern Region was given self-government a few years before the Northern Region, for example. So you had a federation in which there were three—actually four—very strongly regionalized states, which looked after almost all of their own affairs. So here was this separatist tendency which took place before independence, and which meant that many of the living figures in the political field concentrated on their own regions rather than on Nigeria as a country.

Mr. Buchanan: Several of the witnesses have made reference to the tremendous determination of the Ibos to resist and not to give in to the Federal Military Government. What do you feel the likelihood is—if there is a military conquest basically of the highways, of the towns, villages and cities—that the Ibos would be able for a very protracted period to carry on a guerilla warfare? Comparing with Viet Nam, obviously there is a source of supply available, but how is this going to be maintained in the bush country of the Eastern Region?

• 1750

Dr. Shepherd: I think it would be maintained, when the supplies they have at present run out, by capturing supplies. Has this not been a feature in Ireland, for example? Did not the Irish revolutionaries manage by capturing, by raiding armouries and so on, to get the supplies they needed? I do not really

see that there is a problem in understanding how this was could be protracted.

Mr. Buchanan: So you feel that there is a very strong likelihood, even if say on the main arteries and so on a military victory is achieved, that the guerilla warfare would go in indefinitely.

Mr. Shepherd: I do.

Mr. Buchanan: One final question. You made reference to the fact that you saw a great deal of medical and food supplies from Scandinavia and West Germany. Maybe this is an unfair question to ask you, but Canadians have been clamouring rightfully for their government to be taking steps and to be involved in the situation in Nigeria. The question has been asked, how actively have the Canadian church organizations and other charitable organizations in this country been demonstrating their concern directly by assisting and helping? I gather from your early remarks, possibly not too much. Is that correct?

Dr. Shepherd: Do you mean at government level?

Mr. Buchanan: No, non-government; charitable—church and other charity.

Dr. Shepherd: I think the Churches in Canada have been helping a great deal. I do not have exact figures, but I have the impression of a great deal of support.

Mr. Buchanan: I was wondering how you related that to the fact that there were no medical supplies and so on from English-speaking countries.

Dr. Shepherd: I presume the decision is made in Canada by the Canadian Churches as to what to do with the money which has been collected. I know that some has gone into hard cash in the relief work inside Biafra. It is very necessary to buy local supplies of food and distribute them. So some money has been used this way. But I have not seen Canadian relief materials in evidence at all.

Mr. Buchanan: Thank you.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, going back to your introduction of Dr. Shepherd a few hours ago, did you say that Dr. Shepherd held some position in the administration of the relief program for the World Council of Churches in Biafra.

The Chairman: I said that he had been Chairman of the Protestant Churches Relief Group in Biafra for the past six months.

Mr. Hymmen: I just wanted to verify that.

Dr. Shepherd: If I could say so, sir, that is a sort of local part of the World Churches Organization.

Mr. Hymmen: My reason for asking the question is that I wanted to ask another question, and I want to establish that first. Of course you are quite familiar with São Tomé, but not too familiar with the operation at Fernando Po. You have mentioned the difficulty in flying in relief, and the difficulty of distribution in the various towns and villages. What type of supply position does the World Council of Churches operation have in São Tomé? In other words, exactly how much food supply is there now for the future?

Dr. Shepherd: I am sorry, I cannot give you an exact answer. All I can say is that the supplies have been flowing in freely.

Mr. Hymmen: Was it decided originally that the International Red Cross would work out of the one area and the World Council of Churches would work out of the other area? Was that arranged by agreement, or by accident?

• 1755

Dr. Shepherd: It was arranged by agreement, but it is not that they are working in two areas. In fact they are working very close together. We had a system whereby in each province the Red Cross and the World Council of Churches shared premises. We each had a representative there; we each had access to one another's stores. And so this means a very close co-operation, in fact.

Mr. Hymmen: This question was asked last week of another witness: Is the extent of co-operation between the International Red Cross, whereby our Canadian assistance is going, and your group carrying on as well as it can?

Dr. Shepherd: No, I do not think it is. I was speaking at field level. I think it would be right to say that we in the Churches have been a bit irked by the delays in the Red Cross operation. The Red Cross has been supported by so many governments and large relief organizations that it has worried us that it has not succeeded in getting in more goods.

The reason, as far as I can ascertain, is that outside Biafra there has to be so much checking with the Nigerian Government. If anything goes wrong the Red Cross flights just stop, and then parley takes place; then they start again. They have been subject to this in a way which the Churches have not.

Mr. Hymmen: Of course, the International Red Cross explained earlier that they are maintaining a strictly neutral position. The Churches may not feel it necessary to maintain that position.

Again, the question was asked last week—I think I have my answer here—that there could be more co-operation between the International Red Cross and the Churches. Of course, Church groups in this country represent a good segment of our population.

Dr. Shepherd: I think there is room for improvement.

Mr. Hymmen: I have one more question. We have understood that up to the present time there has been a demand for high protein food. A Canadian ship left one of our eastern ports last week with fish and powdered milk. I understood from a previous witness—this was mentioned earlier—that the demand may change to carbohydrates or more bulk food. I suppose your people, through the Churches, are aware of this and are taking steps to correct the type of food that is being sent in?

Dr. Shepherd: Very much so; we and the Red Cross usually together draw attention to these situations as they arise, just as we have together put out the mortality figures.

If I may refer just briefly to something you said earlier, you said that the Churches do not feel the same need for neutrality. I want it to be clear that the Churches are politically neutral. The Churches do not interfere in the political workings of Biafra or Nigeria.

Mr. Hymmen: But you did say, sir, that you did not feel the same necessity for checking and double-checking as the International Red Cross does.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; well, I might point out that I offered my services to the Red Cross towards the end of last year. I was home on leave and it seemed to me right to do so, through the World Council of Churches. During a period of three to four months I was called six times to be at the ready to leave to join an early Red Cross Medical Team. Each

time the thing fell through because of some disagreement with the Nigerian Government. During these three or four months no Red Cross aircraft entered a desperately needy country at all.

• 1800

The Churches, although they were neutral, felt that they would not be held up by red tape and...

Mr. Hymmen: Perhaps the International Red Cross is as plagued by red tape as are governments.

One final question, and I ask you this in connection with the Church of Scotland: Several witnesses have suggested, not too strongly, that this war has some elements of a religious war, with the Moslem influence in the North and of course the Ibos who, it has been suggested, are the only segment of Christian population in Nigeria. Are there not other tribes in the West, for example, who are of Christian faith?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; any impression that the Ibos are the only Christian group in Nigeria is completely wrong.

Mr. Hymmen: I do not know whether or not this is a fair question to ask, but what is the feeling of the people in the West, for example? Are they entirely behind the Central Government?

Dr. Shepherd: I could not just say the extent to which they are behind the Central Government. There is obviously a substantial number who are. I do not feel that all of them are. In fact, the West strikes me as a region that is ripe for the next sort of round of Nigerian troubles arising.

I would not eliminate religious elements from the war altogether. I say this because of the disagreement which has existed for years between the indigenous people of Northern Nigeria, a very large number of whom are Mohammedan, and incoming easterners who have gone up there to trade or take up appointments. There has always been friction. And, of course, this is the area in which massacres have taken place on several occasions—the last occasion in very large numbers. It is certainly not a purely religious conflict—I would not say that for one moment—but I think religious feelings do enter into it to some degree.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is now just after 6:00 o'clock. We still have four question-

ers. There is no reason to think that the questions still to be asked are any less important than those that have been asked. As you can see, our numbers have been somewhat reduced. In addition, other questions may occur to members during the dinner hour.

Dr. Shepherd has come a very long distance. I think all of us would like to be sure that he has been given an opportunity to give us all the information he has.

However, it is entirely up to you. We can continue now, or we can adjourn and reconvene at 8:00 p.m.

An hon. Member: Reconvene at 8.00 o'clock.

The Chairman: Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Before we adjourn may I ask the Doctor when he intends to go back home?

Dr. Shepherd: I would like to stay in Canada for a few days now that I am here, to see some relatives and friends.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): The next question would be, then, would that be totally at the expense of the Canadian Government?

The Chairman: That will be a privileged question!

We will reconvene at 8 o'clock in the same room.

EVENING SITTING

• 2017

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we will commence our evening sitting now.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would say to you that I am slightly disappointed that we always seem to be without a quorum and start relatively late. I would also like to say that it seems to me that those who are on the other side, who are very interested in these particular questions, are certainly not attending these Committee meetings.

In view of Dr. Shepherd's experience and the length of time which he has been in that area of Nigeria—I believe he said 12 years—he would know the circumstances prior to the war, as he told us today. My question to him is this: We are always discussing the number of deaths in Biafra, whether it be because of

malnutrition or other sickness. Does the same situation prevail outside of Biafra? Is the death rate somewhat similar just beyond the war zone and outside of Biafra itself? In other words, do you always stay inside the line or do you ever get out and see what is going on outside that black line that we have on the map, for example. Is the death rate similar outside that zone, or is it just in that area of Biafra that the death rate is so great?

Dr. Shepherd: It is in that sort of oval central area marked off that I have been talking about. But I know of parts outside of that, mainly to the south and east of it, where I think the death rate is every bit as high because of the war.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): What about the west side?

Dr. Shepherd: If you mean the Western Region, I think that in the Western and Northern Regions of the country they just have their normal death rate. I do not think the war has influenced their death rate.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): One more question, Mr. Chairman, and it will be the last. What is the normal death rate?

Dr. Shepherd: I cannot give you that figure, sir, because...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): There are many things that you could give us. I asked you for the birth rate and you did not give it. You do not know the normal death rate. I thought, in view of the statement you made this afternoon that you were very, very concerned with the "serious human problems" existing in this particular area, that you would know the answers to these two questions that I am trying to get you to answer.

• 2020

Dr. Shepherd: Well, I am sorry, I do not know, sir, because it has not been recorded.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Fine, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard, you are next.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, I must say that I too am very disappointed to think that so many of the Opposition do not attend these committee meetings. However, I suppose that they are not on the roster for tonight and we perhaps can excuse them for not being on it.

I would like to revert to the motives of the two powers that are really putting up the material being used to make this war possible, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. These two nations, from what you say or what you imply, are really responsible for what amounts to genocide in Biafra. Is that correct?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, it depends on the interpretation you put on "genocide".

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): By implication this afternoon you implied that in your opinion this was looking like genocide.

Dr. Shepherd: I certainly think that there is an element of genocide in it.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Would you not say that either it was genocide or it was not?

Dr. Shepherd: No, sir, because Nigeria is such a heterogeneous collection of different peoples and cultures it would be a remarkable conspiracy if 200 tribes and almost as many cultures had decided on a unified act of genocide. I do not think this is the case. I think I said this afternoon that I did not think that there was a general deliberate genocidal movement.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): But in witnessing what is going on you have said that, in effect, it amounts to this. What would be the possible motives of these two powers? You implicated your own country in this and said they are part of it. What motives would they have for this kind of thing?

Dr. Shepherd: Well obviously I can only hazard a guess at this. I would say there are two motives: one is political influence in that part of Africa, and the other, economic interest.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You suggested this afternoon that there might be some other reason. Is that the other reason that you were talking about?

Dr. Shepherd: Well I do not think the political interest is superficial, it is easily apparent. I find the British attitude so unreasonable that I feel there must be things behind the scenes which I do not know and which is not generally known.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Are you in favour of some other power supplying arms to Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: It is a very difficult question to answer. I would be in favour of anything that produced a stalemate. I do not personally want arms to be supplied to anyone. I think my position is that I would like a general embargo on arms to the two sides.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Then you feel that the supplying of arms to Biafra would only inflame the situation?

Dr. Shepherd: No. I think if you put the question in that way, that the supply of arms at the present time would tend to induce a stalemate, which I would also be in favour of.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Would you not feel that the supplying of arms to Biafra would create a situation where the great powers on one side would be facing some great powers on another side and we might have a situation like we have in Viet Nam?

Dr. Shepherd: Well I would wonder if that situation is not there already and that it is just in a stage of development and has not escalated to the extent you are suggesting. But I think it may have been there for some time.

• 2025

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You use the word "escalate". Is this not what you would be doing if you supplied arms to Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: My idea, which is a sort of pipe dream—or at least it may be—would be to give the Biafrans enough power so that . .

Mr. Gibson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness is not answering the question. He is evading the question. I submit he should be asked to answer the question.

The Chairman: Well I think we have to let the witness answer the question in the way he thinks best.

Mr. Gibson: He is giving his idea, not an answer to the question, and that is my point of order.

Mr. Lewis: What else can he give but his own idea—yours?

The Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Lewis: When we invite someone to come across the Atlantic . .

Mr. Gibson: I think anyone who has flown across the Atlantic has had a pretty tough time...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes. I am not going to cross-examine the witness; I am merely trying to get a direct answer to the question. I do not wish to embarrass him. I realize he has come here on a voluntary basis. I am not trying to pin him down, so to speak; I am merely trying to get the answer clearly that I think should come out.

You suggest that if someone supplies arms to Biafra that this might in some way produce a stalemate. Do you not think that the opposing powers, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., which now have great investments of arms and materials in there, would in turn escalate their supplies?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, I wonder if the unpopularity of the United Kingdom policy is not so great that they would have difficulty in fact in increasing the supply beyond the present rate.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Sometimes we have had reason to suspect the motives of the United Kingdom, we have almost always had reason to suspect the motives of the other power. But quite often the United Kingdom has behaved as a very responsible nation in the world. Do you think it is just possible that they might feel they are doing their best to preserve law and order in Africa?

Dr. Shepherd: To be honest I cannot see that as their main motive. There has not been a loss of law and order, so far as I know, in Eastern Nigeria.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Would you not say that a revolution would be considered a loss of law and order?

Dr. Shepherd: Well it depends which level of law and order you mean. What I meant by what I said was that in Eastern Nigeria the rule of ordinary law for the citizen and so on has prevailed all along.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): But a civil war is really a disruption of the state's authority. We hear all the time of the great dangers that exist in Africa—the fact that Africa is a powder keg that could blow up at any time. Do you suppose that this might possibly be the reason that the United Kingdom takes it upon itself to do what might be considered in the long run a peacemaking venture in Africa?

• 2030

Dr. Shepherd: Well it might be, sir. The last breakdown of law and order in Nigeria, or at least my understanding of it was in 1966 when people ran amok killing Nigerian citizens, and 1965 was the breakdown of law and order in Western Nigeria.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The one in 1966, I understand, was a slaughter of the Ibos mostly. Is that correct?

Dr. Shepherd: I would say it was a slaughter of Eastern Nigeria, not just of Ibos.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): It was largely composed of Ibos and the other minor tribes, is that right?

Dr. Shepherd: In so far as Ibos are the largest single tribe. But I did not see any discrimination in it. I was working as a doctor at that time in a minority area and people from that minority area who had been living in Northern Nigeria were coming for treatment.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Who was responsible for the outbreak in 1965?

Dr. Shepherd: The cause of the breakdown appears to be that an election in Western Nigeria at that time was not conducted with propriety, that there was election rigging said to be blatant. I am not able to say this from personal observation. The election rigging was said to be blatant and many people in the West demonstrated their dissatisfaction and there was fighting between the two main rival political groups.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): So, if you could say that there was such a thing as a first action in the war, it was precipitated by the Ibos and the other tribes by creating this situation in the election.

Dr. Shepherd: I would say it was created by political parties, it was created by probably the abuse of power by the party that was in office at the time the election took place.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): And which party was that?

Dr. Shepherd: I am sorry I forget its exact title. It was the party of which Chief Akintola was the head and it was an alliance with the main party of Northern Nigeria, the NNA; the initials of the party were NNA. I am sorry, I cannot remember offhand the...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): And were not the Ibos a major prt of this alliance?

Dr. Shepherd: No, the main party in Eastern Nigeria, the NCNC, had another alliance with the second party of Western Nigeria, the Action Group. This united alliance was called the UPGA.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The slaughter of 1966 was a result, you say, though, of the dissatisfaction over the election in 1965, in the way it was conducted.

Dr. Shepherd: Well, sir, I would say that the way the elections were conducted—there were two elections, 1964 and 1965—gave rise to such dissatisfaction that a constitutional crisis arose towards the end of 1965. It did not look as if it was being handled well and this was the point at which the first military coup took place. When I say not being handled well, there was no attempt to restore law and order which had broken down and there was no agreement which had been called for to annul that fraudulent election and hold a fair election.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): It was a result of the fact that the Northerners felt aggrieved in general by the way that those elections had been held that caused the outbreak in 1966, is that not true?

Dr. Shepherd: That caused the...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The outbreak of the pogroms in 1966.

Dr. Shepherd: It is said that the pogrom which took place after the second military coup resulted from dissatisfaction with the government of the first military coup.

• 2035

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What would the Ibos do if the position were reversed, if they were in a majority position and were in a civil war situation? Would they be behaving somewhat like the Northerners are now?

Dr. Sheppard: I just could not say...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): How do they treat their prisoners?

Dr. Shepherd: How do they treat their prisoners? Well, all I know is from living quite close to the Chief Red Cross Delegate in Biafra that he visits the prisoners and has

found their state reasonably satisfactory; but that is all I know of it.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Are there atrocities on both sides?

Dr. Shepherd: I have less knowledge of atrocities said to be committed by Biafra, less personal knowledge of such events taking place. I know of incidents on the periphery of Biafra where there have been disagreements between local clans or local tribes because there are many tribes and where there have been blood baths. I have not had to deal with these personally in the same way as I had the 1966 massacres, for example.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): One other question. You talked about the food supplies and you mentioned medical supplies coming in from European countries. Are you getting adequate medical supplies?

Dr. Shepherd: We are better off with medical supplies than with food supplies. We could certainly do with more; we are always running on a knife edge. Some things, some particular items we are very short of and need much more of; but the two, the medical supplies and the food supplies, have to be balanced up so that we ask for a certain proportion of our relief supplies to be medical and we name the particular things we want.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Fine. Thank you very much, Dr. Shepherd.

The Chairman: Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander: Fist, Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my regrets for not having been here on time, through you to Dr. Shepherd. I was at another meeting and I do hope that you will accept my apologies for being late.

Doctor, just in furtherance to the question just asked of you, could you indicate to the Committee what particular items of drugs you would place a priority on at this particular time?

Dr. Shepherd: I would place several items on that list: vitamins, anti-malarial drugs, anti-dysenteric drugs, certain antibiotics. These would be amongst the main ones.

Mr. Alexander: Has there been a great shortage of these in the past?

Dr. Shepherd: There has been an especial shortage I would say of vitamins and anti-dysenteric drugs because in a situation such

as there is in Biafra just now, conditions like dysentery tend to be rife.

Mr. Alexander: I see. So you would appreciate seeing more concentration in these areas in terms of drugs.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I would.

Mr. Alexander: I see.

Dr. Shepherd: But, you know, the list of needs in the medical armamentarium is pretty great.

Mr. Alexander: It is long.

Dr. Shepherd: It is long. We have gone through times, for example, with lack of insulin, which means life and death to diabetics; and digitalis, which can mean the difference between life and death to people with heart conditions. Although these are needed, they are not needed in tremendous quantities as are the other things I have mentioned.

Mr. Alexander: With respect to the Ibos, are there many Ibo doctors practising their profession in Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, there are a lot. Nigeria was an under-doctored country but with the return of, not just Ibos but other Eastern doctors...

Mr. Alexander: Other Eastern doctors also.

Dr. Shepherd: The doctor position is not good but it is better, in a sense, than in peace time. However, the medical work multiplied out of proportion to that; so there are more doctors than before but there is much more work for them than before.

• 2040

Mr. Alexander: I see. Doctor, I am particularly interested in the educated person in Biafra, particularly the Ibo. Can you tell me what has been happening with the lawyers and the scientists and the engineers, teachers, professors and all those with high skills or high specialist standards? Do you have any comment on that, because I am particularly interested in knowing just what is happening to the educated person in this troubled area?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, many of them are languishing. There is no doubt about that, but I think they have all offered themselves for any work in the national interest or in the humanitarian interest field so that we now

have probably highly educated men as directors of most refugee camps. We have people like managing directors of commercial firms who have been offering to the churches to engage in relief work in any stage of the operation. There are some scientific people who are doing war work. They have all sorts of departments and food and agricultural research which is going on.

Mr. Alexander: It has been brought home quite vividly on several occasions that when the Federal Military Government captures an area, you very seldom see the educated come back, or in the alternative they are never around. Could you make a comment on that?

Dr. Shepherd: I think probably the educated with their greater consciousness of what is taking place in the country have feared more what would behold them if they were caught. That is one thing. Another thing I would say is that many uneducated people have also retreated into central Biafra, although quite a number of peasants, let us call them, have remained in the bush near their own areas and then filtered back. There is still a great number who have retreated towards the centre and are wandering about inside the bush there.

Mr. Alexander: I notice that you were quite emphatic in stating that it is impossible right now to prove, let us say, any political philosophy of genocide, but you were then also very careful in leaving us with the impression that there were some who had tendencies of genocide. I think that was your word, "some". I wonder if you could refer with more detail to the "some". Who would the "some" be?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know that I can identify them. I do not know that they are a clearly identifiable group, really.

Mr. Alexander: Well, perhaps I could lead you a little, Doctor. What about the army personnel? As I understand it, the Nigerian army at one time was of extremely high caliber and respected throughout the world. I am suggesting to you that perhaps some that you referred to could be within the ranks of the army?

Dr. Shepherd: I think that is likely.

• 2045

Mr. Alexander: And at what level—the private, the sergeant, the captain or the general?

Dr. Shepherd: I am really not equipped to answer this. As far as the army is concerned, since I am working in hospital, I naturally have to go by hearsay. I have colleagues who have been working in various parts of the country, who have remarked on this and that incident that has taken place when a village has been fallen upon and a lot of non-combattant people have been killed.

Mr. Alexander: But you seemed to be very clear when you said that you knew that genocide was hard to prove. However, you left little doubt, as a result perhaps, of discussions or observations, that there were some who had shown tendencies towards genocide. I was hoping that perhaps you could follow that through with some illustrations?

Dr. Shepherd: Do you wish me to name specific places and people?

Mr. Alexander: Incidents; what I am trying to find out is why you said that it appeared to you that there were some people with tendencies towards genocide.

Dr. Shepherd: May I give a recent illustration, sir?

Mr. Alexander: Yes; I would appreciate that.

Dr. Shepherd: I have been under the impression in the last few months that the Nigerian army has become much more disciplined, where it was not last year. Just two nights ago I was speaking with a friend, an expatriate, who had left Biafra only two weeks ago. He had been in a village near Aba, a Biafran town which fell last month—this was a village which had been recaptured—and he said that there were over 600 civilian bodies there. He did not see how this could have happened just in the ordinary course of the fighting.

Mr. Alexander: Yes.

Dr. Shepherd: They knew there were journalists in Biafra at the time and they did their best to contact them and bring them down because of this genocide controversy. But by the time they got back the Federal army had recaptured that village.

He told me this, and I am on the same sort of relationship with him as you are here with your colleagues. Although I do not have the first-hand evidence myself I believe him.

Mr. Alexander: You have no reason to disbelieve him?

Dr. Shepherd: I have no reason to disbelieve him; and I have repeatedly heard of this type of thing taking place.

Mr. Alexander: And these are the types of things that have led you to state that there are some who have tendencies towards genocide?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir.

Mr. Alexander: I see.

Dr. Shepherd: If I may add something, I would think it highly desirable that such information as this, with a note of the location of the place, should be brought to the notice of observers going to Nigeria so that inquiries may be directed along that particular line.

Mr. Alexander: In other words, in line with the thoughts you have, in the event that it be decided, rightly or wrongly, that a group from this Committee go to Biafra and Nigeria, this is the sort of thing that they should look into primarily in order to discount, or confirm the theory of genocide?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Alexander: I see.

Doctor, is it the World Council of Churches that is involved with the relief to the Biafrans? Is this the organization—the World Council of Churches?

Dr. Shepherd: The main body of World Council of Churches' relief is actually going through the Red Cross, but there is some relief from the World Council of Churches and a large body of relief from other Churches coming through São Tomé.

Mr. Alexander: Directly to Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir.

Mr. Alexander: I see. Then I take it that some relief is going into Biafra without the actual sanction of the Federal Military Government?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, sir.

Mr. Alexander: So there is no agreement, written or otherwise. The World Council of Churches just took it upon themselves, because of a situation, to go in regardless of what repercussions might ensue?

Dr. Shepherd: But there is a history behind this, if I could interrupt, sir.

Mr. Alexander: Yes, I would like to hear that.

• 2050

Dr. Shepherd: Initially, the Churches, or at least, the World Council of Churches, wanted to operate with the Red Cross. It was when Red Cross negotiations with the Federal Government were breaking down on bringing in relief supplies that the Churches decided not to wait. They were acutely aware of the starvation situation and that was why they decided just to go ahead.

In fact, this may have encouraged the Red Cross itself to go ahead even when it did not have the sanction of the Nigerian Government.

Mr. Alexander: I was always under the impression, too, Doctor, that the Church was particularly concerned about creating any ill-feeling with any government in Africa, particularly because of their missionary hopes. But notwithstanding that they had seen how other African countries had reacted to the Churches being involved in their particular countries during times of stress—and by that I mean missionaries being told to leave and to get out—the World Council of Churches still took it upon themselves actually to defy the Federal Military Government? Would you agree with that?

Dr. Shepherd: There was the *de facto* situation that the World Council of Churches was not suddenly starting afresh to do something. Their representatives and work had been in Eastern Nigeria for years. With the war and secession they found they still had workers and projects in there and they decided to continue to support them. They always did some relief work and this was a case of building it up in larger quantities.

Mr. Alexander: And there have been no repercussion from the Federal Military Government as a result of these actions, have there?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not think so. The World Council of Churches, through its own representatives, has tried to find common-ground negotiations between the two sides. They have expressed their concern equally. They have probably sent more personnel and relief materials to the Nigerian side of the line. I do not think they have been active in trying to find a solution.

Mr. Alexander: In other words, what you are saying is that perhaps because the actions

of the World Council of Churches were accepted by the Federal Military Government and because it believed in their integrity and their not becoming political the Government then closed its eyes to their actions as far as the aid was concerned?

Dr. Shepherd: No; I think the pendulum has swung against the Churches. I hear it quite openly stated on Nigerian radio that the Churches are in collusion with the rebels and are helping to stir them up and goad them on. I think there is quite a bit of suspicion there.

Mr. Alexander: In other words, then, could we say that the same type of suspicion has perhaps been directed at the International Red Cross?

Dr. Shepherd: Oh, yes, sir, indeed. I have heard on Northern Nigeria radio the Red Cross, Caritas Internationalis and the World Council of Churches lumped together as an organization of international criminals.

• 2055

Mr. Alexander: Would you say that perhaps we are going to reach a stalemate with respect to even giving aid to Biafra? Does this seem like a possibility?

Dr. Shepherd: Do you mean because of Nigerian objections?

Mr. Alexander: Yes. Because of the attitude they are now taking with the churches, the attitude that you have now stated that perhaps exists with the Red Cross, do you think perhaps that we will reach an impasse now and that perhaps we will not even be able to get aid in?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, it might reach that stage but I would hope that the pressure of world opinion, which has probably enabled us to carry on thus far, will continue to enable us to carry on, and I think it is pressure of world opinion that has done it.

Mr. Alexander: In other words with more world opinion, being exerted upon the Federal Military Government, do you feel that its attitude is changing?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I think it has.

Mr. Alexander: Doctor, there have been a couple of statements made with respect to non-white and white nations, and I am particularly interested in this. I believe it was stated in the House on one particular occasion that the black nations are not too anxious to

have any intervention by the white nations in terms of becoming involved with their civil disturbances. Now this is sort of shocking to me, and perhaps it is true and perhaps it is not. Is it not true that these black nations are quite prepared to accept our aid in areas where there are no civil disturbances?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Alexander: And they seek it?

Dr. Shephard: Yes.

Mr. Alexander: Would you be able to tell me to what extent our African nations are suspicious of or reluctant to having non-white nations intervene in their affairs in terms of civil disturbances?

Mr. Lewis: Non-white or non-black?

Mr. Alexander: By the white on the non-black?

Dr. Shepherd: If I understand what you are saying, sir, I think there is a very real fear amongst African nations about the same kind of situation arising in respect of them as has arisen in Nigeria.

Mr. Alexander: I do not quite follow your answer. Perhaps I can put it another way. Are the non-white nations in Africa suspicious of white nations intermingling in their affairs?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Dr. Shepherd.

The Chairman: Perhaps before calling upon Mr. MacLean I should say that we have had a quorum now for some time. Could I get someone to move and second the following resolution: that the evidence taken thus far this evening be incorporated as part of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of this evening's sitting.

Mr. Groos: I so move.

Mr. Cafik: I second the motion.
Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: And perhaps also I might mention that there has been forwarded to me from our colleague, Mr. Hugh Faulkner, MP for Peterborough a petition which he says has been signed by 1,124 people in the City of Peterborough and which reads as follows:

We, the undersigned, are deeply concerned that close to 5,000 Biafran/Nigeri-

an children are dying every day from starvation in spite of the fact that food is available.

We protest the lack of effective action shown by all the political parties. We charge our representative with his obligation to ensure that a formal Canadian statement be made in the United Nations in the interest of humanity, demanding that the necessary steps be taken to see that these children be fed, regardless of any political implications, barriers or borders.

If it is agreeable, perhaps we could just file this very large petition with the Clerk. Is that agreed?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, if you do not mind. We have all received petitions of one kind or another, I am sure, in the House. Why is this particular one being filed here?

• 2100

The Chairman: It was just given to me and I thought that perhaps it was the wish of the Committee that it should be filed.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Certainly I have received letters and I am sure that all Members of Parliament have received letters.

The Chairman: If it is the wish of the Committee that this should not be filed as an exhibit I am perfectly happy.

Mr. Lewis: You now have it on the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Groos: I think it would be advisable to make all of these exhibits.

The Chairman: I thought that it was the normal course to pursue, but I have no objection to...

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I do not know whether it is the normal course or not but with respect to every item that comes up in Parliament we all receive mail. Are we supposed to make it available to whatever committee is concerned? For example, on the Omnibus Bill I am sure that all of us have received a ton of mail.

The Chairman: Well this is rather a lengthy petition. I personally have not counted the names but I am told by Mr. Faulkner that there are 1,124 names on this petition. Now what is the wish of the Committee?

Mr. Ouellet: Mr. Chairman, is it the usual procedure of the Committee to do this?

The Chairman: As a matter of fact I consulted with our Clerk before reading out the petition. He tells me that is the usual course for the Committee to receive these petitions as a matter of courtesy and to file them as exhibits but not to print them as part of the testimony before the Committee. So if there are other petitions—

Mr. Ouellet: Well, I do not have any objections then.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, this is a question I think of privilege that we are extending to the Deputy Speaker of the House. If other Members of Parliament, whether they be on this Committee or not, receive similar petitions tomorrow or the next day, do you wish to have them as well?

The Chairman: I gather, as long as we are not required to print them, that there will be no great problem. They will be filed with the Clerk instead of being filed with me.

Mr. Ryan: I think it would be the privilege of all members on their own responsibility to ask the Committee to file such a petition, or even a letter if it were pertinent, as an exhibit.

The Chairman: This particular letter was addressed to me as Chairman of the Committee and this was the reason I brought it to the Committee's attention.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I see no objection to filing it. I cannot see that it can be offensive to anyone. It is a privilege extended to anybody in Parliament.

The Chairman: Is it agreed that this should be accepted as an exhibit but not printed with our proceedings?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: The Clerk has handed me a letter. No doubt all of us have received letters on this subject but this is addressed to the Committee and is from the Nigerian Student's Union at the University of Alberta. It is signed by two people and contains a number of statements disputing evidence given before the Committee. After discussion with the Clerk it was suggested that the usual procedure would be to have copies of this made, if you wish, and given to members of the Committee, and then a decision

could be made as to whether we wanted it filed as an exhibit or whether or not it should be printed with our proceedings.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, do you personally consider it important enough to be circulated?

The Chairman: Well it expresses a point of view. I do not know anything about this particular union. It is a four-page letter and I think perhaps the easiest plan—it is addressed to the Committee and some action would have to be taken on it—would be to prepare copies and distribute them to members, and then we could decide what we should do with it. Is that satisfactory?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean, you are the next questioner.

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, first I want to say, perhaps on a point of privilege, that I think it is regrettable that comments should be made by members of the Committee with regard to attendance of other members of the Committee. The situation varies from time to time, from day to day, from hour to hour. This sitting is an extension of the sitting which most members thought would be over at 6 o'clock and I am not sure that all members of the Committee are even aware that we are sitting, although notices have been sent to their offices. And from day to day the situation varies. The very opposite is the same on other days, and I think this is a kind of point of order that we can do without in this Committee.

• 2105

But to get on with my questioning. Dr. Shepherd, when the war began—I am not speaking of the original massacres and so on—but at the point when the civil war began and the Biafrans in other parts of Nigeria retreated to what they call Biafra, and the fighting as such began, where were the lines of the two opposing forces, the Biafrans on the one hand and the central Government of Nigeria on the other?

Dr. Shepherd: They were around the boundary of the Eastern Region.

Mr. MacLean: Did the Biafrans at any point at that stage, or at any later stage, take any action which would lead any reasonable person to think that their ambition was to stage another coup and take over control in the whole of Nigeria?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I think probably that situation did arise when they crossed the Niger into the Mid-Western Region and advanced through the midwest.

Mr. Lewis: Was that before the fighting or after?

Dr. Shepherd: This was after the fighting started.

Mr. MacLean: Then when the situation stabilized, there was a point I suppose, when these Biafran forces were driven back into what is considered to be Biafra.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, that is so.

Mr. MacLean: Was there any indication at this time that Biafra was trying to establish rights of safety of the ordinary citizen in the Federation of Nigeria, and at that point was there any possibility of negotiation by Biafra to remain in the confederation or would that have been possible, in your opinion, at that point? Or, conversely, were the Biafrans fixed in their opinion at that time that they were to separate from the confederation?

Dr. Shepherd: The federation? I think there was a definite feeling in Biafra at that time that a confederal system would have been acceptable—a confederation of Nigeria and Biafra.

Mr. MacLean: Was there any indication that the Federal forces at that time wanted only to establish their position with the hope of negotiation with Biafra to remain in a federation, or did it appear that they wanted to over-run Biafra if they could?

Dr. Shepherd: I would say that it appeared that they wanted to over-run Biafra and impose the three-state system that the Eastern Region was to be converted to; that this was a point on which they insisted.

Mr. Lewis: A total of 12 states, three of which were in the Eastern Region.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

• 2110

Mr. MacLean: At earlier stages during the history of Nigeria since the Federation was formed, have there not been times when the Eastern Nigerians—the Ibos chiefly perhaps—made concessions or perhaps were the most interested in retaining the Federation at times when there was a considerable opinion that it would be better to go their separate ways?

Dr. Shepherd: I think this is very much the case. I would say that the Biafrans had been very strong Nigerians. They were very much for Federal Nigeria, and they were a uniting influence in the country.

Mr. MacLean: Is it not an ironic situation that had they separated at an earlier date, resulting in this war not being technically a civil war but an international war, where you would have the situation of Nigeria invading Biafra if it were a separate state, the status of Biafra in international law or international morality would be entirely different? For example, it would be completely against the principles of the United Nations that a larger country, or that any country, should invade another. And second, would it not be true that if it were not classified as a civil war and a rebellion, international agencies, whose purpose is to relieve human suffering, would be much freer to operate; that they would not be dependent on a veto of one side or the other with regard to sending supplies or medicines or anything else to one side or the other, or to both?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I agree with what you say, sir.

Mr. MacLean: Now I have a few questions which may be embarrassing to you as a native of Britain, so do not hesitate to refrain from answering them if you feel so inclined. I am at a disadvantage because the policy that has been followed by the British Government in regard to Nigeria is simply beyond my comprehension, and therefore some of the questions I ask may not be ones that you feel you can answer. But has the British Government sought eye-witness information from British subjects returning from Biafra to Britain, or are they dependent entirely on the normal channels of information through diplomatic sources?

Dr. Shepherd: I did not know about their having sought information, sir. It is just possible that they have been offered so much that they did not need to seek it. I do not know of them asking for information at all. So as far as I know their sources are completely out with Biafra except in so far as people have volunteered information.

Mr. MacLean: I take it then that you, yourself, have not been asked by, for example, any representative of the British Government to give your views as to what is taking place in Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: No, I have not, sir. But, like so many others, in fact I would say probably without exception the British who have been in Eastern Nigeria have offered information either directly to the government or to their Members of Parliament.

Mr. MacLean: Over a long period of time when various countries all over the world were gaining their independence, self-determination of peoples was considered to be a human right, at least a very desirable objective. How is it that it is not felt that Biafrans—or Eastern Nigerians—have this right? Why is it that it is felt that they do not have this right, simply because they made the choice some years ago of going into the federation rather than staying out?

• 2115

Dr. Shepherd: Presumably they have been deprived of the right from the legalism of having been united in the federation six years ago. On the other hand, I think it is worth noting in relation to this that people, British administrators, have drawn attention in the past to the real difficulties that were going to arise in the federation and I think this has been particularly the case with regard to the Northern Nigerian Federation. The Northern Nigerians themselves raised considerable doubts during the pre-independence years as to their willingness to join the federation because, I think, they were culturally so different. They knew there was going to be a clash. There had already been smaller clashes, in fact.

Mr. MacLean: Why should the existence of what someone has called a "paper nation", consisting of widely divergent peoples of different language, different culture, different religion and so on, deny each group the right of self-determination without bloodshed?

Dr. Shepherd: It is very difficult to answer the question. In this particular instance, I presume, so many people see the advantages of a large nation, a large mixed nation like this, the most powerful nation in Africa, possibly, potentially. They see the advantages of this without being aware of the disadvantages.

Mr. MacLean: It seems anomalous that other federations—the Federation of the West Indies and others—were able to decide that they did not want to continue as a federation and went their separate ways without hardly a ripple on the surface of international affairs

and yet, in this case, it seems that the British Government has a complete mental block as far as the possibility of the various parts of Nigeria breaking into two or more separate nations is concerned. This I find hard to comprehend. Now along this same line, the Federal Government of Nigeria—I just want this for the record—in your thinking has not been democratically elected.

Dr. Shepherd: That is so.

Mr. MacLean: It resulted from a coup?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. MacLean: Some cynic has said that rebels have never won a civil war because as soon as they win they proclaim themselves the patriots. This would perhaps seem to be the case in Nigeria, in the federation.

With regard to public opinion in Britain, is it right to assume that the British people generally—you can only give an opinion on this naturally—are quite satisfied with the way in which the Government in Nigeria has come to power, and yet are very exercised because the governments of other countries are not sufficiently democratic—Rhodesia, for example? This seems to me to be anomalous unless there is something in the mix of which I am completely unaware.

• 2120

Dr. Shepherd: I agree. It is completely anomalous.

Mr. MacLean: In fairness, would it be your opinion that possibly the British Government is sending arms to the Nigerian Government reluctantly, to fill a vacuum because if they did not they would feel that Russia or some other power would establish a foothold in that part of Africa which would have an even more calamitous result in the end than this terrible civil war that is going on?

Dr. Shepherd: I deduce this. There would obviously be a big vacuum if Britain did not supply these arms, and it does seem most likely that Russia would fill the vacuum.

Mr. MacLean: I guess I will leave it there.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan: Dr. Shepherd, following up Mr. MacLean's questioning, is it not true that in this case there was not just an attempt to secede that there was a further attempt—in fact not just an attempt, the Ibos did attack

the Midwest Region—to take more territory than was strictly regarded as Biafran territory?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, this is so. I think there was some reason behind this. There seemed to me personally quite a body of opinion in the Midwest that was in sympathy with Biafra. And, of course, it was a state which might also have wanted its independence.

Mr. Ryan: Did the oil problem, the oil reserves in the Rivers Area, have anything to do with this march by the Biafrans into the Midwest Province?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know the reasoning that was behind the Biafran march into the Midwest. It may have been that they knew of the sympathy of the people there and wanted to join up with them. That may have been the sum total of the reasoning.

Mr. Ryan: What percentage of the population would be sympathetic at that time to Biafra? Would you have any notion?

Dr. Shepherd: Probably the part of the Midwest that is ethnically related to Biafra.

Mr. Ryan: Then, in your opinion, should that part of the Midwest be a part of Biafra if there were secession and separate states set up?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I believe that this situation is one in which the people should decide that there has to be a plebiscite or a referendum to help arrive at the right human conclusion.

Mr. Ryan: Could you tell the Committee how many tons of supplies are presently backed up at São Tomé waiting for delivery into beleaguered Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: I am sorry, I do not have the figures.

Mr. Ryan: Could you give us any idea of the air mileage from São Tomé to Uli?

Dr. Shepherd: About 300 miles.

Mr. Ryan: And is that considerably farther than the Fernando Po route into Uli?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, it is.

Mr. Ryan: And how far would you estimate it would be from Fernandópolis?

Dr. Shepherd: Perhaps about 100 to 150. I am sorry, I do not know exactly.

Mr. Ryan: So our *Hercules* flying out of Fernando Po could make many more trips than they could out of São Tomé. They could turn around quicker and perform more trips in a night?

Dr. Shepherd: No, from each place it is not possible to make more than two trips. Any one aircraft can make two trips.

Mr. Ryan: Why is that? Is it the unloading problem, or do they have to fly around a certain bit of territory in order to get into Uli?

Dr. Shepherd: They usually do not come directly because of anti-aircraft fire. They have to avoid this all the time.

Mr. Ryan: So the difference in distance from the two bases does not make much difference then, really. The anti-aircraft fire is the stumbling block for the most part?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, that is right. I think the unloading facilities could also be improved.

Mr. Ryan: That is another part—a substantial part of it.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, they have been improved actually, and the process of improvement is going on all the time.

• 2125

Mr. Ryan: This afternoon I was drawing to your attention an article in the *Christian Science Monitor* about the Nigerian airlift from Calabar into the Cross River Delta area to a town of Uyo. To my knowledge, unless I missed it, we had not heard anything about this airlift before—and there may be others on the Nigerian side that we have not heard about. I would like to corroborate just a few facts that appear in this article and I think the quickest way to do it would be just to read you the pertinent paragraph and ask you if you could corroborate it. I quote from this article in the week-end issue of the *Christian Science Monitor* Monday, October 21, headed:

UNICEF steps up emergency food airlift to Biafra refugees

On page 13, second column:

Mr. Robards's helicopter company is under contract to UNICEF. The UNICEF-marked helicopters are his own; two were transported from the United States (one of these was lost on a mission), the others were purchased from the Nigerian Air Force. The fleet will soon number six.

During one week in late September he and his staff flew in 85 tons of food and supplies (about 12 tons a day). Their goal is 30 tons a day.

Would you have knowledge of these facts and would they be substantially true?

Dr. Shepherd: I think they would be substantially true. I heard word of this starting before I came here.

Mr. Ryan: It is not nearly the order of the church mission into Uli or the Red Cross but it is still fairly substantial at 12 tons a day for this particular area.

Dr. Shepherd: Oh well, no; actually there is more coming by river into this area. You see, the normal means of transport to that area from Calabar is by means of a several hundred tons launch that can make several journeys in a day and I believe that probably there are something like maybe 200 tons a week coming by launch.

Mr. Ryan: This same article, in the first column, says, about the pilot:

He knew, too, that the rivers' fish resources, which normally provided food for the region, were inaccessible. The rivers were closed off for security reasons.

Would that close off this delivery system you were telling us about as well?

Dr. Shepherd: Well, I heard from the Red Cross, who gets word from both sides of the operation in Biafra, that the normal air launch service was running and that supplies were coming up river in this way.

Mr. Ryan: When were you last advised to this effect?

Dr. Shepherd: I think I was aware of it, let us say, four to six weeks ago.

Mr. Ryan: And you have not heard of any change in that situation?

Dr. Shepherd: I have not heard of any change.

Mr. Ryan: Have you knowledge of any other airlifts in the Nigerian-controlled area of Biafra other than this one that I mentioned to you.

Dr. Shepherd: Incidentally, there is not an air strip at Uyo.

Mr. Ryan: No, there is a helicopter coming in.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, it is a helicopter. No, I do not have personal knowledge of other airlifts although I believe that some supplies are going to Enugu and to Port Harcourt by air, but I do not have any details about quantities.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Doctor.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Dr. Shepherd, I have the impression, from the testimony we have heard recently, and yourself too— I may misinterpret it—that generally speaking you are sympathetic to the cause of the Biafrans. Is that a reasonable assumption?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, it would be. Could I add the rider that I believe the Biafrans have to decide the situation for themselves. I am not an active political worker for the Biafrans or any such thing.

Mr. Cafik: You do not want to interfere in their internal affairs.

Dr. Shepherd: I do not want to interfere.

Mr. Cafik: Are you sympathetic to their cause just in a sympathetic manner, not in a sense that you are actively working on their behalf because you share their fear of reprisals and loss of life and property if they were to lose the war?

• 2130

Dr. Shepherd: I think I sympathize because the sequence of events from the time their trouble started seems to me to have given them no opportunity to express themselves with regard to the government of their country and their own personal security and so on. I think there has been a big need since 1966 to give them the confidence that they would be acceptable as full Nigerian citizens in the same sense as all the other citizens.

Mr. Cafik: At one time they must have had this confidence, and in recent years?

Dr. Shepherd: Oh, fully.

Mr. Cafik: And I would gather you feel that they have completely and totally and forever, more or less, lost the confidence because of the uprisings and the slaughter of 30,000 of them in the Northern area. That is the main event that you feel might justify them historically?

Dr. Shepherd: There is that event but there have been other events such as the attempt to reach agreement at Aburi and Ghana, when all sides met and when it seemed that an acceptable formula had been worked out in general terms. And I think, my impression in Biafra at the time was that the delegates came home reasonably satisfied, hoping to remain together with Nigeria under these terms, and they hoped that in a few years there might be a coming together again more closely.

Mr. Cafik: In your mind what is more important to the Biafrans, the feeding of their starving people or the gaining of their independence?

Dr. Shepherd: Obviously, sir, you feel it is a fair question?

Mr. Cafik: Yes. If you do not feel qualified to answer it, I would have no objection and I would understand. However I would think that you must have a view on what is most important to the authorities in Biafra, not to the Biafran people necessarily because authorities do not always speak for the people.

Dr. Shepherd: I think that the authorities in Biafra, at the moment, speak for the people.

Mr. Cafik: What do they say in this regard?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not think in this regard they say that independence is most important and the saving of the children is next important. Anyone who knows Biafrans or Nigerians knows that they have a tremendous regard for their children.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I have heard that.

Dr. Shepherd: I would not begin to say that they were sacrificing their children. I could not believe this. They are so concerned for them. I think their independence though is of tremendous importance to them. I think they have completely lost confidence in Nigeria and in their future in Nigeria, and one of the consequences of this is that they have been blockaded and their children are suffering. For my part, I would say that they have shown the relief organizations so much co-operation as regards bringing in relief materials and, once the materials are in, distributing those materials. They have been so completely co-operative that obviously at the

same time as trying to gain independence they are also trying to save as many of their children as they can.

Mr. Cafik: Why I would suspect that perhaps one takes precedence over the other was the Biafran authorities' reluctance to allow land routes, air corridors and so on into Biafra with food some time ago, and it would give the impression that the conduct of the war and the outcome of the war was much more important to them than the bringing in of food to feed their starving population. Would that not be fair observation?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, but I think it was the terms under which a land corridor would be operated more than the principle of a land corridor that troubled them. I think there was disagreement over whether it would be a properly demilitarized corridor. If it had been a completely demilitarized corridor then I do not think the Biafrans would have been so worried about it.

• 2135

Mr. Cafik: Now just pursuing for a moment the demilitarized corridor, I presume that the corridor would go through Federal territory into Biafra.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: And in Federal territory you would hardly need to demilitarize it because it would be their property. In Biafra I would suspect there would be the same reasoning—that you would not need to demilitarize it because it was Biafra. It does not make much sense to make that argument—at least, on the surface.

Dr. Shepherd: It was going through what the Biafrans would call “occupied Biafra”.

Mr. Cafik: I see; and what they wanted was the Federal troops to “de-occupy” occupied Biafra before they would open the corridor?

Dr. Shepherd: No, not to “de-occupy” occupied Biafra but to “de-occupy” a zone on either side of this corridor.

Mr. Cafik: But for what reason? They already occupied it. It does not make any sense to me.

Dr. Shepherd: The pressure on the corridor was to bring relief supplies through.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Dr. Shepherd: It would have involved improving the transport facilities along that corridor.

Mr. Cafik: Yes; but it would have involved Nigeria doing that, which it could have done in any event because it controlled it.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: I cannot see that Biafra would have anything to say about that, or have any concern about it.

Dr. Shepherd: But one could not say that it was completely and securely in Federal hands. It was an area in which there were operations, up and down. Long after Enugu, for example, was in Federal hands Biafran commandos were raiding it; and I think, likewise, there were Federal sorties down from this area into Biafra, in and out.

Mr. Cafik: If the opposite is true, that they really controlled this area, then the same argument holds up, that why would they want it demilitarized if they controlled it?

Dr. Shepherd: They did not control it. It was an area in which there were military operations by each side.

Mr. Cafik: By both sides.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; and as far as the Biafrans were concerned—at least, as I understand their point of view—they wanted it demilitarized so that neither side could carry out military operations for a few miles on each side of it. Without that security they felt that the Federal forces would take advantage of the relief operation going on there to make further inroads into Biafra.

Mr. Cafik: I understand what you are saying, but I do not understand the argument. I will drop it. I say that with all due respect; I am very sorry. I do not wish to imply anything other than...

Dr. Shepherd: I am only trying to voice what I understood the argument to be.

Mr. Cafik: Yes; and I understand what you said, and I appreciate it.

May I ask you a theoretical question? I gather one cannot do this in the House of Commons, but I would like to do it here for a moment.

The Vice-Chairman: An "if" question?

Mr. Cafik: Yes. If you were convinced that the Federal authorities in Nigeria would not harm the Biafrans in terms of life or property and if you believed that they would be treated in the same way as all other Nigerians would you be in favour of the Biafrans capitulating?

• 2140

Dr. Shepherd: You mean, then, would I accept that the right solution to this problem was that Biafrans should remain within the Nigerian Federation on the terms which the Nigerian Government imposed, which gave security of life and limb but up to the moment no constitutional expression?

Mr. Cafik: Yes; if they were guaranteed and assured of it and you felt that it would be implemented would that be the proper solution to the conflict?

Dr. Shepherd: I am sorry; I would like to ponder that for just a second.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Dr. Shepherd: I think probably I would, although I do not see it working out in practice.

Mr. Cafik: Yes; but in terms of the question as worded you would say yes.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: Now, I gather that the Federal authorities have, at least in theory, offered a guarantee of life and property and that they would be treated equally with other Nigerians. The question now seems to boil down to whether their overtures and offer are real and whether they can really be trusted to implement them.

If an international body, or a nation such as Canada—any group with power—were to put in a peacekeeping force to guarantee that those terms would be lived up to I gather you feel that the Biafrans then ought to accept it.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes; well, if I were in their position I would accept it.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Dr. Shepherd: But I do not honestly feel that the problem is all that solvable in this way. When I look to the long-term future I do not feel entirely happy about it, but I think what you have made is a very reasonable proposition. It would certainly make me happy.

Mr. Cafik: One last question. There seems to be some fear and I must admit I share it to some extent that if Biafra were to become an independent state within Nigeria there would be a great possibility that we would unleash in Africa a series of tribal wars such as perhaps the world has never seen before. This could be quite a bad thing for perhaps the next 50 or 100 years. If there is any justification for that statement then one would have to tread very, very carefully. Do you feel that there is any justification, or any basis, for such a fear?

Dr. Shepherd: I really do not. I think there are going to be tremendous problems of this sort in Africa irrespective of the Nigeria-Biafra situation. Although each situation has similarities there is a uniqueness to the Nigeria Biafra situation which is not exactly applicable in other countries.

Mr. Cafik: Mind you, they probably felt the same uniqueness in the Congo, and I am sure it will be the same the next time the problem arises. Every problem is felt to be unique, and I am sure it is, but are you not afraid that by creating an independent Biafra you may set a very dangerous precedent?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not think that the creation of an independent Biafra would especially encourage others to try the same thing.

Mr. Cafik: Do you not think that if one group a tribe as it were, became successful and was recognized internationally, that would certainly give comfort to other groups that were rather inclined to rebel against their own nation?

Dr. Shepherd: I think the situation in Nigeria is more similar to the Central African Federation that was and then was not. There you had a collection of different people artificially joined in a federation. Of course, it was a federation that the British Government was very, very interested in and did everything in its power to press, but it broke down. Nigeria had its self-governing regions. This is something we must always bear in mind. For almost all of their own affairs these regions were self-governing. I feel that Nigerian is more akin to Central Africa.

Mr. Cafik: And sort of similar to Canada in that respect then.

Dr. Shepherd: I suppose so.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you.

Mr. Gibson: Could you explain, sir, why the other African states, or most of them have not taken any action in this matter at the United Nations?

Dr. Shepherd: Do you mean the African states that have not recognized...

Mr. Gibson: ... Biafra, yes.

Dr. Shepherd: Or the ones that have recognized it?

Mr. Gibson: No, the ones that have not.

Dr. Shepherd: Yes. I think their leaders fear to for the reasons contained in the last question; and I think their leaders want to secure themselves.

Mr. Gibson: Then sir, what causes you not to think that there would be a great war in the area, as opposed to the neighbouring African states that do?

● 2145

Dr. Shepherd: I think there are going to be these troubles in Africa irrespective of whether Biafra is recognized. I think one has to remember that Biafra would probably be the fourth largest country in Africa, certainly Africa south of the Sahara. When you think in terms of many other countries you find that they have only one, two, three or four million inhabitants and the problem is different. I think the fact that Biafra is a coherent and an articulate country which has been self-governing puts it into a different category.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Wahn?

Mr. Wahn: Mr. Chairman, like other members, I would like to thank Dr. Shepherd for having come so far to help us in our consideration of this difficult problem.

I believe, Dr. Shepherd, you mentioned that for the last six months you have been Chairman of the Protestant churches relief group in Biafra. Does that relief group work in the territory controlled by the Federal Military Government as well as in Biafra?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, its counterpart works in the Federal area.

Mr. Wahn: I believe in your evidence you mentioned that you did not believe that the Federal Government of Nigeria had a policy of genocide, but you went on to say that you

believed that there were within Nigeria groups having genocidal intentions. I believe that was the language used. And then later in response to a question you indicated that you were referring to the troops in the field in some cases. I believe you indicated that the basis for your belief was what you had heard from others rather than what you had seen for yourself. Am I correct?

Dr. Shepherd: In recent times, yes sir.

Mr. Wahn: In recent times. What period of time would that be?

Dr. Shepherd: Well the last six months, during which I have been fairly confined to my own area and have not been near the battlefield.

Mr. Wahn: During the last six months then you have yourself, personally, seen no evidence of genocide?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes. I have not been in the spot where what may be construed as a genocidal act has been committed.

Mr. Wahn: As far as the last six months are concerned, your statement to the effect that there is within Nigeria a group having genocidal intentions is based upon what you have heard from others rather than upon what you have seen yourself?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes sir, that is true.

Mr. Wahn: In his evidence earlier Mr. Smith, in reply to a question asked by Mr. Cafik, had a few remarks on this question of genocide. Mr. Cafik had said:

Mr. Cafik: Would I be fair in assessing your comments tonight as, number one, to your knowledge there is no genocide in the area, and number two, there is a definite humanitarian need in these two territories and that perhaps we have some obligation to fulfil that need?

And in reply to that question, Mr. Arnold Smith, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, said:

On the human need, on the fact of human suffering, surely there can be no doubt. Genocide is a very big word, and I said that certainly in my judgment genocide is not any part of the policy of the Federal government and I know of no evidence that would suggest it has been going on. I do have some evidence—mainly it has not been recent, but earlier

on—of some atrocities by groups of soldiers on both sides, and these things have been very deplorable. Great efforts have been made by General Gowon and his officer corps to check them. I think that if the war really gets to a stage of guerilla resistance it could become very dangerous indeed. You really cannot tell a guerilla from a civilian and if there is a serious decision to undertake long-term guerilla resistance, in my judgment this could create a profoundly dangerous problem.

In your view, Dr. Shepherd, is that statement by Mr. Smith a fair assessment of the situation to which he is referring?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, I think it is. The only thing I could add is that I have more information from close colleagues about possible acts of genocide than probably Mr. Smith has, and that I have heard from various areas near the battlefield of acts which suggest genocide, although I have not, as I said, had first-hand vision of them myself.

Mr. Wahn: In your evidence also, Dr. Shepherd, you referred to the fear of genocide which the Biafran people undoubtedly feel and you said that it was regrettable that nothing had been done to remove this fear of genocide. In his evidence before this Committee Mr. Sharp had a statement on this point. He was asked by Mr. Thompson:

• 2150

Just what is the official attitude of the Nigerian government, particularly as we hear the word "genocide" bandied about.

Mr. Sharp: I have been advised that the Federal Military Government...

The context indicates that he was advised by our Mission in Lagos. I think that is a fair assumption. I will continue:

...has offered amnesty, with the possible exception of Colonel Ojukwu. Secondly, they have offered that the police in the eastern province would be staffed by Ibos. Thirdly, that there would be foreign observers during a transition period and, fourthly a mixed commission to run the "Biafran Area" pending constitutional government. I understand that this is the sort of general offer that has been made. So, it does include amnesty I think but there has always been a little bit of uncertainty as to whether that would extend as far as the rebel leadership.

If in fact that offer had been made by the Federal Military Government would that, in your opinion, go some distance toward removing the fear of genocide to which you referred?

Dr. Shepherd: Yes, it would go some distance, sir. I would agree it would. A lot would depend on details though of how the operation was to be conducted. If I could give an example, attention has been drawn today to the four Red Cross workers who were killed. This sort of thing could happen all over the place in Biafra, in many areas. There could be more people involved. It is my impression that this sort of thing is going on without the outside world knowing anything about it. It would certainly have to be a very large and careful operation to exclude the possibilities of this in the future.

Mr. Wahn: In your evidence, Dr. Shepherd, you suggested that Canada should take the lead in seeking a ceasefire through the United Nations. In his evidence before this Committee Mr. Arnold Smith was asked by Mr. Laprise:

Are you of the opinion that a request made by the United Nations for a ceasefire in order to improve the negotiations possibilities between the two parties, would be possible and do you think that this could be accepted by Nigeria and Biafra?

Mr. Smith: According to my information in the present situation, there is no possible practical possibility that a majority of the United Nations, or even the Security Council members would agree to order a cease-fire without conditions, that is a matter which is purely academic for the time being.

Do you disagree with that assessment and, if not, why would you recommend that the Canadian Government should lead in what Mr. Smith describes as an academic exercise?

Dr. Shepherd: Well I feel it is rather a tall order for a person in my position to disagree with Mr. Smith. I believe, however, that there is quite a body of world opinion which would be willing to support Canada in this and I wonder if taking the first step would not encourage others who have not shown their hands so far to come forward and support Canada.

Mr. Wahn: On that point would not a ceasefire at this stage amount to intervention on

behalf of Biafra? I refer now to the testimony by Mr. Sharp at page 128, where he says:

Throughout the negotiations to which I have referred earlier in this statement the one unqualified condition upon which the Federal Government has insisted is that the insurgents must acknowledge the unity in some form of the Nigerian state. Only on this basis has Lagos been prepared to consider a ceasefire. It is therefore evident that from the Nigerian point of view any attempt by an outside agency, even the United Nations itself, to impose a ceasefire would be tantamount to underwriting the Biafran claim to the right to secession. This view is accepted by all but four of the member states of the Organization of African Unity and explains their opposition to United Nations action, as well as their own reluctance to go further than extend their good offices in the effort to stop the fighting.

In other words, if there were to be a ceasefire upon the basis of the present boundary lines that would, in effect, recognize the independent existence of the Biafran state, would it not?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know that I am sufficiently *au fait* with these matters to be able to say. I just do not see that to have a ceasefire definitely does imply independence at the present time.

May I ask you, sir, why you say it does necessarily imply independence, or recognition of Biafra?

Mr. Wahn: Merely because it would have to be a ceasefire upon the basis of the present boundary lines which ensure that a certain part of the country is separate from the larger part.

Any ceasefire, in other words, will stabilize the existing front.

Dr. Shepherd: Well, could it not be a very much more conditional independence—the conditions being that much more time and thought be given to the future constitution of the country? Living in Biafra, one of the frightening things of about peace talks has been how the war situation has always blown up into an offensive just as peace talks were being prepared. This is a definite fact. Let someone start making preparations for peace talks and there will be a huge military exercise against Biafra; the air-war will be

stepped up; a new military offensive will burst out. I presume this is a means of trying to force Biafra's hand at the negotiating table, but psychologically it does just the opposite.

Mr. Wahn: I have a more specific question, Dr. Shepherd. In your testimony you mentioned that there were people who still had jobs and money in Biafra and that they were able to get whatever food they required. Is there no rationing by the Government of Biafra to ensure that available food is fairly distributed among the people?

Dr. Shepherd: There is no rationing. Two of the staple food stuffs have controlled forces. I think the reason for there being no rationing system is just the impossibility of enforcing it.

● 2200

Mr. Wahn: Finally, Dr. Shepherd, all the evidence that you and other witnesses have given before the Committee indicates the magnitude of the relief problem. It has been suggested that within a few months 3,000 tons of supplies a day will be needed to extend relief to the population, and that probably 4 or 5 million people will require assistance within a period of several months.

Do you believe that relief of that magnitude can be handled by the voluntary church organizations and the Red Cross, or must there be some other system developed? If so, what other system do you visualize?

Dr. Shepherd: The advantage in having the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations running the relief operation at present is that they know the country so well. The chief delegate of the Red Cross knows the country intimately and the voluntary organizations have people who know the country intimately. This is very important in conducting this relief operation.

I believe that probably many more people should be brought in, but as far as possible they should be under the auspices of the relief organizations there at the moment.

I do not know whether that is a satisfactory way of putting it.

Mr. Wahn: Yes; but the question in my mind is whether there is any possibility of some relief organization functioning under the United Nations, but as a relief organization?

Dr. Shepherd: I think this could be highly desirable but it would depend on the exact

situation in the country at the time. Already there has been a lot of consultation with the United Nations.

Mr. Wahn: I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Chairman, while you are resuming the Chair I would like to request a change in our record.

In our Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 9 for Friday, October 18, 1968 at page 375, in the eighth line of the first column, the word "experience" should read "acceptance".

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, it is ten o'clock. Are there any other questions?

The Chairman: That exhausts the list of questioners, unless someone else has additional questions.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have only one. It is not a joke; it is really serious. I wish to ask Dr. Shepherd if he is related to Lord Shepherd of the Commonwealth Office over there?

Mr. Ryan: The good shepherd?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): No, no. He is the Minister of State in the Commonwealth Office. Do you happen to know him, Doctor?

Dr. Shepherd: I do not know him, sir.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Thank you.

Dr. Shepherd: I think the Shepherd clan is pretty divided, actually.

The Chairman: If there are no further questions I would like to say, on behalf of the Committee, how deeply indebted we all are to you, Dr. Shepherd, for having come so far and for having given us so much assistance in the consideration of the problem which this Committee has before it.

The Committee will adjourn until tomorrow at 9.30 a.m.

Mr. Ouellet: Before we rise, Mr. Chairman, I have a question of privilege.

[Interpretation]

I would like to refer to what Mr. McLean said. I realize that the Conservative member is unhappy about some remarks made about the attendance of the Committee. He suggested that such remarks should not be made.

I agree with Mr. McLean, but I would suggest that he should warn his colleagues who are Committee members to attend more often or to be replaced and, then, we will not come back on the subject of attendance, because I must say, this is the fact, that since the Committee began sitting the quorum is upheld only by the members of the Liberal party and the NDP. We have approximately 90 percent of our members most of the time, the NDP has about 66 percent and unfortunately the Conservative party...

• 2205

Mr. Lewis: 66 and two thirds.

Mr. Ouellet: Yes, that is why I say 66 percent. Unfortunately the Conservative party, except for a very few exceptions, has never more than 25 or 33 percent of its number and this is quite deplorable. I note that in the House of Commons, in front of the Press Gallery members, the Conservatives are always present to put as many questions as possible on the Nigerian problem. This might be unfortunate, but some tend to think that the Conservatives are more interested in their personal publicity than in searching for a solution to this important problem.

[English]

The Chairman: Order. I am not a procedural expert.

Mr. Alexander: I am glad he can talk because I have not heard from him since I have been sitting here.

The Chairman: I am inclined to think that—

Mr. Ouellet: I have been questioning as you have, Mr. Alexander, on many occasions.

The Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It may be the quality and not the quantity that they are considering.

The Chairman: In any event, I am sure that all members reading the record will—

Mr. Lewis: We do not need a quorum for this quarrel; I am going.

The Chairman: All members reading the record will no doubt pay attention to the exhortations of—

Mr. Ouellet: Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that we stress this fact because the steering committee has invited distinguished witnesses to come from far away to be here, as has our witness tonight, at a suggestion made by members of the Loyal Opposition, but they did not even have the courtesy to come and listen to the witness whom they suggested the Committee should call.

The Chairman: Well, I think it is fair to say that all members will bear that in mind, Mr. Ouellet.

Mr. Ouellet: I hope so.

The Chairman: We are meeting at 9.30 tomorrow morning.

Some hon. Member: Who is our witness tomorrow morning?

The Chairman: General Milroy is our witness tomorrow morning.

Some hon. Member: It is in another place—Room 112-N.

The Chairman: It is in Room 112-N in the Centre Block.

Mr. Alexander: I just want to ask a question with respect to our proceedings. I have listened to my friend. Are we interested in hearing from the CBC?

The Chairman: I have a note of the gentleman whose name you suggested, Mr. Alexander, and this will be put before the steering committee some time tomorrow.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, sir.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE


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ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968



STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE
No. 11

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1968

Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESS:

Major General William A. Milroy, Senior Canadian Observer on
the Observer Team to Nigeria.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Alexander	Mr. Harkness	Mr. Marceau
Mr. Anderson	Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Mongrain
Mr. Barrett	Mr. Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Mr. Nesbitt
Mr. Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Mr. Ouellet
Mr. Buchanan	Mr. Hymmen	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Thompson
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Legault	(<i>Red Deer</i>)
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Winch
Mr. Gibson	*Mr. MacDonald	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)
Mr. Groos	(<i>Egmont</i>)	
Mr. Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Mr. MacLean	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

*Replaced Mr. Carter on Tuesday October 22, 1968.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, October 22, 1968.
(18)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Marceau, Mongrain, Nesbitt, Ouellet, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk—(28).

Also present: Messrs. Allmand, Cantin, MacDonald (*Egmont*) and Pilon, M.P.'s.

In attendance: Major General William A. Milroy, Senior Canadian Observer on the Observer Team to Nigeria.

The Chairman introduced Major General William A. Milroy, the witness for this morning's sitting. Major General Milroy made an opening statement and was available for questioning.

At approximately 10:05 a.m., members began their questioning. Copies of a portion in English of the surrender document issued by the Nigerian Federal Government were distributed to the members.

With the questioning of the witness continuing, at 12:05 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING (19)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Marceau, MacDonald (*Egmont*), Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk—(25).

Also present: Messrs. Allmand and Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), M.P.'s.

In attendance: Major General William A. Milroy, Senior Canadian Observer on the Observer Team to Nigeria.

The Chairman announced that a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would take place immediately after this afternoon's sitting.

Members of the Committee continued their questioning of Major General Milroy until approximately 5:40 p.m.

It was agreed that a *Restricted* document entitled *Operational Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces*, would be copied for the information of the members.

It was also agreed that the Subcommittee should consider and recommend as to the advisability of copying the terms of reference of the Observer Team to Nigeria, for the information of the Committee members.

With the questioning of Major General Milroy continuing, the Committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m., until Wednesday, October 23, 1968, at 3:30 p.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, October 22, 1968

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have our quorum and I believe we are ready to commence this morning's hearing. This morning our witness will be Major-General Milroy. Major-General Milroy was formerly the Commandant of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College in Kingston. He joined the army originally in 1940 and served in the Second World War as a squadron commander in the Armoured Corps.

Before becoming Commandant at Kingston, he was in command of the Brigade at Gagetown, New Brunswick. He is now the Senior Canadian Observer on the Observer Team to Nigeria. Major-General Milroy will make an initial statement and then will be available for questioning by members of the Committee. General Milroy?

Major-General W. A. Milroy (Senior Canadian Observer in the Observer Team to Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, what I propose to do is to run through the history of the Team from the time I was appointed to it to the present, to explain to the members what we have been doing and the basis for our various reports.

The letter that set up the Team—with which I believe the Committee is familiar, dated September 6—invited Canada, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, OAU, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to send observers to inspect Federal military operations in the war-affected zones or areas of the country.

Now, the Federal Military Government asked that the observers arrive in Lagos by September 14. I was informed of my appointment on the evening of September 12, and I arrived in Lagos on the morning of Tuesday, September 17. In Lagos I met Major-General Henry Alexander, the British Observer, who has had considerable experience in Africa, having served in the Ghanaian Forces for some time and in the Congo. He had with him an assistant.

Major-General Raab the Swedish Observer, who has been an Observer in Korea, and an

assistant Swedish Observer arrived a few days after I did. Mr. Gussing the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and an assistant had been in Lagos on other duties for some time. Mr. Gussing was subsequently joined by another Assistant Observer, so the UN consists of three.

I was joined by an Assistant Canadian Observer, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington, on September 27, and about August 1 our group was joined by the representatives of the OAU, Major-General Hoffman from Algiers, and Brigadier-General Naga of Ethiopia.

Now, when I arrived on September 17 we could get no information about when the Polish or OAU Observers were going to arrive, and so we asked the Federal Military Government to allow us to start our work without waiting for them. The Federal Military Government agreed and on Monday, September 23, we met with Major-General Gowon and some of his senior military and civilian advisers.

• 0945

At this meeting which was designed for the purpose of briefing us and also discussing the terms of reference, we agreed that our group of the three members who were already there plus the UN representative would start work the next day; that the whole team, for the first phase, would visit each of the divisional areas in turn and that once we were in a divisional area the team would not necessarily remain together but would split up as it saw fit.

We, the observers, agreed that, as a general rule, no group or no inspection team would consist of fewer than two members representing different countries—a member and an assistant observer or a senior observer and an assistant observer. This was a change from the original concept which had been thought of when the initial invitation went out, but it was one on which we insisted and the Federal Military Government agreed.

It was agreed that the reports would be submitted to the Federal Military Government and to the four countries concerned. The

United Nations representative had to submit his differently—his reports are submitted directly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations—and the OAU representatives, when they arrived, adopted the same procedure.

So that on any one project, or one inspection trip, there could be three reports: one by the team of four military members representing the four countries, one by the UN representative and one by the OAU representatives.

The UN and OAU representatives were not in a position where they could sign the reports that the representatives of the four countries put out.

It was agreed that the team was free to release its reports to the public 24 hours after submitting them to the Federal Military Government and to their own governments. This is the procedure we have followed.

Finally, it was agreed that members or representatives of the press would be able to accompany the teams on their inspection trips.

The major charge against the Federal Military Government Forces, of course, was that of genocide, the definition of which we took from the UN Convention on this, which is the committing of acts with the intent to destroy wholly or in part the Ibo people and their property.

As a basis for trying to examine this charge and other charges, we decided to examine the claims made by the Federal Military Government that they were doing just the opposite.

• 0950

Specifically, the Federal Military Government claimed that they had issued a code of conduct, with which you have already been issued, governing the behaviour of their troops.

As part of our investigation we went around to find out if, in fact, the divisions knew of this code of conduct and were passing on its instructions to their troops. Were the troops observing their instructions?

The Federal Military Government made the claim that the army and the civilian administration had a system for providing medical care, feeding and rehabilitation for the displaced persons in its particular area. We wanted to see if, in fact, they had a system; and if they had a system, was it operating?

They claimed that the Ibos and other persons under detention were being properly

cared for. The task was to find these people and see if, in fact, they were being cared for.

They claimed that there were many Ibos living in areas occupied by the Federal troops and occupying positions in the government, in the armed forces, as well as in commercial firms. Our task was to find if this was true.

They claimed that abandoned Ibo property was being protected and looked after awaiting the return of the owners. Our task was to check in and see if this was correct.

Finally, the claim was made that Ibo traders were returning to the northern parts of the country which they had left earlier. We have yet to check this, but again, this is another point we propose to check.

Once we had the agreement to start work, we left Lagos on Tuesday the 24th and flew to Benin City where we did a quick inspection of the camp and their store system there, and were in fact, on our way to the area of the 1st Division where we arrived Wednesday of that particular week.

Our method of operation was roughly as follows: we agreed that the chairmanship of the group—I am talking now of the observers from the four countries—would rotate weekly except that we would not change the chairmanship if we were in the midst of a trip. General Raab was our first chairman and conducted the discussions with the Federal Military Government.

On arriving at the divisional headquarters we were briefed by the divisional commander and his staff on the layout of the brigades or sectors of that division and the particular task they were carrying out. We then went into a private meeting of just the observers and decided what we wanted to do. Having decided on our course of action, we then informed the divisional commander of the facilities required, where we wished to go and how long we proposed to stay.

In the three visits to date, to the three divisional areas, it has been our practice to divide into two teams. The make-up of these teams is decided by having the senior observers draw lots for each area they were going to go to; normally two will go to one area and two will go to the others and then in any area covered by two senior observers the remainder of the team is made up with the assistant observers from the other countries where the senior observers are going to the second area. So that we had a team, generally speaking, in each area representing all the four countries involved.

The UN and the OAU observers join whichever one of the teams they choose or they may choose not to join them at all. That is up to them.

When one of our teams goes to a sector or an area, it visits the various formation or sector headquarters in the particular area that has been allotted to it and it then decides from further briefings where it wants to go within that sector or in that area.

Generally speaking, we visit some or all of the following: displaced persons' camps, villages and marketplaces if they are occupied, Red Cross medical and feeding stations, prisoners of war, detainees, food handling depots and battalions and company positions. Meetings are held with state officials where appropriate.

We do not follow a rigid program. We make impromptu stops at villages and camps; we stop people on the highway and any time one of the members has a curiosity about any particular activity that we are passing, we are prepared to stop and examine it.

Our plans are made progressively as we pick up information from the people we see. We talk to the Red Cross people and find out where they are operating and we go to take a look at their operations.

● 0955

In nearly all of our visits we were accompanied by representatives of the press, both the foreign press and the Nigerian press. The numbers were normally about 14, over half of them usually being members of the international press and representing countries like Great Britain, the United States, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Switzerland, and probably some other countries as well as the Nigerian press that, in fact, reports the news for a number of countries including Canada. Only on our last trip were we accompanied by a Canadian newsman.

During our actual tour we speak to displaced persons in the camps, the villages, the POW's, Red Cross officials, missionaries, members of the civil administration and officers and men of the Federal army. Many of these discussions are in private.

On returning from a visit we compile our reports; to date these reports have been agreed. Normally, the report is then given by noon of a given day to the local representative of the countries concerned and the Federal Military Government.

One day later we call a press conference and the report is released at the conference by the members of the team and not by the Federal Military Government. We answer questions if the press so desire. The chairman is normally responsible for conducting the press conferences.

In addition to the three visits we made to the various divisional areas, we made one investigation as the result of an allegation. This was the investigation made at Okigwi into the deaths of the Red Cross officials.

The Federal Military Government asked the group to investigate the matter and a team of three plus a UN representative went the same day. The group could and would have sent a team even without the FMG request.

We are at present investigating another allegation that came as a result of a newspaper article in Canada concerning an incident at a town called Urua Inyang. We have had a great deal of difficulty actually locating where this particular incident took place. We finally found a town by this name, but it is not in the location that we were given. Instead of being 16 miles south-west of Umuahia it is 14 miles south-west of Ikot Ekpene in an area that we understand was at the time in the hands of the Federal troops. We are continuing to look into this affair and the team going this week will endeavour to find more information on it.

Mr. Chairman, I propose, if you agree, to go to my map and just give the members some idea of the actual areas we covered.

The Chairman: That would be very helpful.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This map is the old Eastern Nigeria plus part of the Mid-Western State; and the area running about like that, including an area on the west side of the Niger River, is roughly what is known as Ibo or Ibo-speaking territory. I have a tribal map here which you may wish to look at afterwards which defines the area rather more specifically.

Our first trip, as I said, consisted of going to Benin City where we just stopped overnight, looked at a camp and the food distribution system and we then went to Enugu, which was the headquarters of the First Nigerian Division. At Enugu we split into two teams. The team with which I was connected on the first day went down straight south to Awgu where the sector headquarters was. We were briefed there and we then proceeded south to the airstrip at Obilago.

I had with my group the compete press party as they were all interested in seeing the airfield. On the way down we stopped at the battalion headquarters at Ishiagu and while we were there some 11 or 12 village elders from the area out to the east here came in bearing gifts for the battalion commander and asking if they could bring their people out of the bush.

When we got down to the airfield there had been a battle there that morning. In fact, we passed some wounded and dead being carried back on the road that we took, but there was nothing happening at the time we were there. The area was quiet, as is normal in the front-line position. There are normally no people there except the troops occupying the position.

• 1000

I might point out that because of the fighting the actual front line happened to be the road we were on—it ran like that. On both sides of the road for a distance of 10 or 15 miles the area, so they told us, was inhabited by the secessionists and I have no particular reason to doubt them. The rest of the front line was up in here somewhere.

We went back to Enugu that night and the next morning—less the press as most of whom either went over here or went home—we went back to Enugu. On the way down we stopped at Obunagu, which is a market town that seemed to be in operation and we wandered around to see what was happening. It was one of the market towns they were starting to build up and there were a fair number of people selling and buying various goods.

We carried on to Awgu and investigated the Federal Military system there and the feeding of the refugees they had. They had a food station and they also had a refugee camp for people who were coming out of the woods.

It was at this place that I ran into a man who worked for the Ministry of Finance, I believe, with the Biafran Government. He had two very small children with him. His wife and the remainder of his children were lost on this side—they had split and gone along. He was the one who informed us that as far as the people on this side and his family were concerned once a person fell into Federal hands he was dead. He obviously was not because he was talking to us.

We ran into a truckload of people who had come out of a little village here to the east bearing these surrender documents—I have

one here as you may not be familiar with them—that they dropped from the air—a free pass.

They were on their way back to bring the people out of the village. The road had broken down and, in fact, they had had to return and then they had to go by foot. This is one of the areas the team will be checking this week.

We went back into a little village well back in the hills—in the valleys—and we found a village in which we were told there were anywhere from 3,000 to 8,000 people. We walked through the village, or part of it, and there were certainly people living there. There was absolutely no damage whatsoever and by the look of it, it certainly appeared as though there had never been any fighting in that particular area.

We then returned to Ishiagu for the night, stayed the night there and during the evening had discussions with the Red Cross officials, who have a set-up right in that area and, as a result of those discussions, the next morning we went north for a few miles and we stopped at the town of Nenwe. It was at this area that we ran into the concentration of women and children who had suddenly come out of the bush that we mentioned in our first report. One week they had 100 people and the following week the Red Cross worker assessed the size of the crowd at anywhere between 1,000 and 1,500. With one assistant he was trying to look after them.

We stopped a little farther north at a feeding station which was being run by the Nigerians themselves. It was being run extremely efficiently with one Red Cross chap watching to see how it was going and I imagine there were 500 to 1,000 in that particular area.

We then proceeded north and went to the town Agbani—a marketplace—which was not really in operation but which was surrounded by a number of villages, as is the custom in that part of the world. We then went to one of the villages and found the people living there quite normally and seemingly unworried.

We went across to Udi where we found a Red Cross station that was feeding a number of women and children under a very efficient Red Cross officer indeed. Many of these children, in particular, showed the effects of malnutrition, but the doctors had this under control except, as we pointed out in our report, that there was a shortage of medical stores, largely, I gather, because of the problems of

transportation from Lagos up to that particular area.

We then turned back to Enugu, spent the night, and the next morning had discussions with the officials of the state administration, who were telling us what they were doing to get the town of Enugu and the area back into operation. Enugu is a very attractive-looking town, but completely dead. None of the services are working effectively, but they have a plan for getting them back to work and they were working very hard at it.

This is another point that the team will be checking this week when they go back to see how much progress has been made. There is also a Red Cross camp in that area and we went to have a look at that.

Meanwhile the other team had gone over to Abakaliki, had been briefed there and stayed in that area for two or three days. They made a trip all the way down here to Uwana, travelled around the Uwana area here, back up to Abakaliki, around in this area and back, and then they spent a day in Abakaliki which is a little further advanced than Enugu in being brought back to life.

• 1005

This was the team that ran into some Catholic missionaries who had stayed behind and who had not, in fact, left with their flock as it seems many had in this particular area.

Then on the Monday we started back to Lagos but we were delayed, in fact, because of the engine failure on our airplane and we did not get back until Tuesday.

The next trip was to the area of the Third Marine Commando Division commanded by Colonel Adekunle. We went there, were briefed by him and then, once again, split into two teams. The team which I was not on went to the Calabar area.

This team moved up toward the area of Uyo where they stayed. They went up to Ikot Ekpene, travelled around in a circular route through that part of the world and encountered the Red Cross officials who were looking after approximately 200,000 refugees living together with the civilian administration and the army. I have the details of that particular Red Cross—Red Cross and civil administration—activity here with me.

Meanwhile, back at Port Harcourt our team went first of all up to Aba, where we looked on that particular day at a camp in the city of Aba, talked to the brigade commanders and to another camp not quite so far up. The next

day we went up the next road over to the next brigade area to Ihie and looked at a very good camp in that particular area—farther back down in this area here—and then on the third day we went to Owerri and looked at the camp, which is more of a detention camp in many ways—a combination of a displaced persons camp and a security camp—for people picked up in the front areas because it is right in the front area there in which we spent some time. We also went up in advance of the town itself to see if there was anything much to see, but again, as I said, when you get up in that area there is practically nobody around.

An hon. Member: Mr. Chairman, a point for clarification. I was wondering whether you could indicate whether they were in a secessionist-controlled area or in the area controlled by the Central Government.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am sorry if I did not make that clear. All the areas in which we were operating were controlled by the Federal Military Government. When we had finished that trip, we made a side trip down to check on the area of Bonny down here where the initial landings were made by the Federal Marine Commando Division and we also inspected the camps at Port Harcourt and talked to the government officials.

The team came back, wrote its report, and made its third trip to Benin City in the area of the Second Division which occupies this area that the secessionists had occupied at one time—the area up to Benin City—and the bridgehead here at Onitsha. After a briefing in the Onitsha area the team split up and the one team that I was with inspected the camp in Onitsha which is run—it holds about a thousand Ibos—by the Ibo people and, in fact, the people who normally live in Onitsha but are put in this particularly camp because the village itself is practically in the area of fighting and most of the houses and things have been damaged.

We then came back and looked into a camp here at Asaba, talked to the Red Cross people in Asaba and then, on our way back, stopped at this town of Ogwachi-Uki to talk to the civilian administration but they happened to be in the midst of the first day of the New Yam Festival and so we did not stay there too long.

Meanwhile, the other team had taken off and gone all down through this area which is supposed to be occupied by approximately a half million Ibo-speaking people and they

went down to Owerri and then travelled all through the area here, including areas that we were told we would be unable to go through such as Kwale, Usoro, stopping at prisons and camps as they went through the area.

Generally speaking, in this area here, except along the river, life seems to have returned entirely to normal.

Along the river there is still infiltration taking place and some of these camps like the one we went to at Asaba is really inhabited by people who have been moved out of the villages near which the infiltration is taking place so that the Federal troops can carry on operations in those areas.

That report was being written; I have seen the draft. The report itself should be in this morning but I had to leave in order to get here before the final report was signed and issued. Mr. Chairman, that is the account of our activities to date.

• 1010

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Milroy. A number of members have indicated they would like to ask questions. All members will have an adequate opportunity to ask questions. I just suggest that perhaps the first questioner should not try to exhaust the subject but keep the questions within reasonable limits in the hope that some other questions will remain to be asked by other questioners. If any are missed we can always start around again. The first member on my list is Mr. Groos. Also, I suggest to members that they speak into the microphones. I apologize that we are a bit crowded here. This afternoon we will be back in our regular meeting room—371—in the West Block. Mr. Groos?

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, General Milroy, I thank you for your almost too brief explanation and I am sure we are going to hear more later on as we...

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, the acoustics here are not very good.

Mr. Groos: I am really speaking towards the Chair. Can you not hear through the microphone?

Mr. Lewis: I could not and my hearing is good.

Mr. Groos: Well, I think I will try to do without the microphone, then. I was very interested to hear what General Milroy had to

say. I was very interested, in particular, to hear that when you went on your tours of the various areas you were accompanied on these first two tours of which we have had reports solely by foreign and Nigerian press and there were no Canadian press representatives there at all.

So far we have heard evidence mainly from Biafran visitors and Biafran experts and naturally it is their evidence that has appeared in the press. Who was it that went on the last trip? Was it a Canadian press man representing a large group or was it a small newspaper?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, it was John Best of the Canadian Press who accompanied us on the last trip.

Mr. Groos: Oh, I see. But to your knowledge he is the first Canadian press representative of any sort who has been accompanying you or any of the other Observer Teams.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Who has accompanied any of our Observer Teams, yes.

Mr. Groos: Any of the Observer Teams in your group? I see. Did you speak to him about this? Was there any explanation for it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, I was delighted to see him and we had discussions and I tried to fill him in on what had been going on before. I was delighted to see him but the presence or absence of a representative of the Canadian press, of course, was really not my responsibility. I was concerned about it. I was delighted to see that he had arrived.

Mr. Groos: Did he give any indication of why he had suddenly decided to report the stories from the Nigerian side as opposed to the Biafran side?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, no. He had just arrived in Lagos and, in fact, he arrived I think the day before we were going to make our trip and was very fortunate to be able to get into the group because at that time we tried to restrict the numbers a bit because the press group was getting bigger than our group.

Mr. Groos: I see. To move on to another subject, I was very interested in what you said about tribal leaders coming out of the woods bearing gifts and asking if they could bring their people out of the bush and you mentioned a surrender document. I certainly have not seen that surrender document and I

do not know whether any of the others have. Have they? Can you hear me all right over there now?

Mr. Lewis: Loud and clear.

Mr. Groos: I have not seen this. I wonder whether we could pass it around and take a look at it? What does it indicate? What are the inducements that it offers to anyone using it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is not a surrender; it is really a safe-conduct pass. It merely says that if they bring this to the local military officer they will be looked after. That is really what it says.

Mr. Groos: I see. I presume you and your group have looked into the way the national Military Government is living up to this. Is it your experience that it is living up to the promises made in this document?

• 1015

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes; insofar as the areas that we have examined are concerned I think it is. However, may I make one point? When I say, the leader coming out of the bush, in fact it is not always a leader. Sometimes it just happens to be one man who has enough nerve to come out and contact the military forces.

Normally they are so frightened that they do not want to do it. It takes that one man to make the contact, but once that initial contact is made—I am now talking about the First Division area which is an Ibo area—that seems to be all that is required to bring his group out of the bush. In many cases it is not the traditional leader; in many cases it is a younger man and usually one who can speak English.

Mr. Groos: Is that what you were trying to say when you were explaining how you visited one camp and there were a hundred people there and, I think you said, later on you went back and there were a thousand? You mentioned also this father who had been separated from his children.

You know, we are interested in personal incidents such as this. If I can paraphrase what you said, he said that once he had been separated from his children and he was on one side of the line and on the Nigerian side as opposed to the Biafran he would be expected to be dead by his relatives living on the Biafran side but that was not, in actual fact, the case. What was he doing? Was he ...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: When I saw him?

Mr. Groos: Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: He was in a refugee camp run by the army.

Mr. Groos: Was he being well looked after?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh yes. He was being fed and his children were being looked after but he was having to look after them himself, of course. His wife was not there. He was being looked after; being fed.

Mr. Groos: We have been very concerned and we have heard some evidence that perhaps the educated Ibo is not coming out and surrendering: that he, in fact, is the person being persecuted most by the Nigerians if persecution is, in fact, going on. Have you anything to say about that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, I probably should have enlarged on that. In the Northern area and in the southern area we noted that there were not many educated Ibos. We think the reason is because they have gone back into Iboland, in to what is left of Biafra. This is what we assume.

However, in the Mid-Western State this is not the case. In the Mid-Western State the towns are operating and the schools are all going. It is the one area where the schools are operating. They are not operating in the First and Third Division areas. Two of the members of the Governor's Council of the Mid-Western State are Ibos. There are Ibos in the civil service. The teachers are going there. So, the educated Ibos are back in the Mid-Western State but in the East-Central State area we think that probably they are really the ones who are withdrawing with the forces.

Mr. Groos: So you saw no evidence of any persecution of the educated Ibos?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh no, we did not see any of that. We just saw an absence of a lot of them. As I say, we think they are in the area with the secessionist troops.

Mr. Groos: Could you tell us anything about the relations between the Red Cross and the Nigerian Government.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think this is really out of my field. What I can tell you is that in all the areas we visited, with the exception of the Port Harcourt area, the Red Cross was operating and operating effectively, and I

think in every case they reported that the relations with the army were good.

Generally the system is that the army feeds people for the initial couple of weeks and gets the food to them until the Red Cross and the civil administration can catch up to them.

In the area of Port Harcourt that we visited the Red Cross was not there but they were coming in the following week. The Nigerian Red Cross were coming in and it is my understanding from one of the UN members who was there last week, and to whom I spoke just before I came here, that the Red Cross is moving into that area in good strength which means that the Nigerian Red Cross and the International Red Cross will be operating in all the areas.

Mr. Groos: I have one last question. I have many more questions, Mr. Chairman, but taking your advice I will put myself down at the end of the list, but after this one last question.

I gathered from what you said that once you decide on the area into which you wish to make a visit, that you are given complete freedom. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

• 1020

Mr. Groos: And, in actual fact, where you go is decided only at the last minute by lot. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is not quite correct. We have our meeting and decide really how many teams we will make up. The make-up of the teams is decided by lot.

Mr. Groos: I see. Do you advise the Area Commander or the Divisional Headquarters Commander ahead of time exactly where you wish to go? Of course, what is worrying everyone is that you might be seeing some sort of a set play; something that has been prepared for you.

Could you describe once again for the Committee how you overcome that problem to make sure that you actually see life as it really is there and not something that has been prepared for you.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Perhaps I should explain the system that we followed in the Third Division area. When we arrived there we were briefed. The Divisional Commander had a plan all typed out for our visit and the timetable, and everything, made and he was

going to move us as a complete team across the front.

After our discussion we explained to him that this was not the way we wished to operate. We wished to break into two groups and operate quite separately and we wanted provisions made for the necessary transportation, and one thing and another, for us to carry out our moves in that particular manner. Then, once we get into a sector, where we want to stop and what we want to go and see is really sort of decided on the spur of the moment.

We realized this was going to be one of our problems and this was one of the reasons we insisted that the press must accompany us.

We realized that if we carried out our investigations by ourselves that anyone could point the finger at us and therefore we made the point that the press must accompany us. Therefore I suggest that the people who really can say whether or not we are doing our job or being led down the garden path are the members of the press. That is their job.

One of the other devices we follow, for example, is if we go to a camp we do not stay together. For example, I may go into the camp and I will check the people around and I will go around and see what is going on.

Meanwhile, say that General Henry Alexander is with me, he will collect a few people and will go off into a room and talk to them. Some of the other people just wander off by themselves. We do not stay by ourselves. We are quite free to split up, go anywhere we want, see what we want, and obviously it would be an extremely difficult job to keep an eye on all of us, because in any one group there are seven of us.

So, we have done our best, particularly in this first trip, to see that we are not led around by the nose and, of course, we are now going back to the areas. Today we split into two teams; one is going to the First Division area and one is going to the Third Division area. They have a bit of a plan because there are some areas that we have not seen yet. They may look at those areas and they are going to stay there for three or four days. We propose to keep doing that.

Mr. Groos: Is there any communication problem when you are speaking to these people? What language do you speak to them in, and do you do it through an interpreter or directly?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Generally speaking you can find a number of people who can speak English because English is the common language of the area. Occasionally, when you are talking in a village or to someone who cannot speak English, you need an interpreter. The sort of questions you ask him are where is his village, where does he come from, is he an Ibo, a few questions like that, and you have to do that through an interpreter.

Mr. Groos: Thank you.

Mr. Cafik: General Milroy, on the reports that you have submitted as the Observer Team, and I believe there are three of them at the moment, is there any substantial difference between the report the Observer Team has made and the one the UN or the Organization of African Unity has made?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: To date the UN has only issued a report on our first visit, which I believe the Committee has, and it confirms. I do not think there is really any difference. There might be a bit of difference in emphasis, it is written in a different way, but it does not disagree with our report. That is not quite right. They also issued a report on the Okigwi incident, which I think is very, very similar to the one we issued.

There is no requirement, of course, for the UN to issue reports when we issue ours, and I do not think Mr. Gussing proposes to do it the same way as we issue our report. We have not gone firm on this, but basically our approach was going to be to issue the first three reports to give people an over-all picture and then perhaps we will issue reports only from time to time to indicate changes or when a specific allegation is made that has to be covered by a report. Mr. Gussing may do this differently. To my knowledge the OAU has not issued any reports at all yet.

Mr. Cafik: To what extent would your reports possibly reflect the government view of this situation in Nigeria and Biafra? The reason I ask the question is that I have the feeling that those who have visited the Biafra side have spent a great deal of time talking with officials of the rebel government and to some extent I feel that they reflect the views of the official government of that side.

I wonder if there is the same possibility here, that in your interviews of the military authorities in a given area you perhaps let their views or their explanations colour your approach and perhaps you see what they have led you to believe you might see.

• 1025

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Perhaps if I were to explain. We met and talked to General Gowon once. Our normal contact is the Permanent Secretary for Defence and we see him on occasion and practically always on administrative matters. We do not really discuss the situation with him.

Accompanying us are two liaison officers, Colonel Father Martins, who is a Catholic priest, and Colonel Apolo. These are liaison officers who are very effective in that they have the ear of the government. But to my knowledge—and I normally travel with Colonel Apolo—they really say very little about the government policy unless we should happen to ask them at some particular time. So that the only people we really talk to—other than the sort of talk you might get socially, and there has not been that much of it—would be the divisional commanders and the brigade commanders.

Their problems are largely operational and administrative; operational from the point of view of fighting the war. This is not our task. How they fight the war is not our business and therefore we do not discuss a great deal of that.

Our business is how they look after the refugee displaced people in their areas, and we do discuss that with them. We do discuss policy with the state people, as I pointed out. We have discussed it with the people in three states now; the governor or the state administrators, or the secretary of the state administrator in the three states. I would have thought that our contact with the opinion-making people, as we say, or the decision-making people, is really quite restricted because we are out in the field, and when we are back we are not back for that long.

Mr. Cafik: Do you really feel that your observations are not in any way shaded by preconceived notions given to you by the government authorities?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would hope they were not; I do not think they are.

Mr. Cafik: You mentioned that missionaries have been involved, and you have met a number of them. The impression has been created, I think, within the Committee, that, generally speaking, all the missionaries in Nigeria are on the Biafran side, in the sense that they are politically sympathetic with the Biafran position. Would you think that is a statement of fact?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I might make one point. We have not met a number of missionaries; we have met a few. The biggest group was met by the group that went to Abakaliki, and I was not with that group. Most of the missionaries seemed to have gone. We met two or three working with Red Cross groups; so that is clarified.

As to the actual feelings of the missionaries, I do not think I would like to say; I have not talked to enough of the missionaries about that particular aspect. However, they are very close to the people, and in many cases it appears that they have followed their people when they retreated with the secessionist forces.

Mr. Cafik: I think it is quite important for us to realize what percentage of the Biafrans, perhaps, have stayed behind after the Federal forces have overcome a territory. Would you have any idea?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not think I could make an estimate. In the North around the Enugu area, more and more seem to be coming out all the time. This is a point I am afraid I did not make clear. It is in our second report, that in the South a great deal of the area is not Ibo area, it is Rivers' people area and Ibibio area, and many of those people seem to have come out and gone back to their homes. What the army does when it gets them is keep them for a couple of weeks, feed them until their strength is back, give them a bit of money, and then send them home.

• 1030

In the Mid-West State, as far as I can make out, all the Ibos are back at that camp. There must be some missing, but of the half million from the villages we saw, most of them seemed to be back and life seems to be quite normal. You drive down Agbor and the markets are going and life appears normal and the schools along the road—there is row after row of these schools where they board—are all going, and the kids are out running around.

Mr. Cafik: Constantly, General, we have been told that in the event Biafra were to fall there would be a prolonged state of guerrilla warfare for many, many years to come. I have not, from reading any of your reports of the Observer Team, seen any evidence that there is any guerrilla warfare in the presently occupied territory of Biafra. Have you seen any evidence of guerrilla warfare?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We have seen no evidence and have reported no evidence of guerrilla warfare. This may be in my report—the report has not caught up to me yet and it may not be in the final draft—but there is infiltration.

There is infiltration both North and South of the Onitsha area across the river. Primarily this infiltration appears to be for the purpose of getting food, but from what was described to me I would not describe it as guerrilla warfare. However, having said that...

Mr. Harkness: Just for clarification, by infiltration you mean infiltration of civilians, not infiltration of armed units of the Biafran forces?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Infiltration of soldiers, by soldiers.

Mr. Harkness: This is infiltration by soldiers.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: By soldiers, yes, but I would not describe it as guerrilla warfare. It is infiltration; they come in to get food, as we understand it. However, having said that I would not want to make a guess on the possibility of guerrilla warfare.

The Chairman: For the help of the translators and the people operating the equipment, could particularly those members sitting at the inside spaces speak into the mikes.

Mr. Cafik: I understand that in the conduct of the war the Federal troops really, in effect, overcome the roads and take over the major towns, but the bush and surrounding area is perhaps still populated by Ibo people who have withdrawn themselves from the populated areas; is this a fact?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. What we think happens is that, as they use a tremendous amount of ammunition in this war, when a force is advancing there is a great deal of firing going on, and the country folk particularly, and some of the city folk, get out and get into the bush. Then the forces go by and sometimes they stay there; this is the problem.

This is why we do not know how many are hiding in the bush. I think the problem is that the longer they hide in the bush, that is where they are going to die. If you can get them out of the bush, you can look after them. We do not really know how many are hiding in the bush. There is a possibility that

many of the people we think are in the secessionist-held territory are, in fact, still hiding in the bush on the Federal side of the line.

Mr. Cafik: Is there any effort by the Federal authorities to go in and approach these people in the bush?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, first of all this is one of the reasons they use these pamphlets, these leaflets, but they are only partially effective because this bush is very, very thick, and getting in to find people I think would be an extremely difficult job. What is far better is to try to get them to come out. However, we have, I think, suggested that anything that can be done to attract them out of the bush should be done. We suggested, for example, using loudspeakers in airplanes. We suggested this as a possibility, and I think the government, particularly the civil administration, are probably looking into things like this.

Mr. Cafik: Is the government genuinely concerned with trying to feed the people after they have over-run an area?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would say yes; the government has a policy, the army carries the food, and initially the army feeds, and in so far as it can, gives medical treatment to the displaced persons that come into its care.

Certainly this is what was happening in the First Division area and in the Third Division area. Once the Red Cross and the civil administration move in the army continue to help in so far as they can, and are requested to do so. In many cases you will find, perhaps at a Red Cross station, two or three army people helping them out. In the Third Division area on the West side, the army was doing all of this—doing all the work there. We observed on this, and said that we thought really they were giving an operational commander a very deep zone of administrative responsibility and we thought they should try to move that administrative zone up and turn it over to the civilian administration. But the Army is doing it.

Mr. Cafik: How large is the problem of starvation in the Federally-controlled area of Biafra?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, once you get the people, if you can get them and start feeding them, it is not terribly great because the food is there. They can get it in and they can bring them around, provided they can get them and

catch them soon enough. Some people who come out obviously are too far gone.

• 1035

In the area of Calabar—this one report I had—when the people went around they said there were about 200,000 refugees being fed. But as the Team went around it discovered, it reported to me, a group of about 3,000 who had just come out of the bush who were not being cared for. This was reported to the Red Cross, and the Red Cross were up there the next day. The deaths in that group were estimated at that time at about 20 per thousand. However, as soon as the food and the medicine can get to them, the death rate goes down very quickly. There is food, and the problem is getting the people and getting it to them.

Mr. Cafik: General, I know this is not within your terms of reference as an official Observer there but do you believe that the Federal area of Nigeria would allow your Observer Team to go in to Biafra to observe what is happening there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: To my mind it was not in the concept under which we were sent there. If the suggestion were raised I think first of all we would have to be clear as to exactly what we were going in there to do. We are supposed to report on the behaviour of the Federal Military troops. Now, obviously we know that people are starving in the secessionist-held area. You have had evidence from reputable people; we know that and there is no need for us to go in and further prove that point.

From the point of view of observing the activities of the Federal troops, it is our belief that is more effectively done, under the way the war is going now, by advancing behind the Federal troops rather than retreating in front of them.

Third, if we go into Biafra why are we going there? We would have to be very clear. Are we going in there to look at the activities of the Federal troops only and, if so, what are we going to look at? Or are we expected to look at the activity of the Biafran troops? Are we supposed to report on how they are feeding people? I think any suggestion like this would have to result in revision of our terms of reference. I think the whole team would have to go—at least the four senior representatives would have to go. I feel that we should have the agreement of the Federal

Military Government and our own governments before we would do this because, in fact, it changes the terms of reference under which the Team was constituted.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I understand, but ignoring that fact if we can have a theoretical question, do you believe the Federal Government would allow you to go across the lines or would they have some objection in principle, other than your terms of reference?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not think I should answer that. I have not asked that question of them and I cannot really answer.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Now, you say that your terms of reference is to view the conduct of the war in so far as the Federal troops are concerned. Do you think it within your terms of reference to be concerned about the charges of indiscriminate bombing by Federal authorities within the Biafran area?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. Actually, when you say "indiscriminate bombing"...

Mr. Cafik: Or, allegedly indiscriminate bombing.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: ...I would have thought what was more to the point is if there is, in fact, discriminate bombing against non-military targets.

Mr. Cafik: That has been the charge, or that has been the evidence.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: Now, would it seem to be within your competence and within your jurisdiction to look into that kind of charge?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I expect that in some of our future activities we would be looking on our side already into the activities of the air forces in so far as we can and trying to satisfy ourselves on that activity. I might point out that in all the time I have been there, in all the time I have been in the field, I have yet to see a war plane in the sky, which does not necessarily mean they are not there.

Mr. Cafik: This morning I heard that one of the problems of our getting *Hercules* aircraft in to the Nigerian side is that there is not an airport large enough to handle a *Hercules* aircraft. Does that sound like a reasonable statement? Do you have any evidence to

indicate that there really are airports large enough to accommodate these large aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am a little out of my competence here. I am not so sure that size is the answer. I think the problem is the bearing or the strength of the runways.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I think that is right.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: For example, in Enugu the runway was bombed during the fighting and has been poorly patched. I am not too sure about Port Harcourt and Calabar, it would take an expert to say that. But Lagos, I know, can take them.

• 1040

Mr. Cafik: You do not know of any of the other airports?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Now, Obilagu presumably could take them because, I gather, it was landing *Hercules* or *Hercules*-type craft while the secessionist still held it, but at the present time it is pretty close, I think, to what is called the front line to be used by anybody.

Mr. Cafik: All right; I have one last question. On the matter of genocide, in your first report you stated quite clearly that there was no justification in the charge of genocide, obviously based within the areas that you visited—you cannot judge areas you have not seen. Do you still feel that is a justifiable statement at this point in time?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Using a definition which I gave in my initial briefing, we feel very strongly that there is no evidence of genocide, and just the opposite. The intent of genocide is what we are looking for. Does the government have the intent to destroy, one way or another, the Ibo people? It is just the opposite. They seem to be doing everything they can when these people come into their hands to feed them and to look after them. Therefore, we say that the term "genocide" should not be applied in the areas that we have visited.

Mr. Cafik: Does this lead you to the conclusion or the suspicion that perhaps the Biafran authorities are conducting a propaganda war in this respect to whip up a fear within their own people that this will happen in order to create resistance?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Perhaps I could answer it this way: There is no question in our minds, and we have so reported, that there is

a very great fear of genocide on the side of the Biafran secessionists. There is no question at that; they are afraid that is what is going to happen to them. Now, how this fear got there I am not prepared to say.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, very much, General Milroy.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: General Milroy, I would like first to ask you a question that does not relate to your evidence and the experiences of the Observer Team of which you are a part. Just to general military expertise, when we were in that part of the world we discussed what sort of force might be necessary to police it if a ceasefire were politically possible. It happened to be the Governor of Sao Tome, a Portuguese military man of some experience, who pointed out to us that with the Niger River on the one side and, I think, the Cross River on the other and with relatively few means of communication, a fairly small force, say of about 5,000 people—an international force, be it Commonwealth or UN or ONU or what have you—would be able to do an effective job of policing a ceasefire. I wonder whether, from your experience, you could comment on that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not think I will comment directly on that, sir, but could I answer it this way? My belief is that the size or presence if any of an observer or a peace-keeping force will depend on the political negotiations that take place to arrive at a peace, and that the military requirement will probably take second place to what the two sides decide are acceptable to the Federal Military Government and are required by the other side to give them the reassurance they need.

It would be quite possible, if you looked at it from the purely military point of view, for a very small group of observers to do all that was required, but in arriving at a peaceful solution a larger force might be required.

Mr. Brewin: Now, General Milroy, I would like to call your attention to the third of your Observer Team's reports, dated October 15. Do you have it in front of you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Do you mean the second interim report, sir?

Mr. Brewin: I am sorry. It is the Report of the Observer Team's Visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division. Do you have the report?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, I do.

Mr. Brewin: I call your attention to the third paragraph of the report of your Team on the first page and read this to you:

It has become more apparent that the future efficacy of observers will depend largely on their continued presence throughout the whole area and their ability to visit, without undue delay, the places where incidents are reported as taking place. It will also depend on good communications both in the matter of air and ground transport and wireless. These are lacking at the present time. The group is not constituted to be able to follow the method of operation suggested above. We therefore recommend that the organization of the group should be changed to enable it to have certain of its members permanently on the ground in each divisional sector. We consider this matter to be urgent and would be happy to discuss it with the Federal Government at an early date.

• 1045

The first question I would like to ask you about that is whether this reorganization has taken place?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, sir. As you see, we have suggested to the Federal Government that we would be prepared to discuss it.

Mr. Brewin: Has the Federal Government discussed it with you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I believe they may be raising it this week with us, but they had not raised it at the time I left.

Mr. Brewin: I take it that the substance of that paragraph is that through lack of communications and air and ground transport, through inability to visit the places where incidents are reported, the efficacy of what you have been able to observe to date has been seriously hampered.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, sir. We say our future efficacy is what we are after. We think, having done our first go-around and looked at the whole situation, that rather than stay in a group we should now break up into smaller groups which is, in fact, what we are doing this week; we are breaking into two groups.

Rather than go out for two or three days and then come back, if we had a few more

people we could leave some people permanently in each divisional area and the remainder could then move back and forth from our base. That means that rather than having to move out from Lagos we can have someone who is always on the ground, knowing what is going on, and we can then "beef-up" any particular areas we see fit.

Mr. Brewin: Then have you not been handicapped to date by inability to follow up quickly on complaints about incidents? I know you have been to one place.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The only complaint we have had—and in fact we flew in General Gowon's jet the very same day and were in the area within a very short time of getting the complaint. That is the only complaint that we have had, but we think the complaints may not necessarily come the way they were expected to come when this group was set up. They are things that we will try to pick up ourselves.

Mr. Brewin: I would like to ask you to be specific—you have already mentioned it—on what both Mr. Charles Taylor and Mr. Stephen Lewis mentioned—the evidence of eye-witnesses at the town which they described as Urua Inyang. They said that according to eye-witnesses some 500 people were massacred sometime this month and they reported in considerable detail the evidence they received. So far you have not been able to investigate whether those allegations have any substance?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That was the incident, sir, on which I touched in my initial briefing. That was referred to us from Canada, which is the only country, to my knowledge, that has raised it. About the 9th or the 10th we immediately tried to locate this area.

I think the report says it is on the road south-west out of Umuahia. There are three roads—one railroad and two roads—south-west out of Umuahia on which fighting is taking place. There was no town of that name that we could find. The group was quite prepared to send a team to look into the incident if we could give them a specific location. We wired back here to Canada to ask for more information and the reply we got was that perhaps the town had another name, but they were unable to suggest what the name was.

Mr. Brewin: Perhaps I had better ask this question first: obviously if such an incident took place, the investigation, to be satisfactory,

would have to follow closely after the incident, would it not? Otherwise the evidence would not likely be there very long.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Brewin: I want to discuss with you for a moment the fact that you have not been able to contact the authorities within the Biafran-held territory. In this connection have you considered contacting people such as Mr. Taylor and Mr. Lewis, who said that they heard these detailed accounts?

• 1050

Maj. Gen. Milroy: One of the purposes of sending our wire back to Canada was to get more information and all we got in reply was that it may have been a place with a different name. I was going to say, however, that we did locate a town with this name. It is a very unusual name. It is south of the area in which it was described and this week part of the team that is in Port Harcourt is going to see what it can find out about this particular incident.

The problem is that there are a great many villages and towns in that area. It is quite heavily wooded and we could spend a great deal of time wandering around trying to find a location without a great deal of success unless we could get a better guide. So we will start off by going to the town that is of the name that we were given.

Mr. Brewin: General Milroy, I am not blaming you in any way for this because you said that your terms of reference do not include consulting anyone of, what we might call, the other side within the Biafran area. That is correct, is it not?

But does it occur to you that you might be a little handicapped because, after all, those are the people who are making the allegations that there have been, if not genocide, various incidents of massacre when the Federal troops have advanced. Do you not think it is a little bit of a handicap not to hear what the complaining parties have to say so that they can pinpoint their allegations for you to investigate?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This is a point that has been raised, and as I said, if the suggestion is that we should go to talk to those people, I personally think it would be under the arrangements that I outlined earlier on.

In other words, what exactly are we going to look for? Our terms of reference would

have to be changed; we would have to have the agreement of the parties that drew up our present terms of reference; and would we then restrict ourselves to the activities of the Federal forces?

Mr. Brewin: In that connection, perhaps it would not be proper for you to do so. But have you had access to or studied any of the detailed complaints made from the other side, some of which have been put into writing and are petitioned to the Third Committee of the United Nations? Have you had an opportunity to look in detail at those complaints?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Brewin: So, in other words, if there were a number of allegations—I will just mention one of them: for example, patients being killed in October 1967 at Calabar General Hospital after shelling for many hours and that sort of thing—you did not know about you could not investigate them? I want you to read the...

An hon. Member: What was the date of that?

Mr. Brewin: The date of that was October 1967.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Did you say the people were killed by shelling?

Mr. Brewin: Yes, I do not know whether or not it is correct, but according to two members of the hospital staff the invading Nigerian army shelled the Calabar General Hospital for many hours and many patients were killed. I am just asking you, using this as an illustration, whether this sort of incident has been called to your attention.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You say the Calabar Hospital?

Mr. Brewin: Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: When is this supposed to have happened?

Mr. Brewin: October 1967.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: October 1967... we have not, to date, been going back to investigate any allegations. Our first task when we got there was to get around and see exactly what was happening in the war-affected areas right now and what policies were being followed. We have not gone back on any of these particular activities.

Mr. Brewin: General Milroy, you understand I am not criticizing; I am just trying to find out the scope of your investigation. There is a well-known reporter on African affairs—Collin Legum...

May I have order, Mr. Chairman, I cannot hear myself.

The Chairman: Order, please.

Mr. Brewin: ... of the *London Observer* who reported on January 21, 1968, that most killing of Ibos occurred in Benin, Warri and Asaba after Biafran forces were dislodged from their brief occupation of the Mid-Western State. The fury of the non-Ibo majority in this state, was turned on the Ibo minority. Although Federal troops took part in the killing, it was they who, in the end, brought the situation under control.

Another quotation under the same date:

The greatest single massacre occurred in the Ibo town of Asaba, where 700 Ibo males were lined up and shot.

That report was from Collin Legum of the *London Observer* on January 21. Has that sort of allegation been brought to your attention? It relates to Benin, where you were and where you said, as I understand, that everything was perfectly normal.

• 1055

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is quite right. We have not, as yet, and I do not know if we will start going back on allegations such as that. Our view is that right now our job is to try to keep fully in touch with what has been going on since our activities actually started.

Mr. Brewin: So, I will put it this way. If these events occurred, it would be no part of your duty to investigate their truth?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No it is not.

Mr. Brewin: Yet, on the other hand, if they occurred—and I say “if” because it has not been proven—the fear of the Ibos would not be unnatural, would it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If they occurred, I quite agree with you.

Mr. Brewin: You went to the various divisional commands and you mentioned, I think, in the southern front—I am not sure what division it was—meeting a certain Colonel Adekunle. He is described—I do not know whether you have heard this title ascribed to him—in this morning's *Globe and Mail* as the

"Black Scorpion". Did you know him personally?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I met him during our tour. The "Scorpion" is the insignia of his particular division.

Mr. Brewin: In any event, did you discuss with him the course of the war, the activities of his particular troops and his own attitudes?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: He briefed us; we had some discussions with him; he was going to accompany us on some of our trips, but did not do so because he had other duties to perform. He is a young man, very dynamic, and has a tremendous responsibility; he has the whole of the southern front, you might describe it, in this particular war.

Mr. Brewin: Do you think his attitude was such as to justify confidence that the troops under his command would treat these civilians with mercy and care? Is that your judgment?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do. As a matter of fact, the one thing the troops in his division fear, is the divisional commander. They fear him more than anything else. I think they have a tremendous amount of respect for him and I think that our statement that they are reasonably well under control is a truth.

Mr. Brewin: I know it would not be exactly polite, perhaps, to discuss this matter with him, but did you discuss with him the statements attributed to him? I am now looking at the English weekly, *The Economist*, of August 24, 1968, where the following statement was attributed to him:

...as reported by *De Telegraaf*, Amsterdam:

"I want to see no Red Cross, no Caritas, no World Council of Churches, no Pope, no missionary and no UN delegation."

"I want to prevent even one Ibo having even one piece to eat before their capitulation."

"We shoot at everything that moves."

Then the question was asked:

And when your forces march into the centre of Ibo territory?

"Then we shoot at everything. Even things that do not move."

Those are quotations from reputable papers. Did you have a chance to discuss that attitude of mind with Colonel Adekunle?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not entirely. We did have some discussions and he gave his views on the activities of organizations coming in from outside Nigeria and his views on the sovereignty of Nigeria and the activities of some of these organizations. I might point out that these organizations of which he spoke, and which you quoted him as saying he did not want to see, are in fact operating in his area.

Mr. Brewin: And this business about shooting at everything that moves—and that he does not want a single Ibo to get any food before capitulation, you did not discuss those statements with him.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We found no evidence to indicate that that was being followed in his division.

Mr. Brewin: And I think you would agree that the divisional commander—I think you have indicated this already—would have greater control over how the people on the other side, the Ibos, would be treated than any other authority in Nigeria.

• 1100

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, and I think in paragraph 9 of our second report we touched on that when we drew attention to the question of the incident of a Sergeant-Major maltreating a soldier dressed as a civilian, and also on paragraph 11 when we drew attention to what we thought was inadequate care of prisoners of war.

Mr. Brewin: General Milroy, I have a quotation here from *The Times*, London of September 29, it appears to be, and it purports to be a report by one Nicholas Lloyd of *The Times*, London at the Obilagu airstrip in Nigeria on September 29, and it is an interview with you and Major-General Alexander. I want to read this to you and ask you if it is correct:

The British representative, Major-General Henry Alexander, a polo-playing Yorkshire farmer and former commander of the Ghanaian Army during the Congo civil war, told me: "It is very difficult to prove genocide unless you actually see it, but by getting up as close as possible to the fighting in areas just taken by Federal forces, one can form an impression."

"The impression I already have forming is that things here are not half as bad as they were in the Congo."

"The young officers I have met have been most impressive and everyone seems to be trying to get refugees fed and looked after in this very difficult situation."

That is the end of that part of the quotation. Did you hear him say that and do you agree with him?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not remember him making that particular statement. Did you say it was at the airfield?

Mr. Brewin: It is said to be from the Obilagu airstrip.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: General Alexander was not at the airstrip.

Mr. Brewin: That may be where he filed the report from. You did interview a man from *The Times*, London, did you not?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. You see, I got a little confused. No, I cannot make any comment on his comparisons with the Congo. I think one point I should bring out here that is quite impressive is that the Nigerian forces appear to be playing this whole problem, if you will excuse the expression, very coolly. There is never any reference made to the enemy. They do not call them "the enemy". I did not encounter any expressions of hate, or anything like that, that you might expect from one force about the force they are fighting. This is particularly so in the young officers. I think the basis that they are following, if you look at it from the military point of view, the way they are looking at it is when this war is over they are all going to have to serve together and many of them are going to have to serve in the same units, and therefore they must do nothing that is liable to endanger that relationship any more than they have to.

Mr. Brewin: I want to deal with the next paragraph. This is Mr. Lloyd reporting:

All four observers emphasize that Europe and America must get this war in perspective after the great emotional "hue and cry" over the plight of the surrounded Biafrans.

Is that correct reporting, that you did emphasize that attitude at this time, on September 29?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, I believe it is unfair to ask the General if the reports of the press are actually true in every

detail. I would now like to tell Mr. Brewin that he has missed the Manitoba papers.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not know that I could say that in fact we said that to that particular...

An hon. Member: Genocide?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: When he said that did he in fact not say "all four senior observers"?

Mr. Brewin: He said, "All four observers emphasize..."

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Because it could be that if he were one group or the other there would in fact be two senior observers and two assistant observers.

Mr. Brewin: He does not quote you and Major-General Alexander directly. I will now read the next quote:

●1105

Major-General William Milroy from Canada explained: "Most armies loot, including some of our own, and if innocent civilians are killed in an area of fighting it is a pity, but it is probably not genocide."

Did you make that statement?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I did not make that. In fact, it seems to me that was not made in that area but at another time. By our definition of genocide, "intent to kill", the fact that people are likely to get killed in the actual fighting taking place is not genocide. It could be—as it was in the Okigwi circumstance—described as murder, but it is not genocide.

Mr. Brewin: Let me read just two more paragraphs and then I will be through, Mr. Chairman:

General Alexander added: "From the palaver in Europe, it seems we can fight our wars any way we want, but we like telling new young countries how to fight theirs.

"Remember that thousands of children have always died of hunger every year in Africa and unless the Red Cross stay here for the next 20 years working flat out, they will continue to do so."

Do you remember General Alexander making that statement on this occasion?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not remember him making it, but he has made statements rather similar to that, yes.

Mr. Brewin: Just one more question, and that is this. Your report—and I for one do not question the accuracy of the factual statements in your report—is made, I take it, only in relation to the areas you actually saw and in relation to the time with which you were in fact dealing. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We emphasized the area that we visited.

The Chairman: Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): General Milroy, we are very grateful to have you with us this morning and I would like to emphasize that I think you are the first witness in two weeks who has given us another side of the story. Nearly every witness has given us only one side of the story; that is to say, the Biafran side. Did you ever have any experience in Nigeria before?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I had no experience in Nigeria nor in Africa, except for a stop-over in North Africa during the war.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Therefore I would imagine that you would have no reason to pick sides or to favour one over the other?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No reason to.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Therefore I assume that anything you would observe would be strictly objective.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I hope it would be.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I would like to come back to something which has been mentioned and which I think is of such importance that it should be mentioned again. You say there were no Canadian newsmen with you other than one the last trip, when there was one. Does this also apply to Canadian television?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: There was, I understand, a Canadian television team, CBC, in Nigeria or Biafra in August, but there was none when I was there. I understand that the coverage received in this country was done by a stringer, is that the word? I think, a stringer from a Nigerian organization.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): We know of course that there have been a couple of teams on the Biafran side in the immediate past, but they have not been over on the other side. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this is a serious situation which should be dealt with, perhaps in the Committee on Broadcasting.

I wonder about the numbers of people dying per day. You mentioned a while ago that 20 per 1,000 would die if they were in the bush and that as they came out that figure would go down. We have heard some people talking about 8,000, 10,000 a day, and within a couple of months it will be as high as 25,000 a day. Undoubtedly they were referring to the Biafran side and they were referring to it in the context of the war continuing, I would imagine. How many people die per day in the area you saw?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Could I go back to the figure of 20 per 1,000 that I mentioned? That was the figure given for the group of 3,000 to 5,000 that had just come out of the bush, discovered by the Team in the Calabar area. I understand that once a group is taken into care the figure drops quite quickly to about 5 per 1,000. I could not give you a figure on how many people are dying, particularly of malnutrition, in the area we visited. Generally speaking, once they come out and you can get hold of them, the figure is not very great. Some of them die, but you usually can bring them around. The people who are dying, we think, are the ones who are still in the bush, and we have no idea what their number is. They are either in the bush on the Federal side, or they are in the bush or in the camps on the other side.

●1110

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): The aid that we are sending, then, into the Federally occupied zone is not all that necessary if people are not dying; as much as it would be necessary on the Biafran side, for example?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think it is necessary because while they may not be dying they are pretty sick, and we have observed in a couple of reports that particularly medical supplies are short at the front. I do not necessarily think they are short in Nigeria. The problem appears to be one of transportation into the areas where they are actually required.

We also suggest that if either the war stops or a great number of people suddenly come out of the bush the facilities and the supplies could be overtaxed or overwhelmed. This is a warning that we make based on what we see because we do not know how many people are coming out of the bush.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I am wondering, General Milroy, about the children particularly. We have seen all kinds of pictures that are

quite sad. There is one that sticks in my mind. It was a picture, taken in a Federally occupied zone, of a young woman with a baby on her shoulder, and the caption under it said the baby was dead. We have no way of knowing whether or not the baby was dead, but is this a common sight for little children—babies—to have died from starvation?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the area that we have been in it is not a common sight. There have been cases where there have been dead children. In some of the areas we have been there are a number of very sick ones. I mentioned Nenwe where a large number of these children were very undernourished. As you know, in many cases they will bloat up so it is not immediately obvious when you look at them that they are hungry. They are not necessarily skin and bones, but the doctors point out to you the ones that are in very rough shape. I am trying to remember that particular case you mentioned. There was one place we went where there was in fact a dead baby.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): In your assessment is there anything else that Canada can do with regard to these children, an airlift to a nearby country or anything like that? Is there something else that we can do?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You are really a little out of my field. I do not know, for example, the situation of the Red Cross stocks and the transport and one thing and another. I know that, for example, the Red Cross just received another group of vehicles from Oxfam, which they, I believe, sent to the Enugu area. In our reports we point out that we think transport is one of the problems, and of course the Canadian Government has already tried to do something about transport.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Could you tell us, General Milroy, how you were received, not only by the officials, but by the people? When you went into the various areas, were the people afraid of you or were they glad to see you? Did they know that you were a Canadian? Did they know your group was an international group or did they look upon you with suspicion? This kind of thing.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. I think there are a couple of points that are interesting there. The first point is that wherever we went we were given a military escort because the Nigerian authorities had guaranteed our safety. So it usually meant that when we went

into a village or something, we went in with at least two land rovers with troops in them. It was extremely interesting to me that this group would drive rather suddenly into a village and instead of everybody taking off in all directions, which you would expect them to do if they feared the soldiers, they just stood there and watched us and then started to gather around.

I would say that most of the people we went to see did not really have much of an idea who we were. The camp leaders in many cases, particularly if they had radios, knew who we were and what our mission was. We were always received extremely well. They were delighted to come and ask questions. It was very difficult sometimes to get past a group because they appeared to be very hurt if you did not stop and talk to them. You particularly have to make a point of going to talk to the elders, the senior members of any group. However, we were well received, but what we thought more significant was that there appeared to be no fear of the Federal troops. This was particularly in the area in the North, where there were more people and more troops around.

• 1115

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I have just one more question, General Milroy. This Committee has a motion before it which suggests that a delegation of parliamentarians go to Nigeria in order to see all sides. This came about as a result of a number of things. It seemed that many of the witnesses thought this was a good idea and urged it; also because we were told that Canadians are extremely well received all over Nigeria, on both sides. I would like to ask if you think that is a good idea, and also if you think it would hamper the work of the International Observer Team, and if you think generally that it could accomplish something?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Could I just be clear? The suggestion is that this group go to Nigeria?

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): A portion of it, yes. To all of Nigeria; to the Federal side and the Biafran side.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think if you went, certainly I feel sure that the Federal Military Government would be delighted to see someone from Canada. A representative from England was in Nigeria when the Team was operating. It has no effect on our activities whatsoever unless the members, in fact,

wanted to come with us on one of our visits, which would be no particular problem. I think beyond that it really becomes a political problem, and is not in my field.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): Thank you very much, General.

The Chairman: Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. Buchanan: General Milroy, in the various areas in which you operated, did you find there was a greater reluctance on the part of the people in the bush to come out in various areas depending on the tribal origin of the Nigerian military forces. In other words we have been told that it was the Hausas who slaughtered the Ibos in 1966 and of whom they are particularly afraid. I was wondering what the composition of the military forces was, and if there was more reluctance in the areas where the Hausa troops were operating?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, the army does not seem to have a tribal makeup. It seems to be all mixed up. I tried to ascertain whether there are in fact tribal units, but there are only two recruiting depots and the divisions get their troops out of these training depots. I could not attribute any difference in the rate to that factor. What did seem to me was that in the Northern Area where there are more—because of the kind of war they are fighting—there are more troops on the roads and one thing and another, and therefore easier for the people in the bush to come in contact with them than it is in the Southern Area, this contact seemed to be made more frequently. On the other hand, in the South most of the people are Rivers people, and they come out and stake up and then go back down to their own areas. So there seems to be, to my mind, no relation between the makeup of the army forces and the willingness of people to come out of the...

Mr. Buchanan: Do you know whether there is a fairly substantial number of members of the Hausa tribe in the forces, or are they primarily Yoruba?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think there are probably a good number of them, yes. But I would not want to hazard a guess as to what the proportion would be.

Mr. Buchanan: Several of the witnesses have suggested that the likelihood was very high that there would be an on-going guerrilla operation, virtually endless, if a military

solution, or at least capture, was achieved. With this in mind—maybe this is outside the area in which you wish to comment—I would be interested in your thoughts as to the likelihood of a military stalemate as the situation now exists.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not really think I should comment on that. As I say, as to the actual waging of the war and the fighting, we are interested in it only in so far as it affects the civilian population. Anything I would give you would be a pure guess.

Mr. Buchanan: Have you seen any indications that there is behind the lines a substantial behind-the-lines operation by the forces of Biafra?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have seen none. I have read or heard the statements made that preparations are being made to set up such an activity, but I have seen nothing.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan.

• 1120

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, General Milroy. I direct your attention to the Observer's Report, Mr. Chairman, Appendix B to the *Minutes of our Proceedings and Evidence*, Number 1, filed on Tuesday, October 8th, 1968. We found on page 49, towards the end of the booklet, and in the second column where the Observer's Report is dealing with restoration of normal life. It describes how:

When an area is first occupied the army provides the civilians found there with the foodstuffs...

And it

...is taken over as rapidly as possible by the civil administration of the Red Cross...

And so on down to where the sentence appears:

A contributing problem is the lack of money in the hands of the people.

What factors, General, would cause the Observers to put this sentence in this report?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have noted that this has raised questions before. What we meant there was that the Red Cross or the civil administration of the army give the people the basic foods. But in many cases they come out of the woods and they have no money. They have either thrown away the money

they had, or they figure it is useless, so they cannot buy anything. They cannot buy the things they are not given, and if you cannot buy anything then you cannot get the markets going. Most of their feedings in this country are by these little markets. Therefore, a person with no money at all has no way of getting soap or things like that he might want, any comforts. He has no way of getting the markets going. For this reason, Colonel Adekunle, when he sends a man back—it is my understanding, I have not actually seen the men get the money—gives each man a pound for each member of his family, and they go back just so they can start an economy going again. This is what we were mentioning. In our second report we suggest that in some areas where particularly prisoners are given 15 shillings or so, they should in fact get a weekly allowance. There are things that the Red Cross does not and cannot give, which the people would like to be able to buy. Also, once they can get the markets going, then life comes back very quickly. This is what we were referring to.

Mr. Ryan: What about the distribution of stock fish and other high protein foods? Did you see this being distributed?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh, yes. Stock fish in particular is one of the high protein foods. We went to the areas, and whenever we went to the camps one of the things we insisted on seeing was where the food was and what it was, and how it was distributed. When we went to Benin City, for example, we were taken to the warehouse of the rehabilitation organizations where we saw the rooms full of rice and garri, and saw that outside they had the yams stacked like cordwood. The yam is amazing.

Mr. Ryan: Carbohydrate?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. But they had salt, and stock fish. They had a form of flour too, that they were keeping. They could only keep it for so long. If they could not issue it to somebody they were going to have to make bread out of it. And we also examined the books to make sure that this was not a sort of static installation that just sat there, and in fact shipments in and out were recorded very effectively by a little girl there. So we have seen and we do make a point of going to see this wherever we visit a camp. We also make a point of seeing how they prepare it. In some camps the cooking is common. In other camps where they put people in family units,

say in Port Harcourt for example, where people are living in a camp, they are in family units and they do their cooking in family units.

Mr. Ryan: Did the food supplies seem to be distributed with a fairly even hand? Were there problems over the distribution that you noticed?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: There did not appear to be. In one place I went to in the North sector, the actual distribution was being handled by the Nigerians themselves, assistants to the Red Cross, and they had a system of a little gate and five people would be let through at a time, and they had their tins and one thing and another, and the chap serving would pour in a ration, depending on the children the woman said she had, and it looked like a reasonable ration for what they should have.

Mr. Ryan: Was there any evidence of people trading their high protein food particularly for other items, or for cash?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We saw no evidence of that and in fact we were not particularly looking for it. I suppose it is a possibility. The other problem we touched on in our first report is that even if you give some of these families, and particularly the village families, some of this high protein food, they see no reason—they are so conservative, they have never eaten it before—why they should start now. This was an explanation given to us. But no allegation of profiteering or selling Red Cross or other supplies was made in our hearing.

● 1125

Mr. Ryan: We have our *Hercules* aircraft in Lagos now, and I understand there are adequate supplies at Lagos for distribution by the *Hercules* if they can land in the proper areas. Would you know the order of supplies backed up at Lagos?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not. These are Red Cross supplies you are talking of. Of course the army supplies and the civil administration supplies are separate and in addition, and I do not know the amount.

Mr. Ryan: You told us that these three or four airfields that potentially could take care of a *Hercules* are so much out of order, due to poor repairs, that the situation looks pretty well hopeless for these aircraft.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, I probably said more than I should have. I am not an expert on airfields. My understanding was that the problem appears to be the bearing surface of the airfield in a couple of cases, or the repairs in another. But the actual problem, I do not know enough to speak about.

Mr. Ryan: It may be a political problem; you do not know. Is this what it is?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It could be a combination of a political problem and a load bearing problem that is causing the trouble. It is a Red Cross matter and we do not get involved in it. In fact, I was back only the one day before I took off for here, after the airplane had arrived.

Mr. Ryan: The same problem would arise at Uli in the beleaguered Biafran sector behind the perimeter of the fighting.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: My understanding is that the Uli airfield will take a Hercules. Again, you are asking a non-expert.

Mr. Ryan: Well I know that Hercules have been in there. But it also has had to be repaired like you have described and I am sure the repairs must be hurried. That is the problem.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I understand that it will take the Hercules. Also, my understanding was that the one at Obilagu, on which I have been, would take the Hercules—certainly it looked as if it would.

Mr. Ryan: That could be used, in your opinion, say, for the danger in the immediate area.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: For example, if peace were declared, I think the Obilagu airfield could be used right away.

Mr. Ryan: Well, the same situation would apply, even if we sent over Caribou or another type of aircraft, unless we sent helicopters in there then.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well again, you are getting me out of my field. I would have thought that if it is a bearing problem an aircraft with less of a wheel load might be able to operate on some of these fields that will not take a Hercules. Again, the Air Force experts would have to tell us the answer to that.

Mr. Ryan: It just seems to me that we have been mislead a bit about the sending over of

these Hercules at all. They seem to be getting held up so badly that I am just wondering whether we were wise in the first place to ever do it. You seem to give us the impression that behind the Federal lines, at least, the distribution is pretty good and the food is getting out fairly well except in the bush, which is pretty well an impossible place to make distribution in any event.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is not quite what we said. What we said is that there is a distribution system but that in some areas there appears to be a shortage of some foods, more particularly medicines, but that if either the war ends or a great number of people come out of the bush then the resources could be strained. That is the point we made.

Mr. Ryan: At the present time. . .

Maj. Gen. Milroy: At the present time they seem to be able to cope except in some areas for medical supplies, and we would hope that perhaps as a result of our reports those shortages have been corrected.

Mr. Ryan: I understand that a UNICEF helicopter airlift from Calabar to Uyo is flying about 12 tons on the average per night into Uyo and that they have about six aircraft, six helicopters at their command, or will have shortly.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You say there are aircraft flying at night. Uyo of course is in Federal territory and I would have thought the helicopters would fly day or night. I know they are operating. The team told me they were but I did not get any more details.

Mr. Ryan: I think they are flying by day all right because there was a photograph in the paper of them taken at daylight at Uyo.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Right.

● 1130

Mr. Ryan: It is supposed to have unloaded its load within three minutes and then taken off again. Then we understand from Dr. Shepherd's testimony yesterday that in the Cross River Delta, where there is quite a shortage of food, the military lines are being broken to allow food to go in by river to that area. Is this situation pretty general throughout the whole area north of the beleaguered Biafran oval as well as south? Are they getting in by these other methods—by helicopter, by river, by road and so on?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the North I would say that practically all transport is by road at present. To my knowledge there are no helicopters in that area. I think the only helicopters that are operating are operating out of Calabar. Transport in the North is largely by road and I would think in the Port Harcourt area the transport is largely by road. It is very difficult in the Port Harcourt area because the retreating secessionists are extremely ingenious at blowing up roads and the repairs and the by-passes in many cases are extremely rough—you know, just boards and things around—and it is very hard to get around. So the transport is very slow, and most of the transport in that part of the world is by road.

Mr. Ryan: Are they getting better fed in the South than they are in the North, or would you have an opinion?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the South there are two parts. In the Port Calabar area—this is the one for which I have the detail on how the Red Cross are feeding them—the figure is about 200,000 and the feeding seems to be adequate. In the Port Calabar area the feeding seems to be adequate but our view was that the operational commanders had too great a responsibility. There, however, the situation is a little different. Most of the people are Rivers people to date. They bring them in, feed them, and then send them home because they all live south. So the food seems to be adequate but we think the administration should be handled by the civilians and not by the Army. We think that with a civilian Red Cross administration looking after them they will get a little more attention than they do now.

Mr. Ryan: In food distribution I take it you saw no evidence of any charge being made whatsoever for the feeding of any person that was in any difficulty at all?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: None, and I am sure that if the Red Cross were in the organization there they would report it if that was a problem. Certainly, with the Army distribution, from anything that we saw, there does not seem to be anything like that at all. For example, the one in Awgu was all handled by I think a Corporal or a Sergeant; he was a very efficient young man, had three or four chaps helping him, and they were bombing right along.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, General.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: General Milroy, I would like to go back a little to the way in which you did your work. I understand that you did not know the area prior to getting there. Do you know whether General Alexander knew the area prior to getting there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not know that he had ever been in Nigeria.

Mr. Lewis: Do you know whether any one of the members of the Observer Team, both senior and assistants, knew the area before getting there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I cannot speak positively but I would say probably not, no.

Mr. Lewis: Well then, you arrive at a place and you see the divisional commander first, and he briefs you. I am curious to know what he briefs you about?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: He briefs us on the disposition of his forces, what areas he controls, how he has broken down his command. For example, in the north area he has broken it into three brigade areas, or sectors as he calls them—one, two and three. The third one is at Nsukka in the North. Now he assumed that we would go to all three. In fact, we did not go to Nsukka, the third brigade area at all. We will go to it this week.

Mr. Lewis: I will come back with a general question in a moment. Then you go to the brigade commander and he briefs you. What does he brief you on?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We then break into our teams. "A" team normally would go to the sector commander and he would brief us on the layout of his troops and say: Well this is what I have, this is what I hold, this is what is happening. He would just try to give us a general picture of the activities in his particular area.

Mr. Lewis: I am trying to put myself in your position and in the position of that team. I have never been in that area. There are a lot of scattered villages, as you have said, you do not know where they are and you are briefed by these people as to the disposition of their troops. How do you know where to go?

• 1135

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, having looked at the area, first of all we want to find out where the camps are.

Mr. Lewis: By "camps" do you mean refugee camps?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, refugee camps—any refugee camps in the area. We want to find out where those are. We find out where any Red Cross installations are because we try to go to those particular installations. Then we just say, well, we are going to drive down this road and see what we can find, or we will drive up this road. For example, on the third day in Awgu, when we were going north, we said all right, we want to go to these Red Cross stations which we now know are operating, we will go there. Perhaps there is a village that looks like it might have a fair number of people, and we go there. When we get there it is a marketplace. Because of the conformation of the towns there the marketplace is the centre of the town but in fact not many people live there. So we say all right, now we will go to one of the surrounding villages, and we either grab one of the village elders who happens to be there or somebody else and we go out and try to find one of the villages around to see if there is anybody in it. On that particular occasion we then said, all right, we want to go over to the area of Udi because we know there is a Red Cross station over there. We went across and the man who ran that was in fact the Red Cross co-ordinator for the whole area. So we got him off to one side and discussed the matter with him. He then also came to see us on Sunday morning and gave us a briefing on Red Cross activities in the whole area. We just take a look at the area and figure out where we would like to go. We may take advice, we may ask for some, or we may just...

Mr. Lewis: Do you never ask the divisional or the brigade commander about the location of villages and where you could find people? Do you never do that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You see, in the areas in which they are operating there is usually only one or two roads anyway, and then roads off to either side. They might suggest some of the villages. Normally the things we ask them about are the camps and things that they are responsible for. As you go along and want to stop at a village that you go by, you just stop there.

Mr. Lewis: General Milroy, you say they *might* suggest some of the villages—if they do not, they do not; if they do, they do. You were there, you discussed it with them. It

would seem to me quite natural that you would ask them. Do you do ask them what villages you might go to? Do they tell you? Not, "they might"—you were there.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, I am thinking of an example where they suggested we visit a village where these people brought in these passes and we were going to do that until the road went out; then it was too far for us to go so we will do that this time. As I say, we go down the list and we say "all right, let us go to that village; let us go and have a look at that". I am just trying to think of whether the divisional commander or the brigade commander actually suggested we go anywhere. Normally where they will suggest we go is perhaps to a battalion headquarters, or something like that.

Mr. Lewis: The war, as I understand it—I really do not know anything about it except what I have heard and read—goes along the roads. Not all the villages are by the roads, I am told.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is right, and obviously this is one reason we have tried to get off the roads and have a look at a village. War does not always go on along the roads in all areas either; in some areas there are a lot of tracks and they go through the tracks, and one thing and another.

If I could answer it this way, we endeavour in the time we have available to see as much as we can and we either take suggestions, or take suggestions from one another, or take suggestions from the Red Cross. What I think you are trying to get at is whether we are sort of led into specific places. I am prepared to accept that once or twice perhaps they have taken us to places they wanted us to see, but not always.

Mr. Lewis: At least we have got that far. There are some cases where that might be the case but not always.

Now, when you set out, you set out in some kind of vehicle. Who is in the vehicle?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Normally we move in Land-Rovers and there would be, say, two Land-Rovers with the observer group. Usually, depending on how big a press party we have, there would be either one or two Land-Rovers for the press group. Also, as I pointed out, there would be either one or two Land-Rovers with soldiers in them for guard and then there may be another one with the chap who is the liaison officer we have at that

particular time. So the group can, if we have a number of press, get up to about seven vehicles.

Mr. Lewis: There are some Nigerian soldiers in each of these vehicles?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not in each vehicle, no.

Mr. Lewis: Or in one of the vehicles of the convoy?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In some of the vehicles; in the convoy.

Mr. Lewis: In the convoy, yes. Forgive me for asking this personal question. Are you dressed in military uniform or in civilian clothes?

• 1140

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I wear uniform, as do the other officers. The Polish assistant observer is a civilian; he is not a military officer. Mr. Gussing and his group wear civilian clothes. The Ethiopian representative wears uniform and the Algerian one does not.

Mr. Lewis: But the observers from the four countries, Canada, Britain, Poland and Sweden, all wear uniforms?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They all wear uniforms.

Mr. Lewis: So that when you approach a group of civilians in a village or in a camp you are dressed in military uniform as you talk to them.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Dressed in military uniform, yes.

Mr. Lewis: And are the Nigerian soldiers anywhere around when you discuss these things with them?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Sometimes they are and from time to time we have to ask them to stand back a bit if they get too close.

Mr. Lewis: I am interested in that detail too, General Milroy. Again I am trying to visualize it. You walk into a camp or a village. When you do that—when you get out of the Rover—then the Nigerian soldiers are with you.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They go with us or they may be posted around the camp.

Mr. Lewis: And of course, the civilians there in the camp and in the village see you in the company of the Nigerian soldiers.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is correct, and there are usually soldiers there before we get there too.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, and there are usually Nigerian soldiers there before you get there. You ask the civilians these questions in these surroundings, with Nigerian soldiers following you and other soldiers around. I do not mean that the soldiers are there during your conversation, but the people you talk with have seen the Nigerian soldiers accompanying you, is that not right?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In many cases that would be true.

Mr. Lewis: General Milroy, you say in your reports and you said this morning that civilians has been filled with fear—justified or unjustified—and that it took, you said at one point, some courage for one person in the bush to come out and meet the military people and then go back and bring the people in the bush out, so that you emphasize, as many people have emphasized before this Committee, that these people who have fled into the bush are fearful.

Would it not occur to you that if you appear in a military uniform and they see you accompanied by Nigerian soldiers, when you talk to them they are likely to be a little concerned about what they might say to you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, this occurs to us, and this...

Mr. Lewis: They are not likely to be entirely frank, are they, in those circumstances?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The point I think I have already made is that the one thing that does surprise us is that they do not seem to be afraid at all. We would have thought, under these circumstances, that some fear would be evident and we do not find this.

Second, when we talk to people, the ones we really want to talk to in any great detail—the chap who has been a school teacher, or something like that, a chap who is a little better educated—normally what we do is to go off separately with them and chat away with them and nobody knows what we say.

This chap generally, I think, is going to tell you what we hope is the truth in so far as he can. We hope that the fact that soldiers are around is not going to inhibit him because they cannot hear what he is telling us.

Mr. Lewis: I know, General Milroy, and I am not saying that you can do anything else. I want to make it clear that I am not criticizing the Observer Team. I suppose this is the only way you can function in view of the kind of team you are. You are a team of military observers. However, I suggest to you, General Milroy, that the tendency in a person giving you information in that environment would be to be rather careful about what he says to you, whether he is a teacher or a peasant or anyone else. He is as likely to want to tell you what he thinks he ought to say as he is to tell you what he would really like to say. Is that not so? Is that not a likelihood?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is a possibility which we recognize. That is one of the reasons we try to operate as we do, as I say, splitting into individuals and trying to get these people into a situation where they will not be afraid, if they want to tell us anything to tell it to us. Now, this is one of our problems. We really are talking now about the degree of our success.

• 1145

Mr. Lewis: That is rather important. Related to that, General Milroy, you said that you drew some conclusion—I do not say you drew an important conclusion—from the fact that when you approached the village the people did not scatter, they stood around. Would that village have been held by the Federal forces for some time? Were you in areas that had just been captured or were you in areas that had been captured some time earlier?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Both, really; some where the people had just come out of the bush and others where they had been out of the bush for some time.

Mr. Lewis: Then I suppose you would agree that the people would stand around out of curiosity as well as out of friendliness and out of their desire to receive the Nigerians with open arms.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: What really struck us was the lack of fear.

Mr. Lewis: What do you mean by that? Excuse me for interrupting you, but what do you mean by the "lack of fear"?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, if you, as I say, drive into a small village that does not really expect to see strangers from one day to the next in a convoy that includes armed soldiers,

normally we expected, anyway, that women and children would probably run to their houses or scatter, but this did not happen.

Mr. Lewis: You know, this is sort of theoretical, but I must say frankly, General Milroy, that I am not impressed by that comment at all. You say that these villages and these camps would have been occupied by Nigerian soldiers already, there were Nigerian soldiers there and the people were there. Is it not more likely that people who had never seen outsiders before would stand and watch and that you cannot draw any conclusion about what is in their hearts from the fact that they stand around you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: These villages are not necessarily occupied. The camps are the ones where normally there are soldiers around. I drew the conclusion that if they had been badly treated by the Federal troops, particularly to the point of genocide, that some fear would be indicated.

Mr. Lewis: Let us leave the genocide aside. All I am asking you for the moment is that you do not jump so. Let us leave that aside for the moment. All I am asking is that you are not really justified in drawing any general conclusion about the happiness or unhappiness, satisfaction or fear of people because they stand around curiously watching you come into the village.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The statement we made was that there was a lack of fear when we drove into these areas. I think that is the statement we made, which I think is a fair one.

Mr. Lewis: I am sorry?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The statement we made in our report was that when we drove into these areas the inhabitants did not indicate fear of the Federal soldiers. That is our statement.

Mr. Lewis: And that has happened elsewhere. You said at first that you were there to investigate a charge of genocide and other charges. What other charges?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think, really, we were there to investigate and report on the conduct of the Federal troops in the war-affected areas and in the terms of reference, or the letter of invitation, genocide is specifically mentioned as being one of the charges, but it also says that there may be other charges. I

think the concept was that we would be getting a number of complaints such as the Okigwi one. These to my mind would be the other charges, if somebody makes a specific allegation.

Mr. Lewis: They are the charges. You also said in the first of your reports, I think, that you did not see many educated Ibos. Would you mind telling me who would be in that description?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: For example, in the first division area we found no schools operating, no school teachers. The town of Enugu is practically empty. It was a state capital. There is practically no one there at all except the state administrator and a few people he has brought back. In the areas we went to there were houses that would indicate that in those areas people lived whose means were perhaps above average. We did not find any of these particular people.

Mr. Lewis: Those people were not there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We did not find any of those people. Generally speaking, we found—and I am talking about the first division area in particular—the people who were the villagers but the school teachers were not there.

Mr. Lewis: Did you mainly find women and children and fewer men, than if it were a normal village?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I will have to be careful how I answer. In many cases I think we found more men than we expected. This is following along your line of reasoning, that maybe the men were missing, but there were numbers of men in the area. I was not able to say, well now, the proportion of male to female and children is greater or less than it was, say, before the war started.

• 1150

Mr. Lewis: Did you get any impression as to the proportion of people who returned? I gather it is different in the various divisions. In the First Division the proportion was small, I understand.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the First Division probably the numbers—and I have to be careful here—who were returning and coming out seemed to be greater than they appeared to be in the area of the Third Division that I went to. On the other hand, on the eastern side of the Third Division, out of Calabar, as I say, the figures here are about 200,000.

Mr. Lewis: Did you inquire? Does anybody know? They apparently do not have statistics as to how many people had been there earlier so that you can make some estimate as to the proportion that had returned. Have you any idea?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. We were not able to do this. It is very hard. For example, I was unable to find, even in a discussion with the governor and his staff, what the population of Port Harcourt had been before the war. I got two or three figures. It was anywhere from 200,000 to 400,000. It is very difficult, when you ask somebody how many people used to be in this area, to get an answer. They either do not think that way or they do not have the records.

Mr. Lewis: General Milroy, I understand from your evidence that in no case did you hear from the people to whom you spoke of the bombing of hospitals, or market places, or schools, where people were staying, or anything like that. You never heard a word about the bombing by Nigerian airplanes of these places?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. I heard no reference and I cannot recall the others making reference to it, but I would not want to say that they had not heard.

Mr. Lewis: You just never heard of that. We have heard quite a bit about such bombings. We have read reports of such bombings, and the document that Mr. Brewin referred to has bombings going back to 1967 anyway, I forget the month. You never heard from anyone in the Calabar area, in the Port Harcourt area or in any other area about one single bombing of a hospital or a market place, or anything like that.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I did not. I am not saying that the bombing did not take place. We know that both sides have been bombing. No one has made specific reference to this in any discussions that I have had and I cannot recall this aspect coming up in any discussions on reports.

Mr. Lewis: I must say frankly, General Milroy, that that fact alone—and I may be listening with my prejudices instead of with my ears, and I thought I would say that before somebody else did—that you never heard of a single bombing of any of these areas, which have been widely reported in British papers, in American papers and in Canadian papers, tells me that the conversations you had with

people were not very frank conversations on the part of the people.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not necessarily agree with that. I think that perhaps the people I was talking to had not been in one of these bombing raids. I do not discount the fact that bombing is taking place and this may be an area, and probably is, in which we will endeavour to do more investigation in the future.

As I say, in all our trips around we have seen no war planes. There are war planes and they must operate and we will endeavour to find out a little bit more about it, but it has not been one of the points that has been brought up and emphasized.

Mr. Lewis: Surely one of the reasons it has not been one of the points is your statement, in answer to some questions, that you do not consider it to be your duty to investigate what happened back in time, that you just come to a place and you look at what is happening there now.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Certainly on our initial tour this has been our task.

Mr. Lewis: You emphasize that you never saw any fear around you and yet you also emphasize several times that you do not have any doubt—I am not quoting you but I am sure that I am representing it accurately—that the Ibos in fact fear what will happen to them. If nobody showed fear, nobody indicated fear, how did you get the impression that there is no doubt that the Biafrans do in fact fear the Nigerians?

• 1155

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I will deal with that first in context. The reference to that was in driving into villages that were populated that we saw no particular evidence of fear. The people that you talk to, the elders who have come out or the representative who comes out says that the reason people do not want to come out is because they are afraid. I was afraid but I had enough courage to come. I was afraid. They tell us that they are afraid; that is why we say that they are afraid.

Mr. Lewis: Did you ask them why they were afraid?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The main reason they are afraid, as I pointed out before, based on what they have been told, is that they think there is a very strong possibility that they will be killed.

Mr. Lewis: But they were simply taking somebody else's word. According to you, none of them experienced anything that justified the fear; no bombing, nothing. Did they ever mention to you the pogroms, for example, the massacres in 1966, as a possible reason for their fears.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am just saying that they said they were afraid and we agree that they were afraid. The reasons for this fear and what it is based on, I think they are many and varied, but the fear exists.

Mr. Lewis: Are not the reasons rather important, General Milroy? If you come to a community and they tell you that they are afraid to come out of the bush, is it not a necessary and natural thing for you to try to find out what it is that makes them afraid? If you are to report to us in Canada and to other parts of the world that the Ibos are afraid, one of the important things is to decide whether or not anything had happened in their experience that justifies that fear or whether that fear is entirely manufactured.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: On the information that we have been given the basis seems to be the word that they have in the secessionist area that if they fall into the hands of the Federal troops they will be killed. That seems to be the major reason for their fear.

Mr. Lewis: Did they tell you where they got that word?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They did not tell us specifically. It seemed to be the information that was given to them by whatever means they got information when they were in the secessionist area.

Mr. Lewis: I just have two or three more fairly short questions. You said at one point that your understanding was that this Black Scorpion, Adekunle I think is the name, gave Biafrans a pound, I think I heard you say.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I said people in the displaced camps. They could be Ibos. The term Biafran...

Mr. Lewis: You merely used that to cover more than the Ibo tribe?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. The people in his camps, many of whom are in fact Rivers or Ibibios, a pound in the family. This is our understanding.

Mr. Lewis: How did you get that understanding?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We were informed of this on several occasions.

Mr. Lewis: By whom?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: By the military authorities. On the actual question of their getting the money, I did not actually see them get the money.

Mr. Lewis: General Milroy, if the Federal Military Government invited this Team, I suppose it is not wrong to assume that they are anxious that the Team not get a bad impression. And I suppose it is not wrong to assume that they would send word down to their divisional commanders and to their brigadier commanders and to the other military personnel in the area that they should behave; would that be a wrong assumption—that while you were there they should behave?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think the answer to your question is the code of conduct. General Gwon has sent the word down how he wants them to behave in his code of conduct.

Mr. Lewis: He sent that down in August.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. He has invited us to have a look. He asked us personally if we saw anything wrong to report to him. In fact in our reports we have pointed out several areas where we think action should be taken to improve them and particularly the people who report.

I would say that the Federal Government has a plan or a policy for looking after the displaced people, and that they are prepared to let strangers come in and have a look at it. They invited us to come to have a look at it. I do not think they are under any impression that if we find something we do not like we will not say so.

Mr. Lewis: I did not suggest that. When you arrived at the headquarters of a division, your arrival was not a surprise?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It certainly was not a surprise in the Second and Third.

Mr. Lewis: When you arrived at the brigade commander's headquarters it was not a surprise, so that down the line the information went that there was this Observer Team investigating?

• 1200

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They would, of course, pick this up from the newspapers and the radio anyway.

Mr. Lewis: And they would naturally be rather careful during your visit, would they not?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: And I would hope, knowing we are coming back, after our visit.

Mr. Lewis: Pardon?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I say, they know we are coming back, so I would hope after our visit.

Mr. Lewis: They might be careful for some months.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Which is a desirable...

Mr. Lewis: Very desirable, General Milroy. One of the witnesses, I think it was Mr. Grossman but I am not sure, said that this military Observer Team, if it did nothing else, would have the effect of abating any tendency toward unnecessary cruelty. That service you are performing and we are grateful for it, I can assure you.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We hope that we make some contribution.

Mr. Lewis: The second last line of questioning I wanted to ask you...

The Chairman: You will not be very long, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: No, it will not take me long.

The Chairman: It is twelve o'clock now.

Mr. Lewis: Right. You saw only Red Cross people in the areas you visited, and no other relief workers from the church relief organizations? You made reference only to Red Cross.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, but I think I am correct in saying that there are other people. I remember, for example, one particular priest I met. I think anyone who gets mixed up assisting in this work normally wears a Red Cross badge. That is my understanding.

Mr. Lewis: I see.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: And I am sure that in the groups I saw there were probably people who were perhaps temporary Red Cross workers.

Mr. Lewis: And might come from the church relief organizations.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, who would come from the church or any other organization.

Mr. Lewis: My final question is about these airport facilities for our *Hercules*. You disclaim expertise; I can say I claim complete ignorance, but I understand from reading that if they had the aluminum planking, as I think they call it, they could fairly quickly set up an airstrip. Do you know anything about that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have not heard that raised, except it seemed to me something about making parking bays or something was raised. I know you can make an airfield with aluminum strip, but that, I understand, is constructing right from the beginning.

Mr. Lewis: Did you hear whether they have these aluminum strips?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I am not aware whether or not they have them.

Mr. Lewis: So you really cannot be of any help on that score?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I really cannot.

Mr. Lewis: As to whether our *Hercules* could be accommodated by building fairly quickly along the roads, airstrips and parking places through the use of this aluminum planking?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am afraid I cannot contribute anything on that, sir.

Mr. Lewis: Thank you.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, this seems to be a natural place to make a break. We will adjourn until 3.30 this afternoon.

Mr. Barrett: What comment was made by Mr. Stewart when he indicated there was a thought that a parliamentary group might visit Nigeria? Was that a philosophy of his own, or a philosophy spoken as part of this Committee?

The Chairman: There is a motion before the steering subcommittee which has not been acted on.

The meeting this afternoon will be in Room 371, West Block, where the facilities will be somewhat better.

AFTERNOON SITTING

• 1540

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe we have a quorum now. Would you please come to order. Perhaps I could just take a moment to announce our plans. We plan on having a meeting of the Steering Committee immediately after the adjournment of this meeting. We plan on adjourning this meeting at 5.45, if that is agreeable. This evening is budget night so we will not be able to continue our hearings this evening. If we do not finish with general Milroy's testimony this afternoon, we plan on calling him again tomorrow afternoon at 3.30, if that is agreeable to the Members.

An hon. Member: Mr. Chairman, could you name the members of the Steering Committee?

The Chairman: Yes, I will do that. They are Mr. Legault, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Groos, Mr. Fairweather, Mr. MacLean, Mr. Brewin and Mr. Laprise. If the members of the Steering Committee could meet here in this room after adjournment of the meeting at 5.45 it would be helpful.

I believe Mr. Brewin has a point of order that he wishes to raise.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I was asked to bring the following to the attention of the Committee on a point of order or a point of privilege. Apparently, and I only have this indirectly through the telephone, a press report rising out of this morning's evidence has created a misunderstanding that I am sure the Committee and the witness would not like to allow to remain. During this morning's evidence the witness said that the Observer Team had tried to locate the town in which Mr. Taylor and Mr. Stephen Lewis reported that 500 Biafran civilians had been massacred on or about Friday, October 4 and they gave some account of having spoken to alleged eyewitnesses. The witness said in his evidence that they have looked 16 miles in the area south of Umuahia and they failed to find this place, and this has been reported, apparently, as indicating that...

An hon. Member: It is in the *Journal*.

Mr. Brewin: ...perhaps no such place existed and that it was all fiction. Now I am informed that there was a mistake or misstatement in the article by Mr. Taylor in that it was not supposed to be the village of "Uruainyang". It says in the report of the *Globe and Mail* of October 10 that it is 16

miles south of Umuahia. I understand in fact it is 15 miles south or east of Aba, or a southeasterly direction from Aba in Anang Province.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): On a point of order...

The Chairman: Order, please. We have a point of order before the Committee.

Mr. Brewin: I said "south or east". I do not have the precise direction but it is in a southeasterly direction from Aba in Anang Province. I understand that this area has recently been retaken by the Biafrans—I am not sure whether this information is accurate. But the witness did suggest that the Observer Team were trying to look into this matter. I thought it important that this should be brought to his attention as soon as possible. Also, he might want to make a comment to indicate that he was not suggesting in his evidence, as some press reporters inferred, that the place did not exist and that he was indicating that perhaps these events reported had not in fact occurred.

● 1545

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin, I think the record will indicate that quite clearly, although the witness may want to add some additional comments, because my recollection of this morning's testimony was that the witness went on to say that since that time they had located this village although it is not in the place indicated in the original press report.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, sir, I did say that we had subsequently located this village about 14 miles southwest of the town of Ikot Ekpene which would sound, from what I remember of the map, perhaps in the same area as the one you are just describing, using Aba as a point of reference. We have found that that is the area they should be looking in, and the Team is out there now.

The Chairman: The next questioner I have on the list is Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): General Milroy, I would like to ask some questions about the interviews that you conduct with the people who have come in out of the bush. We have been told that the people who have come in out of the bush are fearful and afraid and only come out reluctantly after they are persuaded to do so by someone who is pretty hungry. Now when you talk to these people—you have told us that you speak to

them privately—what sort of reaction do you get? Do they express pleasant surprise that they have not been shot or disposed of?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not say that they express it quite that way, no. The one I mentioned this morning merely said that the people on the other side, his family, would assume that he had been killed. He did not say that he was pleased that he had not been killed. They do say, if you take certain cases, how they were treated, that they were reasonably well treated by the Federal Forces. They usually say how they got in contact with an officer or something like that, who talked to them and reassured them. I guess once they got over the initial discussion they accepted that nothing was going to happen to them.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You did discuss this matter of fear with them and get their reaction to it.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, they tell us they are afraid but that in the process of coming in contact with the Federal Forces they find, in fact—at least the ones we talked to—that nothing happens to them.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Did you find that any of them made any derogatory remarks whatsoever about their treatment after they turned themselves in?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In some cases, and I am quoting from the reports. I think we mentioned that some of them—particularly from the other ranks—tended to get the occasional insult or disparaging remark, but not from the officers.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Some disparaging remarks on their treatment?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. I think it is covered in the second report.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Were they just general gripes?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I gathered that was the sort of thing.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The kind of thing that anybody would make, say, if they were exposed to those conditions perhaps?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, I did not actually go on with it in my case and in the other cases the people who questioned them did not actually say what form these comments took.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): When you operated at the front, how close to the action were you in terms of time? How close were you say, to the taking of a village?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Probably the closest example we had was when they went to Okigwi and there was still fighting going on in the town when they got there. When I went to Obilagu the airstrip had been taken for two or three days—they were still fighting over it but the Federal Troops had had it for a few days. There was still fighting going on in the Owerri area but it had been in Federal hands for some days. We have not followed directly into a village as yet other than Okigwi.

• 1550

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): So if there were any wholesale atrocities then you would have expected to see some signs of it, I would think, in your trips to the front. If it was the common and regular thing to have happen then you would have seen it.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We would expect to hear somebody talk about them again. This is what we suggest in our change of organization, to give us a better opportunity to be on the spot when we, in fact, do move into a village. But normally we would expect it if something like this happened. We would hear about it or we would find some sort of evidence.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): And you did not see any evidence of this kind?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): We have had testimony to the effect that the FMG bombed and strafed collections of civilians, gatherings of civilians, in marketplaces or anywhere that they could gather, or were inclined to gather. The FMG aircraft would descend on known gathering places perhaps twice a day and bomb and strafe civilians when there were no known military targets in the area. Do you have any comment to make on this?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I have no comment to make on that. I have not encountered anyone who reported any incidents such as that to us, and we have already discussed the problem of the air attacks in the secessionist area. Obviously we cannot see, from where we are, exactly what kind of attacks are taking place and check on any allegations that are made in that particular respect.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): It was not a topic of general information, as far as the people you interviewed were concerned? You did not pick up any information this way from people who had been subject to this sort of thing?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not about air attacks, no.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Did you about other attacks on civilians, what might be called unwarranted attacks on civilians?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, we did not. For example, one we mentioned, the sergeant major we caught ourselves, and the one in Okigwi, the one we have reported especially. But we have had no specific reports on this kind of incident you were mentioning.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): How many individuals would you have interviewed or have had casual conversations with who might possibly have given you some kind of information of that kind? Are you talking about dozens of people or hundreds of people?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If you go into a camp and you split up, each one of us, let us say you spend an hour and a half there, during that time you would hope to talk to maybe 20, 30 or 40 people, many of whom would be the villagers. You find out where their village is and where their families are and how long they have been in the camp and where they were before they got to the camp. You probably will not get a great deal of information out of them. The more educated ones are the ones that give you a bit more information, and, except in the Mid-Western area, as I pointed out, there is not a great number of these. So that in a camp you might talk to perhaps 12 people of that sort. At a camp like Port Harcourt where there are more educated people, you obviously would be able to talk to more. Of the ones we talked to in Port Harcourt, there were a couple of journalists there who were, in fact, running the camp. There were Ibos who were running the camp. Three or four older people were the ones that General Alexander interviewed.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In dealing with these people that you were interviewing, there has been some suggestion in the discussions today that perhaps the people you talked to were intimidated by the presence of uniformed people in the area, of the representatives of the FMG. Do you feel that

you were able to establish confidence in the people you interviewed privately? Do you feel that they were satisfied that you were not an agent of the FMG, that you were actually a neutral observer? Was this something of which they were well aware when you talked to them, that there would be no repercussions from their discussions with you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would say that in most cases we had a good rapport with them, depending again in each case on how intelligent the chap was. You can never be completely certain, but when a discussion is being carried on, privately, they know that no outsider is listening to them, and it has been our impression that we were getting reasonable information from them.

•1555

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You went to some pains, then, to establish the fact that you were a neutral observer and that they had nothing to fear in telling you the things that actually happened to them?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the conversations with the people, yes.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You feel satisfied that you got that point across as much as was possible?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, I think particularly with the ones who were a little better educated.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): It has been suggested that the FMG were feeding, in one place, 200,000 refugees. I think you mentioned this figure, 200,000?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Were these refugees composed of all of what might be termed the enemy, or were they refugees from their own areas? Were they Ibos, or how were they made up?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This place I mentioned particularly was the one in the Uyo — Ikot Ekpene area. I was not in that area myself; it was the other team who reported on that area. Most of those would be either Rivers people or Ibibios, because if you look on the map, you see that it is really an Ibo-speaking area. No, I would say, based on the information I got, that most of them are probably Rivers people and Ibibios.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): There would be a number of Ibos in with them?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, there would be, but I would not want to hazard a guess as to what proportion.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Is the fear of genocide, felt entirely by the Ibos, or are the Rivers people also somewhat in fear of this?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The Ibos, of course, are the ones we are primarily concentrating on. I would say that the Rivers people are also afraid. Now, whether it is a fear of genocide or the fear of the fighting that drove them into the bush, or which fear is greater, I would not want to say. I would think it would be a proportion of both of them but I would not really want to be more specific than that.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): At any rate, in various parts of the country, large numbers of refugees—Ibos, Rivers people, and the other minor tribes—were being looked after, fed by the FMG, supplied with medical care and, in many cases, being given money and the opportunity to return to their villages and resume their normal lives. This would hardly be the act of a nation that was in the process of genocide, would it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This is our conclusion, and the basis for our comments on the Federal Military Government's activities. I might point out that this feeding is not only done by the Federal Military Government. The Red Cross and other people are also contributing.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Right. So that whatever atrocities may have been committed—and apparently there have been some major atrocities—whatever ones may have been committed in your view would have no relationship to a general over-all program of race extermination?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. There is no program of intent to destroy the Ibo people in the areas that we have visited. This is our conclusion.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you. One other thing. It has been suggested by some of our witnesses that it would be beneficial to all the parties concerned to create a stalemate in Africa in this campaign by the supplying of arms to the Biafrans. It has even been suggested that Canada should engage in this process. What is your comment on this?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Now, you are really getting me into a field that is beyond my par-

ticular competence. My only comment would be that, from the evidence we read about people starving, as long as the war goes on, more people will starve, or die from malnutrition.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): So, in order to prevent this starvation death of as many people as possible, it would be better to have the war pushed to a conclusion by the conquering of the Biafrans?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not think I should answer that question. I think, really, that is one that is really out of my field and I would be expressing an opinion on it.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You are a military man and you must have some thoughts on...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, but in this particular job I am supposed to be an observer with rather restricted terms of reference, and I have made it quite clear in Nigeria that my responsibility is not to comment on the war.

• 1600

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you very much.

The Chairman: I have the following questioners on the first round: Messrs. Laprise, Anderson, Harkness, Mongrain, Gibson, Yeu-chuk, Hymmen, Guay, Legault, Allmand, MacDonald and Fairweather. Mr. Laprise?

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: General Milroy, I would like to ask my question in French, I believe that you are an experienced soldier and my first question would be to ask you if, during your observations near the battle line, you have been able to draw comparisons as regards the number of prisoners compared to other wars and other battlefields that you may have visited previously? For instance, you can make comparisons, if there are as many prisoners in Nigeria now as there are in other wars?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am afraid that for a number of reasons I cannot make the comparison you seek. The war is quite different. I am not familiar with the number of prisoners that have been held. Also, in some areas what happens is—as I have been given to understand—that if the professional soldiers are about to be captured they change into civilian garb. The statement has been made, that

some of the refugees coming back are, in fact, or could be classed, as soldiers; they would have been soldiers if they had remained in uniform.

In the First Division area they evidently make no particular attempt to weed these people out. They check them through the camps and if their villages are in behind they send them back. Therefore, the number of prisoners actually held, as opposed to perhaps the number of professional Biafran soldiers, probably bears no direct relation to the number of soldiers who may now be in Federal-held parts of the territory.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: During your observations, can you also draw a comparison regarding the prisoners that you have seen, that is, are they treated as well as in other areas? The prisoners that you have met, you must have visited camps, do you believe that they are treated in the same way as prisoners are treated in other wars?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We have made an observation on the treatment of prisoners in our Second Report. There we point out that although the ones we have seen appear to be reasonably well fed and reasonably well cared for, they do not get enough exercise; and there are certain other things that we think the Federal Government should do. For example, there is the question of accounting for their property, allowing Red Cross visits, and other activities such as that to which prisoners are entitled. These various requirements should be observed, and in some cases we found they were not being observed. But the prisoners themselves appear to be perfectly well fed. It is really a question of exercise, their property and giving them something to do and perhaps—I think we also suggest—giving them some money.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Laprise: I have another question to ask you. During your observations, on the battle-front, have you seen Europeans either working near the anti-aircraft guns, for instance, or training Nigerian troops?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am not sure that this is in the competence of our Committee. It is not one of the activities on which we are called on to report. I did not see any Europeans

near any anti-aircraft guns that I saw, with the exception of members of our own group.

•1605

On the question of training of the troops, in the areas we were in, of course, they are operational troops. There are training areas—training schools and so on—and I do not know how they are staffed.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson: General Milroy, did you find any resentment at the presence of the Team in any area of Nigeria? In particular, was there any difference in the attitude of the authorities towards you in the different military regions, or were you received, if not enthusiastically, at least courteously throughout.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes; we were received very courteously. I think, initially, in some of the places there was a great deal of reserve. This is partly attributable to the fact that these divisions are commanded by very young colonels, and if you land three or four major-generals in their midst it is a bit of a shock under any circumstances. But once they found out how we wanted to operate and what we wanted to do even this seemed to go away and they were all quite willing to help us and tell us anything we wanted to know.

Mr. Anderson: Do you foresee difficulty if the Observer Teams are increased in number and if officers perhaps of the rank of captain are sent rather than major-generals?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We are now anticipating what might take place if the Federal Military Government wishes to discuss a change in the make-up of the team and I think it would probably be improper for me to go ahead and give any of my ideas because these discussions have not taken place.

The changes we envisioned would not, I hope, be in great enough numbers to cause any objection on the part of the Nigerian authorities or the Nigerian military authorities.

Mr. Anderson: You mentioned, sir, that you had 14 press people accompanying you on at least your first visit and that a number of these were from foreign countries. Did their press reporting reflect the views of the Committee, or of your Observer group, or were they critical of your efforts? I ask that because we have heard that only one Canadian has recently gone; and Mr. Brewin earlier

made it very clear when he quoted a British newspaper which was, in turn, quoting a Dutch newspaper which was, in turn, quoting an unknown reporter who was, in turn, reporting Adekunle. We just have not had any Canadian press reporting on what is happening on the Nigerian side of the lines. Can you indicate whether the press reporting of other countries has been favourable to or critical of, your Observer Team?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: My problem is that, in fact, I see very little of the press reporting that is done.

My impression has been that to date they think our manner of operating is reasonable. I am not aware of any specific critical writing, but that does not mean that it does not exist somewhere. But we do not see newspapers that much, and when we get back into Lagos we see them for only two or three days.

Mr. Anderson: But do their attitude towards you in the field and their questioning of you denote cynicism, or, indeed, scepticism, about what you are doing?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not to any great degree. Some of them question our future method of procedure and some of the points that have been raised here have been raised in discussions with the press—where do we go next and how are we going to operate next? But, as a general rule, it seems to me that they agree that our method of proceeding for the first phase was a reasonable way to approach the problem.

Mr. Anderson: You mentioned, sir, the fears of the Ibos before coming out of the bush. In your questioning did you come across people who, despite the fact they had come out of the bush, still entertained pretty strong fears about what might happen to them, say, when you went around the corner and disappeared from sight?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The one place we have mentioned specifically is where the Ibo people are in the camp in Port Harcourt. There is a pretty good-sized camp there, and a very well run camp. It is actually run by the Ibos themselves. They live in an area of houses, and one thing and another, and they live by families. As we pointed out the leaders of this particular group advised their people to stay in the camp for the present time. The leaders are afraid that if the Federal forces suffer reverses perhaps these troops might take it out on the Ibo people. Therefore, rightly or wrongly, they suggest they stay in this camp

where they are together and the forces are there to protect them; and the Federal Government allows them to stay there.

However, the Chairman did interview one man, an Ibo, who was in his house when the town was attacked. He was told by a neighbour to stand in front of the house, and he did. He survived the attack on Port Harcourt, went into the camp and has now been brought out and is back in his house. He was got out of the camp by the company for which he works. Therefore, some of them are, in fact, coming out of camps and going back to their houses.

Mr. Anderson: Yes; but are the people concerned that perhaps although they are alive now they may not be a few weeks from now when the Nigerians may have more leisure to dispose of those they dislike?

• 1610

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh, no. There was just one camp that we encountered and it was for this other reason, that there might be a reverse.

Mr. Anderson: In other words, when they do come out of the woods and into the control of the Federal military authority there is a general allaying of fear and suspicion there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Once they make connection the fear seems to go away fairly quickly.

Mr. Anderson: Is this true of those who were refugees from other areas and who were refugees, say, during the time of the atrocities of last year and 1966?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: A number of the people we have spoken to, when questioned give you their village, but actually they have lived for a long time in the north. Perhaps these are the ones to which you are referring.

Mr. Anderson: Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: And the people we question include quite a number of these people who are from the north.

Mr. Anderson: Yet despite the fact that they witnessed atrocities in the north and perhaps are refugees because of those atrocities, they are nevertheless not fearful now in the areas in which they find themselves?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They did not appear to be fearful; and whether they witnessed atrocities in the north or not I would not know. Incidentally, in my introduction I did say

that one of the points we wished to check on was the statement that the Ibos were returning to the north. We have yet to do that. It is a little further out, but we will be doing that.

Mr. Anderson: To turn to another point, do you feel that Lagos is in full control of the divisional commanders, are they acting more or less independently?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The divisional commanders have a great deal of freedom, because they are right in the field and responsible for their own areas. But there is frequent consultation with Lagos. They fly back and forth all the time. I would say Lagos is in command.

Mr. Anderson: I ask that question because I am concerned that perhaps Lagos might give permission for Canadian aircraft to fly into Biafra and a divisional commander who might be in command of anti-aircraft weapons may not wish to honour the agreement between Lagos and ourselves, or Lagos and the Red Cross. Do you entertain similar fears, or from your experience would you say that any decision by Lagos with respect to Canadian airmen would be honoured by the divisional commanders?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This, of course, is part of the whole procedure to be worked out by the Red Cross with the Federal Military Government. I am sure this aspect would be covered and that once the agreement was reached it would be observed.

Mr. Anderson: Do you feel that the Egyptian pilots are under the full control of the Lagos authorities, or do they act as free agents when they are in their aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not want to comment on the pilots in the air force and how they operate.

Mr. Anderson: You mentioned that a refugee camp is now in Ibo control. Is it true that some of the Ibos who have now come out of the woods are working with the Federal military authorities, acting as policemen, or as acting civil servants or administrators, or is it entirely a military government and a military administration?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: There are two aspects there. First of all there are the camps I mentioned. In some of these the Ibo people sort of run their own camp.

Mr. Anderson: But do they run the area outside the camp at all, as well?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The state administrator for the East-Central area—the Federally-occupied portion—which is Ibo property, is an Ibo. I did not meet him, but I did talk to his secretary who is a very intelligent man. We had a very good conversation. He is an Ibo. The chief of police was not, but he was leaving and an Ibo was talking over.

In the Mid-West sector, as I pointed out, two of the nine members in the governor's council, or whatever he calls his particular organization, are civilian Ibos. It is a military government, of course. The governor is a soldier. There are Ibos in the civil service. Ibos in the police and in the rest of the organization in the Mid-West centre.

Mr. Anderson: They are returning to their positions in the administration.

One other question, sir: Was the food that was distributed by the army in the two-week period before the refugees were turned over to the civilian authorities provided by relief agencies, or is this food supplied by the Federal military forces?

• 1615

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It normally comes up the army chain of command. It is quite possible that at the back of the command it might be fed in by, say, a rehabilitation commission, or something like that. But basically speaking it comes up the military chain of command and provision is made in the supplies given to provide food for refugees as well as for the military.

Mr. Anderson: Sir, we have heard that the lines of communication of the Federal forces are so extended now that it is very difficult for them even to supply their own troops let alone the refugees in the forward areas. Do you feel that there is a likelihood of the relief supplies not being distributed in the forward areas because of the distance of the front from, say, Port Harcourt or other areas where it can be unloaded?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Our fear, or what we worried about, was that if, for any reason, there was a sudden increase in the number of displaced persons the facilities could be overstrained, or even overwhelmed.

Mr. Anderson: But at present you feel—

Maj. Gen. Milroy: At present I think they are able to cope.

Mr. Anderson: Sir, about the randomness with which you visit villages when you are in

an area, do you think that the ones you visit are forewarned? Do your jeeps have radio equipment which would allow the Nigerian forces attached to you to warn someone further up the road that you are on your way and to have everything put in order so that you will have a good impression?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Our jeeps are not radio-controlled; at least, if they are, I have never seen radios; and there are not that many radios in the organization. Whether they are forewarned and, if so, how long the forewarning is, I do not know.

Mr. Anderson: Let me phrase it in a different way. From the reaction that you get when you arrive in town do you feel that it is a surprise to all concerned, including the Nigerian forces there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Generally, they may know we are in the area; they may know we are in the divisional area; so it is not a total surprise that we sort of pop in on particular soldiers. They would not be totally surprised by the fact. But I think in most of the places we go the villagers are surprised.

Mr. Anderson: Sir, you dealt very well with one aspect of your job, which is observation. I would like to congratulate you on it, as I am sure would all members of the Committee and the House. I think it has been a first-class job.

However, there is another aspect, which is the inhibiting effect that your group has on the Nigerian forces' activities and actions. Do you feel that it really does alter things, or do you feel that they would have acted in a reasonable manner in any event, regardless of whether you had been sent?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not really think that that is a question I can answer. We are there; it is a fact. Whether or not our presence has changed their behaviour, their behaviour is as we reported on it. I do not think it would be fair for me to say that they would not have behaved that way if we had not been there.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I had to leave this morning at 11 o'clock to attend another Committee. I hope that none of the questions I ask will be a repetition.

First, General Milroy, I would like to follow up Mr. Anderson's point about the number of Ibos who are still in positions in the Federal Government. I have read, or seen it someplace or other, that these are mostly Western Ibos who lived in the area west of the State of Biafra as it was set up and who were never engaged in this insurrection at all. Have you any information with regard to that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I take it from your statement that the Ibos you refer to are the Ibos on the west side of the Niger and who are still in the government in the Mid-West state?

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is where we saw most of the Ibo people's area returned to normal. Certainly that is the area where most of the Ibos seem to be back working with the State governments.

We have not made any observations on the number of Ibos working in the Federal Government in Lagos. We know they are there, but we have not actually gone around and counted them.

In the east-Central State, the Ibo property, the State administrator, who is an Ibo, is at present going around and building up his own State organization. I know that he visited the south sector, getting a sort of a list of the people who were in the camps there and their various specialties and trades so that he could start employing them and make use of them. But the actual numbers in the East-Central State who are now employed in the State I could not say.

Mr. Harkness: The point I was getting at really is whether these Ibos you mentioned, who were in positions of authority around Port Harcourt, I think you said,—somewhere down in this area—are, let us say, the native Ibos of that area or are Ibos who have been brought in from the Western area which was never concerned in the rebellion at all?

•1620

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The Ibos that we are talking about in Port Harcourt were in a camp which was a camp they were running. Before the war started Port Harcourt had a very large number of Ibos, although it is river country.

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: There were large concentrations of Ibos there and most of them

have left. The ones that we saw in the camp were those who still claim Port Harcourt as their home, but there is nothing like the number that used to be there.

Mr. Harkness: To go on to another point, are the facilities which are afforded to your Observer Team adequate to enable you to carry the thing on properly or not? Particularly, what transport are you provided with and by whom is it provided?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: To date, when we move to an area, we are flown normally in a Fokker friendship aircraft to the airfield nearest the divisional headquarters.

Mr. Harkness: That is a Nigerian Government aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, it is a civilian airline aircraft provided by the Nigerian Government. And when we get to the area, the headquarters is responsible for providing us with our transport and our accommodation.

Mr. Harkness: You have found this satisfactory up to date, have you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh, yes, it has worked up to date. Our suggestion on the changes is that if we deploy ourselves more permanently we may need more transport—it is not really a question of more transport; it is a question of having it practically always under our own control so that we can use it whenever we want to.

Mr. Harkness: This is really what I am getting at; whether there is a need for the provision of transport either by the United Nations or by the countries who are providing the observers.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This would be one of the matters we would raise in our discussion with the Federal Military Government based on the suggestion we made in our second report—the question of the provision of transport, the provision of communications. The ground transport is not a great problem, but perhaps provision of our own airplane or something like that, and just how we would get it, would be a problem.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, if you had your own transport you would be in a better position to discharge your function. Is that the summary?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. We think in our future activities we could move people around from one area to another more quick-

ly. We would not have to wait until they can get an aircraft. It is difficult for them to get airplanes—they have not that many and they cannot produce them just like that. The main one we can get in a hurry is General Gowon's own aircraft but that only carries eight people, you see, so that if you have a larger group it is hard to move around.

Mr. Harkness: This is one of the, let us say, possible recommendations that your team is considering, is it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is one of the points we are proposing to discuss with the Federal Military Government.

Mr. Harkness: Now, along another line. What reactions, if any, have you had from the other tribes that are in these areas which you visited? Particularly, do they have, as far as you can make out, the same fear as the Ibos have, or is their attitude quite different?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The Rivers are the main ones we have run into. And as I expressed a little earlier, they also were afraid, but whether their fear was just a fear of the battle and the bullets primarily, and less of genocide, or a little less of being killed off, I would not really want to say. They were frightened enough to go away and hide before they came back out of the bush, but I would not want to say whether they were less afraid of being harmed by the Federal troops than the Ibos or not.

Mr. Harkness: Did you get any reaction along the line as to whether their sympathies were with the Ibos or their sympathies were with the Federal people?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, not enough that I would want to comment on it. Now that they are back in Federal territory, they are back in their homes and they are settling there, I do not think I should comment any further than that on this.

Mr. Harkness: In regard to the people who were in these refugee camps, first of all, are they being adequately fed as far as you could observe?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, sir. They are getting enough to eat and it is getting better all the time, as long as their numbers do not increase dramatically.

Mr. Harkness: Have they sufficient in the way of medical supplies and medical attention?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The medical supplies and the medical attention are short in certain areas—we have observed on this—the medical supply problem appearing to be one of transport, and the medical attention one being one of trained people.

Mr. Harkness: Then your observation really is that more medical supplies and more medically trained people are required.

• 1625

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, and I think more transport, perhaps, to move the medical supplies forward, because we were given to believe that they are there in Nigeria and Lagos. Perhaps it is a question of getting them up to the front and having more medical people.

Mr. Harkness: And how are these people housed in these refugee camps? Are they tent camps, are they huts, or what are they?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, they are practically—they are all buildings. There are a lot of buildings around. They usually kind of take over one of these schools. There are a number of long, low buildings. They have a lot of boarding schools in that area and they take over an area something like that. In one or two cases—in fact, in one case in Owerri—it is a prison, but in Port Harcourt they live in houses, largely, so that they are adequately covered in what is permanent accommodation. Now sometimes they are very crowded.

Mr. Harkness: Well, a lot of people have been crowded under other circumstances, too. Are these people in these refugee camps free to come and go, or once they are in there are they sort of held there? Is it like a concentration camp, or if they want to go back to their villages, can they leave?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The process is that if their village is in a cleared area, they keep them there, say in Port Harcourt. They keep them there a couple of weeks and feed them up if they require it and then send them back to their village. If their village is not in a cleared area, or in an area in which operations are taking place, they are retained in the camp. Or if, as in the case of the 2 Div. area, they have been moved out of their village because it is an internal security problem, they may be kept there for two or three weeks or more while the problem is being sorted out by the Federal Military Government.

Mr. Harkness: By and large, then, the situation is that if their village is in a non-fighting area, they are free to return to it.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They try to get them back to their villages. They try not to keep them in the camps too long.

Mr. Harkness: Now on another line, what is your observation as to the discipline of the Nigerian Army? Is it reasonably good, and particularly, how is the control of the officers over the men as a whole?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We reported that in our estimation the discipline is good, particularly in the two divisions on which we have reported.

Mr. Harkness: I am sorry I did not catch that.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is good, and particularly in the two divisions on which we have reported. In the first division, the older division, they seem to have quite a few NCOs with a fair amount of service, so that the discipline appears to be good and the officers seem to be in control of the force.

Mr. Harkness: You say you do not anticipate too much difficulty through, say, indiscriminate shooting, looting and what not?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We would not think so, no; not from what we saw during our tour around.

Mr. Harkness: In regard to these areas that you have gone over, what was the amount of destruction? I suppose you can only do these things comparatively of what the destruction is in another war, such as the type of thing that we saw in Italy and Germany. Is it comparable to that, or is it much less, or what?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Much less.

Mr. Harkness: Much less.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Onitsha is probably the worst that I saw. A lot of the buildings there are without roofs and the walls have tumbled down and the market place has been burned and a few things like that, but in Enugu, for example, the damage is more sort of broken windows; some buildings have had shell holes through them, but there is not the same amount of artillery fire, evidently, and therefore the destruction does not appear to be so great.

Now the damage that is done, for example along the roads, is that people come and take

the tin off the roof to cover over their slit trenches and things; this sort of damage takes place as well, but the damage is not as great as in the towns in Italy or anything like that.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, in your observation, there was not what you might call a great deal of unnecessary and wanton damage that had been done.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not a great deal, not in comparison of the terms that we are using here, no. There is a lot of damage, a lot to be fixed up, but the buildings are still standing and have their roofs on them and can be fixed up, which is not what you could say about some of the others.

Mr. Harkness: Did you find any evidence of what you might call widespread burning of buildings?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not burning, no. There are several buildings that have been burned, but not widespread burning. On occasion you will find along the area where they have been fighting along the road that any building with a thatched roof may have been burned—the roof may have been burned off. But most of the buildings are sort of cement block with a tin roof or a form of roof that does not really lend itself to too much burning. They are not wooden houses.

• 1630

Mr. Harkness: And what was your observation with regard to the amount of looting and general removal of personal property that had taken place?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, a lot of the property was missing, in many cases there was practically no property at all, but it was very difficult to say just exactly who had done it. We heard all sorts of statements as to who had done it—that it had been moved out by the people before they left, that it had been taken when the Federal troops came in, or that the civilians had come in and taken it. Our belief is that it had been taken by all three in many cases.

Now the Federal Government is endeavouring to protect its property as much as it can. In Enugu, for example, we went to a city hall where they had stored a lot of things like typewriters, fans and things that they had taken out of buildings and tried to keep. I have an account here of the buildings in the Mid-Western State that have been abandoned and that they have taken over and are trying

to look after until the owners come back. They are endeavouring to do something about it and I think they are trying to do more as they go along.

Mr. Harkness: You heard a considerable amount of complaint on this score, I presume?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not say complaint, it is more what we saw for ourselves in going around and taking a look at the buildings and the damage that has been done.

Mr. Harkness: This was not one of the major sources of complaint of the people that you spoke to?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not really and, as I say, most of our observations were on destruction and that; we were more going around and having a look at it ourselves and seeing the damage that had been done to the buildings. In fact, the buildings in many cases were empty.

Mr. Harkness: Thank you.

Mr. Gibson: General Milroy, I would like to express my appreciation of the conscientious and capable reporting and work that you have been doing in your field, sir. I am sure we all agree with this.

If you will permit me, sir, I would like to ask you a few questions in connection with the place of fighting and nature of the battle that is raging in Nigeria. Are hostilities conducted on a divisional basis whereby a division of troops on one side are contesting a disorganized enemy, more in the nature of a battalion of Nigerians, or several battalions of Nigerians, fighting in different areas against the enemy, more of a jungle warfare with commando-type activity taking place; or is it a mixture of all?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: My impression is it is more of a battalion-type battle. A battalion, we will say, advance down a road. Perhaps you might get two battalions in a brigade advancing if they are clearing villages. I understand they do a great deal of firing, and the fighting seems to be done either before you get to the town or after you leave it but not a great deal in the town itself. However a great deal of damage can be done by all the firing that takes place. The equipment is made up of some artillery, there are armoured cars, and then there are machine guns and rifles.

Mr. Gibson: How about the mortar?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: There are mortars as well, yes.

Mr. Gibson: On a large scale compared to, say, Normandy?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, not on that large a scale. I have not actually gone around and taken an account of how many they have—again on this point of not getting too involved in the conduct of the battle itself.

Mr. Gibson: Then, sir, turning to another subject, a vast majority of the other African states, we have been told, say; "Stay out of the political struggle." In view of your observations and your general knowledge would you agree that it would be a dangerous thing for Canada to mix itself in the political end of this?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I will not answer that. Obviously it is out of my field. I can say that the Federal Government feels very strongly that this is a Nigerian problem.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you, sir.

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Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, I have very few questions to ask. General Milroy, as I understand it, most of the observers are military men and perhaps, basically, there could be a difference in assessing the actual conditions when assessed under the conventions of war. Would that be the actual assessment in this case?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If I could go back to your first premise, while most of us from the four countries are military with the exception of the Polish assistant observer, Mr. Gussing and his two assistants work very closely with us and while he does not report with us—his report is separate—we certainly discuss what we see together. In fact, they have sat in on some of our discussions in the early stages of our reports. The civilian approach is not entirely absent. So with that proviso, we look at what is going on from the point of view that a war is in fact being fought. And when a war is being fought certain things are going to take place—people are going to be shot at and people are going to be killed. If you happen to be in an area where an attack is taking place you stand a very good chance of getting hurt. For that reason we think that the wisest people are those who, when they see this happening, take off and hide in the woods and come back out after the leading troops have gone past them.

Mr. Legault: My next question is perhaps a little touchy and please feel free to ignore it if you think it is not proper. In preparing the report I do believe it has to meet with the consensus of all those who are participating. Are there arguments necessarily where certain facts should be brought out and could be stifled because it does not meet the approval of all the observers? Have you encountered this?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think all I should really say is that there is considerable discussion when we write our report but to date we have agreed. I think it should be pointed out that the understanding is that if any member does not agree with the report and has some other observations, provision is made to submit a minority report as an appendix to our report. No one has asked to do that yet. Also, if so desired, it is our understanding that if a member wishes to submit a separate report of his own to his own government, with a copy to the Federal Military Government, this is a perfectly proper procedure.

Mr. Legault: Have there been any such reports?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not yet.

Mr. Legault: So the reports meet with the consensus of all the observers?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. Legault: Yesterday when Dr. Shepherd was here as a witness a question was asked as to the full co-operation of the military forces in providing the necessary food and medicine to that area occupied by the military forces but close to the front. It was indicated that there could be some intention to prevent the fullest co-operation in providing this material. Is that your assessment of the situation, or is it through lack of proper communication and transportation?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Who is Dr. Shepherd, to whom you referred?

The Chairman: Dr. Shepherd was the witness who appeared before us yesterday. He was in charge of the Protestant churches relief group in Biafra during the past few months.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The procedure, as we see it operating, is that initially usually the army is the organization that does provide the food and the other agencies come in behind. The co-operation, generally speaking, in the areas

where those other agencies are operating, has been good or, at least, quite good and in many cases good. The one area where the agencies have not been operating has been in the Port Harcourt area and they are now moving into that area.

Mr. Legault: In your report, General, you have suggested that perhaps more observers should be made available. Do you feel that this is very urgent at the moment?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. Legault: It is not a question of being put off say, for a month but that action in this respect should be taken immediately.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, we did say that we would like to discuss it as a matter of urgency with the Federal Military Government; and whether or not it has in fact been raised this week, I do not know. It could well have been.

• 1640

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: General Milroy, allegations have been made to this Committee that there has been shelling or bombing of hospitals, schools and market places. You said that you had received no complaints respecting these allegations, or that you saw no evidence of it. On the other hand, did you observe any hospitals, schools, or market places that had been heavily shelled or bombed or destroyed?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not think I saw any hospitals, but certainly market places. The market place in Aba had been destroyed. Now it is claimed that in fact that was done, after the Federal troops moved in, by Biafran artillery. Whether or not that was the case I do not know, and I am not prepared to say. But that is the sort of allegation that was made.

The market place in Onitsha has been burned, but it was just burned; there was nobody in it.

When I say the hospitals have not been shelled, in the area of the Owerri hospital there were marks of mortar bombs, but if you are shelling, or bringing down mortar fire, in front of advancing troops, as you know, it is indirect fire. You are endeavoring to bring down fire to bear so that your own

troops can go forward. You cannot be very sure exactly what is in that area in which you are advancing.

Mr. Allmand: The allegation has been that there has been shelling or bombing of hospitals, schools, market places, or camps which there has been shelling or bombing of hospitals, schools, market places, or camps which are nowhere near military establishments, and, therefore, it has been argued further, this is a sign that the Nigerian Government has in fact tried to kill civilians. If you see bombed-out or shelled-out hospitals, schools, market places and so forth, would this not indicate to you that there should be further investigation to find out if there is any military establishment nearby?

This morning, talking about genocide, you said that genocide includes the intent to destroy. It would seem to me that one would presume intent from certain acts. If you see hospitals, or schools, or refugee camps shelled and in a state of destruction, this must have been caused for some reason, which would require further investigation. Have you investigated such things when you have seen them?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If allegations are made that such an installation was shelled deliberately we would have to look into it. But, again, as I say, the shelling generally falls very close in front of your own troops and is usually brought down when your troops are advancing. If your troops are advancing it must be a military objective.

Mr. Allmand: So that the fact that there is, or is not, a military camp nearby would not make any difference?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If the forces are advancing and trying to seize a military area and are bringing fire down to bear on it and it becomes a military objective then the use of artillery fire is customary and expected. Generally speaking, advancing troops probably would not know what is in any of the buildings that are in that area. Therefore, the use of artillery fire, I suggest, in particular, must be tied to the battle itself. The fact that a shell comes down on a military objective which you say is not one that should be shelled, can get you into a tremendous argument. If it is a military objective and the forces are using fire power to go forward then anything near that particular objective is likely to be hit.

Generally speaking, what we find in those areas is that the people have cleared out, especially when you get up to the front line; you do not see any people; they have cleared out and got away.

• 1645

Mr. Allmand: But when you arrive you may see a school or a hospital or a market place in what can be considered generally as a civilian area—especially, I would say, a hospital. Would you consider it your duty, if you saw a hospital pretty badly shelled, not to wait for complaints but say, "Here is a hospital that is pretty bombed out. How did this happen?" Would you consider it part of your duty to inquire about why this hospital was shelled out?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In circumstances like that we would look into it, particularly if there were a lot of bodies.

Mr. Allmand: But, of course, before you arrived the bodies may have been taken away?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They could have, in which case you are never too sure exactly whether or not it was an empty building that was shelled.

Mr. Allmand: In any case, you have not come into contact with that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not with that problem.

As I say, when troops are attacking anybody who is in that area is liable to get hurt. There is no question of that. No matter what kind of accommodation they are in, they are liable to get hurt. The general drill is for them to clear out.

Mr. Allmand: Have you received any complaints, or heard any stories, relating to Ibo military action against civilians, especially Rivers people or the Ibibio people—those who live in the Eastern region but are not Ibo? Have you heard any complaints about atrocities, or even military action, against civilians by the Ibos in retreating, or in conducting the war, against people on the other side?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We have heard some statements about this, but this is not an area in which we are responsible for investigating and we do not report on it. These statements have been made. I do not know how much weight to give them.

Mr. Allmand: If you did see certain evidence of Ibo atrocities, is it in your terms of

reference to report that, too, or are you just supposed to report on Nigerian behaviour?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Basically our task is to report on the behaviour of the Federal military troops. If we wanted to report anything like that, we would do it separately. We would not include it as part of one of our own...

Mr. Allmand: But you might do it, nevertheless?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh, yes, I think if we saw a flagrant case that should be reported we would report it to our governments. We might handle it in a different way.

Again, as I say, we are in a hypothetical situation. We would have to be faced with the exact situation before we would know how to handle it.

Mr. Allmand: Did you notice if there were any Eastern Nigerians, Ibos or others, fighting with the Federal forces or in officer positions?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: There are. We did not go around and count them, but we know there still are Ibo officers serving with the Federal Forces. I do not know their numbers.

We know there are Ibos serving with the Federal Military Government in Lagos but it is not an area we have particularly looked into, as yet, any way.

Mr. Allmand: Are there recruiting stations in that part of Eastern Nigeria which has been recaptured by the Federal forces? Are they trying to recruit people for the army from Port Harcourt or Calabar and these areas?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I could not answer that.

Mr. Allmand: You do not know?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I could not say. I have not seen a recruiting station as such, really, as we have them here.

Mr. Allmand: To return to the "Black Scorpion", in the areas he has captured, or that are now under his control, did you say that the people are being treated fairly, including the Ibos?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes; what we said was that in the Port Harcourt area the army itself was endeavouring to look after them.

Mr. Allmand: Is that an area where he has control?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, that is part of the area under his control. They were trying to run the whole thing themselves. We suggested that the rear area be taken away from the operational commanders and made a sort of administrative zone, administered, if possible, by, say, civilian authorities.

In fact, the Nigerian Red Cross, assisted by the International Red Cross, are moving into that area and I imagine that something along that line will probably take place. But the people in that area are being looked after by the army.

As we pointed out, the standard varies really with the operational commander and his particular task and the attention he pays to this administrative problem as opposed to his operational problem. So the standard in that area would not be the same all the way across.

• 1650

Mr. Allmand: But you did not find any instances of cruelty, or...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We reported on one.

Mr. Allmand: Yes; but is there any great difference between the territories under the "Black Scorpion" and those under other Nigerian officers?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, except that the presence really of the civil administration, the Red Cross, the Nigerian Red Cross and people like that, there was a difference. Even in his own area there was a difference. In the Calabar area and the Eastern side, these agencies were in there and operating. In the Port Harcourt area, they were just starting to come in.

Mr. Allmand: A final question. Are there many non-Nigerian military advisers in the field with the Nigerian Army?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I saw none when I was there.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): General Milroy, I am sorry that I may have missed some of your more pertinent testimony, particularly during the morning session when I had other matters to attend to, but one of the things that surprised me this morning in a statement of yours, and I think I have heard it repeated again this afternoon—stop me if I am mis-

quoting you—in reference to questions dealing with the way in which the war was being carried on, you have answered that how they—I presume you mean the Nigerians—fight the war is not our business.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: What I meant was militarily...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, that is fine.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: ...as opposed to the treatment of civilians, but as to how they carry out their military tactics, we are not there to observe that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, and then just to put this again, you have said, "basically our task is to report the behaviour of the federal military troops."

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, in the war-affected areas, with special reference to the civilians.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This is really, in many ways, the nub of the question that we are trying to resolve in this Committee. I find it difficult to understand why, having set up a team of this nature that is attempting to make a determination on the operation of the Federal Military troops, you would get to a certain point—you have given us a very good detailed explanation, both in your opening statement and later by answers to questions, of the way in which you have carried on your activities along with the other observers—and then you stop, whereas things that have been referred to in this Committee in terms of atrocities that have taken place are things that very often have happened in the heat of combat itself, things that would be considered, I would think, beyond the natural scope of military activities. To use one example, there have been suggestions made that when a village was being taken, or when a community was being taken by the Federal Military Forces, along with the elimination of the opposing military forces, there was also a wholesale destruction of the civilian population. This happened in the very act, if you like, of the military taking a certain situation. Now, are we to understand that it has not been possible for the observers to date to be close enough to the scene of action—perhaps you feel it has not even been within the terms of reference given to you—to see the military in operation, to observe how, in effect, the troops do operate when they are involved in an actual theatre of close combat?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh yes, it is definitely our responsibility to see how they operate.

Now, what I was getting at is that how they attack the town, the military tactics they use, is not our responsibility. We are not there to report on that or tell them they are doing it right or wrong, but how they behave when they attack a village is definitely our responsibility, and I would hope—there are not that many villages, actually, that were attacked lately. In future, if they are attacking villages, we will be very close behind to see what is happening. From what we see at the present time by going up into the forward areas, we do not think there are many people in these villages, so we think that all the people have gone away for one reason or another and that the Federal Forces and the secessionist forces, when they meet in the front of, in the middle of or behind these villages, are doing so on a sort of battlefield, and this would certainly be in accord with the experience I have had in the past. When the bullets start flying around, the civilians, and any others who can, get away.

• 1655

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Are we to understand that to date the observers have not had the opportunity to be close enough behind the Nigerian troops to really see the actual military operation as such, to make this kind of observation?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The taking of a large town, is that what you mean?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Okigwi was the only one. We got in there when the fighting was still going on in Okigwi. They were still fighting there.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): What kind of fighting was it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Bullets flying around.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes. Touché.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Actually, I was not on that particular team. It was a special team. But I think that the Federal troops, in the taking of Okigwi—I believe the figures are correct—lost four killed and about 30 wounded. It gives you some idea that there was not a great deal of hand-to-hand fighting.

Generally speaking, and again I have to be careful, the amount of fighting that takes place in a village does not seem to be as great as you might think. They fight for the village and they fight on the other side of it, but not too much in it.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Is it your observation, since the war had been going on for well over a year before you arrived—and I think we already realize that most of the territory that was originally designated as Biafra has now moved under Federal control—that this kind of operation, whether or not it might have existed in the past—it may be difficult for you to make a similar determination on this—could happen in the future? For instance, I would think, and I am just going from my own meagre information on this point, that there are likely only two major centres left—Uli and Umuahia—where this kind of observation might potentially be made.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: On the basis of a large city, yes. Actually, Uli is not a very large place; it is a small village. But what we hope is that we would be in the picture, and whenever we thought there was an activity going on, we would get right up behind and see what happened; fall right in along behind them.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Are you given any advance information as to where some kind of major military action is going to take place, so that you could be on hand to make this kind of observation?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This is part of the reason for the recommendations we have made for changing our method of operation. By keeping someone in an area more or less permanently, we figure that we will be there to pick up the information that we require and we will be in the know, and we will get the word in a hurry. This is why we are making this suggestion to the Federal Government that we operate this way. And I am sure that they would have no objection.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You have mentioned that you have had fairly free access to and free discussion with people that you have met, people who have been identified in some way or other with the Biafran community that has now passed under Federal Military control. In these discussions, have the people that you have talked with expressed any fears of any kind or any concern with things they are unhappy with? I think that earlier some mention was made of whether there had been complaints with regard to looting. Have there been complaints of any kind that have been raised?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The discussion of fear has usually been a discussion of the reason

they were afraid when the Federals first moved into the area. As I pointed out, as we reported in our second report, the Ibos in Port Harcourt seemed to feel more secure by staying in a camp than by moving out and living in the city. So there obviously is still a feeling among them that until things settle down they would be better off staying together.

Aside from that, it is more a question of when they can get back to their villages.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): There seems to be something unique here distinguishing the Rivers or the Ibibios or the Efik people from the Ibos, in that while the others may eventually get back to their own communities or villages, the Ibos seem extremely reluctant to leave the solidarity even of a refugee camp.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That was true only in the case of Port Harcourt. In the Northern part, around Enugu, all the people I was talking about in the First Division area are all in the Ibo speaking territory and are all Ibos who are going back to their villages.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But I think you did say earlier that you would have no idea what percentage this would be of the original population.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I mean it could be 50 per cent; it could be 10 per cent; it could be 1 per cent.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: And in Enugu, you see, the people have not come back to any great extent yet.

• 1700

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): As a matter of fact—and I do not want to put words in your mouth—I think you said this morning that Enugu was completely dead, or something to that effect.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Something like that, yes. There is very, very little life in it.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Enugu, after all, was the capital of the original Biafra and it had for some time been the capital of the Eastern Region. Did it not strike you as somewhat odd that this main centre which is now well within Federal Military territory is, as you in your own words describe it, completely dead?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well we asked about that and, in fact, the explanation given us was that Enugu was what you might call an artificial town—it was a government town and an army town.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Something like Ottawa.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It was not a village. People came there on posting, you might say, to do their jobs. They were mostly government officials and the more educated members of the community, and these are the ones we say have gone and have not come back. So I do not think it is peculiar that Enugu has not come to life all that fast because it will not come to life until you get these educated Ibos back out—presumably those who are still in the secessionist area. It is not like a village. If a chap does come out I gather he goes back to his village rather than going back to Enugu.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: He has generally a village he comes from.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: He has generally a village he comes from.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This is another interesting thing and you have just referred to it. You have mentioned the fact that there seems to you at least a number of Ibos who have come out and that where one or two have made the break others have followed. But I seem to get the suggestion from your testimony that these are primarily uneducated people, that the more or less educated Ibos have in large measure, and I think this is also in one of your reports, really not made a reappearance.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. That is in both our reports.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Have you tried to ascertain the reason for this or has this seemed strange to you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. We think that they have fallen back with the Biafran troops as they have gone back. For whatever reason it may be, they have gone with them and we think that they are still in the secessionist area. We have not really tried to assess the real reason; we just remarked that they are not there. Now of course they are in the mid-west area.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Would you not think it a rather important thing, inasmuch as the focus here is on the Ibo people, that the question of genocide seems in large measure to come down on the question of the relationship of the Ibo people to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and to the Federal troops, and that this is in a sense a rather critical question for you to make some determination on?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well it is critical but on the other hand the information we get is that there are a very large number of people in the secessionist-held area, therefore our assumption is that that is where they are.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): One of the statements I think you made this morning, and it is made also in your report so you do limit it to the areas in which you have visited—I think I am quoting you here—was: There is no program of intent to exterminate the Ibo people in the areas that we visited.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well that is the definition of genocide that we used and we just used it again when we were expressing our opinion.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Is that a correct statement of yours? Am I quoting you correctly—"There is no program of intent to exterminate the Ibo people in the areas that we visited"?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is the question of "intent". That is the word.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Right.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think the one you are quoting from is from the First Report, is it not?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, and in the Third Report I think there is some reference to it as well.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. What we say in the First Report is that:

There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified.

And we say something similar in the Second Interim Report which, as you say, is the Third Report.

Mr. Fairweather: Page 5.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Right. It is in both these reports.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is right.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): On the question of "intent", and this is something that perhaps is fundamental to a determination on this issue, I would presume by "intent" you likely mean government policy, do you not?

• 1705

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, that there was some program, either a passive or an active one. For example, if they did not feed them, if they did not have a program for feeding them, then you could examine that very closely and see what it was and put an interpretation on it. Therefore part of our reasons for making the statements we make is that the government in fact has a positive policy that is just the opposite to genocide.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): If there was evidence—and perhaps we are getting into the area of conjecture—that on occasion the Federal troops had deliberately embarked on a policy of eliminating great numbers of civilians either in direct relationship to their military operation or on some other occasion would you regard that as "intent"?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You used the term "great numbers".

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes. I am not just talking of the thing that happened with the Red Cross, you know.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am not just talking about one occasion involving perhaps 50 or 100 people because of a platoon that got out of control; I am talking about it happening often enough that we are getting into at least a half dozen incidents perhaps where hundreds of people were killed. You would call that then "intent", would you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well it would certainly not be following out the policy that the government has laid down in its code of conduct, and for that there must be a reason, and if there were a large number it could conceivably be intended that way.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): The point I am trying to make here is that it could happen, as someone suggested, that there may be no definite program of genocide in effect as far as the government is concerned but that there is a sufficient disposition on the part of a goodly number of the troops that this in effect does occur when a situation presents itself.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well then it would depend entirely on the action the government took to stop this. If they did not take any action you would reach one conclusion; if they did take immediate action to stop it then you would reach another conclusion. It would be a hypothetical one.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, but in your position as an observer if you were to encounter this you would regard that as an "intent", as indeed an act of genocide, on the part of the Federal troops?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well I would not go so far as to say that. We would certainly have to look at it, report on it, and give our interpretation and if there was intent, then by the definition, it would have to be called genocide.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): In other words, what I am saying is that if such evidence became known to you, you would have great difficulty in saying there is not evidence of genocide?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the hypothetical case you stated.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, I would hope we would not say it.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Let me come at it another way. If you found there was some kind of a systematic attempt on the part of the military to eliminate the educated Ibos where they were accessible to the military, would you regard that as a form of genocide?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This would qualify under the definition because it says "wholly or in part".

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): So in your eyes it would qualify if you were to know of a situation where the military were attempting to eliminate people simply because they were part of the educated group of the Ibos.

You have, in your Third Report particularly, referred to some things as allegations and I am wondering how you decide whether it is an allegation or a fact? For instance, on page 6 of your Third Report in paragraph (g) "Destruction of Property" you suggest that:

There has been considerable looting, some by the dissidents during their retreat, some by the civil population and some by federal forces.

How do you make that determination?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Which page?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am sorry. It is the October 15 Report.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: October 14.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): October 14.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You may have a different form of the Report. Could you give me a paragraph number?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is almost at the very end. It is (g), the second last paragraph before "Future Action", called the "Destruction of Property".

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh, yes, it is in the Summary.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And part way down is written:

There has been considerable looting, some by the dissidents during their retreat, some by the civil population and some by the federal forces.

How do you make that kind of determination?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well mostly from questions and talking to people. The point we were really making there was that you cannot say it was just one group or another group that made it. We had allegations that the dissident troops did a certain amount of it when they were leaving, that the federal troops did a certain amount when they arrived, and that the civilians were doing it whenever they got the chance. The main point there was that it was not possible for us to say that this group did the damage.

• 1710

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, but it seems rather strange to me that you obviously come to a situation after it has occurred: one side of the combatants have left the scene and you are left with those who have gained that territory plus the civilians who are now under their control and yet you have made statements in this private report—and there are some other references of a similar kind—which seem to have been drawn from conclusions, on what I would call highly circumstantial evidence. In other words, I am wondering how it is possible to make this kind of division unless you had access to all of the people who were involved in that situation.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well the people we talked to made certain statements about who

took things—it was either the federal troops took them or the secessionist troops took them before they left, or a certain amount of it was done by civilian looting—and this is the basis for that particular statement. When we were trying to find out who made the trouble, some people said they did it and others said the Federal troops did it, and so basically what we are trying to point out there is that we think a little bit of everybody did it. But a conclusion we cannot draw is that any specific group did it.

Mr. Macdonald (Egmont): It might have been safer, I would suggest, not to draw even that conclusion unless you had...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, we think that is a fair one. It is as strongly put as we would want to put it, but I think it would be incorrect not to make it because one of the questions that arise is who is doing the damage?

Mr. Macdonald (Egmont): In other words, you strongly hold this opinion; this is not just an impression, you believe that is what actually happened?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Based on the information we were given.

Mr. Macdonald (Egmont): And you would have no hesitation regarding the information that you gave as a full and complete account of what actually took place?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, that all three elements were involved to some degree in the looting that took place.

Mr. Macdonald (Egmont): Does it not occur to you that perhaps in view of the fact that only one side can be heard from in terms of the military action and that others who might speak—civilians, are living with the knowledge that whatever they might say might eventually have some effect, good or bad, on the attitude the military might have towards them, and that, to say the least, the witnesses would be heavily influenced in the testimony they might give.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is possible, but in our estimation it was a fair statement, based on the information that we got.

Mr. Macdonald (Egmont): I do not want to take too long, I have already taken quite a bit of time and I hope I will get a chance to come back. I have one final question I would like to put to you which may have already been explored because, again, it comes to being part of the essential.

The first question I had with regard to observing the military in actual operation I think is essential. Then there is the other question—perhaps it is not fair to ask you but I think it needs to be asked—which is: When a military power effects a blockade, has completed the one that has surrounded the territory of Eastern Nigeria or Biafra during the last 15 months to the point now where we have from a number of authorities statements that by the end of this month more than a million will have died through starvation, does it occur to you, General Milroy, that this in itself might be a form of genocide?

• 1715

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well you are now saying that secessionists have no power of decision of their own. To me that is what you are saying. We know that supplies are getting into them and we know that non-food supplies are getting into them. In other words, they could use those aircraft to fly in more food if they wished. Blockade is a recognized form of warfare and I would say that this blockade is part of the war. If you are going to start saying that the Biafrans have no power of decision then it is a different thing, but I think the Biafrans have a power of decision here.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): This is based on your assumption that they have the alternative either to continue the war in the hope of either winning or preventing the Nigerians from gaining military control over them and also the belief that if they did decide to disperse with the fighting there would be no danger to themselves in that instance.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I would not want to be tied down to what selection of choices are open, but they are still waging a war from their point of view and they do have a selection of choices.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you think they have a better choice than that which they are presently exercising?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not like to say that. Now you are getting me into how the thing should be fought and now it should be handled and that is not my job.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But to come back to my original question, you do not believe that this blockade which has resulted in many hundreds of thousands of death by starvation is in itself a form of genocide?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, and I think I am correct in saying that the Federal Military Government has agreed to several different methods of providing food for the area which, for one reason or another and which I am not competent to speak, have fallen through.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): They have also refused other alternatives.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Perhaps so, but they have agreed to some and in fact food is being flown in right now. You could argue that the blockade is not all that effective.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well it is a limited service even at that, as you know. Thank you. I will pass.

The Chairman: Should I put your name down for the second round?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes, please.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Fairweather, then Mr. Yewchuk and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Fairweather: General Milroy, you are a distinguished Canadian soldier, I do not know very much about wars and I want to find out a bit more about this one. Where, from your observation, do the arms being used in this war come from?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Of course the Federal troops have British equipment. They have other types of equipment but I am not too sure where it would come from. For example, the rifles they use are the NATO-type rifles. I have seen equipment used by the secessionist side that I do not know where it came from. The rifles I saw were made in Czechoslovakia I believe, but where the supply came from I do not know. I have seen a few other pieces of equipment but I am not too sure where they came from—mines, anti-tank equipment and machine guns.

Mr. Fairweather: Is there any evidence that you have seen of arms on the Nigerian side coming from the U.S.S.R.?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well I do not know. I have seen some airplanes which may have come from there, but I do not know and I do not know how the Nigerians got them.

Mr. Fairweather: I know there are techniques used in the world, through the CIA and so on. There are techniques used by people who want to exercise influence in the world to get armaments to the side they are supporting. I do not really care how this

happens. I want to know whether there are U.S.S.R. aircraft and armaments used by the Federal forces in Nigeria.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have seen some but I have not seen them being used.

Mr. Fairweather: And what about Biafra or the secessionists?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well I have mentioned only the equipment that I have seen. This of course is not an area upon which we are called to report.

Mr. Fairweather: No, but you know I did not just ask that because I like to flatter people. You are there because you are a person of very great ability and have seniority in the Canadian Army. We recognize that and honour you for it.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The point I was getting at was that the actual equipment being used is not one of concern to us. We have not been asked to observe on that.

Mr. Fairweather: No.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: How it is being used, perhaps yes.

Mr. Fairweather: But even public people like ourselves find it difficult to take off our hats, you see. When you are there in uniform I suppose you have an interest in armaments. I do not know and I do not really care what technique nations of the world use—I care, but it is not relevant—but if they are French aircraft, for instance, that is a matter of interest to this Committee. Are there any...?

● 1720

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is about all I can tell you. As I say, I have not made a point of looking at the equipment to see where it came from.

Mr. Fairweather: Other questioners have asked about the presence of advisers from the United Kingdom, or British troops, officers and so on. Have you met any, or are there any in Nigeria?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have answered that I have not seen any advisers; but, again, this is an area on which I am not required by the Government to report.

Mr. Fairweather: Have you seen the Egyptian pilots that are allegedly flying for the Nigerians?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have not seen any Egyptian pilots. As I say, I have not seen them.

Mr. Fairweather: But there is no reason to doubt that this is a fact?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: As I say, I have not seen them; and, again, it is an area on which I am not called to report so I have not made any investigation into it at all.

Mr. Fairweather: I was intrigued by your evidence about the vast quantity of ammunition that is used in the warfare. Is there any rationalization of this, or is it...?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: As I say, they fire off a lot of ammunition. It is the way they fight the war.

Mr. Fairweather: But there is no military rationalization?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No; it is one way of operating—the maximum amount of fire power.

Mr. Fairweather: There is, therefore, evidence that there is a lot of it, if they can use a lot?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, when I say “a lot”, again, I have to speak relatively. They fire a lot of what they have, but compared to some of the examples that were mentioned earlier they do not fire very much.

Mr. Harkness: The implication is that there are a lot of unaimed shots?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, a lot of unaimed shots; but the amount of artillery ammunition they would fire does not compare at all with, say, the Korean war, or the Second World War.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, perhaps it would help if we had from General Milroy some evidence of the significance in this operation of the hard-surfaced roadways that they have.

We have had some information that the war is conducted along the hard-surfaced roads and that the bush is left rather to itself. Is this the fact?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Again it is a question of commenting on the manner in which the war is conducted, which is sort of a side-issue from our point of view unless it affects directly what we have to observe on.

Generally speaking, there are major roads—paved roads—in this area and the advances appear to be up these main roads from one centre of communication to the next.

That is a pretty broad statement and it by no means describes the manner in which all the operations are being conducted. I am not competent, really—I do not have sufficient information—to say how they are conducting all their operations.

Mr. Fairweather: Is it possible that this has some significance in the reluctance to provide land routes for the movement of relief supplies?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not get the actual connection. I would not want to answer that, except to say that I thought the Federal Military Government at one time had said they would provide land routes. But I could stand corrected on that.

Mr. Fairweather: You mentioned, of course, seeing the Nigerian troops and I am interested in what type they are; who they are; where they come from; whether they are a regular force, or a good many of them; whether they are young or old? Could you tell us about them?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The army has expanded from about 10,000 to about 80,000 in the period of about a year or just a little bit more. The recruits are recruited all over the country and go, I understand, to two training bases where they are trained and shipped out to the divisions. Therefore, so far as I know, there is no particular characteristic of any one particular force. The troops are young, generally speaking, and the officers are young. You would not call them a professional force; they have not been recruited that long.

• 1725

Mr. Fairweather: But 80,000 relative to the population of the country, even if we ignore for a moment the secessionist part, is not a significant number. Even Canada has more troops than Nigeria relative to population.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is a rough figure. How correct it is, I do not know.

Mr. Fairweather: Is there evidence of a high motivation? Are they freedom-fighters? Are they highly motivated in this objective of a one Nigeria concept?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Certainly the officers are, as the leaders; they seem to be highly motivated. The degree of motivation in the private soldier is one that I would find rather difficult to judge, particularly in an African soldier. It is sometimes hard enough to judge in a Canadian soldier.

Mr. Fairweather: I do not know whether Captain Groos has asked about the sea barricade of...

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): He is a colonel now. He is not a Captain!

Mr. Fairweather: Well, whatever he is he is a pleasant fellow, Mr. Chairman. I regret that...

Mr. Groos: That old Mississippi steamboat, or riverboat, captain!

Mr. Fairweather: Is there still an extensive blockade of the coast and of the sea routes, and so on?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The sea routes really are all in the hands of the Federal troops now, I would say.

Mr. Fairweather: Oh, yes. I should not have referred to the navy. I have been out of it too long.

I have just two final questions. You mentioned jetting around in General Gowon's aircraft. I think you said you preferred to do this in your own aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No; the only comment I have about his is that it is a very small aircraft and it would not carry the whole team.

Mr. Fairweather: But there are airstrips on which to land a small jet?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: A small jet, yes.

Mr. Fairweather: Who is the leader of your mission?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Our method of operation is that the chairmanship rotates weekly, normally on a Tuesday, unless we happen to be on a trip. In that case the chairman...

Mr. Fairweather: You have a duty roster?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes; and as a matter of fact this week the Polish colonel is the chairman.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Yewchuk?

Mr. Yewchuk: Mr. Chairman, almost all of my questions have already been answered. I have just one left, pertaining to the changes that you would like to see made in the form of the Observer Team. I presume that these would be in order to allow you a greater ability to decide whether or not there is actual genocide going on?

According to definition, genocide has to do with the intent of the destruction of a people, either in part or in whole. In view of the fact that there has to be the intent, do you feel that there is any way that you can come back and say that there is, or is not, genocide?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If I may go back, our task is to report on the behaviour...

Mr. Yewchuk: ...of the troops?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: ...of the troops. The allegation of genocide is an allegation, but the "behaviour" of the Federal troops can be taken in very wide scope. We are prepared to discuss it with the Federal Military Government. We have not done so yet, so I am a little hesitant about going into details, but our idea is to increase our numbers—there are really only eight of us on the team—sufficiently that we can keep a presence in each of the divisional areas. This is basically what we are suggesting.

At the moment we go out and because there are so few of us we all have to come back when we have a meeting to decide what we are going to do next. With a few more we could leave people out on the ground.

Mr. Yewchuk: Do you feel there would be much value in having observers right at the front lines while action is taking place?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the area we would expect the observer to go where he thinks he can see what he should be looking for. Because of what we are looking for we really should be where there are people. And this is farther back where the people are coming out of the bush and returning to the villages. This is where you want to see how they are treated. So that while the front line has certain fascinations, a great deal of what we are looking for takes place in the areas behind the front lines where there are more people.

• 1730

Mr. Yewchuk: I was thinking particularly of reports that soldiers come into a village and shoot up the marketplace, killing 500 people that are not involved in the war and that sort of thing.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Our view is that, generally speaking, if soldiers are fighting their way into a marketplace, there are not any people in that village—in that marketplace. But, if that is happening, we would like to be able to be reasonably close to things—follow them in.

Mr. Yewchuk: I am asking this question because we did get such a report that 500 people or so were shot in a marketplace who were just shopping. They were not involved in the war. I think that if there was an observer there to see whether this happened or not it could be a useful thing.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I agree. And our new method of organization would help us give more complete coverage to the area than we are now able to do at our present strength.

Mr. Yewchuk: The other thing that strikes me is the great contrast that we get here from observers on the Biafran side and from observers on the Nigerian side and, therefore, in order to try to come to some conciliation, do you think it would be useful to be on both sides—the same observers to be on both sides—rather than one on one side and another on the other side?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, I have answered that question earlier.

Mr. Yewchuk: I am sorry. I might have been away at that time.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: My view is that with our present terms of reference, the answer is no. If you want to change it, if the government wishes to change our terms of reference and give us other responsibilities, then this would be a matter for discussion. For example, if the observers go on the other side, are they going to observe only the Federal troops, or are they going to observe the troops on both sides? You see, it is quite a different problem. The specific problem given to us is to observe the behaviour of the Federal troops, and we think the place to do that is with the Federal troops. But if the governments concerned wish to change those terms of reference then...

Mr. Yewchuk: Yes. Well, I personally would like to see the terms of reference changed, and that is why I am asking whether you think it would be useful or not—to change it in that way?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Again, as I say, we were invited there to do a specific job. My task is

to report on how we do that job. I think the question of changing it then becomes a political problem which should be discussed between the Federal Military Government and our own government. After all, we are there at the invitation of the Federal Military Government. They asked us to come.

Mr. Yewchuk: The reason I am saying this is that we have to try to come up with some sort of recommendation, and as far as I am concerned I think that this might be a reasonable recommendation to make, that observers be on both sides. If you think it is useful, that recommendation should be made. If you do not think it would serve any useful purpose then, of course, the recommendation may not be made.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think I have expressed my view. This is an area in which I should not be drawn. This is obviously a decision for the Committee and not for me.

Mr. Yewchuk: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson has indicated he has a supplementary. We have been avoiding supplementaries and adhering to the order on the list. But if Mr. Forrestall, who is next on the list, has no objection, we could accept perhaps just one supplementary from Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My purpose for suggesting it is that it is directly related to the questions Dr. Yewchuk has been asking. You stated that it would be an advantage to have observers in all of the divisional areas. You have also referred to the reorganization of your observer duties. Have you, as an observer of one of the member countries, or as a group, made recommendations back to your respective governments or to our government on how you think the work of the Observer Team can be improved in order to meet what you state would be a more ideal situation?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: As we point out in our second interim report, we would like to discuss it with the Federal Military Government and if they are prepared to discuss it, we are prepared to make certain suggestions.

I do not know what the other members have done to prepare themselves for these discussions. In other words, if we are going to go in and make certain suggestions that changes be made, I think the preliminary point would be, first of all, for the Federal Military Government to agree that we should

make these changes, in which case it would then be a question of discussing it with our government and how they were to be implemented. We have our views, our suggestions, but it would have to be a question of discussion back and forth.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): But any restructuring—the initiative for any restructuring—would have to come from you as an Observer Team, would it not, and from your governments?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. The initiative I suggest would be from us as a suggestion to the Federal Military Government and from the Federal Military Government to our governments, who would have been briefed by us on what changes we thought, as a result of our discussion, should take place.

•1735

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Just one follow-up question. Do you know of any steps being taken in this regard towards the restructuring of your team—the expansion of its number and its duties? Perhaps the redefinition of its terms of reference.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, if any steps have been taken to discuss it, they have been taken in my absence in Lagos. I understand, although I was not there, that our government has expressed willingness to take certain steps if they are so recommended. I understand that the British Government are sending one more observer to their team.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Forrestall: My questions, Mr. Chairman, may be somewhat administrative in one sense. I am just wondering if some time during the course of our hearings we have been given a copy of the terms of reference that have been handed to General Milroy?

The Chairman: I have received from the Department the document which indicated the terms of reference and that will be submitted to the Steering Committee immediately after this meeting today. It will then either be filed as an exhibit or distributed at our next meeting. I received it today.

Mr. Forrestall: I think this is something we should have had at the very outset—the very start of our questions. It did not occur to me until the last day or so—the last few days.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall, you may recall it was asked for, and we had to obtain, as I recall the permission of the Government of Nigeria. That has now been obtained and I received it today. It will be made available tomorrow as soon as the Steering Committee...

Mr. Forrestall: Then it would not be proper to ask the General questions about his terms of reference?

The Chairman: Oh, I think so, yes. There is no reason why not.

Mr. Forrestall: You have mentioned repeatedly this afternoon what I gather would be a specific clause in the terms of reference or a specific term. Are there others, or could you outline briefly what they are?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, basically the general paragraph says that we are invited to observe the behaviour of the Federal Military troops in the war-affected zone. That is the general guide for our activities. That is the introduction of the letter. Under the terms of reference it states:

(i) *Visits:* To visit all war affected areas and newly liberated areas, on the Federal-controlled side, to witness the conduct of Federal troops—re charges of genocide, etc. Such visits may be undertaken at their own instance or at the instance of the Federal Military Government on receipt of any international allegations about the conduct of Federal troops in any particular area.

Now, that is the gist of it, you might say. There is then the question of reports, how we handle reports, and then the administrative details of transportation, accommodation, and things like that.

Now, as I pointed out in my initial briefing, my introduction, we enlarged on this on the basis of the fact that we would not necessarily operate as one team; we could split into smaller teams. Basically a team would never be less than two from different countries, either an observer or an assistant observer. Then there is the question of handling the release of material to the press.

Mr. Forrestall: Do your terms of reference invite you to file your majority report, and hopefully never a minority report, with the Federal Military Government?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In fact, it says that the reports are to be made to individual countries or organizations. It says, in fact, that the

team will make their visit together and sign their reports collectively. Well, in fact, we do not. We make our visits so far to a division—although this week we are not doing that—together and we then split up in the division. We have been signing our reports collectively but there is a provision, certainly an understanding although it is not covered here, that if there is a minority report it will be filed.

Mr. Forrestall: Do you, as normal course, file a copy of your report with some authority in Lagos, some office?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I keep forgetting you do not actually have a copy of the report as it is issued. But the report as it is issued is addressed in action copies to the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Government of Canada, the Government of Poland, the Government of Sweden, and the Government of the United Kingdom. The copies are sent to the Organization of African Unity and the Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That is the normal distribution we give the report. And that distribution is given when the report is signed.

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Mr. Forrestall: While I am still on this, could I ask you what is your understanding, either through discussions with Nigerian or Federal Government officials or among yourselves, as to an interpretation of an international allegation?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The subject has not really arisen and I would think the interpretation would be pretty broad. If we decide that we wish to take up a problem, we just go ahead and do it. That is the way we have been operating. We have not had any allegations other than the one about the problem of Okigwi and that, in fact, we did at the request of the Federal Military Government.

Mr. Forrestall: I ask the question because it occurs, I think, to other members of the Committee as well as to myself that the only international allegation of genocide that has been levelled, of course, has come from Biafran officials. Or have you been apprised of other allegations?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The reference is one I have taken from this letter so there is a specific basis for that that we did not look for. The specific reference was given in the terms of reference and we did not look for it. But I would say that our interpretation of an allegation would be quite broad.

Mr. Forrestall: If, for example, another African country were to make such an allegation, you would feel constrained to report back to your government on the implication of that charge.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, we would report what we could find about it. In other words, we would report on the charge in so far as we could.

Mr. Forrestall: General, I think this is something that perhaps the steering committee should go into a little more thoroughly, and I will not want to mislead by any questions I ask. Can I ask you, because it is my understanding that this is a written thing and again it may be administrative, Mr. Chairman, what is this Code of Conduct? Is this a written document?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is, and somewhere in all my papers I have one or at least, I had one this morning. It is a small booklet which I...

The Chairman: That is a document which I received from the Department, and subject to the direction of the steering committee, this will be distributed privately to the members of the Committee before the meeting tomorrow. It is not a public document but will be made available to the Members.

Mr. Forrestall: There have been loose references to it and in some instances people have retreated into it and advanced away from it in some of the questions that have gone on. Well, that is fine. It will be distributed and the question of the terms of reference will be dealt with in the subcommittee. Will we have some result of that before us that will permit us, perhaps, in the formation of our... Again, General, I am sorry, I do not want to tread upon ground that is going to be discussed in another area. Will this be a report, for example, that will come forward from the steering committee that the whole Committee will be able to discuss?

The Chairman: I am going to suggest to the steering committee that copies be made available to members of the Committee. They will

be xeroxed and made available to members of the Committee, so you will have them before the meeting tomorrow or as soon as the meeting convenes.

Mr. Forrestall: I see. I was not trying to anticipate recommendations from that that might form part of a larger one but I was hoping that that was what would happen. Thank you, General, and again may I add my best wishes to you on your return. Incidentally, is it very hot over there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Right now it is not too bad. When you are out in the field it is a little warmer than here but it is a reasonably dry season and it is quite comfortable.

Mr. Forrestall: It is not the rainy season?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Forrestall: Have you had an opportunity to have a can of good Canadian beer yet?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Forrestall: We understand there was a fair amount of it shipped out there.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Nigerian beer is very good.

The Chairman: Well, gentlemen, this seems a happy note on which to conclude our deliberations for this evening. I would remind the members of the steering subcommittee to congregate up here if they will so that we can discuss procedures. We will meet again tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

An hon. Member: In this same room?

The Chairman: We hope in this same room. You will get notice of that meeting.

Mr. Ryan: Could we have a list of speakers so that we will know where we are at?

• 1745

The Chairman: The speakers I have on the list are Messrs. Alexander, MacLean, Monaghan, Hymmen; and on the second round, Mr. Groos, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Cafik.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.


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Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

12

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968



STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 12

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1968

Respecting

The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESS:

Major General William A. Milroy, Senior Canadian Observer
on the Observer Team to Nigeria.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and

Mr. Alexander	Mr. Groos	Mr. MacLean
Mr. Anderson	Mr. Harkness	Mr. Marceau
Mr. Barrett	Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Mongrain
Mr. Brewin	Mr. Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	Mr. Nesbitt
Mr. Buchanan	<i>Boundary</i>)	Mr. Ouellet
Mr. Cafik	Mr. Hymmen	Mr. Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
Mr. Fairweather	Mr. Laprise	Mr. Thompson (<i>Red</i>
Mr. Forrestall	Mr. Legault	<i>Deer</i>)
Mr. Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	Mr. Lewis	Mr. Winch
Mr. Gibson	Mr. MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Mr. Yewchuk—(30)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

(Quorum 16)

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
TUESDAY, October 22, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. MacDonald (*Egmont*), be substituted for that of Mr. Carter on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, October 23, 1968.
(20)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 4:00 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Hopkins, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, Marceau, Mongrain, Ouellet, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch, Yewchuk (28).

Also present: Mr. Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), M.P.

In attendance: Major General William A. Milroy, Senior Canadian Observer on the Observer Team to Nigeria.

The Committee agreed, unanimously, to print the following documents as Appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Terms of Reference of the Observer Team To Nigeria (see Appendix N)

Observer Team's Third Interim Report, dated October 23, 1968 (see Appendix O).

The Clerk was instructed to distribute copies to the Members of two letters written to the *Montreal Star* by Professor Michael Brecher of McGill University, which he enclosed in a letter to Mr. Brewin, M.P., dated October 21, 1968.

The Clerk was also instructed to distribute copies to the Members of a letter to the Chairman dated October 21, 1968, from Professor W. F. Dawson of the University of Western Ontario, together with an article from *The Listener* dated Thursday 19 September 1968 Vol. 80 No. 2060.

Mr. Brewin reported that Dean St. John Macdonald of the University of Toronto Law School will present a brief to the Committee. The Chairman noted that additional briefs from interested parties will be accepted, before the Committee completes its current hearings.

During the afternoon sitting, members continued their questioning of Major General Milroy. At approximately 6:15 p.m. the questioning ended. The Chairman thanked Major General Milroy for his testimony and the witness retired.

Mr. Fairweather moved, seconded by Mr. Alexander,

That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence recommend that the Prime Minister of Canada enlist the cooperation of other Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Heads of State with a view to the early convening of an extraordinary meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers

and Heads of State having among its objectives an immediate ceasefire between Nigeria and Biafra, and stopping the supply of armaments to either combatant.

The Committee agreed to refer the motion to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

Mr. Fairweather moved, seconded by Mr. Alexander,

That this Committee recommends that the Secretary of State for External Affairs take such steps as may be necessary, on an urgent basis, to ensure that Canada's Hercules aircraft are used to their full potential for supplying food and medical supplies to Nigeria and Biafra by—

(a) making the aircraft available to relief organizations now flying supplies from Sao Tome and

(b) making direct representations to the government of Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea to break the existing deadlocks which are preventing the International Committee of the Red Cross from making effective use of the aircraft consigned to it.

The Committee agreed to refer the motion to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would meet immediately after this afternoon's sitting.

The Committee adjourned at 6:20 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Wednesday, October 23, 1968

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we are ready to proceed.

Your Steering Subcommittee met last evening and have agreed upon the following procedure. We hope to finish hearing evidence from General Milroy this afternoon; the General is anxious to get back. Then we had hoped to be able to call Mr. Telli the Secretary-general of the Organization for African Unity, who had been in New York. However, it appears that he has left New York, is somewhere in Africa, and will not be available to give evidence this week.

Mr. Brewin, have you heard about the possible brief from Dean Macdonald?

Mr. Brewin: I am in the process of hearing.

The Chairman: We expect to have a brief from Dean Macdonald of the University of Toronto Law School, which will be considered by your Steering Committee when it arrives and possibly attached as an appendix to the proceedings, if that seems to be an appropriate course to follow.

There are a number of other people who have volunteered to give evidence. I am sure their evidence would be most helpful but, on the other hand, the Steering Committee felt, because of the urgency of getting a report to Parliament and because of the amount of evidence we have already heard, that we should proceed with our report. We are suggesting that those who wish to give evidence should submit briefs, which can then be considered by the Steering Committee when they arrive.

That is the procedure we will follow, if it is agreeable to members of the committee.

Mr. Macdonald (Egmont): Will the briefs be printed?

The Chairman: It will depend upon the brief; they may be worth printing or they may not be.

Mr. Brewin: May I ask a question which is related to this, Mr. Chairman?

I have received a letter from Michael Brecher, a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at McGill University. It seems that he has sent a communication to you as Chairman. Might I ask whether you have received it and what you propose to do about it?

The Chairman: Who was the letter from, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Professor Michael Brecher.

The Chairman: I do not recall seeing it unless it is in today's mail, which I have not had a chance to look at yet.

Mr. Brewin: I have also sent copies of these letters to Mr. Wahn with the request that they be brought to the attention of members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

The Chairman: I do not recall seeing that letter.

Mr. Brewin: Will you look into it then?

The Chairman: Yes. Have you a copy of the letter?

Mr. Brewin: I have a copy. He wrote two letters, I think, to the *Montreal Star* which contained suggestions as to what this Committee should do or recommend.

Mr. Buchanan: Mr. Chairman, you have the one from Professor Dawson?

The Chairman: Yes, I was going to mention that I have received a letter from Professor Dawson of the Department of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario, enclosing a copy of an article on this general subject by Dame Marjorie Perham and suggesting that we call her as a witness. If it is agreeable to the members I could perhaps have this article xeroxed and distributed to the members and then you could decide whether or not you wish it annexed as an appendix.

Mr. Brewin: So we do not have a lot of extra motions would you like to include this

in that? It is the same type of thing, a communication from a professor.

The Chairman: Yes, this is a letter from Professor Michael Brecher from the Department of Economic and Political Science.

• 1605

Mr. Brewin: Some part of the letter may be personal to me, although I do not think it is.

Mr. Winch: May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I believe this is our twentieth meeting since October 8. A great deal of information has been received and many witnesses heard. You have stated that one or two witnesses are not available to the Committee at this time but that they may submit briefs. Has the Steering Committee considered whether or not we have not now had sufficient information to end the actual hearings so we can go to work on the preparation of whatever recommendations the Committee wants to make?

The Chairman: Yes, I am glad you mentioned that, Mr. Winch. The Steering Committee decided yesterday that they should prepare a draft report and then submit it to this Committee. In other words we will put the report under preparation immediately and we will not wait for these briefs. No doubt the briefs will come in before we complete our report and, if necessary, we can modify the draft report.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I realize the urgency of bringing down a report to the House of Commons on this matter and I realize that the Steering Committee itself has made certain decisions as to which witnesses are going to appear and which ones are not going to appear. In any event, I would at this moment like to go on record and state that in my personal view a Committee such as this cannot really do its job properly unless it at least has one or two witnesses who live in the Nigerian area. This is a problem which concerns Africans and we have not heard from one African yet, and it seems to me a bit absurd that a group of so-called foreigners to a country should discuss this whole problem without listening to the people who actually live there and are native to it. I just want to go on record indicating that I think we ought to bring some witnesses from that area. We know that some are available.

Mr. Groos: You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that at one particular meeting agreement was reached on a list of proposed witnesses.

The Chairman: It is for that reason that we sought to call on Mr. Telli. We thought he would be the best possible witness to have. Unfortunately that is not possible.

Mr. Cafik: My point really is that we should substitute someone for him who is native, if at all possible.

The Chairman: What are the views of the members of the Committee on the point raised by Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Alexander: We could perhaps be of assistance to him in one regard. As far as the Biafrans are concerned, apparently the CBC has a taped interview with Ojukwu. Of course this again would only give you one side of the picture. I am sure that they are prepared not only to come in order that we can hear this taped interview, but also show some pictures that were taken there. As I said, this is only one side of the story, but at the same time it would give an indication of his thoughts on this matter. That tape is presently available, sir.

Mr. Winch: Has any thought been given, or is it not diplomatic to ask the Nigerian ambassador whether he would like to appear before this Committee. I am just going on your suggestion now.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, I think someone who is native to the area should appear.

Mr. Winch: Is that undiplomatic or is it a possibility, Mr. Chairman? I am going on the basis now of what my friend just said. In order to get the official Nigerian point of view is it possible to ask say, a representative of the Nigerian Embassy to appear before this Committee.

The Chairman: This was discussed by the Steering Committee last evening. It was thought that Mr. Telli would be the ideal man to get. Are there any further comments.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I have just been down to the east door. Certain people who want to come in and attend the meeting of this Committee have been barred on the grounds that there has been a decision by the Chairman of the Committee that this meeting be held in camera. Quite clearly there are people here who are not members of the Committee and I think if

there is a decision taken to hold it in camera we should either ask these people who are here to leave or else let in those people down below who want to come in.

• 1610

The Chairman: I have a note from the corporal. Apparently these people who are down below put on a demonstration in the minister's office this morning and the security guards are anxious that there should be no repetition of this. I had suggested, because we are anxious that General Milroy finish his testimony this afternoon, that they be admitted on the basis of giving an undertaking that they would not disrupt our proceedings. Now if they have not been prepared to give that undertaking then I think we should proceed without them.

Mr. Anderson: Sir, I can only speak for one person, whom I have met before, who is down there. This person was not a member of the group that went to Mr. Sharp's office this morning. She has given an undertaking to behave herself when she is in the building, and I see no reason at all that she should not be allowed up here.

The Chairman: I agree with that.

Mr. Anderson: Will you, sir, get in touch with the Chairman of the Committees Branch?

An hon. Member: You could give her the message. You have just heard it.

The Chairman: You know the person you are speaking of. So far as I am concerned any person who will give such an undertaking and who is known to you will be allowed into this committee room.

Mr. Anderson: Nevertheless, the corporals at the door are operating, I imagine, quite correctly, under orders given by the Chairman of the Committees Branch. It may be incorrectly, but nevertheless this is their understanding. Perhaps you could do something about it, because I fear that my powers of persuasion would be inadequate.

The Chairman: In order to avoid legal technicalities, I will not require a written opinion on whether I have authority to countermand the instructions given by the Chairman of the Committees Branch. About all I can do is to pass to the corporal the message that I would be happy to have this, or any other

person giving such an undertaking, attend our hearing. Would you inform the corporal?

Mr. Anderson: I will be delighted to. Perhaps while I am going downstairs you could telephone down to the desk and tell them that I am a representative of the Chairman of the Committee?

The Chairman: I have a note from the corporal. Perhaps the best plan is for me to put my remarks on the note.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Mr. Chairman, I think it should be made very clear, to avoid a repetition of what took place this morning that if there is any demonstration at all they will not be allowed to stay.

The Chairman: Oh, they will be put out if there is any demonstration.

Mr. Anderson: I will make that point to them, Mr. Thompson. It is a very good one.

Mr. Barrett: Mr. Chairman, perhaps you should ask them to leave and not throw them out. After all...

Mr. Anderson: It will amount to the same thing, in any event.

The Chairman: Mr. Hopkins, I think you were first.

Mr. Hopkins: I would like to concur with Mr. Thompson's suggestion. I saw part of the episode this morning and I think it is something that should not be repeated within any of these buildings.

The Chairman: Are there any further comments?

Mr. Alexander: May we have some elaboration of that, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Perhaps we should not get into the details of what happened this morning. We have agreed to let them in if they will undertake not to create a demonstration.

We were on the question of hearing additional witnesses. If there are no further comments this matter could be left to the members of the Steering Committee. I would ask the members of that Committee to meet with me in this room after this meeting to make a final decision on that point.

We did discuss it at length last night. There is urgency in getting in a report; and because of the amount of evidence we have had on all sides, and because of the fact that we have a

number of documents as appendices, including the report from the Organization of African Unity—even though we have not had Africans personally present—we do feel that we have a great deal of the relevant information. We felt that we were in a position to get on with the report. We thought the House wanted us to report quickly and that was the reason for the decision of last night.

However, would it be agreeable to the members to leave it to the Steering Committee to make the final decision tonight or whether any further testimony, presumably Africans, should be called?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

• 1615

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, may I bring up a point before we go on to the actual testimony? I want to refer to a *Globe and Mail* article dated Wednesday, October 23, 1968, under the misleading title: "Couldn't find 'massacre' town, Milroy says". This gives the impression, I think, to many people that we have had a group of incompetents down there on the International Observer Team.

Mr. Brewin: Or else a group of liars giving evidence.

Mr. Cafik: If I may proceed without interruption, you will be given a chance to speak in a moment. There are two or three points which, I think, for the purpose of clarification, should be brought up. First of all it states:

...military uniforms worn by the four observers may have frightened refugees and discouraged them from coming out of the bush to talk to the observers.

I heard no evidence of that nature at all yesterday. May I ask General Milroy if that is a statement that he made, or is it in any way related to anything that he said?

Major-General W. A. Milroy (Canadian Member, International Observer Team, Nigeria): No; I believe, as I remember it, it was suggested that perhaps the fact that we wore military uniforms might frighten the people that we were questioning. The people we were questioning were not those coming out of the bush. They were people in the camps or in the villages.

There was never any suggestion that people came directly out of the bush to talk to the Observer Group. Therefore the statement about our uniforms frightening people was

not a suggestion made by me. It may be a suggestion made by someone else, as I understand it. Also, I do not believe that the question of speaking to people coming directly out of the bush was made by me.

Mr. Cafik: From my recollection...

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. If we allow our procedure to go forward whereby we start raising newspaper articles—and there will be many written on this Committee and others—and then comparing them with what the witnesses said we are going to get into a long series of discussions of this kind.

If Mr. Cafik wants to raise questions with the witness about an article he may do it in the regular way, but to raise it as a point of order and to have this established as the procedure seems to me to be very unwise.

Mr. Gibson: I wish to support Mr. Cafik. I think that there is a point of order here. It is almost a point of privilege. If this Committee's evidence is being distorted, or the public is being misled, it is a denial of justice to the Canadian people. I support him 100 per cent.

The Chairman: We need not have an extensive discussion on the point of order. I believe there is a precedent from yesterday, as a matter of fact, when this same headline was referred to.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No. It was another article. It may have been on the same point.

The Chairman: But the same point was raised. Perhaps we would make better progress if we had the correction made by the witness and then proceeded with the questioning.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I had the impression that we were going to deal with a number of things in this article.

Mr. Cafik: No. If you will be patient for a moment there are only three points that I want to bring out. I think they are all very important.

The second point is this. It says:

...Gen. Milroy said. But he conceded that in some cases elders emerged from the bush to tell the team that their people were afraid to come out.

Did such a thing happen? It says that elders came out of the bush and told your team that

their people in the bush were afraid to come out.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I said that, yes.

Mr. Cafik: You said that.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes; that people are afraid to come out of the bush because of the fear they have that the Federal troops will harm them.

Mr. Cafik: But the implication is that the leaders came out and spoke to your team.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik, I do not think we can get into an extended discussion of it.

Mr. Cafik: I am not too sure of that. However, the next point is this, again a quote of yourself:

"Because of a very strong possibility that they would be killed," the general replied.

This was in answer to a question about why they were afraid. Did you say that yesterday?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think it was a fear of being killed.

Mr. Cafik: Yes. That is quite a different thing.

An hon. Member: A fear of being killed—that is the same thing.

Mr. Cafik: No; the strong possibility of being...

The Chairman: Order, please. General Milroy has explained that remark.

Is that the final point?

Mr. Cafik: Yes, that is the final point.

Mr. Anderson: As I suspected, Mr. Chairman, your written word of authority was insufficient and my friends downstairs are still waiting. I was told that only the Speaker or the Sergeant-at-Arms could let them in. If you would please write notes to the appropriate people, or, better still, telephone them...

The Chairman: I think we must proceed with our meeting. I will ask Mr. Ryan to take over as Chairman. If we could have a conference perhaps we could settle it.

• 1620

The Vice-Chairman: I have received from the Chairman a list of the members that have not yet asked questions. They are Mr. Mongrain, Mr. Hymmen, Mr. Alexander and Mr.

MacLean. On the second round the list is Messrs. Groos, Ryan, Cafik, MacDonald and Brewin. If there are any members who have not questioned yet and wish to do so I will add their names to the first round list.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): There is not much point in adding more names unless we retain our Observer here for a further couple of days. I do not think that is necessary.

The Vice-Chairman: We hope that those on the second round will not take so long as perhaps they took the first time. Mr. Mongrain?

Mr. Mongrain: I will pass for the time being.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Hymmen?

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, I just have one question. I am sorry I had to leave early last evening.

Can General Milroy tell us what importance the Nigerian Government attaches this amnesty circular that was produced the day before yesterday, not as evidence but as just a piece of material, in which there was a reference to the safety of lives and property and to medical care and food? What importance do they attach to this, and what degree of success have they had with it so far

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, we have encountered its successful use only in one area, which is around the Awgu area and to the east. There we saw two groups of guards who had reported in and were on their way back to bring in their families.

The actual location of these people is one that we would propose to visit on this second trip, to see, in fact, how many had come back out into their village.

The Federal Government certainly would like to use these. Their effectiveness is probably to a great extent hindered by the fact that in many of the areas where they are dropped they fall into trees and other things and do not get down to the ground where the people can read them. In the particular area where they were used the bush did not appear to be quite so thick and there were more open areas. Probably that is why they were more successful in that particular area.

I understand they are proposing to drop a great many more, but I would have to confirm that when I go back.

Mr. Hymmen: In that same connection, of course, the more educated Ibos, probably from past experience or from the official view of the Biafran Government, would hold this piece of literature suspect.

• 1625

Has the FMG done anything in the way of substantiating this offer of safety? I know it was not in your terms of reference to go into past history and investigate the massacre of 30,000, or the bombing at Calabar or at any other place, but are they doing anything such as by way of radio broadcasts to try to show that they are sincere in their offer of safety for any Ibos who wish to return to the other side?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: At this time I could not give any detailed evidence on what they have done. I suggest that perhaps the request that our observers go to their territory might be one action that would qualify under the heading that you have described.

Mr. Hymmen: Someone on the Committee suggested the other day that your team should contact some of the people who had given evidence before this Committee about the situation in the Biafran sector. My question is this: the International Red Cross is pretty well represented in these areas. In your explanation you mentioned that any time you met in a certain location there were Red Cross personnel there. Is it not one of the duties of a person representing the International Red Cross to point out to their superiors, and, in turn, to the Nigerian Government, any atrocities which have become evident or have taken place?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This would certainly be a source, and it was one of the sources, of course, of the information on which the trip to Okigwi was based—obviously from Red Cross sources.

How the Red Cross processes information like that, or whether it gets it, I am not too sure; but I assume that if it did come up through their chain of command they would take it to the Federal Military Government and ask for an explanation. There are several other ways in which they could handle it; and if it became an allegation which would come to our attention we would look into it.

As I read the terms of reference there is no particular restriction on the way in which any allegation can come to our attention.

Mr. Hymmen: No; but any International Red Cross representative who was familiar, through direct evidence or hearsay, with this massacre that was supposed to have taken place near Aba would not be inhibited in any way in presenting this evidence to your group?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, I hope not.

Mr. Hymmen: And they have not as yet?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not yet.

Mr. Hymmen: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to direct your attention to your October 15 report. I refer you to page 4 and with the section dealing with *Deliberate Destruction of Life*.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Could I perhaps have the paragraph number? My pages are not the same as yours.

Mr. Alexander: I do not believe there are any paragraph numbers to them General. It is under the title, *Deliberate Destruction of Life*. Have you found that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have that.

Mr. Alexander: In the centre of the paragraph you will see the word "Practically".

Practically all Ibos...

Can you find that, sir?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. Alexander: It says,

Practically all Ibos testify to the fair treatment they receive from officers, but some assert that on a number of occasions they have been insulted...

And I would like you to direct your attention to that word "insulted",

...by other ranks.

Then there is your recommendation, sir, following which you state,

We therefore consider that selection of army personnel to look after prisoners, internees and displaced persons should be very carefully done.

What I am trying to do now is to ascertain whether you meant "insulted" or "assaulted" there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Insulted.

Mr. Alexander: Insulted? Why is it so necessary to be extremely careful in choosing army personnel who would look after the prisoners, internees and displaced persons if it was just a case of insult?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We are suggesting that even insult is not really acceptable in this particular case, and we are drawing it to the attention of the Federal Military authorities so that they can make sure that the people who are put in charge will be properly selected, so that incidents and allegations like these cannot be made. That is the suggestion we have made.

Mr. Alexander: So it was your intention, then, to have a high degree of choice of personnel just for the purpose of presenting insults rather than assaults.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes; and this is what we are referring to here, yes.

Mr. Alexander: I see. I now direct you to the same brief on the next page—it probably is page 5—where you refer to the Conduct of Federal Troops. That is under subsection (b) and I read:

The conduct of federal troops appears to vary between sectors, as does their attitude to the civil population. The degree of positive action taken to obtain the confidence of the local Ibos depends at present on the attitude of the sector commander.

Reading this it appears to me that the attitude, or conduct, of the Federal troops can be good, bad, indifferent and, perhaps, with an intention of genocide. Would you agree with that?

• 1630

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, I would not, sir. This is the area in which, as we pointed out, the operational commanders who are responsible for the conduct of operations are also responsible for the administrative control of the areas behind their areas of operation.

This makes them responsible not only for conducting operations but for looking after the conduct of any displaced persons' camps and the return of the local inhabitants to their villages.

The degree of care and excellence with which the camps we went to were run depended a great deal on the operational

commander and his actual task. I think there were four sector commanders, or the equivalent of brigade commanders, in this particular area that we are discussing.

The standards vary. Some of the camps were very, very good in this regard. In one particular case it was a very well run camp. Others were not quite so well run.

This is the basis for the suggestion we make further on that they consider reducing the administrative responsibilities of their operational commanders and placing the administrative areas so released under the control either of officers specially appointed or, even better, under civilian administration.

Mr. Alexander: Am I to conclude, then, that your reference to the word "conduct" has nothing to do with conduct on the field of battle?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. This was not what we were referring to. This is not their operational conduct in fighting. It really has more reference to how they handle the administrative task of looking after the displaced persons, which is what really worried us. We are not reporting on whether they fight well or otherwise.

Mr. Alexander: But I thought that one of your terms of reference was to ascertain whether or not there was a philosophy of genocide. This would have reference to the conduct of troops inasmuch as these troops would be pursuing the wishes or the desires of the government.

I directed your attention to the word "conduct" because I wondered in terms of whether it was their conduct in the field of battle that we were referring to; but we have cleared that up.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Primarily, here, we are more hitting at the administrative looking after of the displaced persons that they have in administrative areas.

Mr. Alexander: General, we had a witness the other day, Dr. Shepherd, who had spent twelve years in Nigeria. He made the statement, as the result of his observations—and his experience there was on both sides of the fence, incidentally—that there were some people who had the tendency to, or the intention of, genocide. On questioning he admitted somewhat reluctantly—but at the same time he admitted it—that this applied to personnel of the army. Would this be in conflict with any of your views?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is somewhat in conflict with our definition of genocide, which, again, as I said, is a program with specific intention.

I gather he was saying that there were those in the armed forces who might take the opportunity to do harm to Ibo people. That is not necessarily genocide. It can be any one of a number of things, but not necessarily genocide. This is his opinion. I would not want to debate that.

It is quite possible that such people do exist—I am sure they probably do—but to relate that to genocide does not fit under our understanding of the word “intention” at all.

Mr. Alexander: I believe what he indicated was that there was an intention of genocide on the part of some army personnel.

Let us move on General. You are familiar with the article in the *Globe and Mail* this morning referring to your second report?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Alexander: It is stated in that article that the Observers' second report was rejected by Biafra. With the consent of the Chairman—and I know he will give it, because members have been reading from various articles, newspapers and so on...

● 1635

The Chairman: I have the article here, Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander: Perhaps I could help the General. For the purpose of the record, it says:

Biafran officials yesterday rejected the second report of a team of international observers invited by Nigeria to watch the conduct of the war.

The Chairman: Mr. Alexander, is it your intention to try to put this into the record as evidence, or do you have a question for General Milroy? He has the report before him. It is not necessary to read it.

Mr. Alexander: Then I will give him an opportunity to read it, sir.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: To begin with, I am slightly confused in that it refers to the second report. The second report of our Observer group dealt with the visit to the Third Divisional area, which does not include Onitsha. Onitsha was included in our third visit on which the report has just been issued.

The only comment I wish to make is that in fact there is a camp in Onitsha that contains, I would say, about a thousand people.

Mr. Alexander: Did you visit that town?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I did; I stayed the night in the town.

The Chairman: Mr. Alexander, perhaps I might interrupt at this point on a matter that may be relevant.

We have now received the third interim report of the Observer Team, which has just been referred to by General Milroy. I have copies of it and perhaps this would be the appropriate time to have the clerk distribute them to the members.

Is it agreed that this be printed as an appendix to the proceedings, as have others?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: I am sorry, Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander: You say that you did visit that area, General.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We visited the town of Onitsha. My team—you will remember how we broke up—actually toured around the outskirts of Onitsha and visited Asaba on the other side of the river. We spent the night in the town of Onitsha and we visited the camp in which we assessed that there were about a thousand people.

In that camp they were practically all Ibos and people who had lived in Onitsha. Those in the camp pretty well ran it themselves. They had a school operating there; there was a small market operating there; and they seemed to be an extremely efficient group and running their own affairs.

Mr. Alexander: Is there any truth in the statement, then, that because of atrocities committed by the Federal troops in their advance to Onitsha almost every Biafran civilian fled the town and that the few civilians who could not escape were slaughtered, even in churches?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have no basis of information on which to agree with that statement at all; and I heard nothing. Onitsha has been occupied for some time.

Mr. Alexander: Yes. But you questioned people there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is right, I did.

Mr. Alexander: And you find no basis for this particular statement that I read?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Alexander: I see. All right, General; thank you very much.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): General, I have not read all your evidence of yesterday, but I take it you have met General Gowon personally, have you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have met him once.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Can you tell us anything about him as a person—his education, character, age? How old is he?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Thirty-four on Saturday. He was educated in the military school at Sandhurst. I am sure he has been to Staff College. I know he is a graduate of the joint services Staff College in the United Kingdom.

He seemed to be a very reasonable officer indeed and he gave us what I thought was a very reasoned briefing before we started our discussions on how we were going to operate. Aside from that that is probably all I should say.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Could you tell us something about his government? We have heard something about his army and the weapons his army uses. Is it a one-man government, so to speak? Does he have a cabinet and so on, and if so, how are they appointed?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: He does have a cabinet. I am not an expert on his government. Of course, this is not an area in which I am qualified to report.

• 1640

I know that on my way to the hearings here I travelled with the Minister of Education of his government, who is a civilian and who was on his way to attend an educational conference of some type in Paris.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): We did have witnesses, I think, who had talked with Colonel Ojukwu. I just wondered whether you had met General Gowon.

It is a military government, so-called?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is a military government.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): And does he have advisers such as cabinet ministers?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Both civilian and military. In our initial briefing he was attended by both military and civilian advisers. I think probably most of them would be classified more as sort of deputy ministers rather than perhaps cabinet ministers.

I can say that in the briefing and the discussions we had, he emphasized several times—not once but several times—that he wanted us to tell him anything we saw that we thought he should know. He emphasized that repeatedly.

Mr. Smith: On the other side, of course, you have never met Col. Ojukwu.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Smith: So you cannot tell us anything about his government as such. That is all; thank you, General.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Winch goes on, you went out a moment ago to get people in. Could you report on your mission?

The Chairman: Oh, yes, definitely; I would be glad to. Apparently, to let them in required permission of the Speaker. I spoke to the Speaker and he said that in view of the fact that they were prepared to give undertakings not to create a demonstration, he would speak to the Sergeant-at-Arms, so presumably the wheels are turning and these people will be permitted in in due course, Mr. Brewin. The Speaker said he would arrange it in any event. So they should be in quite promptly.

Mr. Hymmen: They should be in next week, then.

Mr. Brewin: The wheels are turning with their usual speed.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, most of the questions I had in mind have already been asked and answered, but if possible I would like to have some clarification on three. Now, in asking on these three, may I say that I understand the position of General Milroy, which is somewhat delicate, and therefore I will understand if he cannot answer.

I was most interested in the remarks the General made about certain thoughts which the Observer Team have in mind and want to discuss with the Nigerian Government in order to make their Team more efficient.

In view of what the Team of Observers have in mind and because they think that they can do a more expeditious job is it possible for him to give us some indication, if their ideas are accepted, as to how large a group he thinks will be required from Canada in order to create a sufficiency as far as Canada is concerned, and will they all be of military status, or perhaps part civilian?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Assuming the Federal Military Government accepts our suggestion that we discuss the matter and our suggestion that the group should be enlarged, the numbers from Canada—and I am hazarding a guess here because it has to be discussed—probably would not be more than about ten.

Mr. Winch: About ten.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. This includes communications.

Mr. Winch: Could I then ask: if this comes about—it will be a decision of government, I know—would it be your thought that in addition to the additional ten Canada should make available transport and communication facilities in order to expedite your work?

• 1645

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I shall put it this way. If the Federal Military Government agrees with our suggestions, then the Team among themselves might come up with suggestions as to how the additional people and facilities could be provided, and I would come back and suggest certain things that we could provide; and communications would be one that I might suggest Canadians could provide.

Mr. Winch: Thank you. The other day we had evidence given by Doctor Shepherd, of whom you have already heard. He informed this Committee that his own hospital was razed by Nigerian Air Force and that he knew from his medical and missionary colleagues that other hospitals, and schools which are now hospitals, had also been razed. Do I understand from what you told us yesterday, in view of the fact that we got this straight from Doctor Shepherd, who was there and whose own hospital was razed, that you have found no indication where you have been of hospitals or schools used as hospitals

being razed when they are not in the centre of military targets?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We had neither any particular evidence of this, nor did I personally see any hospitals that had been razed in that way. However, in our continuing investigations we may well come across some. I am not ruling it out; I am just saying that to date we have not seen it.

Mr. Winch: You have not?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not I, personally. Mind you, I did make the point that the Owerri Hospital area had been shelled. By whom I am not prepared to say, but it had been shelled; but not the buildings themselves.

Mr. Winch: I have been rather interested in your visit. I notice that it appears—now if I am wrong, you tell me immediately—that you have been visiting areas that have been under Federal control for many, many months.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, sir, that is not quite correct. We have visited some areas that have been under Federal control for a long time, but other areas have quite recently been occupied by Federal troops; Aba, for example, and Owerri—Owerri, I think, about a couple of weeks. The airfield in Obilagu when we went there had been occupied about three days.

Mr. Winch: Do you estimate that your major job is to get where there has been recent activity?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is one of our jobs. Not necessarily our major job. I still feel that one of our major jobs is to get back into the areas where the Ibos are coming out of hiding, or the people are coming out of hiding, and see how they are treated. As I pointed out, in most of the forward areas there is practically no one to be seen at all; there are only soldiers around; there are no civilians to be seen around at all. Therefore, we think that the most important places to go to are the villages, the marketplaces and the camps, to try to find out where the people are and how they are being treated. To find the people and see how they are being looked after.

Mr. Winch: On my last question I hope you can give us some advice, but it is up to you, sir. We have been told on several occasions by witnesses there has been a breakdown in the past on what could be termed a ground route for the supplying of relief from the

Nigerian area into Biafra; and if my interpretation is correct, the evidence would seem to be that there was a breakdown although both agreed because of a refusal to make the ground route a demilitarized area. In your travels, is it possible for you to indicate, from what you have been able to see and hear—you can only speak from the Nigerian side—as to a ground route being established, but demilitarized so that it is not part of war, but through for relief? I think it would mean a lot to us if you would give us any views on that.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am afraid, sir, that I am not well briefed at all on the discussions that went on on the establishment of a land route. The establishment of a land route is not difficult; it is just the conditions that you pointed out—the restrictions that have to be observed on it. My understanding is that the Federal Military Government has agreed to such a proposal; just why the negotiations broke down I am not prepared to say.

• 1650

Mr. Winch: And that is the very point I am at. You understand that they agreed to it.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I understood.

Mr. Winch: Have you any understanding as to whether they would agree to its being a demilitarized zone on each side of the route? Have you any information of that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. As I said, I do not know the details.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Winch. We have a number of names of members for the second round of questioning. Are there any more for the first round before we proceed with the second round?

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, I think I was on the list for the first round of questioning.

The Chairman: I am sorry, Mr. MacLean, in error your name was struck off. We will call you now. Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you. General Milroy, could you refresh our memory and tell us when this code of conduct for the Nigerian forces was issued, approximately?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have taken a look at my book and it is not dated, and therefore I would be wrong if I gave you a specific date. I do not know. My understanding was that it

was issued this past summer. But about that I cannot be specific.

Mr. MacLean: Someone said it was issued in the month of August, last August. I do not know whether that is authentic or not, but assuming it was issued some time in the last few months, it would seem to me that when orders or codes of conduct are issued this is done to correct some situation. Have any Nigerian authorities admitted to you that prior to the issue of the code of conduct, the conduct of the troops or of anyone under their control was not satisfactory, that perhaps atrocities were occurring in spite of them, that it was to correct situations of this sort that the code was issued? Was there any admission of this or indication that this might be the case?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, there was not any admission to me, but I think the fact that the Federal Government has conducted on at least two or three occasions the trials of people accused of incorrect conduct would indicate that they have in fact had such cases.

Mr. MacLean: Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We did not get into a discussion of the background for the reason for issuing it. They said we have issued it, and we are observing it; and we propose to comment and inspect on the basis of those allegations, or those statements.

Mr. MacLean: I do not want to read anything into this that is not justified, but the implication would seem to be that prior to that they feared there might have been situations that would not satisfactorily bear the light of day, and they wanted to correct this situation.

I would like to have something cleared up with regard to the terms of reference of the Observer Team itself. I take it that your duties are limited to the treatment of Nigerians generally in the area controlled by the Nigerian authorities.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: "The conduct of Federal soldiers in war-affected areas" is the term in the initial paragraph of the instruction.

Mr. MacLean: I see. How is this interpreted? I presume that in Nigeria they have not heard of unification yet. What, if any, authority or ability has the Observer Team to observe what sort of action may be taken by the Nigerian Air Force or aircraft behind the lines?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not read that to mean there is any restriction, that we must look only at the army.

Mr. MacLean: No, but on the other hand, have you any practical ability to control or to observe what the air force is doing behind the front, or where the fighting takes place?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Certainly not to control. With regard to the degree to which we can observe or comment on their actions, as I have already pointed out, we have not done very much in this area as yet. It is an area that I think we should investigate more fully than we have to date.

• 1655

Mr. MacLean: We have had witnesses who said that there were occasions when aircraft stooged quite freely over small towns and they always stayed where there was no possibility of ground-fire or anti-aircraft fire affecting them, and then when they found a village, a marketplace teeming with people, they usually strafed it with anti-personnel rockets, which according to Dr. Shepherd, one of the witnesses already referred to, had a devastating effect. In a matter of minutes there would be perhaps 100 fatal casualties or casualties up in the scores, plus very many cases of arms and legs being blown off and other serious wounds as well. You have no correct means, up until now at least, of knowing what sort of armament is being used or where?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. It is something we can certainly find out—what armament is being used.

Mr. MacLean: Have you been able to make any observations or have you had any indication whether in addition to the normal fighting on the front, there are commando operations well behind what would be considered to be the lines by either side?

From the previous witness I drew the conclusion, although I may not be accurate in this, that in one case of a village where the Nigerian forces suddenly appeared and the inhabitants thought they were safely behind the Biafran line, if I may call it that, they were just slaughtered *en masse*.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, the question of commando operations, the only one to which I have made reference and which I have heard anything about, is the infiltration taking place

north and south of Onitsha. There is infiltration, we know, in that area and across the river. In so far as the Federal forces making commando raids, I have heard no evidence other than the statement you have made on this particular aspect of it. The sort of operation I have noticed or noted is the advance down a road or in some cases through the country, but mostly down a road, and I have not heard any account of what you are talking about, what we call deep penetration raids. Mostly it is a question of just forcing.

Mr. MacLean: I presume that this would be the very kind of thing, though, that would be very hard to check on, because it would be done very secretly, I presume. I mean for military purposes, if for no other.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. MacLean: I think the presence of the Observer Team cannot do anything but have a tremendous beneficial effect, or at least ensure that conduct is of a type that is acceptable to a civilized world as far as that can be so in the conditions existing in Nigeria at the present time, and I found much of your evidence extremely reassuring.

But—I say this in no critical way—I would like to say that the situation you observed is that there are good relations between the Biafrans, or whoever happen to have been recently liberated, or over-run, depending on your point of view, and the Nigerian forces, and that there was no evidence of fear or anything of this sort. I would like to submit also that it is possible that this evidence could be an indication of the reverse.

This sounds paradoxical, perhaps, but in a situation where people are deprived of any means to resist, completely at the mercy of the people that have power over them, the natural instinct to survive is very great, and people under those circumstances usually retreat to the only defence that is open to them, and that is defeat.

• 1700

Something occurred to me when you were giving the impressions your Observer Team got throughout the whole area. Some years ago I had the experience of being for a period of time in three countries which were occupied by a power that not only committed many atrocities but obviously engaged in genocide and yet everything you said with regard to the occupied part of Biafra would

have applied equally to the situation I mentioned, because in such circumstances any indication of fear or any furtiveness whatsoever that might be displayed by any of the persons in the area automatically gives them away and automatically condemns them in many cases to special treatment—being watched, or even in some cases liquidated. I can say from personal experience that in those circumstances people can put on a terrific act. I saw the populous associating in the most cordial way, apparently on the surface, with the occupying power—the military forces there, almost bursting with the joy of life. If you travelled on the Metro late at night in Paris, for example, you would see the occupying forces coming home from the various parties with their French girl friends, as the case was there, and you would think that this was the happiest situation you could possibly encounter.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): On a point of order, is that a question, Mr. Chairman?

The Vice-Chairman: Would you please shorten it a bit.

Mr. MacLean: I will try to. In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, people would never admit under those circumstances, even to each other, that they were not perfectly and correctly treated by the occupying powers. My question, for which this long harangue provides a background, is this: Do you suppose that in at least certain circumstances this could be the real interpretation of the evidence that you found?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It could be a possibility but I do not think, in the case of the people that we are talking to, they are that sophisticated. I do not think they could do that. I believe that they would find it very hard to conceal their fear if they were afraid, particularly the little ones.

Mr. Lewis: You do not have to be sophisticated, just survival conscious.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is perhaps so but, in my own opinion, that is not the case.

Mr. MacLean: I have just one more short question. Have you any indication of the treatment received by those who were in the bush and, who happened to be discovered there by the authorities without making any effort to come out? There is a difference.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have no particular evidence that they were treated any differently than anyone else. I do not know that I discussed this specifically with anyone who was discovered in the bush. In the case of most of the ones we talked to, someone came out first and contacted the Forces generally along the roads.

Mr. MacLean: The point of that question of course is that it depends on the treatment received by natives, even very unsophisticated people. Under the circumstances, if the treatment they received was not desirable they would very quickly catch on that the way to survive is to come out.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have no reason to believe that there was any difference in the way they were treated, but I cannot remember speaking to anyone who said that they were in fact discovered in the bush by someone going in on a patrol or anything like that.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt on a point of procedure?

• 1705

The Vice-Chairman: Is it on a point of order?

Mr. Hymmen: I did not want to interrupt Mr. MacLean but I was going to ask whether you would permit a clarification of one of his questions for the record. Maybe some of the other members of the Committee have read the material which was submitted to us by the Clerk of the Committee, which gives General Gowon's complete directive and code of conduct under date of August 18.

The Vice-Chairman: You know the attitude towards supplementaries in a committee of this size, Mr. Hymmen. Can you possibly wait until maybe the end of the first round?

Mr. Hymmen: All right.

Mr. Lewis: It is just a point of information, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: If he would call it that it might be a little easier to recognize it.

Mr. Lewis: He has just called it that.

The Vice-Chairman: Agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Go ahead, Mr. Hymmen. You have everybody's sympathy.

Mr. Hymmen: Excuse me, sir, but my interpretation of the directive was not correct. 18/10/68 is October 18, which is probably the date on which this directive was sent to this Committee and it has nothing to do with the date of the directive itself. But I thought in the testimony the day before yesterday somebody did mention August.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman—

The Vice-Chairman: Are you speaking to this point?

Mr. Lewis: Yes, Mr. Chairman. It was either the Secretary of State for External Affairs or Mr. Harman from the Department who gave us August as the month for that particular directive. This is what I recall.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. I think the point is that the one I have here is not dated and the one that you refer to was sent directly from Lagos through the Department of External Affairs channel.

The Vice-Chairman: To the first round the name of Mr. Ouellet has been added. Mr. Ouellet, will you proceed.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Ouellet: I would like to know if General Milroy or the other members of the Observers Team were of the opinion when he left for Canada, that Biafra could hold much longer or indefinitely in front of the federal troops.

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is a matter on which I would not want to voice any opinion.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Ouellet: I would like to know if General Milroy is aware of a statement by Dame Margery Pelham to the effect that the only humanitarian solution to this particular war would be the capitulation of Biafra and acceptance of the federal state? I would also like to know his opinion on this possibility?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am aware of the article of which you speak. I have not read it but I know it was a subject of editorial comment in Lagos and in the British newspapers, particularly while I was there. Again, it is a subject on which I should not voice an opinion.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Ouellet: I would like to know General Milroy if other members of the Observer

Team are of the opinion, in the light of the information they could obtain that the Ibo leaders would have absolute guarantees of survival and respect of their rights in case Biafra capitulates?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: All I can say on that is that the Federal Military Government's policy, as I understand it, grants a general amnesty to everyone with the exception, I believe, of the leaders. Now I do not know how many leaders they include in that but, as I understand it, it is a general amnesty under the policy that the Federal Military Government has announced.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Ouellet: Are there specific cases where this rule of mercy has already been applied?

• 1710

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It really applies to the soldiers, and I would not want to be too specific on how many soldiers have been captured or have given themselves up and have been released into civilian life. I would not want to say how many, if any, have actually passed from being POWs into civilian life, but certainly if they are being detained as POWs, they are being looked after.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Ouellet: Have you spoken to soldiers who have obtained this new status?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, we have spoken to prisoners of war, yes, if that is what you mean. I have not spoken specifically to any person who was a prisoner of war and who is now a civilian living in his native village.

Mr. Ouellet: Thank you.

The Chairman: That is the end of the first round of questioning. At this point, I might mention that members have received a copy of the terms of reference for the Observer Team. That was circulated.

An hon. Member: Yes, here it is.

The Chairman: I think members have received that and several other documents. The Steering Committee recommended that it be attached or appear as an appendix to our Proceedings. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Does that include the Code of Conduct, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: No. The Steering Committee recommended that we print only the Terms of Reference. Members have a copy of the Code of Conduct, but that would not be printed as an appendix.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Could I just ask for clarification. What is the status of that document? Is it a public document?

The Chairman: At the top of the copy you have it is marked "Restricted". I gather it goes to the officers of the Nigerian army and to the police, but it is not for general distribution. The Code of Conduct is marked restricted. That is all I know about it, really.

Mr. Winch: Could I ask how the Terms of Reference were distributed, and this restricted copy of the other?

The Chairman: Copies were made and instructions were given that they be delivered to each member of the Committee. If you have not received them, Mr. Winch, I apologize, and copies will be made available.

Mr. Winch: I just asked because I do not have them. That is the reason I asked.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos.

Mr. Groos: Well, Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. Many of my questions have been covered by other questioners.

We are dealing very much in numbers in our investigation here, General Milroy, and figures have been given to us about the amounts of food that are required now and in the future, and the numbers of person who are suffering and dying, and for various individual forecasts and so forth, and they vary very considerably. I notice that in this Report we have just received here, we now have another figure which varies quite a bit from something which has not actually been produced as evidence but which gives an idea of the dilemma, I think, in which the Committee finds itself. In the *Globe and Mail* of Tuesday, October 22, in an article written by another observer from the London Observer Service, Mr. John de St. Jorre refers to the town of Onitsha, saying that before the war there were a quarter of a million people living there, whereas in your Report you say that there were about 100,000 living there. How do we explain this very considerable difference in figures?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think I told you once before that one of the things I find very difficult is to get anyone to be specific about the population of any one place. As I say, regarding the town of Port Harcourt, I got from one government official a figure of 200,000 and from another a figure of 400,000. So I would not say that any of the figures that I have of populations of the towns are any more than very approximate.

• 1715

Mr. Groos: It has a bearing, in a way, on the amount of effort that is going to be required to bring relief, as you can understand. I notice in this article another thing on which I would like to have some clarification from you. It refers to the Nigerian Second Division, and makes mention of difficulties they are experiencing in so far as "the shortage of experienced officers and NCOs" is concerned. It says that:

The difficulties are further compounded by the toughness of the local Ibos who have not returned to the federal side in any significant numbers.

Does this mean that there are some Ibos now serving in the Federal Nigerian army, or would this just mean that there are not any who have returned, have surrendered, or given themselves up?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, there are Ibos serving in the Federal Military forces. I am not quite sure of the meaning he has in that particular article. I am not familiar with that article. I know that particular division is a very new division, the newest division, and it suffered heavy losses in getting across the Niger River, and its cadre of experienced NCOs is less than that of the other divisions, particularly of the First Division.

Mr. Groos: We heard the other day from Dr. Shepherd about arrangements being made for Red Cross aircraft to fly in over a certain route and make a landing at a certain spot, and that this aircraft was fired upon and that the airfield was actually bombed. Would this be a reflection, in your opinion, of perhaps some lack of control over the troops that were operating in that area, or lack of communication, or both?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It was my understanding that the flights into Biafra's secessionist area are at night, and they include Red Cross flights and other flights, presumably carrying military equipment and things like that.

Mr. Winch: This is a special airport and, according to Dr. Shepherd, they would have the red cross on it, arranged by mutual agreement, and it was bombed the next day. Is that not what your point is?

Mr. Groos: I think that was my recollection of the incident.

Mr. Winch: It was bombed the next day.

Mr. Groos: Perhaps I could ask you about this Code of Conduct. Is this Code of Conduct—you having read it and I have not—based on a sort of international convention, or is it something constructed for the special conditions which exist in Nigeria today?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It was a special directive from General Gowon himself. You will notice that he does make mention of the rules of the Geneva Convention, separately, but I think these are specific instructions that he has given to his commanders and their troops.

Mr. Groos: I have two more very short questions. Maybe I was away when you spoke about visiting prisoner-of-war camps as opposed to refugee camps. Have you already expounded on that—the difference in the conditions that you found there?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We have commented on it and, in fact, in our Reports we have observed on it. Generally speaking, the report we made in our Second Interim Report was that we found that while they were being well fed, they were getting inadequate exercise and there were other amenities that they should normally be given that they were not getting.

Mr. Groos: Well, I apologize then for asking you to repeat that.

My last question. In the organization of the country itself we have obviously a war zone and a military government. The war zone I presume is entirely under the control of the three military commanders of the areas. Is there a sort of—for want of a better word—"civilianized" zone, a rear zone where things are gradually returning or have returned to civilian control?

• 1720

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the East Central State, which is really the one where the fighting is taking place now, there is what they call a state administrator. All the other states have governors. He is a state administrator and has a staff—I had discussions with his secretary—

and he has a commissioner of police. I also had discussions with the man in charge of a state broadcasting set-up, and this man is responsible for organizing the areas in rear of the military operational zones, and I know that, for example, when we were in the Third Divisional sector, he had just been down into those areas of the Third Divisional sector that came in his state, getting a list of people who were in the camps, some idea of the Ibo people in the camps and some idea of their skills. I understand that it was his plan to use these people to help in the reconstruction of his state. They do have plans, for example, of getting the town of Enugu going again and getting their schools going again. When we were in Enugu they were proposing to open a hospital I think the week after we were there.

So there is a civilian administration working in that state and it is taking over the area as it is released to them by the military. If the recommendations in our second report are accepted I would assume that more of the area will come under his jurisdiction than is at present the case.

Mr. Groos: I have one last question, Mr. Chairman, and I am dying to ask this one. Is it possible for you to visit the banks of the Niger River which were referred to the other day as one possible means of getting supplies into the Biafran-held territory?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In fact I crossed the Niger River at Onitsha—the bridge has been blown and there are ferries operating there—in a boat. The infiltration that is taking place in the Mid-West state is taking place across the Niger River, because in several areas the secessionists and Biafrans are in fact right up the river.

Mr. Groos: We understand they hold one spot on one side of the river, according to the evidence given by the doctor the other day, and that this might possibly be used as a waterway for getting larger supplies into the country.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is a suggestion I have not heard before.

Mr. Groos: Well it is one that interests me very much in view of the sheer volume of supplies that are undoubtedly going to be required.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The only problem might be the actual access to the river itself. Some of the rivers tend to be a bit swampy on the

side, but that might be a straight problem of building roads. Otherwise it could work.

Mr. Groos: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: General Milroy, as the secessionist government apparently will only allow certain selected journalists to land at Uli and as there is some word to the effect that their press reports are censored even at that—I am specifically referring to the CBC report on Sunday morning last; the report of Mr. Tim Ralfe apparently was censored—I am wondering if this same kind of procedure is followed by the Nigerian Government in the Nigerian area?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Can I say firstly that I do not know whether or not the statements you have made about the secessionist policy are correct but, as far as I know, the press that have accompanied us have never complained to me that anything they have filed has been censored.

Now this is the only evidence I have. We have had a number of people from the London Times and Reuters News Agency they have never made a statement that their work has been censored.

Mr. Ryan: Have you any explanation as to why, even now, there is only one Canadian journalist in the Federal Military Government territory, and there were none before? Is there any suggestion that they are being kept out?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, there is no suggestion that they are being kept out, to my knowledge. I do not know why they are not there.

As you say, there is one there now, a Canadian press correspondent in Lagos.

Mr. Ryan: Following up the question by Mr. Groos, I understand the visit of your team to Onitsha was between October 15 and 18 and that you were there for two good days at least, the 16th and the 17th?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We were there overnight, so we were not in Onitsha itself for two complete days. We arrived in the afternoon, were briefed, spent the night, visited around Onitsha in the morning, and at about noon left to go back to the Asaba side.

Mr. Ryan: It is at Asaba on the west side of the Niger that you made your headquarters, and in the Mid-West state?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, actually where we stayed was in Onitsha on the East side, right in the town itself. We stayed on night.

• 1725

Mr. Ryan: But most of the time you were there you stayed at Asaba overnight?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No, we only actually stayed the one night in that area, and most of our time was in Onitsha.

Mr. Ryan: And this large, fairly new bridge, costing \$15 million, connects Asaba with the Onitsha area. Is that bridge completely out or just one or two sections?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, the East span—that is the span from the last pier to the land—has been dropped.

Mr. Ryan: This would be done by the retreating Biafrans?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well this is the claim that was made.

Mr. Ryan: I see from the same article that Mr. Groos cited, the article in *The Globe and Mail* of yesterday by Mr. St. Jorre that:

The Biafrans have succeeded in cutting the Onitsha-Enugu road and control an eight mile stretch only six miles from the centre of this town.

Could you corroborate that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, that is right. The road between Onitsha and Awka is not opened to Federal troops.

Mr. Ryan: And that is a stretch of about 22 miles and an eight mile part of it is occupied by the Biafrans, is that so?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, those figures would be approximately correct.

Mr. Ryan: This report makes out that there has been a major breakthrough between Asaba and Awka that goes completely around Onitsha, takes them around Asaba and, in effect, makes it pretty perilous for the Federal troops at the moment?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If I could perhaps just qualify that a bit, there is this break in the road and infiltration takes place through that break up into the country north of Onitsha and I gather across the river. Mostly, I gather, the infiltration is by troops out getting

food. You said a major breakthrough—there is a hole there.

Mr. Ryan: Is the breakthrough or hole such that the Second Division is cut off from its men at Awka so much so that to bring in supplies to the men at Awka they have to go 400 miles to the north?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: They use the supply lines for the First Division.

Mr. Ryan: In other words, they come in on the Enugu road—from that direction to Awka?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I assume that is how they do it.

Mr. Ryan: Then I take it there is a link-up between the First Division and the Second Division at Awka all right?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well it is a road farther to the East.

Mr. Ryan: I have one more question about Onitsha. Is there in the area a tribe of Ebos that are often mistaken for Ibos?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have not heard of it. I have a map here and I will just take a look.

Mr. Ryan: I just wondered if you had heard of that.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Is this the Ibibios?

Mr. Ryan: No, Ebo. Ibo is spelled I-b-o, but then there is the Ebo tribe.

Mr. Brewin: The Ibibio?

Mr. Ryan: Then there are the Ibibios as well.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: According to a tribal map I have here, the area of Onitsha shows only Ibos, there is further to the west around the area of Benin City a tribe shown as the Edos. Now I would like to add here that we did hear some information that the Ibos around Onitsha are known as Onitsha Ibos as opposed to Ibos from other parts of the country who presumably are known by the nearest town to which they live.

Mr. Ryan: You told us that you had inspected some of the armament of the Federal side. Have you had occasion to inspect any captured arms?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Could I please say that I have not had occasion to inspect any armament, I had occasion to see it. It is of course beyond my responsibility. I have seen equipment of the Federal Military Government and I have seen a bit of equipment claimed to have been captured or left by secessionist troops.

Mr. Ryan: Could you give us the countries of origin of the captured weapons?

● 1730

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The only one, and one I have already mentioned, I believe, is a rifle which was made in Czechoslovakia, but where it actually came from I do not know.

Mr. Ryan: Then in your Third Interim Report, at the end of it, under the heading *Future Action* on page 3 you say:

The Observers intend to return to the Second Nigerian Division area at a later date in order to satisfy themselves on certain matters which they did not have time to examine fully.

I wonder if you would mind, if you feel you can, telling us what these certain matters are.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You get me a little off base here. In order to get to this hearing I was able to read only the draft report. I was not able to sit in at the final conferences when the report was written. But in the draft report that I read this sentence was not there.

In so far as my group was concerned, I do not recall having any particular items that they would classify—in other words, we certainly propose to go back. We certainly propose to look again and see what changes have taken place since our first visit. But I would not want to say what this refers to specifically. I have sent off a wire asking if they would enlarge on the meaning of that particular paragraph.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Milroy, first of all I want to apologize for involving you in what I consider to be a misleading article in *The Globe and Mail* today. But to justify myself to some extent I thought it was in the interest of every member of this Committee to see that the testimony which you, yourself, gave yesterday was not given to the public in any misinformed

manner—to misinform the public—and I apologize for that.

The first question I would like to ask is whether the FMG troops are volunteers or whether they are conscripted? Do you have any idea?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: My understanding is that they are volunteers. They are all volunteers.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you. Secondly, this is a political question and perhaps I should not ask it; but do you have any idea as to whether the FMG intend to return to a democratic form of government after this war?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not be able to answer that at all.

Mr. Cafik: You have not heard anyone mention this on the government side?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No.

Mr. Cafik: All right. In your testimony yesterday you indicated, I believe, that it was the generally accepted practice that the Ibos would withdraw from a town and the Federal troops would pursue them and that the fighting actually took place either before you got into the town or after the town itself, but not right in the town.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In general, much of the fighting.

Mr. Cafik: I have the impression, as a result of that statement, that the Ibos themselves withdrew from the town because they probably did not want it damaged. Do you think that might be the reason?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That could be one possible reason but I would not want to say.

Mr. Cafik: You see no military reason why they would have done that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. And I would not want to say that they did it in every case either.

Mr. Cafik: Right. But this seems to be the general—

Maj. Gen. Milroy: A pattern.

Mr. Cafik: —pattern of the war. I had the impression that they probably did it for reasons of not wanting to destroy their own property. And if that is true, it is rather odd behaviour on the part of the Ibo people to do

this when they seem to be so terribly afraid that they are going to get killed or everything they own is going to be destroyed anyway. So if they did it for that reason, it would seem to indicate to me the fact that they did not really believe that their property was going to be destroyed. I do not think you can draw any real conclusion from that, but I think it certainly leads one to believe that. Otherwise they would not care whether it was destroyed in the course of the fighting or not.

I understand also that it is the general pattern of the war that during the time of the actual fighting the population goes back—precedes the war zone. In other words, there are not too many civilian people around in the actual area of fighting.

• 1735

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This is it, from our observation and from what we see where we go. It would be, I think, reasonably normal, once the bullets start flying around or any noise starts, that the people would, generally speaking try to get out of the way.

Mr. Cafik: And I have the impression that in your view they retreat to either one of two places. They either go into the bush within the area or back into the Biafran-held lines to precede the troops.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes. Or if they go into the bush, that bush may not necessarily be in the area.

Mr. Cafik: Right. But have they as much opportunity to flee ahead of the advancing troops into the Federal-held territory as they do into the Biafran-held territory?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh, I would not want to answer that. I would not have thought that they would flee toward the firing. I think they would go—you know—sideways.

Mr. Cafik: Right. So the fact that so many civilians are in Biafra—and there are, I gather, eight to 10 million of them—does not necessarily indicate that that is where their sympathy lies. They might be doing it to just get away from the firearms.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh, there are any number of reasons. I would not want to hazard a guess nor necessarily agree with the numbers.

Mr. Cafik: With respect to the Terms of Reference that were passed out here today, I noticed that on page 2, item (iii) there is a

time limit set of two months. According to the date of September 14, it would seem as though the Observer team would finish their work by November 14, or is that fairly flexible?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If you notice it says: "Two months in the first instance."

Mr. Cafik: And my question has been: is there a second instance?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think that this is one of the points that would probably come out of the discussions that we would have with the Federal Military Government if they accept our invitation to discuss the future activities of the team.

No one has been specific to me, saying that two months means November 14 or November 12 or whatever it is.

Mr. Cafik: So you feel that it is rather open-ended at present?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I feel that it is. It is open, certainly, to further discussion by the governments concerned.

Mr. Cafik: There is one other item. In item (ii) on the same page under: *Facilities to be provided for the Team*, it is mentioned that the "Federal Military Government will provide air, land, and water transport." And I have the impression from testimony yesterday that the Observer Team itself was a bit unhappy with the facilities they had in this regard.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In our operations to date, the transportation they have given us has been quite adequate and has included air, land and water. We have, in fact, travelled by water.

In our suggestions as to how we can operate in the future, we suggest that in order to carry out our method of operation we perhaps need transport that is rather more quickly available, particularly air transport, than is the case at the present time. The Federal Military Government does not have a great deal of air transport. Therefore, if you want an airplane you just cannot phone up and say you want it right away. It sometimes takes a little while to arrange it.

Mr. Cafik: But generally speaking you are satisfied with the transportation facilities that have been supplied?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: To date.

Mr. Cafik: To date. But you anticipate requiring more for the future.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: If we enter into these discussions as to how we think we should change our method of operation, and they are agreeable, our suggestion would be some change in our transportation arrangements.

Mr. Cafik: Fine. Thank you, General Milroy.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, on a point of information, I have a little booklet here entitled "100-hundred facts about NIGERIA" which is published by the Ministry of Information, Information Division, Lagos, Nigeria.

Mr. Lewis: Of Nigeria?

Mr. Ryan: Yes, of Nigeria. And it gives the exact population of Onitsha as 80,000.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: As eighty thousand?

Mr. Ryan: Yes.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Is that Onitsha or Onitsha and area?

Mr. Ryan: Onitsha itself.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Onitsha itself.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): General Milroy, I would like to come back to the sort of framework in which we are having this discussion and the fact that you yourself are here as a representative of this Observer Team. I suppose it has occurred to you, because of your own involvement in it, that this has been a rather strange exercise on your part—not appearing before the Committee but being involved in the Observer Team. As a military man, do you know of other situations where an observer team has taken part in observing the conflict in a civil war?

• 1740

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would say, subject to correction, that this is probably a unique operation. I do not know of any operation that was quite like this one before. This is one of our problems—to figure out how we are going to operate.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is a fact that the Observer Team was set up in September and that in August there was issued a very interesting document in this "Code of Conduct". It must have led you to wonder about the purpose of all this.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think the purpose is stated quite clearly here. They wanted us to come and inspect the Federal Military operations in the war-affected areas. Further on they make reference to the charges that have been made against the Federal Military Forces.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): In the civil wars or even in the international wars that have been waged—and there has been a number of lesser and greater wars fought in this century—do you know of any during which there was allegation concerning this ugly business of genocide?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No necessarily of genocide, but of being killed and of atrocities.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Of atrocities, of extensive atrocities, because obviously this is what you have been charged to look into. In connection with that, and going back to something that was asked of you yesterday, you suggested that in the first encounter that you had with some of the military people in the field, divisional commanders and what have you, there seemed to be a bit of hesitancy—"reserve" I think was the actual word. You suggested, I think lightheartedly, that the presence of four major generals perhaps accounted for a good deal of that. Did you in fact wonder if perhaps there was more to it than that?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. We were there to find out what was going on.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): The reason I raise this is that there have been suggestions, and I would like the reaction to the suggestion, that the Government in Lagos has become over the past number of months increasingly distressed over the action of the Federal Forces in the field and a certain loss of control, and that perhaps both the issuance of the Code of Conduct in August and then the calling for the Observer Team that might be on the spot, might in fact be an attempt by the Government of Lagos to put the brakes on, so to speak, on some very serious misdemeanours that were taking place in the field. Do you think that this is part and parcel of...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You are asking for my opinion. That would not be my opinion. My opinion would be that the reason they set up the committee or asked for the Observer Team was the allegations being made about the conduct of the troops. But again, that is

my opinion. I do not know the exact reason why they asked for the Team. I know what they say here.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And another matter, with specific regard again to the military people in the field, I would think that in the course of conversations you obtained some reaction from them on their attitude toward various relief agencies. I would like, for clarification, to know whether or not you found a difference in attitude by the military people toward certain relief agencies as against others.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: There is expressed occasionally a feeling that some relief agencies appear to operate—let me put it this way—do not pay enough respect to the sovereignty of the Nigerian Government.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Could you be more specific?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I do not think I would like to be any more specific on it. This is not one of the areas that I am required to report on, and while I hear information, it is not one that I go in and try to check my sources and find out exactly what it is all about.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Without putting words in your mouth, though, it is fair to say that the Red Cross would seem to be the most acceptable relief agency in the eyes of the military people at least.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Nigerian Red Cross.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I see. You are distinguishing between the Nigerian Red Cross and the International Red Cross then, are you?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, my suggestion is that, for example, in the area of the Third Division around Port Hartcourt, the Nigerian Red Cross—the Red Cross organization that is now in there—is, of course, supported by the International Red Cross.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Perhaps I should not put you in a position of evaluating the attitudes of others towards the other relief agencies, but this seems again to be part of the over-all problem that we have been having in this country in trying to really make practical efforts toward getting our relief materials to all parts of the conflict, both in Nigeria and in Biafra.

• 1745

On a couple of occasions during the last day or so you have been asked about the presence of persons other than Nigerians in the Military operations that are taking place. I am frankly quite surprised to learn that you recall seeing none other than Nigerians. I think it has been pretty widely reported that on both sides of this conflict there are mercenaries, nationals of countries other than Africa, and if anyone was observing military action on either side, it would not be very long before they would notice these people, and yet, I think, you have indicated quite clearly that you have seen none. Is that really so?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I made no comment on the question of non-Nigerians on the secessionist or Biafran side. I made no comment on that whatsoever. The comment I did make was that I had not seen anyone who was not a Nigerian in the forces that we visited.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But it would not be very hard to identify one who was not? I am talking about a white man.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Oh yes. It would not be very hard.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You have said that you had seen no white person in any military capacity or in any capacity in which he might be advising the military activities of the FMG?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I have not seen any. We and the Red Cross are really the only white people I run into.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): In discussion yesterday with Mr. Lewis and others, you talked in terms of the reception which you receive from these refugees or the Biafran people that are now within Nigerian-held territory, and I think you established with the Committee the feeling that you were regarded as being neutral. Is that correct? So you feel that you are in fact regarded by these people as neutral observers?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would hope so. I would want to be careful how far I qualified this by saying everybody regards us as neutral. I would hope that particularly the more educated ones we discussed matters with would regard us as being neutral.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Well, let us say the educated ones, because obviously these

are the ones with whom you had the most communication. And you really think that in these cases these people do regard you as being neutral?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I think they do, yes. How neutral is neutral? But I think they regard us as being separate from the Federal Military Government.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): But along with being separate, also neutral?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): In your conversations with these people, have you indicated first, that you were there at the invitation of the Nigerian Military Government, and secondly, that you will of necessity not be able to travel or visit on the Biafran or secessionist side of the conflict?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We do not indicate the second part. We discuss or tell them who we are, in many cases, if we think they do not already know why we are there, or what we are supposed to be doing.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Would you not think—here I am drawing a conclusion which you can disagree with or choose not to answer—that when you are there obviously with the Nigerian military authorities and traveling in their transport, and if the more intelligent and educated people you talk with become aware, either directly or indirectly, that you are there to observe only this side of the conflict, it is almost a virtual impossibility to be regarded as a neutral observer by these people?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would not have thought so. I do not think so.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am concerned now in terms of the actual prisoners of war that are being taken. You have been reluctant to express any figures in terms of how many there are and certainly the reports give no evidence as to how many there are. But I am anxious to know whether it is generally the rule that prisoners are being taken. Or is it a fact that in the military context this situation just happens very, very rarely?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Prisoners are being taken. When we were in Onitsha, for example, they had two that had been taken the day before we got there. They were wounded. Generally speaking, they are shipped back.

Many of them are shipped back to Lagos. It is one of the areas that on our succeeding investigations we proposed to go to, and have a look at them in Lagos.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): They are being sent back to Lagos?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Many of them are sent back to Lagos.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And have you had a chance to examine the conditions there under which they are being treated?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Not in Lagos yet. In other areas—the ones in Port Harcourt, Owerri, and some of the other areas where people are being detained—we have been there and talked to them and reported on them.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Is this the general rule, do you think, that they are being sent back to Lagos, the prisoners that are being taken?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, I would think it appears to be the policy. For example, we brought one back with us when we came back from Eneagu. There was a prisoner who had been captured. He came back on one of our airplanes with us.

• 1750

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am wondering now—again on a general question—what preparation took place either with yourself or the other observers before you travelled to Nigeria to take part in this commission, what kind of...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: From here?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Yes—what kind of briefing, what kind of orientation existed? I do not want it in great detail, just a general idea of what form of orientation you would go to the situation with?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, generally speaking, I did not have very much time, obviously, and my briefing, primarily was really telling me what the terms of reference were, reading up on some of the background material on what the situation was, and what we were supposed to do. With that I took off.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): So basically the impressions that you would form were to be the ones that would happen after you got there; you did not have an opportunity to

either brief yourself on the history of a number of events that might have led up to the conflict or obtain a detailed breakdown of the cultural or political situation over the last number of years, or what have you.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I was given some briefings on those and some material.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): From whom would you have received this material?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well when I reported to External Affairs and the military authorities they gave it to me.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It was basically then by our own Department of External Affairs.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, basically I would think so.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Did you receive information of this nature from any other source?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We also had briefings, as I pointed out, from General Gowon.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Did you receive any briefing either directly or indirectly from the British High Commission?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: No. Of course, I also, spoke to our own High Commissioner, although he did not give me a briefing. He has nothing to do with my operations at all, but he is our High Commissioner. I would report to him and he would give me some idea of the situation.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I think you gave a figure indicating how many Federal troops there are actually under Nigerian command at the moment.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I believe I mentioned a figure of 80,000—that is approximate; I would not want to say how correct that is. I was really using it to express the expansion of the army.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Is it possible to say how many distinct combat units will be operating at any one time?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It would not be possible for me to say that, no—and I think it would be incorrect in many ways for me to start trying to find out.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): That is very true. I am just trying to think of the dimensions of your particular job. I think you said there were eight people who are observers.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the actual team, plus the UN and the OAU, making a total of 13.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Making a total of 13 altogether.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Basically, how many teams do you divide into? What is the greatest division you can make of this group, or what division have you been able to make to date?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: We could make four teams, on the basis that a team should really consist of representatives from two countries.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): So it is possible to make four.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Four, yes, plus the OAU and the UN. The UN send out one man.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): So what we are talking about then is the optimum possibility at the moment of four teams covering the military activity of roughly 80,000 troops.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would say that is certainly a major responsibility in terms of trying to ascertain in significant detail exactly what would be happening at any one time.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: That is one of the reasons for our suggestion that we should discuss this.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Surely. Largely the team has been composed of military personnel, but I think you mentioned that there is at least one civilian on the team. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The Polish assistant observer is a civilian.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you think there is any particular virtue in perhaps having the team more balanced, perhaps almost on a 50-50 basis between civilian and military personnel?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: You could argue that way. I think it is quite important that some military people are there because you are working in a military environment and I

think it would be perhaps unfair to throw just a purely civilian group into it and operate the way we have been operating. As to the question of having additional civilians in the group, there is certainly no reason that it could not be done because we already have civilians operating with us in the form of the UN observers and the Polish assistant observer.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): So possibly if there is agreement by the Federal Military Government that there be an expansion of this observer force it might even be possible that the increase of the Canadian complement might be partially a civilian one.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is a possibility, yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Do you think it might be useful?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well if this Committee thought so and so advised the government, I am sure the government would take the necessary action. I personally, as a senior observer, am quite prepared to accept civilians.

• 1755

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Surely. Now quite naturally, General Milroy, your testimony before this Committee will form part of the over-all basis of our report. Speaking for myself, I have been particularly interested in your testimony, but I must admit that I have been quite disappointed in it. If we are to come to some determination on the actual usefulness of the commission, it seems to me there are a number of unanswered questions that will have to be dealt with by the commission or by some other observer group if we are to make an accurate determination.

I do not think, for instance, that you have, before the Committee or in the reports we have read, really gotten to the bottom of the fear that you have expressed in your report and expressed in your testimony that does exist with many of the Biafran people over genocide. I think unless that question is very substantially answered, much more so than it has been to date, it is very doubtful whether we could ever make an accurate determination on this situation.

I think too that it is not just enough to say that the educated Ibos have not returned; I think that you or someone has to find out a great deal more information about where the educated Ibos are and why they have not

returned. I think too it is not enough just to look at the facts as they are happening within the few weeks that you have been in the situation; I think that any fact-finding commission has to examine what has happened previously over the number of months that the war actually has been fought and perhaps even prior to that.

I think, as well, there is not nearly enough information about what really happens in military engagements. Perhaps it is too soon, you have not had a chance to see enough of the close military action to make a full observation.

I think too that it is unfortunate that you have been able to tell us very little, if anything, about what happens during these bombing raids. There has been certainly a good deal of allegation about the indiscriminate, or as you yourself referred to it "a discriminate kind of bombing". This is a rhetorical question because I would like to get General Milroy's reactions. These seem to me to be basic questions which I am sure he will want to answer even in a general way, because it is part and parcel of his responsibility in serving on this observer team.

I think too we have to come to some determination about what are, in the context of this civil war, justifiable military targets. I felt as well there was far too little information on this comment of yours about the tremendous use of ammunition, because we have heard allegations that ammunition was used so indiscriminately as to destroy in the process of the war not just military targets but many civilian targets.

Mr. Anderson: You have had lots of time to question him on it.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And then too, the matter of looting which you referred to, but again you were only able to tell us what you had heard and there is very little opportunity perhaps to make the kind of observation on which you could specifically pin down exactly who was responsible for this looting.

I could go on and since there seems to be some concern on the other side that I not go on, I will—

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I am beginning to think he is the witness instead of the questioner.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, but, as you know, I have been a witness. I am sorry if I am offending you by these questions.

The Chairman: Mr. MacDonald, I do not think there is any intention to interrupt your line of rhetorical questioning—at least any serious intention to interrupt it.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order—

The Chairman: I think perhaps you are out of order but we have not been very restrictive nor have we been very technical, so I would suggest that Mr. MacDonald be allowed to finish.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, but when we do have time for him to question the witness why does he not question him on these matters? Why does he wait until the very end and bring it all on as a great "What is your reaction, General Milroy, to these 10,000 different opinions of mine?"

The Chairman: Would you care to continue, Mr. MacDonald?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): These are some of the things, General Milroy, that I think should be done if the team is to do a thoroughly responsible job. I in no way mean to imply that the individual members are not very responsible. Personally, I have been very impressed with your own sincerity in dealing with this and I am very pleased that a man of your calibre is serving on this commission. I feel very sorry for you, however, in feeling that in many ways your work has been limited to date. As a matter of fact we have other precedents for international commissions. One could think of the ICC. Even though it has not been terribly successful in Southeast Asia it did have access to both sides. And this to me is the gut issue, if you like, of the success of this observer team. If Nigeria really has nothing to fear I think it should be the first to say: yes, let us approve of an observer team that can observe in all of Nigeria—and if they want to call it the rebel area or secessionist area or whatever, they can. Then I think the force of your report would be greater. And if it is an exoneration of Nigeria it would be much more effective if this could be possible. It is my hope that in any private conversations you might be holding, sir, that you could press this most strongly because I think that then it gives both your credibility and the credibility of the commission considerably added weight.

Now having made that long rhetorical question, do you have any response that you feel you would like to make?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Could I perhaps make three points?

• 1800

The first point you are really getting at is the conduct of our investigations to date. Now there are undoubtedly several ways in which we could conduct these investigations. The way we went at it was the one we all agreed would probably be most suitable, remembering at the time that there seemed to be a considerable degree of urgency, first of all, of getting us there and, secondly, of hearing what we had to say. It was for that reason that we put out our reports in the form we did, in one area at a time. I understand that people have said that they thought this was not the way to do it. I would like to suggest, however, that if our findings had been different it would have been essential to get those findings out immediately; and in the actual fact we found that reporting by areas was quite an effective way to do it because all three areas are quite different.

Secondly, on the suggestions you make as to our conduct, some of the points that have been brought here are obviously very good ones and ones that I may be able to put into action when I get back.

I do not want to say what the Committee's job is, but I hope that if the Committee considers there are certain areas in which we should take action these suggestions will appear in some form so that they can be communicated to me and I can then discuss them with the other members of the Team.

Thirdly, on this question of examining both sides of the activities, I think I have made it quite clear that all I say is that the governments concerned have to change our terms of reference. There is no point in accusing us of not doing something that we are not supposed to do.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Thank you very much. On your statement about the amnesty that will be granted to all but the leaders—and you were not quite sure who that included in Biafra—I trust it will at least include Mr. Brewin and myself should we decide to return at some date!

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin, and then Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Brewin: I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman, because I do not want to go over all these other matters again.

I should say—and it will contrast with what Mr. MacDonald said in this—that I think one very useful feature of the observers being present is that it is unlikely that any atrocities, or misbehaviour, or misconduct, are likely to occur while the observers are in the neighbourhood or where they can see it.

To what extent do you think it might be necessary to expand that particular work and—we can all measure mileage on the map, I suppose—how big an area are we really concerned with here? Eastern Nigeria as a whole, part of which now appears to be Biafra—what are the rough dimensions of it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Of Eastern Nigeria, or just the area in which the fighting is taking place?

Mr. Brewin: Eastern Nigeria?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Eastern Nigeria, as it is shown there, I would not want to say is exactly how big, without getting up and measuring it; but it is a very large area.

Mr. Brewin: It is a very, very large area.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: It is a very large area yes.

Mr. Brewin: Split up by dense forests, and so on.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The Ibo area, of course, is not that big.

Mr. Brewin: No; and the present Biafran-occupied area, as I understand it, is somewhere around the centre and is roughly 50 miles one way by 100 the other. Is that according to your understanding?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would have thought perhaps a little smaller than that. I would have guessed it at about 2,000 to 3,000 square miles; and I am being very approximate.

Mr. Brewin: But we are told—and I do not suppose you can tell us to the contrary—that there are about eight or ten million people there.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I understand those statements have been made. Yes.

Mr. Brewin: The point I am trying to put to you is this: Throughout all of this area there are Ibos who have lived there and if, for example, it happened militarily that the whole territory were occupied by Nigeria, to be sure that there were not to be incidents of destruction of life and maltreatment,—this

presumes the conquered Ibos—would it not require a very considerable observer team, in your judgment, to cover this whole area and to do an effective job?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Well, sir, again, as I pointed out earlier, the actual size of whatever team goes in there would have to be a matter of negotiation between what the Federal Military Government agreed and what the other side said they required.

Again, I think the requirement is going to be dictated more by what is required to allay the fear of the Ibo people than by what might be a purely military assessment.

• 1805

Mr. Brewin: Yes; but would you agree that to allay the fear—if it can be allayed by the presence of witnesses such as observer teams and people from the outside—would require the stationing of a fairly considerable number of observers for a considerable period of time to make sure that the fears, at least, of the Ibos, or of the Biafrans, would not be realized in that circumstance?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Again, as I say, whether or not it is a requirement, I really would not want to say what the numbers should be, but they certainly should be more than we have if there is an agreement for an observer force.

I do not believe the numbers need be quite as great as you suggest, because I think the force should keep moving.

Mr. Brewin: I suppose it should keep moving, but I think you yourself said that it has to be available to deal quickly with incidents. This country is not an easy one in which to get around, certainly after the devastation of war, I take it?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Once the fighting stopped you could get around reasonably quickly. The problem really would be the breaks in the road. If you could get helicopters in...

Mr. Brewin: If you were going to give to the Ibos any sort of reasonable guarantee of an international nature would it not require a fairly sizable international force to be available? It is easy to give paper guarantees, but to give real guarantees would you not need a fairly sizable international force—not 10 or 25 people, but running in the hundreds and possibly even up to a thousand or so?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I would be prepared to say that, depending on how the discussions went, you might well have to agree on a force in the hundreds, initially anyway. But, again, as I say, I would not like to try to commit myself here. It is really how many the Ibo people, in their discretion, think are required, if they want one group stationed in every city, or something like that.

Mr. Brewin: I am not trying to tie you down to exact figures—that would obviously be impossible—but from your experience in observing, and from the difficulties you have had in the area—and you have only been in relatively small parts of a large area—in a situation where there might be eight or ten million people who fear that their lives are in danger, I am suggesting, in a general way—and I think you can confirm it or disagree with it—that it would require a sizable sort of international force?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: A sizable observer force.

Mr. Brewin: Observer force, yes; and observers, I suppose, to be properly impartial and so on, would have to be representatives from outsiders—the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, say, or the United Nations?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: When I mention observers, of course, I am discriminating—observers who are unarmed.

Mr. Brewin: Oh yes, I see. Under different conditions you might require some arms to...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: I am suggesting that an observer force would be adequate.

Mr. Brewin: And an observer force would be completely unarmed. Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to preface my question by reading one paragraph of the evidence that is before us so that I can get the comments of the witness on it. The witness was Mr. Brewin and he stated:

Where we criticize the military observers in that comment you have brought up—I think Mr. MacDonald made the criticism but I fully associate myself with it—we think it was shocking to draw conclusions in a preliminary report when it is quite obvious that the observers could

not have had adequate knowledge or gone into the matter thoroughly enough to draw conclusions.

In view, of the fact the two gentlemen mentioned have retreated a tremendous amount from that statement...

The Chairman: Order, please. That is likely to disrupt our proceedings. Would you mind proceeding with your questioning, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. Anderson: Then I will ask the witness directly, and he can answer yes or no. Does he feel that he had adequate knowledge and that he went into the matter thoroughly enough to draw the conclusions of his first report?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: This, again, refers to the conduct of our investigation. In our opinion, our investigations in the areas on which we reported were adequate and enough for us to make the recommendations that we made.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions for General Milroy? If not, perhaps I could ask one question for purposes of clarification.

I believe it is fair to say that most of the witnesses who have appeared before this Committee have agreed that the Federal Military Government has not adopted a policy of genocide, but several of them have suggested that possibly certain of the troops may have adopted, or engaged in, genocidal practices.

• 1810

In your reports you say that you have found no evidence of genocide, that you have seen no evidence of genocide. Is it true that that refers not only to the fact that you have seen no evidence that the Federal Military Government have adopted such a policy, but that you have seen no evidence that the troops have been engaged in genocidal practices?

Maj. Gen. Milroy: The statement we make, on the matter of genocide is with reference to the whole question of intent. We say that there had to be an intent, or a policy, and we have seen no evidence of this policy. When you start talking about individual troops, or even small groups of troops, you cannot use the term "genocide". You can use any other term you want. You can use "murder" or

"massacre" or anything like that but you should not use the term "genocide". We have already reported, in one case, the action against the Red Cross which was unprovoked and for which there is absolutely no justification whatsoever. But I do think we must differentiate between what one soldier or a few soldiers do—such as committing an act that is against the law, which we should be looking for just as much as anything else—and the policy or program of genocide.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Milroy.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): May I just make one distinction, because I think it is important. In the statement that the observers have made they said they have seen no evidence of genocide. I do not dispute their making that statement but I think a distinction should be made between your statement and a statement that might be made on a judicial basis. What you are in fact saying is that during the time that you have been there...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: And in the areas.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): ...and in the areas which you have visited—which is distinct from a judgment that was made by a court that would not be affected by this limitation of time, which obviously must exist in the case of your operations.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, I would like to agree there, but we have tried to be extremely specific that—we are talking about the areas we visit, which we explain in the opening parts of our report.

The Chairman: Correct me if I am wrong, General Milroy, although I think you made it clear in your testimony. Suppose for example a particular battalion had adopted the policy of wiping out the Ibo people in a particular area. Is it not true that you would regard that as genocide—if a particular battalion had adopted that policy, and therefore when you say you see no evidence of genocide, you have seen no evidence, for example, that any body of troops—a battalion or any sizable body of troops—has adopted the policy of wiping out a particular group of people.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Yes, whether we would in fact call that genocide or whether we would merely call that by any of the many other names you could use would depend on circumstances. Again, as I say, if the battalion is operating in accordance with a policy

of the government, then it is genocide; if it is operating on the policy of a battalion commander I am not so sure you could call it genocide but it obviously is illegal and, depending on the circumstances, you would have to use whatever term you had at the time.

The Chairman: I would like to put a specific question to you. In the course of your observations have you seen any evidence that any recognized army formation, such as a company or a battalion, had adopted the policy of deliberately destroying the Ibos, or a group of...

Maj. Gen. Milroy: In the areas we visited we have neither seen nor heard any evidence to indicate that there are any specifically formed units that carry out this activity.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Milroy.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, I have two motions. I know it is late, but perhaps I could just distribute the copies and then the Steering Committee, when they meet, could vet them. You know, we are not bringing down the government. I do not want to detain the witness, who has been a very patient general.

The Chairman: Perhaps on your behalf I could thank General Milroy most warmly for his very helpful testimony, wish him success in his important mission and a pleasant trip back.

Maj. Gen. Milroy: Thank you very much, sir. I have enjoyed meeting you all and I look forward to meeting you again.

• 1815

The Chairman: Would you like to proceed, Mr. Fairweather?

Mr. Fairweather: As I said, Mr. Chairman, I am perfectly willing to let the Steering Committee vet them in any way. The first is as follows:

(See Minutes of Proceedings.)

The second is as follows:

(See Minutes of Proceedings.)

Mr. Fairweather: I have copies in English and in French.

The Chairman: It may take time to properly consider both of these. Is it agreed that these resolutions be referred to the Steering Committee for preliminary examination?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: It is rather doubtful, gentlemen, whether there will be any meeting of this Committee tomorrow but probably your Steering Committee will be engaged in the preparation of the report.

An hon. Member: What about Friday, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: It is rather unlikely we will meet on Friday.

Would the members of the Steering Committee remain please?

APPENDIX N

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
LAGOS, NIGERIA

6th September, 1968.

Excellency,

The Federal Military Government of Nigeria has decided, as I intimated to Your Excellency on the 29th of August, 1968, to invite an Observer Team which will inspect Federal military operations in the war affected areas of the country. The Federal Government's reason for establishing this Observer Team is in pursuance of its desire to satisfy the world opinion, contrary to the malicious propaganda of the rebels, that there is no intentional or planned systematic and wanton destruction of civilian lives or their property in the war zone.

The Observer Team will be made up of one distinguished representative from each of the following countries or organisations:—

- (i) Canada.
- (ii) Poland.
- (iii) Sweden.
- (iv) United Kingdom.
- (v) Organization of African Unity, and
- (vi) U.N. Secretary-General: Informal—Not a U.N. observer as such, but a person whom U Thant can personally trust to report to him on his findings, and who therefore can, on that basis, work with others as a team.

Terms of Reference.

(i) *Visits:* To visit all war affected areas and newly liberated areas, on the Federal-controlled side, to witness the conduct of Federal troops—re charges of genocide, etc. Such visits may be undertaken at their own instance or at the instance of the Federal Military Government on receipt of any international allegations about the conduct of Federal troops in any particular area.

(ii) *Reports:* These will be made to individual countries or organisations; but the team will make their visits together and sign their reports collectively. Members are also free to publish such reports in Lagos or elsewhere, but copies of all reports issued should be deposited with the Federal Military Government.

(iii) *Duration:* Two months in the first instance—from the time all the members assemble. It is hoped that all will arrive in Lagos within the week ending September 14.

*Facilities to be provided
for the Team.*

(i) *Headquarters:* The Team will be based in Lagos or anywhere else they prefer, and is logistically possible. The Federal Military Government will take all necessary precautions to guarantee their personal safety.

(ii) *Transport:* The Federal Military Government will provide air, land, and water transport, etc.

(iii) *Board and Accommodation:* These will be the responsibility of the Federal Military Government.

It would be appreciated if you could be kind enough to bring this formally to the notice of your Government and let me know the name of the person selected to serve on this Team at your earliest convenience.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(A. A. Baba-Gana)
Permanent Secretary.

H. E. Mr. T. P. Malone,
Canadian High Commissioner,
Tinubu Street,
Lagos.

APPENDIX O

NIGERIA: OBSERVER TEAM REPORT

Following is text of the Observer Team's Third Interim Report dated October 23, released to the Press in Lagos on October 23. (The report is signed by Lt. Col. Pinnington, Colonel Olkiewicz, General Raab and General Alexander.)

TEXT BEGINS: *Observer Team to Nigeria Third Interim Report*

Outline of Work

The Observer Team to Nigeria travelling with the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the two representatives of the Organization of African Unity and their assistants visited the area of the Second Nigerian Division. The visit lasted from the 15th to the 18th of October. The group split into two teams. One team visited the Asaba area and the bridgehead east of the River Niger around Onitsha. The other team visited the Ibo area west of the River Niger. The teams made their own programs and had complete freedom of movement.

It should be stressed that it is the view of the Observers that the brevity of this visit enables them to reach only tentative conclusions. There are, however, certain matters to which the Observers wish to draw the attention of the Federal Military Government.

Description of Area

The Division is responsible for most of the area of the Mid-Western state, which was recovered from the secessionists during the latter part of 1967. The eastern part of this state, stretching 50-75 miles from the Niger River, is largely inhabited by Ibos estimated at 300,000-400,000.

The Division is also responsible for a bridgehead on the east bank of the River Niger around Onitsha and for the front in the Awka area. The latter was not visited by members of the Team. Fighting continues in both these areas.

State of the Civil Population

The area west of the River Niger suffered relatively little damage from the fighting. All the area has been firmly under Federal control for a year. Life in most parts has returned to normal. For this reason the conditions encountered by the teams were entirely

different from those found in the areas of the First and Third Divisions. The foremost differences are:

(a) All the Ibo people who have returned are living normal lives. Schools are operating and markets are functioning. There is plenty of food and there has been little apparent damage to property in this area.

(b) Camps for detainees are inhabited mainly by people who have been moved out of the areas near the river, in which some infiltrators are operating. They appear to be well fed and well cared for.

(c) Ibos are serving in the State Governor's Council, in the State Civil Service and in the schools.

(d) The Army, civil administration and Red Cross organizations appear to be coping adequately with the task of feeding and administering medical aid to the people in the area.

There is a displaced persons camp at Kwale. Here some 120 young males are housed in the civil prison. They are in good health. However, they are separated from their families. They are confined within the prison walls and have nothing to do. Some have been in the camp for 8 months. Most of them are tradesmen of one type or another, some of them from Benin City. It seems more appropriate in order to facilitate their rehabilitation, to hold people in displaced persons camps within their own home area. A prison is not a proper place in which to hold displaced persons.

We were told that there are still people hiding in the bush along the west bank of the River Niger. If this is so, many of them are undoubtedly suffering from malnutrition.

The Onitsha bridgehead is an operational zone. The city has been badly damaged during the war. The only civilians—some 1,000 persons—are housed in a camp. This camp is run by the Ibos themselves. They appear to be well cared for. Otherwise Onitsha—before the war inhabited by approximately 100,000 persons—is an empty city.

Conduct of Federal Troops and Relations with Civil Population

The Division is comparatively newly formed. Very few of the soldiers have any length of service. There is a program for instructing the troops in the Code of Conduct.

In the area west of the River Niger the troops' relations with the civil are satisfactory except in the areas where infiltration occurs. There appears to be no fear of the soldiers except in the latter area. Occasionally infiltrators operate from dissident territory. The method of dealing with this activity is for the Federal Forces to evacuate the village and take the inhabitants to Asaba. The conduct of the Federal troops, as observed during our visit, appears satisfactory.

In Benin City, the Military Governor's Office has compiled detailed inventories of property belonging to the Ibos with a description of each building, supporting by a photograph and an estimate of the damage. Some buildings have been rented on behalf of the absent owners and the Observers examined books showing rents collected and held for the property owners.

Summary

In summary, in the area of the Second Nigerian Division which the Observers visited we found:

(a) That we had unrestricted freedom of movement.

(b) Conduct of Federal Troops—The conduct of Federal troops as observed during our visit, appears to be satisfactory considering that it is a new division with limited military training.

(c) Conduct of the civilian inhabitants—In the Ibo territory west of the River Niger life has returned more or less to normal. There is plenty of food, including meat. In the Onitsha

bridgehead area where heavy fighting is still going on, there are no civilians apart from those in the camp.

(d) Food and medical assistance—In general food is sufficient and medical assistance adequate but in the Onitsha refugee camp there is a shortage of medical supplies.

(e) Destruction of property—The destruction has been very slight in the Benin area and insignificant in Ibo territories west of the River Niger. Onitsha has been very seriously damaged and it is obvious that there has been extensive looting.

(f) Rehabilitation and reconstruction—We do not consider that a prison is a suitable place for housing displaced persons. On the whole, it seems that the Federal Forces have handed over the administration to the civil authorities in the right way. However, we consider that the army remains too actively involved in civilian affairs in the Asaba area and that a hand-over to civilian authorities would be desirable. The roads are beginning to deteriorate very badly. Unless some action is taken very soon, it will be a major problem.

(g) Genocide—We did not see or hear any evidence of genocide.

Future Action

The Observers intend to return to the Second Nigerian Division area at a later date in order to satisfy themselves on certain matters which they did not have time to examine fully.

TEXT ENDS

OTTAWA

October 23, 1968

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations
and/or a translation into English of the French.

Copies and complete sets are available to the
public by subscription to the Queen's Printer.
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Translations under the direction of the Bureau
for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

PROCEEDINGS

No. 13

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1968
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1968
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1968

Respecting


- 1) The war situation and the reported famine conditions in Nigeria
- 2) Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs

Including

Second Report to the House
and

- a) Lists of Witnesses heard,
- b) Appendices printed,
- c) Exhibits filed.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968



STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn
and Messrs.

Alexander,	⁷ Groos,	Marceau,
¹ Allmand,	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>),	Nesbitt,
Anderson,	Harkness,	Ouellet,
Barrett,	Howard (<i>Okanagan-</i>	² Pilon,
⁵ Borrie,	<i>Boundary</i>),	⁶ Roberts,
Brewin,	Laprise,	⁴ Stanbury,
Buchanan,	Legault,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
Cafik,	Lewis,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
Fairweather,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),	Winch,
Forrestall,	MacLean,	Yewchuk—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

¹ Replaced Mr. Mongrain on October 23, 1968.

² Replaced Mr. Hopkins on October 25, 1968.

³ Mr. Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean) replaced Mr. Ryan on October 30, 1968.
(see footnote 7).

⁴ Replaced Mr. Groos on October 31, 1968.

⁵ Replaced Mr. Hymmen on October 31, 1968.

⁶ Replaced Mr. Gibson on November 4, 1968.

⁷ Replaced Mr. Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean) on November 4, 1968.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
WEDNESDAY, October 23, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Allmand and Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean) be substituted for those of Messrs. Mongrain and Roberts on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

THURSDAY, October 24, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean) be deleted from the list of Members comprising the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

FRIDAY, October 25, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Pilon be substituted for that of Mr. Hopkins on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

WEDNESDAY, October 30, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean) be substituted for that of Mr. Ryan on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

THURSDAY, October 31, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Stanbury and Borrie be substituted for those of Messrs. Groos and Hymmen on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

MONDAY, November 4, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Roberts and Groos be substituted for those of Messrs. Gibson and Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, November 6, 1968.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

SECOND REPORT

Pursuant to its Orders of Reference dated Monday, October 7, 1968, your Committee began consideration of Item 1 of the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs and considered (i) the report of the official observer group on which Canada has a member, of the conduct of federal troops in the prosecution of the war in Nigeria, (ii) the reported famine conditions in that country, and invited Andrew Brewin, M.P. (*Greenwood*) and David MacDonald, M.P. (*Egmont*) to report their observations on the conditions of the civilian population in Nigeria.

Your Committee received five reports from the Observer Team to Nigeria. It also received a Report made to the Secretary General of the United Nations on the incident of Okigwi, Nigeria, and the First Interim Report by the Representative of the Secretary General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities.

Your Committee held 24 meetings from October 8, 1968 to November 4, 1968, and heard the following witnesses (listed in order of appearance before the Committee):

1. Mr. G. R. Harman, Head, Africa 1 Section, African and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs.
2. Major General A. E. Wrinch, National Commissioner, Canadian Red Cross Society.
3. Mr. Arnold Smith, Secretary General of the Commonwealth.
4. Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P.
5. Mr. David MacDonald, M.P.
6. Mr. William McNeill, Co-ordinator for Nigeria, Canadian University Service Overseas.
7. The Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs.
8. Mr. G. Gordon Riddell, Head, African and Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs.
9. Dr. E. H. Johnson, Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada.
10. Mr. Roméo Maione, Director, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace.
11. Mr. Alan Grossman, Ottawa Bureau Chief, *Time Magazine*.

12. Mr. Keith Bezanson, former Canadian University Service Overseas Volunteer.

13. Mr. Charles Taylor, London Correspondent of the *Globe and Mail*.

14. Mr. Stephen Lewis, M.L.A. (*Scarborough West*), Toronto.

15. Dr. Clyne Shepherd, Medical Missionary (Presbyterian), Edinburgh, Scotland.

16. Major General William A. Milroy, Senior Canadian Observer on the Observer Team to Nigeria.

The following documents were printed as Appendices to the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Appendix A—Revised Main Estimates for 1968-69 relating to the Department of External Affairs.

Appendix B—Observer Team to Nigeria First Interim Report.

Appendix C—Observer Team to Nigeria Second Report.

Appendix D—Nigeria—Use by Red Cross of Canadian Aircraft (Statements in House of Commons Debates, Tuesday, October 8, 1968, pages 926 and 927).

Appendix E—News Release issued by Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P. for Greenwood and Mr. David MacDonald, M.P. for Egmont, dated Sunday, October 6, 1968.

Appendix F—Discussion of Nigeria During United Nations General Debate.

Appendix G—Report of Incident at Okigwi, Nigeria—Press Release issued by United Nations Press Services, dated October 9, 1968.

Appendix H—First Interim Report by Representative of Secretary General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities—Press Release issued by United Nations Press Services, dated October 9, 1968.

Appendix I—Declaration of Organization of African Unity, September 16, 1968.

Appendix J—Report of the Observer Team's Visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division.

Appendix K—Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide, Lake Success, December 9, 1948 (together with a list setting out the parties to the convention and the dates of their adherence).

Appendix L—Statement by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. C. Y. Mgonja on Tanzania's Recognition of Biafra, Saturday, April 13, 1968.

Appendix M—Nigeria 1967 *Aburi Report* (without pictures or advertisements).

Appendix N—Terms of Reference of the Observer Team to Nigeria.

Appendix O—Observer Team to Nigeria Third Interim Report.

Appendix P—Memorandum of Points of International Law—brief submitted by R. St. J. MacDonald, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.

Appendix Q—Summary of Countries' Statements at UN on Nigerian Situation.

Appendix R—Observer Team to Nigeria Special Report dated November 4, 1968.

The following documents were filed as Exhibits:

Exhibit No. 1—Copies of newspaper clippings used by Mr. Keith Bezanson during his testimony on Thursday, October 17, 1968.

Exhibit No. 2—Letter received by the Chairman from the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, dated October 15, 1968, enclosing a copy of a statement on the situation in Nigeria by Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Washington, on September 11, 1968. A press clipping from the Washington Post, dated October 5, 1968, was also included.

Exhibit No. 3—Letter dated October 9, 1968, from Mr. Hugh Faulkner, M.P., enclosing a petition signed by 1,124 people in the City of Peterborough.

Your Committee considered the matters referred to it by the said Order of Reference dated Monday, October 7, 1968 relating to Nigeria, and reports as follows:

Report on the Evidence

The Observer Team

1. The evidence presented to the Committee indicates that the Observer Team to Nigeria has been performing a very useful function.

The Observer Team was established on the invitation of the Government of Nigeria and represents a desirable precedent and a sound initiative by that Government.

The Observer Team operates under terms of reference which read as follows: "To visit all war affected areas and newly liberated areas, on the Federal-controlled side, to witness the conduct of Federal troops—re charges of genocide, etc. Such visits may be undertaken at their own instance or at the instance of the Federal Military Government on receipt of any international allegations about the conduct of Federal troops in any particular area".

The Observer Team has not investigated incidents which may have happened before its appointment and it has not visited the secessionist area. The Committee's recommendations include suggestions for an extension of the work of the Observers, an increase in their number, and a broadening of their terms of reference.

The Committee believes that the five reports published to date by the Observer Team has been honest, factual and responsible, and that the procedures adopted by the Observer Team have been reasonable in the light of their terms of reference and the circumstances in the field.

2. The evidence presented to us does not indicate that the Government of Nigeria has adopted a policy of genocide. On the contrary the evidence indicates it is doing its best to assist and to preserve the lives and property of the people, including the Ibo people, in the area now under its control.

The evidence indicates that many of the Ibo people now living in the secessionist area fear genocide, and that this fear is based upon a large number of factors. These include (without attempting to be exhaustive or to assess the relative strength of these factors) religious, tribal and economic rivalries, jealousies and hatreds, the bitterness of a civil war, and the past history of atrocities and improper treatment of minorities.

While there have been atrocities and extreme bitterness in this civil war, there is no evidence that troop formations are engaged in genocide.

3. The evidence indicates that the Government of Nigeria is attempting to impose and maintain proper standards of conduct and discipline among its troops. A code of proper conduct has been issued by the Government to the Nigerian troops. In general, the attempt to enforce proper discipline and conduct seems to be as successful as could be expected in the difficult circumstances which exist.

Conditions in Nigeria

4. The evidence presented to the Committee indicates that the civil war has been the cause of very great hardship, destruction of property and loss of life among the civilian population both in the area now controlled by the Nigerian Government and in the secessionist area. In these areas a very large number of people are dying each day of malnutrition or starvation. While need exists for food and medical supplies in both areas, it is the opinion of the Committee that a much greater need exists in the secessionist area which is surrounded by Federal troops and which is cut off from normal sources of supply.

5. It appears that one of the greatest immediate needs in all parts of Nigeria is for effective means of transportation to get available supplies quickly to people in need. The Committee was pleased to note the action of the Nigerian Government in permitting the International Red Cross to fly mercy relief flights over Nigerian territory to the secessionist held area, and hopes that this action will serve as a useful precedent.

6. If the war in Nigeria continues, civilian suffering and death will be multiplied many times unless the effective supply of food and medical supplies can be increased very substantially. Evidence presented to the Committee indicates that if the war continues 3,000 tons per day of relief supplies will be required by the end of this year. The Committee cannot tell whether or not this estimate is accurate. Clearly however, the aid required will be very large—so large as to raise serious doubts as to whether the problem can be handled adequately by the voluntary church and Red Cross organizations now engaged in the task unless aided and supplemented by governments or regional or international agencies.

Recommendations

1. Since the work of the Observer Team has been beneficial and has helped to alleviate fears and provide incentives for proper conduct, it would be desirable if such work could be carried out in all parts of Nigeria including the secessionist area, and if this work could be extended to include the investigation in all parts of Nigeria, including the secessionist area, of the conduct of troops on both sides, allegations of bombing of civilians and any other acts contrary to the Code of Conduct issued to the Nigerian Armed Forces.

The Observer Team was established on the invitation of the Nigerian Government and was limited to a two month period. The Canadian Government should therefore request the Nigerian Government to extend the duration of its invitation and to widen its terms of reference. We recommend that the numbers of the present Observer Team be increased or a second Observer Team be formed, and that the work of the Observer Team or Teams be extended as mentioned above. As recommended by the Observer Team, for its future efficacy, we recommend that additional communication and transport facilities be provided, and that the organization of the Observer Team be changed to enable it to have certain of its members permanently on the ground in each divisional sector.

2. The Canadian Government acting in concert with other interested governments and international organizations, should approach the Nigerian Government with a view to establishing an International Team to ascertain the extent of need in all parts of Nigeria and the best methods of meeting it.

In view of the evidence indicating the need for vastly increased relief supplies, the Relief Team should give particular attention to the possibility of establishing a land or Niger River relief corridor as well as improving the delivery of relief supplies by air. The Canadian Government should support actively the work and recommendations of any such International Team, including assistance, in concert with other interested governments, in constructing or establishing such relief corridors.

The Committee notes with regret that there is no international machinery to aid innocent victims of hostilities, as there is in the case of natural disasters; and the Committee recommends that, in order to avoid this problem in the future, the Canadian Government take an initiative in developing international machinery to meet this need.

3. The Canadian Government should continue and intensify its efforts to supply effective aid through the International Red Cross. It should also continue to make senior officials available at Fernando Po, Lagos and other key localities to assist and supplement the efforts of the International Red Cross to obtain all governmental and other permissions necessary to enable relief efforts to be carried out effectively. This should include permission to use Canadian Hercules and any additional aircraft, including lighter aircraft, which can be used effectively to carry relief supplies to all parts of Nigeria from whatever airfields can be effectively used for this purpose and effectively supervised by the International Red Cross.

4. The Canadian Government in concert with other interested governments should offer to the Nigerian Government non-military assistance in the building or re-building of civil air strips in any part of Nigeria, for the exclusive use of relief flights.

5. It is important that governmental efforts should be backed up adequately by individual Canadians. The Committee urges Canadian individuals and corporations to be generous in supporting public appeals for aid.

6. It is important that the Canadian Government should continue and intensify its efforts to help the Red Cross to aid suffering children including transporting them from Nigeria to relief centres, or Canada, where they can be given proper treatment or care.

7. Under no circumstances should Canada supply arms either to the Government of Nigeria or to the authorities in the secessionist area.

8. The Canadian Government should continue and intensify its efforts by negotiations through all possible channels, including the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and with interested governments, to persuade the contending parties to accept further mediation. However, steps should not be taken which would jeopardize the effectiveness of our relief efforts.

9. In the event of a cease-fire and a request from the parties to do so, the Canadian Government under the aegis of the Commonwealth or the United Nations should be prepared to assist as far as possible, in an effective peace-keeping force in Nigeria.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 1 to 13*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,
IAN WAHN,
Chairman.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, October 31, 1968.

(21)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera*, at 10:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, Marceau, Ouellet, Pilon, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (26).

The Committee agreed, unanimously, to print the following documents as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings:

Memorandum of Points of International Law—brief submitted by R. St. J. MacDonald, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto (*see Appendix P*).

Summary of Countries' Statements at UN on Nigerian Situation (*see Appendix Q*).

Members discussed a draft Second Report to the House.

At 11:30 a.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(22)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera*, at 5:00 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Borrie, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laprise, Legault, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, Marceau, Ouellet, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn (22).

Members resumed consideration of the draft Second Report to the House.

At 5:30 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 9:30 a.m., Friday, November 1, 1968.

FRIDAY, November 1, 1968.

(23)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera*, at 9:50 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Alexander, Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Borrie, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laprise, Legault, Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*), MacLean, Marceau, Ouellet, Wahn, Winch (21).

Members discussed and carried certain sections of the draft Second Report to the House.

At 11:00 a.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m., on Monday, November 4, 1968.

MONDAY, November 4, 1968.
(24)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera*, at 3:50 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Borrie, Brewin, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, MacLean, Ouellet, Stanbury, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch (19).

The Committee agreed to print the following document as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings:

Observer Team to Nigeria Special Report dated November 4, 1968 (*see Appendix R*).

Members completed their consideration of the draft Report. It was agreed that the Chairman should present it to the House as the Second Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

At 6:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

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APPENDIX P

To: The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Submitted by: R. St. J. MacDonald, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, Toronto, Ontario.

October 22, 1968.

POSSIBLE CANADIAN INITIATIVES IN THE UNITED NATIONS WITH REGARD TO BIAFRA, IN THE VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

I: It is submitted that Canada may properly mobilize support for a resolution in the General Assembly deploring the war, expressing concern for the human rights of the starving civilians in Biafra and calling on both sides for a ceasefire.

This might be done as follows: The General Assembly may assume jurisdiction over situations involving breaches of the specific Charter provisions dealing with human rights.

The concept of human rights is mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations in the Preamble, and in Articles 1(3), 13, 55, and 76. What is crucial to notice in this connection is that the human rights provisions are not merely declaratory but carry with them legal obligation. This obligation is emphatically reinforced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two Covenants of Human Rights recently adopted by the General Assembly. This jurisdiction, which the United Nations has so often asserted in the past in the area of human rights, is based on its power to concern itself with breaches of specific Articles of the Charter which give rise to legal obligations.

There is no reason why a resolution to this effect, predicated on this concern for human rights, should be considered to contravene the affected State's domestic jurisdiction, as protected by Article 2(7) of the Charter. An examination of the past practice of the General Assembly discloses a great number of instances of the exercise of this jurisdiction, which has nearly always been based on a report or finding of a committee of a breach of the Charter Articles on human rights.

For example, from 1954 to 1967, at least eleven resolutions have been passed by the General Assembly with regard to the practice of apartheid in South Africa, those in the last few years calling upon member States to apply sanctions. See G. A. Res. 820(IX), 1917(X), 1178(XII), 1248(XIII), 1598(XV), 1663(XVI), 761(XVII), 2184(XXI), 2189(XXI), 2202(XXI), 2307(XXII).

This interpretation of the jurisdiction of the General Assembly was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in an Advisory Opinion in the case of a Resolution passed by the General Assembly in its fourth session (G. A. Res. 294(IV)), concerning the denial of human rights to Church leaders in Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. The International Court of Justice held in this case that no objection could be raised to the passing of resolutions by the Assembly, on grounds of Article 2(7), when human rights were involved; for Article 55 provided a legal basis of obligation.

C.f. The study of human rights in the United Nations by Lauterpacht in 70 Hague *Recueil* (1947)i, at pp. 5-11, and also see *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations* by Rosalyn Higgins, 1963, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 118-130.

II: Secondly, it is submitted that: It is open to Canada as a first step toward this goal, to see that the matter of Biafra is raised for consideration in the Third Committee of the General Assembly; Canada could then invite the Third Committee to present a draft resolution concerning Biafra to the General Assembly. (As to the procedural propriety of this course of action, see the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1947-48, pp. 23-24).

III: Thirdly, it is submitted that such an initiative by Canada would be wholly consistent with its record of concern and effort for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the United Nations (as witnessed by its declared support for the Covenants on Human Rights, the recent Race Convention and the early Universal Declaration of Human Rights), and with the expectations of United Nations members concerning Canada's role; it is further submitted that Canada is in an auspicious position to undertake such an initiative in terms of its good relations with members of all major blocks of powers, and that such action would in no way prejudice but rather enhance the realisation of the fundamental interests and objectives of Canadian foreign policy.

IV: It must be emphasized that minor infringements of technical rules of international law may be justified by the overriding importance of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms; and this principle is now an accepted rule of interpretation in international law.

V: The expression of the conscience of the international community is evidenced by the attitudes and efforts of the international relief agencies, including the various church groups, in sending food and medical supplies by air into Biafra. In my opinion, it is lawful for Canada to assist the church agencies in this humanitarian undertaking. See D. Bogen, "The Law of Humanitarian Intervention", *Harvard International Law Club Journal* 7: 296-315, Spring, 1966.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

R. ST. J. MACDONALD,
Dean, Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ontario.

OCTOBER 22, 1968.

MACDONALD, Ronald St. John, B.A., LL.M.
Dean of the University of Toronto Law School.
Born Montreal 20th August, 1928.
Educated St. Francis Xavier University, B.A., 1949.
Dalhousie University LL.B. 1952.
University of London (Eng) LL.M. 1954.
Harvard Law School, LL.M., 1955.
International Law Commission Seminar Geneva (Dipl) 1952.
Professor of Law, University of Toronto since 1961 (Now Dean).
Secy. Canronald Society of Canada (Candn Br. mem. Council).
Editor "University of Toronto Law Journal" since 1961.
Lecturer in Law Osgoode Hall 1955-57.
Professor there 1957-59.
Asst. Editor Ontario Reports and Ontario Weekly Notes 1956-57.
Prof. of Law, University of Western Ontario 1959-61.
Founding Editor "Current Law and Social Problems" 1959-62.
Read law with McInnes, MacQuarrie & Cooper, Halifax, N.S.
Called to the Bars of N.S. and Ontario 1956.
Consultant, Department of External Affairs, 1964.
Canadian representative and rapporteur Third Committee 20th U.N. Gen. Assembly.
Author of articles and essays in numerous professional journals in Canada and England.
Served in 2nd World War with R.C.N.(R) 1945.
Discharged with rank of Sub. Lieut.
Member Canadian Bar Association, Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
Law Society of Upper Canada. London Institute of World Affairs.
International Law Association, St. Andrew's Society.
Liberal. Roman Catholic.

APPENDIX Q

Summary of Countries' Statements At U.N. on Nigerian Situation

FM CANDELNY OCT26/68

TO EXTER 3337 IMMED

INFO LDN WSHDC GENEV LAGOS CANFORCEHED(DGPLANS DOPS)

AIRMAIL STKHM

REF OURTEL 3326 OCT26

UNGA XXIII: SURVEY OF GENERAL DEBATE IN PLENARY ON NIGERIAN SITUATION DURING COURSE OF GENERAL DEBATE IN PLENARY 54 COUNTRIES HAVE SPOKEN ON SUBJ OF NIGERIA. OF THESE 54 COUNTRIES, 23 WERE AFRICAN, 3 ASIAN, 13 EUROPEAN, 3 OTHERS, 9 LATIN-AMERICAN, TOGETHER WITH ISRAEL SOUTH AFRICA AND USA. THE 23 AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SPOKEN ARE AS FOLLOWS: ALGERIA BOTSWANA BURUNDI CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE CONGO-KNSHA DAHOMEY ETHIOPIA GABON GUINEA KENYA LESOTHO LIBERIA MADAGASCAR MALI MAURITANIA MOROCCO NIGERIA RWANDA SENEGAL SIERRALEONE TANZANIA TOGO AND ZAMBIA. THE ASIAN COUNTRIES WERE: JPN LAOS AND THAILAND. EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SPEAKING WERE: AUSTRIA BELGIUM CYPRUS DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE ICELAND ITALY LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS NORWAY SWEDEN UK. OTHERS WERE AUSTRALIA CDA AND NZ. LATIN AMERICANS WERE: BARBADOS COLUMBIA ELSALVADOR GUYANA HAITI HONDURAS JAMAICA NICARAGUA AND VENEZUELA.

2. COUNTRIES NOT/NOT SPEAKING ON NIGERIAN SITUATION INCLUDED 12 AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 12 COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND SUCH COUNTRIES AS INDIA AND PAK (INCLUDING SEPARATE ADDRESS OF PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA) AND TURK AND GREECE. THE 12 AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE: CAMEROUN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHAD (ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT OF CHAD) GHANA LIBYA MALAWI MAURITIUS SOMALIA SUDAN TUNISIA UGANDA AND UAR. TWELVE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE ALBANIA BULGARIA BYELORUSSIA CUBA CZECHOSLOVAKIA HUNGARY MONGOLIA POLAND ROMANIA USSR UKRAINE AND YUGOSLAVIA. OTHER COUNTRIES NOT/NOT SPEAKING INCLUDED CAMBODIA AND SYRIA.

3. AFRICA

1. ALGERIA: FELT OAU WAS ONLY POSSIBLE SOURCE OF SOLUTION AND THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NIGERIA MUST BE MAINTAINED. FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS UNDER PRETEXT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ONLY AGGRAVATED THE CRISIS AND CAUSED MORE ULTIMATE HARM TO NIGERIA AND AFRICA THAN THE DETESTABLE WAR ITSELF.

2. BOTSWANA: NOTED SPECULATION WHICH CENTERED AROUND RIGHT OF BIAFRA TO SELFDETERMINATION AND ITS EXTERMINATION BY FMG. ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE WAS ONLY PREREQUISITE FOR STATES REALIZING THEMSELVES THROUGH NATIONHOOD AND SOLI-

DARITY.ALTHOUGH BOTSWANA DID NOT/NOT SUPPORT TRIBAL SECESSIONISTS MOVEMENTS IT DEPLORED EXTERMINATION OF PEOPLES.NOW THAT CIVIL WAR WAS VIRTUALLY OVER IT HOPED THAT FMG WOULD ENGAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF WAR-TORN AREAS,AND QUOTE ENDEAVOUR TO BRING ABOUT MEASURES WHICH WILL ENSURE RECONCILIATION AND LASTING PEACE IN A UNIFIED NIGERIA UNQUOTE.

3.BURUNDI:HAD SUGGESTED CEASEFIRE BUT WAS AWARE OF SECESSIONIST DANGER TO AFRICA AND CALLED FOR RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF NIGERIA.

4.CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE:NIGERIA HAD BEEN THE PRIDE OF AFRICA BEFORE CIVIL WAR AND NOW AN UNJUST AND BLOODY SITUATION HAD TURNED BROTHER AGAINST BROTHER UNDER THE FALLACIOUS PRETEXT OF TRIBALISM.WHILE CONDEMNING THE WAR AND ITS HORRORS CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE CONDEMNED SECESSIONISM NO/NO LESS AND COMPLETELY ENDORSED OAU RESLN AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF A UNITED NIGERIA.

5.CONGO-KNSHA:CONDEMNED FOREIGN MONOPOLY INTERESTS KEEPING SECESSION AND CIVIL WAR ALIVE.UN MUST ASSIST ARTIFICIALLY DIVIDED COUNTRIES AND THOSE THREATENED BY DIV IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD NATL UNITY.

6.DAHOMEY:FORCE SHOULD GIVE WAY TO REASON WHICH WOULD LEAD TO EQUITABLE SOLUTION AND PERMIT NIGERIA TO WORK TOWARD UNITY ONCE AGAIN.NIGERIAN SITUATION WAS A HORRIBLE DRAMA AND A PAINFUL CONFLICT.IT WAS HOPED THAT NIGERIA WOULD BE ALLOWED TO REGAIN THE UNITY AND COHESION WHICH WERE MATTERS PREVIOUSLY OF ADMIRATION AND PRIDE.

7.ETHIOPIA:SOLUTION SHOULD BE LEFT ESSENTIALLY TO NIGERIANS WITHIN ONE SOVEREIGN PERSONALITY AND OUTSIDERS SHOULD ASSIST ONLY ON BASIS OF OAU RESLN OF SEP16.

8.GABON:UN MUST NOT/NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO MASSIVE SUFFERING AND LOSS OF LIFE.UN MUST NOT/NOT TOLERATE GENOCIDE IN STATES WHERE THERE IS INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES.THERE MUST NOT/NOT BE COMPLICITY BY INACTION.

9.GUINEA:SITUATION WAS AFRICAN TRADEDY.IT POINTED OUT DANGER STILL INHERENT IN TRIBAL DIFFICULTIES.IN CONTEXT OF RICH NATURAL RESOURCES OF EASTERNNIGERIA GUINEA REFERRED TO OTHER NATIONS INTERESTED IN ENCOURAGING CONFLICT.WHY DID NOT/NOT THOSE NATIONS CONDEMN ATROCITIES IN OTHER TROUBLED AREAS OF WORLD.CIVIL WAR MUST END IMMEDLY ACCORDING TO PRINCIPLES OF OAU CHARTER WHICH DICTATED RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.GLANCE AT MAP OF AFRICA WOULD REVEAL NUMBER OF POTENTIAL BIAFRAS.

10. KENYA: CONSIDERED IT LAMENTABLE THAT QUOTE OUTSIDERS ARE STILL ACTIVE UNQUOTE IN NIGERIA. IT SUGGESTED CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THIS ISSUE WHILE SO MANY WERE STILL IN NY TO QUOTE FIX AN IMMED END TO DEATH UNQUOTE. IT WAS STRANGE THAT BIG AND ABLE POWERS HAD STOOD IDLY BY DOING NOTHING EVEN FOR HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES.

11. LESOTHO: SHARED HORROR OF ALL NATIONS AND AFRICANS IN PARTICULAR AT SUFFERINGS OF PEOPLE OF NIGERIA. LESOTHO GOVT ASSOCIATED ITSELF WITH EFFORTS BEING MADE TO RESTORE PEACE IN THAT TROUBLED AREA.

12. LIBERIA: SAID UN COULD NOT/NOT OVERLOOK FACT THAT PROBLEM WAS DUE PARTLY TO QUOTE UNWARRANTED OUTSIDE INTERVENTION UNQUOTE IN VIOLATION OF UN CHARTER.

13. MADAGASCAR: CALLED FOR CEASEFIRE AND A RESUMED DIALOGUE BETWEEN FMG AND BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES WHILE EXPLORING ANY BALKANIZATION WHATSOEVER OF AFRICA.

14. MALI: REAFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR OAU RESLN OF SEP 16 AND CONDEMNED ALL SUPPORT FOR SECESSIONIST REGIME. ANYONE WHO AGREED WITH SUPPORT FOR SECESSIONIST REGIME WOULD HAVE TO REALIZE THAT THERE WERE NO/NO RESERVATIONS ANYWHERE. AFRICAN LEADERS WOULD REMEMBER THIS WHEN DEALING WITH SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS OF VARIOUS NATURES INCLUDING QUOTE FREE QUEBEC UNQUOTE. ANY SUPPORT FOR SECESSIONISTS FAR FROM SERVING INTERESTS OF NIGERIA AND AFRICA WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO DIRECT SUPPORT FOR INTERESTS OF IMPERIALIST MONOPOLIES AND CENTRIFUGAL FORCES HOSTILE TO THE UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF AFRICAN STATES. (SEE OURTEL 3258 OCT 22).

15. MAURITANIA: SAID QUOTE WHEN AFRICAN BLOOD IS FLOWING ALL AFRICANS ARE IN DUTY BOUND TO REACT UNQUOTE. BEST MEANS FOR PEACE WAS NOT/NOT TO FAVOUR ONE SIDE OR OTHER. IT DENOUNCED ORGANIZATIONS WHICH UNDER COVER OF HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS TOOK SIDE OF EASTERN REGION AND THEREBY ENCOURAGED CONTINUANCE OF STRUGGLE. TO VIEW PROBLEM IN TERMS OF RACE OR RELIGION WAS DANGEROUS. AFRICA WAS ALREADY BALKANIZED AND UNLESS IT WAS TO DISAPPEAR IT COULD NOT/NOT BE FURTHER DIVIDED.

16. MOROCCO: APPEALED TO SECESSIONIST LEADERS TO HEED OAU AND PUT AN END TO HOSTILITIES. SECESSIONIST LEADERS SHOULD COOPERATION WITH FEDERAL AUTHORITIES IN RESTORING PEACE AND UNITY TO NIGERIA WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF RECONCILIATION. MOROCCO WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ENDORSED EFFORTS OF FMG TO PRESERVE UNITY OF NIGERIA.

17. NIGERIA: FOR TEXT OF NIGERIAN STATEMENT IN GENERAL DEBATE SEE OURTEL 3049 OCT 11.

18. RWANDA: REFERRED TO FRATRICIDAL WAR BEING WAGED IN NIGERIA AND TO FAILURE OF ALL APPEALS FOR PEACE AND ALL CONCILIATION MISSIONS. IT ALSO SPOKE OF COMPLICITY OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF GREAT POWERS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING CONFLICT.

19. SENEGAL: ALL AFRICAN STATES WERE DEEPLY TROUBLED BY FRATRICIDAL STRUGGLES. SENEGAL CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER OAU AUTHORITY

IN CONDITIONS GUARANTEEING QUOTE THE INTEGRITY OF A NIGERIA RECONCILED WITH ITSELF UNQUOTE COULD ASSURE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF PEOPLE AND PROPERTY.

20. SIERRALEONE: PLACED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE UPON BIAFRA-NIGERIA DEBACLE QUOTE WHICH DEMANDS FULL-SCALE ATTN BY THIS XXIII SESSION OF UNGA UNQUOTE. SIERRALEONE NOTED QUOTE INCONVENIENCE UNQUOTE FELT BY LEADER OF ONE SIDE OF CONFLICT TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF OAU OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IT CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE SUPERVISED BY NEUTRAL OBSERVERS ON BOTH SIDES OF BATTLE LINE. IT URGED CESSATION OF IMPORTATION OF ARMS.

21. TANZANIA: EXPRESSED PROFOUND CONCERN OVER NIGERIA-BIAFRA QUOTE GENOCIDAL CONFLICT UNQUOTE AND STATED CONVICTION THAT NO/NO MILITARY SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE. TANZANIA APPEALED AGAIN FOR IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND FOR WAYS TO SUPPLY AND DELIVER HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO QUOTE SUFFERING MILLIONS OF BIAFRANS UNQUOTE.

22. TOGO: CONSIDERED THAT IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE TO ACCEPT IDEA OF INTERNAL DIV OF AFRICAN STATES AS UNITY OF SUCH STATES WAS PRECONDITION OF AFRICAN UNITY ITSELF. TOGO WAS NOT/NOT INSENSIBLE TO HUMAN ASPECTS OF THIS WAR AND BEST SOLUTION TO PROBLEM WAS ACCORDING TO RECENT OAU RESLN. SECESSIONIST LEADERS SHOULD SEEK COMPROMISE WITH FMG AND UNITY OF NIGERIA SHOULD BE PRESERVED.

23. ZAMBIA: BRIT AND USSR WERE QUOTE QUEER COMBINATION OF AGENTS AND BLOODSHED UNQUOTE WHICH MADE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION VERY DIFFICULT. SITUATION IN BIAFRA TOOK ON CHARACTER OF GENOCIDE. ZAMBIA RECOGNIZED BIAFRA BECAUSE QUOTE REAL UNITY BETWEEN PEOPLES CANNOT/NOT BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MASS AND INDISCRIMINATE SLAUGHTER UNQUOTE. ZAMBIA WAS NOT/NOT MOTIVATED BY IMPERIALIST TENDENCIES SUGGESTED IN SOME QUARTERS, AS EVIDENCED BY ZAMBIAN CONDEMNATION OF SECESSION IN KATANGA. BIAFRANS WERE CAPABLE OF RUNNING THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. PEACEFUL CONDITIONS WERE NECESSARY PRE-REQUISITE TO ANY MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS. LASTING PEACE WAS POSSIBLE ONLY IF ACHIEVED THROUGH MUTUAL DISCUSSIONS AND IN JUST CONDITIONS. ZAMBIA PROPOSED CESSATION OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO BOTH SIDES. UN IN FULFILMENT OF UNIVERSAL MISSION SHOULD PLAY POSITIVE ROLE IN BRINGING PEACE TO AREA. UN COULD NOT/NOT GO TO BIAFRA AT INVITATION OF FEDERAL MILITARY GOVT TO WITNESS PASSIVELY DESTRUCTION OF LIVES AND PROPERTY.

4. ASIA

1. JPN: EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER SITUATION AND SUPPORTED HAND OF ASSISTANCE EXTENDED FROM PURELY A HUMANITARIAN VIEWPOINT QUITE REMOVED FROM ANY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

2. LAOS: TRAGEDY OF BIAFRA CONTINUED TO SHAKE CONSCIENCE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD BY DIMENSIONS OF ITS ATROCITY AND HATE.

3. THAILAND: REFERRED TO TRAGIC PLIGHT OF CIVILIAN VICTIMS CAUSED BY LOCAL CONFLICT IN NIGERIA. IT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT QUOTE REASONABLE SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE WOULD BE FOUND SOON AND THAT NIGERIAN PEOPLE WOULD BE SPARED FURTHER SUFFERING.

5. OTHERS (COMWEL)

1. AUSTRALIA: BRIEFLY EXPRESSED QUOTE DEEP CONCERN UNQUOTE AT NIGERIAN HOSTILITIES.

2. CDA: FOR TEXT OF MINISTERS REMARKS ON NIGERIA SEE OUTEL 2971 OCT 8.

3. NZ: WAS DISTRESSED BY SUFFERINGS IN NIGERIA. IT REFERRED TO QUOTE PRAISEWORTHY AND PAINSTAKING ATTEMPTS BY OAU AND UN SECGEN. IT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT UN WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSIST IN MITIGATION OF QUOTE DESPERATE TRIBULATIONS UNQUOTE IN DEVASTED AREAS.

6. EUROPE

1. AUSTRIA: EXPRESSED DEEP-FELT SYMPATHY AND STRONG EMOTION FOR SITUATION AND HAD PROVIDED RELIEF FOR DISTR BY ICRC. AUSTRIA HAD SENT REP TO LAGOS AND OTHER CAPITALS TO EXAMINE ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER HELP AND THIS MISSION WAS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ICRC. AUSTRIA HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY OAU RESLN CALLING UPON ALL PARTIES TO ENSURE IMMEDIATE RELIEF.

2. BELGIUM: IN BRIEF REF PROPOSED PLANS FOR SWIFT RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA.

3. CYPRUS: CALLED FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SPIRIT OF CONCILIATION AND WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UNITY.

4. DENMARK: DANISH ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA WAS ON UNPRECEDENTED SCALE AND DANISH EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED EXCLUSIVELY TOWARDS SOLUTION OF THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS. DENMARK HAD NO/NO WISH TO INTERVENE IN POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT AND REGRETTED ABSENCE OF ARMS EMBARGO. ALL PARTIES SHOULD COOPERATE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES IN PROVISION OF RELIEF.

5. FINLAND: FELT DEEP CONCERN AT TERRIBLE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY INTERNAL WAR IN NIGERIA AND FEELING OF FINISH PEOPLE WERE DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THIS TRAGEDY. FINLAND WAS COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS AND ALSO ENDORSED APPEAL BY OAU TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN SUCH RELIEF EFFORTS.

6. FRANCE: DENOUNCED TRAGEDY OF BIAFRA AND MARTYRDOM OF IBO PEOPLE A TRAGEDY WHICH WORLD COMMUNITY HAD CONTEM-

PLATED WITHOUT TRYING TO PUT AN END TO IT. FRANCE ALSO DENOUNCED OBSTACLES TO ASSISTANCE AND ASKED FOR HALT TO SHIPMENT OF WEAPONS. IT NOTED THAT DETERMINATION OF BIAFRANS HAD NOT/NOT FLAGGED AND THAT BIAFRA HAD QUOTE INCONTROVERTIBLE PERSONALITY UNQUOTE. SOLUTION SHOULD BE SOUGHT ON BASIS OF UN CHARTER.

7. ICELAND: REFERRED TO RECENT COMMUNICATION BASED ON HUMANITARIAN REASONS FROM NORDIC MINISTERS TO SECGEN. IT WOULD CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN RELIEF EFFORTS.

8. ITALY: RECOGNIZED INTERNAL NATURE OF NIGERIAN CONFLICT AS EMPHASIZED AT RECENT MTG OF OAU AND WAS AWARE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO EVOLVE LASTING SOLUTIONS FOR THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. IT URGED SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS AND ASKED UN TO THROW ITS WEIGHT BEHIND OAU WITH ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY.

9. LUXEMBOURG: SAID WORLD CONSCIENCE MUST NOT/NOT REMAIN SILENT IN FACE OF FRATRICIDAL STRUGGLE. UN SHOULD CONSIDER HUMANITARIAN QUESTION AND SHOULD CALL UPON FMG TO FACILITATE DIRECT DISTR OF RELIEF AND ASSURE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF ALL INHABITANTS.

10. NETHERLANDS: OAU WAS APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION TO BRING CONFLICT TO END. FRATRICIDAL STRIFE RAGING IN EASTERN REGION OF ONE OF AFRICAS LARGEST COUNTRIES HAD BROUGHT PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS OF FOUR MILLION DOLLARS FROM INDIVIDUALS IN NETHERLANDS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS. NETHERLANDS HOPED THAT OAU COULD SOON BRING ABOUT END TO ARMED CONFLICT AND ALSO ENDORSED OAU HUMANITARIAN APPEAL. IT FELT THAT REPORT BY PERSONAL REP OF SECGEN IN NIGERIA MIGHT CONSTITUTE VALUABLE BASIS FOR DISPERSING APPREHENSIONS OF PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD AND ADDED THAT QUOTE SHOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT DISCUSSION IN AND SUBSEQUENT ACTION BY THIS ASSEMBLY DIRECTED TOWARDS COORDINATED EFFORTS IN HUMANITARIAN FIELD, NETHERLAND GOVT WOULD WHOLEHEARTEDLY PROMOTE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE.

11. NORWAY: POINTED OUT EFFORTS OF MANY GOVTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAD QUOTE PURELY HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVE WITH NO/NO POLITICAL AIMS UNQUOTE. THERE WAS NO/NO BASIS FOR CRITICISM OF UN OR ITS AGENCIES WHICH HAD NOT/NOT SHOWN QUOTE ANY LACK OF WILL OR DEVOTION TO HELP UNQUOTE. SITUATION FOCUSED ATTN ON INSUFFICIENT MANDATE AND AUTHORITY GIVEN TO UN AND ITS AGENCIES. UNGA SHOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF GIVING UN AND ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES STRONGER MANDATE TO CARRY OUT PURELY HUMANITARIAN TASK OF PROVIDING RELIEF TO QUOTE CIVILIAN POPULATION ENDURING GREAT SACRIFICES BROUGHT UPON THEM BY WARS OR CONFLICTS OR BY OTHER CALAMITIES UNQUOTE.

12. SWEDEN: SUPPORTED HUMANITARIAN AID TO CRUELLY STRUCK CIVILIAN POPULATION OF NIGERIA. IT NOTED CONCERN EXPRESSED

BY OAU IN ALGIERS FOR SUFFERING POPULATION AND HOPED THAT SECGEN WOULD PROVIDE INFO ON PROGRESS OF RELIEF ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA.

13. UK: BRIEFLY DEPLORED QUOTE TRAGIC EVENTS UNQUOTE AND SAID INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST CONTINUE RELIEF AS LONG AS NEEDED. UK IN COOPERATION WITH NIGERIA WOULD CONTINUE SUCH RELIEF WORK UNTIL NEED FOR IT WAS AT AN END.

7. LATIN AMERICA

1. BARBADOS: TRACES OF NEO-COLONIALISM COULD BE SEEN IN NIGERIA TODAY. IT WAS QUOTE FAMILY TRAGEDY OF UNIVERSAL PROPORTIONS UNQUOTE SINCE MANY CARIB PEOPLE AND LATIN AMERICANS HAD ROOTS IN NIGERIA.

2. COLUMBIA: REFERRED TO QUOTE SHAMEFUL CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY IN BIAFRA UNQUOTE.

3. EL SALVADOR: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NO/NO APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONAL CHANNEL TO DEAL WITH EVENTS SUCH AS THOSE IN NIGERIA. IT PRAISED OAU EFFORTS AND FELT THAT EFFECTIVE ACTION COULD ONLY BE TAKEN THROUGH OAU. ELSALVADOR SUGGESTED EXAMINING INTERNATIONAL RULES APPLYING TO CIVIL WAR SITUATIONS TO DETERMINE LIMITS AND PRINCIPLES OF RULES OF HUMANITY THAT EXIST WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL REGS AND PRINCIPLES. THUS APPROPRIATE LEGAL RECOURSE MIGHT NOT/NOT BE LACKING IF SIMILAR SITUATION AROSE IN FUTURE.

4. GUYANA: HAD WATCHED AS A BROTHER WITH ANGUISH AND AGONY TRAGIC STRUGGLE IN NIGERIA AND WISHED TO ENDORSE RECENT RESLN OF OAU. IT HOPED THAT NIGERIAN LEADERS WOULD BE GUIDED IN THIS PROBLEM BY SAME PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY WHICH WERE THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATIONS OF SELF DETERMINATION FOR A UNITED NIGERIA.

5. HAITI: HOPED FMG WOULD ALLOW BIAFRANS FREEDOM AND SECURITY. SITUATION IN BIAFRA WAS QUOTE A TRUE EXAMPLE OF GENOCIDE UNQUOTE.

6. HONDURAS: SAID SITUATION WAS DOMESTIC PROBLEM. IT CONDEMNED FORCES OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LACKING MORAL RECTITUDE WHO USED STARVATION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN ENDS. UN MUST ENSURE RESPECT BE PAID TO SALVATION OF INNOCENT LIVES.

7. JAMAICA: UN SHOULD GIVE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA AS MEMBER OF UN. UNGA SHOULD CALL FOR IMMED CEASE-FIRE BY BOTH SIDES. UN SHOULD ASSIST IN MEDIATING DIFFERENCES AND THROUGH OBSERVER GROUP ENSURE THAT SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AND PERSONAL SECURITY ASSURED.

8. NICARAGUA: RESPECTED NIGERIAN RIGHTS AND DID NOT/NOT SEEK TO INTERVENE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT WISHED HOWEVER TO EXPRESS FEELINGS OF DEEP CONCERN OVER TRAGEDY NOW AFFECTING NIGERIAN PEOPLE.

9. VENEZUELA: REFERRED BRIEFLY TO NIGERIAN SITUATION EXPRESSING HOPE THAT HUMAN SOLIDARITY WOULD TRIUMPH AND PUT AN END TO DIRE SUFFERINGS OF INNOCENT VICTIMS.

8. REMAINING COUNTRIES

1. ISRAEL: SPOKE OF THE CRUEL SUFFERING IN NIGERIA AND ADDED THAT WHILE AFRICAN STATESMANSHIP SEEKS AN OUTCOME TO POLITICAL DILEMMA WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD COOPERATE IN RELIEF OF HUMAN ANGUISH.

2. SOUTH AFRICA: THOUGHT IT IRONIC THAT WHILE BLOODY WARFARE WAS DEVASTATING A REGION ON AFRICA FOR WHICH SO MUCH WAS HOPED AND WHILE SO MANY INNOCENTS WERE EXPOSED TO SUFFERING STARVATION AND DEATH, SO MUCH TIME ENERGY AND MONEY SHOULD BE DEVOTED AT UN TO ATTACKING SOUTH AFRICA AS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

3. USA: BRIEF AMERICAN REF TO NIGERIA SIMPLY STATED THAT DESPITE DEDICATED EFFORTS WITHIN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE TO END THE SUFFERING, CIVIL CONFLICT CONTINUED TO BRING DEATH BY WAR AND STARVATION TO UNCOUNTED THOUSANDS.

APPENDIX R

NIGERIA: OBSERVER TEAM REPORT

The following is the text of a special report by the International Observer Team released in Lagos on November 4, 1968. The report is signed by General Milroy, General Raab and General Fergusson and Colonel Olkiewicz.

INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS AT URUA INYANG BY FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT FORCES

Reason for Investigation

Newspaper stories published in Canada after the capture of Urua Inyang on October 4, 1968, reported that up to 500 civilians had been shot by Federal troops entering the village. This atrocity was alleged to have taken place in the village market place.

Background to Investigation

The observer team had great difficulty in locating Urua Inyang as it is not found on available maps by that name. It had been described as "fourteen miles south-west of Ikote Ekpene". A team had visited Ikote Ekpene on October 7 and heard no reports of such an incident in the area. The team interviewed the Reverend Father Eugene Bree at Uyo on October 7, and although Father Bree had not stated that he lived in Urua Inyang, it had been established that he was from the general area. Father Bree had been enthusiastic in his support of the behaviour of the Federal forces liberating his area on

October 4, and stated that they caused little damage to civilian life or property.

The newspaper report referred to above was received after the interview with Father Bree on October 7.

Investigation October 27, 1968

A team composed of Major-General A. Raab of Sweden, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Cairns of the United Kingdom, Mr. T. Kumanek of Poland and Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. M. Pinnington of Canada visited Urua Inyang on October 27. Mr. Erik Jensen of the United Nations travelled with the team. They were met at Uyo early that morning by Father Bree, Parish Priest of the Urua Inyang area, who accompanied them to the village.

Father Bree is an Irish priest from St. Patrick's Society, Kiltegan, Ireland. He has served in the Urua Inyang area from 1961 to the present and has a thorough knowledge of the people. His parish numbers 3,000 among 40,000 persons in sixty-three villages in the surrounding territory. These villages are grouped in communities and the one surrounding Urua Inyang is the Ika community. During the period that the secessionists controlled the area, Father Bree was co-leader of a refugee camp in the village. Father Bree was in his rectory at the time the village was captured by the Federal forces on October 4. He took shelter there during the battle from 10:00 to 11:30 hours at which time he went out to the street. The village was deserted except for Federal troops. By 12:00 hours people started to return from the forest and by mid-afternoon life was back to normal. Father Bree saw no signs of injured or dead civilians. He checked all his agencies and heard of no civilian losses. He was taken to a brigade headquarters of the Nigerian Army late that day and returned six days later. When he checked his parish upon his return he heard of no mass shootings and was able to account for all of his people. Father Bree was emphatic that such a thing could not have occurred without his knowledge.

The team then interviewed five tribal elders of the area. Their spokesmen were Mr. Augustine Akpou-Enyiekene, Chairman of the Ika Community and Mr. John F. Akpan-Oyoro, Vice-Chairman. The elders described the occupation of the village on October 4 by Federal forces and their stories agreed substantially with Father Bree's. They were emphatic in their denials of any knowledge of their people being shot by Federal troops.

A detailed inspection of the market place where the incident was supposed to have happened was carried out. The one large cement block building in the centre of the area was examined for bullet marks, as were trees and stalls standing in the area. There were no marks. The team is of the opinion that shooting in the quantity alleged would have left marks that would have been both obvious and unmistakable.

Local inhabitants were interviewed and none was aware of any incident of the type alleged.

Conclusion

The observer team has found no evidence of massacre in Urua Inyang by Federal forces on October 4, 1968 as alleged. All inhabitants interviewed were pleased to have the Federal troops among them.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

Copies and complete sets are available to the public by subscription to the Queen's Printer. Cost varies according to Committees.

Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

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STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE
No. 14

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1968

Respecting

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of
National Defence

APPENDIX S

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of
National Defence

WITNESSES:

From the Department of National Defence: Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy
Minister, and Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: ²Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,	Groos,	⁴ MacRae,
Anderson,	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>),	Marceau,
Borrie,	Harkness,	³ McCleave,
Brewin,	¹ Laniel,	³ Nowlan,
Buchanan,	Laprise,	Ouellet,
Cafik,	Legault,	⁴ Penner,
Fairweather,	Lewis,	Pilon,
Forrestall,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),	Roberts,
⁵ Gibson,	MacLean,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
		Winch—(30).

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

¹ Replaced Mr. Stanbury on November 6, 1968.

² Replaced Mr. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*) on November 13, 1968.

³ Replaced Messrs. Yewchuk and Nesbitt on November 15, 1968.

⁴ Replaced Messrs. Alexander and Barrett on November 18, 1968.

⁵ Replaced Mr. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*) on November 19, 1968.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

WEDNESDAY, October 16, 1968.

Ordered,—That, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public moneys, the items listed in the Revised Main Estimates for 1968-69, relating to External Aid Office and National Defence, be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

WEDNESDAY, November 6, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Laniel and Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*) be substituted for those of Messrs. Stanbury and Stewart (*Cochrane*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

WEDNESDAY, November 13, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Ryan be substituted for that of Mr. Lessard (*Lac-Saint-Jean*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

FRIDAY, November 15, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. McCleave and Nowlan be substituted for those of Messrs. Yewchuk and Nesbitt on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

MONDAY, November 18, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. MacRae and Penner be substituted for those of Messrs. Alexander and Barrett on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

TUESDAY, November 19, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Gibson be substituted for the name of Mr. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, November 21, 1968.

(25)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:45 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Borrie, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Laniel, Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, McCleave, Nowlan, Penner, Roberts, Ryan, Wahn, Winch (22).

Also present: Messrs. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*) and Yewchuk, M.P.'s.

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister/Finance; Mr. K. R. Scobie, Director General Civilian Personnel; Mr. J. G. Grant, Parliamentary Officer, Directorate of Information Services. *From Canadian Forces Headquarters:* Vice Admiral R. L. Hennessy, Comptroller General; Brigadier General D. C. Laubman, Director General Personnel Plans and Requirements; Brigadier General A. McCaig, Director General Budget and Finance; Lieutenant Colonel (N) S. M. King, Directorate of Integrated Defence Program. *From the Parliamentary Centre For Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* Mr. Peter Dobell.

The Chairman reported on the meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure held on Thursday, November 14, 1968. The Subcommittee recommended a schedule of eight meetings of the Main Committee, to deal with the Estimates from now until the Christmas recess. The recommendations of the Subcommittee were discussed. The Subcommittee will be asked to consider a suggestion by Mr. Winch that both Ministers be invited to appear, to make statements on the recent NATO meeting.

The Chairman called for motions for the election of a Vice-Chairman.

Mr. Gibson moved, seconded by Mr. Legault,

That Mr. Ryan be elected Vice-Chairman of this Committee.

There being no other nominations and the question having been put on the main motion, it was resolved in the affirmative.

Mr. Ryan was declared elected Vice-Chairman.

On motion of Mr. MacDonald (*Egmont*), seconded by Mr. Groos,

Resolved,—That the items listed in the Revised Main Estimates for 1968-69, relating to the Department of National Defence, be printed as an Appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix S*).

The Committee agreed to stand Item 1 of the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman called Item 1 *Departmental Administration etc.* \$6,465,000 of the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of National Defence.

The Chairman introduced Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister who made a short statement and then introduced Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy

Minister/Finance. Dr. Arnell delivered a prepared statement entitled *The Management Philosophy For Canadian Defence And The Development Of Program Budgeting*, copies of which were distributed, in English and French.

Members questioned Mr. Armstrong and Dr. Arnell for the remainder of this afternoon's sitting. At 5:30 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m.

EVENING SITTING

(26)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Borrie, Cafik, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Laniel, Legault, MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, Penner, Roberts, Ryan and Winch (16).

Also present: Mr. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), M.P.

In attendance: The same persons who attended the afternoon sitting, except for Mr. K. R. Scobie.

Dr. Arnell corrected an answer he had given to a question by Mr. Groos during the afternoon sitting.

The Vice-Chairman advised that Mr. Dobell will be available to assist Members of the Committee with their questions for witnesses appearing before the Committee.

The Vice-Chairman reported a recommendation from the Subcommittee that Mr. Sharp and Mr. Cadieux be invited to appear, jointly, on Tuesday, November 26, 1968 at 11:00 a.m.

The Committee resumed the questioning of the witnesses, which began during the afternoon sitting. The questioning was completed at approximately 9:00 p.m.

Dr. Arnell delivered a second prepared statement entitled *A Review of Organizational Changes And The Capital Equipment Program Of The Canadian Forces*, copies of which were distributed, in English and French.

On motion of Mr. Cafik, seconded by Mr. Legault,

Resolved,—That a statement presented by Dr. Arnell and entitled *Department Of National Defence, 1968-69 Estimates, Selected Major Equipment Items*, be printed as an Appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix "T"*).

Members questioned Mr. Armstrong and Dr. Arnell for the remainder of this evening's sitting.

The Vice-Chairman announced that Mr. Cadieux will be unable to appear before the Committee until the first week in December. After some discussion, Members agreed to hear Dr. Uffen, Chairman of the Defence Research Board at the next meeting.

On motion of Mr. Winch, seconded by Mr. Groos,

Resolved,—That the Committee sit until 10:30 p.m. this day, to complete the questioning of Mr. Armstrong and Dr. Arnell.

The Committee adjourned at 10:30 p.m., until Tuesday, November 26, 1968 at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, November 21, 1968.

• 1544

The Chairman: Gentlemen, perhaps we could get the meeting under way. First I would like to make a brief report with regard to certain decisions reached at the last meeting of the steering subcommittee.

The steering subcommittee proposes that we have four sessions dealing with the estimates of the Department of National Defence. Our method of dealing with these will be somewhat different from previous years. The object would be to build up a knowledge among members of the Committee as to how the estimates are prepared, and the major items in them. This would give us background information which would then be useful when we come to the more detailed review of policy matters which we hope to undertake in the new year. As I say, it is suggested that we have four sessions on the estimates of the Department of National Defence. We have this session, a session this evening, and then sessions on Tuesday and Thursday of next week. According to the schedule I have been given, our meetings next week would be at 11 o'clock on Tuesday and 8 o'clock in the evening on Thursday.

• 1545

Following the four sessions with the Department of National Defence, we then propose to spend time on the estimates of the Department of External Affairs. Here the aim would be to again build up useful background information for a policy review in the new year. It is suggested that we would examine how the expenditures in the field of foreign affairs contribute to the formation of foreign policy, and describe some of the major practical and administrative problems which arise in connection with these estimates. Unless there is some objection, that is the basis upon which we will proceed.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise what I consider a most important matter

here resulting from the report of the steering committee. As all the Committee members know, one of the important issues, as far as defence policy in Canada is concerned, is now to the fore because of the meeting of the NATO partners in Brussels at which Mr. Sharp and Mr. Cadieux were present.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the steering committee, in view of the importance of this matter, I made the request that Mr. Sharp or Mr. Cadieux on return to Canada come before this Committee and give us an explanation and an outline as to policy, and as far as possible what they presented to NATO. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I was in a minority at the steering committee and I was advised by you, sir, that the matter could be raised again after the next estimates are presented before the House, in the latter part of February.

Our steering committee, sir, was on Thursday. On Friday, under Orders of the Day, there were a number of questions, a considerable number of questions by various Members in the House of Commons on NATO, on a Canadian defence policy at NATO, and on the presentations made by Mr. Sharp and Mr. Cadieux. The Prime Minister, in answer to a question from myself in the House and also when he appeared on television that night, on both occasions stated that estimates were before this Committee and that we could have Mr. Sharp and Mr. Cadieux appear before us.

In view of the attitude of the Prime Minister in the House on Friday and over TV that he could see nothing wrong with us having both these Ministers before us, and because on Thursday when I raised the same matter before the steering committee I was turned down, you will understand, Mr. Chairman, why I raised the issue now. I think it is of the utmost importance that on this NATO question and Canada's policy thereon, and the presentation made by the Ministers, that this Committee should be privileged to hear from them now when they return and not at the end of next February when it will be a fait

accompli. I think this Committee is entitled to hear from them on this most important matter as speedily as possible. I therefore raise the issue at this time.

The Chairman: I should inform members that this question was discussed at some length by the members of the steering committee. I think it is fair to say that all members of the steering committee felt it was important to have a thorough discussion of NATO and NORAD. The conclusion we reached at our last meeting was that we just could not possibly have a really complete and thorough discussion of NATO and NORAD in the time we have before Christmas. We must pass these estimates within a certain time limit. If we do not they will be called back to the House in any event without being reviewed by this Committee. The members of the steering committee did not feel that with the six or eight meetings we could work in before Christmas, there would be time to call outside witnesses and do a really thorough job on a matter as important as the NATO and NORAD general defence policy that would be involved in such a discussion. So it was decided to proceed upon the basis that I have outlined to you this afternoon. I realize, however, that possibly there have been changes since the last meeting of the steering subcommittee. We have called a meeting of the steering subcommittee for 5:30 this afternoon, immediately after this meeting, and certainly this whole question can be reopened then. Would that be a satisfactory procedure?

• 1550

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I consider four meetings of this Committee, the two today particularly at which the Minister will not be in attendance, are quite inadequate to deal with the Estimates of the Department of National Defence. There are all the policy matters Mr. Winch has mentioned in connection with NATO and there are also questions in connection with NORAD, both of which have been up in the House on several occasions lately and in which I think a considerable number of people throughout Canada are interested and which also are in a state of confusion.

I certainly think we should be prepared to take more time than four meetings in order to deal with a number of these matters. I am not suggesting that we can go into the entire

NATO and NORAD questions in detail, but I think we should at least take some time on them as well as some other matters.

Particularly, I would like to enter a caveat at the present time so far as passing today any of these items is concerned, because with the Minister's not being present we are precluded, really, from going into policy matters or discussing them, or at least getting any answers on them. Therefore, I suggest that all these items be left not passed so that we can deal with any of them when the Minister is here next week.

The Chairman: That is a useful comment and the steering committee will bear that suggestion in mind as well. Are there any other comments to assist members of the steering subcommittee? Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: Notwithstanding what has been said, there is nothing against our hearing the presentation of the Deputy Minister here this afternoon.

Mr. Harkness: I am not suggesting we should not hear any of the officials that are here, but I am saying that as the officials are not permitted to deal with policy questions, all items should be reserved until we can deal with any policy matters in connection with any of them when the Minister is here.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean first and then Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that at an earlier meeting of the steering committee the matter of the time available to the Committee was discussed. It was pointed out that at that time the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs would both be away and that the Committee would not have an opportunity to hear them until they returned, which is about now.

It was realized, of course, and agreed that the limited time available to the Committee would not permit us to go into an examination in depth of defence or external affairs policies, but on the understanding that these matters would be referred again to the Committee in February, that we would deal with the Estimates in whatever measures we could in the time available to us before Christmas, but in so doing this would not preclude our pursuing some important matters that might be current which time would permit. On that

basis I suggest that the steering committee consider having one or both ministers appear before the Committee, even briefly, at the earliest opportunity so that some questions which are vital and current at the present time might be answered.

The Chairman: I have Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Chairman, I have just a brief comment. I think we really are committed to going forward now with the plans pretty much as they have been suggested by the steering committee, but I do think it is important in view of the great national interest in our future relationships both in NATO and NORAD that we have a very full discussion of these.

• 1555

Since it does not seem possible that this will occur except by accident or by implication in this current discussion, perhaps we could make a note that when our report goes to the House completing these Estimates, we request that at the reconvening of Parliament in the new year, immediately a reference be made to this Committee, perhaps the annual report of the Department or something of that nature, so that a very full discussion can be had on these two areas, with the thought not only that we would hear the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, but that we might also hear from others, either from within our own country or outside, who have something very worth while to contribute to the thinking and the development of foreign policy which would concern itself with this Committee.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. MacDonald. Actually, you see, that was the reason we decided not to get into policy matters before Christmas and not to call the ministers but rather build up a background of useful information with regard to the build-up of the Estimates which would serve as well when we came to make a more detailed review of policy matters. It was felt that we should make a thorough review of policy matters in the new year.

I think I failed to mention this, but if we were called back in the middle of January we hope to get started on February 1 with a detailed policy review. This information that we are getting now from the departmental officials, since we did not intend to call the

Ministers at this stage, will simply be useful to us as background information for the detailed policy review which would be made in the new year. This can be changed by the steering committee if this is their wish. Mr. Nowlan?

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I think what you propose is most likely reasonable with one major reservation, and that is if you can assure this Committee that before the Prime Minister's review of NATO and NORAD is defined and determined, this Committee will have some discussion of it. Otherwise, the whole thing is a farce.

This is the only major weakness I find in your very reasonable proposal, and unless you have some assurance concerning his review which has no time limit and is open ended as far as I know—unless there is a timetable and perhaps some of the departmental officials know but they cannot tell us, I do not imagine—then really everything that is said about NORAD and NATO, I feel, is going to be retroactive after a firm decision has been made by the government.

I am not saying the government does not have the prerogative, obviously, to lay down policy, but let us not kid ourselves in this Committee. If we are not going to discuss it at this stage and attempt to discuss it, and instead talk about mechanics and see how Estimates are approved, although all very interesting I do not think we are ever going to have any really meaningful discussion of either NATO or NORAD and we certainly are not going to help direct or influence the eventual decision. Do you have that assurance?

The Chairman: You have made an excellent point. First, I have inquired how long the policy review by the Cabinet might take and I cannot give you any assurance of when it will be completed but, as I say, we do hope to get our policy review started February 1. These are rather involved matters and I hope we will get onto them before the Cabinet makes a decision but I cannot tell you because I do not know what the Cabinet timetable is.

Second, I also have made enquiries to find out whether I could assure members of the Committee some procedure would be adopted that would make it possible for us to examine the NORAD, and NATO questions on as wide a basis as possible. If I can not get any satisfactory assurance to that effect, in fairness I

think I should inform members of the Committee before we finish the discussions that we are now conducting so that if you wish you can insist upon having the ministers called. Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, could I just add one word, because I would like to emphasize it. Members of the House of Commons are placed in what I consider a very ambiguous position when, in answer to questions on the Orders of the Day, the Prime Minister says when they deal with the Minister of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence: "Well, the Estimates are before the Committee and they can call him".

To have the Prime Minister giving us that kind of answer, which he certainly did last Friday, and then this Committee not hearing him—if we are going to continue getting that kind of answer, the House of Commons members are placed in a most ambiguous and paradoxical position. It is very unfair.

The Chairman: I think the answer to that is that if we do accept this proposed timetable, the Prime Minister obviously will not give that type of answer because he will know that this Committee is not going to consider this matter until the new year. But, as I say, the whole question can be reopened this afternoon by the steering committee. Mr. Laniel?

• 1600

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I think we must be practical, too, and I have not so sure that it would help the Committee to have the Minister come here and say this thing is under review and another thing is under review.

If the government makes a review of some kind, it will come out as a White Paper, and I think that would be something to work on as a laid-down plan of general policy. Then we could question the direction in which the government wants to go. Otherwise, we will be talking of the past in relation to the present, and the present is a period when the government is doing a review. I do not think that we will achieve much by just trying to seek bits of information.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, we could be losing time discussing this point when we could be using it to advantage while we have the deputy Minister here. We could

go through the entire budget, and then we can ask the Minister to give us any reviews that might have been made on policy or anything else. We could then question him if we wish, but in the meantime we could go through the budget as it is, to give us an opportunity to ask various questions. Possibly you, Mr. Chairman, could look into the matter that has been suggested, but let us get some work done today. You probably would have a chance to look into this other matter on our behalf.

Mr. Lewis: I wanted to point out to you two different things that have been dealt with. One is the over-all study and review of defence and foreign policies which obviously would require a long time. I think most of us have in mind listening not only to the Ministers and their Deputies but also inviting experts from outside the Public Service and outside Parliament, which necessarily involves a number of meetings that are not now available.

On the other hand, there has just been a NATO meeting. The Ministers are just coming back, and I think for this Committee not to hear the Ministers on that meeting and get a report from them, whatever information they may have to give us, seems to me to be rather incongruous.

What I would like to suggest to the steering committee—I hope Mr. Winch will be able to attend for us—is that they consider this narrower view, not a thorough review of NATO policy with all that is involved, which probably there is not time for unless we do nothing else for the rest of the time before Christmas. The Minister is coming here and will be subject to some questioning from the members, so that the information we have about the NATO meeting and any commitment that Canada has made or has not made will not be entirely dependent on what we read in the press.

Mr. Harkness: I would like to make one other point, Mr. Chairman, and that is that in my view any consideration of the estimates of this or any other Department without the Minister being present may be a highly educative process, but it is not an examination of the estimates from the parliamentary point of view and by Members of Parliament.

An hon. Member: I would question that statement.

The Chairman: I think the steering committee will take all these comments into consideration.

There are a number of formal motions that we could pass before we call our witnesses.

(See *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*)

● 1605

Would the Committee agree to stand Item 1 of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs and proceed now to the revised Main Estimates, 1968-69 of the Department of National Defence? Is this agreed?

An hon. Member: Agreed.

The Chairman: I will now call Item 1, departmental administration, etc., \$6,465,000. It is at page 318.

We have with us this afternoon the Deputy Minister, Mr. E. B. Armstrong, and a number of officials from the Department, namely Dr. J. C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance); Brigadier General D. C. Laubman, Director General Personnel Plans and Requirements; Brigadier General A. McCaig, Director General Budget and Finance; Commander S. M. King, Directorate of Integrated Defence Program; Mr. K. R. Scobie, Director General Civilian Personnel; and Mr. J. G. Grant, Superintendent, Parliamentary Returns Section, Directorate of Information Services.

I believe a typed introductory statement has been prepared in English and in French and perhaps we could have that distributed. I will now call upon Mr. Armstrong.

Mr. E. B. Armstrong (Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, Dr. Arnell is here today. He is the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for the assembly of estimates in the Department of National Defence. He has prepared two short briefs, one of which is being distributed now and I think would take about half an hour, or perhaps a little less.

The first brief deals with the methods of budgeting in the Department that are presently being applied and being developed. It will provide the Committee with some appreciation of the distribution of military personnel by the principal activities undertaken by the Department.

The second one would expose briefly the content of the 1968-69 estimates, giving the

main capital program contained in them, and explaining the changes that have taken place since the estimates of the Department of National Defence were last examined here.

These are designed to provide the Committee with background that will both assist them in understanding the 1968-69 estimates and hopefully be useful to the Committee in further examinations of defence policies subsequently. If you are agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I will ask Dr. Arnell to proceed with the first brief.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Armstrong. Dr. Arnell.

Dr. J. C. Arnell (Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance), Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I might say in introduction that the information on the slides is in fact included in the text, in case you want to note anything down.

I want to begin by reviewing the concepts of program budgeting and the associated management philosophy which have been developed within the Department of National Defence. As you are well aware, these ideas were included among the major recommendations of the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organization, and their introduction into federal departments and agencies has been under way for the past several years. Like anything new which is all-encompassing as this, progress often appears to be slow and implementation uneven. Thus the full realization of the potential of a total program budgeting system for defence will not be achieved for several years. However, enough has already been done to provide senior managers of both the department and the central executive with a better appreciation of the problems requiring their attention, so that more pragmatic decisions relating to the program and in consequence to the budget are being taken.

● 1610

The Integrated Defence Program

The Armed Services have traditionally undertaken planning, programming and budgeting activities, so that the principles enunciated by the Glassco Commission were similar to those being applied to the then-current practices within the Department.

Thus, at the time of the integration of the Armed Services in 1964, it was accepted as a

matter of principle that the preparation of the Annual Estimates should follow directly from a properly approved Five-Year Program. In order to achieve this, the Programs Division was established as part of the integrated headquarters and made responsible for the maintenance of an Integrated Defence Program (IDP), which was intended to display every component of the program requiring financial support. The first attempt to construct this IDP consisted of the consolidation of the somewhat diversified programs of the three Armed Services into a single document. It soon became clear to the programmers that these individual Service programs had been developed against concepts relating to a single operational environment, which made it very difficult for them to be consolidated and displayed as a balanced defence program. In addition, the 1964 White Paper set the stage for some modifications to the existing force structures, which has had to be introduced into the IDP.

Because the task of Armed Forces is to prepare for an emergency, there are no really recognizable limits or constraints as to size of forces or amounts of equipment required for each task. Thus a Defence Services Program will always tend to be badly overprogrammed, unless very specific guidelines are issued to provide the necessary constraints to mould the program within acceptable financial limits.

Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, it was determined from the beginning that the Integrated Defence Program should be a meaningful document containing only projects which had been developed in an orderly fashion from agreed plans and supportable requirements based on policy guidance. The means of achieving this were outlined in a paper entitled "The Decision-Making/Decision-Implementing Process", prepared by the Programs Division and approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff in the Summer of 1965.

The Decision-Making/Decision-Implementing Process

This paper analyzed the total Planning-Programming-Budgeting process and subdivided it into nine basic elements. These were:

1. Long range planning
2. Force development
3. Requirements definition

4. Program formulation
5. Programming
6. Funding
7. Implementation planning
8. Implementation
9. Operations

These nine headings indicate a flow pattern showing roughly how it ran from long-range planning at the top through the development of the military forces, the requirements for equipment, putting it together as a program, funding, et cetera. The first six elements in this list represent the necessary steps that must be undertaken within a military organization to convert a plan into a program and to fund it in other words the decision-making process. The last three elements in the list all relate to getting the job done after the money has been approved—in other words the decision-implementing process.

Policy Guidance

However, before this process can be made to work, it is necessary to have agreed policy guidance against which realistic military planning can be done. In the past, this has been the weakest link in our management system; not so much from intent, as from a lack of appreciation of the importance of this facet of management. In considering this problem, we have been very conscious of the outside influences during the formative stages of a defence program. Changes in defence policy begin with political considerations arising out of the existing international situation.

• 1615

*no truer word
hath been spoken*

In order to help us analyze the general requirements for defence forces in this broad context, we have produced the following breakout, which is based on the 1964 White Paper on Defence. Within overall policy, we see two military objectives:

A. Meeting National and North American Commitments, and

B. Meeting International Commitments.

These are each divided into three roles:

A. 1. Ensuring internal security in peacetime

2. Ensuring territorial integrity in peacetime

3. Contributing to North American defence,

and

- B. 1. Supporting defensive alliances
2. Supporting UN peacekeeping activities
3. Providing military assistance.

In order to fulfill our obligations under these roles, a number of tasks to be undertaken have been identified. These tasks are:

1. Aid to Civil Power
2. Surveillance of Coastal Waters
3. Aircraft Identification and Interception
4. Counter Bomber Attack
5. Ensure National Survival
6. Counter Lodgements
7. Counter Submarines
8. Air Combat Europe
9. Ground Combat Europe
10. Mobile Ground Support for UN
11. Truce Commissions
12. Military Training Assistance
13. Air Lift

It is important that these tasks can be weighed militarily against the political judgments which are inherent in the decisions respecting the roles that they are to support, for this is the point where the decision must be made as to the allocation of the total resources to each task. This is as far as we believe that the guidance step should be carried, because in effect this list of tasks is really a list of the general requirements (the required capabilities) against which the Canadian Forces have to produce a series of realistic and achievable force structures.

• 1615

Planning the Force Structure by Activities

At this point it is necessary to recognize that these force components that I suggest had to be identified against the task are the lowest level within the planning function, and that when they are consolidated they produce the structure of the Canadian Armed Forces. As such, this is the second half of the interface between the requirements (tasks listed before) arising out of the policy guidance and the actions necessary to meet them.

There has been a considerable body of opinion which has held that, as we have functional commands, these should represent the main subdivisions within this planning function. This opinion was not accepted on the grounds that the Commands are administrative entities to ensure that approved operational plans are fulfilled, not organizations which set the planning format. Indeed, for

planning and programming purposes, we have assembled all operations into an Activities List. This, in turn, has been separated into Operational Activities and Support Activities. Because the Commands are functional, the Operational Activities can in the main be equated to them. However, there are a number of support activities which are not easy to categorize in relation to the Commands, and therefore it is necessary to identify them in the Activities List in order to prevent the formation of a large miscellaneous catch-all apart from a Command List.

There are ten Operational Activities and twenty Support Activities as shown below. These we feel, are meaningful activities from both the military and the administrative point of view.

Operational Activities

1. To Maintain an Air Strike-Reconnaissance Capability
2. To Maintain an Air Defence Capability
3. To Maintain a Mechanized Ground Combat Capability
4. To Maintain a Mobile General Purpose Ground and Tactical Air Capability
5. To Maintain a Maritime Warfare/Surveillance Capability
6. To Maintain an Airlift Capability
7. To Maintain a National Survival Warning and Reporting Capability
8. To Maintain a Reserve Force Capability
9. To Maintain a Military Assistance Capability
10. To Maintain a Truce Supervisory Capability

The numbers shown are the ones that we use for identification purposes and you will note that they include all the activities of the commands. For example, the first one on the list reflects No. 1 Air Division, the second one is Air Defence Command, the third one is the Brigade Group in Europe, the fourth one is Mobile Command, and so on down, until the bottom ones are small groups such as the military assistance capability and truce supervisory.

Support Activities

1. To provide Command Control and Administration
2. To Provide Base Support
3. To provide Communications Services

4. To Provide Supplementary Radio Activities
5. To Provide Recruiting Services
6. To Provide Individual, Professional and Trades Training
7. To Provide Flying Training
8. To Provide Officer Basic Educational Training at Canadian Services Colleges and Universities
9. To Provide Regular Officers Staff and Advanced Training
10. To Provide Other Training, including Training by Contract
11. To Provide Medical and Dental Services
12. To Provide Material Supply Services
13. To Provide Repair and Maintenance Support for Ships, Aircraft and Equipment
14. To Provide Construction Engineering Support
15. To Provide Development, Test and Evaluation
16. To Provide International Liaison
17. To Provide Miscellaneous Services and Support
18. To Provide Service Bands
19. To Provide Search and Rescue
20. To Provide Detention and Security Services

• 1620

In the support activity area are such matters as the Command Control and Administration of the forces and of the command, in fact, the Base Support to run the bases, et cetera, and so on down through. The latter half you will note reflects all the types of training and educational processes within the military. The next slide has the remainder of the support activities and you will note that these are very largely directed to the logistics aspects, the actual supply, the repair and maintenance of equipment, construction and also a number of personnel services.

Within all these activities there are a number of military formations such as the major fleet units, squadrons of aircraft, battalions of infantry, radar stations and the like on the operational side, and the service colleges, supply depots, bases, communications squadrons, and so on, on the support side, as well as small groups of specialists on discrete assignments away from the above entities. These are the smallest subdivisions or ele-

ments of the Defence Services program. At the present time there are approximately 900 separate military units or program elements, each of which has an establishment or table of organization for both military and civilian personnel with respect to rank or grade and numbers, together with a corresponding authorized table of equipment. These program elements can be costed with respect to personnel, operations and maintenance, and capital, and once this basic data has been assembled it is useful both for forward planning and for programming purposes.

Reference was made earlier to the introduction of the Integrated Defence Program in 1964 at the time of the Forces' integration and the difficulties that were encountered in an attempt to produce a single document at that time. Recent experience has shown that if force structures are conceived in the context of this Activity List, the means are automatically available to produce a Five-Year Program which can be supported with suitable analysis. The resultant document is called the Program Review as distinct from the Integrated Defence Program. This latter entity has proved to be essentially a computer program which, once it is fully operational, will provide current information on the manning levels of the various units, equipment holdings, status of outstanding contracts on new equipment, construction and development, together with the financial implications of each.

The Program Review, on the other hand, is a document to be produced on an annual basis to summarize the information contained in the Integrated Defence Program in such a way that the objectives of each activity are stated, together with outstanding national or international commitments—the tasks—and the existing organization and forces to meet them. Thus any change in government policy with respect to one of these activities can be analysed against this background material and, as a program is modified and subsequently approved, the changes that are required in the allocation of manpower, funds and, or equipment in future years will be reflected in this programming system.

When the full system is working, all previous decisions involving new program elements and changes to existing ones will be listed on a time-phased basis within the Integrated Defence Program and summarized annually

in the Program Review. Once this stage has been reached, a future year's Estimates will be prepared directly from the Program Review and modified only to reflect unforeseen factors such as unanticipated financial constraints and the like.

At the time that the 1968-69 Estimates were prepared, which was nearly a year ago, we were still refining our programming techniques, so that the 1967 Program Review did not correspond directly to the picture that is presented in the Estimates Blue Book. For one thing, the Comptroller General's staff was still in the process of refining the personnel establishments for the individual units as a result of the integration of the Services and there was a discrepancy of about 10 per cent between the actual manning levels and the establishments. In the past year, this gap has been reduced to about 5 per cent which, although still higher than we would like to see, is at least manageable.

• 1625

To meet the budgetary ceiling, which allowed a 2 per cent annual escalation over the five year period from 1965-66 until 1969-70, the Department has reduced manpower and restricted some activities in order that the increases in salaries and other costs resulting could be met out of available funds. The size of this reduction can be seen from the fact that the 1967-68 Departmental Estimates were prepared on the basis of 105,000 military and 37,400 civilian man-years, while the corresponding 1968-69 Estimates before you were prepared on the basis of 100,000 military and 35,600 civilian man-years. With these reductions in numbers, the personnel costs have been held to an increase within the allowed 2 per cent.

In order to obtain the best use of the funded 100,000 military personnel within an establishment of about 105,000 during the current year, manning priorities were established within Canadian Forces Headquarters which gave precedence to the operational activities and some of the directly related support activities, while reducing the manning levels in some of the less important support activities to an average of about 90 per cent of establishment.

Since the preparation of this year's Estimates, it has been possible to refine the 1967 Program Review so that it can be used to display the manpower allocations, with the

exception of casual labour and the locally hired personnel in Europe, the allocations among the various activities. The following charts summarize this information, which is grouped under five Operational and three Support functions. I choose the word "functions" because they indicate the types of things that these forces are designed to do and we have used these 8 and put the 30 activities that I showed you earlier within them. This first function A, you will see combines the mechanized Ground Combat Capability, the brigade in Europe, with the Air Strike/Recce Capability, No. 1 Air Division, in Europe to show the total military and civilian manpower that is allocated to this particular function.

The next one relates to the General Purpose Forces for the Defence of Canada and for the Other International Commitments, other than providing the forces in Europe proper. This is the group where the brigade in Cyprus is drawn from, and so on, and this coupled with the manpower shown in the first function totalled to give the manpower that is within Mobile Command, as an example. You will also notice that the Reserves are included in this one.

The third function is the one that reflects the Maritime effort. The fourth one reflects the Air Defence of North America and is really the effort in Air Defence Command. The fifth one, Function E, reflects the Strategic Air Lift which reflects the operations of Air Transport Command, and then we follow the next three with support activities and the first of these called "General" reflects the personnel that are involved in Command and Control and Administration in operating the bases themselves and running the Administrative Communications System.

• 1630

The next slide shows the amount of resources allocated to training in all its forms, from the training of the recruit through, other than the actual operational training done in the squadron of aircraft, and so on. The final slide shows the resources directed to the Logistics and Miscellaneous Personnel Services. Could I have the slides off now, then?

So far I have been discussing the developing Planning-Programming-Budgeting system of the Department of National Defence in

terms of the Defence Services Program, which is funded out of Vote 15 of the current Estimates. This Vote provides for all the requirements of the Canadian Forces, except for the statutory government contributions, both current and actuarial, to the military pension fund, which amount to \$144.6 million, and the \$2 million grant to the Town of Oromocto, N.B., shown in Vote 20. These monies total \$1,634.2 million. The remaining funds in the Estimates total approximately \$80 million and are distributed between the other 10 Votes to provide for the Deputy Minister's staff, the Defence Research Board, the Emergency Measures Organization—recently transferred to the Department from the Minister of Industry—Mutual Aid and Defence Construction (1951) Limited. Where required, the same management philosophy and programming techniques have been applied to the programs financed out of these Votes.

That is an attempt to give you an idea of how we are developing our programming system from the point of display, the allocation of resources, and will in fact be able to fund it as we develop it.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Arnell. I know this document is going to be very helpful to the members of the Committee. I do not think we have ever had anything said on this basis before and it certainly is helpful. I know it is to me and I am sure that other members of the Committee feel the same way.

Do any members have questions at this stage? Mr. MacLean and Mr. Harkness.

Mr. MacLean: On page 3 the process is outlined and there are nine items, Long Range Planning, Force Development, Requirements Definition and so on. This whole thing would seem to me to be a rather hypothetical process until you get down to the hard facts of how much money is available. Long range planning, of course, looks into the future some distance but when the time arrives and it is found, perhaps, for the sake of argument, that the money available due to escalation of cost, perhaps, in real terms or due to a cut in expenditures—or even an increase in expenditures, it does not matter which—if this suddenly happens from one year to the next due to a change in government policy, how does the system react to that situation and how is the limit of priorities established as to which of these functions is going to

suffer most or gain most from the process? I would like some further explanation along those lines.

• 1635

Dr. Arnell: Mr. MacLean, rather than concentrate on the long range planning side of this, with respect to the point of your question—that is the, you might say, unanticipated financial constraint—the thing that I think we are really finding as we are developing this program review document and by breaking things out by activities is that we are being able to look at specific areas and see how much of the resource is, in fact, going into an area and allowing the Department as a whole, and also the military, to establish priorities both within activities as well as between activities.

In other words, having broken things out in this way we have, for the first time, been able to list in many areas just how many men, for example, are going into certain aspects, let us say, of specialist training or into actually running a base without having any regard for the operation. Therefore, out of this and the fact that we have identified 900 individual program elements, it is going to be possible—and I must say “it is going to be” because we are still in the process of doing this—to be looking at these in terms of priorities.

The long-range planning aspect, to come back to the beginning of your question, is of course what must be done any time that there is an announcement of government policy that is a policy looking to the future for some stage. You cannot conceive of developing a force structure without doing some form of long-range planning step to begin with. This is really converting a broadly framed basic policy into terms that are meaningful in the military planning sense. Once you get it to there, then you can start to develop force structures in the military sense, and so on.

Once you get these, then you get back to the priority levels which are, of course, first of all within the Department but if there are problems in sorting these out it becomes a matter of referring back to government as to which, if there are two competing policies, is to be followed.

Mr. MacLean: What is built into the system to react to a situation where there is, perhaps, a sudden crisis? Is the philosophy that you produce the goods to meet the crisis,

never mind the cost? Supposing, on the other hand, the situation is a potential crisis and the Canadian taxpayer is going to be willing to invest another billion dollars a year, let us say, in trying to meet it or gaining some added insurance against it. There are the two approaches to the problem. Would you explain to us the reaction to either of those possible situations?

Dr. Arnell: My first comment relates, I think, to the fact that as a very large percentage of the total fund in the Estimates relates directly to personnel costs, changes can only really occur at the speed at which you can make major changes in personnel. The immediate reaction to an emergency is why we have reserves and that I think, from our point of view, is our immediate reaction until such time as there is a definite policy decision to put, in fact, an extra billion dollars a year in.

I do not think the Department can do very much until it receives new government policy with respect to changing the basic size of the Defence Force in any way other than the use of reserves on an active basis and to pick it up behind. I think, really, the whole thing hinges on how quickly you can change the levels of personnel, particularly in the modern sophisticated age of having to have highly trained personnel, in fact, to put into the field.

• 1640

Mr. MacLean: In this set-up you have outlined to us, there are two important elements. One is the number of personnel, and secondly, establishments of equipment. I am thinking now particularly of operational units. These establishments that are planned here, what kind of establishments are they? Are there more than one kind? Are they fully operational establishments? Are they peacetime establishments or something in between in some cases, where there is provision made for increasing the strength or the establishment of existing units as the need arises? In effect, at the present time, how near is reality to planning as far as procurement of equipment and that sort of thing is concerned? Both of you told us something about personnel strengths, but I am thinking now particularly of procurement of equipment and how much. We were told when unification came about that this would bring about a very desirable effective, allowing us to spend a

greater percentage of our defence dollar on equipment, to make our armed services more efficient, and relatively less on the housekeeping side of things, pay and the normal on-going expenditures.

Dr. Arnell: To answer the first part of your question, there is in fact a full war establishment that is carried on the books, which in many areas is in fact modified downward to the peacetime operational level. This is really what I was speaking of when I spoke of the establishment during my presentation. When I spoke of the manning levels below that, this in fact is the manning within the peacetime establishment, an operational establishment or a supply depot, or whatever it may be.

The prime re-equipment has been aimed at meeting the needs of the operational establishments and to the extent possible to provide the necessary backup and support. In some areas I think one could argue that the equipment is fully supplied. This would be particularly, I think, the case in the buy of a fleet of aircraft. In the case of smaller things, particularly some of the land vehicles, where they are small items and tend to be bought over a longer period of time, there are in fact some, one might say, deficiencies in the full-war one. This possibly tends to focus more on—I am not quite sure what word to use—but they are really the smaller types of equipment, rather than major equipment. But wherever it has been possible, this has in fact been undertaken in a buy, although much of the equipment is phased over a number of years.

Mr. MacLean: I have a number of other questions, but I will pass. They will probably be asked by someone else if I am patient.

The Chairman: I will carry your name forward then, Mr. MacLean. Before calling the next questioner, perhaps I might mention that in addition to the others, Admiral Hennessy is here, who is the Comptroller General. I will also remind members of a discussion earlier when we had the opportunity of having with us on the Committee as an adviser, Mr. Peter Dobell, who is Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. We have Mr. Dobell here this afternoon and perhaps I could take this opportunity to introduce him to members of the Committee. Mr. Dobell.

• 1645

The next questioner is Mr. Harkness.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I have a few rather specific questions. On page 8 when you were dealing with military formations, units and so forth, you say:

...on the support side, as well as small groups of specialists on discrete assignments away from the above entities.

The word "discrete" rather struck my eye, and I wondered what you meant by "discrete assignments."

Dr. Arnell: The sort of thing that I was thinking of would be a small training group that might have been sent, say to Ghana, or a small group that has been put out in terms of some of our mutual aid activity. We had small groups of technical people who were put in the field away from home, operating to do a very specific task, and it was this type of group. I thought afterwards when I read it over that perhaps "discrete" might have a connotation of a different kind. What I was really trying to do was merely identify that they are a group set up specially to do a job that has come forward, that is, in essence a one-time sort of thing and not part of a normal military establishment.

Mr. Harkness: There is no implication of secret, or a set of secret functions for these people?

Dr. Arnell: No, sir.

Mr. Harkness: Somewhat along the line that Mr. MacLean was just speaking about, on page 10 you state:

...there was a discrepancy of about ten percent between the actual manning levels and the establishments. In the past year, this gap has been reduced to about five percent,...

In view of the fact that the total number of personnel has been reduced considerably during that period, it is quite evident, I think, that the lowering of the gap from 10 per cent to 5 per cent has been accomplished by reducing establishments. This is the situation I presume, is it?

Dr. Arnell: It is, sir. There has been much refining of establishment that has come out in the studies that the Comptroller General's staff has made of the actual establishments needed to do certain jobs, particularly on the support side, and there has been consolidation

of certain support activities which have resulted, in fact, in reducing establishments.

Mr. Harkness: What is the percentage by which establishments have been reduced to accomplish this apparent gain of 5 per cent?

Dr. Arnell: The establishments have in fact been reduced by somewhere between 5,000 and 6,000.

Mr. Harkness: What percentage would this be?

Dr. Arnell: That would make it that the establishment, as I mentioned, or at least is implied here because of the 100,000, is about 105,000 at the present time, or a little less than that, and it was...

Mr. Harkness: One hundred and five thousand is the total amount, and the establishment for National Defence Headquarters, for example, has not been reduced, and the establishments in certain other areas, I take it, have not been reduced.

Mr. Armstrong: This is a reduction I think from between 110,000 and 111,000 on establishment figures to about 105,000, now down I think to about 104,000.

In the further briefing that Dr. Arnell plans to give the Committee there is some explanation of some of the changes that have enabled this reduction to be made. In terms of reduction in establishments at National Defence Headquarters and so on, they have been reduced to some degree. I have not got the precise figures.

Dr. Arnell: It is about 9 or 10 per cent.

Mr. Armstrong: It is 9 or 10 per cent. I think you will get a better understanding of some of the changes that have taken place to bring about this reduction together with the examination that Dr. Arnell mentioned that has been made by the Comptroller General's staff to refine establishments, when you hear the further briefing that will be given following this one.

● 1650

Mr. Harkness: To get to something which is perhaps more easily understood, how much has the establishment of an infantry battalion, we will say, been reduced?

Mr. Armstrong: The infantry battalions now in Canada are three-company battalions,

so that is a reduction from a level of around 800 and some odd to 600 and some odd.

Mr. Harkness: Then in the case of an infantry battalion the reduction is around 25 per cent.

Mr. Armstrong: This is true of the infantry battalions in Europe as well.

Mr. Harkness: You say in Europe as well.

Mr. Armstrong: That was part of the reduction from 6,600 to 6,000 that took place at the beginning of this year.

Mr. Harkness: Then in the case of an infantry battalion, as I say, the reduction in establishment is approximately 25 per cent.

Mr. Armstrong: That would be about right, yes.

Mr. Harkness: And is this true, we will say, of armoured regiments which have had the number of squadrons reduced also?

Mr. Armstrong: The number of armoured regiments have been increased in the organization of the four combat groups in Canada, which I think you are aware of, but again the establishment of the armoured regiment has been reduced roughly in the same proportion as the infantry.

Mr. Harkness: Roughly 25 per cent. I presume the same would then also apply to artillery regiments.

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, that is true, except that again the artillery regiments have been established in each of the combat groups, so that while the individual regiment has been reduced there are more regiments than there were under the old organization.

Mr. Harkness: What is the size of the new regiment? It runs in my mind that in the case of an artillery regiment you now have a couple of light batteries, whereas previously you had three heavy batteries.

Mr. Armstrong: I think we can give you that figure in a moment. So you have it there?

The Chairman: If you would like to call upon any of your colleagues to answer specific questions, it is perfectly in order.

Mr. McCleave: In connection with the battalions in NATO, is the brigade group up to this reduced establishment?

Mr. Armstrong: The brigade group is up to its restricted establishment, which is 6,000. The war establishment for the brigade group is 7,000. So that in the event of an operational situation one would have fly over an additional 1,000 people to fill in the war establishment.

Mr. Laniel: May I ask a supplementary while we are looking at this, because I have a question in this field. You say that in order to meet the budget ceiling, which allows a 2 per cent annual escalation over the five year period, the Department has reduced manpower. I would first like to know if the budgeting is done on the establishment or is it done on the actual manning level?

Mr. Armstrong: It is done on the manning level. We provide for the people we have to pay, not the people on the establishment. If we are running 5 per cent short of the establishment, we do not pay the 5 per cent we do not have. We provide on the basis of a manning level.

Mr. Laniel: But even at that, with the increased costs and the line of projection, along with what you might have succeeded in doing in reducing the personnel by revising the establishment, reorganization, integration and unification, do you expect that these two lines of projection will soon meet and then you will perhaps have to think of going over and above the 2 per cent increase to which you have been confined?

● 1655

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, there is no question that...

Mr. Laniel: How soon?

Mr. Armstrong: ...on a 2 per cent increase with costs rising considerably more than that sooner or later, you will have to make some adjustment, that is all there is to it.

The Chairman: I wonder, Mr. Laniel, if we could now go back to Mr. Harkness and defer your further questioning.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness.

Dr. Arnell: The regiments are of two sizes. There is the heavy artillery, which relates to the overseas operations, and the regiment at Gagetown. Overseas there are about 645 positions...

Mr. Harkness: Is that with three or two batteries per regiment?

Dr. Arnell: Three.

Mr. Harkness: That is what I thought. Under the circumstances it must be three.

Dr. Arnell: The regiment at Gagetown has 523 positions and the lighter ones have 394 positions.

Mr. Harkness: In other words, your two battery regiments have 394 and your heavy battery regiments have 645 or 650, approximately, something like that. I think you stated that the present establishment is somewhere between 104,000 and 105,000.

Mr. Armstrong: At the moment the establishment is just under 104,000.

Mr. Harkness: That is what I am getting at. If you were up to strength the establishment would be between 104,000 and 105,000.

Dr. Arnell: The latest figure is just over 103,000.

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, it is actually between 103,000 and 104,000, not 104,000 and 105,000.

Mr. Harkness: I thought you said before it was between 104,000 and 105,000.

Mr. Armstrong: I may have.

Mr. Harkness: According to the last figure I got, the actual strength was something around 99,000. That was on a return I received about a month ago.

Mr. Armstrong: I think the strength today is roughly 98,500.

Mr. Harkness: So you have a shortage in establishment of something in the neighbourhood of 5,000.

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, that would be about it. These estimates are planned on the year-end strength of 98,000, so that would give you roughly a 5,000 shortage.

Mr. Harkness: Which would then allow for an over-all deficit from establishment of something in the nature of around 5 per cent.

Mr. Armstrong: That is right.

Mr. Harkness: Five to six per cent.

Mr. Armstrong: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: I find it a little hard to reconcile this with what you state at the top of page 11. It reads:

... manning priorities were established within CFHQ which gave precedence to the operational activities and some of the directly related support activities, while reducing the manning levels in some of the less important support activities to an average of about ninety per cent establishment.

However, in actual practice, as far as I can see, you have reduced the establishment by 10 per cent, or something along this line. I think you said it was reduced from 111,000 or 112,000, or something, to the present 103,500. We will say that it is roughly a 10 per cent reduction in establishment. But as far as the Army is concerned the actual fighting units, the infantry battalions, the armoured regiments and the artillery batteries, are reduced 25 per cent, which is just the opposite of what is stated here; that the operational activities, and so on, have had precedence given to them.

Mr. Armstrong: First of all may I explain that the statement refers to what we term a peacetime establishment. The peacetime establishment that is referred to there is in fact a three-company infantry battalion, the reduced armoured regiment, and so on. As I said earlier, I do not think you can apply the 25 per cent reduction across the board as you have done because while the armoured regiment, for example, has been reduced in size, on the other hand there is an extra armoured regiment, so that it comes out more in balance. I would agree with you with respect to the infantry battalions.

● 1700

Mr. Harkness: When you come to the infantry battalions, they have not only been reduced 25 per cent in size but they have also been reduced by three battalions. Is that not so?

Mr. Armstrong: They have been reduced by two infantry battalions. They went from 13 to 11.

In a sense, Mr. Harkness, this has partly been offset by the airborne regiment, which is over and above the 11 infantry battalions.

Dr. Arnell: If I might just add, Mr. Harkness, I was planning to go through some of this tonight and outline exactly what has

happened in some of this organization. If you would like to wait we could, in fact, go through quite a bit of this as we planned step-wise tonight and then answer any further questions after that.

Mr. Harkness: I am sorry, I will not be able to be here tonight. However, I am quite willing to have it left except, as I say, it seems quite evident to me that the chief reductions in strengths really have taken place, as far as the land units are concerned in any event, in the actual fighting units and evidently considerably fewer reductions either in establishment or in strength of a considerable number of the support units.

Dr. Arnell: I think I should perhaps explain a little further that note on page 11 you brought out. You are quite right in the reduction of the establishment, say, of the infantry regiments, but it is those operational units such as the infantry regiments that have top manning priority now and are to be manned as I recall to 98 to 100 per cent of establishments.

On the other hand, on the support side even though there may, in fact, be a smaller reduction in the establishment itself, the manning priority may be that they are not to be manned to more than 90 per cent of their establishment and the emphasis at the moment is, in fact, on the manning of the operational units and, as I said, the directly related support units.

Such units as the repair and maintenance support for Air Force squadrons and this type of thing are, in fact, included as the operational type of manning. On a base there will be part of the base establishment that is straight on the maintenance of the aircraft, and this sort of thing. That is where the emphasis on the manning within an establishment is at the moment.

Mr. Harkness: I would just observe that I think this statement on page 10 that there was a discrepancy of about 10 per cent and this gap has been reduced to 5 per cent, plus this statement that precedence has been given to the operational activities, give an unduly optimistic picture of what our actual fighting capabilities are at the present time compared with what they were a year or two years ago.

Mr. Armstrong: Certainly it was not intended to do that, Mr. Harkness. I can see your interpretation of it, but this was based on the establishments as they have been

devised in the present operational distribution of combat groups, and the combat groups in themselves did, in fact, reduce the total establishments and, I would be prepared to agree with you, inevitably reduce the total capability.

Mr. Harkness: I presume the effort was made, just as you and I often made it, to put the best face possible on the situation that existed.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness, were your questions directed towards finding out whether, during the last year for example, the proportion of operational personnel had increased or decreased in comparison with the non-operational personnel? Is that the purpose of the inquiry?

• 1705

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

The Chairman: Would it be possible to answer that in general terms?

Mr. Armstrong: I think the proportion has remained about the same, but perhaps some of the experts could clarify that.

Brig. Gen. D. C. Laubman (Director General Personnel Plans and Requirements): I think if anything the proportion of operational personnel is greater.

The Chairman: I do not know whether that answers the basic question you had in mind, Mr. Harkness, but one of the witnesses has indicated that the proportion of operational personnel has increased somewhat, at any rate.

Mr. Harkness: As a matter of fact, going over this unit by unit I doubt very much, whether this would actually prove to be the case.

An hon. Member: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I do not think the comments from the sidelines were recorded.

The Chairman: In case it was not recorded the evidence was to the effect that proportionately during the past year the operational personnel had increased in relation to the non-operational personnel. I believe that is a fair statement of the evidence.

Brig. Gen. Laubman: That is right.

Mr. Harkness: I think we should also define operational personnel. I think perhaps my

definition of it and some other people's definition might be a little different, but by operational personnel I was referring particularly to fighting units. I know that the Department in many cases puts in as operational personnel some who could be accepted under some definition, but whom I would not include as people who were ever going to be engaged in the sharp end, as it were, and in combat.

Mr. Armstrong: I think there are many ways of defining, it Mr. Harkness, but the comment that was made was on the basis of using the same standard of comparison between the two periods.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions, Mr. Harkness? Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Arnell a question in respect of the main heading of Policy Guidance in his fine presentation and under the second military objective on page 4, Meeting International Commitments. At the top of page 5, you have three roles defined for meeting international commitments:

1. Supporting defensive alliances
2. Supporting UN peacekeeping activities
3. Providing military assistance.

I feel this is a very elusive document, except perhaps in just this area. I wonder whether you can give us some illustrations of what has actually been done by way of allocation? What would now, as of today, come under "supporting defensive alliances?"

Dr. Arnell: At the moment the one that is considered there is really the NATO one alone. At the time this was being discussed it was recognized that the one international defensive alliance we were really involved in was, in fact, the NATO one, but—and again looking at the 1964 White Paper as the basis on which we drew this—if this was to stand the test of time it must accept the possibility of Canada's deciding to get into another defensive alliance of some sort, other than the purely European continent one and it was only in that context that this was brought up.

We have viewed this not so much as the way in which the resources get allocated at the beginning so much as the basis against which analysis should be undertaken in order to sort out the things that must be considered when one looks into whether one should increase, decrease, join, or not join with others in collective security. These three were

chosen in the way they were—again referring to the White Paper—in relation to what seemed to us to be the three basic aims of international defence policy as we understood it; the collective security type of participation in international affairs; the support of UN in the peacekeeping role which is identified as such and you can think through the various things that have been done and are being done,...

• 1710

Mr. Ryan: Currently there would be Cyprus. Are there any others?

Dr. Arnell: I think there is the group still in the Kashmir. There is the Laos Truce Commission.

Mr. Ryan: That would not be UN, though, would it?

Dr. Arnell: No, Laos is...

Mr. Ryan: That is the International Joint Commission.

Dr. Arnell: There is Korea.

Mr. Ryan: Korea is another.

Dr. Arnell: Here again this is really, in looking over a total policy review type of thing, a check mark of what you must run through to see what we are doing.

In the case of providing military assistance, this is military assistance other than anything we do in NATO. This, is merely the separation and this is where we have provided military assistance in Ghana, Tanzania, as I recall, and Jamaica. I could ask my colleagues to think up others, but it is this type of thing.

Mr. Ryan: And perhaps Nigeria now.

Dr. Arnell: The Military assistance is more in the form of training teams, and this type of thing. In Ghana, Tanzania and Jamaica it is a case of providing a training capability to help train the local forces or give them support in either form. We have an air adviser in Malaysia as well, which we would probably class under this same military assistance.

Mr. Ryan: With respect to Item No. 1, supporting defensive alliances, you could get a fairly good projection of what was needed for the next fiscal year by just looking at our NATO commitment alone, but in addition, and under that same head, would you set up a reserve in case we went into another alliance?

Dr. Arnell: The aim at this particular stage is not in fact to say just exactly what would fall out of it, but if in fact the government decided that it was concerned with, say, broadening its collective security activities or defensive alliances and in fact joining up in Southeast Asia or Latin America, or somewhere, we would feel that in attempting within the Department to write down and identify the main considerations—and we would do this in consultation with External Affairs—this should be taken into account as we begin to plan and design a floor structure to meet the needs, and it is under this that we would in fact be thinking of what we are doing now as well as what are the implications of beginning to do something else. It is this rather than just thinking that we will build it from scratch with something, and this is where you can do some broad analysis of the interrelationship between things. From this one can develop what we call policy guidance, which really defines the kind of thing we are going to do in order to meet government policy. The reason we call it policy guidance is because, if you really analyse it, policy does not really get made until somebody approves a costed program. Policy is really made when Parliament votes the money.

Mr. Ryan: I take it there is no contingency allowance whatsoever?

Dr. Arnell: This is only for...

Mr. Ryan: In a case like this.

Dr. Arnell: No, sir, this is only to identify the factors to be taken into account in order to try and create a program that can be put forward.

Mr. Ryan: What would you do with, for instance, the Eighth Battalion situation, which is committed to NATO but is back here in Canada. Would that be put in under this heading or would it be a domestic?

• 1715

Dr. Arnell: This is really why, in presenting the functions, I grouped the individual activities together in the way I did, and the real problem that we have in doing strictly textbook programming is in fact that many forces are at least double-tasked, if not more. In fact, I think you can say that the only operational forces that are not committed to at least two jobs are the Air Division in Europe and the brigade group while it is there, as well as the Air Defence Command.

Air Defence Command is strictly a North American defence activity. Air Division is strictly a NATO activity. In the brigade group the individuals are tasked for that while they are there. When there is a requirement, everything else can be switched almost within the week. The Maritime forces are essentially committed to NATO but they are also committed in the North American defence context. I think the land forces have the widest range of multiple tasking in that there will be a battalion in Canada earmarked for ACE Mobile, and if there is can change the names of those battalions, and in Canada strictly earmarked for this. You can change the names of those battalions, and within Mobile Command this is really internal management. It is not really for somebody else to say. The Mobile commander has to figure out how he will meet the needs. Of course, he has his reserves if he has to do more than just meet the immediate needs. This is really for analysis. The force structure should not come out of this particular place. This is the beginning of that long process.

Mr. Ryan: This is the very general role?

Dr. Arnell: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: My last question is in respect to the 13 tasks set out on page 5. The sixth task is counter lodgements. What is this?

Dr. Arnell: This has been the traditional defence of Canada thing, for which the parachute part of the land forces has always been available. There has always been a requirement in the Canadian defence policy to cope with some infiltration or infringement of Canadian territory by a small party somewhere. This is to remind people that this has always been a responsibility of the defence forces. Of course, it is in this stage of what we call policy guidance where one makes a judgment in any given period of time as to whether that is a high risk or a low risk area, and in that sense you start to allocate resources. If this is considered to be a low risk area, then you play it down. It may be a period when you might expect infiltrators of some sort in terms of military units. You may recall during the last war particularly there was always concern about landings in Labrador, in coastal areas mainly, although there was concern at one stage since the war about the possibility of an air drop. This is what is meant by No. 6.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: We had planned to break at 5.30 p.m. and then resume at 8 o'clock. I have Mr. Groos, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Howard, Mr. McRae and Mr. McLean for a second round of questioning. I thought that if any of the members of the Committee cannot be here this evening perhaps I should give priority to their questions now, if that is agreeable to members of the Committee, and then when we resume at 8 o'clock perhaps we could finish off the questions on this section. This would also give the members an opportunity to review this memorandum during the dinner hour, and perhaps they might also have additional questions. We could then go on to the second presentation. Would that give you enough time? Are there any members who will not be present?

Mr. Laniel: I just have a short question which is supplementary to the line of questioning that was taken by Mr. Ryan.

The Chairman: Is that satisfactory to members of the Committee?

Mr. Laniel: My question is very short. It concerns these tasks. I cannot see where the reserve and the militia are integrated in these tasks. Are they in support of the ground combat troupe in Europe or the air combat troupe in Europe?

Dr. Arnell: The reserves are, in effect, in support of the actual operational side of the forces. In other words, the land reserves are available to Mobile Command in the general sense, so that Mobile Command's major problem—because they are responsible for the brigade in Europe—is to have some reserves to move in the direction at that time. The Reserves are, in fact, committed to Europe. On the other hand, if he wants to train reserves to support the Defence of Canada role, again it becomes largely internal management.

• 1720

Mr. Laniel: When I speak of reserves I speak of reserve units local reserve units.

Dr. Arnell: That is what I am speaking of.

Mr. Laniel: It is?

Dr. Arnell: Yes. There has been lately a very hard look at the actual training and tasking of the Reserves and they are being asked in for this precise thing, to support the...

Mr. Laniel: I know the task of the Reserve has been changed and it has been attached to the combat troops but by the way this list was made I was not sure where it was included, whether it was directly related to the force component that it would be attached to in case of emergency.

Dr. Arnell: In such places as it would. As I pointed out earlier, this in itself does not throw up the actual design of the Forces until you start putting some priorities on it.

The Chairman: The order of questioners is Mr. Groos, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Howard, Mr. MacRae and Mr. Cafik. We will continue with you, Mr. Groos, unless some of those whose names I have mentioned will be here later on tonight.

Mr. Groos: Mine is a very brief question. Dr. Arnell, I notice on page 14 you refer to the other program and you say

...except for the statutory Government contributions, both current and actuarial, to the military pension fund, which amount to \$144.6 million...

I wonder whether you could divide that up between current and actuarial.

Dr. Arnell: It is actually printed in here if I can find it. No, I am sorry, it is not in here. I will have to look it up. Could I take notice of it because I have it and can report on it afterwards?

Mr. Groos: That was my only question.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel, do you have any further questions?

Mr. Laniel: I have a very short one. At the bottom of page 9, you mention

When the full system is working, all previous decisions involving new program elements and changes to existing ones will be listed on a time-phased basis within the Integrated Defence Program and summarized annually in the Program Review.

Then you say that when this stage has been reached,

...a future year's Estimates will be prepared directly from the Program Review and only modified to reflect unforeseen factors...

Does this mean that next year's estimates will be in two parts, one which will have been

worked within your new programming review system, keeping separate the previous program which will have been phased out? Will that be the new presentation of the estimates? Will they be kept separate?

Dr. Arnell: It is not so much the matter of the actual presentation of the estimates. If I might just take, say, an individual program element or a unit within the total Integrated Defence Program such as a squadron of aircraft which at the present time, shall we say, is flying with T-33 aircraft that has been earmarked now to receive, say, CF-5 aircraft two years from now, it is in fact possible as far as that program element is concerned for the present manpower establishment to fly whatever particular airplane they have now, maintain the aircraft, and so on.

• 1725

For the total manpower required, the O & M. cost to keep that squadron going with its present equipment and at the same time to show within the total program—because it is a five-year one—the establishment changes that will in fact occur because you are changing the equipment—because there may be a different number of aircraft; they may in fact require more maintenance men per aircraft to maintain it and so on—there will be a change in establishment and therefore a known change in cost because of personnel costs. You can get the figures for next year's estimates in the program review if it says that next year a given squadron has such and such equipment, so many people, and so on. There is going to be a price on that.

When the price of these things is put all together, essentially you have your estimates if your program is worth anything. If there is an unanticipated financial constraint, if there is something that one really does not know about six, eight or nine months before, if suddenly someone says "change" or if an emergency comes up, if we are required to put up a brigade somewhere that we do not know about now, this is going to change the budget at the time.

What I really mean is that every program element of the 900 will have a story leading into the future and the one year from the current year should be pretty close to the program on which you build your next year's estimates. You add it up and, of course, the way it is displayed is the way people want it

displayed. We do not have a freedom of choice in how we display our moneys for your examination.

The Chairman: This seems to be a convenient time to stop unless, Mr. Howard, you have a brief question you prefer to deal with now rather than this evening at 8 o'clock.

Mr. Howard: It will be all right to wait until this evening.

Mr. Ryan: I have one question, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Arnell: May I just add something before it gets lost in the record? To answer Mr. Gross' question, in speaking of the actuarial figures I mentioned the figure 144.6. The figure is split almost 50-50 with a very slight edge on the actuarial side. There is a \$4 million difference between one and the other, so it is roughly 50-50. For the current pension you have to put something into actuarial of essentially the same amount.

Mr. McCleave: Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief request and we have another minute before 5.30. Could the figures be produced some time during the hearings with regard to Mr. Harkness' question about the ratio involving the operational people opposed to those not operational for the last couple of years?

The Chairman: Would that be possible? Mr. Ryan, do you have a brief question?

Mr. Ryan: I have a supplementary. I take it that if an emergency did arise from the Government's agreeing to go into a defensive alliance other than NATO, it would be done by supplementary estimate, then.

Dr. Arnell: I think it would have to be.

Mr. Ryan: That is the way it would be done?

Dr. Arnell: I think it would have to be.

Mr. Ryan: I just wanted to have that clear.

The Chairman: The order of questioners for this evening when we reconvene at 8 o'clock will be Mr. Howard, Mr. MacRae, Mr. Cafik and Mr. Winch. I ask members of the steering subcommittee to remain for a few minutes to deal with the matter raised by Mr. Winch and certain other items.

EVENING SITTING

Thursday, November 21, 1968.

● 2014

The Vice-Chairman: Dr. Arnell would like to make a correction to the earlier record.

Dr. Arnell: In answering Mr. Groos' question, just before we broke up, as to the split between the contribution to current pensions and the actuarials, I read the wrong column. The actual split is almost exactly 50-50. Out of the \$144.6 million, \$72.0 million is the current contribution for current pensions and \$72.6 million is the amount in actuarial adjustment, so it is really 50-50.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Doctor. I have a couple of announcements.

First of all, if any members of the Committee have any specific questions relative to our specific agenda, which we are all aware of now, would you please get in touch with Mr. Peter Dobell. You may speak to him after this meeting or telephone him at 237-0143.

● 2015

I think it might be of great assistance if witnesses called in future are posted in advance on what questions or types of questions are likely to be put to them. I think if this procedure were followed it would be better for all concerned.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, would the purpose be to give Mr. Dobell an idea what questions we are going to ask of each witness?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes, what you are interested in and then the witnesses will come better prepared with the answers. It may require some research to get the correct answer but it will save time.

Mr. Cafik: But I do not suppose that this will be an essential requirement?

The Vice-Chairman: No, there is no pressure or insistence on this whatsoever. Mr. Peter Dobell is available and he would like to be co-operative in this matter.

The Steering Committee has tentatively decided to have the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence jointly before the Committee at 11.00 a.m. on Tuesday, November 26 next for a two hour meeting. The length of time the Committee sits is necessarily limited because of the nec-

essity to get the estimates processed by the deadline.

The next questioner on my list is Mr. Howard.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Mr. Chairman, I want to deal with the very important matter of the ability of our defence forces to handle possible commitments that we might have in the future.

Mr. Laniel raised what I think is a very important point—the fact that we have been subjecting our forces to a form of attrition. Because of the effect of inflation we are not increasing our budgets and this results in a decreasing net effect on the size and capability of our forces each year. I understand the figure is something like 2 per cent per year at the moment, and at the rate that inflation goes on perhaps we will end up with something like a Boy Scout troop to defend the country before too many years go by. I think this is a matter of considerable concern. It is not a matter of great general popularity in Canada that we think in terms of any increase in expenditure, but yet it seems to me that we have to examine this possibility as a necessity.

It was mentioned by the witnesses earlier that there was a five-year plan of development for the forces. I would like to know how you reconcile this five-year plan with this attrition figure that we have been given and which seems to be in effect?

Mr. Armstrong: The five-year plan is drawn in constant dollars and consequently the attrition factor that you are referring to, which arises out of rising costs, arises only in a situation where those costs are not met. If they are not met then the plan has to be changed. Now during these past four years we have been following a budget that has been inflated at the rate of 2 per cent a year and the costs, as I am sure you would appreciate, have risen by more than that, and consequently it has been necessary to change the numbers of people in the forces and to change the organizational structure to some degree to make up for the increasing costs that we had to meet within those budgetary levels.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): How many years would you say it would take before we reach a state where we do not have an effective force?

• 2020

Mr. Armstrong: This would depend entirely on the future and one the approach taken. On the assumption that appropriate provision would be made to take care of rising costs that were inevitable then this would not arise and your problem would not exist in that respect.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You say on page 2:

Because the task of Armed Forces is to prepare for an emergency, there are no really recognizable limits or constraints as to size of forces or amounts of equipment required for each task.

But you must have some figure in your minds—some figure that you feel that you must not go below. You must have something that you consider a reasonably ideal figure. Is it a million men under arms, or is it 50,000 men under arms?

Mr. Armstrong: We work, of course, with approved programs—undertakings that we are asked to meet. For example, we currently have a commitment to provide a brigade in Europe of 6,000 men. We have an undertaking to provide an air division in Europe of a given number of squadrons. We have undertakings to provide a naval force of a certain size. We have undertakings to provide a given-sized force for the defence of Canada. These are the commitments we design our force to meet.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): This figure is how much, 100,000 men?

Mr. Armstrong: Currently, as we explained earlier, the establishment figure is a little over 103,000. In fact we are manning to about 5 per cent below that. We are carrying about 98,000 just a little above 98,000 at the moment.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Are you satisfied that this is a sufficiently large force for the commitments that we have?

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, it is a sufficiently large force for the present commitments, within the margins I have mentioned, but we are running a little short on the total establishment.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You are not at all concerned, then, that we might be going below a reasonably safe limit for the defence of Canada?

Mr. Armstrong: No, I do not think so. I think where with a reduction in manpower we would be hard pressed if we were asked to accept an additional commitment without expanding the force we would back it up.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): How fast could you increase the size of the force if there was a threat or a commitment overseas to handle a peacekeeping mission of some size?

Mr. Armstrong: It could be increased, I think, fairly rapidly. If we had a peacekeeping commitment of an additional battalion, a thousand men or something of this sort, certainly we could back up for that within a matter of a few months. And by the time it was necessary to rotate these people and fill in behind them, I think we could have the force that was necessary to do that.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): What about the possibility of a major period of unrest on this continent—civil war, perhaps, in some parts of the western world? Do you see that we could be threatened in any way by this kind of thing?

Mr. Armstrong: I suppose this depends on your assessment of threat. We maintain in Canada in the four combat groups forces totalling something like—have you the figures there?

• 2025

Dr. Arnell: The general purpose forces are 18,000 as we showed them, and that is everything plus the battalion in Cyprus. It is about 15,000 or 16,000.

Mr. Armstrong: That, of course, includes the air division.

Dr. Arnell: And it also includes the reserve capability to back it up.

Mr. Armstrong: The ground forces, I think, would number about 14,000. In our general undertakings—and these are joint arrangements worked out between the military committees of Canada and the United States—we normally assess about one brigade for this kind of work. The would total perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 people.

Obviously that would be a limited number under circumstances such as you suggest and would not be adequate for that.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I was thinking particularly of the Prime Minister's

speech in Kingston a few days ago, and I am wondering what capability we have under the circumstances that he envisaged.

Mr. Armstrong: I am explaining really what capability we have, and I think it would be a capability sufficient to take care of a sizable civil disturbance; however, I have no way really of judging the kind of disturbances that you yourself are thinking of.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): We have seen an example recently of a small nation that has put up a very effective military organization by the use of a large part of its army in the form of civilians who are brought in when there is an emergency. I refer to the Israeli forces. We have never done very much along this line. We have a small reserve force. Has there been any assessment of the possibility of making Canada more effective militarily by a similar program?

Mr. Armstrong: Not as far as we are concerned. We have not made any assessments of that kind. In Israel, as you know all the able-bodied men are trained...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I was not really suggesting going that far, but we have a very small reserve force in Canada.

Mr. Armstrong: Our reserve force totals about 24,000 people at the present time, and they are available to back up the regular forces.

Dr. Arnell: I think one of the prime differences that always come out in this type of comparison is the shape of our geography as compared to that of a small nation of the type of Israel, and the fact that our civilization is about 200 miles wide and 3,000 miles long and our land mass is a triangle that stretches from half way between the pole and the equator to within 400 miles of the pole. So we have a tremendous land mass and all the people living in one place.

The concept of the man working with his gun with a frontier close at hand does not in fact hold for Canada. I think one has to say that most of our thoughts on reserves are that they would not be used close to where they live.

You are introducing a different approach to this and I think one would have to really study precisely what the focal points of unrest would be before I could give you a detailed answer as to how much it would

take. In other words, you would really have to have decided how many focal points you had to determine the military forces needed.

Mr. Armstrong: I hope that I have not given the impression that the military operational officers do not take into account in their plans the possible necessity to deal with a civil disorder. This is, as you have probably noted from the presentation that was made to you, one of the functions of the military forces and they do include this in their planning. I think the question that I find a little difficult to answer in your total questioning is really the extent which one might assume this sort of civil disorder would assume.

• 2030

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I certainly do not know the extent.

Mr. Armstrong: I do not either.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I am concerned that we face a very difficult financial problem in connection with our armed forces and I am wondering what different methods there may be in achieving the kind of military strength that a small nation needs.

Mr. Armstrong: In my own judgment it would be the kind of program that involved a capacity to mobilize on a very large scale which has inherent in it the requirement to train the people at some point for at least reasonable periods of time. It would involve, I should think, an increase in defence expenditures to accomplish it, without much question.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman: The next questioners are Mr. MacRae, Mr. Cafk, Mr. Winch and Mr. Borrie, in that order. Mr. MacRae.

Mr. MacRae: I would like, Mr. Chairman, to direct my questions to Mr. Armstrong. We now have four combat groups effectively in the field at this moment?

Mr. Armstrong: That is right, in Canada.

Mr. MacRae: I want to develop that theme, if you would be prepared to answer. We have the brigade in Europe. We do not refer to that normally as a combat group, or do we?

Mr. Armstrong: No, it is referred to as a brigade group, and that is the nature of that

formation. The combat groups are not organized as a standard brigade.

Mr. MacRae: Where are those four combat groups situated now?

Mr. Armstrong: The headquarters—as you know, there may be some units located elsewhere—of each are at Gagetown, Val Cartier, Petawawa and Calgary.

Mr. MacRae: In what state of operational readiness are these four combat groups at this time? Are they fully functional? Do they have all their components either with them at headquarters or elsewhere? Are they completely organized at present?

Mr. Armstrong: I should not answer perhaps that they are completely organized, because the organization into combat groups was commenced, as you know, early this year in the spring. And I do not think I would be right in saying they are completely organized into combat groups now. But on the other hand, I think I would also be correct in saying that the state of readiness is at—how shall I define it—a high level, in respect of these groups.

Mr. MacRae: These combat groups were built for the most part from the strength of the three brigades we had in this country, I take it, and therefore they would be getting skilled and trained units to move into the brigade groups.

Mr. Armstrong: Yes. These were organized from the existing units in the country which heretofore, as you know, were organized as brigades, and this was a reorganization to form them into four combat groups of roughly the same composition, and distributed as I indicated. The combat group at Gagetown is slightly different from the others in that it has some of the heavier equipment that is used in the brigades, the heavier artillery, and so on.

Mr. MacRae: Did you say it does have, or does not have?

Mr. Armstrong: It is equipped that way.

Mr. MacRae: So it would be the best equipped of the four, then.

Mr. Armstrong: Well, the others have lighter equipment which would be air transportable. This is not entirely completed. For example, we are still using the tanks that we have

used before in Canada. We have not yet acquired a light tank that one would consider to be air transportable.

● 2035

Dr. Arnell: I might augment Mr. Armstrong's answer here, to illustrate the point that I think you are reaching for. The battalion that is earmarked for the ACE Mobile Force comes out of one of the light combat groups rather than the heavy group, and that is at full operational strength. It is on very short notice to move. So it is in fact a fully operational battalion, but it is in one of the light combat groups because it is air transportable, as opposed to the heavy side.

Mr. MacRae: What battalion is that, and where is it at this moment, sir?

The Vice-Chairman: Maybe we could have the short notice, too.

Dr. Arnell: Subject to confirmation, I think it is the Queen's Own at Work Point Barracks in Victoria.

Mr. Armstrong: It will be part of a Western combat group, with headquarters at Calgary.

Mr. MacRae: But it is in Esquimalt.

Mr. Armstrong: They are not all located in Calgary.

Mr. MacRae: While that information is being looked for, Mr. Armstrong, what is the total strength of the four combat groups as opposed to the three brigades that we had originally? I think this follows the line of questioning of Mr. Howard up to a point, because these combat groups are the major land force that we have in this country with which to do anything we want to do, outside of course of our brigade in Europe.

Following the line of reasoning that I think Mr. Howard had in mind, if there were civil disorder, if there were anything like that, these are the people we have to count on, certainly the land component. What are the strengths of the four of them as compared with the original brigades?

Mr. Armstrong: It is difficult to answer that in terms of strength as compared. The reorganization into combat groups resulted, in terms of establishments, in a reduction of approximately 2,000.

Mr. MacRae: That was taken care of, I assume, by normal attrition for the most part,

Mr. Armstrong? Is that what happened in this particular case?

Mr. Armstrong: Yes. All of the reductions that have taken place as the strength of the military forces has gone down—which it has done in the last several years—with the exception of the early period, all of that reduction has been by attrition. When integration was first adopted there was some reduction that was not due to attrition, about 2,500 people as I recall.

Mr. MacRae: Are the units of the four combat groups up to strength?

Dr. Arnell: Three of them are at 97 to 98 per cent.

Mr. MacRae: That is in Canada, I am referring to.

Dr. Arnell: In Canada. And the fourth one in Canada is building, and is at between 65 and 70 per cent strength.

Mr. MacRae: What was your first percentage?

Dr. Arnell: Two of them are at 98, and one is at 97.

Mr. MacRae: And one is at 65, the fourth one.

Dr. Arnell: Well, 66, 67, somewhere in there.

Mr. MacRae: Is that the Valcartier one?

Dr. Arnell: Yes. It is the one that is being built.

Mr. MacRae: I think that will be all, Mr. Chairman. Was there one answer that I did not get?

Dr. Arnell: It is the First Battalion, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, and they are based at Work Point Barracks, Esquimalt.

Mr. MacRae: I thank you, gentlemen.

The Vice-Chairman: What would the notice be, and how long would it take them to get overseas if the call came? Twelve hours?

Mr. Armstrong: The standard set for that group is to be in place in seven days.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions to direct to either the Deputy Minister or the Assistant Deputy Minister. I

do not know which one I should address them to.

● 2040

On page 5 of the presentation that we have here today, under item 1., "Aid to Civil Power", what is meant specifically by that? Is that within Canada or outside Canada?

Dr. Arnell: That is within Canada.

Mr. Cafik: As a result of insurrection or strike or ...

Dr. Arnell: It can be anything. It is anytime when the civil authority at the provincial level or other level seeks help from ...

Mr. Cafik: From the federal government through the military forces.

Dr. Arnell: Aid to civil power has been things like the Winnipeg flood of some years back. It can range anywhere from that to assistance if the local police, through the provincial police, and so on through the federal police ...

Mr. Winch: It must come from the Attorney General. Am I correct on that?

Mr. Armstrong: That is right. The procedure for this is described in the National Defence Act.

Dr. Arnell: It is the whole range of the civil authority in Canada, and it is strictly in Canada.

Mr. Cafik: That is fine. Thank you, doctor.

Item No. 5—ensure national survival: Under that item would we have such an organization as EMO, for instance?

Dr. Arnell: At the time this list of tasks was put together the Emergency Measures Organization was reporting to the Minister of Industry, but the military forces have always had a responsibility, in addition to any that Emergency Measures may have, to aid in national survival. This, of course, relates to the problem that would arise in the event of all-out nuclear war.

Even with the Emergency Measures Organization now part of the Department, and still functioning as the liaison with, or the federal organization that deals with, the provinces on emergency measures, the military continue to have responsibilities in some of the communications involved in national survival, maintenance of some of the control centres, and so on.

As written, it is really the military part of this, as we develop, because we are just beginning to try to function on the broader front with the Emergency Measures Organization. This will probably be broadened to include this other thing.

Mr. Cafik: Items 8 and 9—air combat Europe and ground combat Europe: I suppose it is in here somewhere else, but why would that be specifically allocated to Europe? Why are there not other items such as “air combat domestic”, or “ground combat at home”? How are the forces at home covered under this particular category?

Dr. Arnell: On the air side, the counter bomber attack, No. 4, is the air defence one for Canada.

This list was made up to reflect our current pattern of tasks. We do have a task in Europe.

To go back to something I said this afternoon, I believe, in answer to one of your earlier questions on supporting defensive alliances—that they were, in general, up there—as we broke out the tasks we were thinking of here and now, which makes it Europe.

When you get into the Canadian equivalent, the defence of Canada, other than the air side, you find it in a number of places. No. 6, counter lodgements, is, in fact, a ground-air reaction depending on where the lodgement is; or, in fact, it might include a Maritime operation, as well.

I think it is really in that part, coupled with the aid to civil power, because to come back to the question of insurrection, within the Canadian constitution as it is now the civil authority has to take the first step. Therefore, it is really the aid to civil power and the counter lodgements that are the two essentially aimed at supporting other than defence of Canada, against what I must say is largely being considered by us to be an air threat and a naval threat.

• 2045

Mr. Cafik: Item 11—truce commissions: Would the expenditures caused by Canadian participation in the observer team in Nigeria fall under that item?

Dr. Arnell: If I might go back to what I said earlier, this is to examine the sorts of things for which we should be developing

forces; it is not, in fact, the detail of how we carry out a specific operation.

We had not, in fact, planned specifically for the Nigerian one. All the thinking that had been done under that was on the general aspect of participation in this area of activity.

One of the real difficulties, as I am sure you will agree, is that no two of these have ever been the same, and one can only have a general idea of how one would cope with it. I say that rather than that we had designed something precisely for Nigeria.

Mr. Cafik: No; I merely wondered if it would fit into that particular category now that you have the problem.

Dr. Arnell: If it came up in that context it probably would be there.

In fact, after we get a little more experience in a few more things that we did not think of when we wrote this list we might change the list of tasks.

Mr. Cafik: Item No. 13—air lift: What do you have in mind there?

Dr. Arnell: This is the strategic air lift. It is in here to show all the different kinds of task for which strategic air lift might be required. These might be anything from moving a battalion across Canada, or aid to civil power in the sense of searching for lost children, to local insurrection or to response to ACE mobile force or UN peacekeeping. It is where we consider the problem of strategic air lift.

Mr. Cafik: Could it also be constituted as a humanitarian air lift to assist in disasters in any part of the world? Would that come under this item?

Dr. Arnell: We have to consider this, because we are called upon in any given year to undertake a number. If you look at the record over the last few years there have always been humanitarian air lifts in Canada and overseas.

Mr. Cafik: I have one final question relative to page 11. I cannot really understand these functions A, B, C, D. You have, I think, a total of eight of them—five operational and three support functions. Why have we confined ourselves strictly to manpower as opposed to the equipment that is also used in this respect?

Dr. Arnell: This reflects the developing aspects. At the time we put together the pro-

gram review that was the precursor of the present estimates—the ones we are looking at here—it was the first attempt we had ever made to bring the thing into line. It was still in the course of trying to move from what had been three separate programs into one.

The 1967 program was the first one, in fact, in which we had agreed to a list of activities and said, "Let us see what we have". In fact, at the time that we had to put together the Estimates that we are reviewing here we did not have the program review in a form that matched up.

This year we have, in fact, been able to put together a program review for our use to sort things out in a much better form.

We have a partial collection of all the equipment and the money therefor, but it really has not been developed to the point that I felt we could present it to you this year. I hope that in another year, if we come forward with this same sort of thing, we will be able to show the tie-in between the men, the costs and the equipment.

● 2050

Mr. Cafik: Then, in subsequent budgets you would find that under these eight functions you would tie up all the money spent within...

Dr. Arnell: It is the 30 activities; that is how we are doing it.

Mr. Cafik: You are not doing it within the functions themselves?

Dr. Arnell: You will find under Function A on page 11 two of the activities that I have listed.

Mr. Cafik: Yes.

Dr. Arnell: The mechanized ground capability and the air strike/recce. You will find our No. 1 on page 6 and No. 3 at the top of page 7 if you go back in the same...

Mr. Cafik: I do not know which one you have.

Dr. Arnell: At the very bottom of the page you will see "To Maintain an Air Strike/Reconnaissance Capability". That is the one that is reflected on the other page. No. 3 at the top of page 7 "To Maintain a Mechanized Ground Combat Capability" is, in fact, the one that you find there. If you turn to page 12 you will find two of them; the mobile general purpose is No. 4 in that other list, the

reserves is No. 8, and so it goes. So that the 30 have all been reflected in here. All we could really do this year is to let you see, through this method, the way resources are allocated. Now we have not in fact carried it to the point where we have full costs, but this is the aim of the programming system.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much, Dr. Arnell.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I have two questions. I do not know whether it will be my old friend, Mr. Armstrong, or Dr. Arnell, the Deputy Minister (Finance) of the Department of National Defence who will answer.

Outside of the Defence Department all departments of government in Canada, on alterations and construction, work through the Department of Public Works. Why is the Department of National Defence the only department of government that I know of that has other than the Department of Public Works do their construction, namely a Crown Corporation called Defence Construction (1951) Limited?

I have before me now the 18th Annual Report of Defence Construction (1951) Limited. I note that of the directors, two are military men, and the other four have no military designation at all, that not one of the officers has a military designation, and that the head office is not NDHQ—it is in the Kenston building on Metcalfe Street. I note also, Mr. Chairman, in the last report that the majority of alterations and construction are in Canada. As a matter of fact, according to this report there are only three outside Canada—\$800,000 in Soest, and putting two together, \$600,000 in Lahr, Germany. The majority are across Canada—Gagetown, Trenton, Petawawa, British Columbia.

I would like to ask on the basis of financing and efficiency why it is necessary on these revised estimates now before us that of every department of Government the Defence Department is the only one that has within it a Crown Corporation, Defence Construction (1951) Limited when according to this report their expenditures for this year is less than \$3 million?

I hope, Mr. Chairman, you get what I am driving at now. Every other department of government operates through the Department of Public Works on alterations and construction. The majority of these, according to the report of Defence Construction (1951) Limited

ed, are in Canada, with only three outside Canada. You know, I have great trust in our armed services personnel operation and administration. They know how to construct a trench or a house, how to alter it, and how to build a barracks or acquire fire-power. Could I have an explanation why, from a Financial and efficiency point of view, the Defence Department requires a Crown Corporation to look after its alterations and construction?

Mr. Armstrong: Perhaps I could attempt to answer your question. I might say at the outset that you and I are in complete agreement on the fact that the military forces have a very efficient and capable construction group. Defence Construction (1951) Limited, as you perhaps know, reported to the Minister of Defence Production, and their task was to let contracts for defence construction and to supervise the contracts after they were let.

Following the Glassco Commission report, which did, as you probably recall, suggest that consideration should be given to defence construction being undertaken by the Department of Public Works, an examination of very considerable length was made.

I think you would agree with me that in the military operation it is necessary to train military officers and men in construction and engineering because this is required for operational purposes and, consequently, it is desirable to use these people for the specialized design work that is necessary in peacetime.

The conclusion reached by the group who made this study, having regard to the special requirements of the military, was that the construction side of the Defence Department should stay in the Defence Department. It was decided at the same time that Defence Construction (1951) Limited should report to the Minister of National Defence rather than to the Minister of Defence Production, and it does now report to the Minister of National Defence.

It has been possible since that time to co-ordinate the work of the military engineering branch and Defence Construction (1951) Limited, Defence Construction (1951) Limited still assuming responsibility for letting contracts and general supervision of them. After Defence Construction (1951) Limited had been reporting to the Minister of National Defence for about two years we undertook a further study jointly between ourselves, the Treasury Board group and Defence Construction (1951)

Limited to assess whether it would be desirable to incorporate the functions of Defence Construction (1951) Limited within the departmental operation. This study was completed about six months ago and the conclusion again was reached that no improved efficiency or no reductions in cost would be achieved by doing that. We therefore decided to continue the operation as a Crown Corporation, and it is still operated in that way. There are some advantages in this. I think it provides perhaps a greater flexibility than normally is and it is available under the regular departmental operation. It is a type of work that requires some flexibility because the volume of our construction does fluctuate. As you probably know, it involves raising or reducing staffs from time to time, and the corporation I think finds itself in a position to do this little more readily than we in the department would. We find it to be a very satisfactory arrangement. I can assure you, Mr. Winch, that it has been studied very carefully. These studies have not been made by the department alone but have included people from outside the department, and those are the conclusions that have been reached.

• 2100

Mr. Winch: I would like to make one comment on what Mr. Armstrong said. If, as you said, in the initial stage it provides training for the personnel in the Armed Forces it might have some advantage but, Mr. Armstrong, I have the report.

Mr. Armstrong: Do not misunderstand me. I said the training of military personnel in engineering work. This is an organization that effects contracts.

Mr. Winch: Therefore they are not engaged in this engineering work. This is let to contract.

Mr. Armstrong: Well Defence Construction (1951) Limited is the contract organization.

Mr. Winch: It lets the contract.

Mr. Armstrong: That is right.

Mr. Winch: To private enterprise.

Mr. Armstrong: The military organization does the planning and the design.

Mr. Winch: I still do not get your point, Mr. Armstrong. Why are you the only department of government that requires a Crown Corpo-

ration with an expenditure of \$3 million to do this work?

Mr. Armstrong: All I am saying, Mr. Winch, is that we have looked at it very carefully. I think you will agree with me that this work has to be done.

Mr. Winch: Right.

Mr. Armstrong: The conclusion we have reached is that this is an efficient way to do

Mr. Winch: Not through Public Works? Now two-thirds of all your contracts that went through here are in Canada.

Mr. Armstrong: Well almost all of the contracts are in Canada. We are doing very little building outside the country.

Mr. Winch: I am just going by the report.

Mr. Armstrong: That is what I am saying. I agree with you, but it is more than two-thirds.

Mr. Winch: More than two-thirds is in Canada?

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, I think 95 per cent or perhaps 98 per cent is in Canada.

Mr. Winch: Why should it be done by a separate Crown Corporation operating under the Defence Department?

Mr. Armstrong: Well I have endeavoured to explain this. The work is essential. All of the examination that we have been able to make of this indicates that this is an efficient way to do it.

Mr. Winch: Would you please explain to me why it is efficient for the Department of National Defence with 95 per cent of the work in Canada—and I am using your own figure now—to go through this Crown Corporation. Would that indicate then that the other departments are wrong in using Public Works as an efficient way to operate?

Mr. Armstrong: I am not suggesting the other departments are wrong. I am merely explaining what the situation is in the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Winch: Can you tell the Committee why you think it is more efficient to operate through your own Crown Corporation?

Mr. Armstrong: Well I have gone through the studies that have been made that led to that conclusion.

Mr. Winch: Would you tell the Committee why you have come to this conclusion.

• 2105

Mr. Armstrong: I thought I had told the Committee that in the earlier explanation.

Mr. Cafik: He has asked you to tell him, I think the Committee has heard.

Mr. Armstrong: If you would like me to get the detailed reports and go through this more fully, of course I could.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Armstrong, in your opinion, is this a really specialized field where you do need a corporation of this kind? Is it essential?

Mr. Armstrong: Some of the construction of the Department of National Defence I think is peculiar to the Department of National Defence, but much of it is not—we build barrack blocks and so on.

Mr. Winch: Do you think that \$1,096,000 is required for a special study, which only this group could do, to build a fleet club in Halifax.

Mr. Armstrong: I did not say that only this group could do it.

Mr. Winch: It says that this included the construction of a fleet club in Halifax, Nova Scotia—\$1,096,000.

Mr. Armstrong: Perhaps you would be more familiar with a junior ranks club.

Mr. Winch: I was only a lieutenant.

Mr. Armstrong: Well I did not mean it that way. But that, essentially, is what the fleet club is. However, it has in addition locker and changing facilities so that the naval boys when they come off their ships have some place to go and some place to change into civilian clothes and so on.

Mr. Winch: Could that not have been done by the Department of Public Works?

Mr. Armstrong: I did not say that it could not be done by the Department of Public Works. Of course it could be done by the Department of Public Works. I am saying that this organization is regarded by all those who examined it as being an efficient organization to do this type of work for the Department of National Defence. I think what you are suggesting is that it would be cheaper to have it done by Public Works.

Mr. Winch: Or the Armed Forces themselves.

Mr. Armstrong: Or the Armed Forces? Well our studies have not suggested this.

Mr. Winch: My next question, Mr. Chairman, is to Dr. Arnell and has to do with the formation and the format of estimates.

On revised estimates, page 320, we find that our total is \$1,714,954,800. I would like to ask whether or not there would be any problem to yourself in the preparation of estimates if you gave a true picture of the cost of defence. I do not mean just the administrative and operational costs. A great deal of cost comes under material such as destroyers, planes and so on. The cost of National Defence is not just the straight administrative operational costs, there is also the capital cost which I think comes under the Department of Defence Production. Where here do we find the details?

Dr. Arnell: On page 329.

Mr. Winch: I know that, and I know what is there. Are you telling me that that few million dollars shown there is the entire capital expenditure for our Armed Forces?

Dr. Arnell: The capital, as shown on page 330 ...

Mr. Winch: On page 330?

Dr. Arnell: ...which is listed, shows a gross total of \$265 million from which is netted moneys paid out of vote 48 to show the total capital expenditures which come out. The Department of Defence Production let our contracts for us but we actually pay for all the capital.

Mr. Winch: But that is in addition to the \$1,714 million.

Dr. Arnell: No, it is included in that.

Mr. Winch: Well would it not appear when you get your figure on page 320?

Dr. Arnell: Well on page 320 is a summary total of the entire department and you will find...

Mr. Winch: Where on page 320 or before that is included what you have to say on that?

• 2110

Dr. Arnell: ...the first item is on page 319 under vote 15. The title of that vote is "Oper-

ation and Maintenance and Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Major Equipment and Development for the Canadian Forces (Details, page 327)." So the total figure of 1,488 million in fact is broken out in more detail starting at page 327 under vote 15.

Mr. Winch: Page 327?

Dr. Arnell: At the lower part of page 327, Vote 15, which has the same heading.

Mr. Winch: I am sorry, but just where on page 327? Let us get the cost of destroyers, aircraft and that sort of thing. Where do you find that on page 327?

Dr. Arnell: It begins there but if you go down to the bottom of Page 329 you will find that the last five items, for example, are Ships, Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Aircraft and Engines, Ground Mobile Equipment, Armament Equipment. Those are capital expenditures.

Mr. Winch: As part of the ...

Dr. Arnell: Yes, and the \$1,488,557,000 which is shown in that earlier place of this.

Mr. Winch: You do not show the contemplated cost of your four destroyers.

Dr. Arnell: Tonight I was planning, if there is time, to give you a second presentation which touches on the organizational changes and also all the major construction items and I have a table which gives all the major equipment items with the dollar values of the total program, what has been expended to date, what is in this year and what is in the future.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, could you tell us about how many more questioners there are? I would like to hear this presentation and I would be willing to forego the question that I have which will not take too long, but could you give us some indication of how many more people there are?

Mr. Winch: Do I understand now that you are going to give a forward picture?

Dr. Arnell: It was the intention to give you this tonight.

The Vice-Chairman: We do not want to get into Vote No. 15 in too great detail as we are still on Item No. 1. We have Messrs. Borrie, Legault, MacLean and Groos.

Mr. Groos: I will forego because I would like to hear the presentation and I think the other members perhaps might feel the same way.

Mr. MacLean: It is my second round I will forego. I would not ask any questions prior to the presentation.

The Vice-Chairman: All right. Are there any further questions you want to put, Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: I will forego.

The Vice-Chairman: All right. Mr. Borrie?

Mr. Borrie: I will forego also, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Legault?

Mr. Legault: I should like to ask questions afterwards, if there is time, but I think it would be wise to hear the presentation.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen, I think we would be well advised to get at the second report. Could we have the second report distributed?

Dr. Arnell: While it is being distributed, in addition to the actual briefing that I was proposing to give you, there is this table that gives all the major equipment which updates the table that was put into the Minutes of the Proceedings of your Committee on June 23, 1966, which was the last time the detail of the major capital equipment was, in fact, tabled before this Committee. I have structured that table in exactly the same way as this earlier one in case you, Mr. Chairman, or the Committee would feel that you would like to publish it as an appendix to your Minutes in the same way as was done in 1966.

The Vice-Chairman: Yes. Is that agreed? Will someone move that this report be published as an appendix to our Proceedings of this day?

Mr. Cafik: I will so move, Mr. Chairman.

Motion agreed to.

Dr. Arnell: In this second briefing, I propose to review some of the changes in organization and in the operational forces which have had an effect on the 1968-69 Estimates and to discuss briefly some of the major items of capital equipment which are currently being procured for the use of the Canadian Forces.

• 2115

The reorganization of the Canadian Forces into six functional commands, with several additional specialized formations, such as No. 1 Air Division in Europe and the Canadian Forces Communications System, has proved to be quite efficient. During the past year, there has been one major change in this command structure. This is in the field of logistics. While Materiel Command was established to provide the necessary supply and maintenance support to the other functional commands, the responsibility for managing both the development program and the procurement of new capital equipment was vested in the Technical Services Branch of Canadian Forces Headquarters.

This division of responsibilities was originally adopted to permit the retention of the great majority of the engineers and technical specialists in headquarters, so that they would be available to advise the staff of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff on matters relating to future equipment requirements and associated subjects. As similar advice is needed from time to time with respect to operational equipment in the field, a certain duplication of staff occurred at the command level. In the same way, supply policy was established at headquarters and this required a specialized staff which was separate from those at the command. After a careful and detailed study, it was decided that Materiel Command should be amalgamated with the Technical Services Branch and that its function would be administered by a Deputy Chief of Technical Services. This change was put into effect on October 1, 1968. It is planned to have this amalgamation completed by the end of the year and when this is achieved it is expected that there will be personnel savings amounting to about 200 military personnel and 230 civilians.

Among the operational commands, there has been a significant organizational change within Mobile Command. This has been discussed a bit but I think I would like to go through it here to get the details. In the past, the land forces were organized as four brigade groups, three of which were in Canada with the fourth stationed in Germany as part of our contribution to the NATO forces-in-being in Europe. The three brigade groups in Canada are being reorganized into four combat groups, each of which consists of two infantry battalions, a regiment of armour and

one of artillery and other supporting arms. The infantry battalions will have three, instead of four, rifle companies and the armoured and artillery regiments will have two, instead of three, squadrons or batteries. These four combat groups will be based at Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa and Calgary. In addition, the Canadian Airborne Regiment is being formed at Edmonton at the present time. This will be a light, highly-trained unit, which is intended to provide the parachute element of our contribution to the defence of North America.

With respect to the integral air support of the land forces, a number of earlier decisions are beginning to be implemented. With the delivery of the first of the CF-5 tactical aircraft, an operational training squadron is being formed at Cold Lake, Alberta. This will become fully operational in 1969 and will provide the necessary flow of pilots for the operational squadrons which will be formed as the required numbers of aircraft are delivered. Similarly, a helicopter operational training squadron has been formed at Petawawa. In addition to the operational training role, it is intended that this unit will be concerned with the development of new tactics for the use of helicopters in support of ground troops in a mobile environment. To this end, a preliminary order of 10 Bell UH-1D utility helicopters was placed early last year; these have all now been delivered. Finally, a squadron of Buffalo tactical transport aircraft has been formed at Uplands and will form part of the tactical air arm of the mobile forces. As such, it will provide a means of moving men and equipment within a battle area.

• 2120

Turning now to Maritime Command, the major refit of the aircraft carrier *Bonaventure* was completed and she returned to operational service on December 1, 1967 and since then has been engaged in joing Canada-U.S. and NATO exercises extending from the Caribbean to the Norwegian Sea. Construction has begun on both the new helicopter destroyers and the two additional operational support ships, while three World War II destroyers have been taken out of service. Two of these latter ships are in reserve and the other one has been declared surplus.

The three O-class submarines which were bought from the British are now on operational duty. With respect to the conversion of

the seven *Restigouche* class destroyers one, the *Terra-Nova*, which was the prototype for this modernization program, has been completed. Funds are presently being provided for the conversion of three of those remaining and the decision to proceed with the rest will not be made until the necessary funds can be earmarked.

The fleet of *Neptune* marine patrol aircraft has been withdrawn from service. These aircraft were used in the operational squadron based at Comox on Vancouver Island and were also in service at Summerside, P.E.I., for operational training and other purposes. Their role on the west coast is now covered by a smaller squadron of the more versatile *Argus* aircraft, which were transferred to Comox from the east coast. This was done both as an economy measure and also to overcome the inherent shortcomings of the *Neptune* aircraft. The size of the ocean area which is the responsibility of the Pacific region of Maritime Command is so great that the range of the *Neptune* was inadequate for patrolling in the outer reaches of this domain. On the other hand, the *Argus* aircraft, because of its far greater range and endurance, can maintain station for long periods in any part of this ocean area of Canadian responsibility. In addition, the number of operational *Tracker* aircraft, which were designed to undertake similar anti-submarine activities from the aircraft carrier *Bonaventure*, has been reduced by 10 per cent. This was strictly an economy measure, as studies showed that the reduced number was sufficient to meet all the operational training needs and still provide the required number of aircraft for embarking on *Bonaventure*.

At the same time, the maritime air capability, particularly on the east coast, has been improved by the continuing deliveries of *Sea King* helicopters. These turbine-powered aircraft have been purchased both as replacements for the older model helicopters formerly used on the *Bonaventure* and for operation from the current nine helicopter-carrying destroyers and the four larger ones on order. These machines are equipped with the latest submarine detection devices and add a new dimension to the effective range of a surface ship in anti-submarine operations. They also help to offset the transfer of part of the *Argus* fleet to the west coast.

Until last year, 1 Air Division had operated from two bases in Germany and one in

France, with the headquarters also in France. As you are aware, a change in French policy necessitated the withdrawal of our military forces from that country. At the time of our move, we were fortunate in being able to consolidate our former French operations at the air base at Lahr, Germany, from which the French were withdrawing. The move from France to Germany was very carefully planned and carried out with a minimum loss of operational capability. In the year since then, these forces have settled into their new surroundings and have maintained the high operational standards which have been the mark of the Air Division. Prior to the withdrawal from France, we had been maintaining eight operational squadrons on three bases and it had been decided that a more efficient operation could be provided by the reduction to six squadrons of slightly larger size with two squadrons on each base. In effecting this reorganization, 18 CF104 aircraft were withdrawn from service.

• 2125

Turning to capital equipment I will give just a brief summary.

In the last few years, a number of major re-equipment programs have been undertaken. Many of these are now well along the way and the new equipments are being delivered to the forces. As many of these programs are designed to extend over a number of years, it will still be some time before they are all completed.

Reference has already been made to several of the ship conversion and refit programs and I would now like to say a few words regarding the current shipbuilding programs. In April, 1968 two shipbuilding contracts were awarded for the construction of the four modern helicopter carrying destroyer escorts, with a target date for their completion of September 30, 1972. In carrying on the World War II tradition of using the names of Canadian Indian tribes for our ships, these have been named the *Iroquois*, *Huron*, *Athabaskan* and *Algonquin*. These ships will have many modern innovations, one of which is that they will be powered by gas turbines rather than by conventional steam turbines. The second shipbuilding program is that of the two operational support ships, which will be similar to HMCS *Provider*, our sole fleet replenishment ship. These two ships which have been named *Protecteur* and *Preserver* have been under construction since December, 1966 and are scheduled for completion in June, 1969 and

November, 1969 respectively. All the ships in these two programs will be provided with the Canadian *Seasparrow* close range missile system to provide for local air defence. This missile system will enhance the air defence capability of the ships of the fleet, which at present have only guns for this purpose. At the same time that we are building new ships, there is a continuing program of updating the capabilities of existing ships. To this end, nearly \$6 million worth of electronic equipment of one type or another is on order to provide for an improved electronic warfare capability.

During the past two or three years, the mechanized components of the land forces, which includes 4 CMBG in Europe, have been equipped with the M113A1 armoured personnel carrier. This program is virtually complete and during this year a few auxiliary items costing about \$2 million will be delivered. In September, 1968 a contract was let for the first procurement of 105 mm pack howitzer. This is a lightweight, air-transportable, direct support artillery weapon which can be rapidly disassembled for mule or pack transport. It will fire the current 105 mm ammunition. Deliveries under this contract are scheduled to be completed by the end of the current fiscal year. Also for completion during the current fiscal year is an order of 81 mm medium mortars and the necessary ammunition. This is an indirect fire weapon system intended to provide the infantry battalions with integral fire support.

In September, 1967 a contract for 174 *Lynx* command and reconnaissance vehicles was let. This tracked vehicle is small, air-droppable and amphibious, and will replace the *Ferret* scout car now in service. Deliveries of the *Lynx* to the Canadian Forces in Europe were completed in September 1968, with the remainder of the vehicles to be delivered before the end of the present month. Deliveries of the 50 medium self-propelled 155 mm howitzers has been completed and ammunition deliveries will be continued until about the middle of 1969. As a result, more than \$6 million will be spent during the present year on this contract with approximately an equivalent amount being carried forward into future years.

• 2130

The largest program on the air side is the CF5 light attack aircraft. As already indicated, deliveries of this aircraft have been

received for some time and squadrons are in the process of being formed. Prior to this fiscal year, approximately half the total funds assigned to this project had been expended and it is anticipated that another quarter of the funds, or about \$56 million, will be spent during the current fiscal year. The last of the C130E *Hercules* long-range transport aircraft has been delivered and this represents the completion of a \$70 million program to replace the C119 *Flying Box Cars* and the *North Star* aircraft, which made a reputation for themselves in the days of the Korean airlift in the early 1950's.

Earlier reference was made to the *Sea King* helicopters for use with the ships of the maritime forces. This is another program which is nearing completion, as 39 out of a total of 41 helicopters on contract have already been received. A similar situation pertains to the *Buffalo* tactical transport aircraft, as most of the 15 presently on order will have been delivered by the end of the current fiscal year. The last of the current aircraft procurement programs is that of seven *Falcon* utility jet transports. The delivery of the final aircraft of this order was made in June, 1968.

There are a number of items of equipment in the field of communications and electronics which, taken together, represents a total program of well over \$100 million. Of this amount, it is expected that some \$12 million will be expended during the current fiscal year.

Dr. Arnell: Mr. Chairman, I realize that I have made one mistake. The *Buffalo* squadron is being organized at St. Hubert, the base near Montreal, not at Uplands, so perhaps note could be taken of that mistake in my statement.

I really was not going to speak to the table because I thought it was self-explanatory. It is there to support what we have said from the point of view of the capital program.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Arnell. I think we should call out the order as we had it before and ask Mr. Borrie to be the first questioner.

Mr. Borrie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question may relate to the question that was pursued by Mr. Howard. I do not notice anything too much in the way of materiel. It seems to be all heavy equipment, and I am wondering how effective the militia program

is now. I am going back a number of years to the old militia program when every Tuesday night was militia night. Now, the 24,000 people—I think that was the figure—are men that you stated earlier were used for Reserves. Is this what you consider, or what I consider, to be militia?

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, that would be roughly the strength of the militia.

Mr. Borrie: But has this program been increased or downgraded in this forthcoming fiscal year?

Mr. Armstrong: In the current fiscal year?

Mr. Borrie: In this current fiscal year.

Mr. Armstrong: Well, it has not been downgraded.

Mr. Borrie: Well, let me say, then, that it has not been accelerated.

Mr. Armstrong: The numbers of people in the Reserves have been held at about a constant level. They may have reduced very slightly. The Reserves, however, have been given a good deal of special attention in terms of their training. As you perhaps have noted, a number of the units are now training with the Regular Force. Also there have been a group of Reserves training with the brigade in Germany. I think this has been found, both by the Reserves and by the Regular Forces, to be a very successful program of training. The object at the present time is to develop Reserve units that will, in fact, achieve such a state of readiness that they can fit in quickly to back up the Regular units in the Regular Forces.

• 2135

Mr. Borrie: How is this being accepted by those that you are trying to interest? Is it still as keenly accepted as it was five or six years ago, or is it pretty hard to sell?

Mr. Armstrong: My impression is that those people who are involved in the Reserves are accepting this and are very keenly interested in this program. It has a very high degree of support from the people that are participating in the Reserve Forces.

Dr. Arnell: I think I could perhaps augment what Mr. Armstrong has said. Because of the plan to train some of the Reserves to fit right in with the program, of the capital that I have spoken of almost \$1.5 million of

the equipment that I was speaking of has, in fact, been earmarked for the Reserves. For example, in the Armoured Fighting Vehicles, from within that a certain number in the amount of \$374,000 of that particular expenditure in this current year is earmarked for vehicles for the Reserves rather than for the Operational Forces, so there is a certain amount of equipment in the area of Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Ground Mobile Equipment, some armament equipment, electronic and communications equipment, which is exactly the same equipment as the other, so they are getting a small percentage of the equipment being procured for the Regular Forces.

Mr. Borrie: The other question I have, Mr. Chairman, pertains to the Maritime Command. Our Coast Guard facilities in all of our parts of our country are not adequate for the protection and safety of fishermen, shippers, and small pleasure craft. I have often wondered whether it would not be possible for the Department to use the facilities of the manpower, the aircraft and ships that are at its disposal to offer this protection to the coast. At the same time we would be protected so far as our own defences are concerned and we also would be allowing facilities for training.

Mr. Armstrong: As I think you are aware, the Department of National Defence is not responsible for the Coast Guard; this is a responsibility of the Department of Transport. We do, however, co-ordinate the Search and Rescue Service and our ships and aircraft, when they are available for this purpose—and we have some aircraft in particular that are assigned to this job—of course are used for this purpose if it is necessary, so the resources are essentially there as they can be used and are needed.

Mr. Borrie: We do not seem to have enough of them so that we could put them into a regular pattern and at the same time maintain the training discipline necessary.

Mr. Armstrong: This would be very difficult to do; the two patterns would not fit. The training pattern and the necessary patrols that the Maritime Forces are required to undertake would not fit necessarily the other operation of search and rescue or Coast Guard, whichever you want to call it.

• 2140

Dr. Arnell: There are, of course, in this area other statutory responsibilities spread around the federal departments; Fisheries have the responsibility for the fisheries patrol side of things and in particular responsibility for the territorial waters. The Maritime officers have had, in fact, a dual responsibility, in that in the past naval officers have always automatically been fisheries protection officers as well. A certain amount of this joint responsibility has been recognized by statute. To a very large extent it is a co-ordination function in this rescue co-ordination business, in that in addition to the coast guard there are fishery patrol vessels, which have the responsibility of using guns against poachers—the mounted police have a certain responsibility against smugglers in the same category—so that there are in fact a number of vessels of a number of departments, all of which can be pooled together for this as they become available.

Mr. Borrie: Thank you very much.

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, I just have two short questions. They probably should have been asked as supplementaries when Mr. Howard was questioning. Perhaps this also derives from the fact that there has been somewhat of a change in the calls that I have been getting, and my questions will merely satisfy a few of the members if I relate them at this time.

In previous years I used to get calls from some of the servicemen asking how they could obtain a discharge from the services. To my surprise, for the past few months the question that I am asked—although there have not been too many of them—is in what way could I act in order to expedite recruitment. So, there is a change in attitude and I was wondering if there is a policy of slowdown in recruitment.

Mr. Armstrong: During the early months of this year there was a policy of slowdown because we were running down the strength of the forces. Now that we are down to a level of roughly 98,000 we will be recruiting to maintain that strength.

Mr. Legault: Is this presently in operation?

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, that is in operation.

Mr. Legault: To increase the recruitment.

Mr. Armstrong: That is right.

Mr. Legault: My second question is perhaps related to that. There is always the question of a comparison being made, and I am interested in knowing how the benefits that are provided in the various trades in connection with pay or remuneration compare with their civilian counterparts. Is this a factor today or have the forces reached that particular level where their pay compares favourably with the civilian counterpart?

Mr. Armstrong: We hope that the pay of the forces is kept at a level that will compare favourably with the civilian counterpart. I think you may find particular situations where this comparison will be unfavourable. This might arise, for example, because of the different regional salary levels in the country. We pay on a national basis and in some areas of the country I think perhaps you would find that our salary levels for equivalent skills might be somewhat lower than the levels in a particular region, but we follow the basic principle of maintaining military salary levels at as comparable a rate as one could reasonably make them to the skills in civilian life. We have to do this. If we do not succeed reasonably well in doing it, we will not be able to keep these people in the forces.

• 2145

Mr. Legault: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add my congratulations on the two wonderful briefs that have been presented. I believe they are quite enlightening to this Committee.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Legault. Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: I have a number of questions to ask. I hope that most of them will be quite brief. These are the Revised Estimates for this year. They have been revised downward slightly, I think, to the extent of \$7 million. Of course, from a percentage standpoint this is a very small amount, about one-half of 1 per cent. Where was this saving made, where was this scraped off?

Mr. Armstrong: The sum of \$1 million was taken out of the mutual aid portion. This is money that goes to help finance the NATO operation and to meet certain previously agreed cost sharing. From a careful examination of this it was felt that we could in fact reduce that by \$1 million. All but \$300,000 of

the balance was divided approximately equally between the item for buying clothing for the troops and providing funds for repair and maintenance of both equipment and buildings. These are the individual items that you will find here.

Mr. MacLean: With regard to the clothing, what clothing was postponed that it had been anticipated would be purchased? Was it the new uniform?

Dr. Arnell: It was directly related to the new uniform and, as I understand it, it was the fact that the cash flow against the contract was going to be slower than had originally been anticipated.

Mr. MacLean: I want to ask another question. What has been the experience over the last three or four fiscal years with what some departments refer to as lapsed votes? Where you have a huge vote such as Vote 15 you naturally cannot hit it exactly right. You must have a little margin. What amount of money is not expended at the end of the fiscal year?

Mr. Armstrong: The amount of lapsing has been quite small. Does anyone have the actual figures for the last two or three years? As you recall, in 1967-68, the last fiscal year, we required a supplementary estimate. We did not lapse any money. I believe the previous year there was very little left. I will get the figure for you.

Mr. MacLean: My next question is perhaps a more philosophical one, if I can use that term. Here we have Vote 15, which is for roughly \$1.5 billion, or something of that order, which is roughly 15 per cent of the total expenditure of all departments for the year. This vast amount of money is in one vote. I am concerned that while there may be advantages from the point of view of the Department in this sort of an arrangement, is it not possible that by doing it this way you are circumventing to some extent the provisions of the Financial Administration Act with regard to parliamentary control? What are the freedoms that are given you as a Department by having this all in one item rather than spread in ten items for equipment, pay, and so on? By this means, if your bill for anything is underestimated in a year and something else slows down, like contract payments on a ship that is being built, then you transfer the money that was originally intended for one purpose to the other. Have

you perfect freedom within this item to do this?

• 2150

Mr. Armstrong: Within the item we have freedom to transfer. That freedom is not in the Department. We would have to go to the Treasury Board for approval to transfer, for example, from a provision for ships if in fact it turned out that all of that money was not needed, to paying for the maintenance of buildings. We would have to go to the Treasury Board and have that approved. This conforms, of course. It does not contravene in any sense the provisions of the Financial Administration Act.

Mr. MacLean: No, I realize that.

Mr. Armstrong: If that item were broken down into ten different parliamentary items, then in order to supplement any portion of it, that is, any of the ten elements, it would require a supplementary estimate which would have to be submitted to the House.

Mr. MacLean: Providing you can convince Treasury Board of the validity of what you are doing, you have far more freedom than most departments have?

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, I would agree with you. It is true to say that there is more freedom available under this arrangement than would apply if the total item were broken down into a number of different items. In some respects it seems to me this is admitting that it does provide more freedom. It is a desirable feature in the sense that in a military operation one is faced from time to time with having to do things that were not foreseen. We might be asked, for example as we have been asked this year, to put aircraft into Nigeria. This is something we do not foresee in advance, and we have the freedom to finance it within the totals that are available to us.

Mr. MacLean: I would like some figures—I do not want them now, but if they could be made available for inclusion in the report—of the ratio of total expenditures on equipment over the last number of years to total expenditures.

• 2155

Mr. Armstrong: To the total item?

Mr. MacLean: Yes, or to pay, or to something that is comparable. As long as it is comparable, I do not mind.

Mr. Armstrong: I have figures for the last two years only on that earlier question you asked me, if that is sufficient.

In 1966-67 the total original budget that was submitted was \$1,589,000,000 in round figures. The actual expenditures in that year were \$1,640,000,000. The reason for that was bringing in the statutory items, the adjustments to the pension account. If you exclude those, the figure was \$1,574,000,000 and the expenditure was \$1,565,000,000, within \$9 million. In the subsequent year, as I noted, there was a supplementary estimate, but again excluding the actuarial adjustments, the original budget was \$1,671,000,000 in round terms and expenditures were \$1,682,000,000. They were \$9 million over that time.

Mr. MacLean: Referring to the last brief that was presented, on page 3 at the beginning of the first complete paragraph near the top of the page, line 4:

With respect to the integral air support of the land forces, a number of earlier decisions are beginning to be implemented.

How much of the whole is this? Maybe this is a question that should be put to the Minister, but with regard to helicopters, for example, what was the total planned establishment of helicopters for Mobile Command, and where are we in relation to that?

Mr. Armstrong: This figure has not been finally determined. The ten helicopters that are referred to here were an order of helicopters to provide them, as indicated, with a training establishment, a group of helicopters to develop tactical doctrine. As I say, the actual number eventually for Mobile Command has not been finally determined yet, and no orders have been placed for them.

Mr. MacLean: This would be only a beginning in the eventual conception of what the required equipment would be.

Mr. MacLean: I would imagine it would be something in the order of perhaps 150 helicopters.

Mr. Armstrong: That is right.

Mr. MacLean: I would imagine it would be something in the order of perhaps 150 helicopters.

Mr. Armstrong: In respect to helicopters, this is a beginning. Whether it would be that

many, perhaps is doubtful. It might be in the order of 60, or something like that.

Mr. MacLean: Has any procurement commenced or any decision been taken with regard to provision of air tankers to operate with the C-5?

Mr. Armstrong: As you may be aware, a decision was taken to buy four C-141 aircraft which were to be used as tankers as well as transports. Unfortunately, because the production line was closing down, the company were unable to accept the order, and we have not made any decision to buy any other aircraft at this time.

Mr. MacLean: By way of explanation, at the top of page 3—it begins on the previous page—

In addition, the Canadian Airborne Regiment is being formed at Edmonton at the present time.

I may be wrong in this, but I thought there was a battalion of the Princess Pats that were a parachute battalion. Is this the same thing or has it been converted?

Mr. Armstrong: No. The airborne regiment will be one in which all of the men will be trained as paratroopers. Under the previous arrangement there was no special regiment for this purpose.

Mr. MacLean: I had the impression that the Princess Pats had at least a parachute company.

Mr. Armstrong: Well, yes, I think you are right. They would have a company, but they were not the only infantry battalion that had a company of parachute troops.

Mr. MacLean: Is this a new unit that is being formed or does it carry on the traditions and name of one of the previous ones?

• 2200

Mr. Armstrong: No; this is a new unit, known as the Airborne Regiment. It does not carry on the name of any of the previous battalions. It is made up of people from other battalions who will serve in it for a tour and then go back to their battalions.

Mr. MacLean: I am now going to an entirely different subject.

My understanding has been that with unification the combined number of trades in

what used to be the three services has been greatly reduced. They have been combined, I believe, into a smaller number of trades.

Has that organization been found to be adequate, or have there been adjustments in it since?

Mr. Armstrong: We have an expert here if you want to go into this in detail.

There have been some adjustments in it—adjustments essentially in the classification of the trades assigned to particular skills.

There were a total of roughly 10,000 changes; 4,500 where the classification was increased and about 6,000 where it was decreased. This was done about a month ago.

Mr. MacLean: I have had a few complaints from service personnel on this subject. I will not take up the time of the Committee now, but I will probably discuss an individual case or two with the Department.

I have here a letter from a member of the services who says:

As of October, 1966 the trade of Operator (Engineering Equipment) moved up to pay level 5...

A little later on he says:

The picture is suddenly darkened by the announcement that my trade will now revert to pay level 4.

Is this sort of thing happening?

Mr. Armstrong: I am sorry; I missed the first date. It moved up when?

Mr. MacLean: As of October, 1966.

Mr. Armstrong: This would be the first classification of the trade in the new pay structure. There were, as I mentioned, a very substantial number of adjustments. The one in October 1968 was based on a complete review of the assignments to classifications following the institution of the system in 1966.

From now on there will be relatively few adjustments. Those that do take place in the future will be as the result of specific job changes. Therefore, these will be comparatively few. This was a major adjustment that took place in October, arising out of the extensive examination that took place in the two years following the institution of the new system.

Mr. MacLean: I have just one further brief question and I will be finished.

As a result of these most recent adjustments will there be many cases of servicemen suddenly finding their career, or their pay level, or the prospect of reaching a higher one, suddenly curtailed? Are there many cases of this, which will naturally cause a reduction in morale in the services, or at least disappointment?

• 2205

Mr. Armstrong: In the case of those who found their pay level reduced—and, as I say, there were about 6,000 of them—there is no actual reduction in pay, but the pay level being reduced does mean that when an increase takes place at some point the full benefit of it is not obtained, because, first of all, whatever was the difference—which was normally about \$17 a month,—has to be absorbed.

Obviously, those men were disappointed; I am sure they were. It was inevitable that they would be.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacLean, if you do not mind, I would like to interrupt you.

Mr. MacLean: I have finished.

The Vice-Chairman: I have been advised that the Ministers of National Defence will not be able to be with us on Tuesday or Thursday next. We will, therefore, be expecting to call them in the first week in December.

It has been suggested that when the Committee sits on Tuesday we continue with our present witnesses. It is quite evident, Mr. MacLean, that you have further questions and I have others on my list; and I am sure that by next Tuesday many other questions will have arisen in the minds of Members.

Mr. Armstrong: Mr. Chairman, if I may make one comment, we had planned on having Dr. Ussen of the Defence Research Board appear before you. He is going to be out of the city, and the only really convenient time for him to appear in the next week or two would be at your meeting on Tuesday morning, November 26.

The Vice-Chairman: At 1100 o'clock; yes.

Mr. Armstrong: I do not want to change your plans, but I wanted you to know that. If it were acceptable to you it would be more convenient to have the Defence Research Board presentation on Tuesday morning and then go with the other discussions.

Have you any information different from that, Mr. Dobell?

Mr. P. Dobell (Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade): The practical problem is that there are four more periods before December 6, and if two of these are to be devoted to the Department of External Affairs and one to the two ministers then the choice at your next sitting is between hearing the Defence Research Board or continuing with the present examination.

Mr. Armstrong: Are you meeting on November 28?

The Vice-Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Armstrong: And was that to be Defence?

Mr. Dobell: It was to be Defence; but I think what we will probably have to do is to move External Affairs forward to make time available for the Ministers the following week.

Mr. Armstrong: We would be available, if you so desired.

Mr. Groos: May I make a suggestion?

The Vice-Chairman: I am open for comments, yes.

Mr. Groos: I have two very short questions to ask, and I understand there are only three on your list; is that right?

The Vice-Chairman: I have Mr. MacLean, Mr. Groos, Mr. Cafk and Mr. Winch.

Mr. Groos: I was merely going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that to keep things tidy we might continue tonight until we finish and hear the Defence Research Board at the next meeting.

• 2210

The Vice-Chairman: Does anyone else wish to speak to this subject? Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): First of all I would like to congratulate the Minister and his Deputy for the manner in which they have answered the questions. They certainly have given us a lot of consideration. Particularly, also, Mr. Chairman, I wish to congratulate Mr. Winch and Mr. MacLean for having attended the meeting continually since the beginning. My third point was going to be that I was getting tired, that possibly

others might feel the same way, and I was going to suggest that we adjourn for this evening.

Mr. Winch: I would put it a different way. I think it is important that we discuss research but I think it more important that we continue our enquiries of the Minister and the Doctor. If we could complete our questions by 10.30 I would suggest that we carry on. If not, then my suggestion would be that we delay our study of the research until the new year and carry on our enquiry of the Minister.

The Vice-Chairman: How many are in favour of continuing until 10.30?

Mr. MacLean: have you some objection?

Mr. MacLean: Not really, except to say that it is pretty difficult for us to come to an intelligent decision now with all the variables there are in front of us and that perhaps we should adjourn now. In the meantime perhaps the Chairman could arrange a brief meeting of the Steering Committee to map our future course.

The Vice-Chairman: Are you suggesting a Steering Committee meeting on Monday?

Mr. MacLean: It could be tomorrow.

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, as I can ask my questions at another time I will defer to Mr. MacLean who, after all, is the veteran critic for the Opposition.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I am further down the list and I will certainly defer. However I do not think that it would be advisable to come back and continue this meeting. I think it would be better if we went on to the next subject.

The Vice-Chairman: We have to decide what is more important for us to do at this moment: get the Estimates through, question these witnesses, or bring forward the testimony of the Defence Research Board.

Mr. Winch: I would move that we sit until 10.30 in anticipation of completing our enquiry of the Minister of Defence.

Motion agreed to.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: I have no more questions.

Mr. Armstrong: I did not answer one of Mr. MacLean's questions. You asked for an indication of the percentage of capital. Now

the particular figure I have is the percentage of Vote 15, that large Defence Services Vote, and it runs like this: 1965-66—18 per cent, 1966-67—18 per cent, 1967-68—20 per cent, and about 19 per cent for the current year. Is 19 per cent correct?

Dr. Arnell: I think it is down a little. I think it is 18 per cent.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Groos, do you wish to proceed?

Mr. Groos: I said I would ask my questions on another occasion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Groos. Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: In view of the time I will defer as well.

Mr. Winch: In view of the time I would like to make my question very short—in other words, I am not going to question the \$168 million on capital expenditure on ships on page 329. However I would like to ask for a brief explanation in respect of what is on page 330. In the two-year period 1967-1968 and 1968-69 there is a total of a \$65 million expenditure for electronic and communication equipment. I would like to hear just a little about that. Then, we being at peace, I would like to ask the Minister just what he has done with \$57 million of ammunition and bombs?

• 2215

Mr. Groos: They are all under the House of Commons.

Mr. Winch: Those two figures are rather extraordinary—electronics and communications for two years \$65 million, and ammunition and bombs \$57 million. Could you just very briefly, Mr. Minister, give us some information on that?

An hon. Member: It is a very good question.

Mr. Armstrong: Perhaps we could get a list of some of these items.

Mr. Winch: It is on Page 330.

Dr. Arnell: With respect to the ammunition and bombs—while Mr. Armstrong is checking the other one—the answer in general is that this is building up stocks for much of the new equipment that was bought. Included in this would be all the ammunition for the 155 mm. Howitzer and so on that I mentioned—

Mr. Winch: Fifty-seven million?

Dr. Arnell: —in the briefing. It was a very large undertaking. Now I am only mentioning the artillery—

Mr. Winch: You understand my point: \$57 million seems an extraordinarily large amount to spend on ammunition and bombs in two years with Canada at peace.

Mr. Armstrong: Perhaps I could give you at least some indication of the nature of the items and the amounts that are included. First of all, on communication equipment—

Mr. Winch: That is \$65 million for two years.

Mr. Armstrong: I am really only dealing with one year. I do not have all the details at hand with respect to the previous year and I am giving you the 1968-69 figure.

Dr. Arnell: \$31 million.

Mr. Armstrong: This will give you some appreciation of what is in it. Communication equipment for the mobile land forces: \$7,723,000 to provide for 5-mile, 15-mile and 50-mile radio programs for the land forces. This is the radio equipment the land forces have at hand. In some respects this equipment was World War II type and it involved...

Mr. Winch: Further down there is \$24 million. Where is the other \$24 million?

Mr. Armstrong: I am coming to that. Electronic warfare equipment with electronic counter measures and so on: \$4,119,000.

Dr. Arnell: There is still \$20 million.

Mr. Armstrong: Perhaps I had better start from the beginning of this list. Communication equipment of a fixed nature—that is, for land mines and so on, \$8,258,000; communication equipment for mobile air—this would be for aircraft, \$559,000, communication equipment for mobile sea—for ships and so on, \$1,426,000. The total of communication equipment for land, which I referred to—I mentioned \$7 million—is \$10,779,000 all told. Then various types of radar, navigation aids, identification equipment—friend or foe equipment and that type of thing, \$627,000; similar types of equipment for mobile air, \$714,000; for mobile sea, \$1,222,000; for mobile land, \$374,000. Operational data processing equipment, \$46,000; electronic warfare equipment—this is

some of the equipment that was mentioned in that statement that Dr. Arnell gave you, \$7 million. There are a number of smaller items—sonobuoys is one of the larger items, \$3,750,000. That gives you a general list of the items that make up that total amount.

• 2220

Mr. Winch: You are only \$4 million short.

How about the \$57 million on ammunition? That figure intrigues me. We are at peace and \$57 million strikes me as rather heavy.

Mr. Armstrong: This is a list...

Mr. Winch: By the way; does that include anything for the Bomarc?

Mr. Armstrong: No.

Mr. Winch: We do not supply the ammunition for the Bomarc?

Mr. Armstrong: No, this would not include anything for the Bomarcs. There is ammunition and bombs for air purposes, \$2.916 million.

Dr. Arnell: This is new ammunition.

Mr. Armstrong: This would be principally...

Mr. Winch: In 1968-1969?

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, this is 1968-1969. This would principally be concerned with ammunition for the CF-5's...

Mr. Winch: That leaves 29 million.

Mr. Armstrong: ... and some ammunition for providing the conventional capability for the air division in Europe. New types of ammunition and bombs for the land forces which would include the 1.5 mm howitzer, and so on, \$9.977 million; ammunition and bombs for the sea forces, \$3.233 million. Then there are replacement requirements for all three services; replacing training ammunition, and so on, totals \$19 million.

Mr. MacLean: I have a supplementary question. When new equipments are brought into service presumably they are replacing something. Is there much ammunition that becomes surplus and what is done with it?

Mr. Armstrong: I do not have the actual quantity of ammunition that might have been declared surplus in the last year.

An hon. Member: Where is it dumped?

Mr. Armstrong: I think it is usually dumped at sea.

An hon. Member: It is dumped off either coast.

Mr. Armstrong: There is a dump on both coasts and that is how it is disposed of, but I do not have the actual figures of what ammunition, if any, was declared surplus during last year.

Mr. Winch: Does this \$31 million include blank ammunition for the training of your...

Mr. Armstrong: The list includes training ammunition, yes.

Mr. Winch: All right; it just seems like a lot of money to me.

Mr. Groos: Just to clear that up, Mr. Chairman, am I not right in saying that this amount of ammunition is not for use in just those years? It is made in a batch and is...

Mr. Armstrong: Yes.

Mr. Groos: ... on your inventory for a series of years.

Mr. Armstrong: You buy ammunition and training ammunition in lots for at least three years at a time, but ammunition is expensive.

Mr. Winch: Do you keep your dumps—I think you call them ammunition dumps do you not; I remember that there is a big one in Kamloops—completely stocked with ammunition?

Mr. Armstrong: This is not the basis on which ammunition is bought. It is bought on the basis of the calculations of ammunition required for training purposes and for operational reserves. In the case of the brigade there are certain ammunition reserves that are provided behind that brigade.

Mr. Winch: A lot of warships actually carry a full complement of ammunition.

Mr. Armstrong: Warships would carry a complement of ammunition and there are reserves maintained on shore.

Dr. Arnell: This, of course, includes torpedoes and some very special individual items.

The Vice-Chairman: Would it include missiles; missiles on aircraft such as the Nike or equivalent?

Mr. Armstrong: We do not have Sprint or Nike. We have missiles on the interceptor aircraft and it does include those.

The Vice-Chairman: Do we have Redeye missiles for infantrymen that cost \$5,000 a shot?

Mr. Armstrong: No, we do not have the Redeye.

Mr. Winch: We have a Sidewinder, do we not?

Mr. Armstrong: No, we have no aircraft that carries the Sidewinder; we did have at one time.

• 2225

Mr. Winch: I was going to say that when I was over in England we had a Sidewinder.

Mr. Armstrong: Not now.

Mr. Winch: Not now? What about our Bofors; are they supplied?

Mr. Armstrong: No, I am sorry, the...

Mr. Winch: What about the artillery with the brigade? The Honest John?

Mr. Armstrong: Oh, the Honest John.

Mr. Winch: The Honest John.

Mr. Armstrong: That is a nuclear warhead and that...

Mr. Winch: No, but is that part of our supply of ammunition?

Mr. Armstrong: No.

Mr. Winch: That is American supply, is it? For our brigade we have the Honest John, but the Americans have the ammunition.

Mr. Armstrong: We do not hold the ammunition.

The Vice-Chairman: Have you finished Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: It seems like a lot of money.

The Vice-Chairman: I take it you are finished, then, Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Yes, thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Are there any further questions?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I have one question. In all of this discussion about

purchases and procurement of various pieces of equipment and discussion about future developments in equipment, there has been no mention of the computer program that DND is starting at the present time. It is my understanding that they are seriously undertaking a study of a very, very expensive computer program here in Ottawa and I am very surprised that there has been no mention of it.

Mr. Armstrong: I think probably the program you are thinking of is the one that is designated as the DEVIL Program.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I think that is what it is called, yes.

Mr. Armstrong: There would be provision for computers that we are now using in the supply system in these estimates, but there is no provision for the acquisition of a new computer for this purpose in these particular estimates.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): When would you anticipate that there would be an expenditure on this?

Mr. Armstrong: That system is to be fully operational, I think, in 1972 and I would expect we would probably begin to spend money on this in the next year or perhaps two years.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In the next year; do you mean this year's budget?

Mr. Armstrong: No; in the future.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): The one after it? How much money are you talking about?

Mr. Armstrong: I do not have the figure offhand. I do not know whether anyone here does. Do you have it, Ralph?

VADM R. L. Hennessy (Comptroller General): It has not been calculated yet.

Mr. Armstrong: No; I do not think it has been determined yet.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Winch: May I ask one brief question just to clarify something? Does the estimate of ammunition which we have in our estimates by any chance include under your purchase ammunition for supply in any way at all to an ally or to any other country? Is it strictly for our own Canadian forces?

Mr. Armstrong: This is entirely for our own Canadian forces.

The Vice-Chairman: Are there any more questions? I take it that we will have the Defence Research Centre next.

Appendix S

NATIONAL DEFENCE

No. of Vote	Service	1968-69	1967-68	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
	A—DEPARTMENT				
(S)	Minister of National Defence—Salary and Motor Car Allowance (Details, page 321)....	17,000	17,000		
(S)	Associate Minister of National Defence—Salary and Motor Car Allowance—not required for 1968-69 (Details, page 321).....		17,000		17,000
		17,000	34,000		17,000
	ADMINISTRATION				
1	Departmental Administration, Operation and Maintenance including authority, notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act, and subject to allotment by the Treasury Board, for total commitments of \$2,778,219,375 for the purposes of Votes 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 and 45 of this Department regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that \$1,079,322,000 will come due for payment in future years) and authority to make recoverable advances under any of the said votes and, notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act, to spend revenue received during the year, subject to the direction of the Treasury Board, in respect of assistance rendered to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or any member thereof, any member of the British Commonwealth or any provincial or municipal government and in respect of charges for supplies and services as authorized by Treasury Board and made pursuant to regulations under the National Defence Act (Details, page 322).....	6,465,000	6,347,000	118,000	
5	Grants to Military Associations, Institutes and other organizations as detailed in the Estimates (Details, page 324).....	246,375	246,375		
		6,711,375	6,593,375	118,000	
	EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION (formerly the responsibility of the Minister of Defence Production)				
7	Administration and Operation (Details, page 325).....	2,896,800	3,229,300		332,500
10	Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment, including authority to make recoverable advances not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of the Governments of the Provinces of the costs of joint programs (Details, page 327).....	249,000	2,230,200		1,981,200
12	Grants to Provinces and Municipalities for Civil Defence and related purposes and authority to make recoverable advances in accordance with terms and conditions approved by the Treasury Board (Details, page 327).....	3,750,000	5,200,000		1,450,000
		6,895,800	10,659,500		3,763,700

No. of Vote	Service	1968-69	1967-68	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
	A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
	DEFENCE SERVICES				
15	Operation and Maintenance and Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Major Equipment and Development for the Canadian Forces (Details, page 327)....	1,488,557,000	1,465,863,000	22,694,000	
20	Grants to the Town of Oromocto (Details, page 332).....	2,000,000	1,850,000	150,000	
		1,490,557,000	1,467,713,000	22,844,000	
	DEFENCE RESEARCH				
25	Defence Research Board— Operation and Maintenance (Details, page 332).....	32,411,000	32,770,000		359,000
30	Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment (Details, page 334).....	11,044,000	8,947,000	2,097,000	
35	Grants and Contributions as detailed in the Estimates (Details, page 334).....	7,400,000	7,400,000		
		50,855,000	49,117,000	1,738,000	
	MUTUAL AID				
45	Contributions to infrastructure and the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the transfer of defence equipment and supplies and the provision of services and facilities for defence purposes in accordance with section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, not exceeding a total of \$19,986,000 including the present value of defence equipment or supplies or the cost of services made available by the Canadian Forces estimated in the amount of \$4,686,000 and provided by appropriations for those Forces in the current and former years in respect of which, notwithstanding sub-section (3) of section 3 of the said Act, no amount shall be charged to this appropriation or paid into a special account; provided by this vote (Details, page 334).....	15,300,000	18,000,000		2,700,000
	GENERAL				
48	To authorize, notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act and section 11 of the Surplus Crown Assets Act, the payment into the special account in the Consolidated Revenue Fund referred to in National Defence Vote 48 of the Main Estimates for 1965-66 of revenues received during the current and subsequent fiscal years from the sale during the current fiscal year of surplus buildings, works and land not exceeding an aggregate amount of \$10,000,000 (Details, page 335)....	1	1		

No. of Vote	Service	1968-69	1967-68	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
	A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
	PENSIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS				
(8)	Payments under Parts I-IV of the Defence Services Pension Continuation Act, Government's contribution to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Account, Government's contribution under the Canada Pension Plan in respect to Canadian Forces, Government's contribution to the Regular Forces Death Benefit Account under Part II of the Public Service Superannuation Act and an annuity to the widow of the Honourable Norman McLeod Rogers (Details, page 335).....	144,608,110	141,182,634	3,425,476	
50	Civil Pensions as detailed in the Estimates and to authorize in the current and subsequent fiscal years in respect of members of the Royal Canadian Air Force on leave without pay and serving as instructors with civilian training organizations operating under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan who were killed, payments to their dependants of amounts equal to the amounts such dependants would have received under the Pension Act, as amended, had such service as instructors been military service in the armed forces of Canada, less the value of any benefits received by such dependants under insurance contracts which were effected on the lives of such members of the Royal Canadian Air Force by or at the expense of the civilian organization (Details, page 336).....	10,514	9,990	524	
—	Appropriation not required for 1968-69 (Details, page 338).....		1		1
		144,618,624	141,192,625	3,425,999	
	SUMMARY				
	To be voted.....	1,570,329,690	1,552,092,867	18,236,823	
	Authorized by Statute.....	144,625,110	141,216,634	3,408,476	
		1,714,954,800	1,693,309,501	21,645,299	
	B—DEFENCE CONSTRUCTION (1951) LIMITED				
55	Expenses incurred by Defence Construction (1951) Limited in procuring the construction and maintenance of defence projects on behalf of the Department of National Defence and procuring the construction of such other projects as are approved by Treasury Board (Details, page 338).....	2,295,000	2,350,000		55,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
		A—DEPARTMENT	\$	\$
		Approximate Value of Major Services not Included in these Estimates		
		Accommodation (provided by the Department of Public Works).....	5,472,100	5,135,500
		Accommodation (in this Department's own Buildings).....	58,215,600	54,784,300
		Accounting and cheque issue services (Comptroller of the Treasury).....	5,464,400	5,693,100
		Contributions to Superannuation Account (Treasury Board).....	21,169,500	21,214,500
		Contributions to Canada Pension Plan Account and Quebec Pension Plan Account (Treasury Board).....	3,636,400	2,893,900
		Employee surgical-medical insurance premiums (Treasury Board).....	2,328,500	5,517,200
		Employee compensation payments (Department of Labour).....	996,600	1,130,500
		Carrying of franked mail (Post Office Department).....	476,800	421,100
			97,759,900	96,790,100
		Statutory—Minister of National Defence—Salary and Motor Car Allowance		
		Salary.....	15,000	15,000
		Motor Car Allowance.....	2,000	2,000
		(1)	17,000	17,000
		Statutory—Associate Minister of National Defence— Salary and Motor Car Allowance—not required for 1968-69		
		Salary.....		15,000
		Motor Car Allowance.....		2,000
		(1)		17,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		ADMINISTRATION		
		Vote 1—Departmental Administration, Operation and Maintenance including authority, notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act, and subject to allotment by the Treasury Board, for total commitments of \$2,778,219,375 for the purposes of Votes 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 and 45 of this Department regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that \$1,079,322,000 will come due for payment in future years) and authority to make recoverable advances under any of the said votes and, notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act, to spend revenue received during the year, subject to the direction of the Treasury Board, in respect of assistance rendered to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or any member thereof, any member of the British Commonwealth or any provincial or municipal government and in respect of charges for supplies and services as authorized by Treasury Board and made pursuant to regulations under the National Defence Act		
		DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Executive Scientific and Professional:		
		Deputy Minister (\$28,750)		
1	1	Associate Deputy Minister (\$23,000)		
1	1	Senior Officer 3 (\$20,500-\$25,750)		
3	3	Senior Officer 2 (\$18,500-\$23,500)		
5	4	Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$21,250)		
10	9	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
1	1	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
3	2	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
2	2	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
2	2	Administrative and Foreign Service:		
		(\$18,000-\$21,000)		
14	10	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
23	18	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
9	8	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
18	20	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
47	49	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
76	72	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
56	62	Technical, Operational and Service:		
		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
1	1	(Under \$4,000)		
15	15	Administrative Support:		
		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
37	25	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
271	265	(Under \$4,000)		
128	156	Prevailing Rate Positions:		
		(Full Time)		
2	5	Local Assistance Abroad:		
		(Full Time)		
2	2			
727	744	Continuing Establishment.....	5,033,000	4,905,000
(727)	(744)	Casuals and Others.....	14,000	12,000
(4)	(4)			

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		ADMINISTRATION (Continued)		
		Vote 1 (Continued)		
		DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION (Continued)		
(731)	(748)	Salaries and Wages.....(1)	5,047,000	4,917,000
		Civilian Allowances.....(1)	36,000	35,000
		Pensions, Superannuation and Other Benefits for Personal Services.....(1)	500	500
		Travelling and Removal Expenses.....(2)	211,500	224,000
		Postage.....(2)	35,000	30,000
		Telephones, Telegrams and Other communications Services.....(2)	56,000	42,000
		Publication of Departmental Reports and Other Material.....(3)	47,000	48,000
		Professional and Special Services.....(4)	6,000	3,500
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Equipment.....(7)	55,000	70,000
		All Other Expenditures.....(12)	49,000	50,000
			5,543,000	5,420,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 3,716,745		
		1966-67.....4,567,953		
		1967-68 (estimated).....5,091,500		
		INFORMATION SERVICES		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
	1	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
1	1	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
3	2	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
		Administrative Support:		
	1	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
17	18	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
6	6	(Under \$4,000)		
28	29	Continuing Establishment.....	142,000	116,000
(28)	(29)	Casuals and Others.....		6,000
	(2)			
(28)	(31)	Salaries and Wages.....(1)	142,000	122,000
		Military Pay and Allowances.....(1)	525,000	500,000
		Pensions, Superannuation and Other Benefits for Personal Services.....(1)	300	500
		Travelling and Removal Expenses.....(2)	30,000	50,000
		Telephones, Telegrams and Other Communication Services.....(2)	12,000	12,000
		Publication of Departmental Reports and Other Material.....(3)	190,000	224,000
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Equipment.....(7)	13,000	5,000
		All Other Expenditures.....(12)	9,700	13,500
			922,000	927,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 572,030		
		1966-67.....674,707		
		1967-68 (estimated).....927,000		
		Total, Vote 1.....	6,465,000	6,347,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		ADMINISTRATION (Continued)		
		Vote 1 (Continued)		
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....	\$ 4,288,775	
		1966-67.....	5,242,660	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	6,018,500	
		Vote 5—Grants to Military Associations, Institutes and Other Organizations as detailed in the Estimates		
		RIFLE ASSOCIATIONS		
		Dominion of Canada.....	63,000	63,000
		National Defence Headquarters.....	180	180
		Alberta.....	2,025	2,025
		British Columbia.....	2,025	2,025
		Manitoba.....	2,025	2,025
		New Brunswick.....	1,685	1,685
		Newfoundland.....	180	180
		Nova Scotia.....	2,160	2,160
		Ontario.....	4,590	4,590
		Prince Edward Island.....	1,080	1,080
		Quebec.....	3,375	3,375
		Saskatchewan.....	1,485	1,485
			83,810	83,810
		MILITARY SERVICE ASSOCIATIONS		
		Canadian Infantry Association.....	11,000	11,000
		Canadian Military Intelligence Association.....	2,000	2,000
		Canadian Signals Association.....	3,500	3,500
		Conference of Defence Associations.....	6,500	6,500
		Defence Dental Association of Canada.....	2,250	2,250
		Defence Medical Association of Canada.....	3,500	3,500
		Military Engineers Association of Canada.....	4,000	4,000
		Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association.....	6,400	6,400
		Royal Canadian Artillery Association.....	9,000	9,000
		Royal Canadian Army Pay Corps Association.....	2,250	2,250
		Royal Canadian Army Service Corps Association.....	4,500	4,500
		Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Association.....	3,500	3,500
		Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Association.....	3,300	3,300
			61,700	61,700
		MILITARY, UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTES AND OTHERS		
		Air Cadet League of Canada.....	50,000	50,000
		Alberta United Services Institute.....	675	675
		Cadet Services Association of Canada.....	2,000	2,000
		Edmonton United Services Institute.....	675	675
		Hamilton and District Officers Institute.....	900	900
		Kingston United Services Institute.....	270	270
		London United Services Institute.....	360	360
		Lake of the Woods United Services Institute.....	180	180

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		ADMINISTRATION (Continued)		
		Vote 5 (Continued)		
		MILITARY, UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTES AND OTHERS (Continued)		
		Moncton United Services Institute.....	200	200
		Montreal United Services Institute.....	900	900
		Moose Jaw Military Institute.....	270	270
		Naval Officers Association.....	13,500	13,500
		Peterborough United Services Institute.....	360	360
		Prince Albert United Services Institute.....	180	180
		Royal Canadian Air Force Association.....	18,000	18,000
		Royal Canadian Air Force Benevolent Fund.....	4,500	4,500
		Royal Military College Club of Canada.....	270	270
		Royal Canadian Military Institute.....	1,800	1,800
		Royal Canadian Navy Benevolent Fund.....	2,000	2,000
		United Services Officers Club of Charlottetown.....	180	180
		United Services Institute of Manitoba.....	450	450
		United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.....	450	450
		United Services Institute of Ottawa.....	675	675
		United Services Institute of Quebec.....	450	450
		United Services Institute of Regina.....	450	450
		United Services Institute of Saskatoon.....	270	270
		United Services Institute of Vancouver.....	450	450
		United Services Institute of Vancouver Island.....	450	450
			100,865	100,865
		Total, Vote 5.....(10)	246,375	246,375
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$	245,050	
		1966-67.....	244,600	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	246,375	
		EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION		
		Vote 7—Administration and Operation		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Executive, Scientific and Professional:		
1	1	Senior Officer 3 (\$20,500-\$25,750)		
2	2	Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$21,250)		
1		(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
2	7	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
3	2	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
2		(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
1	3	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
3	1	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
15	14	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
9	13	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
5	15	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
17	13	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
1	2	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A-DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION (continued)		
		Vote 7 (Continued)		
		Salaried Positions: (Continued)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
	1	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
1	1	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
2	4	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
4	4	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
6	7	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
		Administrative Support:		
6	6	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
47	59	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
6	8	(Under \$4,000)		
		Prevailing Rate Positions:		
16	17	(Full Time)		
150	180	Continuing Establishment.....	1,292,500	1,459,440
(150)	(180)	Casuals and Others.....		26,000
	(6)			
(150)	(186)	Salaries and Wages.....(1)	1,292,500	1,485,440
		Overtime.....(1)	3,600	4,000
		Allowances.....(1)	21,000	14,000
		Travelling Expenses.....(2)	282,000	273,000
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(2)	15,000	9,000
		Postage.....(2)	6,100	5,000
		Telephones, Telegrams and other Communication		
		Services.....(2)	59,200	47,000
		Departmental Publications.....(3)	82,000	59,500
		Informational Programs Other Than Publications....(3)	64,600	46,100
		Engineering Services.....(4)	355,000	545,000
		Scientific Services.....(4)	209,200	98,000
		Training, Educational Services.....(4)	7,000	4,000
		Corps of Commissionaires.....(4)	31,000	26,000
		Other Special Services.....(4)	143,000	217,000
		Repairs of Buildings and Works.....(6)	9,000	10,000
		Repairs of Machinery.....(6)		103,400
		Public Utility Services.....(7)		1,000
		Materials and Supplies—Office Furnishings and		
		Equipment.....(7)	41,700	58,185
		Materials and Supplies—Stationery.....(7)	27,500	30,000
		Materials and Supplies—Other.....(7)	226,000	177,775
		Sundries.....(12)	21,400	15,900
			2,896,800	3,229,300
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 2,177,853		
		1966-67.....3,120,036		
		1967-68 (estimated).....3,027,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION (Continued)		
		Vote 10—Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment including authority to make recoverable advances not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of the Governments of the Provinces of the costs of joint programs		
		Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works and Land.....(8)	88,000	1,610,000
		Construction or Acquisition of Equipment.....(9)	161,000	620,200
			249,000	2,230,200
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 466,059		
		1966-67.....743,013		
		1967-68 (estimated).....524,600		
		Vote 12—Grants to Provinces and Municipalities for Civil Defence and related purposes and authority to make recoverable advances in accordance with terms and conditions approved by the Treasury Board.....(10)	3,750,000	5,200,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 5,100,345		
		1966-67.....5,365,615		
		1967-68 (estimated).....5,200,000		
		DEFENCE SERVICES		
		Vote 15—Operation and Maintenance and Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Major Equipment and Development for the Canadian Forces		
		CANADIAN FORCES		
		OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Executive, Scientific and Professional:		
2	2	Senior Officer 2 (\$18,500-\$23,500)		
2	2	Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$21,250)		
1	1	Director of Studies, Royal Military College (\$23,000-\$24,000)		
1	1	Director of Studies, Collège Militaire Royal (\$21,000-\$22,000)		
1	1	Director of Studies, Royal Roads (\$20,500-\$21,500)		
1	1	Medical Specialist 2 (\$17,500-\$25,750)		
60	56	(\$18,000-\$21,000)		
24	6	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
108	63	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		DEFENCE SERVICES (Continued)		
		Vote 15 (Continued)		
		CANADIAN FORCES (Continued)		
		OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (Continued)		
		Salaried Positions: (Continued)		
		Executive, Scientific and Professional: (Continued)		
107	163	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
385	204	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
67	172	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
23	27	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
5	4	Administrative and Foreign Service:		
8	6	(\$18,000-\$21,000)		
16	10	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
23	15	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
72	86	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
586	457	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
76	88	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
2	4	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
11	12	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
83	100	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
691	435	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
2,900	3,141	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
8,928	6,661	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
140	3,245	(Under \$4,000)		
69	95	(Part Time)		
225	190	(Seasonal)		
		Administrative Support:		
3	20	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
220	177	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
5,393	5,351	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
3,726	3,894	(Under \$4,000)		
5	3	(Part Time)		
2	1	(Seasonal)		
		Prevailing Rate Positions:		
9,423	10,703	(Full Time)		
7	3	(Part Time)		
258	183	(Seasonal)		
		Ships, Officers and Crews:		
579	580	(Full Time)		
		Local Assistance Abroad:		
99	117	(Full Time)		
		Command Pool:		
720	720	(Full Time)		
35,052	37,000			
1,031	1,913	Less: positions to be deleted during the year		
34,021	35,087			
(34,021)	(35,087)	Continuing establishment.....	169,833,000	163,340,000
(652)	(700)	Casuals and Others.....	1,872,000	2,313,000
(34,673)	(35,787)	Salaries and Wages.....(1)	171,710,000	165,653,000
		Overtime, Premium Pay and other Credits.....(1)	5,409,000	4,669,000
		Employer Contributions to Unemployment Insurance.....(1)	1,455,000	1,519,000
		Civilian Allowances.....(1)	393,000	491,000
		Military Pay and Allowances.....(1)	700,987,000	627,196,000
		Travelling and Removal Expenses.....(2)	46,551,000	45,187,000
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(2)	4,222,000	3,800,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		DEFENCE SERVICES (Continued)		
		Vote 15 (Continued)		
		CANADIAN FORCES (Continued)		
		OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (Continued)		
		Postage.....(2)	677,000	650,000
		Telephones, Telegrams and other Communication Services.....(2)	23,279,000	18,773,000
		Publication of Departmental Reports and other Material.....(3)	3,185,000	2,500,000
		Advertising, Broadcasting and Displays.....(3)	536,000	867,000
		Corps of Commissionaires and Other Services.....(4)	28,324,000	26,203,000
		Professional Fees, Architects, Engineers, etc.....(4)	1,450,000	1,655,000
		Medical, Hospital Services and Consultant Fees.....(4)	6,430,000	6,012,000
		Fees for Special Courses.....(4)	2,075,000	1,722,000
		Operation of Service Establishments and Provision of Facilities by Contract or Agreement.....(4)	15,278,000	15,886,000
		Dental Treatment Services.....(4)	56,000	80,000
		Rental of Land, Buildings and Works.....(5)	7,669,000	7,039,000
		Rental of Equipment.....(5)	4,188,000	
		Repair of Buildings and Works.....(6)	38,222,000	37,500,000
		Repair of Equipment.....(6)	137,583,000	135,458,000
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Equipment.....(7)	5,040,000	5,618,000
		Fuel for Heating, Cooking and Power Generating Units.....(7)	15,221,000	12,900,000
		Clothing and Personal Equipment.....(7)	16,219,000	12,800,000
		Dental Supplies.....(7)	411,000	331,000
		Fuels and Lubricants for Ships, Aircraft, Mobile Support Equipment and Mechanical Equipment.....(7)	25,191,000	24,633,000
		Food Supplies.....(7)	19,644,000	18,385,000
		Miscellaneous Materials and Supplies.....(7)	17,717,000	16,515,000
		Medical Supplies.....(7)	2,692,000	1,470,000
		Barrack, Hospital and Camp Stores.....(7)	4,966,000	5,800,000
		Municipal or Public Utility Services.....(7)	22,440,000	22,500,000
		All Other Expenditures.....(12)	4,916,000	12,257,000
			1,334,116,000	1,236,069,000
		Less: Estimated amount recoverable.....(13)	94,962,000	84,310,000
		Total, Operation and Maintenance, Canadian Forces....	1,239,154,000	1,151,759,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$1,148,153,124		
		1966-67.....1,180,774,503		
		1967-68 (estimated).....1,226,460,000		
		CONSTRUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF LAND, BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT		
		Construction of Buildings and Works.....(8)	19,356,000	24,600,000
		Purchase of Real Properties (Land and Buildings).....(8)	750,000	1,400,000
		Construction or Acquisition of Machinery, Equipment and Furnishings:		
		Ships.....(9)	76,399,000	61,196,000
		Armoured Fighting Vehicles.....(9)	9,250,000	14,500,000
		Aircraft and Engines.....(9)	68,489,000	95,221,000
		Ground Mobile Equipment.....(9)	4,977,000	12,139,000
		Armament Equipment.....(9)	8,932,000	9,433,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		DEFENCE SERVICES (Continued)		
		Vote 15 (Continued)		
		CANADIAN FORCES (Continued)		
		CONSTRUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF LAND, BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT (Continued)		
		Construction or Acquisition of Machinery, Equipment and Furnishings: (Continued)		
		Electronic and Communication Equipment..... (9)	31,860,000	33,138,000
		Special Training Equipment..... (9)	2,320,000	3,280,000
		Miscellaneous Technical Equipment..... (9)	12,044,000	15,131,000
		Ammunition and Bombs..... (9)	31,193,000	26,086,000
		Gross Total, Construction or Acquisition.....	265,570,000	296,104,000
		Less: Estimated amount to be paid from the special account authorized by National Defence Vote 48..... (13)	33,617,000	
		Net Total, Construction, Acquisition, etc. Canadian Forces.....	231,953,000	296,104,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$220,312,893		
		1966-67..... 235,133,441		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 288,104,000		
		DEVELOPMENT		
		Professional and Special Services..... (4)	808,000	749,000
		Construction and Acquisition of Equipment..... (9)	16,642,000	17,251,000
		Total, Development.....	17,450,000	18,000,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 30,936,694		
		1966-67..... 17,457,057		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 16,000,000		
		Total, Vote 15.....	1,488,557,000	1,465,863,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$1,399,402,711		
		1966-67..... 1,433,365,001		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 1,530,564,000		
		(Further Details)		
		Maritime Command		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	170,741,000	165,690,000
		Capital.....	111,721,000	115,957,000
			282,462,000	281,647,000
		Mobile Command		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	162,543,000	142,203,000
		Capital.....	96,419,000	88,698,000
			258,962,000	230,901,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		DEFENCE SERVICES (Continued)		
		Vote 15 (Continued)		
		CANADIAN FORCES (Continued)		
		(Further Details) (Continued)		
		4 Canadian Infantry Brigade		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	64,654,000	55,915,000
		Capital.....	12,578,000	24,473,000
			77,232,000	80,388,000
		1 Air Division		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	64,770,000	62,409,000
		Capital.....	3,907,000	5,218,000
			68,677,000	67,627,000
		Air Defence Command		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	123,002,000	116,777,000
		Capital.....	11,111,000	13,702,000
			134,113,000	130,479,000
		Air Transport Command		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	102,671,000	93,871,000
		Capital.....	14,606,000	29,376,000
			117,277,000	123,247,000
		Training Command		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	205,495,000	184,491,000
		Capital.....	10,426,000	9,530,000
			215,921,000	194,021,000
		Materiel Command		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	115,743,000	114,711,000
		Capital.....	2,369,000	3,384,000
			118,112,000	118,095,000
		Canadian Forces Communication System		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	26,419,000	23,997,000
		Capital.....	1,167,000	7,375,000
			27,586,000	31,372,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		DEFENCE SERVICES (Continued)		
		Vote 15 (Continued)		
		CANADIAN FORCES (Continued)		
		(Further Details) (Continued)		
		Canadian Forces Headquarters and Miscellaneous Units		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	171,213,000	161,991,000
		Capital.....	17,303,000	15,454,000
			188,516,000	177,445,000
		Reserves		
		Personnel, Operations and Maintenance.....	31,903,000	29,704,000
		Capital.....	1,413,000	937,000
			33,316,000	30,641,000
			1,522,174,000	1,465,863,000
		Less—Estimated amount to be paid from the special account authorized by National Defence Vote 48...	33,617,000	
		Total, Canadian Forces.....	1,488,557,000	1,465,863,000
		Vote 20—Grants to the Town of Oromocto..... (10)	2,000,000	1,850,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$	1,850,000	
		1966-67.....	1,750,000	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	1,850,000	
		DEFENCE RESEARCH		
		Vote 25—Defence Research Board—Operation and Maintenance		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Executive, Scientific and Professional:		
1	1	Chairman (\$28,750)		
1	1	Vice-Chairman (\$25,750)		
2	2	Defence Scientific Service Officers 8 (\$24,250- \$25,750)		
22	23	Defence Scientific Service Officers 7 (\$20,450- \$24,250)		
47	49	Defence Scientific Service Officers 6 (\$19,150- \$21,250)		
138		(\$18,000-\$21,000)		
	136	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
218		(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
	211	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
201	216	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
6	7	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
3	3	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
2	5	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
1	1	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
2	1	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
8	5	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
12	12	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
45	38	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
7	14	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		DEFENCE RESEARCH (Continued)		
		Vote 25 (Continued)		
		Salaried Positions: (Continued)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
1	1	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
4	4	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
23	23	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
145	145	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
465	467	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
600	597	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
91	91	(Under \$4,000)		
		Administrative Support:		
2		(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
45	20	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
315	275	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
142	211	(Under \$4,000)		
274	274	Prevailing Rate Positions: (Full Time)		
2,823	2,833	Continuing Establishment.....	21,693,000	20,000,000
(2,823)	(2,833)	Casuals and Others.....	504,000	430,000
(93)	(93)			
(2,916)	(2,926)	Salaries and Wages(1)	22,197,000	20,430,000
		Overtime.....(1)	187,000	170,000
		Employer Contributions to Unemployment Insurance.....(1)	17,000	18,000
		Civilian Allowances.....(1)	270,000	258,000
		Military Pay and Allowances.....(1)	289,000	340,000
		Travelling and Removal Expenses.....(2)	583,000	841,000
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(2)	83,000	87,000
		Postage.....(2)	4,900	5,000
		Telephones, Telegrams and other Communication Services.....(2)	229,200	181,000
		Publication of Departmental Reports and other Material.....(3)	50,000	46,000
		Exhibits, Advertising, Broadcasting and Displays.....(3)	24,000	36,000
		Corps of Commissioners and Other Services.....(4)	205,000	147,000
		Professional Fees.....(4)	43,000	207,000
		Fees for Special Courses and Scholarships.....(4)	186,000	
		Provision of Facilities by Agreement.....(4)	1,500,000	1,500,000
		Contract Research.....(4)	1,268,000	
		Rental of Land, Buildings and Works.....(5)	15,000	9,000
		Rental of Equipment.....(5)	1,191,000	829,000
		Repair of Buildings and Works.....(6)	889,000	858,000
		Repair of Equipment.....(6)	685,000	669,000
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Equipment.....(7)	503,200	405,000
		Fuel for Heating, Cooking and Power Generating Units.....(7)	154,000	155,000
		Fuel and Lubricants for Ships, Aircraft, Mobile Support Equipment and Mechanical Equipment.....(7)	78,000	79,000
		Food Supplies.....(7)	57,000	50,000
		Miscellaneous Materials and Supplies.....(7)	2,782,000	2,938,000
		Municipal or Public Utility Services.....(7)	343,000	373,000
		All Other Expenditures.....(12)	155,000	2,139,000
			33,988,300	32,770,000
		Less:—Amount recoverable from Communications for Administrative Services.....(13)	1,577,300	
			32,411,000	32,770,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....	\$ 25,713,478	
		1966-67.....	27,942,199	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	32,770,000	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		DEFENCE RESEARCH (Continued)		
		Vote 30—Defence Research Board—Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Land and Equipment		
		Construction or Acquisition of Buildings, Works and Land.....(8)	1,335,000	1,662,000
		Construction or Acquisition of Machinery, Equipment and Furnishings:		
		Ships.....(9)	6,095,000	3,820,000
		Other Equipment.....(9)	3,760,000	3,465,000
			11,190,000	8,947,000
		Less:—Amount recoverable from Communications for Administrative Services.....(13)	146,000	
		Total, Vote 30.....	11,044,000	8,947,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 5,475,910		
		1966-67.....4,670,459		
		1967-68 (estimated).....8,947,000		
		Vote 35—Grants and Contributions as detailed in the Estimates		
		Industrial Research Grants—To foster defence research in Canadian industry by supporting selected defence applied research programs on terms and conditions approved by the Treasury Board.....(10)	4,500,000	4,500,000
		Other Grants and Contributions.....(10)	2,900,000	2,900,000
			7,400,000	7,400,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 7,466,817		
		1966-67.....7,263,495		
		1967-68 (estimated).....7,400,000		
		MUTUAL AID		
		Vote 45—Contributions to Infrastructure and the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the transfer of defence equipment and supplies and the provision of services and facilities for defence purposes in accordance with section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, not exceeding a total of \$19,986,000 including the present value of defence equipment or supplies or the cost of services made available by the Canadian Forces estimated in the amount of \$4,686,000 and provided by appropriations for those Forces in the current and former years in respect of which, notwithstanding sub-section (3) of section 3 of the said Act, no amount shall be charged to this appropriation or paid into a special account:		
		Procurement for Mutual Aid.....	1,625,000	125,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		MUTUAL AID (Continued)		
		Vote 45 (Continued)		
		Transfers to NATO Countries of Equipment from Service Stocks.....	1,200,000	3,576,000
		NATO Aircrew Training.....	3,486,000	5,500,000
		Contributions to Infrastructure and NATO Military Budgets.....	13,675,000	17,875,000
			17,161,000	23,375,000
		Total, Mutual Aid.....	19,986,000	27,076,000
		Less—Transfers to NATO Countries of Equipment from Service Stocks.....	1,200,000	3,576,000
		Less—NATO Aircrew Training (Provided for in Defence Services Vote 15).....	3,486,000	5,500,000
		Provided by this Vote.....(10)	15,300,000	18,000,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 14,663,178		
		1966-67..... 18,719,795		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 18,000,000		
		GENERAL		
		Vote 48—To authorize, notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act and section 11 of the Surplus Crown Assets Act, the payment into the special account in the Consolidated Revenue Fund referred to in National Defence Vote 48 of the Main Estimates for 1965-66 of revenues received during the current and subsequent fiscal years from the sale during the current fiscal year of surplus buildings, works and land not exceeding an aggregate amount of \$10,000,000.....(12)	1	1
		PENSIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS		
		Statutory—Payments under Parts I-IV of the Defence Services Pension Continuation Act, Government's contribution to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Account, Government's contribution under the Canada Pension Plan in respect to Canadian Forces, Government's contribution to the Regular Forces Death Benefit Account under Part II of the Public Service Superannuation Act and an annuity to the widow of the Honourable Norman McLeod Rogers.		
		PAYMENTS UNDER PARTS I-IV OF THE DEFENCE SERVICES PENSION CONTINUATION ACT (CHAP. 63, R.S. AS AMENDED).....(1)	9,555,159	9,928,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$ 8,554,378		
		1966-67..... 9,053,175		
		1967-68 (estimated)..... 9,432,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		PENSIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS (Continued)		
		Statutory—Payments under Part I-IV (Continued)		
		GOVERNMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CANADIAN FORCES SUPERANNUATION ACCOUNT (CHAP. 21, STATUTES OF 1959) AND THE AMORTIZATION OF ACTUARIAL DEFICIENCIES ARISING OUT OF PAY REVISIONS.....(1)	126,896,563	123,427,900
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 75,550,270		
		1966-67.....115,244,517		
		1967-68 (estimated).....127,832,000		
		GOVERNMENT'S CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE CANADA PENSION PLAN IN RESPECT TO CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL WHO ARE CONTRIBUTORS.....(1)	7,834,768	7,539,234
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$.....		
		1966-67.....9,909,883		
		1967-68 (estimated).....8,298,000		
		GOVERNMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE REGULAR FORCES DEATH BENEFIT ACCOUNT UNDER PART II OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE SUPERANNUATION ACT (CHAP. 47, STATUTES OF 1952-53, AS AMENDED)...(1)	316,620	285,000
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 172,053		
		1966-67.....244,577		
		1967-68 (estimated).....285,000		
		ANNUITY TO THE WIDOW OF THE HONOURABLE NORMAN MCLEOD ROGERS (CHAP. 47, STATUTES OF 1940, AS AMENDED).....(10)	5,000	2,500
		Total, Statutory Item.....	144,608,110	141,182,634
		Expenditure		
		1965-66.....\$ 84,279,201		
		1966-67.....134,454,652		
		1967-68 (estimated).....145,849,500		
		Vote 50—Civil Pensions as detailed in the Estimates and to authorize in the current and subsequent fiscal years in respect of members of the Royal Canadian Air Force on leave without pay and serving as instructors with civilian training organizations operating under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan who were killed, payments to their dependants of amounts equal to the amounts such dependants would have received under the Pension Act, as amended, had such service as instructors been military service in the armed forces of Canada, less the value of any benefits received by such dependants under insurance contracts which were effected on the lives of such members of the Royal Canadian Air Force by or at the expense of the civilian organization		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		PENSIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS (Continued)		
		Vote 50 (Continued)		
		CIVIL PENSIONS AS DETAILED IN THE ESTIMATES		
		Robert Allen.....	193	193
		Mrs. Mary Whittington.....	200	200
		Mrs. Eleanor F. Nixon.....	1,048	1,048
		Mrs. Jessie Vernice Ward.....	949	949
		(10)	2,390	2,390
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$	2,809	
		1966-67.....	2,389	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	2,390	
		TO AUTHORIZE IN THE CURRENT AND SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE ON LEAVE WITHOUT PAY AND SERVING AS INSTRUCTORS WITH CIVILIAN TRAINING ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING UNDER THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN WHO WERE KILLED, PAYMENTS TO THEIR DEPENDANTS OF AMOUNTS EQUAL TO THE AMOUNTS SUCH DEPENDANTS WOULD HAVE RECEIVED UNDER THE PENSION ACT, AS AMENDED, HAD SUCH SERVICE AS INSTRUCTORS BEEN MILITARY SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF CANADA, LESS THE VALUE OF ANY BENEFITS RECEIVED BY SUCH DEPENDANTS UNDER INSURANCE CONTRACTS WHICH WERE EFFECTED ON THE LIVES OF SUCH MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE BY OR AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION..... (10)	8,124	5,100
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$	4,426	
		1966-67.....	4,416	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	4,416	
		ITEM NOT REQUIRED FOR 1968-69		
		To extend the purposes of Vote 470, Appropriation Act No. 3, 1940, to increase to \$5,000 the annual annuity payable to the widow of the Honourable Norman McLeod Rogers during her lifetime.... (10)		2,500
		Total, Vote 50.....	10,514	9,990
		Expenditure		
		1965-66..... \$	7,235	
		1966-67.....	6,805	
		1967-68 (estimated).....	9,306	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1968-69	1967-68		1968-69	1967-68
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		PENSIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS (Continued)		
		Appropriation not required for 1968-69		
		To authorize the Treasury Board, for the purpose of calculating pensions under Sections 13 and 14 of the Defence Services Pension Continuation Act, to prescribe the pay and allowances deemed to have been received on and after October 1, 1966 by men of the Canadian Forces below the rank of Warrant Officer.....(1)		1

APPENDIX T
NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—1968-69 ESTIMATES
Selected Major Equipment Items
(\$ Thousands)

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	Cash Phasing		
		Actual Expenditure to 31 March 68	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1968-69	Balance to be paid in Future Years
DDH CLASS CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM	220,692	20,300	39,500	160,892
Continuation of an approved program to construct four modern helicopter carrying destroyer escorts to improve the Fleet's ASW capabilities. These ships will carry the Canadian SAE SPARROW Close Range Missile system, the Variable Depth and Hull Mounted Sonar AN/SQS-505 system, the Italian Oto Malaria 5"/54 Mk. 45 gun, the CCS 280 Action Information system and the latest types of electronic warfare and communications equipment.				
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SHIPS	63,308	18,569	23,200	21,539
Continuation of an approved program to construct two ships similar to HMCS PROVIDER to replenish the fleet at sea and provide a limited sealift capability.				
RESTIGOUCHE CONVERSION PROGRAM	49,700	5,146	5,500	39,054
Continuation of an approved program to improve ASW capabilities of four ships, installing modern Variable Depth and Hull mounted Sonar (AN/SQS-505/AN/SQA-502) systems and ASROC (anti-submarine rocket) weapon systems.				
OBBERON SUBMARINES	49,200	42,377	3,000	3,823
Completion of an approved program to construct three conventional submarines to improve the fleet's ASW capabilities and to provide realistic training for anti-submarine forces (both surface and air).				
BONAVENTURE REFIT AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM	12,570	11,606	545	419
Completion of an approved program to improve the operational capability and habitability of this ship.				
NAVAL RESEARCH SHIP	11,919	3,839	6,095	1,985
Continuation of an approved program to construct a ship to carry out hydrographic and oceanographic research for the Defence Research Establishment (Atlantic).				
TECHNICAL ENGINEERING SERVICES	Recurring Item	3,257	900	1,000/ annum
A continuing programme to hire civilian consultants and design services to determine the most suitable systems and equipments required to meet ships' operational characteristics and the optimum installation arrangements.				
ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER M113A1, COMMAND POST M577A1, CARGO CARRIER M548	46,049	43,437	1,877	735
A continuing program to provide increased cross-country mobility, and protection against blast, heat and radiation from nuclear explosion. 461 APC's in first buy, 500 in second.				
ARMoured RECOVERY VEHICLE M578	1,272	114	800	358
Eight vehicles (tracked) to provide essential recovery facilities for armoured fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery.				

NATIONAL DEFENCE

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—1968-69 ESTIMATES

Selected Major Equipment Items
(\$ Thousands)

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	Cash Phasing		
		Actual Expenditure to 31 March 68	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1968-69	Balance to be paid in Future Years
HOWITZER MEDIUM SELF-PROPELLED 155mm, M109..... Fifty howitzers to equip the artillery regiments in mechanized brigade groups.	10,955	8,263	1,424	1,268
155mm AMMUNITION..... Various types are being procured for use with the M109 SP Howitzer.	15,679	6,471	5,044	4,164
TOTALS.....	26,634	14,734	6,468	5,432
105mm PACK HOWITZER..... This is a lightweight, air-transportable, direct support artillery weapon which can be rapidly dis-assembled for mule or pack transport. The howitzer fires the current 105mm M1 ammunition.	2,597	Nil	1,100	1,497
MEDIUM MORTAR, 81mm.....	545	237	131	177
AMMUNITION..... This is an indirect fire weapon system providing infantry battalions with integral fire support.	7,953	2,838	1,311	3,804
TOTAL.....	8,498	3,075	1,442	3,981
CARRIER, COMMAND AND RECONNAISSANCE (LYNX)..... This tracked vehicle, of the M113A1 family, is a small, air-droppable, amphibious vehicle which will replace the Ferret Scout Car now in service.	11,000	3,999	6,821	180
TRUCK, UTILITY, 1/4 TON M38A1 (JEEP)..... This personnel and light cargo carrier will replace similar vehicles now in service as they reach the end of life.	7,661	2,736	298	4,628
C130E HERCULES AIRCRAFT This is a long range prop-jet transport which has replaced C119 Flying Box Car and North Star Air- craft.				
Completion of an approved program for 20 C130E aircraft. The last four aircraft were delivered in early 1967.	57,395	56,921	300	174
Completion of an approved program for exchanging three C130B aircraft for four C130E aircraft. Two aircraft were received in July 68 and two aircraft were received in August 68.	12,500	3,514	8,000	986
TOTAL.....	69,895	60,435	8,300	1,160
CS2F TRACKER MID-LIFE MODERNIZATION..... A program to up-date ASW capability of 45 CS2F aircraft.	10,070	8,228	1,200	642
CC115 BUFFALO AIRCRAFT..... A continuing programme to procure 15 tactical trans- port aircraft for support of the field forces.	46,900	35,581	4,500	6,819

NATIONAL DEFENCE

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—1968-69 ESTIMATES

Selected Major Equipment Items

(\$ Thousands)

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	Cash Phasing		
		Actual Expenditure to 31 March 68	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1968-69	Balance to be paid in Future years
CHSS-2—SEA KING HELICOPTER..... A programme for an amphibious anti-submarine warfare helicopter. It will be flown off destroyer escort ships with which it forms an ASW weapons system. 41 helicopters are on contract of which 39 have been received.	87,258	81,171	3,500	2,587
CF5—LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT A continuing program for 115 light attack aircraft.				
AIRCRAFT AND ENGINES.....	215,000	120,830	51,000	43,170
ARMAMENT EQUIPMENT.....	9,148	1,692	3,678	3,778
AMMUNITION AND BOMBS.....	5,367	56	1,533	3,778
TOTAL.....	229,515	122,578	56,211	50,726
CL89—SURVEILLANCE DRONE AN/USD-501..... A photo-reconnaissance pilotless airborne vehicle which will be launched by artillery units. It is being developed jointly by Canada, US and the Federal Republic of Germany.	7,765	1,465	2,400	3,900
CC117—FALCON AIRCRAFT UTILITY JET TRANSPORT..... Completion of an approved program for 7 Fan Jet Falcon aircraft for Command communication operations. Aircraft delivery completed June 68.	13,200	11,269	1,200	731
CUH-1H—UTILITY TACTICAL TRANSPORT HELICOPTER.... A program to procure 10 Bell UH-1 helicopters and support materiel, to train air crews and technicians for the UTT helicopter role in Mobile Command.	7,000	3,084	1,900	2,016
ARGUS IMPROVEMENTS..... Navigation and flight control systems improvements for 32 Argus aircraft.	16,838	5,235	5,500	6,053
COMPUTER DRIVEN ALTIMETER SYSTEM..... A program to improve altitude accuracy of CAF aircraft.	4,485	28	375	4,082
CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT..... On line cryptographic equipment to provide long haul strategic communication networks with simultaneous encryption and decryption.	10,743	8,379	1,294	1,070
RADIO SET, 50 MILE—304 SETS.....	19,000	6,140	6,500	6,360
RADIO SET, 15 MILE—1078 SETS				
RADIO SET, 5 MILE—2069 SETS A program to re-equip the Land Forces with up-to-date tactical radios for manpack and vehicular use. These sets are all standard in the US Army.				

NATIONAL DEFENCE

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—1968-69 ESTIMATES

Selected Major Equipment Items
(\$ Thousands)

Description	Estimated Total Programme Cost	Cash Phasing		
		Actual Expenditure to 31 March 68	Estimated Cash Expenditure 1968-69	Balance to be paid in Future years
ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT..... Major component parts of a comprehensive program to equip one aircraft carrier and 20 ST LAURENT, RESTIGOUCHE and ANNAPOLIS Class DDE's with an effective Electronic Counter Measure System (Noise and Deception Breaklock Jammers for RESTIGOUCHE Class only). In addition, provision is made for Fleet Schools and peacetime attrition.	5,706	901	707	4,098
NON DIRECTIONAL SONOBUOYS..... An expendable underwater listening device used in ASW operations and exercises. New procurement is required annually to replenish depleted stock.	Recurring Item	—	3,750	Recurring Item
PROJECT MALLARD..... A programme to develop a digital, automatically, switched trunk communication system by 1975 for the Armies and associated Air and Naval forces of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is to provide voice, facsimile and data facilities with complete security for all users whether they are stationary or on the move.	8,100	139	737	7,224
Three Transportable Radio Communication Stations required to provide Mobile Command, Air Transport Command and Maritime Command with rear link and air-ground-air communications in support of UN and NATO operations or in the defence of Canada. The stations are scheduled for delivery in September, 1969.	2,250	Nil	500	1,750

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE**

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

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ON

DEC 27 1968

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 15

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1968

Respecting

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the
Department of National Defence

WITNESSES:

From the Defence Research Board: Dr. R. J. Uffen, Chairman, Dr. L. J. L'Heureux, Vice-Chairman, and Mr. A. M. Pennie, Deputy Chairman (Operations).

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,
Anderson,
Borrie,
Brewin,
Buchanan,
Cafik,
Fairweather,
Forrestall,
Gibson,
Guay (*St. Boniface*),

Harkness,
¹Howard (*Okanagan
Boundary*),
Laniel,
Laprise,
Legault,
Lewis,
MacDonald (*Egmont*),
MacLean,
MacRea,

Marceau,
McCleave,
Nowlan,
Ouellet,
Penner,
Roberts,
²Stewart (*Cochrane*),
Thompson (*Red Deer*),
Winch,—(30)

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

¹ Replaced Mr. Groos on November 25, 1968.

² Replaced Mr. Pilon on November 25, 1968.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
MONDAY, November 25, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*) and Stewart (*Cochrane*) be substituted for those of Messrs. Groos and Pilon on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, November 26, 1968.

(27)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Borrie, Brewin, Cafik, Forrestall, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, McCleave, Nowlan, Penner, Ryan, Roberts, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Wahn, Winch—(24).

Also present: Messrs. Bell and Robinson, M.P.'s.

In attendance: From the Defence Research Board: Dr. R. J. Uffen, Chairman; Dr. L. J. L'Heureux, Vice-Chairman; Mr. A. K. Longair, Chief Staff Officer (Scientific); Mr. G. R. Vavasour, Acting Chief of Plans; Mr. A. M. Fordyce, Comptroller; Mr. J. F. Naylon, Acting Deputy Comptroller; Mr. G. D. Watson, Chief of Personnel; Mr. A. M. Pennie, Deputy Chairman (Operations); Mr. Jean Baril, Assistant Secretary. *From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* Mr. Peter Dobell, Director.

The Committee continued its consideration of the *Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of National Defence*. Members agreed to stand Item 1 of these Estimates.

The Chairman called Item 25—*Defence Research Board, Operation and Maintenance* \$32,411,000.

The Chairman introduced Dr. R. J. Uffen, Chairman of the Defence Research Board, and Dr. L. J. L'Heureux, the Vice-Chairman. Dr. Uffen read a prepared statement describing the organization and work of the Board. Copies were distributed, in English and French. The Committee agreed to print appendix A, appendix B and appendix B-annex I of Dr. Uffen's statement as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendices U, V, W*).

Dr. Uffen and Dr. L'Heureux answered questions concerning various activities of the Defence Research Board. Mr. A. M. Pennie, Deputy Chairman (Operations), provided information to the Committee.

The Chairman announced that the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs will appear at a meeting of the Committee to be held on Tuesday afternoon, December 3, 1968. The Ministers will report on the recent NATO meeting.

The Chairman suggested that the Committee might be able to complete its consideration of the Defence Estimates on December 3, 1968 and the External Affairs Estimates by the end of that week. There was some discussion concerning the meeting schedule to take place on Thursday, November 28, 1968 at 8:00 p.m. The Chairman will refer this matter to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure for its recommendation.

The Committee completed its questioning of the witnesses and the Chairman thanked them for their helpful and interesting testimony. The Committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, November 26, 1968.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe we now have a quorum. We were considering the Revised Main Estimates, 1968-69, of the Department of National Defence. Would the Committee agree to stand Item 1 of the estimates which we were considering at the last two meetings and proceed with the items pertaining to the Defence Research Board, namely Items 25, 30 and 35? Is that agreed? Then I shall call Item 25.

Department of National Defence

25 Defence Research Board Operation and Maintenance, ...\$32,411,000

The Chairman: Dr. R. J. Uffen, Chairman of the Defence Research Board, is present and also Dr. L'Heureux, Vice-Chairman of the Defence Research Board, and I shall now call on Dr. Uffen.

Dr. R. J. Uffen (Chairman, Defence Research Board): Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, my understanding is that you would like some introductory material in order to deal with the estimates. For this purpose we have prepared for you a brief summary of the activities of the Defence Research Board. It is being distributed now. The presentation will take approximately 25 minutes.

The statutory functions and powers of the Defence Research Board are contained in Part III of the National Defence Act as it was amended to 1967, and in the copy of the presentation which I am leaving with you, it appears as Appendix A. But briefly, I may say, the functions of the Board are to carry out such duties in connection with research relating to the defence of Canada and development of or improvements in material as the Minister of National Defence may assign to it, and to advise him on all matters relating to scientific, technical and other research and development that in its opinion may affect national defence.

The Board consists of a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, certain ex officio members, and several additional members representative of universities, industry and other research interests as the Governor in Council appoints.

The current membership includes myself as Chairman, Dr. L'Heureux as Vice-Chairman, and the following ex-officio members. Dr. W. G. Schneider, who is President of the National Research Council of Canada; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, the Deputy Minister of National Defence; General J. V. Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant-General F. R. Sharp, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant-General L. G. C. Lilley, Chief of Technical Services.

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The members by appointment include Dr. W. G. Bigelow, Associate Professor of Surgery at the University of Toronto, and who recently was the leader of the group that conducted a heart transplant at the Toronto General Hospital; Dr. H. E. Duckworth, the Academic Vice-President of the University of Manitoba; Mr. J. D. Houlding, President and Director of RCA Victor Co. Ltd.; Mr. G. W. Hunter, Deputy Minister of Defence Production; Dr. H. H. Kerr, Chairman, of the Ontario Council of Regents for Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology; Dr. A. B. Van Cleave, Chairman of the Division of Natural Science at the University of Saskatchewan; Professor M. L'Abbé, Vice-Rector of the University of Montreal; Professor N. LeBlanc, Vice-Rector of Laval University.

The Defence Research Board has at present approximately 2,600 employees of which about 600 are professionals, that is, they are graduates of universities or their equivalent. The Board operates eight research establishments and a headquarters, and we have submitted estimates for 1968-69 of \$50.8 million.

The Board's eight research establishments are as follows:

The Defence Research Establishment Atlantic (DREA) located at Dartmouth, Nova Scotia

is concerned primarily with research related to problems of anti-submarine defence in the North Atlantic including underwater acoustics, signal processing transducer research and hydrodynamics. In addition, DREA provides certain dockyard laboratory services for the Canadian Maritime Forces. This is quick reaction service concerned with things like corrosion studies.

The Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment (CARDE) located at Valcartier, P.Q. is concerned with research in the fields of armament, night vision aids and detection devices, propellants and explosives, aerospace research and weapons systems analysis. Its role involves close links with the Canadian Armed Forces, and a substantial number of Service personnel are attached to this Establishment. Its working language is French.

The Defence Research Analysis Establishment (DRAE) Ottawa, as well as being an establishment of the Defence Research Board, is also a division of the Canadian Forces Headquarters and it is staffed by both Defence Research Board scientists and by military officers. Operational research scientists, working under the general supervision of DRAE, are also located at the headquarters of some of the Canadian Forces Commands elsewhere.

The work of DRAE includes the analysis of strategic problems, investigations of maritime, land, and tactical air operations and equipments, analytical studies of North American defence questions and studies of problems concerning the deployment and utilization of military personnel, programming, and logistics. In addition, DRAE plays an active role in the planning and analysis of various exercises and field trials, and provides certain statistical and mathematical services to the Canadian Forces.

Activities at the Defence Chemical, Biological and Radiation Establishment (DCBRE) at Shirley Bay, just outside Ottawa, consists of research into the defensive aspects of biological, chemical and nuclear warfare, and investigations of electrical power sources which include batteries, fuel cells, thermionic and thermoelectric devices but not conventional electrical generating systems.

The Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment (DRTE) is also located at Shirley Bay and is concerned primarily with applied research into radio wave propagation, military communications and radar systems,

and signal detection. In the field of electronics, applied research and instrumentation are combined with fundamental investigations into solid-state physics, and with studies of electronic circuits. Radio physics studies deal mainly with the physical processes in the upper atmosphere that affect radio propagation and radar. The Defence Research Board's satellite program has been a special feature of DRTE's activities in recent years. DRTE is in the process of being transferred to the new Department of Communications.

The research program of the Defence Research Establishment Toronto (DRET) at Downsview is concerned with the factors involved in the efficient performance of servicemen in various adverse military environments. Broadly, the role of DRET is to measure and understand the particular capabilities and limitations of human beings which are of special significance to the military and to promote recognition of these variables in the design of military equipment and the formulation of training and operational procedures.

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Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) located at Ralston, Alberta consists of a central laboratory together with a secure test area of 1,000 square miles with access roads, communications systems and power supplies. The Establishment conducts basic and applied research on problems concerned with defence against biological, chemical and nuclear warfare. The programs of DCBRE at Shirley Bay and DRES at Suffield are complementary and closely coordinated.

The Defence Research Establishment Pacific (DREP) is located at Esquimalt, and it is primarily engaged in research leading to improved methods for the detection of submerged submarines with special reference to Pacific Ocean conditions, and they are not quite the same as the Atlantic. The effort is mainly distributed among three fields of physical research; underwater acoustics, low-frequency electromagnetics, and fluid dynamics. It also provides scientific and engineering consultative services and assistance to the Maritime Forces on the Pacific coast.

This gives you some idea of the work carried out intramurally in the Board. Within our resources, of course, we cannot work in all the fields in which the Canadian Forces need advice and support. Our domestic capability is made much stronger by co-operative agreements on defence research

with our allies. Wherever possible, the object is to have a co-operative program in which the Canadian effort is complementary to that of our allies rather than competitive. The Technical Co-operation Program between the United States, Canada, Britain and Australia is perhaps the outstanding example of such agreements. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is another, so that the general picture is that in defence research Canada is part of a team rather than standing alone.

The Board recognizes a number of principles which are applicable whenever decisions are made on the nature, scope and magnitude of its research programs whether carried out within the Board's establishments or extramurally in universities and industry. The first of these is that its advisory and supporting role to the Minister and the Forces is its primary and major responsibility; contributing to the collective efforts of our allies in defence research comes second, and the support of university and industrial research related to defence comes third. However, another important principle is that the proper balance between long-term and short-term programs must be maintained. It is important that the Board foresee future scientific and technological development by keeping Canadian defence science in the forefront of advances to new knowledge. Its attention must therefore not be concentrated entirely on current problems, or even on the clearly apparent problems of the immediate future.

In 1967 policy concerning the operations of the Board was critically and thoroughly reviewed. The outcome was the adoption of a policy of decentralization by which the responsibilities for program implementation were transferred from headquarters to the establishments while retaining the responsibilities for planning and personnel and financial management in the headquarters.

These changes were made to accomplish several purposes. One was to develop closer links between DRB and the Services at both the "management" level and at the working scientist level. Two benefits are expected; our scientific support to the Services is being strengthened and, conversely, the needs of the Services are becoming better known at all levels within DRB, but particularly in the laboratories where ideas are generated. In other words, we want our scientists to be familiar with military problems, attitudes and thinking so that they will be defence scientists rather than just scientists in a defence establishment. A second purpose was to free

headquarters from the concerns of daily operations in order to concentrate on policy and planning. A third purpose was to ensure strong scientific and technological links from the establishments to universities and to industry. Finally, it will provide better career opportunities for our scientists and make more effective use of our available resources.

• 1125

The importance which we attach to close relationships between the DRB and the Armed Forces is emphasized by the appointments of senior DRB scientists as Scientific Assistants to both the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of Technical Services. These two scientists have very important responsibilities in ensuring that the scientific and technical interests of the Armed Forces are made known to DRB and, conversely, bringing to the attention of the Armed Forces the assistance and advice which science can give. We have just appointed a third Scientific Assistant, to the Chief of Personnel, who will be concerned with human problems.

Of particular interest is the arrangement for handling operations research and systems analysis. I would like to dwell on this subject for a few moments since I feel that it has special importance. The science of operational research grew very rapidly during World War II when, for the first time, trained scientists were used to analyse the operational effectiveness of military forces in the field, and to devise new strategies and techniques which would improve their capabilities. Since World War II the complexities and expense of military equipment have made it necessary to carry out very detailed and careful analysis before such systems are developed and constructed. The type of training needed for operational research and for systems analysis is similar. Both require a strong mathematical and analytical background, an inter-disciplinary approach all backed by military experience. We have an excellent arrangement whereby scientists and military officers combine to provide these services. The point I would like to make here is that we now need highly qualified scientists in the development of long-term strategy. In such areas as personnel selection and training, the demand for social scientists is increasing and the Defence Research Board is now concerned with research fields in which it has hitherto not been involved.

As Chairman of DRB I am a member of Defence Council, the senior decision-making body of the Department of National Defence and can arrange for a scientific input to matters which are dealt with by this Council. The Chief of the Defence Staff holds regular meetings to discuss planning or operations of the Armed Forces and the Vice-Chairman of DRB or I attend these meetings. The development of equipment for the Armed Forces is the responsibility of the Chief of Technical Services of the Armed Forces. He receives guidance from a senior group known as the Development and Associated Research Policy Group (DARPG). The DRB member of this is our Deputy Chairman (Scientific). DRB is thus able to arrange that certain development projects be undertaken in its establishments and to assist the Chief of Technical Services with both the technical aspects and management of those projects carried out by Canadian industry.

You will find our estimates on pages 332, 333 and 334 of the Revised Estimates for the year ending March 31, 1969. As I have mentioned, we are transferring one of our establishments to the new Department of Communications. However, the estimates before you include the intramural costs of this Establishment except for recoverable amounts of \$1,577,300 shown near the bottom of page 333 and \$146,000 on page 334. They do not, however, include extramural costs for research satellites, which are shown under the Department of Communications.

In the presentation of the Estimates, the Planning Staff in Defence Research Board has identified five activities which are in competition for the resources made available by Parliament to the Board. These are, first, Defence Research and Preliminary Development. As you might expect, this takes the largest part of the Board's budget, since it accounts for most of the laboratory and field work carried out at the Board's establishments.

Second, Direct Technological and Analytical Support to the Canadian Armed Forces and the Defence Council. This includes the rest of the laboratory and field work at our establishments, helping to solve the day-to-day problems the Forces have with their present equipment. It includes Scientific help to the Intelligence community of the Forces, and it includes the very important work of the Defence Research Analysis Establishment of which I have already spoken.

Third, Defence Scientific Liaison and Information Services. This covers all methods of getting information we do not actually produce, including our offices abroad, our sections attached to the Armed Forces and our Scientific Information Services to disseminate the reports acquired.

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Fourth, Stimulation and Support of Defence Granted Research. This represents our endeavour to create and maintain defence research interests in universities and industry by grants-in-aid, about which I will say a little more presently.

Finally, Central Administration. This embraces the central management and its branches, including personnel, services, finances, and so on.

Let me now refer briefly to the University Grants Program. The awarding of grants to members of university staffs has three objectives. The first is to acquire new scientific knowledge that may prove applicable to the solution of defence problems. The second is to develop and support in the scientific community as a whole, an interest in defence science that will be valuable in the long run. The third is to assist in staffing the various establishments of the Board with promising young scientists. The main criteria used in judging grant applications are the scientific quality of the proposed work and its relevance to defence interests. It need not be related to the intramural program of the Board, and there are no classified projects carried out in universities under our University Grants Program.

The grants are awarded on the basis of assessment by Advisory Committees drawn largely from the universities and by the Board's staff. This advice is reviewed by the Standing Committee on Extramural Research of the Board which is chaired by Professor Duckworth, the Academic Vice-President of the University of Manitoba, which in turn advises me. You will see from Vote 35 on page 334 under "other grants and contributions" that we expect to award \$2.9 million in University Grants in 1968-69.

You will appreciate that in order to have work carried out by those best fitted to do so, the Board contracts out certain work. If this work is best performed in a university, the contract will be placed there; if in industry, the contract will be placed with a firm. You will see on page 333 under Vote 25 that we

expect to contract out work to the total of \$1,268,000 during 1968-69. I would like to distinguish very clearly between this contracted work and the University Grants Program I have just described and the Industrial Research Grants Program about which I would now like to say something.

Industrial Research Grants are awarded to promote and strengthen the research capability of Canadian industry in defence technologies. Assistance is available through this program to enable firms to establish new research programs or to expand existing research activities. The goal is to improve both the quality and quantity of applied research in Canadian defence industry so as to enhance its ability to meet the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces competitively and to participate in the development and supplying of equipment with our allies.

Projects are initiated by Canadian companies and are not necessarily related to the DRB intramural program. On submission to DRB, they are appraised by an Inter-departmental Committee which makes recommendations to the Board. If they are not suitable for our program, they may be referred to the National Research Council for consideration under their Industrial Research Assistance Program. Once the research aspect of an Industrial Grant is completed, the program may be advanced to development under one of several assistance schemes which are the responsibility of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. We plan to make Industrial Research Grants to the amount of \$4.5 million in 1968-69. It will be seen that the Board's policy with respect to industry is one of collaboration and assistance wherever possible, and liaison with industry is maintained at all levels from the Board itself down to the scientists at the laboratory bench.

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I would like now to revert to the first activity I named, that is, Research and Preliminary Development. How does this serve military needs, which are the reason for the Board's existence? We show five sub-activities which are the basis of military requirements: research on combat and active defence; research on passive defence; research on command and control; research on logistics and research on manpower. Of the resources allocated to research and preliminary development, 55 per cent goes to the work on command and control, and 24 per cent to that on combat and active defence. The other

three sub-activities taking relatively minor amounts.

There is another way of looking at the allocation of the total financial resources which DRB estimates it needs, in terms which are probably more familiar to you, as follows: Operations Research and General Analysis, 2 per cent; Maritime Research, 13 per cent; Armament Research, 21 per cent; NBC Defence Research, 12 per cent; Telecommunications Research, 16 per cent; Human Performance Research, 4 per cent; University Grants, 6 per cent; Industrial Research Grants, 9 per cent; Research Ship Construction, 12 per cent and Headquarters, 4 per cent.

The research ship construction is an item that occurs only occasionally.

This does not give a complete picture in the case of Operations Research and General Analysis, which does not need equipment or construction. In fact, Operations Research and General Analysis requires 12 per cent of the Board's Scientific staff.

In Appendix B to the copy of this presentation, you will find the DRB estimates set out in summary form by votes and by activities.

We have set up in the Board a committee of the senior officers of the Board called the Program Review Group continuously to review and plan our scientific program. The Chairman of that Group is the Vice-Chairman of the Board, Dr. L'Heureux, and he is with me today and he would be pleased to answer questions relating to this aspect of the Board's work. I have also with me a number of other senior officers of the Board who can supply detailed information on other questions you may wish to ask.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Uffen. I have the following questions: Messrs. Forrestall, Allmand, Ryan, Winch MacRae, Cafik and MacLean. Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: I wonder, Mr. Chairman, whether I can be a little parochial and ask the witness or any of his colleagues that are here, a few questions about the Defence Research Establishment at the Atlantic Coast. I am essentially concerned not about detail or any specific questions, but about the grey area of co-operation between DREA and the Bedford Institute of Oceanography. Can you tell, first of all, whether there are any co-operative programs, or any programs conducted jointly.

Dr. Uffen: I do not think there are any formal arrangements for a joint program

which is financed between the two departments, but there is co-operation. However, the Defence Research Establishment at the Atlantic has to concern itself with defence research, so it is restricted to certain types of activities very largely concerned with submarine detection. We are concerned with the physical properties of the ocean and the ocean floor, and things like that.

There is also a certain amount of classification required to the nature of the results. The people at the Bedford Institute are not necessarily cleared for the classified work. I understand they hold joint symposia; they meet fairly regularly. The present Director of the Bedford Institute is a former senior member of the Defence Research Board and quite familiar with our activities, a familiar face in the defence department.

• 1140

Mr. Forrestall: But you are satisfied that there are no avenues for closer co-operation? I think, for example, you are spending some \$6 million on the research vessel QUEST. I will ask you a question or two about that later on. I am just wondering whether you are going ahead building such a vessel while the Institute of Oceanography has several vessels equipped for scientific research. Are you completely satisfied...

Dr. Uffen: I am never satisfied. As you are probably aware, I have only been two years in the Defence Department. I am not a professional public servant, so I have a slightly different attitude than some people. I must say I am never satisfied, otherwise I would never have introduced the review of our activities when I became Chairman.

However, with respect to the QUEST, the QUEST is going to be a very remarkable ship with rather unusual characteristics, which you would not require in the Bedford Institute. The QUEST has to be absolutely silent. Its engines and all the equipment inside the ship are suspended in a way to reduce the vibration to an absolute minimum, and we hope that when the ship is sitting motionless there will be no noise at all. This, I hope you will agree, is an unusual requirement which can be explained as necessary in a defence environment but rather dubious for a marine oceanographic institute.

Mr. Forrestall: You will pardon my ignorance about it in one sense, but have tenders been called, or is this still in the engineering work up stage?

Dr. Uffen: The QUEST has been launched and it will be commissioned May 3, 1969, all going well.

Mr. Forrestall: Where was it built?

Dr. Uffen: At Burrard Dry Dock, North Vancouver.

Mr. Winch: That is no place to build it.

Mr. Forrestall: I will not argue with that. It will operate then, I assume, on the West Coast?

Dr. Uffen: No, after it is commissioned it will be moved to the Atlantic and its program will be in the Atlantic Ocean.

Mr. Forrestall: Sorry about that, Mr. Winch. I have just one or two more questions. You mention that the research ship construction, the 12 per cent, as you broke down on page 13 the disposition of your total available resources, was a from time to time item. Was that also the subject of a special budgetary request? That is, when this is out of the way will you have \$6 million? Can you continue to ask for this and spread it around?

Dr. Uffen: Not likely.

Mr. Forrestall: Not likely.

Dr. Uffen: The financing of the QUEST required, I think, \$1.6 million last year. I can get the precise figure if you would like it.

Mr. Forrestall: The point was that this total figure is not money that was taken away from other aspects of your research work.

Dr. Uffen: No, it is a non-recurring major capital expenditure, identified separately in the Estimates because of its peculiar nature.

Mr. Forrestall: Do you have any long-range cost of plans for the expansion of Maritime research within the context of defence?

Dr. Uffen: I prepare proposals; the government makes the plans.

Mr. Forrestall: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand:

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Uffen, how does our expenditure on defence research, as a percentage of government income, compare with that of other countries in NATO? Or as a percentage of gross national product, or any other way you have of measuring it?

Dr. Uffen: I can give it to you in a general way. Our expenditures in defence research in Canada are a small proportion both of the gross national product or of the defence budget. They are 3 per cent of the defence budget. In some larger countries, with heavy responsibilities, they are 5 to 6 per cent.

Mr. Allmand: What about Norway or Belgium, which are smaller countries in NATO?

• 1145

Dr. Uffen: I think ours are less than Belgium's. They are certainly less than Sweden's, a non-NATO country, when expressed as a percentage of their defence budget.

Mr. Allmand: In doing this research you must develop a certain number of patents. Do you receive any income from your development of patents, or from the licensing of patents?

Dr. Uffen: There is a small income, but the Defence Research Board does not see it. I do not believe that the income comes back to the Defence Department at all, but I can have that confirmed.

Mr. Allmand: Would the amount of revenue on patents, licensing and so forth be significant?

Dr. Uffen: No, it is not. The government's policy is one of protecting the Crown's interest, so that the Crown has royalty rights and so on, and the revenue from patents is very modest.

Mr. Allmand: About a year ago there was an article, syndicated to different newspapers throughout Canada about biological and chemical research going on in Alberta. I think the article was by Boyce Richardson, although I am not too sure of that. I am speaking from memory.

He alleged that that research was not only on defence but on the development of biological and chemical weapons.

Are you familiar with the allegations made in that particular article? Is it true that there is development of biological weapons at that particular site, or anywhere outside of Ottawa?

Dr. Uffen: I am not familiar with that particular article, but I am familiar with similar allegations. They occur from time to time.

The answer is that we do no offensive chemical-biological warfare research. We do

not manufacture weapons for offensive purposes. We only do studies for the defence of our own forces, such as on the equipment they need, respirators, their effectiveness, how to use them, and occasional exercising of personnel.

I must be honest and admit however, that when one is doing fundamental studies on defence against biological or chemical agents one has to know what they are. We therefore, have people who have fundamental knowledge about toxic agents. This fundamental knowledge is common both to those concerned with defence and those concerned with offensive activities.

Mr. Allmand: Do you have quantities of these biological and chemical weapons at these sites for use in your defence research?

Dr. Uffen: Very minute laboratory quantities, of the type that you would see in a chemist's experiment—manipulated remotely, and so on—to study the properties.

Mr. Allmand: How do you decide what work to do? How does a research requirement originate and how do you decide how much of your resources to spend on a particular project?

Dr. Uffen: They originate in a number of ways, and I will not belabour some of them. Some originate outside the Board, in a Defence Industrial Research program; some originate in a university fundamental research program; some originate with our allies, through the Technical Cooperation Program; and some originate in our own laboratories.

This is precisely the area for which Dr. L'Heureux is responsible. May I refer your question to him?

Mr. Allmand: Yes.

Dr. L. J. L'Heureux (Vice-Chairman, Defence Research Board): Mr. Chairman, requirements originate in a number of ways. The Canadian Armed Forces have long-term operational equipment objectives which they would like to meet, but the state of science is not far enough advanced to produce the equipment to meet those. They also have operational equipment requirements which technology is sufficiently advanced to meet.

• 1150

If it is an objective, we study the long-term, technical implications of it and what research is required to meet it. We either carry out special studies in the laboratories,

with the armed forces, or we ask the advice of university people industrial people, or our allies. From this we formulate a proposed project, which is done by the Deputy Chairman of the scientific staff of the Board, with the establishment.

This proposal is staffed completely, with the necessary amount of money, the time, and the effort, and is submitted to the program review group which our Chairman mentioned. It is then fully analysed and if the priority is within our financial resources, and is higher than that of other projects, we will carry on this work and drop others. This is for direct support to the armed forces.

There are other major projects with our allies, more connected with basic national security, which originate within our own laboratories. These are staffed in the same way and their priority is weighed against their long-term implications.

Mr. Allmand: This is my final question, Mr. Chairman.

How do you evaluate the work being done by industry and the universities? I note that almost 10 per cent of your budget is given to grants to industry and that a large amount of money is also given to the universities. Do you feel that this is a successful program—first, for industry and then the universities?

Dr. Uffen: By all means; we get an enormous return. The university program is more likely to be fundamental research, on which it is not easy to put an assessment. This is the source of many new ideas. This is where people keep us informed about what is happening right on the forefront of scientific advance, so that we do not get behind. There is no use coming second in defence research.

We assess it by a series of those advisory committees that I mentioned in my presentation. There are about 240 scientists distributed across the country—many of them in universities, but some in industry—who meet once or twice a year and assess the applications that a professor may make to us. The advisory committees assess them for scientific merit and we take their word for it. If they say a man is a first-class scientist this is pretty well the end of it.

They advise us about defence interest, but we reserve the right to make the final assessment on whether or not it is related to defence interest, because sometimes a

professor may make a magnificent proposal, not knowing that the work has already been done.

Mr. Allmand: What about industry? Which is the higher expenditure.

Dr. Uffen: The industrial program is run a little bit differently. We fund a professor completely, but in industry it is roughly a 50-50 operation.

The industry makes a proposal to us, saying what they would like to do. They pay approximately half the cost and the Defence Research Board provides approximately half the cost.

The proposal is reviewed in a similar way by an interdepartmental committee, involving representatives from the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, the Department of Industry and the National Research Council.

Two project officers are appointed. One is from the Defence Research Board, and is a scientist or an engineer. He monitors the scientific engineering content of the proposal. The Department of Industry appoints a project officer and his concern is primarily with the management of the country, its financial resources and so on—is it likely to be able to carry out the proposal that has been submitted.

Mr. Allmand: In any case, you feel it is money well spent.

Dr. Uffen: Oh, undoubtedly; I would like to increase the proportion of our money that goes into these extra-mural programs; but it has to be done in a predetermined fashion, with a definite purpose in our doing it.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand, you were asking about royalties and patents. Dr. Uffen tells me that royalties and patents revert to the Receiver General of Canada.

• 1155

Mr. Allmand: I see. Do you have a figure on that?

The Chairman: I have no figure here.

Mr. Allmand: I merely wanted to know whether or not it was a significant figure. He has said that it is not.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: Dr. Uffen, at about the fifth last line on page 6 of your presentation you say:

It is important that the Board foresee future scientific and technological development by keeping Canadian defence science in the forefront of advances to new knowledge.

What would be the impact on your work if Canada were to pull out of its NATO and NORAD alliances?

Dr. Uffen: We would re-assess what we are doing to determine whether it was still applicable to any new government policy. My guess is that at the fundamental level, where we are doing research in the physical properties of matter or in electronics—the fundamental chemistry—it would make very little difference.

At the applied physics level it might give to one project a higher priority than we formerly had given it. For example, if there is a major change in government policy, I think we would want to have another look at the proposals and programs we were supporting in applied psychology.

At the development level it might have considerable effect; and it might have a considerable effect on the Defence Research Analysis Establishment. We might give that analysis establishment a series of problems to study, to work out the pros and cons of different options. It would have a big effect there.

Mr. Ryan: In your opinion, generally, would Canada fall far behind in defence research developments if we withdrew from these alliances?

Dr. Uffen: It would depend on whether we withdrew from the Technical Cooperation Program. If we withdraw completely we would be on our own and vast sources of information previously available would just be cut off. But if you had in mind, say, a military withdrawal, or something of that kind, it might not affect the technological aspect.

In fact, I would recommend most strongly that we never withdraw from the scientific-technological aspects of any of our agreements with any of our allies. It costs very little, there is no political or economic commitment and you get a lot back for your investment and effort.

Mr. Ryan: Is there automatic distribution to all allies of classified technological information?

Dr. Uffen: There is automatic distribution, but it depends on the level of security and the need to know. There are certain things that would automatically be distributed to us, but there are other things that would not be distributed to us at all; and there are some things we would not ask for.

Mr. Ryan: What you ask for you are usually able to get, are you? Are you usually able to get information about a project on which you are currently working?

Dr. Uffen: If the people who own the information feel that we have a legitimate need to know. One of the best ways to qualify is to be able to put something in the pot. That is, if we are respected as very knowledgeable in some aspects of science, then by contributing to the collective pot of information we become members of the club and can draw on it.

Mr. Ryan: I see. Do we draw more information by participating in the purchase of a developed instrument? For instance, if we were to go on in on the purchase of a missile, do we participate to any greater extent by doing that than if we were not a partner in the actual purchase?

Dr. Uffen: If you just buy the completed piece of equipment off the shelf, you would get very little, but most programs are a little more complicated than that. The agreement to purchase very often requires or has an option to participate in the research and development and the actual preproduction stages. So, there is not any simple answer to your question.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Dr. Uffen.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, may I first of all extend my own and the compliments of all members of this Committee on the most comprehensive presentation which has been made by the Chairman of the Defence Research Board. It is one of the finest, to my knowledge, that has ever been produced.

• 1200

A number of the questions I had in mind have already been asked and answered, but may I say how pleased I am before this Com-

mittee that the Chairman should have given a categorical answer to the effect that the Defence Chemical, Biological and Radiation Establishment built at Shirley Bay and Suffield is in no way whatsoever concerned in research or development of a chemical and other means for offence purposes. It is most important that we should have received this categorical statement from the Chairman in view of a number of charges that have been made across Canada and carried by the press.

I therefore, without repeating the questions and answers already received, would like to ask the Chairman two questions. In the presentation the Chairman of the DRB said:

Wherever possible, the object is to have co-operative programs in which the Canadian effort is complementary to that of our allies rather than competitive.

and that:

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is another, so that the general picture is that in defence research Canada is part of a team rather than standing alone.

Mr. Chairman, I use those words of the Chairman of DRB to ask this question: in recent weeks we have read in the newspapers a report to the effect that either the Defence Research Board or the National Research Council developed a most marvellous piece of equipment, which is to be used by NATO, superior to a similar development in the United States, but that because of political decisions NATO is going to use the American development although it is inferior to that developed in Canada. On that basis and in view of the fact that Canadian taxpayers are putting money in research and development, are you in a position, Dr. Uffen, to inform this Committee not only on the particular matter to which I have just made reference and of which I am certain you are aware, as to whether or not you find that the work and the findings, the new developments undertaken by your scientists and brought to a conclusion which you feel are superior, as a result of your co-operation and working as part of a team, are negated by political decisions outside your control. I do not wish to put you on the spot, but I think it is an important question.

Dr. Uffen: I am getting used to it. I have received a few bruises since I joined the Public Service. With respect to the particular item you raised, I think you are referring likely to a newspaper account of the appear-

ance of the President of the National Research Council before the Science Policy Committee of the Senate.

Mr. Winch: That is correct.

Dr. Uffen: He was asked about a development of Counter-Mortar Radar. Many people do not realize that this program was initiated about 1954 or 1955 and was terminated in 1961, so it is becoming history. Am I right on the dates?

Mr. Winch: It is the principle that I am concerned in, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Uffen: May I also say that I am not aware of the details of it. I think Dr. L'Heureux is because he has been on the Board for 20 years. Perhaps I will ask him to comment more specifically on that one.

It does involve costs. You can have a superior piece of equipment, or a superior process, but you also have to take into account how much it costs. That may be an important factor here.

Mr. Harkness: You mean here, Doctor, how much it costs to actually produce it for use?

• 1205

Dr. Uffen: Yes. I am not sure whether this is appropriate to the Counter-Mortar Radar, but if you produce a magnificent piece of equipment, the construction and manufacture of which costs too much, then sometimes you have to reluctantly say "We will take another one which is almost as good, but costs a great deal less". This leads me on to your more general observation. It would be, in my mind, astounding if from time to time one of our allies did not produce a piece of equipment which was used instead of ours when we were completely convinced that ours was the best. This happens. We make a proposal, but we do not always get our way and I do not suppose we ever will.

Mr. Winch: On your comment which you made to the effect that the development of equipment for the Armed Forces is the responsibility of the Chief of Technical Services, you receive guidance from the senior group, the development and associated research policy group, and then you went on to add that you are able to arrange that certain development projects be undertaken in this establishment and to assist the CTS with both the technical aspects and management of these projects carried out by Canadian industry.

You have given us a clear picture of the assistance you give to Canadian industry. • 1210

Could I ask if you are now undertaking any projects giving advice, assisting industry on such things as the late lamented Bobcat, the Avro Arrow, the hydrofoil in Halifax, where Canada has had a most unfortunate experience. Are you conducting any more of this kind of work or financing this kind of work? If so, are you in a position to tell us what it is?

Dr. Uffen: I hope we are not conducting the kind you referred to because they were all failures, I believe. We do this all the time. I cannot refer to a specific project easily, but I will ask Dr. L'Heureux to do that.

Mr. Winch: Perhaps you might on this hydrofoil.

Dr. Uffen: Yes, I can speak about the hydrofoil because in the two years I have been here I have learned quite a bit about it.

The hydrofoil has reached a stage now where it is ready for evaluation at sea. The research and development part that we would play has long since past. Now, 10 years ago Defence Research Board scientists played a major role in the hydrofoil concept, in the test model design and so on. It then progressed into the development stage where it was contracted out to industry and then our scientists became less active, although they were retained for advice. We have one man at Dartmouth who is probably one of the world's greatest authorities on the subject. The thing has now reached the point where it is really no longer a research item. It is at the evaluation stage. The trials start in the spring.

Dr. L'Heureux: That is right.

Dr. Uffen: We are really interested in it. We also think it is a good investment.

Mr. Winch: Could I ask you then, because of your statement that we try not to be competitive with allies, what the position was—and I know this was before your time—in regard to the United States and the United Kingdom who are also doing the same thing at the same time? Now where does co-operation and efficiency come in if three countries are doing the same research for the same development at the same time, and yet we go ahead with a prototype?

Dr. Uffen: There are different sizes of hydrofoils and they are used for different purposes. Canada undertook the development of a 200 ton hydrofoil, open ocean, I believe to operate at approximately 40 knots in sea state five and so on, in complete co-operation with the British and the Americans who undertook to study and build hydrofoils of a different size. This was done as a co-operative program, and as I understand it the British and the Americans stayed away from this particular size of hydrofoil and from the hydrofoils developed for this purpose. Its purpose is to tow a submarine detecting device and I do not believe that the Americans or the British are working in that area because they knew that Canada was going to do it. I think the Soviet Union is.

Mr. Winch: I just have one more question and it is not classified. Could you tell us now how many projects you are involved in on the development of new armaments, offence or defence, and are they being done directly by yourselves or in co-operation with industry?

Dr. L'Heureux: Mr. Chairman, as far as the specific question is concerned, it depends on the definition of "projects", but if it means a program of endeavour, we run roughly 20 major programs within DRB, either by ourselves or in collaboration with our allies, or in collaboration with the Armed Forces. Within these broad programs there are programs in armament, underwater acoustics, detection, command control et cetera. This is roughly the number of programs we run. These are what we call major programs.

Then, within these programs we have specific projects. We have projects in research and underwater acoustics, transmission through the atmosphere of electro-magnetic energy and so on. We have very specific projects leading to more applied projects for the Armed Forces.

Mr. Winch: I just want to ask one final question on this same phase. On these projects, if some of them are given to industry to work on, which also means research, what is the co-operation between your research and their research, and who is the final authority when it is between yourselves as the DRB and the research on the project given to industry? I imagine from what I have read in the past that sometimes

there is conflict which gives rise to the millions of additional cost over what was estimated.

Dr. Uffen: When a project is contracted out by the Defence Department, whether it is the Chief of Technical Services or the Defence Research Board, it is funded by the Department of National Defence and the Department says what they want done and the industry does it as well as they can. That is, you make a normal contract with the terms specified before you start, but do not confuse that with the Defence Industrial Research program where the company proposes what it wants to do. It does what it pleases, providing it spends the money on the project on which it said it was going to spend it, and the results belong to the company.

So there are two opposites. In one case the company does what it wants to do if we put up approximately half the money, and in the other we say what we want done.

Mr. Winch: That is my point. You put up half the money.

Dr. Uffen: Yes.

Mr. Winch: Where is your authority to come into conflict on the subject? Do you have any such authority?

Dr. Uffen: Under the DIR program the terms of agreement are that the company does what it wants to do.

Mr. Winch: Although you put up half the money?

Dr. Uffen: Yes; and if the program is of no use from our point of view we do not renew it.

They are reviewed regularly. You will remember I mentioned that there are two monitors—two project officers—and we have a monthly report. The terms are such that the project can be terminated.

The philosophy is that if you are going to sponsor someone and give them support you must throw the bread on the waters and let them proceed under their own steam. That is the difference between a grant in aid and a contract.

If we always specified what we wanted done it is doubtful whether an industry would be able to originate, develop and maintain a full research facility. Every time a project

stopped they would have to curtail their research facility. That is not what we want at all.

In the national interest we think there ought to be a number of prosperous, sound Canadian industries with their own research facilities.

• 1215

Mr. Winch: If you put up half and the project is successful does the Receiver General get any share of the royalties on the new development?

Dr. Uffen: At our level, the DIR, no. Usually what happens is that when it gets out of the applied research stage it goes into a development stage and the funding then comes from the Department of Industry. Under a certain program, the name of which I have forgotten—there were two or three—they start to put some strings on the expenditures to make sure that the work is done to Canadian profit. Our program insists that the work must be done in Canada and exploited in Canada.

Mr. Winch: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. MacRae is next, followed by Mr. MacLean, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Howard and Mr. Laniel.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you.

I wish to ask Dr. Uffen a few questions about the Shirley Bay establishment, the Defence Chemical Biological Radiation Establishment, and the one at Suffield. When were these establishments constituted in their present forms?

Dr. Uffen: I think Suffield was constituted in approximately its present form during the Second World War, and was turned over to the Defence Research Board 20 years ago; and DCBRE, the one at Shirley Bay, approximately the same.

Mr. MacRae: Has any thought been given to amalgamating these two establishments physically as well as scientifically? I take it that Suffield, because of the large area involved, is used for testing, and so on; but has any thought been given to amalgamating them?

Dr. Uffen: We have examined the possibility from time to time, but they are quite different.

As you mentioned, the Suffield experimental station has assets you cannot reproduce anywhere else. It is only there that we can have a very large explosion, for example, as was done this past summer.

They could, I think, be amalgamated, if need be, but I would have to be rather careful about what might, or might not, be done, because things are done at DCBRE on power source development—batteries and so on—and I doubt that anything would be gained by amalgamating them. There are chemists involved but they are not always of the same type—organic chemists and physical chemists.

Mr. MacRae: In your statement you discuss biological, chemical and nuclear warfare. In reply to Mr. Allmand and Mr. Winch you have said that we do completely defensive research in this.

That is fine, but if one believes in the principle of deterrents—I happen to, and I presume many do—which nations of the NATO alliance are at this moment, first of all, conducting extensive research in the offensive uses of nuclear warfare?

Dr. Uffen: I do not know.

Mr. MacRae: Chemical warfare?

Dr. Uffen: I do not know.

Mr. MacRae: Biological warfare?

Dr. Uffen: I do not know.

Mr. MacRae: Who could tell me?

Dr. Uffen: I imagine the heads of the agencies of the nations you have just mentioned.

Mr. MacRae: All right, Dr. Uffen; that is not very helpful, but thank you anyway.

As a practising scientist, do you know of any real defensive position we could take that would prevent annihilation in the event of all-out nuclear warfare? We can dig a hole in the ground, climb into it and take certain things in with us, but have we any defence? Perhaps I am not putting it very well, but what I am asking is whether, in the event that the great powers decide to wage all-out nuclear warfare, there is any defence, or does it mean annihilation of our civilization?

• 1220

Dr. Uffen: As you know, this is not an easy question to answer. There are two aspects to it. "Complete annihilation" means different things to different people.

I do not want to leave the impression that I feel that the slaughter of very, very large numbers of people can be treated lightly, but it is technologically conceivable that one could develop a defensive ballistic missile that would reduce the hazards considerably. The Americans have recently launched such a proposal—the so-called sentinel anti-ballistic missile system.

If you are able to do this to some degree it reduces the incentives for any hostile adversary to undertake it, and so it may have a deterrent effect.

Your question is one which has to be very carefully analyzed and I cannot make an unequivocal reply.

Mr. MacRae: Let us take the three in turn. In chemical warfare the use of poison gas now goes far beyond what we did some work with in World War II. How far can we defend ourselves against the most sophisticated chemical gases that now exist?

Dr. Uffen: Some of the most sophisticated ones are really horrible, and it is questionable what one could do if these were indiscriminately used.

However, the likeliest type of thing, or one that we have to foresee, is the use of debilitating agents against servicemen. For example, servicemen in a peacekeeping role could be confronted with tear gases and agents even more debilitating. If you are prepared, and your adversary knows you are prepared, the incentive again is reduced and the likelihood of his using such agents is diminished to some degree.

Mr. MacRae: I wish to explore that very briefly.

Unless protection against chemical warfare has changed very drastically about the only thing was the respirator. As I understand it, there are now gases against which no respirator is effective. Therefore, in the event of the all-out use of chemicals we really have little or no protection. Is that not true?

Dr. Uffen: In the event of all-out use, yes. But when we examine, for example, the cost of such all-out use of an agent, or when we examine what an adversary might have to do to use it, one could come to the conclusion that it is perhaps not as appealing to him as some other activity.

Therefore, we also have to take into account the likelihood of this happening, and

as I understand it the likelihood of an adversary using chemical agents as a strategic weapon at the moment is small.

Mr. MacRae: Finally, I take it that that would also apply to biological warfare? They would be roughly similar. Because as I understand it, to take it further, we now have the capability of destroying ourselves with biological warfare?

Dr. Uffen: The capabilities are there, but I do not think they are analogous. They are different. I am not a specialist in chemistry or biology, and I am not able to give the precise answer, but they are not the same. I have a specialist here.

Mr. MacRae: Perhaps he might care to comment.

Dr. Uffen: Mr. Pennie, Deputy Chairman of the Board, was for many years the Director General of the Suffield experimental station. He has a good deal of experience. He may be able to answer this more precisely than I can.

• 1225

Mr. A. M. Pennie (Deputy Chairman, Defence Research Board): Mr. Chairman, I might go back, just one removed, to the question you asked about our having the respirator and nothing else. This, I think, would perhaps apply in a civilian environment, but in the military environment the Board is responsible for a great deal more than the respirator. There is protective equipment such as over-garments, gloves, mitts, scarves, shoes, and what have you.

In other words, we are at the stage where we feel more confident that the Canadian serviceman could face a considerable contamination in the degree of attack from most of the known chemical agents that he is likely to face. This is one point you raised.

The degree of operation is another aspect of the problem to be examined in the Board, and as the Chairman pointed out extensive tests are carried out at Suffield. Instead of using live agents we use simulants. Within the last four or five weeks a test was carried out jointly by Canadian, American and British forces in which they did this very thing, to find out how effective they were with the full type of over-garment which each country has selected as its choice. This was to assess the performance of the military men under these conditions and to find out how effective the garment was against the simulants which were dispersed in the air by aircraft.

When all this is analyzed I guess we will be in a better position to give you the answer on just how effective this protective equipment would be. But I can assure you that it forms a major part of the Board's program in the defensive field of chemical warfare.

In the biological field the same question arises. The equipment there is the respirator. Again, one of the Board's prime projects in this field is to establish a respirator capable of excluding from the respiratory system any type of material which might be disseminated in a biological attack.

To carry it forward from that, in the respirative field we are also interested in naval operations. One of the problems with ships attacked at sea is to find how effectively they could operate in a biological cloud. In this matter the Board has co-operated with the naval forces and has developed a filter system which could be applied to the commanding citadel of a ship. By the use of appropriate simulants again—non-pathogenic agents—it is possible to assess the degree of contamination or otherwise of a ship's company under these conditions.

Therefore, the program is predicated on trying to improve the defensive aspects of the equipment of the man in his fighting environment, which changes, as you know, as equipment changes in the armed services. We are keeping up with the times and ensuring that we are looking ahead to perhaps new types of agents and new methods of dissemination which have to be conquered.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questioning except for just one observation. It would appear then that we can, up to a point, in chemical and biological warfare protect the Armed Forces numbering roughly 100,000, but it would appear from the questioning, and I have not been convinced otherwise, that as far as the rest of the 20 million or so people of the nation are concerned, it would be impossible to save them in this type of warfare.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I still have a number of questioners: Mr. MacLean, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Howard and Mr. Laniel. It is quite apparent that we will not finish this morning. We usually try to wind up our hearings around twelve or twelve-thirty. What is your wish? We have a meeting scheduled for Thursday evening from 8.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. Would it be possible for you to be back at that time?

Dr. Uffen will be leaving this afternoon and will be returning Thursday night too late for our hearing. We will be sitting from 8.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. on Thursday.

Dr. Uffen: The aircraft is due to arrive at about 11.00 p.m.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could not extend this meeting half an hour and wind it up this morning?

The Chairman: Shall we try?

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

• 1230

The Chairman: Right. Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: Quite a number of my questions have been asked already. I have been left with a few dregs here. Doctor, would you say something about the problem of liaison with other research institutions, both our own and other countries? I am thinking now of where the division of responsibility lies between various activities of the National Research Council and the Oceanographic Branch of the Fisheries Research Board and numerous others. For the enlightenment of the Committee perhaps you could give some specific cases. For example, the testing that is done out at Uplands in the wind tunnel and so on: whose jurisdiction does that come under? Further to this general question it seems to me that in the present age there is such a tremendous expansion of scientific knowledge that it must be a terrific job to keep track of it all so that you do not suddenly find something you have been working at for a couple of years has already been done by someone else, and that the results are already available if you know where to find them. Would you say a word on these two general topics?

Dr. Uffen: I will start with your second one and work back.

The information problem is, of course, an important one and we have a Defence Scientific Liaison and Information Services with a staff whose concern is to keep the information available to the people concerned, to distribute it properly and so on. We have people doing research work within that group right now on computerized methods, and information theory and so on, so that we hope to keep abreast of the situation and introduce any new modern technological aid that we can acquire.

On your other question about liaison, we have liaison with the National Research Council both formally and informally. I was a member of the National Research Council before I became a member of the Defence Research Board. In fact, I had to resign from NRC in order to take this appointment. The President of the National Research Council is on my Board and we know each other well. Our scientists know one another because the Defence Research Board very largely grew out of the National Research Council.

There are certain things which can only be done once in Canada; that is, one facility and you do not duplicate it. With respect to the National Aeronautics Establishment, the decision was made about ten years ago that the National Aeronautics Establishment would be better located in a civilian agency, so they made it the responsibility of the National Research Council, but it is advised by two groups of committees: one at a policy managerial level, and one at a technical level, and some of our scientists and some of the military personnel are on the advisory panels for the National Research Council.

Mr. MacLean: But you cannot keep your research neatly compartmentalized, can you? They will be doing some things on occasion which you would naturally be doing if you had the facilities?

Dr. Uffen: The policy is to do it where the people with the competence actually exist. For example in the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, they have specialists in seismology, the study of earthquakes. The same kind of people are the kind of people you need to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions. We did not try to set up a competing organization. We have one or two specialists who are our liaison officers with the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources who do the work under contract by financial encumbrance for the National Defence Department. I believe it is still by financial encumbrance. I may be wrong. Is it? I understand it is not any more, but was until recently.

Mr. MacLean: What about liaison with our allies? I suppose that we, on our own, do not do any scientific intelligence in the sense of trying to ascertain what advances any non-allies are making in certain scientific fields?

• 1235

Dr. Uffen: We do little. We supply a few specialists to work with our military staff.

Mr. MacLean: This is perhaps a farout question, but at Shirley Bay I think at some time there was some research or inquiry made into UFOs. What are you doing along that line, if anything?

Dr. Uffen: Well, I do not know whether it was done at Shirley Bay or not but up until about a year ago there was an organization within the Department of National Defence which did very careful work. About a year ago or maybe eighteen months ago the responsibility was transferred to the National Research Council on the grounds that experience had demonstrated that, if there are UFOs, whatever they are was not apparently a defence problem. Unidentified flying objects have been observed for a long time, and will probably be observed for some time to come, but they are unidentified.

Mr. Nowlan: Do you believe in them, Doctor?

Dr. Uffen: Well, it is not a matter of believing in them. An unidentified flying object is a believable thing by its very title. Perhaps what you mean is do I believe in the possible explanation that UFOs are due to extra-terrestrial activities.

Mr. Nowlan: I am sorry, I apologize.

Mr. MacLean: From the scientific point of view, can most of these UFOs, unidentified flying objects so-called, be explained from a scientific point of view or is there a certain percentage of them that seems to defy rational explanation?

Dr. Uffen: Most of them can be explained but there is a residue of observances which are unsatisfactorily explained.

Mr. Winch: That is the most honest statement I have heard for a long time.

The Chairman: Do you have any further questions, Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: I am finished.

The Chairman: Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: To revert just very briefly to the hydrofoil, as I recall this project, the foil to be used was a different type of foil than the one which was being experimented with by either the U.S. or the U.K. Is that not a fact?

Dr. Uffen: I think that is true.

Mr. Harkness: And has this type of foil proved more satisfactory than the perhaps more conventional ones which were being used in these other countries?

Dr. Uffen: I think in the model stage, that is, in the test platform stage where we are talking about something 30 to 40 feet long, that it proved superior for some things. I do not yet know whether it is going to be superior in the full scale prototype, that has not yet been tested.

Mr. Harkness: That will only be shown by the performance of the prototype craft after it is in full operation, I presume?

Dr. Uffen: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: A considerable amount of work in regard to navigational equipment for tanks was being carried out, I presume at CARDE, and we produced a form of equipment which I believe was highly satisfactory. Has that gone into production? Is it in use in our tanks, or what has happened to that program?

Dr. L. J. L'Heureux (Vice-Chairman, Defence Research Board): Yes, this equipment, Mr. Chairman, has gone into production and some of our allies are looking at this equipment. It is very satisfactory.

Mr. Harkness: It is in actual operation in our tanks at the present time, is it?

Dr. L'Heureux: I understand it is, yes.

Mr. Harkness: But we have not yet succeeded in selling any of it abroad?

Dr. L'Heureux: I believe we are quite close to this.

Mr. Harkness: I certainly hope that will be the case because it seemed to me like a very useful project, one which was badly needed and also provided the possibility of considerable foreign sales.

In regard to the telecommunications on page 4, you state:

The Defence Research Board's satellite program has been a special feature

That is the Alouette that has been put up in recent years. And...

DRTE is in the process of being transferred to the proposed new Department of Communications.

● 1240

Does this involve the transfer really of all the personnel and the equipment, both of which have been engaged in that operation, to the Department of Communications or is it merely a transfer of the project?

Dr. Uffen: It is a transfer of most of the personnel. The assets of the laboratory, the people, the project, are, for the most part, being transferred to the new department. Of course, the legislation for the new department has not yet been passed, so when I say, transferred to the new department, I mean we are in the process of transferring really to the Postmaster General. There are not adequate facilities available to the new organization to do some of the things that have to be done, such as paying people, recruiting for next year and so on, and the Defence Research Board for the time being is still doing the housekeeping work.

There is a certain proportion of the activities at DRTE which is clearly military projects, which will continue to be done by the same staff within the new department but under the National Defence Department's jurisdiction by financial encumbrance to the new department when it is set up, and we will have specialists who will monitor the program for the National Defence Department.

Mr. Harkness: Does this mean then that your electronics laboratories at Shirley Bay will be turned over to the Department of Communications?

Dr. Uffen: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: So that from now on there will be joint occupancy of the Shirley Bay establishment. You will be running part of it and the Department of Communications will be running part of it.

Dr. Uffen: In the transition period we will continue to run the whole works, that is, the maintenance production, contracts and so on, but at some time to be determined by the government, yes. Presumably in the next financial year or something like that a new method of operating will emerge.

Mr. Harkness: I do not know whether this is a fair question to ask you or not but I do not know of anybody else who could answer it. Do you think this is going to be a workable and efficient arrangement, to have a split in the control of those laboratories and in the work which will be carried on?

Dr. Uffen: As far as the sciences are concerned, I think we will have no problem. We can make many complicated systems work because the group of scientists is small enough that they really work as personal acquaintances anyway. I may be able to answer your question in part by pointing out that over a year ago, in August 1967, I made a recommendation to the Privy Council Committee on Science and Technology that the Alouette-Isis satellite series should be moved to a civilian agency. The time had come when the military priority was declining, the civilian priority was rising, so this was not a new thing at all as far as the satellite communications were concerned. So that aspect of it had been initiated quite a while ago.

Mr. Harkness: The reason I asked the question is that in my experience, when there is joint control or two or three departments involved in the same operation, quite frequently there has been delay and confusion, and that is why I wondered whether in your view this would be an efficient operation under this new setup. But apparently you think so, so I will leave it at that.

In regard to the research you have at Downsview involving the efficient performance of servicemen in various adverse military environments, are they now the people that are carrying on any research as far as cold-weather problems are concerned? This used to be carried on at Churchill, but with Churchill having been closed up, I am wondering where any of this cold-weather experimentation is going on.

Dr. Uffen: I do not believe we do a great deal of it.

Dr. L'Heureux: Mr. Chairman, we have cold chambers and so on at Downsview to carry out specific experiments under laboratory conditions, so that the cold-weather work we do now is done at Downsview.

● 1245

Mr. Harkness: But the whole program of what you might call cold-weather experimentation and its effect on personnel and equipment, to a large extent has been phased out.

Dr. L'Heureux: We do more laboratory work and less field trials at the moment, but we still could do field trials when necessary. The main work now is laboratory work and especially the effect on the physiological aspect of the human.

Mr. Harkness: Do you consider that sufficient? Is not the ending of field work, field trials and so forth, a weakness as far as our research along this line is concerned?

Dr. L'Heureux: We do the laboratory work but the Armed Forces, of course, carry on and do some trials themselves in the cold climate, so that there is not a complete gap. Of course, we would always like to do more but we have to limit ourselves to the resources we have.

Mr. Harkness: As far as Suffield is concerned, how many of these big explosions have you had there now? Is it two or three?

Dr. Uffen: Two at 500-ton chemical explosion, and one at 100-ton chemical explosion.

Mr. Harkness: These are really simulated nuclear explosions.

Dr. Uffen: Five hundred tons is half a kiloton, and if you get a certain distance away from the centre of the explosion the effects simulate, to a great degree, the effects that could accompany a nuclear explosion.

Mr. Harkness: The radiation element is not present. Are you planning on continuing this series of explosions?

Dr. Uffen: Well, having just completed one this summer, it is a little early to say what will evolve. I could answer that question only after we have evaluated the results of the test that took place in the early part of this summer.

Mr. Harkness: How many other countries took part in this series of tests at the last explosion, which I think was last year. Was it not?

Dr. Uffen: The United States and the United Kingdom, and it was in June or July. Pardon me, it was in August.

Mr. Harkness: There were only the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition to ourselves?

Dr. Uffen: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: On page 7, you say,

The outcome was the adoption of a policy of decentralization by which the responsibilities for program implementation were transferred from headquarters to the establishments...

I am not quite clear what the meaning of that is. Could you give me an example or two as to what you mean by this transfer of responsibilities for program implementation?

Dr. Uffen: Perhaps you will recall we had a number of directorates in headquarters, and we have a director general of a laboratory. It was not entirely clear who would be responsible for seeing that a program was carried out. When I arrived I felt that there was an unnecessary layer of administration in the Board's headquarters. I saw no reason why the director general of the laboratory could not be responsible for carrying out the program, and we could gain by transferring positions in the headquarters to the laboratory and let them run their own programs.

Mr. Harkness: The result of this has been a decrease in the number of personnel at headquarters and an increase in the laboratories.

Dr. Uffen: Yes, and not only a decrease in the headquarters establishment, but also it allowed some flexibility to redeploy positions at the same time as the Treasury Board was holding us to a constant manpower. I had no other way to change programs.

Mr. Harkness: On the next page, near the end of the page, you stated:

...the demand for social scientists is increasing and the DRB is now concerned with research fields in which it has hitherto not been involved.

What are these fields, in particular?

Dr. Uffen: It is only a few years ago that we started to do an active program in psychology. We have very few economists. If you are going to study equipment and its cost effectiveness, then you have to have a group of people who are not physical scientists but economists. Our Armed Forces are going to be called upon and conceivably could be called upon again, as they have been in the past, to operate in new environments, new cultures, and to appear there rather suddenly without much opportunity for preparation. This means that we should have available to the Armed Forces geographers, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists. One of my observations was that a very large part of the scientific needs of the Armed Forces in this day and age are of a sociological or environmental type, including not only the physical environment, but also the cultural environment.

• 1250

Mr. Harkness: What kind of research for example would an anthropologist do in this particular branch of your activity?

Dr. L'Heureux: It concerns the customs of the country. We have certain customs in the Western world. We like certain perfumes, for example, while in other countries they might like some other odours. It concerns the whole acclimatization to the customs of a country, because when our troops arrive there as peacekeepers they do not go there to fight. They go there to keep peace, and anything they can do to be part of the environment—not try to change the natives, but rather change to what the natives are accustomed to—is what we are looking for.

Mr. Harkness: I have one other question. In regard to this matter of contracting out, you say that you expect to contract out work to a total of \$1,268,000 in this fiscal year. What are these contracts?

Dr. Uffen: More than \$1 million goes out to contracts.

Dr. L'Heureux: Mr. Chairman, every program every establishment, either lacks the type of person required for a certain project, or wants to build a certain kind of hardware. Take CARDE for instance. They may give a contract to construct three of a prototype of some piece of detection device. These are the kinds of contract that the establishments give to industry. This applies to every establishment.

Mr. Harkness: What are the specific contracts which will cover this \$1,268,000?

Dr. L'Heureux: Some are for assistance in testing. Of these, CARDE is the one I know best. Testing in the aerophysics program is one of them, to manufacture pieces of equipment.

An hon. Member: Could you read the titles?

Dr. L'Heureux: I will read some of the titles. We have a Study of Terrain Evaluation for Mobility, to McGill University; Study in the Physical Properties of Ice, to McGill University; Study of Rate Effects on Development of Soil Strength Related to Dynamic Similitude of Vehicles, again to McGill University; Study of Detection of Signals in Noise at Queen's University; Studies Related to Microwave Propagation, to McGill University;

Meteorological Studies on the Hazen Lake Tanquary Fiord Areas, to McGill University; Structures and Properties of Uranium Based Alloys, University of British Columbia; Theoretical and Experimental Studies on Microwave Scattering Phenomena from Hypersonic Turbulent Wakes, Laval University; Study of Electrostatic Probe Techniques, RCA Victor Company Limited, Montreal, Quebec; and Studies on Difunctional and Tri-functional Hydroxyl-terminated Polyether, Laval University.

Mr. Harkness: I had rather taken it from the brief here that these contracts would be mostly to industry, but in actual fact they are mostly to...

Dr. Uffen: No sir. He has not finished the list. The first half of the list is the universities.

Mr. Harkness: I see.

Dr. L'Heureux: The others are mostly industry.

Mr. Harkness: How would this work out as between universities and industries in these contracts?

• 1255

Dr. L'Heureux: If the work is quite basic, it depends on who has the capability.

Mr. Harkness: No, I meant more particularly, of this one and a quarter million, would half or three-quarters of it go to universities, or three-quarters to industry, or what would be roughly the proportion?

Dr. Uffen: There are fewer in industry but they are much bigger. For example, Duplate Canada Limited, \$38,062; Computing Devices of Canada Limited, \$85,000; Philco-Ford of Canada Limited, \$120,000; RCA Victor Company Limited, Oh, I should leave that one out; Computing Devices of Canada Limited, \$40,000 and \$15,000. We have not got them totalled.

Mr. Harkness: No.

Dr. Uffen: What is it, half and half? Two point eight million goes to RCA Victor Company Limited for the satellite program.

For 1967-68, not the estimates in front of you, \$4,238,000 to industry, \$642,000 to universities. Pardon me, I would like to correct that. About \$3,500,000 to industry, compared

with about \$600,000 to universities. There are more projects but smaller amounts of money contracted to the universities.

Mr. Harkness: The basic reason I asked the question is I wondered to what extent these contracts which you put out were of assistance to industry as far as their development of scientific research in their own industries was concerned.

Dr. Uffen: I am told it is substantial.

Mr. Harkness: Apparently it is a substantial amount. Thank you.

The Chairman: Before calling the last four questioners, perhaps I could get agreement of the Committee to print as appendices to our Minutes, Appendix A, Appendix B, and Annex I of Appendix B of Dr. Uffen's opening statement. Is that agreed?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Again, before calling the last four questioners, I should report that we now plan on having the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence appear before the Committee on December 3, probably in the afternoon, to report to the Committee on the NATO Ministerial Meeting. The steering committee, I think, came to an agreement. It was understood that the Ministers might not be in a position to answer questions about future government policy concerning NATO, and in the time we would have available we certainly would not be able to go into any detailed review of defence policy in that one session, or in the time we have available before Christmas. So then I thought that, following the appearance of the Minister, the Estimates of the Department of National Defence would be passed, and then we would go on to consider the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs in the hope that we would be able to pass them by the end of next week.

We do have a period scheduled for this Committee on Thursday evening, from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. We have already heard departmental witnesses on the Estimates of the Department of National Defence.

Would members be satisfied to pass the Estimates of the Department of National Defence at our meeting on December 3 without hearing further evidence, or is there some necessity to call further witnesses and have another meeting of this Committee on

Defence Estimates on Thursday, assuming we can finish with the Defence Research Board this morning?

• 1300

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I can only reiterate the complaint I made at the first meeting of this Committee, that I do not think you can carry on a reasonable examination of the Estimates without the Minister being present and able to answer on all policy matters which arise relative to almost everything in the Department.

Therefore, if Estimates in future, as is apparently planned, are going to be considered entirely committees, I think it is essential that we have an understanding that the minister will be present to answer questions.

This idea of a token appearance of two Ministers coming in for one two-hour period on External Affairs and Defence is completely ridiculous. I certainly would not be prepared to agree that these Estimates, or those of the Department of External Affairs, would be anything like adequately examined. In fact, they would not even be scratched by a procedure of that kind.

The Chairman: Do you have a specific suggestion, Mr. Harkness, to meet the point that you have made about our meeting on Thursday?

There is a problem. We can only hold so many meetings.

Mr. Harkness: I realize there is a problem with this session and these particular estimates, because we will have to deal with the Estimates for the next fiscal year fairly shortly, but I certainly would not for a moment accept that whatever is done about these Estimates be taken as any precedent for dealing with the Estimates in committees in the future.

The Chairman: I can see that; but relative to these Estimates do you feel it is necessary to meet on Thursday?

Mr. Winch: I have a comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: You feel that we should meet on these Estimates on Thursday?

Mr. Harkness: Yes.

Mr. Winch: On December 3, in the afternoon, we will be dealing solely with the report of the two Ministers on what took place at NATO and what are our present

commitments as a result of that. We will not have time, I am afraid, to go into the entire question of the Defence Estimates.

I suggest that it would be unfair not to have a further meeting—perhaps that evening; I do not know—at which the Minister of Defence could be present, when we are considering not just the question of NATO but the entire Defence Estimates that we are passing.

I personally, sir, feel very strongly that there should be one more meeting, with the Minister of Defence present, so that we might be able to ask questions and get some views on the present defence policy, outside of NATO, and on the present Estimates.

The Chairman: Is that your view, as well, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Yes; very strongly.

The Chairman: I do not know whether or not the Minister of Defence would be available on Thursday evening.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, if the Prime Minister wants these Estimates back—and I know he does—and if this Committee wants to do its job, then I say we are entitled to have the Minister of National Defence present when we consider and pass \$1,700,000,000 of Estimates.

The Chairman: I think that was agreed. The only question was whether it would be sufficient to have the Minister present at the joint meeting on December 3.

Mr. Winch: That is only on NATO.

The Chairman: I gather that some members at any rate feel that we should continue with the Defence Estimates this Thursday evening?

Mr. Harkness: You say the Minister cannot be present?

The Chairman: No, the Minister cannot be present.

• 1305

Mr. Harkness: Then what is the use, if the Minister cannot be present.

Mr. Winch: It is not much use.

The Chairman: I think perhaps, in the circumstances, I will speak to individual members of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure and try to work out something which will be virtually agreeable.

We still have a few questioners. Mr. Howard has gone. There are Mr. Robinson, Mr. Laniel and Mr. Nowlan. Shall we try to complete this?

Mr. Nowlan: Mine will be very short.

Mr. Robinson: Mr. Chairman, many of my questions have already been answered, but I do have others.

I note one thing that may, or may not, be of concern. You suggested, Dr. Uffen, that RCA Victor will be doing contract work for some \$2.8 million. In view of the fact that Mr. J. D. Houlding is by appointment a member of this Committee is there any conflict of interest, or does this kind of thing happen infrequently or frequently?

Dr. Uffen: There is no conflict of interest because he is not involved in the contracting. The contracting for this particular project goes through the Department of Defence Production, and Mr. Houlding has no opportunity whatsoever to influence the contract. Furthermore, as I believe is normal professional practice, he has made his participation quite apparent to everyone concerned. There is nothing undeclared.

Mr. Robinson: Do I correctly understand that tenders are awarded for the kind of work that you envisage, or do you go specifically to a contractor to carry out the work that you want done?

Dr. Uffen: If I may make a distinction between what has happened in the past and what may happen in the future—perhaps I am anticipating you a little—the satellites that are being actively considered at the moment for the communication satellite have gone out to tender.

Were you thinking of the ones that have been referred to recently in the news?

Mr. Robinson: I was thinking of both.

As a matter of fact, you have brought up another point. I had assumed that the Canadian Government had gone out of this business and that as a result we had lost a considerable number of employees to the United States who had taken over part of our space program. Are you suggesting that we are back in the space program business?

Dr. Uffen: We have never lost anybody of any major importance in the research satellite field or in the communications satellite field.

Mr. Robinson: I think it was Mr. Harkness who mentioned that a number of programs entered into through your Department had to do with resulting failures, to use your own terminology.

What happens to the personnel and the employees who have been involved in these special projects? Are they re-employed on some other project, or are they lost to the organization?

Dr. Uffen: Within the Defence Research Board the vast majority are re-employed on another project which requires their special abilities. We have a regular turnover, as has any organization, but I think it is comparable with that of any other research organization.

Mr. Robinson: I recall reading something to the effect that at the time of the demise of the Avro Arrow, great groups of scientists, specialists and technicians moved to the United States to take part in their program. Are you suggesting that that kind of thing does not happen today?

Dr. Uffen: Not from DRB; there was no exodus from DRB. The exodus was from the contractor who had undertaken the development of the aircraft.

Mr. Robinson: If I am not mistaken, the Defence Research Board does not come under the Public Service Commission. How do you hire the people you want and what are your policies on promotion and how are they arrived at?

Dr. Uffen: We have our own personnel department. We do our own recruiting. Over the years, policies and procedures have been established for recruiting first-rate people.

The recommendations are made to a Standing Committee of the Defence Research Board. The Chairman of that Standing Committee at the moment is Mr. John Houlding, from Industry, and he is quite familiar with the going rates for scientists and engineers.

I cannot recall the names of the other members of the Committee but it is they who have the statutory responsibility for seeing that our employees are appointed in a non-political fashion on the basis of their qualifications and merit.

Mr. Robinson: When you employ these people is it a requirement that they either become, or are, bilingual at the time of their appointment?

• 1310

Dr. Uffen: We have a requirement to have a reasonable proportion of people who are bilingually competent, but that is no problem to us because fortunately for 20 years now we have had a laboratory at Valcartier in Quebec, and over the course of time the Defence Research Board has acquired a group of first class scientists and engineers who happen to be bilingual. We have not had any problem. Seventy-five per cent of our people at Valcartier are fluent in both languages.

Mr. Robinson: I note on page 3 of your report that under the heading "The Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment" you say that its working language is French. Am I to understand that everybody, not only the 75 per cent you have just mentioned, must be bilingual.

Dr. Uffen: No. What I mean by "the working language is French" is that if you go there do not expect to hear everybody speaking English. When you get there you will find they are speaking French, but if you converse in English you can always find someone who will converse with you.

Mr. Robinson: But it is the policy that French is the working language at Valcartier?

Dr. Uffen: It is not a policy. It just happened historically that we have this very large group. Dr. L'Heureux was Director General of that particular establishment. Perhaps he should answer your question.

Dr. L'Heureux: It is not the policy but over 85 per cent of the substaff are French-speaking. When they arrive at CARDE many of them do not speak English at all. About 50 per cent of the professionals are of French-speaking origin, but they are bilingual; so that normally you will hear—and naturally it will evolve now more than ever—mostly French at CARDE. That is what is meant by the statement.

Mr. Winch: And if the most able scientist were not bilingual would you take a less able man because he was bilingual?

Dr. L'Heureux: No. I would like to answer this one. The professionals we have at CARDE have been recruited all through the country. You will find that we have at CARDE a mixture of professionals from every university in Canada. Some may leave,

if they wish, but those who remain learn French. They did not learn French when they arrived.

Mr. Robinson: To put the question a little differently, am I to understand that you have not lost good English-speaking personnel because they were not bilingual?

Dr. L'Heureux: Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer it in another way. Some of them do not stay at CARDE because they do not like the environment in Quebec. This is mostly the families, not the workers. Some of them leave because of this.

Mr. Robinson: Have you had any difficulty in staffing the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment at Valcartier because of not having enough bilingual people?

Dr. L'Heureux: None whatsoever; as a matter of fact, we have a great demand from B.C. to come to CARDE because they would like to work in that environment.

Mr. Robinson: How is the Defence Research Board coming along in implementing the government's present policy on bilingualism?

Dr. L'Heureux: We feel, as our Chairman said that we are ahead. We have a great number of people who are already bilingual; we have some taking courses; and we have a whole establishment where they speak French practically all the time. Therefore, wherever we need bilingual people we have them.

Many of them who are not are taking courses to become bilingual. In headquarters we feel we can operate bilingually.

Mr. Robinson: I notice on page 2 of the report you indicate that:

The Defence Research Board at present has about 2,600 employees...

Do you have any distribution according to numbers for each of these eight different establishments that you mention?

Dr. Uffen: Yes, we do have. May I ask Mr. Gordon Watson, the Chief of Personnel, to answer that? I think he can produce the figures faster than we could.

The Chairman: Do you have quite an extensive list of questions yet, Mr. Robinson?

Mr. Robinson: I will be going for at least an hour.

The Chairman: If it is that serious I think we should adjourn because we still have two members of the Committee—

Mr. Robinson: Mr. Chairman, when could we have these people back again?

The Chairman: Well, we had hoped to finish now, Mr. Robinson, because Dr. Uffen has to leave at 3 o'clock.

Mr. Robinson: I have many questions that I would like to ask and get answers to, but if it is the wish of the Committee that we dispense with them—

• 1315

The Chairman: Certainly any member may attend a committee hearing and ask questions; that is a custom, but I still have two members of the Committee who have not had an opportunity to ask questions yet—Mr. Laniel and Mr. Nowlan—both of whom, I understand, have relatively brief questions to ask.

Mr. Robinson: Then, Mr. Chairman, maybe I could bow out at this time and let the members of the Committee ask questions. If there is any time left maybe I could ask a few more.

Mr. Laniel: My question is very short. I have other questions but they might seem repetitious. Concerning the Defence Research Establishment Atlantic and the Pacific one, is there not duplication there? You seem to assume or affirm that there is a difference between the two environments as far as antisubmarine warfare is concerned. Is that not a duplication that brings expenses?

Dr. Uffen: No. There is actually a physical difference in the properties of the ocean so that the transmission of sound through the water, for example, is not precisely the same. You have to make actual measurements at sea for the Pacific and not try to transfer measurements that you made in the Atlantic and hope that they will apply to the Pacific.

In another respect they are different, too. Most of our specialists on under ice Arctic studies are on the Pacific Coast. Most of our specialists on electromagnetic methods of measurement and detection are on the Pacific Coast. And the quick reaction group, which might appear to be a duplication, is necessary on both coasts because of the maritime forces on both coasts.

Mr. Laniel: Does this mean that these scientists spend a good proportion of their time in the field—at sea?

Dr. Uffen: Yes. I am not able to give you the actual amount but they go at sea in a submarine and they may be gone for six weeks, testing out equipment that has been developed in the laboratory.

Mr. Laniel: I have a supplementary question to the one asked by Mr. Harkness concerning the Telecommunications Establishment that is going to be transferred to the Department of Communications. Do you have the same set-up with the National Research Council as you will have with the Department of Communications? Do you sponsor anybody doing research for you in the Department of National Health and Welfare?

Dr. Uffen: Not at the Department of National Health and Welfare but we do at the National Research Council. We have recently made an arrangement with the National Research Council where we had too small a group of people to be viable by themselves, so they are going to move in and work physically alongside a similar group of people in the National Research Council.

Mr. Laniel: And they come under your establishment?

Dr. Uffen: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nowlan: I have two short questions. One is actually supplementary to Mr. Robinson's. I gather, Mr. Chairman, from the doctor's remarks that because of all the circumstances bilingualism, even though the Research Board is professional- and scientific-oriented, will not adversely affect recruiting in the future; it has not in the past in any event.

Dr. L'Heureux: No, I think this is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nowlan: Then I come back, really, to the function of the Board in my question to the doctor, even though he has had a long day, and I would like to repeat what Mr. Winch said about the brief. This is the basic question and I may not have any other questions, depending on how you answer this one. If you answer it one way, I might have a couple of supplementaries. Do you, as a Board, carry out evaluation assessment studies of equipment that the armed services are

looking into? I refer to the part of your brief—page 9—where you say that the responsibility for equipment is with the Chief of Technical Services. Does that Chief say, "We need a piece of equipment" and give you terms of reference, so that you then look at two or three different pieces of equipment?

• 1320

Dr. Uffen: Yes.

Mr. Nowlan: You do not necessarily develop them, but you assess them?

Dr. Uffen: Yes. For example, at CARDE, the Armament Research Development Establishment, there is a continuing program of testing weapons and evaluating them for the army.

Mr. Nowlan: I am coming specifically to a precise piece of equipment, and that is a replacement plane for the Argus, which is now the basic plane for antisubmarine warfare surveillance and which is over midway through its life span, I am informed, and the lead time for another plane is getting rather critical. Now, I will ask the direct question: is the Board at the moment engaged in any assessment or evaluation study of the various types of planes that might replace the Argus?

Dr. Uffen: I do not remember all the exact projects that are under way, but I think the answer is yes because the establishment that we call the Defence Research Analysis Establishment has a division which does this very thing. I would have to go and check what they are doing but I am assuming that it would be a correct answer to say that studies are going on in that very area.

Mr. Nowlan: But you do not know when they will be completed?

Dr. Uffen: No, I am sorry. I do not.

Mr. Nowlan: Was such evaluation or assessment study done for the CF-5 when it was purchased?

Dr. Uffen: That was before my time but the same operations research establishment existed and I think probably the answer is yes, that the study was made.

Mr. Nowlan: You will make your study and recommendations and then obviously it is a policy decision as to whether they are carried out or implemented by the Minister.

Dr. Uffen: Yes, and there are many opinions, many factors, that have to be taken into account besides the technical factor.

Mr. Nowlan: I appreciate that. That is all the questioning I have. I appreciate that the time is late and we might not be able to get these gentlemen back, but I would be most interested in the study on the replacement for the Argus.

The Chairman: Dr. Uffen has just made a suggestion which may help to solve your problem, Mr. Robinson. I am anxious that any member should be satisfied that he has obtained the information he wants. Dr. Uffen has mentioned that it would be possible for him to answer or to have answers given to any questions which you may still have to ask if this is satisfactory, or perhaps they could even be put in the form of a memorandum which could be incorporated in the record if there are a fair number.

Mr. Robinson: Mr. Chairman, I could always put them on the Order Paper but I have about seven short questions and we have about seven minutes and maybe this would be sufficient. I presumed we were going until 1.30. Is that correct?

The Chairman: We were going to try to finish as quickly as we could. If we can finish in seven minutes, by all means let us do so.

Mr. Robinson: All right. I expect that because of the military nature of much of your work it cannot be discussed with university scientists, for example. Does this in any way limit your relationship with the rest of the scientific community in Canada?

Dr. Uffen: Very little. We do discuss most of our work with the rest of the scientific community. It is only a very, very small part of the work which is classified, and the 240-odd members of our advisory panels are cleared. We can therefore discuss with them classified subjects if we need to.

Mr. Robinson: Earlier the whole question of the role of the forces was considered to some extent and I would assume that you are looking at research from the point of view of defence; whereas the role of the forces would appear to be basically that of a peacekeeping force. I am wondering if this changes the role of your Board.

Dr. Uffen: The definition of what is "peace-keeping" is not easy. I think everything that

Canada does could be regarded as peacekeeping.

Mr. Robinson: I ask for a breakdown of personnel in the Defence Research Board. I suppose somebody could send me that information.

Dr. Uffen: Do you mean the various establishments?

Mr. Robinson: The eight different establishments that you have. Could you give me some breakdown of the 2,600 personnel? That could be sent to me by way of a memo, if you like. Do you also have a breakdown of the military people with each of these eight components?

• 1325

Dr. Uffen: Yes, we do have. I think perhaps the best thing for us to do would be to give you a folder that we have. It is a quite extensive one which has all of these data assembled about personnel. A brief visit with our Chief of Personnel or one of the other members of the staff might give you all the information.

Mr. Robinson: Fine. Thank you very much. I notice that on page 6 you indicate—well, to use an old cliché—"you only get out of something what you put into it". You are indicating that you put a great deal into research in co-operation with other NATO partners. Do you feel that we get sufficient out of this co-operation from the research done by the other partners, that is apart from the United States, for what we put into it?

Dr. Uffen: Yes. I think we get back more than we put in.

Mr. Robinson: On page 13 there is a breakdown of the budget, shall we say, in percentages. Is this a reasonably constant figure or is this something specific for the year in question?

Dr. Uffen: It is specific for the year under discussion but it changes as time goes by. It does not change drastically, but when Dr. L'Heureux and I took over the management of the Board we made a fairly substantial redistribution in the course of two years.

Mr. Robinson: On page 8 you mentioned that you:

...just appointed a third Scientific Assistant, to the Chief of Personnel, who will be concerned with human problems.

To start with what sort of qualifications does this person have, and in what areas does he have his primary concern? Would he be involved in areas of morale of the present forces, in terms of the problems resulting from unification, the problems resulting from wearing a new uniform and this kind of thing?

Dr. Uffen: He himself is a psychologist. He was in the armed forces and was a prisoner of war, I believe. He has been for several years now the director of one of the wings of the research establishment in Toronto, and the first job that he has been given to do by the Chief of Personnel for the armed forces is to make a study of what he thinks ought to be done and he has been given three or four months to do it. He is going to visit our servicemen at sea and abroad before he prepares a program for us.

Mr. Robinson: Would your Board have had anything to do with the selection of colour and design and implementation and use of the new all-forces uniform?

Dr. Uffen: None whatsoever as far as I know. I know of none.

Mr. Robinson: I will leave my questions at that, Mr. Chairman. I notice that it is almost one-thirty.

The Chairman: Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Robinson. On behalf of members of the Committee I would like to thank Dr. Uffen and Dr. L'Heureux and their assistants for not only a very helpful presentation, but an extremely interesting one. You can see that we hardly wish to let you go. Thank you, ever so much.

The steering committee will meet and decide how to handle the problem raised by Mr. Harkness and Mr. Winch.

APPENDIX U

OFFICE CONSOLIDATION OF PART III,
NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT
(AS AMENDED TO 1967)

Authorities:

Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Chapter 184

Statutes of Canada 1950, c. 43; 1964-65, c. 21; 1966-67, c. 26, s. 13.

THE DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD

53. (1) There shall be a Defence Research Board, which shall carry out such duties in connection with research relating to the defence of Canada and development of or improvements in materiel as the Minister may assign to it, and shall advise the Minister on all matters relating to scientific, technical, and other research and development that in its opinion may affect national defence.

(2) The Defence Research Board consists of a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, appointed by the Governor in Council, and

(a) the President of the National Research Council of Canada; 1966-67, c. 26, s. 13;

(b) the Deputy Minister of National Defence;

(c) such members as may be appointed by the Minister, as ex officio members representing the Canadian Forces; and

(d) such additional members representative of universities, industry and other research interests as the Governor in Council appoints. 1964-65, c. 21, s. 3.

(3) The Chairman and Vice-Chairman hold office during pleasure, and shall be paid such salaries as the Governor in Council determines.

(4) The members of the Defence Research Board, other than the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or the ex officio members, hold office for a period not exceeding three years but are eligible for re-appointment, and shall be paid such remuneration, if any, as the Governor in Council determines.

(5) Each member shall be paid his travelling and other expenses incurred in connection with the work of the Defence Research Board.

(6) The Chairman is the chief executive officer of the Defence Research Board and, under the direction of the Minister and in

accordance with policies approved by the Board, shall oversee and direct the officers, clerks and employees of the Board, have general control of the business of the Board, have supervision over the work directed to be carried out by the Board, be charged with the organization, administration and operation of the defence establishments of the Board and perform such other duties as the Minister may assign to him.

(7) The Vice-Chairman shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him under the by-laws made by the Defence Research Board.

54. The Defence Research Board may, with the approval of the Minister,

(a) Notwithstanding the Civil Service Act or any other section of this Act or any other statute or law, appoint and employ the professional, scientific, technical, clerical and other employees required to carry out efficiently the duties of the Board, prescribe their duties and, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, prescribe their terms of appointment and service and fix their remuneration;

(b) make by-laws or rules for the regulation of its proceedings and for the performance of its functions;

(c) enter into contracts in the name of Her Majesty for research and investigations with respect only to matters relating to defence; and

(d) make grants in aid of research and investigations with respect only to matters relating to defence and establish scholarships for the education or training of persons to qualify them to engage in such research and investigations. 1950, c. 43, s. 54.

55. (1) All expenses of the Defence Research Board shall be paid out of moneys appropriated by Parliament for the purpose or received by the Board through the conduct of its operations, requests, donations or otherwise and shall be paid by the Minister of Finance on the requisition of the Minister.

(2) The Minister may request the Minister of Finance to allocate any portion of the moneys appropriated by Parliament for the purposes of the Defence Research Board for scholarships or grants in aid of research and investigations, and thereupon the Minister of

Finance shall hold that portion of the moneys in trust and may at any time on the requisition of the Minister disburse that portion of the moneys for scholarships or grants in aid of research and investigations.

(3) Any moneys allocated by the Minister of Finance under this section that, in the opinion of the Minister, are not required for the purpose for which they were allocated shall cease to be held in trust. 1950, c. 43, s. 55.

APPENDIX V

SUMMARY OF 1968-69 ESTIMATES FOR DEFENCE RESEARCH (REVISED)

By Vote


	1968-69	1967-68
Operations and Maintenance (Vote 25)	\$32,411,000	\$32,770,000
Construction and Acquisition of Buildings, Works, Lands & Equipment (Vote 30)	11,044,000	8,947,000
Grants-in-Aid (Vote 35)		
University Grants for Research	\$ 2,900,000	
Industrial Research	4,500,000	
	7,400,000	7,400,000
	<u>\$50,855,000</u>	<u>\$49,117,000</u>

By Activity

	1968-69
1. Defence Research and Preliminary Development	\$27,448,000
2. Direct Technological and Analytical Support to Canadian Armed Forces and Defence Council	3,412,000
3. Defence Scientific Liaison and Information Services	1,491,000
4. Stimulation and Support of Defence Oriented Re- search	
Grants-in-aid	\$7,400,000
Ship Operations in Support of University Grants	300,000
5. Central Administration *	4,709,000
	<u>\$44,760,000</u>
Construction of Research Ship QUEST	6,095,000
	<u><u>\$50,855,000</u></u>

* This includes some centrally controlled funds as well as Headquarters.

APPENDIX W



LIBRARY
JAN 10 1968
HOUSE OF COMMONS
First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

16
Government
Publications

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE
No. 16

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1968

Respecting

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of National Defence

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs

APPEARING:

Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs,
and Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,	Gibson,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),
Anderson,	^a Groos,	MacLean,
^a Barrett,	Harkness,	MacRae,
Borrie,	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	McCleave,
Brewin,	<i>Boundary</i>),	Nowlan,
Cafik,	Laniel,	Penner,
¹ De Bané,	Laprise,	Roberts,
Fairweather,	Legault,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
Forrestall,	Lewis,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
		Winch—(30).

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

¹ Replaced Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*) on December 2, 1968.

² Replaced Mr. Buchanan on December 3, 1968.

^a Replaced Mr. Stanbury on December 3, 1968, who had replaced Mr. Marceau on December 2, 1968.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

MONDAY, December 2, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. De Bané and Stanbury be substituted for those of Messrs. Guay (*St. Boniface*) and Marceau on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

TUESDAY, December 3, 1968.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Barrett and Groos be substituted for those of Messrs. Buchanan and Stanbury on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,

The Clerk of the House of Commons.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, December 4, 1968.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

THIRD REPORT

Pursuant to its Order of Reference of Wednesday, October 16, 1968, your Committee has considered the items listed in the Revised Main Estimates for 1968-69 relating to the Department of National Defence.

Your Committee commends them to the House.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 14, 15 and 16*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman.

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, December 3, 1968.

(28)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Borrie, Brewin, Cafik, De Bané, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, MacRae, McCleave, Nowlan, Penner, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Roberts, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch (27).

Also present: Messrs. Deachman, Goyer, Hymmen and Reid, M.P.'s.

In attendance: Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence; Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. H. B. Robinson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. John Grant, Parliamentary Officer, Directorate of Information Services, Department of National Defence; Mr. Peter Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Centre For Foreign Affairs And Foreign Trade.

The Committee resumed consideration of the *Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of National Defence*.

When the Committee adjourned the previous sitting, Item 25 had been under consideration. The Committee agreed to stand Item 25.

The Chairman called Items 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48 and 50 of the Estimates which were severally carried, *on division*.

The Chairman called Item 1 which was carried, *on division*.

It was agreed that the Chairman should report the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of National Defence, to the House.

The Chairman called *Item 1 of the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs*. He introduced the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Mr. Sharp read a prepared statement, concerning the NATO Ministerial Meeting recently held in Brussels. Copies were distributed, in English and French.

It was agreed to print the communiqué dated 16th November, 1968 which was issued at the end of the NATO meeting, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix X*)

The Chairman introduced the Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence. Mr. Cadieux read a prepared statement, concerning the defence aspects of the NATO Ministerial Meeting. Copies were distributed, in English and French.

Members of the Committee questioned the Ministers on the subjects referred to in their opening statements, for the remainder of the afternoon sitting.

At 6:20 p.m., the Chairman thanked the Ministers and the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

Hugh. R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, December 3, 1968.

The Chairman: I believe we have a quorum.

At our last meeting we were on Item 25 of the Department of National Defence estimates. We have heard witnesses on that Item. The Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence will both be with us this afternoon. If it is agreeable to the Committee I would propose that we stand Item 25. Before calling upon the Minister and if it is agreeable to the members, the Committee could pass the National Defence estimates which are before us and on which we have heard evidence, so that we will not interrupt the presentations by the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Is that satisfactory to members of the Committee?

Mr. Winch: Provided we have the right of questioning on matters of defence.

The Chairman: That is quite clearly understood. Gentlemen, I will call the following Items of National Defence: 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 45, 48, 50, 1.

Items agreed to, on division.

The Chairman: The Clerk reminds me that I should get your agreement to reporting the National Defence estimates to the House. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have with us today the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Sharp. He has prepared a statement reporting on the NATO Conference. As we discussed at earlier meetings of the Committee, my understanding is that after this statement we will have questioning on it.

I think it is recognized by all members that we cannot cross-question Mr. Sharp very effectively on the policy of the government which is now under review, and that this particular meeting is largely limited to discussion of what transpired at the NATO meeting.

Following Mr. Sharp's statement there will be a statement by Mr. Cadieu, the Minister of National Defence, after which there can be questioning of both Ministers or either of them.

Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Secretary of State for External Affairs): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From the outset the NATO Ministerial Meeting recently held in Brussels had a special character going well beyond the customary annual ministerial appraisal of the international situation and the state of the Alliance. For the first time in the history of the Alliance, the Ministers assembled in advanced session to deal specifically with the implications of a serious international development—namely, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. They did so in circumstances contrasting strongly with those surrounding their last two meetings.

Less than a year ago, in December 1967, they had met in regular session to proclaim a new emphasis on détente in the Alliance's future activities. This new emphasis, which was seen as an essential prelude to a negotiated settlement of outstanding European problems, seemed warranted by the improved climate of East-West relations and the results of a year of intensive studies by the Alliance. These studies had produced what became known as the Harmel Report, named after the Foreign Minister of Belgium who played a leading role in its evolution.

• 1545

The theme of the Harmel Report, which was formally adopted by NATO Ministers a year ago, is that future Alliance policy should be based on the twin concepts of deterring possible aggression and seeking solutions for East-West problems through a dialogue with the Eastern European countries. In approving the Harmel Report, Canada subscribed to a new collective emphasis on improving the political atmosphere, on developing East-West contacts and on concrete moves in the sphere of disarmament and arms control. All of this

was done without sacrificing the security of members of the Alliance.

At Reykjavik five months later, the Ministers carried their détente policy a stage further with the concrete offer of mutual and balanced force reductions. At the time this move was seen as the first in a series which would eventually enable the security of Europe to rest on some more durable foundation.

It is only in the light of this background that the profound effect of the Czechoslovakian affair, particularly on the European members of NATO, can be measured.

On the eve of their meeting in Brussels, the NATO Ministers faced a difficult dilemma. By its actions the U.S.S.R. had dramatically rejected a concept of détente upon which all Western planning had been based. In addition to hopes of successful arms limitation talks with the U.S.S.R., the Western concept of détente had assumed that there would be a gradual evolution within the Communist bloc towards more humane and open societies, together with a gradual establishment of healthy relations between Eastern and Western Europe. There had been an underlying assumption on our part that the Soviet Union would acquiesce in these developments; certainly they were not expected to have recourse to force to impede them. This assumption proved wrong and now there can only be serious doubts about how the Soviet Union will react to the changes which must inevitably occur in Eastern Europe. This new situation could affect Western interests indirectly, or even directly in the case of West Berlin, which is surrounded by the territory of the so-called German Democratic Republic.

Despite the setback the Soviet Union had dealt to their hopes, NATO member states realized there was no real long-term alternative to East-West understanding.

The question therefore was how could they most effectively bring some influence to bear on Soviet leaders? How could NATO register its condemnation of the Soviet Union's action in Czechoslovakia while still holding the door ajar to the resumed pursuit of peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West, including progress in the vital fields of disarmament and arms control?

Since this was a problem shared by all members of the Alliance, the opportunity which the Brussels meeting provided for consultation with other countries in similar cir-

cumstances, demonstrated once again the value of the consultative aspect of NATO's activities. For Canada it was not only an occasion to hear the views of others; it also provided us with an opportunity to play a part in determining the kind of response which NATO should make to the Soviet intervention. In this way we can reasonably feel that we were able to influence the evolution of East-West relations in a direction that I believe reflected the views of Canadians—i.e. that NATO should respond in a firm yet restrained fashion.

It is a tribute to the Alliance that it was possible to solve so effectively the dilemma of condemning Soviet action while still holding the door ajar, as well as to reconcile the nuances of difference with which 15 governments would naturally view a situation as complicated as the one which has been brought about in Eastern Europe. A sense of compromise founded on common purpose and the habit of consultation, together with the excellent preparatory work which preceded the Brussels meeting, made possible the balanced and restrained consensus which is set out in the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting. A copy of this communiqué was tabled in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister on November 18 and reproduced as an appendix to Hansard. I hope members of the Committee will have had an opportunity to study it. For any who have not been able to do so, copies are available here today from my staff.

● 1550

The discussion in Brussels had two principal elements. In the North Atlantic Council itself, Foreign Ministers examined the political aspects of the situation, while in the Defence Planning Committee the Defence Ministers of the 14 countries which contribute to NATO's integrated forces, dealt with the military considerations. I will be describing to you the results of the political discussion and Canada's approach to it, while my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, will deal with the military side.

It was the strong and unanimous view of the Ministers that the Soviet Union's use of force in Czechoslovakia had not only jeopardized peace and international order but had also violated the basic right of the people of Czechoslovakia to shape their own future without outside interference. In view of earlier Canadian condemnation of Soviet ac-

tion, you will not be surprised that we supported this approach by the Council.

There was also agreement that the use of force and the stationing in Czechoslovakia of Soviet forces not hitherto deployed there, gave rise to uncertainty about the future intentions of the U.S.S.R. After all, the Soviet Union had demonstrated an impressive capability to bring substantial military force speedily to bear on a situation in Central Europe. Its decision to intervene with force in Czechoslovakia could not help but raise questions as to whether such an approach foreshadowed a new direction in Soviet policy for the future. It is hardly any wonder that, in the words of the communiqué, it was considered that this uncertainty required great vigilance on the part of the Alliance. For us in Canada it is not always easy to put ourselves in the position of our European Allies. However, I am sure that the reality of the concern and uncertainty felt by them will have been sensed by Members of Parliament who had the opportunity to attend the recent meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly which happened by coincidence to be held in Brussels the same week as the Ministerial Meeting.

The Ministers also expressed their concern about the Soviet contention, made following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that there was a "Socialist Commonwealth" within which the U.S.S.R. had the right to intervene if it considered that developments in the area were inimical to its own interests. This concern of course paralleled our own which I referred to earlier in the Fall during my statement to the United Nations General Assembly on October 9th. I said at that time that Canada could not accept that a community of interests, real or alleged, political, cultural or economic, entitles one country to take upon itself the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another. In the Commonwealth of Nations to which we belong, the right of national self-determination is so taken for granted that member countries are free to develop ties with any other countries, including of course socialist countries.

The doctrine of the Socialist Commonwealth is the antithesis of the principle of non-intervention recognized in the United Nations Charter. It is particularly disturbing for the implications it could have for attempts at rapprochement and the ultimate unification of the two parts of Germany. In this context the Ministers in Brussels confirmed the support of their governments for the declared determination of the United States, United

Kingdom, and France to safeguard the security of Berlin and to maintain freedom of access to that city. This part of the communiqué represents a reaffirmation of existing commitments for Canada.

The Ministers accepted that the uncertainties extended to the Mediterranean basin. They agreed that recent expansion of Soviet activity in that area required continuing vigilance to ensure that the security of the Alliance was not adversely affected. It was also accepted that there should be a continuing effort on the part of members of NATO to find political solutions for the problems of the region which would help to ensure its peaceful evolution.

The Ministers agreed that while the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia did not constitute a direct threat to NATO, the uncertainties regarding future Soviet intentions could not be ignored. The communiqué therefore reaffirmed the determination of their governments to defend members of the Alliance against any armed attack, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty. It also observed that any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean, would create an international crisis with grave consequences.

• 15.55

It was considered that in view of the new situation created in Eastern Europe, certain improvements in the military forces available to NATO would be desirable. The nature and extent of these improvements were discussed in the Defence Planning Committee and the Minister of National Defence will be describing that discussion to you in more detail.

I would like to emphasize however that the limited improvements envisaged for NATO's forces could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered provocative or an escalation of the arms race. Their immediate military purpose was to improve the ability of the Alliance to cope with the uncertainties of the period ahead resulting from recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. Behind this, they served the larger political purpose of demonstrating to Soviet leaders that recourse to force in solving European problems was unproductive; that the reaction which it would inevitably generate could only serve to complicate rather than ease the solution of present or future problems.

Having accepted the requirement to maintain appropriate defences, the Ministers

underlined with equal emphasis their unanimous view that détente remained as the long-term goal of the Alliance. It was agreed that the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had seriously set back hopes of settling the outstanding problems which divided Europe, but it was acknowledged that solutions for these problems, together with progress in arms control and disarmament, were essential elements in establishing a situation of lasting peace. In my own statement to the Council I expressed the importance which Canada attached to continuing progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. I expressed the hope that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would not become a casualty of the events in Czechoslovakia and urged that early action be taken by all concerned to bring the Treaty into force as soon as possible. I also indicated our desire to see the important discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive strategic arms begin as soon as possible.

The Ministers agreed that continuing attention should be devoted by the Alliance to arms control and disarmament so that progress could be resumed as soon as circumstances permitted. The communiqué specifically noted that while recent Soviet actions seem to rule out any movement for the time being on the question of mutual force reductions, NATO should pursue its study of the issues involved so that it will be in a position to move ahead when more favourable circumstances prevail. Canada attaches particular importance to this element of the discussion in Brussels.

In conclusion, the Ministers agreed that the North Atlantic Alliance would continue to stand as the guarantor of security and the essential foundation of European reconciliation. Recent events had further demonstrated that its continued existence was more than ever necessary.

In my statement to the North Atlantic Council, I stated that like others we accepted that the threat to the Alliance resulting from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was an indirect one which faced NATO, not with a problem of responding to premeditated aggression, but rather of coping with the uncertainty and the possibility of miscalculation which recent Soviet conduct had fostered. In view of this situation we agreed that NATO's continuing determination to resist any aggression directed against its members should be made clear, as well as the fact that the

Alliance could not be expected to remain indifferent to any further moves which even indirectly threatened its security.

While we accepted that it was natural in the existing circumstances to stress the defensive character of the Alliance, we considered it was important that NATO should take advantage of all reasonable opportunities to resume the dialogue with the Soviet Union and thus to promote in due course progress toward the settlement of the issues facing Europe. We therefore supported the view that NATO's policy should be to keep open the option of normal relations with the U.S.S.R. against the day when the Soviet Union itself would recognize that such a course was in its own best interest. We urged that the communiqué should clearly reaffirm the Alliance's pursuit of détente, together with the achievement of arms control and disarmament measures, as its long-term objectives.

• 1600

There is no doubt that on the eve of the Brussels meeting, there was some concern on the part of the other members of the Alliance regarding Canada's support for NATO. The events in Czechoslovakia had caused them to appreciate once again the value of NATO as a means of ensuring their security and they were naturally anxious that nothing should be done, particularly at this time, to detract from the solidarity of the Alliance. By the time the meeting was over I think we were able to satisfy our Allies that we shared their concern about the future security of Europe; that although we were reviewing our foreign and defence policy we would continue to live up to our commitments to NATO until such time as they might be altered; and that if in the future the Government of Canada should consider changing our role in the Alliance we would of course consult with them.

In summary, the Canadian delegation to the Brussels meeting endeavoured to reconcile two main objectives.

The first of these was to emphasize—in a measured and practical manner—our condemnation of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

The second was to co-operate with our Allies in producing a response to this action which was designed to influence in a constructive way the thinking of Soviet leaders—to encourage them to resume the dialogue with the West rather than resort to the use of force in seeking solutions to problems.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Perhaps in order that our record may be complete we might obtain agreement of the members to have the communique issued at the end of the NATO conference appended as an appendix to our proceedings.

Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Cafik: It was mentioned that copies of the communique issued at the conclusion of the conference were available. I wonder if they could be passed out to those of us who would like to have a copy now?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, my staff told me they would have copies with them.

The Chairman: The Clerk has a few copies available for those who do not have copies. Copies were distributed previously to the members' offices.

Mr. Sharp: It was also printed as an appendix to *Hansard*.

The Chairman: Perhaps I could call upon Mr. Cadieux for his statement.

Do you have copies of your statement available for the members?

Hon. Léo A. J. Cadieux (Minister of National Defence): Yes, whether they will be available now or later, I do not know, but we have prepared copies.

The Chairman: Before we start, did you have a question, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, on a point of procedure—with no criticism meant at all to today's arrangement—I wonder if it would not be possible in the future to have these statements printed the day before the hearing and distributed so that members could read them the day before rather than have them read at the meeting, which necessarily occupies a considerable amount of time that might otherwise be used for discussion and questions.

The Chairman: That is a very helpful suggestion and we will try to do that.

Mr. Cadieux, will you proceed.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Cadieux: Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to thank the Committee for having invited me to come here this afternoon and I want to say how very pleased I am to have

the opportunity to come before the members of this Committee. We shall deal with the very serious events that occurred last August, and I shall inform you about the meeting I attended in Brussels together with my colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Before dealing with the defence matters that were discussed at the Ministers' meeting of NATO, you might perhaps like me to go over Canada's participation, in the past, in the NATO defence effort. Although relatively isolated geographically, Canada has taken part during this century in two World Wars, and in several other lesser wars. This experience has brought Canadians to accept two fundamental defence principles: the first one is that, from the point of view of Canada, peace and prosperity depend on maintaining peace in the world, and that Canadians have the obligation to assure and maintain peace in the world. According to the second principle, the only logical attitude that Canada can take to ensure the maintenance of peace, is working together with the nations that are pursuing the same objective.

[*English*]

We applied these principles to Europe during the precarious decade following the Second World War. The prospects for continued peace were uncertain, and our European friends were in military and economic disarray. In the early years of NATO Canada responded, on the military side, to the pressing needs of cooperative defence by providing, under Mutual Aid, material sufficient to equip two and a half Army divisions; we trained over five thousand pilots; we provided over one thousand aircraft and twenty-five naval ships. Forces were assigned or earmarked in all three environments: naval forces for service in the North Atlantic, a Brigade Group in Germany backed up by the balance of a division in Canada, and an Air Division in Central Europe.

● 1605

As our allies grew in strength and self-assurance under the climate of confidence made possible by the Alliance, we have been able, in consultation with them, to reduce our share of the European defence burden, both as a proportion of the total effort and in absolute terms. Although our force commitments are now less than they were initially, this has been compensated to a significant degree by extensive improvements in weapons and

equipment. The Canadian forces now based in Europe constitute a relatively small but militarily significant and identifiably Canadian contribution to Alliance defence.

The stability engendered by the NATO Alliance gave rise during the mid-60's to hopes for more normal relations with Eastern Europe, and even for some optimism regarding an eventual settlement in Europe. You will remember that the keynote of the NATO ministerial meeting a year ago in Brussels was the promotion of détente between east and west, and in Reykjavik in June we began to think in terms of an early start on negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries for balanced reductions of Forces. Unfortunately efforts in this direction were thwarted by the tragic events of last August. The unwarranted invasion of Czechoslovakia gave all member nations cause to reflect on the adequacy of the Alliance defences, and it was apparent during our meeting two weeks ago that a consensus had developed. There was general agreement that the new situation called for increased vigilance and a qualitative improvement wherever possible in currently committed forces. The Czech crisis created a mood of caution and concern, and re-emphasized the need for defence preparedness in the face of an uncertain future.

In my statement to the Defence Planning Committee, which you will recall is the Council-level committee of the fourteen member nations participating in the integrated military command organization, I supported the general consensus that qualitative improvements in our committed forces would constitute reasonable and prudent action at this time, and I discussed several measures that we are taking along this line.

For example, I mentioned the four helicopter-equipped destroyers and the two operational support ships now under construction. Since there has been some discussion about these vessels and their relation to NATO I would like to explain to you our present plans for employing them after their construction is completed and they are commissioned into the Canadian Armed Forces. First of all, although support ships contribute a great deal to NATO's anti-submarine capability by enabling our ships to spend a higher proportion of time on active operations, they are not normally earmarked to NATO, but remain under national command even in wartime. On the other hand the four new destroyers would in the normal course of events

be earmarked to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) when they become operational. When this takes place, we plan to remove four of the older destroyer escorts from the list of forces now earmarked to SACLANT and retain them in the Canadian Forces for North American defence purposes only. Thus we are not at this time planning any increase in the number of ships committed to SACLANT, nor are we planning any extension in the normal area of operation of our NATO committed maritime forces (for example, in the Mediterranean) and our allies have been fully informed of our present intentions. The new destroyers will of course provide significant qualitative improvement in SACLANT forces. In discussing our contribution to SACLANT I also referred to our destroyer modification program, and pointed out that this too will lead to qualitative improvements in NATO's anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

• 1610

I drew attention to our program of re-equipping the Brigade Group in Germany and indicated that we are giving high priority to its completion. This program includes, for example, a substantial number of new reconnaissance vehicles, some new counter mortar radars, a large number of new wheeled vehicles, and completion of the stockpiling of certain kinds of ammunition.

I pointed out that our reserve forces will be enhanced through improvements in training facilities and increased training intensity, and that we intend to continue the training of reserve personnel with the Brigade in Europe.

I announced that we had decided to participate in the 1969 exercise of the NATO ACE Mobile Force (Land) in the northern regions of Norway, as we have done on two previous occasions. We will be providing a battalion group for this exercise, and we will at this time also practice the strategic air and sea operational deployment of the unit to Norway.

Finally, I stated that we had deferred the final decision regarding our planned twenty percent reduction in the number of aircraft in the Air Division in Germany. I might add that in private discussions with several of my NATO colleagues I learned that Canada's reassurance regarding the Air Division was particularly appreciated.

To clear up one or two misconceptions about the Air Division, I would like to

remind you that the CF-104-equipped squadrons are dual-capable, and we have available now in Europe stocks of conventional ordnance for these aircraft. They are capable of making an effective contribution to the strategy of flexible response adopted by NATO a year ago. This is a concept that we support in principle and one that we have catered for in our committed forces. The Canadian Air Division is among the finest in NATO, and I would not hesitate to stand it beside any such formation in the world. Our CF-104 pilots, supported by the whole of the complex organization of the Air Division, have repeatedly taken the honours at NATO training competitions. The same applies to our ground forces in EUROPE—there are none better. When I spoke in Brussels I mentioned that our military forces are all professionals, and I assured our allies that we are maintaining them at their high standard of equipment, training, and operational readiness.

On the defence side, the main purpose of the meeting two weeks ago was to reaffirm Alliance resolve, in the aftermath of the Czech crisis, to stand together against aggression directed at any of its members, and to consult on specific measures being taken to ensure that the necessary defences are maintained. Canada both joined with the other members of the Alliance in reaffirming this intention and in maintaining and improving Canada's defence contribution as I have outlined to you.

While I am before you, I would like to say a word or two about Canadian security in relation to NATO. The major threat to the security of Canada and the Canadian people comes from the prospect of an intercontinental nuclear exchange arising out of a conflict of interest or of ideology between the superpowers. The forum where superpowers' interests most closely impinge on each other is Europe, and hence Europe, in my view, is the geographical region where Canada's security is most in jeopardy. Thus, Canada's security is very closely interlocked with the security of Europe. These are inescapable facts of the world we live in. In the past we considered it to be in the interests of Canadian national security to meet the challenge through our participation in NATO. How we meet the challenge in the future is one of the very important considerations of the defence review. But I would ask you to remember this, the defence review cannot remove the challenge.

• 1615

Perhaps I might finish by repeating to you my closing remarks to the Defence Planning Committee two weeks ago. At that meeting I said: "The Czechoslovak affair has demonstrated to all of us the importance of a collective approach to defence problems. Canada's history of the last half-century amply attests to our enthusiastic support of such an approach and has shown our willingness to make an effective contribution every time it was required. Collective security continues to be the guiding principle of Canadian defence policy."

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

As members know, we have a meeting scheduled in this room this evening starting at 8 o'clock. At that time we will be considering the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs. Unfortunately the minister will not be available this evening so I hope we can conclude our questioning of him by 6 o'clock at the latest. I imagine most members will want to ask questions or, at least, many of them will, so I ask the questioners who are called upon first to exercise a reasonable degree of restraint as to time and ask their most important questions, knowing that some of the others will probably be asked by other members. The first one I have on the list is Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: I do not know which minister to refer my questions to—either one could deal with them. First, in the communiqué—and I cannot lay my hands on it at the moment but I read it before—there is a reference to NATO's being concerned with a direct or indirect threat. Whatever the exact language is, the ministers probably know where it occurs. Since words are not used lightly by people in that situation, what is the reference; what did the Council have in mind when it was talking about an indirect threat? For example, I noticed in the Defence Minister's statement the sentence:

On the defence side the main purpose of the meeting two weeks ago was to reaffirm Alliance resolve, in the aftermath of the Czech crisis, to stand together against aggression directed at any of its members,

That is clear enough, but "direct or indirect aggression" is not that clear.

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, as I endeavored to make clear in my submission to the Committee, it was recognized the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not a direct threat to the members of the NATO Alliance. It did have a very disturbing effect, however, upon the prospects for peace because it marked a new departure in Soviet policy and one that created new kinds of uncertainty in the world.

We also, of course, had to look at the situation that might arise if the Soviet Union were to take action, not by way of attack upon a member country, but in other areas of Europe in the Mediterranean that would have an effect upon the balance of power in Europe. If you will refer to the communiqué, Mr. Lewis, you will see that the members of the Alliance used terms to indicate that this would create an international crisis with grave consequences.

The Alliance does not specify the kind of action it would take if it gave notice to the Soviet Union that, as a fact, any action of that kind by the Soviet Union would constitute that sort of crisis.

Mr. Lewis: But to be specific, is what the members of the Council had in mind possible action of the Soviet Union in East Germany?

Mr. Sharp: Well...

Mr. Lewis: Suppose that instead of an invasion of Czechoslovakia there were Soviet forces and Polish forces placed on the soil of East Germany. Is that what the Council had in mind as a kind of indirect aggression—indirect in the sense that it is not against a member of NATO but a kind of indirect aggression that NATO has to be prepared to reply to?

• 1620

Mr. Sharp: I do not think that would have been very different from the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in its effect. It would have had the same effect upon us as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in that it indicated the Soviet Union was prepared to use force in the promotion of its political aims in that part of Eastern Europe. That would not have been categorized as a direct attack on NATO any more than was the invasion of Czechoslovakia but it would have created the same sort of uncertainties about future Soviet intentions.

Mr. Lewis: I am trying not to make statements in view of the Chairman's proper request that we not be lengthy but what I am

concerned with is to establish some things a little more concretely, and I appreciate the Minister may not be able to answer as bluntly as in other situations. What I am concerned about is whether the direction of NATO has been changed somewhat. I read into the communiqué that some members of NATO were so concerned about the invasion of Czechoslovakia that there was an implied intention to consider the possibility of a NATO response, not merely in words—which is what this communiqué does; issue a statement of its concern and appeal to the U.S.S.R. not to hurt possibilities of détente.

I have worried ever since I read the communiqué—and I have read it several times, both in the newspapers and in *Hansard*—because it seemed to me to suggest that there was a readiness on the part of some members of NATO to consider a military response in the case of Soviet action in some countries; Yugoslavia, for example, judging from some statements made in Washington; East Germany, judging from the emphasis in the communiqué about Germany; difficulties about Berlin—that any of these might change what has till now been the direction of NATO.

Mr. Sharp: Perhaps I might deal with the first part of your question Mr. Lewis. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was a great shock to the NATO powers. As both Mr. Cadieux and I have said, until that event occurred we had gone on the assumption that it was possible to look forward to a détente, not only in the sense of an accommodation between the Soviet Union and the United States as the two great superpowers, but also a détente that would come about as a result of a relaxation of tensions, the promotion of freer exchanges between all members of the Warsaw Pact and of the NATO countries.

It would have been set back in the same way or in a somewhat similar way by the invasion of East Germany. It also indicated, and particularly the declaration of the socialist commonwealth doctrine, that the Soviet Union was prepared to use force in a way that up until this time we had not thought they would be prepared to do. That would have been the bearing, it seems to me, of action in any of the Warsaw Pact countries.

When you get outside of that sphere—when you get into the periphery—into other parts of Europe and into the Mediterranean, the ministers of the NATO countries were very careful in their statement of how they would

interpret that sort of event, which was to say that as a fact it would create an international crisis that was considered to be grave.

I do not believe it would have been wise for the NATO powers to have gone any farther than to say that, because in a situation like this I think some uncertainty about the actions the NATO countries might take under those circumstances is proper. I believe that uncertainty helps to promote peace.

Mr. Lewis: It is a new doctrine. It will go down in international history as the "Sharp doctrine", not knowing where you are going helps the other fellow not to go.

Mr. Sharp: If he does not know where you are going in a situation like this, he...

Mr. Lewis: I was asking whether we knew where we were going and I gathered that we did not, and you thought that would help.

• 1625

In any case, to bring that to an end I have two very short questions and I will be finished, Mr. Chairman. The Prime Minister, on more than one occasion stated, and I think you did, Mr. Sharp, that it was important not to over-react to the Czech situation. I took that to mean the sensible approach was to recognize that, even though one did not like the Soviet's proposition of a socialist commonwealth as being acceptable and that, in fact, we were accepting certain spheres of influence in Europe—I happen to disagree with the whole notion of those regional pacts but that is irrelevant—and what the Prime Minister meant and what you meant was that if the Soviet Union acts within its own area of influence, NATO should hold its temper and its response.

Can we be assured that the attitude of the Council of Ministers was that it was not prepared to start action which might result in actual war and an actual confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. because of the Soviet Union's acting in certain directions in its sphere of influence?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, I was satisfied that the action taken by the NATO Council had the right degree of permanence and restraint. We did not act in such a way as to begin a new arms race. The reaction of the NATO powers was restrained. It was notice to the Soviet Union that the NATO Alliance remained strong but no indication to an acceleration of the arms race.

I believe one of the great accomplishments of the Brussels meeting is that it was a well-balanced response. Furthermore, it invited the Soviet Union to resume the dialogue with the West, but I am sure you will agree that for the Soviet Union to feel that it had a right to interfere by military action in the internal affairs of one of its allies is contrary to all the concepts of international order under which we now operate.

Mr. Lewis: There is no doubt about that. In both your statements, Mr. Sharp, and in Mr. Cadieux' statement there was reference to efforts being made to start discussions with the Warsaw Pact. What precise efforts have, in fact, been made? None that I know of through the press, other than the discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union at the non-proliferation treaty meeting. Have there been any direct approaches to the Warsaw Pact for the purpose of discussing a reduction of arms on both sides?

Mr. Cadieux: No, but the hope of these discussions being achieved after the preliminary contacts that had been made between the U.S.S.R. and the United States was very real last year, and it was hoped that opposing groups—this line of conversation—would be available. Of course, it was disappointing this year because it seemed that it was a major setback and that we could not hope unilaterally to decide to reduce forces without being assured that parallel reductions would take place on the other side.

Mr. Lewis: But there have been no discussions?

Mr. Cadieux: No actual discussions to my knowledge, but last year there was a feeling that we were nearing the point where it would be possible.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Cadieux, could you assure this Committee that when the defence review is completed—I suppose it has to wait till then—that you will be producing a White Paper for the House dealing not only with the decisions that may be made by the government or the conclusions that will have been reached by the Government, but also with the strategic theories behind the conclusions?

• 1630

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, I think this is a logical development of the defence review. We are going to make extensive presentations to the Committee. The Department of Nation-

al Defence is preparing now a range of possible options according to the different political approaches that could be taken in this particular sphere, and I think the best way to present our views and to provoke the useful debate that is necessary will be to present a White Paper in which these considerations plus, I believe, the political implications as far as Europe is concerned anyway, will have to be included. This is the definite aim of the Committee, to end up with such a White Paper.

Mr. Lewis: My final question, Mr. Cadieux. Are the statements which you gave us earlier the absolute sum total of commitments that you made on behalf of Canada? The communiqué, on page 3, states:

The quality, effectiveness, and deployment of NATO's forces will be improved in terms of both manpower and equipment in order to provide a better capability for defence as far forward as possible.

And later on:

The conventional capability of NATO's tactical air forces will be increased. Certain additional national units will be committed to the Major NATO Commanders.

There are several such statements which, unless I misunderstand, go rather beyond the statement of Canada's commitments which are contained in the statement which you read to us earlier. I wonder whether you can tell this Committee if what is described in your statement to the Committee is complete or whether there were discussions beyond the things you mentioned in your statement.

Mr. Cadieux: I am not exactly using the same terms today that I used in the Defence Planning Committee. But I have this part of the text which related to our commitments. I have a list here, and they are the same actually, but my statement was worded a little differently.

● 1635

Mr. Lewis: You are having another meeting in Brussels on January 16, 1969...

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Lewis: ...presumably to complete these discussions.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. We will meet to complete the discussions and also to make the commitments for the one-year period, which is the customary procedure. This meeting, as you know, was supposed to be held in

December but since we held the advanced meeting it was decided that it would be more appropriate to hold it one month later. At that time, January 16, 1969, according to the directions I have from the government, I will have to make known what our commitments are.

Mr. Lewis: But at this time there are no more commitments than those mentioned in your statement.

Mr. Cadieux: No. No more.

The Chairman: The questioners I have at the moment are Mr. Fairweather, Mr. Allmand, Mr. MacLean, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Nowlan, and Mr. Borrie. Have I missed anyone? I will put you on, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Fairweather: I wonder whether Mr. Sharp would like to comment on the possibility of the United States signing the non-proliferation treaty and whether Canada has made any representations, I do not know really how this is done. Do we wait until a new President comes in, or what?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, the position, as I understand it, is that the question of the non-proliferation treaty and how to proceed with it in the United States is under discussion between the outgoing administration and the new administration. We have been in touch and have urged the administration to proceed, and have urged it to urge the incoming administration to proceed.

● 1640

We ourselves have no hesitation in ratifying the treaty, and it will be put forward for ratification in due course.

Mr. Fairweather: Do you see a danger in future Soviet military initiatives in Roumania and Yugoslavia?

Mr. Sharp: I have been following developments very closely and I would hesitate to offer an opinion. There have been varying reports but there have also been a great many doubts. For example, one of the doubts that has been expressed recently is whether there was any substance to the reports that circulated around the world as to Soviet intentions with respect to Roumania. As for Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government itself has made it clear that it would resist any aggression by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Fairweather: I do not know to which Minister I should address this question, but I will leave it floating and either one can answer.

I am wondering why NATO was caught short during August, in the sense that events took place in Czechoslovakia before the world, or NATO at least, had any warning about it.

Mr. Cadieux: I do not quite understand your question. If you mean that there was no evident response, I think this was a very definitely planned restraint. Certainly on the Intelligence net anybody who could analyze what was taking place could see that something certainly was in the offing. From the intelligence reports that we had, we at National Defence Headquarters certainly had some idea that something was possible. But it was not, I think, considered to be anything aimed definitely at any of the NATO countries. I think that might explain the non-response, or unpreparedness, that took place. I would be very surprised if at NATO Headquarters they were not aware of what was going on.

Mr. Fairweather: One last question to Mr. Sharp, Mr. Chairman. I am wondering about the fact that Canada's ambassador in Czechoslovakia was on leave and was to be replaced, and that really we had no ambassador from August to November. Does this not leave us in a rather extraordinary position? Why does it take so long? I know the domino theory seems to work in ambassadorial appointments, but does it take this long to respond to a vacancy in a crucial country?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, our ambassador in Czechoslovakia had been in his post too long. We had been planning to withdraw him. We withdrew him; we made the decision after what the whole world regarded as a hopeful development, and he was brought home. I may add that his presence in Ottawa was very valuable to us at that time. The fact that we had a man who had recently been in Czechoslovakia helped us a good deal, particularly when we had to deal with the questions of the kind of response we should make to those Czechoslovakians who wanted to come to Canada. So, it was not altogether a loss, the fact that he did not happen to be on the post at that time.

It is not unusual to take some time to replace ambassadors. We sometimes have

vacancies for a few months. This is not only our procedure, but it is the procedure of other countries. We sometimes have a chargé d'affaires in Canada from another country for a considerable period.

I would like to add this, too, Mr. Chairman. Those who were left in Czechoslovakia really performed very well, and perhaps if these words can get back to them, they will be perhaps encouraged a little bit to know that the Secretary of State recognized their abilities.

Mr. Fairweather: This is not to be taken as an implication of any criticism of the people involved. It is the speed with which the replacement came about.

Mr. Sharp: It is not unusual to take some time to replace ambassadors. If it is not standard international practice, it is not unusual.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make more precise the changes in our defence commitments as a result of the Czechoslovakian incident. In his statement, the Minister of Defence says that basically the changes are of a "qualitative" nature.

With respect to the ships, he points out that four helicopter-equipped destroyers will replace four older destroyers, and that two support ships will replace others. Do these new destroyers and support ships entail more men under NATO commitment than the present destroyers and support ships?

Mr. Cadieux: No, they do not, Mr. Chairman. They do not necessarily entail more men, but they have better equipment, and the fact that they have helicopters also adds to their range. These ships are going to be used mainly in the ASW role. Helicopters extend the range of coverage of the ocean, and in addition, support ships can maintain a certain number of ships almost constantly on station. They do not have to come back to be refuelled, or to get provisions. The supply ships go to them. Therefore, efficiency is actually increased, and in that sense it is a marked qualitative improvement over the present system.

Mr. Allmand: Would this change have been in effect if the recent events in Czechoslovakia had not taken place?

Mr. Cadieux: Oh, yes. These ships have been on the way for some time. I think the construction was decided in December 1964.

Mr. Allmand: Under item 8 on page 4, you talk about re-equipping the Brigade Group in Germany. Was this re-equipping program to take place anyway, or is that a change since Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Cadieux: I think, Mr. Chairman, I used the word "completion". This re-equipping again is part of a five-year program, and it started three or four years ago, I believe. It implied the buying of compatible equipment like APC's with which the Brigade is equipped. What I meant here is that we are completing this re-equipping. I think I spelled it out—some counter mortar radars. I think we have to take delivery of 65 new reconnaissance cars. I think we are getting delivery of something like 24 self-propelled guns this year. And in that sense again, this is really a qualitative improvement in our Brigade Group in Germany.

Mr. Allmand: This qualitative improvement would have taken place in any case whether there had been Czechoslovakia or not?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Have there been changes in the qualitative aspects of the forces in Europe as a result of Czechoslovakia, or were you just announcing qualitative improvements which were going to take place anyway?

• 1645

Mr. Cadieux: There have been no changes in the plans that we had before the Czech crisis. I just underlined what was actually taking place, and I wanted to impress the NATO members that we have there a very considerable force, that it is very effective, and that we are trying to improve its quality.

Mr. Allmand: That is all. I just wanted to make that more precise.

The Chairman: I have Mr. MacLean and then Mr. Thompson, whose name I omitted before.

Mr. MacLean: In the main, the questions I was going to ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs have been asked by Mr. Fairweather. However, there is one further question that I might ask him, although it may not bear directly on the problem.

It would seem to me that although the Czechoslovakian affair was a dramatic thing, there is also a very considerable threat or change in the balance of power with regard to

increased U.S.S.R. naval strength in the Mediterranean and the apparent working toward greater influence in the Arab world with the possibility of obtaining naval bases in North Africa, and this sort of thing. Is there any appropriate comment you would like to make in that regard?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, given the relative strength of NATO and Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, I think the significance of what the Russians are doing there is perhaps more political than military, though this does not reduce its importance in the various sensitive situations which are to be found in the area.

NATO must, of course, ensure that its security interests in the Mediterranean are protected. But in our view—and this is what I stated to the Council when I was in Brussels—it will be through political measures designed to ensure the peaceful and orderly development of the region that any negative objectives which the Soviet Union may have can be countered most effectively. And, as the Committee is aware, one of the most important areas of concern is in the Middle East.

Mr. MacLean: And North Africa—Algiers.

Mr. Sharp: I meant that, as part of the confrontation between Israel and the Arab States.

Mr. MacLean: Now with regard to the qualitative improvement of our defence forces of which the Minister speaks, is it not correct to point out that this is not an absolute improvement—that our strength is only relative to the strength of a possible aggressor, and surely they, too, are improving the qualitative effectiveness of their forces. It is a case of having to keep running to stay in the same relative position, so to speak. Is this not true?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, except that I think we are making a very worthwhile effort in the maritime field. When we talk, for instance, of having re-instated the conversion of the *Restigouche* class, this is really something new, which is quite an improvement over the previous performance of the ships. One of them, as you know, the *Terra Nova*, is now complete and is being evaluated. I think this particular item, as far as the naval element is concerned, is really a qualitative improvement. Now of course you have to equate that with the importance of the threat, and I think the best we can say here is that we are

stretching our resources to the limit in order to maintain the best possible force that we can afford.

Mr. MacLean: I imagine that you could not answer this question anyway—I mean here, but I presume that NATO, as an organization, and the individual countries within it, should keep themselves as well informed as possible of the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the forces of the Eastern Bloc.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, by all means. I myself have had many briefings on that particular subject.

• 1650

Mr. MacLean: With regard to the 20 per cent cut in the Air Division which has been postponed—and which has been definitely postponed for at least a year from January I understand.

Mr. Cadieux: I think what I said in the House is the accurate way of saying it. The decision to reduce has been deferred and the government now has to decide when this step is going to take place, if it takes place at all. Therefore, I will have to see what instructions I get at the January meeting.

Mr. MacLean: The firm commitments that will be made in January will carry for a year at least?

Mr. Cadieux: This is the customary period, yes.

Mr. MacLean: Am I correct in assuming that the closing down of the Zweibrücken base is going on as scheduled?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, it is.

Mr. MacLean: Now I presume direct closure was planned when it was assumed that there would be a 20 per cent cut in our air crew?

Mr. Cadieux: No, not necessarily. The planning for the closing of Zweibrücken was made after we had taken over the base at Lahr. This base actually was much better than we thought. Actually we have stationed on that base now not only the squadrons but also the headquarters of the Air Division. Not only the base itself but the area, in particular, provides a lot of accommodation, and there is no problem actually in operating from the two bases that will be left the six squadrons that we now have, as well as the headquarters. This is a situation that we benefit from

because we took over a base that seems to be much better than anticipated.

Mr. MacLean: You have pretty well answered my question already. I just wanted to be assured that the retention of the Air Division at its present strength, plus the closing of the base at Zweibrücken would not create any problems with regard to facilities. I am thinking of subsidiary facilities such as schools for dependants children and all this sort of thing?

Mr. Cadieux: No, we have...

Mr. MacLean: These are adequate?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes—Well, as you know, we have six or seven months to plan. We have buildings now at Lahr, in a sector called the casern, which we can convert into classrooms. We have done so in the past year for the squadrons that are there. I am assured by the Commander—I went to Germany after the Brussels meeting to check on that specifically—that there is ample accommodation for school children. We also have a lot of married quarters that had been occupied late in the transfer by the French people and they are now renovating them, cleaning them up and so on, and they will be available.

On the economy itself, you can see a lot of civilian construction going up, a lot of high-rise apartments, and it is not anticipated that there will be any problem at all as far as the dependants are concerned. The purpose of this exercise that was planned was to try and save administrative positions, and I think we will be able to achieve these savings notwithstanding the fact that we maintain the same number of squadrons and the same number of names.

Mr. MacLean: The delay in the cut of 20 per cent will have no effect on the equipment. I take it that there are enough aircraft to continue to keep the squadrons at full strength for the continued period?

Mr. Cadieux: Until the mid-seventies.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I have three quick questions, Mr. Chairman.

Are we to gather from the statements made by both Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of Defence—I am directing this question to the Minister for External Affairs—that a commitment has already

been made to member NATO nations and to NATO itself that Canada will not be withdrawing from or even changing its role when the NATO Treaty comes up for renewal in 1969?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, this is based on some misunderstanding, I think, of the nature of the NATO Treaty. The NATO Treaty is of indefinite duration. All that happens as from August 1, 1969 is that any country may at that time give a year's notice that it intends to withdraw, but the Treaty itself is of indefinite duration.

• 1655

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): That is not the point of the question, whether we are going to give a statement of intent one way or the other. Have indications been given to the member NATO countries or to NATO itself that Canada's role will not be changing?

Mr. Sharp: No, I made it quite clear in my statement here and to the NATO Council that we had a foreign policy—a defence policy review under way. I did not indicate that we did intend to use the option to withdraw. The matter is still to be decided. I did not give any notice that we intended to withdraw.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): But you did not give any notice to the contrary, that you would be continuing with the same emphasis?

Mr. Sharp: There was no necessity for me to do that. It was sufficient that I did not give any notice of our intention to withdraw. Indeed, I could not do that before August 1, in any event, but I did not forecast that we would.

As long as we are members of the Alliance we are loyal members.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): A question to the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Chairman.

Is it correct to interpret from your statements, Mr. Minister, that in so far as Canada's defence policy has been formulated Canada's emphasis in the future is going to be maritime rather than in ground forces or even air forces, both of which are now nuclear equipped?

I sense that there is an emphasis, not only in your statement but in your remarks, that we are searching for a maritime role of greater importance than we have had.

Mr. Cadieux: Mr. Chairman, no. I did bring in the contribution to NATO that we are

making in the maritime field because it seems to me that this is almost all the time forgotten—that when we are talking of what we are doing in NATO most of the time we are talking of the Air Division and the Brigade Group. But actually we are doing much more than that, and although it is in the direct defence of Canada it is a worthwhile contribution to NATO.

For instance, we participate in the NATO standing naval force. We have something like 20 ships committed to NATO all year round. This is something I believe that we should talk about whenever we are among other members of the club. We should not be too shy about saying what we are doing because I think it is a very worthwhile contribution.

Now I am not trying to put one contribution against another or to put an emphasis on one or the other; I am just stating what we are doing.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It follows as a fact then that we still have admirals on the bridge?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I hope we will keep them.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): If I might ask one further question indirectly related to the NATO question, Mr. Chairman, how soon does the Minister of Defence expect to be able to enunciate the specific roles of various training bases in order that such a definition might eliminate many of the uncertainties that surround some of these bases, particularly those in the West?

Mr. Cadieux: I would like to tell you very candidly I wish I knew. This, again, is a problem which is conditioned by the review itself. It all depends on the outcome, I suppose, of the general review. We at the Defence Department are almost prepared now to make some recommendations based on consolidation. This has been a problem that has stayed with us for a number of years now. One is always very perplexed, you know, because there are always options. I think we might be in a position to arrive at some recommendations which we can make to Cabinet. I would like to have Cabinet involved in this regard because there are regional problems involved in the closing of bases and in the consolidation.

Mr. Lewis: The regional desks as well?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I hope I will not get too many people involved. I will limit that to Ministers, if possible.

I think we should be ready to present comprehensive proposals to Cabinet within a matter of two or three months. I have been saying that for a long time, but this time I mean it.

• 1700

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am sure you meant it before. Thank you, Mr. Cadieux. I have one short question for the Minister of External Affairs. Is it fair then to say, Mr. Sharp, that critics who have expressed fear, in fact many of the NATO member countries, that Canada might be withdrawing into a position of isolationism characteristic of our position in the years immediately preceding World War II are wrong?

Mr. Sharp: I know I speak for myself, and I think I speak for the government, when I say that I doubt whether such a policy would be in the national interests of Canada. I believe that it is necessary for Canada to work with other countries, both to maintain our security and to promote the peace that we are all seeking.

Whether it is within this alliance or some other I do not know, but I doubt very much whether a policy of isolationism would appeal to Canada at all, or to any Canadians.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): In other words, we move from strength to strength, not from strength to weakness.

Mr. Sharp: Certainly I can predict one thing about the defence review; it will be based upon the dual objectives of our national security and forming a base from which we can be most effective in promoting the relaxation of tension that lies at the basis of most of the fears that we now have about another World War.

The Chairman: Are you finished, Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Yes.

The Chairman: The questioners that I have are as follows: Mr. Ryan, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Cafik, Mr. Nowlan, Mr. Borrie, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Winch, Mr. Hymmen and then Mr. Lewis on the second round. Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: I would like to ask Mr. Cadieux a couple of questions. Mr. Cadieux, you say

you have had some opportunity to study the posture of the military situation behind the Iron Curtain, and I am wondering whether you could not give us an idea of the picture now in East Germany and Yugoslavia. I understand that before the Czech crisis there were about five Russian Divisions permanently stationed in East Germany plus probably the Russian troops in East Berlin, and that they had some right to go in there for manoeuvres and put in up to about 20 divisions as and when they saw fit, but that there was no such situation in Czechoslovakia before the invasion. The Warsaw Pact powers could only go in there for manoeuvres; there was no set arrangement whereby Russian troops could be stationed there. Is this so, and what is the change now?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know that I can usefully give a proper answer to a question of that kind. From our intelligence reports it seems that a lot of shifting around is taking place. How accurate they are on each occasion I am not so sure. In the case of Czechoslovakia to which you refer in particular, there seems to have been a pattern; the manoeuvres looked almost like a dress rehearsal of the invasion that took place afterwards, and this might be an explanation of why the complete occupation of Czechoslovakia took only a couple of hours.

Now, I think the question that you refer to and the answer I gave was in relation mostly to the state of the naval forces on the Russian side. It has been my conclusion from different briefings we have had on this particular subject that the Russian navy could be considered now to be the number two navy in the world. It is equipped with brand new ships, some of them are of new concept and therefore, I think, a country like Canada which has long coasts on two oceans should be concerned with this particular development.

• 1705

The application of sea power, I think, is something very, very relevant to our own consideration when we come to the security problems of Canada, and I think the special emphasis that we put on surveillance on both coasts is directly related to our particular problem. Now, I cannot be precise on that. Really I would have to prepare a briefing on such a matter and it would have to be given in camera because we have some sources that we do not want to divulge for security reasons and in order to maintain our sources.

Mr. Ryan: I agree with you. With respect to the Russian navy and the fact that it is now probably second in the world, I was more concerned about the situation in Czechoslovakia. Now, I understand they have withdrawn most of the estimated 600,000 troops from Czechoslovakia and moved them to winter quarters, and there are now left permanently perhaps 80,000 or 100,000 troops. Could we have an estimate of that?

Mr. Cadieux: I think the estimate is something like 100,000—about that.

Mr. Ryan: Are they to stay there permanently; is there any...

Mr. Cadieux: That I do not know. I think there are some political developments going on and certainly some negotiations. The Czech government has been able to reduce the number of troops; the eventuality of their being reduced further is very real, but this is something on which I can only speculate.

Mr. Ryan: As long as they stay there, are they not a menace, not only to the Bavarian border of West Germany, but also to Yugoslavia down through the traditional invasion route through Hungary to Serbia and Croatia?

Mr. Cadieux: I think it is always a question of intent, and who can say what the Russians intend to do? Certainly the forces there present a theoretical danger at least, but I think we have to live with that and we have lived with it for a long time. I think what the Russians demonstrated in Czechoslovakia is that they did what we knew they could do all along, actually.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, I want to pursue if I may, first with the Minister of National Defence and then with Mr. Sharp, some questions asked by previous speakers having to do first of all with our maritime strength. The Minister indicated that we had some 20-odd ships now committed to the NATO fleet. This is not at any one time; this is on a continuing and reserve basis, is that correct?

Mr. Cadieux: They are earmarked.

Mr. Forrestall: They are earmarked?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Forrestall: How many of these same 20 ships—we will use that figure—is that an accurate figure, do you know?

Mr. Cadieux: I believe it is, yes.

Mr. Forrestall: How many of these same ships would be committed on a continuing or earmarked basis to SACLANT?

Mr. Cadieux: All of them are committed. Actually I think the number is 18; I would like to check that. There is the aircraft carrier, 15 destroyers, 3 submarines, and I should also mention the aircraft which are very important. We have 25 *Argus* and 24 *Trackers* which are part of that maritime fleet.

Mr. Forrestall: In other words, Mr. Minister, it is a joint commitment to NATO through SACLANT. Would that be a fair way of describing it?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, and they do participate in manoeuvres.

Mr. Forrestall: There is no critical difference in the commitment, really, at all?

Mr. Cadieux: No, not at all.

• 1710

Mr. Forrestall: I will just shift a little bit then, Mr. Minister, and refer you to page 6 of your statement at paragraph 14, in which you deal with Canadian security in relating to NATO. You say:

The major threat to the security of Canada and the Canadian people comes from the prospect of an intercontinental nuclear exchange arising out of a conflict of interest or of ideology between the superpowers.

First of all, Mr. Cadieux, does this represent a change in our appreciation of where the initial threat might come from—not the type of threat, but where it might come from?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not think it represents a change from the past 20 years, or something like that. As soon as there was a kind of competition between the two superpowers, the development of ABMs and atomic weapons, I think this was a real situation.

Mr. Forrestall: Will you identify the superpowers, then?

Mr. Cadieux: Could I say there are two of them?

Mr. Forrestall: Could I ask the Minister of External Affairs whether he shares in par-

ticular the wording in the way you put it because it seems to me that if there has not been a change, then there has been a critical restatement of an appreciation. Would you agree with it, Mr. Sharp?

Mr. Sharp: Yes, I would agree with it. Indeed, I said on television when the broadcast was made that we have a very vital interest in Europe because quarrels in Europe could result in a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the battle-ground might well be Canada. Therefore, there is no denying our interest in the events that take place in Europe where the quarrel might take place.

Mr. Forrestall: It is academic, I suppose, to ask the further question, but I will ask it anyway. Does Canada foresee any immediate major threat from what I would call the third superpower, that is to say, mainland China?

Mr. Sharp: Shall I put it this way? It is not a concern of NATO at the moment.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Cadieux, are we getting on dangerous ground if we attempt from this to draw any conclusion that might include an increase in our capability of meeting this type of nuclear threat—those are your words—thinking in terms of the Bomarc?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know what your opinion of the Bomarc is, but with me they have a good reputation. Actually I was told by the Commander of NORAD not very long ago that they are still the best and the most effective weapon we have.

Mr. Lewis: Against what?

Mr. Cadieux: I know you do not agree.

Mr. Lewis: Against what? I am just asking an innocent question.

Mr. Cadieux: Against bombers.

Mr. Lewis: Against land bombers?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. Out of 1000 trials, I think there were only four misses. This is pretty good.

Mr. Forrestall: That is essentially it. It is pretty hard to test the real thing, is it not?

Mr. Sharp: Let us hope we never have to.

Mr. Cadieux: In an evaluation of what new equipment you would require, I think you have also to take into consideration the tech-

nological developments that are taking place. This is going to change the whole outlook in the next few years and the tendency, I think, would be for a more automatic interception and probably a curve of addition of expenses and then a flattening out.

Mr. Forrestall: Are you speculating, Mr. Minister, or are we in fact now considering other instruments of defence?

Mr. Cadieux: I am speculating only on what is taking place in the world. Therefore, when I say the world, I mean in both Russia and the United States and we are, of course, concerned in both cases.

Mr. Forrestall: I do not want to put you in the position of compromising our Chairman and his instructions to us not to take you beyond the difficulties you will have in January of naming numbers and indentifying pieces of equipment, but have we considered reviewing whether or not our present defence against various types of nuclear vehicles is adequate? Are we considering weaponry more sophisticated than the Bomarc, in the light of more sophisticated carriers of nuclear weapons.

• 1715

Mr. Cadieux: May I answer you this way, that we have scientists who are in constant rapport with the research and development taking place elsewhere, and that we also are making special studies of the technological developments that are going to take place in the next three or four years.

Mr. Forrestall: I would like very much to ask about the role of our maritime fleet in the defence of our own land, but I will pass for now.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Forrestall.

For the guidance of members, we still have eight questioners on the first round. The time for each, if equality allocated, would amount to about five minutes.

Mr. Cafik, Mr. Nowlan, Mr. Borrie, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Winch, Mr. Hymmen, Mr. McCleave and Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Yes, Mr. Chairman. On page 2 of your statement, Mr. Sharp, in the second paragraph it is stated:

At Reykjavik five months later, the Ministers carried their détente policy a

stage further with the concrete offer of mutual and balanced force reductions.

Were these offers made to the Warsaw pact countries, or was it an internal matter?

Mr. Sharp: I wish to speak to one of my officials before I answer that, because I want to be quite accurate.

Mr. Chairman, this offer was made in the Reykjavik communiqué. It was notice to the Soviet Union and to the Warsaw Pact that the NATO countries were prepared to make mutual and balanced force reductions.

Various studies were being carried out on how these could be proceeded with after the offer was made. Unfortunately, because of the intervention of the Czechoslovakian crisis they did not get beyond that stage.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much. My next question, which is a follow-up of others, I would like to direct to the Minister of National Defence.

On page 6 of your statement this appears:

...and hence Europe is the geographical region where Canada's security is most in jeopardy.

I presume it follows from that that our allocation of defence forces will, in future, continue to be directed more toward NATO than toward NORAD, for instance? Is that a fair observation? We feel that our security is more in jeopardy, as stated here, than it would be by having defence forces tied in with NORAD?

Mr. Cadieux: Actually we are spending approximately the same amount of money in the two efforts, but I think, over-all, one cannot separate them arbitrarily.

If one costs our operations in NATO and isolates the operation in Europe one comes to an expense of something like \$130 million; but the support part of that operation is all borne by expenditures which are made in Canada. Therefore, how can one really arrive at a very precise figure relative to the NATO effort?

• 1720

There are also, the maritime forces which have a double task—the direct defence of Canada and participation in SACLANT's operations. There, again, how can one divide them arbitrarily? I think it is a very difficult exercise.

However, I think it is fair to say that we are actually trying to operate our forces to do three things—provide the air defence of Canada, provide sufficient forces to be worthwhile in NATO and, at the same time, provide forces for the internal security of Canada.

These efforts are interrelated, if you wish, and I do not think you can say that the emphasis is going to be more on NATO, or less on NORAD, or more on internal security. The kind of effort and financial commitment you are willing to make have to be based on over-all estimation of what the situation is in Canada.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you.

My last question is an academic one and may not be fair, but it has bothered me for some time.

It seems to me that Tito in Yugoslavia will be involved in the next crisis in Europe, if it does happen. Has any approach been made by Tito to NATO asking for any backing should he be invaded? And, if he were, what would the position be? Are you free to tell us?

Mr. Sharp: No; I know of no approach by the Yugoslav Government to the NATO powers to come to the aid of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Lewis: There are reports of quite the opposite attitude by Tito.

Mr. Sharp: I have heard such reports, too, and they may be true. But certainly the NATO powers have had no approach from the Yugoslav Government.

Mr. Cafik: NATO must have discussed this matter. Would it be fair to ask what their views are in this respect, or what their reaction might be?

Mr. Sharp: Yugoslavia is one of the countries on the periphery of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was in connection with Yugoslavia, as well as other areas, that the statement was made that any aggression by the Soviet Union would create an international crisis.

As I said earlier in my testimony, the NATO powers have not taken on any new commitments, but we felt it wise to state that in our view such a development would create an international crisis.

In other words, we could not be indifferent to any such development, but it did not seem to us to be wise to indicate what such a reaction would be, because the circumstances are unpredictable.

Moreover, as I said, this is an area in which some uncertainty helps to deter the aggression.

Mr. Cafik: To pursue that one step further, on a point of information, is there any limitation on what countries can belong to NATO? For example, if Yugoslavia were to make application would there be any reason for their exclusion?

Mr. Sharp: We have never had an application.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan?

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I have three or four questions, depending on the answers, which I wish to direct basically to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

I refer him to paragraph 14, half way down page 6 of the statement of the Minister of National Defence, which starts with the words:

...Europe is the geographical region where Canada's security is most in jeopardy. Thus, Canada's security is very closely interlocked with the security of Europe. These are inescapable facts of the world we live in. In the past we considered it to be in the interests of Canadian national security to meet the challenge through our participation in NATO. How we meet the challenge in the future is one of the very important considerations of the defence review. But I would ask you to remember this, the defence review cannot remove the challenge.

• 1725

Mr. Sharp, do you agree, without qualification, with that statement? I say "without qualification", because we are now in the age of participatory politics when there is a profusion of Privy Councillors making statements of policy in many areas not within their responsibility. This was a statement by the Minister of National Defence with which I gather he agrees—and I want to know, first, if you are in agreement with it, without qualification, because I have another question that follows. As far as I am concerned, a yes or a no will do.

Mr. Cafik: Would you care to tell us what your second question is?

Mr. Sharp: I find myself in agreement with this statement. I have no difficulty with it whatever.

Mr. Nowlan: You rather indicated that in a general answer relative to another part of paragraph 14, but I am glad that that is your answer in this case.

I now refer you to page 8 of your statement, Mr. Sharp, where you say as follows:

In conclusion, the Ministers agreed that the North Atlantic Alliance would continue to stand as the guarantor of security and the essential foundation of European reconciliation. Recent events had further demonstrated that its continued existence was more than ever necessary.

That was a statement of the Ministers after their recent meeting in Brussels. It is in your statement today and I assume that you are in complete agreement with it today?

Mr. Sharp: Yes. I would not have agreed to the communiqué if I had not been.

Mr. Nowlan: You, in your position of responsibility as our Secretary of State for External Affairs, will have a good deal of influence on our final review. If, (1), you think of Europe as still the geographical centre of our security and, (2), that the North Atlantic Alliance up to now has been the guarantee of our security, is it conceivable that Canada is going to withdraw from that combination, the North Atlantic alliance?

The Chairman: I do not know whether or not the Minister would want to answer that particular question, Mr. Nowlan, because I suppose it gets into the question of the review which is now under way, and there is no decision on that.

Mr. Nowlan: No, Mr. Chairman; and no decision is going to be made, because the Prime Minister has stated in the House of Commons that Ministers, to provoke thought and stimulate mental processes, can express different viewpoints.

We have before this Committee one of the most important Ministers on this review, along with his colleague, the Minister of National Defence. They both have papers which they have submitted to this Committee.

Some Ministers have already said what we should do. I am asking this Minister, along with his colleague, whether, in view of these two statements—one, that Europe is the centre of security, and the other, the Minister's own, that security has been guaranteed by the North Atlantic Alliance, in his opinion, for what it is worth—and it may be worth a lot, on it may be worth little; but he is our

Secretary of State for external Affairs—it is conceivable, if we believe these two points of view, that we could withdraw from the North Atlantic Alliance?

The Chairman: I am sure the Minister does not need any protection from me.

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, it is the government's present policy to support the Alliance. Therefore, the statement that is made in the communiqué represents no change in our policy.

As I said earlier, we are members of the Alliance; we participated in these decisions; and we participated in the communiqué.

We are now engaged in a review of our policy. Everything is open for discussion so that the people of Canada and Members of Parliament can have an opportunity of expressing their views about what we should do in the future. I certainly would welcome the views of members of this Committee on whether, in the light of what Mr. Cadieux and I have said, we should continue in NATO, and if so, to what degree. That is what we want to know.

At the present time we are members of the Alliance. I support the statements that are made in the communiqué.

Mr. Nowlan: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate part of that answer; but it avoids part of the question. Could I put the question another way. These two gentlemen are much more knowledgeable, have many more facts, expertise and experts behind them to make the statements they did today. Would it not be fair, then Mr. Sharp, to say that if you, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs, still believe that Europe is the geographical region for our security and that the North Atlantic Alliance has been the guarantor of that security that a withdrawal of one of the partners to that Alliance would certainly affect the strength of that security.

• 1730

Mr. Sharp: Well let me say, . . .

Mr. Nowlan: Yes or no. A yes or no answer will do.

Mr. Sharp: . . . Mr. Nowlan, that I agree thoroughly with what the Minister of National Defence has said, and that is: Canada's security is very closely interlocked with the security of Europe. These are inescapable facts of the world we live in. We have to

make a decision as to how we respond to that challenge. I believe it is a very good thing that the government is avoiding making the decisions that it will have to make now so that there can be a free and an open discussion of this matter. I have personal views about this which I do not intend to give the Committee now, because I believe that by so doing I might in some way inhibit the discussions. I would like to hear the views of the hon. member and of others on this Committee.

An hon. Member: You will not inhibit us.

Mr. Sharp: But at any rate, as long as we are members of this Alliance, we will play the part that we have undertaken to play. There are so many questions involved in our general orientation in the world that until we have reviewed them adequately and given an opportunity for Parliament and for the members of Parliament and for the public to express their views, I do not really believe that at this stage it would be helpful in the debate if I were to express personal views, except upon the facts—and the facts, the Minister of National Defence and I have had no hesitation in stating.

Mr. Nowlan: So this, Mr. Minister . . .

Mr. Groos: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

Mr. Nowlan: This is my last question.

Mr. Groos: This was just a point of order.

Mr. Nowlan: Well if we get into points of order then the whole thing bogs down.

Mr. Groos: No, I do not think this will take very long. It was my understanding that the purpose of this meeting was to get a statement from the Minister on what took place in the Ministerial meeting in Brussels. I do not think we should range far from that. I am sure there are a lot of people who have other questions. It seems to me that we are rather straying from the point.

The Chairman: I think perhaps we are in a borderline area, but Mr. Nowlan has indicated that he just has one other question.

Mr. Nowlan: This is my last question.

The Chairman: I think the Minister has indicated quite clearly that he is not going to express a personal opinion on the question which has been asked by Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: I appreciate that. I would not want to embarrass the Minister by having him express a personal opinion. But I did question him on the facts of the two statements and the Minister answered fairly. All I can ask of the Minister now is this: that if he agrees with the facts as stated by the Minister of National Defence about the position of Europe in our security and his own belief that the North Atlantic Alliance is the guarantor of that security, then does it really matter how much discussion and how much debate there is going to be by either members of this Committee or by other people because, as the Minister of National Defence has, I think, very fairly stated, no matter what our review is—and it is the responsibility of the Treasury Board to make the final decision—you do not remove the facts of security and the guarantor of a security.

Mr. Sharp: Well may I answer that, Mr. Chairman. There may be some people in the country who do not agree with this statement and I would like to hear a presentation of their point of view. This is one of the facts that must be taken into account. There may be other facts that should be brought out too. There may be some who disagree with this analysis, but Mr. Cadieux and I, in a sense, are anticipating the review in saying to the public: "We believe this to be a fact that will not disappear and it is one we must take into account in our review."

• 1735

Mr. Borrie: Mr. Fairweather touched on this question a little earlier and if Mr. Cadieux would like to make further comment on it or leave the answer stand, I am quite prepared to take it that way. In reports of the time of the Czechoslovakian invasion it was considered by people in authoritative places that NATO intelligence was not really aware until the next morning that the invasion had taken place. These are the reports of the press and from some rather authoritative sources.

Mr. Cadieux: I really do not know how to answer a question like that. We were not aware of the invasion; the invasion took place and was over with in a matter of two hours. Now I would doubt very much that the intelligence net in NATO was not aware of the movement of troops. Now of the actual operation which took only two hours, it is possible that it took them by surprise—I do not know. I suppose, like any other structured body, they have meetings, say, at 9 o'clock in the

morning for intelligence briefings and as this happened during the night therefore they learned of it when they met. This is possible and this is probably what it meant. I cannot speculate on that because I have no particular knowledge.

Mr. Borrie: My other question is for Mr. Sharp.

Is it an actual fact that our representatives at the NATO conference were embarrassed by the reconsideration of our role in NATO, as reported by the press?

Mr. Sharp: No, I do not think there was any embarrassment. There was some misunderstanding I think. The government, through Mr. Trudeau and myself, had indicated that we were going to have a review of foreign policy and that our position in NATO was one of the subjects that was going to be dealt with in the review. But I know I speak for my colleague and myself when I say that this was understood and that we had no difficulty in participating in the meetings and no difficulty in agreeing with the communique. Indeed we helped to draft it. May I add that it was extremely valuable for us to be able to participate in this meeting, because not only were we made aware of the views of the other countries but we were able to put into it a particular Canadian attitude. So that it is in all respects a communique that reflects the views of 15 countries. The remarkable thing is the degree of unanimity, the fact that there were no dissenters. Every country, including France, agreed to that communique without qualification.

Mr. Borrie: Thank you. Did our attitude have any bearing on what other NATO countries will be doing in their assessment of their role in NATO as well. Was there any indication of this?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, I discovered that in the NATO Council there are many countries that are reviewing their defence and foreign policy. Perhaps they are doing it in a somewhat more formal way, but everyone in this troubled world re-assesses his position to see whether it correctly reflects the rapidly changing events.

Mr. Borrie: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Sharp, were all the participating ministers unanimous in respect of all aspects of the final statement?

Mr. Sharp: I believe so. I do not think there were any qualifications whatever. They would have appeared in the statement if there had been qualifications.

Mr. Laniel: Did I understand you to say that all the Ministers from the 15 NATO countries were there?

Mr. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Cadieux, was the French Minister of Defence attending the Defence Planning Committee.

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Sharp: The Minister of External Affairs attended the NATO Council meeting. I was talking about the meeting of the Council itself and all the Ministers, as I recall it, were there.

● 1740

Mr. Laniel: Perhaps I could carry on my questioning with Mr. Cadieux.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Minister, I wonder what the philosophy of France is at the present time. On the one hand, we talk about solidarity, unanimity and that NATO is trying to unite itself and present common front in the face of a somewhat urgent situation and then on the other hand, there is at the same time a member of NATO who is not playing the same game as the others. I am also wondering what France's attitude is regarding the military decisions of NATO concerning military forces. At the present time, France has troops in Germany. Does NATO or SACLANT have authority over those troops?

Mr. Cadieux: I think that the basic position of France, Mr. Chairman—and it was reaffirmed at the last meeting—is that it is opposed to the integration of the forces stationed in Germany under French command. That is the basic difference in the entire organisation where the other forces are under SACEUR. This implies that if there were a crisis where the intervention of French troops was considered necessary and useful, there would have to be negotiations with the French command.

Mr. Laniel: Even for the troops that are in Germany?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Laniel: Is SACEUR or are the members of NATO aware of the forces that France

could put at the disposal of NATO under special circumstances?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. There is consultation between the various commands.

Mr. Laniel: How can NATO defences be made more effective? The question arose at one time whether NATO was ready to meet the urgent situation that occurred in Czechoslovakia. Some said, too easily, that a lot of people were away at SHAPE, and that even if they had wanted to do something, they couldn't have. I wonder exactly what this solidarity amounts to. At the meeting of the ministers, was any consideration given to making another attempt at getting together with France to improve the military efficiency of NATO? For instance, have you studied the question of deployment in France?

Mr. Cadieux: We did not discuss it at this meeting. I think though that in wartime or in a special situation, commitments are made to have French forces united with the NATO troops. You are asking me to express an opinion on France's attitude, and I really think that it would be ill-advised on my part to try and interpret the underlying reasons of its external policy. NATO, as an organization, is obliged to take into account the attitude of various member countries, and I think that where France is concerned, arrangements have been provided that would cover emergencies and ordinary situations.

Mr. Laniel: In the statement at the end of the meeting.

● 1745

[English]

The foreign minister of France recalled that for its part unless events in the years to come were to bring about a radical change in East-West relations, the French government considers that the Alliance must continue as long as it appears to be necessary.

[Interpretation]

I am wondering whether we should not become a little bolder. We speak of strengthening NATO to all the other members but not to France. I think we ought to do so. This is an opinion, and I don't ask you for an answer.

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I would add—to make NATO's position clear—that all this is foreseen, because in emergencies, the arrangement provides for an option on the part of France: it will either have to accept integra-

tion or maintain a system of consultation. I think that these difficulties would be solved if there were an important enough crisis to mobilize all the energies of the Alliance.

[English]

Mr. Laniel: I will now address myself to Mr. Sharp on another matter. In your statement and in the communiqué, you speak of the twin concept of NATO defence policy and the mutual balance of forces whereby a solution might be found through a mutual reduction of forces. I keep on asking myself who is going to start, and I wonder sometimes if it should not be one of the members of NATO, perhaps Canada, that could start.

We try to show solidarity in NATO. It is not a confrontation, we state that we are more and more united and we want to improve the set-up of defence protection of Europe, of Continental Europe, of the West. We hope at the same time to indicate to the Warsaw Pact and to Russia in particular that they should not repeat these actions because it might endanger the peace of the world.

I do not know exactly how we can reach the objectives of the Harmel Report by doing this, and if to our mind the only solution is a mutual balance of force reduction, I think that Canada, although it is committed to NATO, although it must keep its engagements, should be free to re-examine the situation and decide for itself what it should do in the future.

Mr. Sharp: May I make one or two comments upon what has been said, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I think it is a misapprehension to think that we are there to defend Europe. We are there to defend Canada.

As Mr. Cadieux said, the national security of Canada is involved, otherwise we would not be there at all. We are there in order to protect Canada.

If we decide that we do not want to continue in NATO, we can make that decision. It is open to us at any time, from the first of August on, to give notice that we intend to withdraw, and that is the decision that we have to make. But make no mistake about it, we are there now. We decided to join the NATO pact not to defend Europe, but to defend Canada, because the greatest tragedy that could take place for Canada is that a nuclear war should break out because of a quarrel in Europe that would be fought over Canada. We would be destroyed.

We must get this clear in our minds that we are not there to protect Europe. Europe is

just as committed to protect us. But more important, the question is how do we prevent a war. The NATO treaty is based upon two concepts. First, it is essential that we should be strong enough that we will not be invaded, and secondly, it has been agreed for a number of years now that NATO exists not only for the purpose of defence, but also to provide a basis from which there can be negotiations for a relaxation of tensions in Europe that might lead to the outbreak of a war and a confrontation between the two great super-powers.

I do not believe it is possible to pursue either of these objectives alone. You cannot pursue a détente by being weak. That seems to me to be the essence of the problem we face.

Mr. Laniel: With regard to a reduction in armaments or the détente that might be brought about between the two main powers, is Canada informed or does it know exactly or at least have an idea of that détente, what is going on, so that if we are to revise our defence policy we will be able to plan it for years ahead and establish objectives?

• 1750

Mr. Sharp: Yes, we take part in all the discussions of the NATO Council. As I said in my opening statement, until the invasion of Czechoslovakia we believed that it would be possible to work towards a relaxation of tension in Europe. We believed, indeed, that the time might come when we would not have a NATO and a Warsaw Pact, when these would become unnecessary.

As members of the organization, we are working with our friends to try to bring about a situation in which our security is not threatened, and the best way is to proceed with the discussions, not only between the super-powers, but we thought originally also the kind of discussions that were taking place with Czechoslovakia and Poland, in the hope that Europe would not be divided into two antagonistic blocks, but that there would be a restoration of the sort of open and free communication that exists between us and our friends in the West. That is the objective of NATO, and as long as we are in it, I believe we should pursue both of these ends.

Mr. Laniel: I just hope that no one at the NATO conference thinks that if one member drops out, the other members should keep our defence in the same shape. I just hope

this thing did not come to the mind of anyone. Thank you.

The Chairman: We still have four questioners in the first round, Mr. Winch, Mr. Hymmen, Mr. McCleave and Mr. Brewin. Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I was interested in a remark made a moment ago by Mr. Sharp, that one of the great issues is the prevention of war. That being so, could I ask the Minister how much emphasis was placed on what he said in his statement, as follows:

It was the strong and unanimous view of the Ministers that the Soviet Union's use of force in Czechoslovakia had not only jeopardized peace and international order but had also violated the basic right of the people of Czechoslovakia to shape their own future without outside interference.

How much emphasis was placed on that principle?

Mr. Sharp: Which principle are you talking about?

Mr. Winch: "To shape their own future without outside interference."

Mr. Sharp: I can assure you that every one of the Ministers who participated in the debate devoted a great deal of time to that particular principle, which is absolutely fundamental to international peace and order.

Mr. Winch: It is because I thought that was in your mind that you placed that emphasis on it. Can I also ask then, did you accept that affirmation without qualification as coming from the representative from the United States, in view of their policies in South Vietnam and the People's Republic of China?

Mr. Sharp: Mr. Chairman, I hope we are not going to stray over to...

Mr. Winch: It is based on a country's right to shape its own future without outside interference.

Mr. Sharp: My understanding of the United States position in Vietnam is that they were invited to help protect South Vietnam.

Mr. Winch: And the non-recognition of the people's choice in Red China. It is based on the principle that...

The Chairman: I think, Mr. Winch, we really could get into quite an extended dis-

cussion which might go on beyond six o'clock if we got into...

Mr. Winch: However, I think I have raised a very important issue there because the prevention of war is based on acceptance of principle and truth and facts. Not according to expediency as to what is taking place in one country or another.

Mr. Sharp: I can say that I entirely agree with that statement.

An hon. Member: You do not really think that the Americans were invited?

Mr. Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Winch: Could I ask the Minister of National Defence one question? In view of the fact that we are now committed for a year at least for the maintenance of our air division in Europe with no reduction in our squadrons, could you tell us what is the position of our equipment there? I mean the CF-104's as to their life, as to their phasing-out, or possible replacement, especially in view of what I understand is a military belief that the CF-104, which is the sole aircraft equipment of our division, being strike reconnaissance is not capable of any use in Canada or elsewhere in the event that you call any back.

• 1755

Mr. Cadieux (Labelle): There are several questions here, Mr. Chairman. The first relates to the life of the aircraft.

It is the opinion of the air division commander that he has enough aircraft to maintain the present numbers, both of aircraft and of squadrons, until the mid 1970's. They now have a deal capability. That is, they can act conventionally and they can act as strike and reconnaissance.

As was spelled out in the White Paper of 1964, it has not been the intention of the government to have a follow-on aircraft in that role, and therefore what is going to become of them after that, or the role itself, is something that is being discussed specifically now at the defence review.

Could these aircraft be used in Canada? I believe the answer is of course they could.

Mr. Winch: They can?

Mr. Cadieux: If they are conventional bombers, certainly they can be used in Canada for that purpose. They are that now. They

are both, strike and conventional, and this conventionality can be increased.

Mr. Winch: I know, but at full speed they can last only half an hour in the air. Is that not correct?

Mr. Cadieux: They can be used over there. Why could they not be used here? It is the same thing with the CF-5.

Mr. Winch: If they fly 15 minutes from take-off they have got to start immediately heading back.

Mr. Cadieux: I do not know. I think you are overdoing it there.

Mr. Winch: Well, it is pretty close.

An hon. member: It think it is 18 minutes.

Mr. Cadieux: Of course there is a relationship between the...

Mr. Winch: I was there when they gave us a demonstration.

Mr. Cadieux: I know, but you did not fly all the way, I hope.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, do you have any further questions?

Mr. Winch: No, that is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Hymmen.

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, I have two brief questions for the Minister of National Defence. One of the important conclusions which might have been drawn from the recent invasion of Czechoslovakia *vis-à-vis* NATO is that the force should be more mobile. I would like to ask the Minister if our brigade group in Germany is more mobile, less mobile, or equally mobile compared to the other forces of our allies in the NATO forces?

In other words, what effect would some indication in this direction have on our equipment compliments?

Mr. Cadieux: Actually it is so mobile that we have dropped the word "infantry". We do not call them infantry any more. It is fully mobile, as mobile I think as any formation now in Europe, and perhaps more so.

Mr. Hymmen: Any changes might have to do with regards to the other forces, and not ours?

Mr. Cadieux: This is my assumption, and also I think I stressed the fact at the NATO

meeting—it had some response—that they are professional forces. This is quite qualitative when you talk in the context of forces which are partly recruits. This is a very vital point that we made there, and some countries actually reacted by saying that they were going to try to have more professional forces committed.

Mr. Hymmen: I have just one more question. The Minister referred to the helicopter-equipped destroyers which eventually will be designated to SACLANT, I believe. A certain defence critic, who perhaps can remain nameless, has suggested that we might do better to have submarines, even if on a cost standpoint they had to be conventional submarines rather than nuclear ones. I wonder if the Minister would like to comment on that, and if he could tell us when these destroyers are going to be completed.

Mr. Cadieux: We expect they will be completed in 1971 and 1972. We have procured—there is a time element involved in all these operations—a weapons system, we have built a power plant and what we are doing now, of course, is building the last part of the ship, the hull, to put all these things in, and then you will have a sea trial. We expect that by 1972, or possibly 1973, they will be in operation.

● 1800

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Chairman, in regard to the suggestion I made, the Minister did not really discuss the question of whether more missile-equipped submarines would serve us better than the destroyers. I realize in the decision to proceed with these destroyers he must have an answer.

Mr. Cadieux: I think the basic premise in our attitude is that we have a defensive and not an offensive force, and therefore you can initiate all sorts of debate on whether you should have this or that. No question is ever all black or white. I suppose if one is air-minded, as this gentleman probably is, he would have another opinion, but we are trying to have a balanced force and it is a defensive force, and therefore I think our reasoning is very valid.

Mr. Hymmen: Thank you.

Mr. McCleave: Mr. Cadieux, in paragraph 6 and the first part of paragraph 7 on page 3 of your statement you mention qualitative improvements in our committed forces at

this time, and then you give these four helicopter-equipped destroyers as an example, but these are some years away. What qualitative improvements in the committed forces have occurred at this time in the naval environment?

Mr. Cadieux: First of all, this year we have commissioned the *Terra Nova*, one of the *Restigouche* class which, as you know, is equipped with brand new detection systems. It is now being evaluated and on the basis of the preliminary experience that we have had with this particular ship we have decided that three others will be converted. I think this is an immediate qualitative improvement and it is done, of course, within the perennial exercise of trying to reconcile means and needs. I think we are doing all right.

Mr. McCleave: And the qualitative improvement in the air environment was simply the fact that there was not the 15 per cent reduction. Or was there, perhaps, something more involved there?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, because the reduction was deferred.

Mr. McCleave: Finally, on the qualitative improvement through the reequipping of the Brigade Group, was anything new being sent into Germany? You mention new reconnaissance vehicles, counter mortar radars, new wheeled vehicles and stockpiling certain kinds of ammunition. Was this part of the original program of estimates for the Department for the year or was something new brought in that would bring about a qualitative improvement?

Mr. Cadieux: No. These expenses will accelerate eventually. We had planned to go slow on them because most of the brigade reequipment had been done, but as a reaction to the Czechoslovakia crisis we decided to accelerate the procurement of these items.

Mr. McCleave: Would it be a fair question to ask what new equipment has been moved in specific quantities to Europe since the Czech crisis?

Mr. Cadieux: I think it is a fair question but I do not have a fair answer.

Mr. McCleave: I have a question for the Secretary of State for External Affairs. At the bottom of page 9 it says:

... that if in the future the Government of Canada should consider changing our

role in the Alliance we would of course consult with them.

I would like some elaboration on that to clear up a point in my mind. Would this consultation be to present proposals before the Canadian policy was determined and ask them what they thought of it, or would it be to present them with the fait accompli of the Canadian policy?

Mr. Sharp: I would think, Mr. Chairman, that if we were to make such a serious decision, to change our role in NATO or to withdraw from it, there would be extensive consultations in advance in any such decision.

• 1805

Mr. McCleave: So that NATO's views, for example, could be part of the decision process. That is, they would have a chance to say, "We think that perhaps Canada should take a different look at this matter".

Mr. Sharp: Shall I put it this way, that already the fact that we are engaged in a review has led to many representations to us from various of our allies and friends.

Mr. McCleave: Friendly arm twisting.

Mr. Sharp: No, not at all. I have welcomed this. I have felt that that is exactly what we wanted to happen, and I hope it will also result in many representations to the government from the public, and so on, as to what they think is the proper role; reasoned statements of the position that they think Canada occupies in the world and how best to maintain our security and promote peace. That is what it is all about. I have welcomed the views that we have had from other countries.

Mr. Brewin: I just have two questions. The first one is for the Minister of National Defence. There is a reference in the communiqué of the last Council meeting of NATO which I would like to read. This appears on page 3, paragraph 8:

Ministers agreed that the co-ordinated implementation of these measures and the provision of additional budgetary resources to the extent necessary to support them would form part of the NATO Force Plan for 1969-1973 which will be submitted in January 1969.

My question is were we part of the ministers who agreed to that?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, we agreed to that. As you know, this is a regulatory feature. There

is the defence plan, which is a projection of a five-year effort, and there is the commitment for one year that we have every year and, of course, we agreed with that.

Mr. Brewin: It refers to additional budgetary resources. We are not committed to any now in advance of the review that we have been talking about, are we?

Mr. Cadieux: No, but certainly you are accepting the budgetary implication when you defer a decision to reduce the number of your aircraft. There is a budgetary implication there and, of course, we accept that when we make a decision. This is what is meant there.

Mr. Brewin: This mentions a NATO force plan. I guess it is for a five year period, is it not, or is it four years?

Mr. Cadieux: The NATO force plan would be the five year period in which, for instance, we include the ASW destroyers with the helicopters. These will be in the plan but later on, if we stay NATO under the same conditions, we would have to make a commitment every year.

Mr. Brewin: But in January of 1969 when we receive this four or five year plan, whichever it is, for additional budgetary resources, and so forth, at that time we will not be committed in advance of the findings of your review?

Mr. Cadieux: No. I think they call it earmarking. They are earmarked, but they are not assigned.

Mr. Brewin: Suppose you later decide to change the role of our contribution to NATO, or even conceivably to get out of NATO, I doubt if you will decide on the latter, but if you should decide to do that then the fact that you have accepted this NATO force plan for four years does not prevent you from—

Mr. Cadieux: No, it does not. Actually, this is what is discussed at the December meeting. First of all, the military committee gets together in anticipation of the meeting of the Ministers and they discuss the revised commitment that is going to be suggested by the individual members, and you can withdraw or add to it.

Mr. Brewin: The reason I am asking this question is that I recall very well that our commitment to the main strategy of tactical nuclear defence was done through what they call NATO processes, which were very vague

and they were not reduced to writing—for security reasons, I suppose—and I want to be quite sure that by this so-called NATO process we are not committed to something that would make the whole review of foreign policy a rather useless exercise.

Mr. Cadieux: If my word can reassure you, I want to reassure you completely.

Mr. Brewin: I am very much reassured.

Mr. Sharp: I can support the Minister.

Mr. Brewin: Now I am doubly reassured.

I just have one final question which I will direct to both the Ministers. Can they give us any further light on who is assisting in this famous review of defence and foreign policy? I appreciate the fact that the Cabinet will decide on the final White Paper, or whatever emerges from it, but who is doing this? Is it the Department of External Affairs? Is it outside experts? Who is doing this reviewing for us?

• 1810

Mr. Sharp: May I give part of the answer, at any rate, from the point of view of the Minister of External Affairs. In the first place, this review of foreign policy engages almost every department of government because foreign policy has many, many facets and it bears upon policies in a wide range of fields. For example, it obviously relates to trade, it relates to the activity of the Secretary of State—cultural affairs—and it relates to the Department of Immigration. These are three departments that have an input to our foreign policy review.

Mr. Brewin: You are not using those machines, are you?

Mr. Sharp: Pardon me?

Mr. Brewin: You used the word “input”. It frightens me.

Mr. Sharp: I am sorry. I do not ordinarily use jargon. They are making a contribution of a point of view upon the issues that are facing us. You might remember that the foreign policy review is of very wide range in character because nowadays foreign policy affects so many aspects of our life. Our biggest task at the moment is to make a review of our relations with European countries, and we have detailed certain of our officials, who have been taken off their regular jobs, to concentrate upon the review in that area. The

mission that we made to Latin America was part of that review, where several ministers, together with a great many officials, went down and devoted themselves for a month to relations with Latin America and explored it in all its aspects.

However, we intend to go outside the government and seek the views of informed people. For example, plans are laid for a meeting right after New Year's in the first week of January and we have invited a number of academic groups to nominate people who might come in to exchange views with us, not in such a way as to commit them but to see if we can find a technique for drawing on their special knowledge and their special views.

Mr. Brewin: If I may interrupt you, will this be a public performance?

Mr. Sharp: No, not at this stage. However, we place no limitation upon what they want to say. They can repeat the same views outside if they wish, but we want the advantage of a give and take. I hope that we will receive representations from associations and from individuals who would like to contribute. Then, as the Minister of National Defence has said, we would be moving towards the preparation of a White Paper which would set out the structure which perhaps in the first instance would be related particularly to Europe and the defence review. These are closely related because of the juxtaposition of NATO. Then I would hope that in this Committee, for example, there would be an opportunity for people to come and express their views about these proposals in order to give us the advantage of the public discussion that is necessary. However, I think you will agree that at some stage the government must put forward some views as to the direction our policy should move.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, but you would like this Committee to do some of its reviewing even before—

Mr. Sharp: I certainly would. This would have to be on the basis of questions that might be put for discussion rather than the ministers putting up propositions to be fired at.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: I think the last questioner is Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: This is a second turn. I do not think that it would be entirely fair, Mr. Chairman, since there might be others who would want to go a second time.

• 1815

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis, mentioned that he had two or three very brief questions if we have the time. Are there others who want to ask questions?

Mr. Laniel: I hate to go before the end of the meeting, but I have to leave.

Mr. Cafik: I have commitments myself, but I have no objection. I do not know how long it is going to take, but I know that many of us have things to do.

The Chairman: Could you finish off in two or three minutes, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: Thank you, my questions will not be long.

This, to me, is very important in regard to any resolution of the problems in Europe. Does the communique indicate a determination by the NATO members that re-unification of Germany is a pre-condition of any permanent peace treaty in Europe? I notice that all they state in the communique is they want re-unification of Germany. That is the position now of the NATO members, that re-unification of Germany is an absolute condition for a détente in Europe.

Mr. Sharp: I would think the answer to that must be no. The re-unification of Germany is desirable. I do not think that it is necessarily the only solution.

Mr. Lewis: Personally, I am very glad to hear that.

The second question relates to the Mediterranean. The NATO powers are very concerned about Soviet naval powers in the Mediterranean now. I hope you will not misunderstand me, Mr. Sharp and Mr. Cadieux, I am as disturbed about it as the NATO ministers have said they are. I would like to ask either one of the Minister if it was realistic of the Western World to expect that the Soviet Union would permit the Sixth Fleet of the United States to have sole sovereignty over the Mediterranean? Was it not to be expected that the Soviet Union would want some naval strength in that sensitive part of the World? Why should we all become so terribly disturbed about something that we would do if we were in the Soviet position?

From their point of view it is a perfectly realistic thing for the Soviets to have done in the present state of the world.

Mr. Sharp: May I say in reply, Mr. Lewis, that I find the actions of the Soviet Union with respect to Czechoslovakia so irrational that I share the concern of the West about the intentions of the Soviet Union. That is why the invasion of Czechoslovakia has given such a shock to confidence.

Mr. Lewis: I share the concern, but was it not to be expected, and should we, therefore, avoid over-reacting to the Soviets going into the Mediterranean from the point of view of their national security in view of the presence in the Mediterranean of the Sixth Fleet if the United States in very considerable power? Should the Western World jump with such panic when the Soviet Union did what any reasonable power would do in similar circumstances?

Mr. Sharp: I do not accept that the NATO powers did jump in panic. I look upon the communique issued by the NATO powers as being, under the circumstances, a very restrained and moderate statement. I do think there is reason to be concerned about the motives of the Soviet Union, having in mind what they did. If the Soviet Union had permitted the relaxation of tensions to take place in Europe, if they had permitted the liberalization of Eastern Europe, then we might have had more confidence about their ultimate purposes, but under present circumstances I share the concern of the NATO powers. There are grave uncertainties created by the actions of the Soviet Union which must disturb us in all areas of the world where the Soviet Union is increasing its power.

Mr. Lewis: Is it possible, Mr. Sharp, to explain the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia in terms of its internal fears rather than external pressures or external intentions of aggression? If so, would that not change the estimate one makes of the danger points in Europe and in the Mediterranean? If the Soviet Union reacted in Czechoslovakia because liberalization in Czechoslovakia

would have an effect in Poland, in the Soviet Union and create internal problems for those monolithic states inside their country, then surely the conclusions that are to be drawn from the action in Czechoslovakia are not quite the same.

• 1820

Mr. Sharp: It would seem to me—and I hope you agree with me, Mr. Lewis—that the very fact that the Soviet Union felt it necessary to stop those liberalizing tendencies in Eastern Europe by a military invasion, raises very profound questions about the future because, in my judgment, and I am sure in yours, the only way that we are going to ensure peace in Europe and in the world is to permit people to develop their own aspirations without interference even from their friends.

Mr. Lewis: Subject to what Mr. Winch asked you earlier, I agree.

The Chairman: Before adjourning and before thanking the Ministers, may I remind members that we are meeting again in this room at 8 o'clock tonight. I realize that is awkward, but so far it has been the best we could do with the co-ordinating committee. We will be hearing the officials of the Department of External Affairs and dealing with the estimates of that Department. Perhaps during the dinner hour members of the Committee and particularly the representatives of the various parties could consider whether or not we can dispose of these in one sitting, or whether we should try to arrange another meeting later in the week.

Now, on your behalf, I would like to thank the Minister. Starting toward the end of January or the beginning of February, we plan to have a very thorough and very detailed review in this Committee of basic defence policy. I know that the preliminary canter that we have had so far this afternoon will be most helpful. Thank you very much.

Mr. Lewis: Can we make sure that we will have the White Papers by the end of January?

APPENDIX X

OTAN

PRESS SERVICE

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ M3 (68)1

For immediate release

16th November, 1968

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 15th and 16th November. The meeting was attended by Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers. The Council had moved forward from mid-December its normal year-end meeting so that Ministers might discuss at an earlier date the serious situation following the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia and the occupation of that country by forces of the Soviet Union and of four of its Warsaw Pact Allies.

2. Ministers reaffirmed the inviolability of the principle, which has been invoked on numerous occasions by every country, including the USSR, that all nations are independent and that consequently any intervention by one state in the affairs of another is unlawful.

They noted that this principle has been deliberately violated by the Soviet leaders with the backing of four of their allies. World opinion has been profoundly shocked by this armed intervention carried out against the wishes of the Government and people of Czechoslovakia. All the members of the Alliance have denounced this use of force which jeopardises peace and international order and strikes at the principles of the United Nations Charter. Like all other peoples, the people of Czechoslovakia must be free to shape their future without outside interference. Agreements concluded under the pressure of occupying forces can provide no justification for challenging this basic concept.

3. The contention of the Soviet leadership that there exists a right of intervention in the affairs of other states deemed to be within a so-called "Socialist Commonwealth" runs counter to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter, is dangerous to European security and has inevitably aroused grave anxieties. It gives rise to fears of a further use of force in other cases.

The use of force and the stationing in Czechoslovakia of Soviet forces not hitherto deployed there have aroused grave uncertainty about the situation and about the calculations and intentions of the USSR. This uncertainty demands great vigilance on the part of the Allies.

4. Applied to Germany the policies which the USSR derives from its doctrine of a so-called "Socialist Commonwealth" raise new obstacles to the rapprochement and ultimate unification of the two parts of Germany. Moreover, they would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Four Power agreements relating to Germany as a whole.

In this situation, and bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the Ministers reaffirm the determination of the Alliance to persevere in its efforts to contribute to a peaceful solution of the German question based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of European security. Their Governments do not recognize the "GDR", and they reject all claims which would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany against the will of the German people.

Referring to their communiqué issued in Reykjavik on 25th June, 1968, the Ministers confirm the support of their Governments for the declared determination of the Three Powers to safeguard Berlin's security and to maintain freedom of access to the city. They recall the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of December 16, 1958 on Berlin and the responsibilities which each Member State assumed with regard to the security and welfare of Berlin. They note with satisfaction the important measures taken by the Federal Republic of Germany in conformity with the status of Berlin for the purpose of maintaining the viability of the city. They associate themselves with the position of the Three Powers as regards the legitimate concern of the Federal Government for the welfare and viability of Berlin and as regards the resulting ties which exist between the two on the basis of the arrangements in force.

The Ministers associate themselves with the call made upon the Soviet Union by the Three Powers to respect the quadripartite agreements concerning Berlin and the decisions taken pursuant to these agreements by

the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

5. The new uncertainties resulting from recent Soviet actions also extend to the Mediterranean basin. This situation requires that the Allies continue by every available means their efforts to promote stability and a just and equitable peace, as well as mutual co-operation and understanding, in the area. The expansion of Soviet activity in the Mediterranean, including the increased presence of Soviet naval units, requires vigilance to safeguard allied security.

6. The members of the Alliance urge the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace, to refrain from using force and interfering in the affairs of other states.

Determined to safeguard the freedom and independence of their countries, they could not remain indifferent to any development which endangers their security.

Clearly any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences.

7. So long as the Soviet leaders adhere to a policy of force, these new uncertainties will remain. The Allies are convinced that their political solidarity remains indispensable to discourage aggression and other forms of oppression. Above all, they stand wholly determined to meet their common responsibilities and, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, to defend the members of the Alliance against any armed attack.

8. The Allies participating in NATO's integrated defence programme have, therefore, been obliged to re-assess the state of their defences. They consider that the situation arising from recent events calls for a collective response. The quality, effectiveness, and deployment of NATO's forces will be improved in terms of both manpower and equipment in order to provide a better capability for defence as far forward as possible. The quality of reserve forces will also be improved and their ability to mobilise rapidly will be increased. Renewed attention will be directed to the provision of reinforcements for the flanks and the strengthening of local forces there. The conventional capability of NATO's tactical air forces will be increased. Certain additional national units will be committed to the Major NATO Commanders.

Specific measures have been approved within these categories of action for improving the conventional capability of NATO's forces. Ministers agreed that the co-ordinated implementation of these measures and the provision of additional budgetary resources to the extent necessary to support them would form part of the NATO Force Plan for 1969-1973 which will be submitted in January 1969. They also acknowledged that the solidarity of the Alliance can be strengthened by co-operation between members to alleviate burdens arising from balance of payments deficits resulting specifically from military expenditures for the collective defence.

9. A year ago Ministers affirmed in the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance that, while maintaining adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter any aggressor, the Alliance should work to promote a policy of détente. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has seriously set back hopes of settling the outstanding problems which still divide the European continent and Germany and of establishing peace and security in Europe, and threatens certain of the results already achieved in the field of détente. Indeed, in view of the action of the five members of the Warsaw Pact, the scope and level of Allied contacts with them have had to be reduced.

10. More specifically, prospects for mutual balanced force reductions have suffered a severe set back. Nevertheless, the Allies in close consultation are continuing their studies and preparations for a time when the atmosphere for fruitful discussions is more favourable.

11. In any event, consistent with Western values the political goal remains that of secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West. The Allies are determined to pursue this goal, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The search for peace requires progress, consistent with Western security, in the vital fields of disarmament and arms control and continuing efforts to resolve the fundamental issues which divide East and West.

12. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to stand as the indispensable guarantor of security and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation. By its constitution the Alliance is of indefinite duration.

Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary. The Foreign Minister of France recalled that, for its part, unless events in the years to come were to bring about a radical change in East-West 'relations, the French Government considers that the Alliance must continue as long as it appears to be necessary.

13. The next Ministerial Meeting of the Council will be held in Washington on 10th and 11th April, 1969.

14. The Defence Planning Committee which met in Ministerial Session on 14th November will hold its next Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on 16th January, 1969.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 17

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1968

Respecting

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department
of External Affairs.

WITNESSES:

From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. T. H. Bennett, Director General, Finance and Administration; Mr. W. S. Durdin, Chief Passport Officer.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,	Groos,	MacRae,
Anderson,	Harkness,	McCleave,
Barrett,	Howard (<i>Okanagan-</i>	Nowlan,
Borrie,	<i>Boundary</i>),	Ouellet,
Brewin,	Laniel,	Penner,
Cafik,	Laprise,	Roberts,
De Bané,	Legault,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
Fairweather,	Lewis,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
Forrestall,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),	Winch—(30)
Gibson,	MacLean,	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart.
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, December 3, 1968

(29)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 8:05 p.m., with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Borrie, Cafik, De Bané, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacRae, McCleave, Penner, Roberts, Ryan, Wahn, Winch (17).

In attendance: From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. H. B. Robinson, Deputy Under-Secretary; Mr. J. K. Starnes, Assistant Under-Secretary (Administration); Mr. T. H. Bennett, Director General, Finance and Administration; Mr. W. S. Durdin, Chief Passport Officer; Mr. M. Cook, Head, Personnel Operations Division; Mr. A. J. Matheson, Head, Finance Division; Mr. A. R. Boyd, Peace-keeping and Military Assistance Division. *From the Parliamentary Centre For Foreign Affairs And Foreign Trade:* Mr. Peter Dobell, Director.

The Committee resumed its consideration of *Item 1 of the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs.*

The Chairman introduced Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Cadieux made an opening statement, explaining the Estimates and the administration of his Department.

Mr. Cadieux was questioned by Members of the Committee. He was assisted by Mr. Bennett and Mr. Durdin.

Mr. Cadieux agreed to provide the Committee with information concerning Canadian exports to Taiwan, and allowances in connection with Canadian participation on International Commissions, as requested by Mr. Ryan.

At the end of the questioning, the Chairman thanked Mr. Cadieux and his officials. The Committee adjourned at 10:00 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, December 3, 1968.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, it is a little past the hour. As there are a number of things going on this evening, perhaps we could get underway in the hope of finishing by ten o'clock. As witnesses this evening we have Mr. Cadieux, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and officials of the Department of External Affairs.

We have previously called Item 1 of the estimates of the department of External Affairs, and we will continue with that item now.

There has been distributed to you a memorandum containing a great deal of information as to how the departmental estimates are prepared. In addition Mr. Cadieux will make a short introductory statement, following which he will be available to answer questions.

Mr. M. Cadieux (Under-Secretary of State, Department of External Affairs): I am very happy to appear before you to explain the estimates of the Department of External Affairs and to talk to you about departmental administration. Those of us who are charged with the responsibility of administering departments of government and the programs assigned to them are acutely conscious of our responsibility to ensure that the resources allocated to us are used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We are also conscious of the need to explain in particular to you, the representatives of the people of Canada just what it is that the tax payer is paying for. You have a right to know and it is our duty to tell you with as much precision as possible what are the responsibilities of our departments, what they are required to do and how they go about doing it. We are always open to suggestions as to how we might do it better.

You have before you a paper prepared in the Department of External Affairs which tries to set out in highly abbreviated form the answers to some of these questions—what is the Department, what are its responsibilities,

who is discharging them, how do they do it, what does it cost? The paper, of course, does not cover all aspects of the work of those who make up the Department of External Affairs. Many books have been written on the conduct of foreign relations. I have no doubt that several interesting books could be written about the manner in which the Department of External Affairs discharges its responsibilities, but this is not what we are paid for. So I hope you will find the paper before you a satisfactory, as it were, thumbnail sketch which I will do my best to fill in by answering any questions that come to mind in reading it.

I do not propose to make a long statement but if you will permit me I should like before answering your questions to elaborate a few points that are only touched on in the departmental paper and to say something about a few of our current preoccupations.

I said a moment ago that we were conscious of our responsibility to administer departmental programs as efficiently and effectively as possible. The point I should like to make about that is that in fact the Department of External Affairs is itself a program, the objective of which is the protection and the promotion of Canadian interests abroad. This involves expenditures on only two activities which fit the normal definition of program. They are our information and cultural relations programs about which I will have more to say in a moment. The point is that apart from these information and cultural relations activities and the payments we make to international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO by reason of our membership in those organizations, the expenses of my Department are related to the activities of people, for it is through people—their use of intelligence and personality—that diplomacy is conducted.

I stress this point because it is of the utmost importance to the representation and protection of Canada's interests abroad that we have the best qualified and most representative people possible engaged in that activity. One very special problem we have always

had to face but which has become far more acute in recent years has been the need to encourage bilingualism. We have long recognized the importance of working toward a service that was truly representative of Canada in culture and language, and we have achieved a high degree of two-language proficiency. In the rotational officer categories—Foreign Service officers and External Affairs officers—28 per cent are bilingual and another 20 per cent are able to utilize both French and English adequately. But these figures do not perhaps reveal an accurate picture. What becomes clear from a closer scrutiny of these figures is that a very high percent of younger officers are bilingual or able to use the other language. And care is taken to ensure that all those entering the Department are given ample opportunity to acquire bilingual proficiency if they do not already have it. As a result, the ratio of bilingual officers is increasing rapidly. Of some 400 stenographers and typists, a third have qualified to receive the 7 per cent pay bonus for a proven ability to work in both languages. These proportions are among the highest in the federal government, but they are not as high as we would wish them to be.

We have also been encouraged by the number of officers who have come to us from French-language universities. Officers whose mother tongue is French make up 21 per cent of the total. We are also seeking to increase the opportunities open to our French-speaking officers to be able to express themselves in French. Despite our shortage of staff, a large number of officers are engaged in French-language courses, full-time or part-time, and we are indebted to the language schools of the Public Service Commission for making this possible. The results have been encouraging. A knowledge of the two official languages enables our officers to understand all aspects of their country and to represent Canada abroad in a more effective fashion. Continued efforts are also being made to obtain French-speaking staff members as clerks, stenographers, communicators, and other kinds of support staff.

The importance of our having a truly bilingual service cannot be overstated as the principal spokesmen abroad for Canada, our ambassadors and the staffs they supervise have important roles to play as do those of us who serve in Ottawa and try to contribute to the preservation of Canadian unity. I need not take your time with a recitation of the

points made in the government's paper on Federalism and International Relations published earlier this year. I might, however, recall for you a paragraph that is relevant to the information and cultural relations program I mentioned earlier:

Looked at in broad terms, "cultural relations" involve not only academic exchanges, the theatre, music, and the arts, but a wide range of activities of an educational, scientific and technological character. As such, a program of cultural activities and exchanges sponsored at the governmental level, like an external aid program, is a closely integrated part of a country's foreign policy, and is so considered by virtually every modern state. Canada is no exception, and in recent years increasing attention has been given to devising a coordinated policy in this field. Since it reflects a policy designed to meet the interests, of all Canadians, such a program must take full account, as in all other areas of Canada's foreign relations, both of our federal constitutional framework and of our bilingual character.

• 2020

In the paragraph I just quoted there is a reference to external aid programs. I should like if I may to say just a word about the involvement on the part of External Affairs in the formulation of Canada's international development policies and in the administration of the development assistance programs. The Department is, of course, represented on the Development Assistance Board as well as on the Development Assistance Committee that works under it. Beyond that again there is the most painstaking and thorough examination of development assistance programs and policies within the Department in an attempt to ensure that what is done to the benefit of one country may not operate either to the detriment of another or may even have an unwanted influence on some other aspect of the economic or social development within the same country. In the field, while efforts are being made by the Canadian International Development Agency to deploy more aid administrators, the burden falls mainly on the ambassador and his regular foreign service staff. In some countries development assistance may be the most important continuing

issue between Canada and the recipient government and since in many countries development assistance represents an activity of great importance to the recipient government, the involvement of the ambassador and his staff in its administration not only provides a means of access to the host government but almost invariably gives rise to policy issues of a political or economic nature with which the Department must be involved. It is therefore important that aid administration should be a direct concern of my Department and of its members serving abroad. At the same time we have to recognize that it is a very time-consuming activity in many countries where administrative and managerial efficiency are abysmally low by Canadian standards. We also have to recognize that as the number of official Canadians engaged in development assistance programmes and other activities on behalf of the Canadian Government increases abroad, a very substantial burden is placed on the Department of External Affairs in connection with their administration and protection.

This is, by no means the only or indeed the most significant addition to the tasks of our missions abroad connected with the presence of specialist staff drawn from other departments and agencies of government. In places when such specialist staff is present it is the responsibility of the ambassador and of his principal assistant, drawn from the Department of External Affairs, to ensure that the activities and efforts of all members of the mission are coordinated and directed to a consistent end. For these posts where there is no official from other departments or agencies of the government the task is one of ensuring that the needs of all elements of the government are satisfied to the extent possible within the limited resources of the post and in accordance with an order of priorities which best achieves the objective of the protection and promotion of our interests in the country concerned.

In conclusion I should like to mention briefly the subject of planning. I do so to try to put in perspective the policy review activities in which the government and the Department is now engaged and which I understand the Committee will shortly be undertaking. There are many ways for a Department like ours of engaging in policy planning. Some foreign offices have found it beneficial to have the activity concentrated in one unit. Others have chosen to have the policy planning team

placed in an organization which is grafted on to rather than an integral part of the foreign ministry. Still others have found it helpful to engage in policy planning at different levels within the same organization. For our part we are not convinced of the value or nor are we committed to any particular planning approach. We have, however, found it necessary to engage large segments of the Department's personnel resources in the current fundamental and far-reaching review of Canadian foreign policy. Among the reviews in which we are now deeply involved and which, in this concentrated form, is engaging the energies of a high proportion of the Department's staff, are the review of policy towards NATO and national defence, towards Europe, towards China, towards Latin America and the United Nations. In addition, of course, there is a review of Commonwealth problems which normally precedes each meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. In these reviews there has been a happy and welcome development, that is, the involvement of the academic community in our study of our relations with Europe to begin with. Many of us have long felt that the academic community could make a substantial contribution to a balanced study of Canadian foreign policy but we have not known how this could be achieved. I think that the means has now been found in relation to the review of Canada's European policy. I hope that it will be possible to extend this cooperation between our Department and interested members of the academic community into other areas of study.

• 2025

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Cadieux. I have on my list of questioners Mr. Fairweather, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. De Bané and Mr. Winch.

Mr. Fairweather: My problem, Mr. Chairman, is that my questions are rather scattered. However, these estimates are rather dead until next year, so perhaps the Deputy Minister will not mind.

First of all as to capital, where is the new construction under this item taking place?

Mr. Cadieux: You mean construction for the year 1968-69?

Mr. Fairweather: Yes.

Mr. Cadieux: I think the major places are Bonn, Warsaw, New Delhi and the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Mr. Winch: I noticed an item of \$575,000 for capital expenditure in Yugoslavia, so I thought that must be construction.

Mr. Cadieux: Bonn is about 70 per cent completed, I think.

Mr. Fairweather: What about New Delhi, is that finished yet? It has gone on for about 15 years.

Mr. Cadieux: No, I think this will be just the first stage.

Mr. Fairweather: But you have owned land there, though?

Mr. Cadieux: We own land there, and have for a number of years. I think the idea is to have the chancery there and to build staff quarters over a period of time. I think the residence is still under consideration as to whether it will stay where it is or whether eventually it will be put on this site. Another place is Tokyo, where a temporary chancery building is under construction because we would like to extend and develop the present chancery building. Another place that I think is underway is Warsaw, Poland. These are the major places. In other places you have smaller adaptations of buildings or repairs going on all the time.

Mr. Fairweather: You mentioned recruitment. Do you have difficulty in recruiting good people to represent us?

Mr. Cadieux: The short answer is no, but I would like to qualify that. The problem is that as a department we are in competition with private enterprise and with other branches of the government. We have difficulty to the extent that we have to arrange for our officers to go around the country with Civil Service Commission teams to explain what kind of careers we offer, and I think we can only remain in the business of attracting good people if we continually make an effort through our academic liaison unit and through visits to the universities to make the students and professors aware of the openings that we have in the Department.

Another problem is that the officers in our Department are being trained in a type of work which makes them valuable for activities in other fields of government. I think that provincial departments which are similar to ours—the one in Quebec in particular—and also other branches of the government in Ottawa are interested in the kind of training

that our people acquire over the years. At times our officers find a career opportunity to serve the country very effectively in departments that are sometimes close to us, such as the co-ordinating departments—the Privy Council is one of them—and other agencies of a similar nature.

Mr. Fairweather: Perhaps I had better put the question. Is your establishment filled each year, are you below establishment or are there gaps. I know about going around to the universities, which is an annual thing, but are you filling the vacancies you need to fill as a result of those recruiting trips?

• 2030

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, we have no difficulty in getting an adequate number of candidates and getting them in our establishment and training them.

Mr. Fairweather: I notice a little later in this gray-covered document a matter of military aid to Greece. I suppose one should not editorialize, but what would be the justification for Canadian military aid to the Greek Government?

Mr. Cadieux: The justification is that this is a program that I think was adopted or encouraged by NATO some years ago, I think in 1962. There was at the time a feeling in NATO—and here I realize that I am perhaps going a little beyond what would be normal for a civil servant to advance in the way of justification—but there was a collective decision in NATO that the southern flank needed some assistance, and member countries were encouraged to give assistance to these two countries if they were in a position to do so. In 1963 Canada appropriated a million dollars and cheese and tinned meats were sent to these two countries to relieve their budget and enable them to concentrate on the military side of their activity. A little later in 1964 some problems developed as you know, in connection with Cyprus and this assistance was suspended.

In 1966, this appropriation was revised and the idea of the Canadian Government was to strengthen the southern flank of NATO by making a contribution in an area where it was felt that Canada could make a contribution that being the provision of communication facilities. As a result of negotiations with the two governments, the present situation is that a firm of Canadian engineers has been

retained to survey the route where these communication facilities could be provided. When there is agreement as to the best route and the best equipment to put in there, the question of providing material assistance will arise again.

Mr. Fairweather: But do not our policies change with changes of governments? Surely an arrangement made in 1962 would have to take into account what has happened in Greece.

Mr. Cadieux: This has happened, I think. There was a suspension after 1964 in view of developments affecting Cyprus, and at the moment you have a Canadian engineer who is surveying the possible route—

Mr. Fairweather: I am not talking about Cyprus. I am talking about the military. I want the latest information.

Mr. Cadieux: As to the political situation there, as you realize, I am under some inhibitions here, but what I can say is that these two countries, Greece and Turkey are members of NATO, and their ability to defend themselves is a matter of concern to NATO and the provision of adequate communications between them in the military field is something that would be of significance in terms of helping them to defend themselves.

Mr. Fairweather: What steps is the government taking to re-establish our relations with Gabon? Is there an appropriation here?

Mr. Cadieux: All I can say is that the latest statement made on this by the Prime Minister was that our relations with Gabon were suspended, and there is nothing that I can add to that. At the moment we do not have diplomatic relations with them. It does not mean that we do not communicate with them occasionally, but on some subjects we do not receive word, such as scholarships for citizens from Gabon. There is some communication through our embassy in Washington but the question of whether diplomatic relations will cease being suspended is a political decision and that political decision has not been made.

Mr. Fairweather: What about Zambia? Have we any representations in Zambia and if not, are there plans?

Mr. Cadieux: No. We have no direct representation in Zambia. I think our representation is through Dar-es-Salaam.

Mr. Fairweather: I understand there is a good deal of feeling that perhaps this would be useful.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, this is something that is very much under consideration and with the plans we are making for expansion, compatible with the resources that can be made available to us, this is a possibility. It is certainly on the list.

• 2035

Mr. Fairweather: Just one other area, because I realize there are others who have questions. What contact do we have with—to use language that is approved—the rebel government of Rhodesia?

Mr. Cadieux: The rebel government of Rhodesia?

Mr. Fairweather: Well, I am just trying to use your own Minister's way of describing other rebellions.

Mr. Cadieux: We have no office there now.

Mr. Fairweather: No, but is there any contact? Is that through Mr. Smith? Would a contact be through Mr. Arnold Smith?

Mr. Cadieux: I suppose that Arnold Smith may have some contact with the government of Rhodesia but this would not be Canada. Smith is an international functionary representing the Commonwealth Secretariat. The United Kingdom government has had, in the past and very recently, dealings with that government about the possibility of a solution. So far as we are concerned, I think that there is a UN resolution about communications with that government.

Mr. Fairweather: Did you ever think of changing the name of the Department and shortening the rather cumbersome title for the ministry?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, this has been considered on many occasions.

Mr. Fairweather: Is that an appendix to the review that is going on now?

Mr. Cadieux: No, because this has been looked at in the past on a number of occasions. This is a problem that has some particular ramifications. It is not a problem of very high priority but it has been looked at on occasion. To change the name would require legislation. There are other aspects related to that. There is also the matter of titles of representatives in Canada from other countries. Related to that is how to designate

Commonwealth representatives in other countries, as to whether they could still be referred to as trade commissioners or whether they would become consuls general. It raises this kind of problem.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. Forrestall: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Could Mr. Cadieux or any of his staff bring us up to date on the totality of our dollars and cents, expressed that way, contribution to the Nigerian-Biafran situation, apart from such direct matters as salaries that might have been involved with the sending of aircraft manned by military personnel?

Mr. Cadieux: My colleague points out to me that this question was raised in the House and that the answer was given on November 27, by Mr. Forest, the Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Privy Council. If you wish, I will read this.

Mr. Forrestall: No, just the total figure. I am sorry I did not know that it had been given on that.

Mr. Cadieux:

What cash contributions have been made by the government to relief operations in Nigeria up to and including October 31, 1968?

Mr. Forrestall: Yes, I did know that. The question I asked, Mr. Cadieux, is as to the total amount of money involved, as far as you can estimate at this particular time, and I would include the very recent amounts for the additional purchase of fish. I do not believe that figure was included either. That involved purely cash; there have been other considerations. Do you have an accurate figure of what this amounted to in dollars and cents.

Mr. Cadieux: No, I do not think I have the figures here because there are many elements to this. The fish, for instance, is in the estimates of the External Aid Office, (CIDA), but I would not have that here.

Mr. Forrestall: You would not have it. That is fair enough. However, am I right in understanding that it is on your Department's initiative that, for example, the previous boat load of fish and the one that is now being gathered was commenced?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, but for budgeting purposes, while we may take the initiative, working closely with the External Aid Office and other agencies, the bill is sometimes passed on to the External Aid Office because they have the appropriation for this kind of thing; or, sometimes part of it goes to the Department of National Defence.

• 2040

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Cadieux, I wonder—

The Chairman: I have you down, Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but on this question I was going to bring up a point of information.

The Chairman: Perhaps we had better carry on. We have a large number of questioners—

Mr. Forrestall: You might leave me now, rather than have the Under-Secretary bouncing back and forth, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: If all the other members are prepared to have Mr. Cafik make this information available, I am certainly quite happy to have him do this.

Mr. Cafik: No, but the question raised the fact there was a million dollars not taken into account, in that question that you referred to in *Hansard*. I believe that there was one million and half dollars involved in the second shipment of fish, if I recall correctly what was said in the House.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, we could move into the general area of how we are doing as a nation in terms of the contribution we are making as it relates to our gross national product? Are we approaching some of the international standards that have been suggested from time to time? One per cent is a figure: how do we stand in terms of that with regard to the estimates that are now in front of us?

Mr. Cadieux: Again I have to plead that this belongs to the External Aid Office, CIDA.

Mr. Forrestall: It will.

Mr. Cadieux: yes.

Mr. Forrestall: You are rapidly shooting me down, Mr. Secretary. This is not an attempt at facetious humour, because there remains some question about it at least in the part of Canada that I come from, but could advise us of the status of our representatives in Formosa at the present time?

Mr. Cadieux: We do not have a representative in Formosa.

Mr. Forrestall: None at all?

Mr. Cadieux: No. Formosa has a diplomatic representative and consular representatives in Canada but the Canadian Government does not have a representative in Formosa.

Mr. Forrestall: That was not a facetious comment, Mr. Chairman. I asked the question because the Prime Minister seemed to believe a week or so ago that there was a representative in Formosa. I thought that should be cleared up. We will have the External Aid people, will we, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: If members wish, that certainly is possible. We have their estimates before us and if the members wish, that could be arranged. It would require an additional meeting. We had rather thought that that might not be necessary but if members wish them to come before us, we can do it.

The estimates for the new year, of course, will be before us, we hope early in the new year, but if you wish to have them before us, we perhaps could arrange a special meeting, but it would take a special meeting.

Mr. Forrestall: You are not yet in a position to advise when you would expect those estimates—whether it will be in January or February?

The Chairman: I understand, early in February or the middle of February. We hope to get started on this general policy review of defence matters before that time, of course.

Mr. Forrestall: Could I simply leave it at this, then, and ask that the steering committee consider the advisability of it. It is not important in that there is nothing urgent about it, particularly in the context of what is now in front of us, but it would be nice to have had some indication and then perhaps the Chairman could advise the steering committee. It would certainly answer my question. I am curious as to whether or not we are progressing in some orderly fashion towards a reasonable contribution in the field of external aid. One per cent, while I do not accept it, is nevertheless an internationally spoken level, and the answer to it, no matter how it came, would be welcomed by myself.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Forrestall. Mr. De Bané.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. De Bané: Mr. Cadieux, I would like to ask you two questions which are perhaps not very closely linked. First, in terms of semantics, what is the difference between Foreign Affairs and External Affairs?

• 2045

Mr. Cadieux: Well, the difference is as follows: I think that the intention, in using External Affairs, was to use a term that would cover relations with England and the Commonwealth countries which had the same sovereign as Canada and which, consequently, were not considered as foreigners in Canada, whereas Foreign Affairs, was for countries that did not have any historical or constitutional ties with Canada.

So, the term "External Affairs" is wider than the term "Foreign Affairs".

However, through the years, the situation within the Commonwealth has changed, and some now consider that it would be simpler for Canada to do like some other countries, that is to apply or use the term "foreign" for External Affairs so as not to make a difference between the countries which, even though they are still members of the Commonwealth, are not always very different as far as the way of doing business with them is concerned.

Mr. De Bané: Can we say that it would be opportune that we should do this?

Mr. Cadieux: It is a matter that has been debated and which will have to be decided on by the Government eventually.

Mr. De Bané: Do you think it has some merits to it?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, that is a question which is strictly political, I believe, and, as a civil servant, I can say that there are pros and cons. As far as I am concerned though, I cannot give you a personal opinion without giving up the strict neutrality which a civil servant must follow as far as those questions are concerned.

Mr. De Bané: Now, with regard to the budget for next year, does this cover the construction of a building for your Department, in Ottawa?

Mr. Cadieux: That comes in the budget of the Public Works Department. Now, what has been provided for so far, is that the plans are

being worked out, the tenders may be called starting in January. Now, as far as I am concerned, I received a letter from the Deputy Minister of Public Works which said that he was drawing up his plans, on the supposition that the tenders might be called in January.

Now, whether the sums have been allotted to his Department for next year's construction, personally, I cannot tell you that.

[English]

At the moment there is no loss of time. The plans are proceeding and it is only in January that the decision will be made whether or not to call for tenders.

[Interpretation]

Mr. De Bané: Should I interpret from what you say that the Department is not terribly interested in getting things moving swiftly?

Mr. Cadieux: On the contrary, the Department would very much like to go ahead with the construction of a building because, at the present time, the Department is spread in 11 different buildings, and maintaining liaison between the different services is certainly quite complicated. We are not the only Department in this situation but, in our Department, the various services are obliged to compete for the recommendations which have to be made to the Government, so that liaison between the different services of the Department must be the very nature of things, be more intimate than is the case in other Departments.

That is why I think there would be great advantages, simply from the viewpoint of efficiency, in bringing together under the same roof all the services of our administration. There are also many other considerations which must be taken into account. I think that there would be a certain advantage for the country, whenever possible, to have a building that we could identify as being the External Affairs or Foreign Affairs building of Canada.

There is also another factor, namely when you have a building which has been constructed for your own purposes, you have facilities that make it much easier to keep up relations with other countries. For example, you have a conference centre where you can organize meetings, have offices for translation and also hold press meetings so that the Department and the country will, I think, when we will have a building such as this to our disposal, derive definite advantages from it.

Mr. De Bané: When I consider where the other departments are located, I have the impression that if we make a comparison, the Department for External Affairs is really the most disfavoured in this respect and, on the other hand, should the Department for External Affairs obtain decent headquarters, then the premises it occupies on the Hill could very well be used by the Members of Parliament.

• 2050

Another question. Concerning what we see in the item on page 10, the French version of your statement, Mr. Deputy Minister—

Mr. Cadieux: No, I am not sure we are talking about the same document.

Mr. De Bané: This may not be a very pertinent question, but I see here that the recommendations concerning our policy have a number of sources, including:

information received from intelligence services.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. De Bané: Are these intelligence services strictly Canadian, or do we depend on intelligence services belonging to other countries?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, when I read this text, I thought somebody would ask me that question. The word "intelligence" has a kind of particular sense, which means "information". It does not mean "spying" because, of course, we do not have a service of that kind. As far as intelligence services are concerned, there is, among others, the CIA in the United States which gathers informations on matters about which the American Government has to take decisions. In some cases, some of the information that is gathered by the CIA can be placed at our disposal and we use it.

There are also other countries which have intelligence services and which give us the results of their inquiries with regard to certain matters and we have the advantage of this work which has been done elsewhere. This way, we sometimes realize a considerable saving of resources and, in some cases, this applies for instance, when we want to open a mission in some country. We address ourselves to a friendly service which has an embassy there, or a consulate, and we tell them: Well, what is the equipment which our people ought to bring; what will they have to spend for rent; what is the status for workers

over there who work 11 months per year for 13 months of salary?

These are things that we must know if we want to draw up our budget. In most cases, or in many cases, it is information of this nature that comes under the heading "Intelligence".

Mr. De Bané: Next, with regard to local employees from other countries working for our missions, generally speaking, do they have their security clearance?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, it depends on the country.

Mr. De Bané: I will give you an example.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. De Bané: I was in New York at the United Nations, a month ago. I had occasion to talk with the car driver, an American who has been employed by our United Nations Mission for the past five or six years, and he was explaining to me, and this is related to "management" which you dealt with, he was explaining to me that each time that he carries highly confidential material, another employee of the Mission goes with him because he does not have a security clearance, since he is not a Canadian. Two people just to carry an envelope! I think that the five years he has been working there should have been ample time to make an inquiry about him, quite apart from the saving this would have entailed.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, but we have regulations with regard to protection of information enclosed in these pouches. And our regulations require that the employees must be ...

Mr. De Bané: Canadian.

Mr. Cadieux: . . . Canadian. That is one consideration, the other one being that in certain countries, which are friendly you can go to the police to find out if the employee you want to recruit has a record, if he is reliable, if he is an honourable man; as an employer, it is a precaution that you take. But, in other countries, it would be a great mistake to act in this way for reasons that you probably guess.

Then this is why, in certain cases, there is some kind of security clearance in the sense that, as employer, we take normal precautions to insure that the man has no police record, that he is a sober man, that he is a reliable employee; it is in that sense that

there is a security clearance. But with regard to local employees, in all the countries, these people are limited to certain things with regard to classified material. They cannot transport classified material; they cannot keep it; there is quite a number of things which cannot be entrusted to those people.

Mr. De Bané: Another question. With regard to the study undertaken by the Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China: is this study fairly well advanced?

• 2055

Mr. Cadieux: As Mr. Sharp explained it this afternoon, the reviews on foreign politics are inter-departmental exercises, in the sense that it is not simply the Department of External Affairs that gives an opinion, but you have many services that are interested, that are consulted and that must give their opinions as well. Then, this work has been done at the level of the administration. Now, there are some proposals which are submitted to the Government and the Government will then be asked to give guide lines concerning what may have to be done subsequently.

But, the preliminary work has already been done with regard to the administration or the civil servants. The work is not finished but they have submitted certain questions to the Government which will now give them some guide lines.

Mr. De Bané: A few other short questions. With regard to the visit of the Honourable Lionel Chevrier in Africa two years ago.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. De Bané: I heard ...

Mr. Cadieux: I believe it was a year ago, in December, last year.

Mr. De Bané: Yes. I am sorry. I heard it said that, wrongly or rightly, certain African countries are complaining that the concretization of the projects announced by Mr. Chevrier is too slow and that this is due to all kinds of regulations which exist in Canada, in relation to normal development of any government project. Is this justified criticism? Is there any way to remedy this in the future?

Mr. Cadieux: I can assure you that the impatience of these countries is quite understandable. Their needs are great and I would

like to see the decisions taken by Mr. Chevrier, implemented as soon as possible. This is perfectly understandable.

Only, what happened is that Mr. Chevrier had a mandate that was far more liberal than the one given to the missions which are normally sent abroad. He had the power to decide on the spot on a good number of projects; he also had the right to agree to local expenditures, in fact, he had been given exceptional powers in view of the nature of his mission. This had been the first explanation. The second point is that once he returned here, we had to coordinate the work of the various services and find a way to put all this in action and, effectively, in certain cases, for reasons which are complex and which vary from one country to the other, there have been some delays. But the most energetic dispositions have been taken to advance things rapidly and I think that if you have heard any criticism in the past, now the reason no longer exists, because we have done everything that we possibly could to satisfy these countries.

However, I must add that without knowing it, because we are very interested in External Affairs, I answered a question which should have been directed to my colleague, the general director of CIDA, Mr. Strong.

Mr. De Bané: Then, a question which perhaps will be more in your own field, i.e. our relations with France.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. De Bané: Where do they stand at the present time? Is there any improvement?

Mr. Cadieux: You are not asking me a question on the administration of the Department. I must point out that for a civil servant, this is a political question which raises questions of appreciation.

Mr. De Bané: I am sorry. Now with regard to the allocations for French and English-speaking countries: what is provided in the next budget?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, I know that there is a very substantial increase but, once more, as far as assistance to the French-speaking countries is concerned, this field is dealt with by my colleague, Mr. Strong. The Department of External Affairs gives political advice on this. But what I can tell you is that we, of the Department of External Affairs, and I am not suggesting either the External Aid Office or

the CIDA, as we now call it, did not agree, but we have recommended that there should be a substantial increase in the funds. There where there was nothing a few years ago, we have \$300,000. Now the subsidies are between 20 and 30 millions dollars, so that there has been an almost vertical increase. We deplore certain limiting factors, for the Department as well as the External Aid Office, for instance, the recruiting problems for staff to carry out these programs efficiently and in an orderly manner. And here there is a conflict between the increase in moneys and the setting up the infrastructure, the recruiting of staff that can cope with rapidly increasing operations.

• 2100

Mr. De Bané: My question is perhaps too delicate, so you are free not to answer it. With regard to the possible candidates in your Department, especially French-speaking candidates, do you question them with regard to their ideas about the constitutional future of Canada?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, because—not because it is done systematically in all cases, but at the present time, if you recruit people for the Public Service, no matter from what area of the country, you can hardly have an interview of 1 hour with a candidate without referring to this concept of the future of the country and his ideas about this matter. If he answers: “I am against changing of the Senate” or “I am against changing the Supreme Court”, his admission will not depend on his opinions. It is the way he answers that gives an idea of his intellectual background, his turn of mind, briefly, of the type of man you are recruiting. I can assure you that when asking questions of this kind, the Department's intention is not to establish a norm: a candidate is not excluded because he has given a “wrong answer” to two or three questions. The purpose of the oral examination is to find out the quality of the candidate, to form a judgement on his moral, intellectual and other aptitudes, to fulfill the duties with which he may be entrusted by the State. The question about whether or not the candidate is a reliable person, falls under the jurisdiction of the police. If he belongs to certain organizations, if he puts bombs in mail boxes, well of course, that would be a point against him.

Mr. De Bané: But if he is very nationalistic regarding Quebec, could this...

Mr. Cadieux: Well, you have to say what you mean by "nationalist". It covers a lot of things.

Mr. De Bané: I meant on this side of separatism...

Mr. Cadieux: It is a matter of judgment, once again. I think that someone who is a nationalist—if you think that it means someone whose interests are to see that French-Canadians are recognized throughout the country—can be engaged without any problem. But if by nationalist you mean someone for whom French-Canadian interests are absolute, for whom Canadian interests shall never prevail over French-Canadian interests, you have somebody who is not really a Canadian. You have somebody who wants to just serve Quebec interests but does not want to integrate into the Canadian reality. In that case, you have to ask other questions.

It is quite possible that a young man of 21, before a group of judges, a panel, just to show off, would say things he might not actually maintain when he gets to Ottawa and realizes that there is a wider perspective, and sees French-Canadian problems in the world context and the Canadian context. In such cases, I think that we must rely on the experience of the members of the panel and understand that young people can sometimes have a certain way of seeing things, and you also have to believe in the intelligence and good faith of the young candidates. I think that the panel's attitude is to show trust in people, find people who are willing, and to give to those people who are capable of developing themselves, the possibility of doing so.

Mr. De Bané: One last question. What is the attitude of the Quebec government, and especially of its Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, with regard to relations with France? Could you give us some information on this subject?

• 2105

Mr. Cadieux: It is very difficult for me to answer that question objectively, because there have been confrontations between the Departmental and the Intergovernmental Department of Quebec. But, what I can say, is that the attitude of our Department in anything that has to do with the development of relations between Quebec and France, has always been very favourable. We in External Affairs have always thought that it was not up

to us to stop anything that was legitimate and natural, but to add a Canadian dimension to what Quebec wanted to do, to put in charge of our relations with France, not only Quebecers, but Canadians of all other parts of Canada. With regard to the blanket agreements and agreements that have come under the Federal government, the Department of External Affairs has always been consulted, and its attitude has always been very co-operative and favourable.

Mr. De Bané: I asked this question, because provincial Civil Servants have told me that if the relations are tense, it is because they are looked upon by Ottawa like children and prevented from acting on their own even when legally entitled to do so. They quoted as an example an agreement they had planned to sign with Belgium, about two years ago. Now, according to them, the federal government beat them to the punch, showing that Ottawa does not trust Québec. So, I am very glad to hear that, on the contrary, Ottawa, is very open about these things.

Mr. Cadieux: The attitude of the federal government, at least that of the Department of External Affairs, is that it cannot consent to the idea of allowing Québec to sign agreements as an independent country with Belgium. This is out of the question! If the government's policy changes, matters will be quite different. The Department of External Affairs will always be considered as very narrow minded when it will be a matter of letting Québec take Canada's place at international meetings. We have certain limits imposed upon us by government policy. By the way, I wish to point out that it is totally unjust to say that the Department of External Affairs or its officers have a policy of their own. They are the government's advisors, and they carry out the policy of the government. When Québec has to deal with the Department of External Affairs, it is not Mr. Cadieux or Mr. X of External Affairs, it is dealing with, it is the Canadian government which has taken a decision which we carry out as best we can. This is a very important distinction, because there is a tendency in some groups, to personalize things, to accuse Mr. so and so, and I don't think that this is right, nor is it the way to deal with the problem.

Mr. De Bané: Thank you very much, Mr. Cadieux.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, could I have a brief explanation of the operation of the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the magnitude of it? I note that this year the cost to Canada is \$895,000 of which \$500,000 is to assist in defraying the cost of accommodation.

What kind of accommodation do they have that takes half a million dollars from Canada as a grant in aid?

Mr. Cadieux: It is located in a new modern building in Montreal and this is an attempt on the part of the Government of Canada to assist in encouraging that organization to remain in Canada.

Mr. Winch: It cost half a million last year too. Do you anticipate that it is going to go on costing a half a million every year?

Mr. Cadieux: Well, if this were not done I think it is conceivable that other countries would offer this organization accommodation at a cost that might be less. What the government has to consider is the advantage that you have in having an organization on your own national territory—the prestige that this may give to the country, the occasions for readier contact with the Secretariat and so on. These are the kinds of considerations that enter into a decision to subsidize accommodation.

Mr. Winch: This prestige status is costing us money.

Mr. Cadieux: This is one of the considerations but, as I mentioned, there are other advantages. Some of these people live in our country, they tour the country, they gain a better knowledge of our country, and some spend a fair proportion of their income in our country. These are some other aspects of it.

Mr. Winch: I noticed a little item here called International Development Assistance ... \$62,900,000, and of course there is no breakdown. This fund was established in 1965. What is the present status of the fund and what are the major items that make this expenditure so heavy? It is not charged against aid; it is a large amount of money and it is going into a fund. It is on page 133.

Mr. Cadieux: This is for my colleague Mr. Strong, who is heading up CIDA.

Mr. Winch: Even though the money comes directly under your vote?

Mr. Cadieux: I do not think it is External Affairs.

Mr. Winch: Yes, it is. The reason I asked is because it is down under External Affairs.

• 2110

Mr. T. H. Bennett (Financial Management Adviser, Department of External Affairs): Sir, if I may explain. The estimates that are labelled External Affairs in the blue book include those that are labelled A here covering the Department; then there are in addition the estimates of the External Aid Office, now called CIDA, and finally the International Joint Commission. They are all labelled External Affairs but my Under-Secretary is only directly responsible for the parts regarding the Department.

Mr. Winch: Then you would not have information on the status of the fund or anything else.

Mr. Bennett: No, sir.

Mr. Winch: I guess we are going to have to call them before us.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Cadieux, are there any items in the estimates to provide for staff that you may take on for the review of External Affairs policy and also for seconding men on your staff already to work on the review? I note that you have an item on page 118 for Professional and Special Services which increases this year to approximately \$982,000.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Would that item cover people that you may pay to work on this review? Also, what other provisions do you have for this?

Mr. Cadieux: We have two I think, one under the Information Division. I think that the Education Liaison Section there have some money to invite people to seminars, which is the main way I think that consultation will take place. But on top of that we have money under Professional Services that would enable us, if this became necessary, to recruit someone for a period of time.

Mr. Bennett: If I may, the funds which are shown on page 118 at \$982,000 could be used

for the employment of personnel on a short-term basis, but essentially it is devoted to the costs of architectural fees, similar contractual services, tuition and examination fees, the Corps of Commissioners, consultants and experts that we do engage from time to time for a variety of purposes.

Mr. Allmand: With respect to those who may be invited to participate in this review, I notice in your annual report for last year you have a section on Bibliography. There seems to be a growing number of articles and books written by Canadians and others on Canadian foreign policy. Are these the type of people that you may invite to these seminars? I see here the name of Mr. James Eayrs, Mr. Edward McWhinney, Dean Maxwell Cohen of McGill University and so on.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, I think it is likely to be people of that type but whether it would be these persons, I cannot say. We had a discussion with representatives of the academic community and the understanding was that they would select people who would come to discuss with officials and members of the government is policy review. It is not the department that will make the selection; it will be the academic community itself. For instance when we deal with Latin America we will go to representatives of the academic community and say, "Will you designate and invite the people that you think are knowledgeable about this to come and meet us and to confer with us on this review."

Mr. Allmand: What about journalists and private associations who are concerned with foreign policy—United Nations Association in Canada, Oxfam of Canada, and other such groups?

Mr. Cadieux: In the first place, the members of the academic community may designate people who are not necessarily professors. Some of those people who are knowledgeable may be covered by that.

Again, another aspect of it is how your Committee here will conduct its business. You may decide to invite newspapermen, editors and others who are knowledgeable about these things.

Mr. Allmand: But your approach is to academics, not to journalists and others.

Mr. Cadieux: Our approach is to academics, to begin with.

Mr. Allmand: I see.

Mr. Cadieux: Whether the government at some later stage invites newspapermen, journalists or editors who may be especially knowledgeable about the question, remains to be seen. We have not yet reached that stage. For instance, when we have a meeting with academics who are knowledgeable about Latin America I can well see that we may consider asking some of our Ambassadors in Latin America to attend these meetings. On those occasions, if there is an editor, a newspaperman, or someone who is knowledgeable...

Mr. Allmand: A foreign correspondent, for example.

Mr. Cadieux: —I would not see why these people could not join that group. I do not see this as being exclusive, but certainly the academic community would be one important element in this. As I say, I do not exclude the possibility; frankly, I think it is well foreseen that this Committee may wish to invite people such as those you mention to come and give evidence.

Mr. Allmand: Since the incident of James Earl Ray and his passport have any steps been taken to tighten up the operations of the passport bureau?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes; a good many studies have been conducted and recommendations have been made to the government on this. I expect that, before long, decisions will be made and announced.

Mr. Allmand: Recommendations relative to new procedures—?

Mr. Cadieux: With respect to new procedures; to tighten up on the security side and to improve the general operation of the passport service.

Mr. Allmand: Sir, over the last year I have received many inquiries from Canadian citizens, who formerly came from Germany, about pensions that they have accumulated in Germany. It seemed that the answer I got back from the Department each time was that we did not have a treaty with West Germany to cover the granting of these pensions, as there is no Germans who migrated to the United States.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: How intense are the efforts by your Department to try to establish some

type of agreement to help these Canadians who have accumulated pensions in Germany?

Mr. Cadieux: I can assure you that we are very anxious to move on this because we know that it affects a fairly large number of people.

The problem is complicated by the fact that in some respects provincial jurisdiction is involved, and, to move, there would require to be negotiations with the provinces, and these would be of some magnitude.

Mr. Allmand: This is for reciprocal pension rights?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. It is not something we can do except, perhaps, in respect of those areas of federal jurisdiction that would be affected. If these people work for the federal government you can make an arrangement. If they are under provincial schemes you would have to involve the provinces in the operation.

This is just one of the aspects that explain why it has been difficult to move very quickly on this.

Mr. Allmand: Are your officials actively working on this?

Mr. Cadieux: I know that they are working actively on it. Just how soon they expect to be able to get results I am not at the moment briefed on, but I can undertake to get the information and give you a further accounting, if you wish.

Mr. Allmand: I am following up certain individual cases.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. I would not normally be concerned with individual cases, but . . .

Mr. Allmand: No.

Mr. Cadieux: . . . I am quite aware of the fact, because a number of cases have crossed my desk about the general problem of how to move with Germany in the negotiation of a treaty, taking into account the provincial aspect, among others.

Mr. Allmand: Sir, at the end of this year our role on The Security Council will terminate.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: Will the staff in the mission at New York be cut as a result of that?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes; there will be a reduction.

Mr. Allmand: Of how many?

Mr. Cadieux: It will be fairly substantial. If you are on The Security Council you have sometimes to take positions daily on complicated political issues. We expect that after the new year there will be a gradual tapering off and that we will be reducing the staff. We will probably revert, not quite but essentially, to the *status quo ante*, when Mr. Tremblay was head of the delegation; but there will be some reduction.

Mr. Allmand: When I was there, sir, I made an observation, which quite surprised me, about the delivery of *Hansard* and Canadian newspapers.

• 2120

Mr. Cadieux: Yes?

Mr. Allmand: Canadian newspapers arrived at the missions in New York—and this also happened when I was in England—sometimes within three to four days after their publication, but *Handard* was nearly two weeks late.

An hon. Member: Perhaps it went through the dead letter office!

Mr. Allmand: It seemed to be delivered in a bag. I have spoken to people in other missions in New York, and even those in offices there that are less than missions, such as the World Bank office in New York—a Canadian there told me that they get newspapers from all over the world by airmail every day.

It occurred to me that it is very important, not only for Parliamentary observers but also for your staff there and in other countries, to receive, not just through a wire but through newspapers, up-to-date editorial comments and *Hansard*, and so forth, so that you can see what is being printed in the Canadian press; otherwise you would get out of touch very quickly.

Without mentioning any names, I spoke to some of your officers there and they also wondered why.

Mr. Cadieux: It is a very fair question and one that has exercised us considerably over the years. We have looked at this carefully.

It may well be that our answer is not very good, but we will look at it.

Mr. Allmand: What is your answer?

Mr. Cadieux: To try to keep them informed is complex; it is not an easy problem.

Every day we send them the CBC news bulletins. To some missions it is in English and to others it is in French. These they do get. In addition, we send them by air-mail the first six pages of *Le Devoir* and of the *Globe and Mail*. These go everywhere.

Another element to take into account is that they subscribe to a large number of newspapers, which they do not get by air-mail but get fairly soon; and, as well, they get magazines and background and books and all sorts of things about Canada.

When they have to deal with some specific issue they get special instructions from us. In other words, it is the responsibility of headquarters here, and of the Minister in particular, who knows what the general situation is in the country, to give to those in one particular post, which has occasion to act, instructions that take into account the political situation here.

In addition to that, any special, important statements made on any current policy issue are sent by telegram to nearly all the missions.

We do not proceed on the assumption that those who are sometimes 2,000 miles away from Ottawa will be left to assess, through newspapers and magazines, what may be developing in Canada that may have a bearing on their operation. It is up to the people here to do that for them when it will have any effect on how they are going to present the case to the other country, which is their main job.

Another consideration that is very relevant is that to send, for example, 10 daily newspapers to our mission would cost us \$360,000 annually. That would be a very substantial expenditure.

In some cases it is certain that those at the mission that received 10 newspapers would not in any case, (a) have time to read them, and, (b), even if they read them that we could confidently leave them to interpret their meaning relative to the Canadian scene and how they should affect their operation in a specific case. For that you must rely on contact.

Mr. Allmand: Sir, I was at the United Nations when the Nigerian incident first arose in the Canadian Parliament. The only two newspapers we got immediately were the *Globe and Mail* and *Le Devoir*.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

29317—2½

Mr. Allmand: First of all, I think it is wrong to send these two newspapers. I do not know on what basis they were chosen to be sent to our embassies throughout the world. There should be a broader choice. There is at least room for a newspaper from each region of Canada: the West Coast, the Prairies, Central Canada, the Maritimes and Quebec.

In addition, I find that it is only by reading the editorial comment on the news stories that one really sees the reaction of the people of Canada to a political problem. I have found the news releases sent by your Department very inadequate in relation to reading the front pages and the editorial columns. I realize that even that does not inform one in a complete way but, I still think it gives one a better impression of public reaction within the country.

In relation to *Hansard*, what we received were extracts, and these I found to be incomplete, as did your own officers. If I were such an officer and I wished to examine something in depth I would want to see the complete *Hansard* the very next day.

Mr. Cadieux: There is no doubt that it is desirable, in principle, to send more, but one runs into the problem of how much time one's people can stand reading stuff that comes from home when their job is really to represent you there and to report to you on what is happening. This is one aspect.

• 2125

Another aspect is that to send the six-page parts of the two newspapers already costs us \$26,000. These are the only two papers with which we have been able to do this. They have air-mail editions that are prepared for us to send. In the past it used to be one of the two Ottawa papers, but we later changed to the *Globe and Mail*.

It is possible that later some other paper may be willing to give us this service and then, at an additional cost, we could send these in addition. But, as I say, you run into the problem of how effectively a mission can use much of this material.

Mr. Allmand: In any opinion, it is something that should be reconsidered, because I think the service is inadequate and I have found other missions with a better service in this respect.

When Canadian embassies abroad give part of their space to the Department of Immigration, or the Department of Trade and Com-

merce, or Defence, do you derive revenue from the bookkeeping entry for that?

Mr. Bennett: If I may answer that, sir, where we own the building there is no charge for the space occupied by other departments. If we are renting the chancellery property the other departments are charged on a *pro rata* basis for the square footage of space they use.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I still have seven questioners on my list. We were thinking of finishing this sitting at ten o'clock. We have had rather a long day, and there is no reason for our not having another sitting; a great deal of interest has been shown in the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

Perhaps we should proceed, though, and see how we get along, with a view to having another meeting if we cannot finish this evening.

The questioners I have on the list are Messrs. Ryan, McCleave, Cafik, Legault, Roberts, Borrie and Gibson.

Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, I wish to pursue the question of defence support to Greece and Turkey. I understand that this is a communications system that was instituted some years back and that a considerable bit of work has now been done on it by way of feasibility studies?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Have any purchases of capital equipment been made?

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Ryan: Is this the microwave system, Mr. Cadieux?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Was the general route of it planned to go from Greece through Turkey to one of the central nations, such as Iran or India?

Mr. Cadieux: No; I think it is just between Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Ryan: It was not intended to link up with anywhere in the Middle East or the Far East?

Mr. Cadieux: This is not my understanding, no.

Mr. Ryan: Does the \$1,000,000 which will probably be spent relate to this communications system or to something else?

Mr. Cadieux: I think this is the provision to cover expenditures which may develop during the year. Basically, this year, I think it is merely a study by an engineer, and that the \$1,000,000 may not be spent.

Mr. Ryan: Last year there was also an appropriation of \$1 million. Was that, or any part of it, used?

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Ryan: I have a note here relative to Mr. Allmand's recent questions. I believe you said there is a telex system between the UN delegation and Ottawa?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: And in addition there would be some direct telephone lines, would there not?

• 2130

Mr. Cadieux: Oh yes, we are always on the telephone.

Mr. Ryan: How many government lines are there?

Mr. Cadieux: These lines, I do not know how many. Perhaps Mr. Bennett would know.

Mr. Bennett: Just one; it is a direct line, sir.

Mr. Ryan: How many would have access to that in the delegation?

Mr. Bennett: It goes through the delegation switchboard to all the telephones in the delegation.

Mr. Ryan: There was a question asked in respect to Taiwan. I would like to know where Taiwan presently ranks as a customer of Canadian exports: Could we have some recent figures on that?

Mr. Cadieux: You can have them but I am sorry I do not have them with me tonight.

Mr. Ryan: Maybe we could have them filed later as an exhibit, with permission of the Chairman and the Committee.

The Chairman: Could we plan on receiving them, Mr. Cadieux, and we can file them as an exhibit with the Committee records?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: I understand, Mr. Chairman, we do not have the estimates of the International Joint Commission before us but that these have been referred to the Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works even though they are in External Affairs estimates. I also understand however, that the External Aid Office is in our estimates and is our responsibility. We do not have Mr. Strong here tonight or anybody from his Department. I am, however, interested in the International Commissions in Indo-China. I understand these are pertinent to your estimates, Mr. Cadieux.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: First of all, in your summary, and it may or may not be a mistake, I noticed on the first page about half way down under the heading Operational the second item is Indo-China and the revised estimates for 1968-69 are \$587,800; the expenditure for 1967-68 is listed as \$530,718; but at page 121 of the External Affairs' Estimates the 1967-68 operational expense item is listed at \$539,000. Is that just a mistake or is there an explanation for that?

Mr. Bennett: The figure printed in the Estimates Book is the estimate that was printed the year before in the same Blue Book. It is the amount that was provided. The figure in the submission of the Under-Secretary of State, which is a smaller amount, for the same year 1967-68 was what we actually spent.

Mr. Ryan: I see. Why do you have such an increased estimate for operational expenses for the current year? We go from \$530,000 up to \$587,800, which is roughly \$57,000 difference. Why would that be necessary? I believe this is pertinent just to the Cambodia and Vietnam estimates and not the Laos ones?

Mr. Bennett: That is right, sir. If I may answer this, the increases and decreases in this amount which account for the change are spread over a variety of items. Salaries increased by \$4,000 in spite of the fact there are the same number of people. This is for normal wage increases. There was a slight increase of approximately \$7,000 for overtime work at the mission. The allowances went up as well—Again, for the usual incremental increases. Increases in freight and express and cartage are a reflection of rate changes

and increased cost of doing these things. Similarly there was a \$7,000 increase in communications between Ottawa and the post, again a reflection, in part, at least, of increases in the rates that are charged to the Department by commercial carriers. There was a decrease in repair and upkeep for buildings of \$1,000 and the rest are not significant items. The net change is \$48,000, I believe.

Mr. Ryan: \$48,000 in the estimates, but in the actual, between this year's estimates and last year's expenditures, it is \$57,000.

Mr. Bennett: That is right.

Mr. Ryan: This overtime item seems to have gone up from \$4,000 estimated in 1967-68 to \$11,000 in 1968-69 for 30 officers. Why would that overtime be necessary?

Mr. Bennett: It appears to be simply a reflection of the increased amount of overtime that is worked by the people at the Commission, sir.

Mr. Ryan: Have there been increased demands in the past year?

Mr. Bennett: I would assume so. We have been deliberately holding the permanent establishment at the same level for the last few years and when there is an increase in activity, people are required to complete the job.

Mr. Ryan: Why is Laos International Commission treated separately on page 131? There is an estimate for 1967-68 of \$35,000 and an estimate for 1968-69 for \$35,000 as well.

Mr. Bennett: Under Item 15 we pay 1 per cent of the budget of the Commission. It is a different arrangement with Laos.

Mr. Ryan: Have we two central headquarters there for the three Commissions?

Mr. Bennett: I believe there is a headquarters in each country.

Mr. Ryan: In Laos, Cambodia and in Vietnam?

Mr. Bennett: Yes, sir. We have separate groups of people.

Mr. Ryan: Is there one in Hanoi?

Mr. Bennett: The one in Hanoi is really part of the whole Commission for Vietnam. The head of the mission is based mainly in Saigon.

Mr. Ryan: I see. Where is the Laos one?

Mr. Bennett: Vientiane, the capital.

Mr. Ryan: The Cambodian one?

Mr. Bennett: I always have a terrible time pronouncing that, sir, Phnom Penh.

Mr. Ryan: I see the allowances seem to have gone up quite a bit, from \$108,000 to \$130,000, which is \$22,000 in one year. Is there some particular explanation for that?

Mr. Bennett: A large number of the allowances are affected by changes in salary rates. I can give you a breakdown of the changes in various allowances. The foreign service allowances and the differential allowances went up from \$69,000 to \$71,000. This is a reflection, as I understand it—I am not an expert in this—of the income of the officers based on salary; a reflection of their salary. The representational allowances increased from \$25,000 to \$41,000.

Mr. Ryan: What is representational allowance?

Mr. Bennett: This is an allowance given to officers to permit them to extend hospitality in connection with their official duties.

Mr. Ryan: Do we also have a military attachment to each of these?

Mr. Bennett: Yes, sir, and the costs of the military are borne in the Department of National Defence estimates.

Mr. Ryan: Yes.

Mr. Bennett: The allowances are affected, of course, by the cost of living indexes in the country as it increases.

Mr. Ryan: About how many military officers have we in these three Commissions?

Mr. Bennett: I am sorry, sir, we do not have it.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan are you finished?

• 2140

Mr. Ryan: No, I am not quite through. I am just wondering if we could not have that a little later on with the other information.

I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, with respect to repairs and upkeep of equipment what this equipment would be? Would it be cars or radios or just what would it be?

Mr. Cadieux: It could be radios, TV sets, kitchen equipment and things like that.

Mr. Bennett: Pretty general; a whole range of things.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. McCleave.

Mr. McCleave: Mr. Cadieux, does the international service of the CBC come under the departmental wing now?

Mr. Cadieux: No. We advise the CBC, but I think it comes under the CBC now.

Mr. McCleave: The relations between you and that service have not changed in the last year or two?

Mr. Cadieux: We advise on policy. This is my understanding of the position.

Mr. McCleave: In our recruiting program in attempts to make more headway in certain countries in Africa, do you go to Canadian universities for coloured students who might become officers of the foreign service?

Mr. Cadieux: If they applied and were successful in the competition, we would certainly take them.

Mr. McCleave: Yes, but do you seek them out?

Mr. Cadieux: Not specially.

Mr. McCleave: Have you any in the Department now?

Mr. Cadieux: No, I do not think so.

Mr. McCleave: Has any attention or thought been given to the idea of trying to interest some of these people in External Affairs careers?

Mr. Cadieux: I think this is a good idea. If we could do that we would certainly welcome it.

Mr. McCleave: So that this might be followed up now?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. We cannot do that in a special way, because I can see there would be problems if we were to select on a different basis from that suggested by the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission, in these competitions, provides that the qualifications have general application. If someone with such a background applies, we

would certainly take a special interest. However we would find it difficult to suggest that we start recruiting for the Indo-China post on a different basis, or that we would start recruiting for the Indian or sub-continent posts again on a different basis. This, I think, would lead to consequences that might not be very satisfactory for the officers themselves. We like to think that when people are recruited in the service, they are not recruited for a special post but for a career that enables them to serve everywhere and to rise to the highest post.

Mr. McCleave: Mr. Cadieux, I must say that I share your sentiments entirely except that in some parts of the country I think we are being put in a position of having to take some interim measures to overcome some rather nasty problems that are developing. However, I do not pursue that line of thought except that I am pleased that some attention will be given to the thought that I presented tonight.

Some time in the next couple of years it is anticipated that the House of Commons, or one of its committees, will be dealing with the question of changes in the electoral law. I know that your people, and perhaps the Trade and Commerce people, are almost exceptional in that abroad they do not have the franchise. When the time comes to consider these matters in committee about changes in the law, would your people be prepared to come before the Committee and help in giving our people abroad the franchise?

Mr. Cadieux: We have co-operated in the past with the Standing Committee, with the electoral officer, and if this is the wish of the Committee we will certainly be very glad to do all we can. We would like to see this come about.

Mr. McCleave: If this is an unfair question, please do not answer it. Is there not a fair amount of resentment in the Department because its numbers are so small and scattered that the employees, just do not have the vote, whereas we have made arrangements so that the service people can get the vote.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes, I think that there are many officers who feel very strongly about this.

Mr. McCleave: And finally, sir, I would like to deal with the Passport Office for a moment or two, without dealing with certain

items that are now very much to the fore and in the courts.

As a result of recent developments, if I can put it delicately that way, is consideration being given to changes in the procedures within the Passport Office?

• 2145

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. McCleave: Would this have to be brought into effect by regulation?

Mr. Cadieux: By regulation, which would fix the requirements to be met before a passport was issued, the duration of the passport and that kind of thing—whether people should be required to submit different kinds of documents and fuller documentation, whether personal appearance would be involved, and so on.

Mr. McCleave: On a slightly different topic, sir. In May, June and July members of Parliament are faced with people suddenly rushing off to the United Kingdom or somewhere else for holidays and it seems to me that this must throw an extra burden on the Passport Office. Is any special thought being given to cure that particular situation?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes. We have the chief Passport Officer with us tonight and, if you wish, he may be able to give you more particulars on the kind of remedial arrangements contemplated to cope with that seasonal increase.

Mr. McCleave: I do not want to take up your time, and I think there are three more members who have questions, but perhaps the officer would give us a brief explanation.

Mr. W. S. Durdin (Chief Passport Officer, Passport Office, Department of External Affairs): Could I have the question again please?

Mr. McCleave: It was in connection with the extra burden of business on your office, Mr. Durdin, during May, June and July, or at the start of the summer season?

Mr. Durdin: The only comment that I can make in this respect is that it is very difficult to change the habits of the public. We are considering various devices that might tend to change the workload over the 12 months period, but quite frankly we have not solved this problem.

Mr. McCleave: Is there any thought of advertising or perhaps an educational program, using the travel agencies?

Mr. Durdin: We have very good contact with the travel agencies. We communicate with them fairly frequently. As to changing the workload itself, I doubt whether this would solve the problem.

Mr. McCleave: Let us deal first with the travel agencies. Do you not think it would be in order to issue a circular asking their help, by suggesting to people who come in to make travel arrangements that they shop early for their passports if they really want to go abroad and not be faced with these last minute crises which crop up by the thousands at that time of the year.

Mr. Durdin: Yes, I think that is a possible suggestion we should investigate.

Mr. McCleave: And on the second point, the actual mountain of work concerned—and full compliments to your office and staff, sir; I do not detract from their hard work one single bit—is there not a possibility of working an extra staff for a couple of months—perhaps retired people, RCMP and the like? I do not know exactly what type of officer you have, but perhaps a few dozen extra bodies at that critical time would help the situation.

Mr. Durdin: I might say that we have endeavoured to develop, shall we say, a second shift so that the hours of attack in the 24-hour period would be extended, but we have had great difficulty recruiting staff for this purpose.

• 2150

With regard to general recruitment, I might say it is very difficult to hire people casually and bring them up to a level of experience and knowledge where they can really make an effective contribution. We do use a large number of casuals. We recruit them in the universities. We take these people in early, give them training to try to bring them along so they can be carried to a higher level of response, but it is a very difficult problem and we just have not come up with a solution of staffing for this particular purpose. I might say another experience we had this year was during the postal strike. We carried out a decentralization program and acquired considerable experience. We think that this is a good technique that would help to spread the

focus of attack entirely centrally. So we have gained some experience from this situation.

Mr. McCleave: From the emergency?

Mr. Durdin: Yes.

Mr. McCleave: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, originally we had planned on having two sessions on the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs. I think it is quite clear that this was a wise decision. We cannot really complete the Estimates this evening because we have quite a number of questioners left. It has been a very useful session. In addition, there have been questions asked on the External Aid Office.

It occurred to me that we might try to persuade the co-ordinating committee to permit us to have another meeting some time later this week at which time we perhaps could finish the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs and also deal with some of the questions which have been asked with regard to the External Aid Office.

Is this agreeable?

We have perhaps five minutes left. Mr. Cafik, you are next on the list. Perhaps we could conclude with your questioning, if you think it would not take too long.

Mr. Cafik: I will only take a minute or two. I would like to ask a question in respect of diplomatic and consular missions.

First of all, according to the report there are 87 places in which we have diplomatic or consular missions, and I gather from the annual report that there are 33 countries where we have non-resident missions, which makes a total of 120 countries. That leads me to the question: In all countries that Canada recognizes do we have either resident or non-resident missions?

Mr. Cadieux: We do not.

Mr. Cafik: What standard do we use to decide this?

Mr. Cadieux: The countries that have missions are obviously those that are more immediately important to Canada. Then you establish relations with countries that are next, if you wish, in order of importance; and then there are those where you have no representatives at all and no accreditation—they have a slightly lower priority. I am speaking in general terms. You may have cases where you do not have representatives

and yet the country may be extremely important. A case in point is mainland China, where we do not have diplomatic relations or connections with Peking at this moment.

Mr. Cafik: I will not pursue that further. My next question is in respect of non-resident missions.

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: I gather from the Estimates that there is no attempt to break down the non-resident cost for the country involved, that it is left with the country in which the diplomat resides?

Mr. Cadieux: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: There were no attempts to break that down.

Mr. Cadieux: His travel expenses for the four posts to which he was accredited, apart from the one where he was residing, would be carried on his main mission estimates.

Mr. Cafik: Yes, but there would be no breakdown of those expenses?

Mr. Cadieux: No.

Mr. Cafik: I noticed another item in here, one for Iceland in the amount of \$1,000, which seems to be a pretty nominal amount for any kind of an operation. I just wonder what you have in mind over there.

Mr. Cadieux: We have a very distinguished honorary consul there.

Mr. Cafik: Yet no one works there, and I gather no one gets paid.

Mr. Cadieux: No, but I think that probably there are some expenses connected with the operation of that office. Is that where the \$1,000 comes in?

• 2155

Mr. Cafik: Yes, there is \$1,000 for something.

Mr. Cadieux: I wondered also whether we would not have some expenses there in connection with the visit of our Ambassador to Norway. However, I am informed that would be on the Norway budget.

Mr. Cafik: This might be a good precedent to use to cut down expenses in the Department of External Affairs. Perhaps we could

get this type of operation elsewhere. Thank you very much.

Mr. Borrie: Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable, I would like to make a comment on Mr. Allmand's suggestion. I would certainly go along with his suggestion that *Hansard* could be made use of by the diplomatic corps but not the daily newspapers. I would hate like heck to think that our diplomatic corps was using newspapers for diplomatic purposes. I am thinking of the Nigerian Biafra situation, where Biafra was accusing the Federal Military Government of Nigeria of genocide, which was very capably picked up by our newspapers. So I would hate to see our diplomatic corps relying on newspapers.

The question I was going to ask was asked previously but it seemed to me to be confined primarily to offices established by Quebec in foreign countries rather than dealing with it generally. As you are aware, British Columbia has offices located in San Francisco and London, and I imagine Ontario has also. Does the Department of External Affairs find that there is any conflict of interest with these offices that are located in the same proximity?

Mr. Cadieux: Generally it works rather well. It creates not problems but additional work in the sense that you have to keep liaison with them. When visitors come you have to arrange how they are met and who entertains them. There is a certain need here to take precautions to avoid affecting relations. Generally, our experience has been that it works very well.

In addition, there is a growing volume of travel by provincial officials and in countries where provinces do not have offices they rely on the Canadian mission there to make arrangements for them to be received. This is something that we welcome very much—this is what we are there for, but the volume is increasing. In places like Madrid and other countries in Europe there is a steady flow of visitors from provincial capitals dealing with one subject or another and our mission has to be involved in welcoming them, making arrangements and supporting them in all sorts of ways. As I say, this is something that is very desirable, and we are glad to do it. In London, for instance, where there are many provincial offices, their officials are in close touch with Canada House. Relations over the years have been excellent between these offices and Canada House—and I mean all these offices. Over the years, particularly in

London, the various areas in which everybody operates, has been worked out and it seems to be quite satisfactory.

Mr. Borrie: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: I think perhaps we should adjourn now.

Mr. Legault: I understand we are going to have another meeting and at that meeting we will have Mr. Strong as a witness?

The Chairman: We will have someone from the External Aid Office, yes, to answer questions regarding external aid.

Mr. Legault: Do I understand that Mr. Cadieux will be finishing up tonight?

The Chairman: Some questioners have not completed their questioning. I thought perhaps we could plan on finishing off with the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs and then...

Mr. Legault: I thought we had pretty well completed questioning Mr. Cadieux.

The Chairman: You were one of the ones on the list, Mr. Legault. Are you satisfied?

Mr. Legault: Mr. Chairman, I had only one remark to make to Mr. Cadieux because I found out that the question I had was relative to that which would fall under the responsibility of Mr. Strong, after a question by Mr. Forrestall which was answered by Mr. Cadieux.

• 2200

[Interpretation]

Mr. Legault: Mr. Cadieux, I would like to congratulate you for your presentation. And I would like to make one comment. It is a compliment, actually. The responsibilities you have consist necessarily in controlling expenditures. The remarks made by a number

of delegates in other countries are rather sarcastic regarding the fact that the Canadian delegations that go elsewhere do not always have the necessary services they require. But I think it is something that may depend upon the Officers in those particular regions, and I think we must seek to cut those expenditures. What is rather ridiculous though, is that delegates are quite often obliged to ask for certain transport facilities or information from people who are provided these services by those countries benefitting from our own aid to under-developed countries. I am referring to drivers and cars. It is frustrating to have to depend on the services of other countries that you are helping financially for similar services.

It is just a remark, and it is especially a compliment for the responsibility you shoulder. It seems to me that this matter should be rectified in regard to the countries that we are helping. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson: My question has already been answered, thank you very much.

The Chairman: Several of the members who had questions left when I mentioned that we would be having another meeting. I will check with them, and if their questions are directed toward External Aid and if their questions are not related to matters which Mr. Cadieux and his officials could answer, then perhaps we could consider that we have obtained all the necessary information from Mr. Cadieux and his officials. If, on the other hand, they still have questions, then I think perhaps we might have to call upon you once again, Mr. Cadieux, but we will let you know.

On behalf of the members I would like to thank you, Mr. Cadieux, and your officials for a very helpful presentation.

The meeting is adjourned.


OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 18

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1968

Respecting

Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of
External Affairs and the External Aid Office.

WITNESSES:

From the Canadian International Development Agency: Mr. G. P. Kidd,
Vice-President (Operations); Mr. F. J. Chambers, Director of Plan-
ning; Mr. D. R. McLellan, Director of Finance.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,	Groos,	MacLean,
Anderson,	Harkness,	MacRae,
Barrett,	Howard (<i>Okanagan-</i>	McCleave,
Borrie,	<i>Boundary</i>),	Nowlan,
Brewin,	Laniel,	Penner,
¹ Buchanan,	Laprise,	Roberts,
De Bané,	Legault,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
Fairweather,	Lewis,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
Forrestall,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),	Winch—(30).
Gibson,		

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

¹ Replaced Mr. Cafik on December 5, 1968.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS
THURSDAY, December 5, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Buchanan be substituted for that of Mr. Cafik on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

FRIDAY, December 6, 1968.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

FOURTH REPORT

Pursuant to its Orders of Reference of Monday, October 7, 1968, and Wednesday, October 16, 1968, your Committee has considered the items listed in the Revised Main Estimates for 1968-69 relating to the Department of External Affairs and the External Aid Office.

Your Committee commends them to the House.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 17, 18*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,
Chairman.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

(Text)

FRIDAY, December 6, 1968.

(30)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9.45 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Barrett, Borrie, Buchanan, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, MacRae, McCleave, Penner, Ryan, Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Winch—(21).

In attendance: From the Canadian International Development Agency: Mr. George P. Kidd, Vice-President (Operations); Mr. Fergus J. Chambers, Director of Planning; Mr. D. Ross McLellan, Director of Finance.

The Committee resumed consideration of the *Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs*.

It was agreed to print the following document as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence: *Presentation by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on the 1968-69 Estimates*. (See Appendix Y).

Item 1 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called Items 10 and 15, which were carried.

The Chairman called Item 30—*External Aid Office, Salaries and Expenses, \$4,003,000*. He introduced Messrs. Kidd, Chambers and McLellan of the Canadian International Development Agency (formerly the External Aid Office).

Mr. Kidd read an opening statement and was questioned thereon, assisted by Messrs. Chambers and McLellan.

Item 30 was carried, *on division*.

The Chairman called Items 35 and L25 which were carried.

The Chairman called Item 1 which was carried.

It was agreed that the Chairman would report the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 pertaining to the Department of External Affairs and the External Aid Office, to the House.

Copies of the *Annual Review 1967-68* of the Canadian International Development Agency were distributed to the members present.

The Chairman thanked the witnesses for their presentation to the Committee.

The Committee adjourned at 11.15 a.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Friday, December 6, 1968.

External Aid Office

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have a quorum.

The other day there was presented to us a memorandum prepared by the Department of External Affairs. Is it agreed to have this memorandum printed as an appendix to our proceedings?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: We are resuming consideration of the Revised Main Estimates 1968-69 of the Department of External Affairs.

At our last meeting we completed the questioning of the officials with regard to the estimates of the Department. Is it agreed, that we stand Item 1 of these estimates, call the other External Affairs items, and then proceed to the consideration of the items for the External Aid Office.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: I will call Item 10 on page 114 of the estimates.

• 0945

Mr. Winch: I thought we agreed at our last meeting, Mr. Chairman, that all estimates have been considered with the exception of the one for which the witnesses are here today. I would suggest that you just call all the items except the one which is before us today.

The Chairman: Yes, that is what I am going to do now. I am going to proceed to call them.

Mr. Winch: That was our agreement at the last meeting.

The Chairman: Shall Items 10 and 15 carry?

Items 10 and 15 agreed to.

The Chairman: I will now call Item 30 of the External Aid Office.

30 Salaries and Expenses \$4,003,000

We have with us this morning Mr. G. P. Kidd, the Vice-President of Operations; Mr. Fergus Chambers, Director of Planning; and Mr. Ross McLellan, Director of Finance. Mr. Kidd, I believe you have an opening statement.

Mr. G. P. Kidd (Vice-President of Operations, Canadian International Development Agency): Mr. Chairman, honourable members, ladies and gentlemen. May I initially convey the regrets of the President of CIDA, Mr. Maurice Strong, for being unable to be with you this morning. In substituting for him, I shall do my best, along with my colleagues, to answer any questions in your minds relating to our estimates. Before, however, we turn to the detailed estimates of the Canadian International Development Agency, perhaps you will allow me a few minutes to make some general comments on the Canadian development assistance program and its administration over the past year, which I hope will prove helpful in your consideration of these estimates.

An important feature of the Canadian aid effort has been the determination of the Canadian government to try to increase the level of aid as rapidly as possible and to proceed progressively towards the aid target set by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. In this connection the Canadian delegation at the UNCTAD II Conference, held in New Delhi in the early part of 1968, gave its support to the realization of a target level of 1 per cent of gross national product at market prices sometime in the 1970s, provided economic conditions would permit this increase. This target level would of course include flows of economic assistance from Canada in addition to that included in the estimates of the Canadian International Development Agency. According to international custom, private capital flows and loans made by public corporations, such as the Export Credits Insurance Corporation, are also included in the total aid flows. Never-

theless, the largest part of the aid flows from Canada are included in the Estimates of the Canadian International Development Agency which you have before you this morning. The increases in the amount of funds requested for 1968-69 therefore reflect the Canadian commitment to increase aid levels which the Government has made subject to economic and other circumstances.

In addition to the increase in the total Canadian aid effort, the Canadian International Development Agency is placing greater emphasis on the effectiveness of that aid. With this objective in mind we are striving to coordinate our programs more closely with those of other developed countries and multilateral agencies. We are concentrating our aid in countries and areas in which Canada has significant interests and in which we believe the most effective contributions can be made to the development of those countries. We are also attempting wherever possible to become involved in more integrated projects which include various types of technical assistance as well as capital assistance in order to meet the priority requirements of developing countries. Our emphasis, in fact, on development, on broadening the economic base of recipient countries, rather than what one might term aid handouts, was reflected in the recent change in title of the office from that of the External Aid Office to the Canadian International Development Agency.

We are making more use of the five-year forward planning and commitment authority. This authority enables CIDA to commit resources over a five-year period so that Canada and the recipient country can develop projects on a much more effective and planned basis. It further permits us to relate our annual commitments more clearly to anticipated expenditures and to speed up the flow of program aid by permitting long-term arrangements in Canada for the supply of goods and commodities.

• 0950

We are taking steps also to improve our field administration and using more special purpose task forces to investigate development needs in particular countries. We are also carrying out on-the-ground surveys where our aid is concentrated. I myself, with a team of officials from the office, have only just very recently returned from four weeks in the Caribbean where we have had an opportunity to go over the program in many of the islands, discuss their development pri-

orities and see where most effectively Canadian goods and services can be used to meet their developmental priorities. We are also taking steps to post more program administrators and field engineers abroad to assist in the planning and implementation of our projects.

The Agency is also providing extensive training to its staff in cost benefit analyses for projects and is increasing the capacity of the staff to analyze the economic problems and requirements of the developing countries to which we are providing aid. In addition, it has become clear that effective development of projects and their expeditions implementation requires much more extensive and intimate contact with the recipient countries than has been the case in the past. For this reason, the amount of travel by the officers of the Agency has been increased. As you will see, we have also added to the total number of our staff and, we hope, the quality of this staff. All of this is reflected in the increase in the administrative vote included in these Estimates.

The general character of the aid program for 1968-69 has not changed substantially from that presented to you for the year 1967-68. There are increases in both our grant aid and our developmental loans as well as on the multilateral side. At the same time the proportion of grant assistance under Vote 35 and loan assistance under Vote L25 has not changed significantly.

You will note some change in the breakdown of the grant assistance where the amount expended on food aid is somewhat less than in 1967-68 fiscal year, while increases are suggested in other votes. Food aid is of course an interim measure which is necessary in the period until developing countries can grow their own food supplies. We place emphasis in our programs in assisting developing countries in increasing their agricultural productivity. The reduction this year in food aid reflects primarily the improved harvest in India and Pakistan; we feel the prospects are good and that improved varieties of wheat and rice, along with the application of fertilizers, will increase yields of basic food-stuffs in many of the developing countries sufficiently so that they will become independent of food assistance in the years to come. We expect, therefore, that this type of aid will tend to become a decreasing propor-

tion of the total Canadian development assistance in the coming years.

I do not wish at this time to take up more time of the members of the Committee in these opening remarks. I have available for distribution to members of the Committee copies of our Annual Review which provides a general round-up on our aid program. I should be pleased to pass around copies to the members of the Committee for their future reference, either now or at the conclusion of the meeting.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I are at your disposal for any questions you wish to raise.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Kidd. Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, before we get into any detailed discussion could I ask, as I did, sir, at the last meeting, if this Committee could be given a breakdown of the fund. This fund was established by legislation in 1965. Fifty million dollars was added last year, and in this year's estimates I note the figure is \$67 million. What are the major items of expenditure involved in this increase of \$17 million? Would you also give us the present status of the fund?

Mr. Kidd: Is this the special accounts you are referring to?

Mr. Winch: The special fund that was established for aid in 1965.

• 0955

Mr. Kidd: Special Accounts really provides one account for all non-lapsing votes related to capital and technical assistance extended under our grant aid in order essentially to avoid administrative and bookkeeping problems of maintaining a series of separate accounts in this field that would each have unliquidated balances in them. When it was set up in 1965 it was to facilitate the liquidation of the unexpended balance of the old Colombo Plan fund plus the unexpended balance of the international development assistance subvote, and then subsequently each year it has had that sub-vote transferred into it. It is essentially for administrative and bookkeeping reasons.

Mr. Winch: It may be for that purpose but there is an increase from \$50 million in the last estimates to \$67 million in the estimates this year. I take it that is a revolving fund.

What is the present status of the fund, and what are the major items of expenditure?

Mr. D. Ross McLellan (Director of Finance, Canadian International Development Agency): This would be very difficult to answer, sir.

Mr. Winch: I appreciate that but when it is \$67 million, and going up, this Committee would like to have some information on the operation of the fund.

Mr. McLellan: Well, sir, the fund was established to provide monies for technical and capital assistance for the developing countries of the world. On April, 1, 1965, when Parliament first approved the establishment of the fund, roughly \$51 million of unliquidated monies in the Colombo Plan fund were transferred into the new fund, plus \$30 million unliquidated in the first year's International Development Assistance sub-vote of Vote 35. Now each year since that in Vote 35 the first sub-vote is International Development Assistance. We had put \$50 million in there, I believe, in 1965, in 1966 and 1967, and as Parliament appropriated the total vote—granted full supply, we transferred the \$50 million—we had to—into the International Assistance account. This year, 1968-69, the amount asked for in this International Development Assistance sub-vote is \$62.9 million. The moment full supply is granted, by the wording of the vote, the whole of the amount must be transferred to this International Assistance account, which is used solely for capital projects, commodities and technical assistants, advisors, teachers and trainees in developing countries. Once the funds are appropriated this office begins negotiations with developing countries as to how best we may use the monies to assist them for capital work, technical assistance and so on. But as there is a time lag in fully committing these funds, at the end of a particular fiscal year not all the funds are spent. However, the vote is non-lapsing and is carried forward into the new year. Nevertheless, it is fairly well committed in terms of commitments and plans with developing countries. Mr. Kidd and Mr. Chambers could speak more fully on the planning side. I could say that at the present moment, if you include the \$62.9 million in the current year's estimates which will be transferred into the fund, the unliquidated balance in the fund—that is, cash unspent, is

roughly \$106 million. At the end of this year it will be about \$80 million.

Mr. Winch: I appreciate the information. Could I just ask two very brief questions then. It will be around \$80 million.

Mr. McLellan: Roughly \$80 million—unspent but committed.

Mr. Winch: The money having been voted, is the committing of it strictly the responsibility of the Cabinet?

• 1000

Mr. McLellan: The money having been voted, it is the Cabinet that allocates the moneys in the vote to various nations—what we call geographic allocations. We have copies here of the geographic allocations not long ago approved by Cabinet. Within these allocations we work out capital works projects and technical assistance projects with the developing countries, but we can only act upon the request of developing countries. And we have innumerable capital works programs going on in various parts of the world which constitute commitments, but the flow of cash against the commitments is not always at an even rate. So that at the end of each fiscal year there is always some money in the fund which has not yet been spent, but which is committed and is in process of being spent.

Mr. Winch: In your report do you show how, by Cabinet decision, the money has been allocated to what countries, and for what purpose? In other words, because it gives what is basically a blank cheque for this purpose, does Parliament receive a breakdown of how the Cabinet has spent what amounts to between a \$50 million and \$60 million a year expenditure?

Mr. Kidd: Certainly it totals two areas. We can give you those figures.

Mr. Winch: But not to the countries and the purposes, or does it?

Mr. Kidd: Not necessarily to the individual project because you allocate so much, let us say, to a particular country.

Mr. Winch: No, the Cabinet does.

Mr. Kidd: Yes, but it will take time before you have decided on what project, and at the time you have selected a project, that would go forward for ministerial approval before it was agreed upon.

Mr. Winch: I am thinking of parliamentary control over expenditure of this magnitude or of Parliament's at least knowing how it has been expended. Basically that is the only point, Mr. Chairman, I have in mind. Could we get more information on that at a future date?

Mr. Kidd: Yes. Would you like a breakdown by the areas?

Mr. Winch: Not only that, but my point is whether or not it should be a policy of your Department through External Affairs, because your Estimates come under there, to supply annually to Parliament the amount of money that has been expended. Has that been considered at all?

Mr. McLellan: Do you mean detailed projects—all our projects and so on?

Mr. Winch: If \$2 or \$3 million goes to Pakistan and a few million to India, and so on I personally think, Mr. Chairman, that although it is a blank cheque and Cabinet makes the decision, because of the large amount involved there should be a policy of advising Parliament how it has been expended and for what purpose. That is the main point I have in mind.

Mr. Kidd: There is a breakdown by country in the Annual Review, but not by individual items of equipment.

Mr. Winch: Or food, or whatever?

Mr. Kidd: This is just by sector. It would give you a breakdown of major projects, but not of how many bulldozers or how much fertilizer.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): By sector, do you mean by country?

Mr. Kidd: In the sectors listed here, for instance, we have commodities, education, energy, food, health and social services, industrial plants, natural resources, and so on.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Under each country.

Mr. Kidd: Yes, under each country.

Mr. Borrie: Could we have the booklet you prepared?

Mr. Kidd: Yes, it will be distributed now.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson.

• 1005

Mr. Anderson: I was very much interested in your remarks, sir, on co-ordination with other countries in attempting to restrict our aid to areas where there is a significant Canadian interest because I think that this is an excellent trend which perhaps has not been present sufficiently in the past. Could you give me some indication of the change in the emphasis of our aid program? Could you give me some indication of the number of countries we are now giving aid to in relation to the number we gave aid to five or ten years ago? Could you give some indication of the way in which we co-ordinate with the major aid-granting powers such as the United States, such as Great Britain, whether we break down on a geographic basis or whether we provide certain types of stuff and they provide the other things? Could you elaborate a bit in that particular area?

Mr. Kidd: There are various forms, actually, Mr. Anderson, for co-ordinating aid with underdeveloped countries, and it depends very much which area you are concerned with. For instance, in general terms we have some co-ordination through the Development Assistance Committee in Paris. There are also various consortia established by the World Bank where you get a committee with seven or eight primary donor countries involved, say the Indian consortia, where they would get together and co-ordinate perhaps in a given field, perhaps over the whole range of the programs. For instance, in the Caribbean, from where I mentioned I just returned, there we and the British are the primary aid donors and we ensure that the fields we are operating in are different from the fields they are operating in. In the Windward and Leeward Islands we have selected four sectors of concentration for Canadian aid—education, civil aviation, water development and agriculture; whereas the British are tending to concentrate on harbours, road development, public buildings and this sort of thing, so that you are not at cross purposes in any way.

As far as the countries referred to are concerned, we have tried to concentrate more on a restricted number of countries not only where Canadian interests are involved, but we feel this way you will really make a more effective developmental impact rather than scattering your aid in small packets. This does not mean that you do not give aid to

some other countries in the area, but that your major concentration around certain countries—in Asia, for instance, it involves India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaysia; in Francophone Africa Senegal, Cameroun and Tunisia; and in English-speaking Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and to some extent East Africa. The other major area of concentration is the Commonwealth Caribbean which actually, on a per capita basis, is the largest aid area.

Mr. Anderson: Yes. You focus your aid in a certain country but you still give a certain amount, a relatively minor amount, to other countries in the area. Is this done strictly for political purposes, or is there any real value in it?

Mr. Kidd: In some cases it has been historical, as in the Colombo Plan. We have a number of countries that are involved in there. We have not increased in those areas but we have maintained a certain amount of technical assistance. We are not initiating new major capital projects. In the case, for instance, of Francophone Africa, the government has, as you know, put high priority on the aid effort in this area, and while we have three major countries of concentration we are also providing aid to Congo, Kinshasa, Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and other countries.

Mr. Anderson: But it does strike me that for a country that has as little to give as Canada—and I think we all agree that a country of our population cannot alone do a great deal for the underdeveloped world—we spend far too much on small programs in too many different countries. Perhaps we should be concentrating our entire aid efforts on one country and thus allow this country to reach the 'take-off stage—what the economists consider to be the level at which you can have self-sustaining growth. It seems to me that despite the fact that we are concentrating a bit more on one or two countries in each area, we are nevertheless still far too spread out, and with all the problems of the extra cost involved in administration and other areas perhaps we are really not doing very much to overcome the problem but are merely giving a sort of band aid technique of aid. Could you comment on this?

Mr. Kidd: In dollar value, if you took the countries of concentration it would come to about 80 per cent of our total aid effort. You have to leave out of this the multilateral picture where you would hope to pick up some

of the smaller countries—new countries that have joined the United Nations and this sort of thing. You also have the problem that in some cases, for instance in the Caribbean, it is a concentration regionally. I think you would agree that it would be very difficult to give aid to only one Windward Island and to Jamaica and leave the others out.

● 1010

Mr. Anderson: I would certainly agree with you, sir, that it would be a very difficult decision, but I think perhaps it is a decision we may be faced with and one on which I am not going to ask you for an opinion because it should come from politicians rather than the people who are administering the program. But my experience has been—I was administering the aid program in Viet Nam when I was out there among other things—that we were wasting a tremendous amount of money because we had a program which is very small. And it was top-heavy. We did not have any opportunity to make use of any economies in scale in either granting the aid or in carrying out the projects that we intended to. This I think has been taking place in far too many countries of the world.

At that time—I do not know about now—a good portion of our aid was strictly gifts for political purposes, for international political purposes that were of no value to the people in the areas concerned.

The Canadian people are concerned about Viet Nam, but unless we could really do something perhaps we should not have been there at all; perhaps we should have been concentrating that aid in an area where there was an opportunity for economic growth or an opportunity for Canada to really do something in a small field. I thought we were tackling far too great an area of human suffering to really do very much.

I have just said, sir, that it would be unfair to ask you to comment on this, but could you perhaps give me some indication of how the concentration is taking place now. Would you say that three quarters of our aid program is given to six countries, or ten countries, or twenty countries?

Mr. Kidd: Well, you start out with the rough figure, let us say, of 80 per cent going to these countries of concentration, and the number would be roundabout a dozen. If you take the two biggest recipients, India and Pakistan, I think this would account for close

to 50 per cent of our program. This is the biggest single area of concentration. The Caribbean comes high, as I mentioned, on a per capita basis, but on total dollar value.

Mr. Anderson: Have there been any studies done in the Caribbean where we have done most per capita to indicate the effect of our program over ten years? Is there any appreciable increase in the gross national product, or in the per capita annual income which can be attributed to these aid programs? Or has the increase in productivity simply been taken up by an increase in population, a decrease in private investment or some other factor?

Mr. Kidd: In the Caribbean generally it is not taken up by an increase in population because the population tends frequently to move out of some of the very small islands. No, we have no study of that at the moment except what we can observe, and from discussions with the people we see what improvements have been made. At this stage, it has been more a question of trying to determine what the priorities are and to try to get them moving economically. But I may say that in relation to the general point you have been making we are very conscious of the value of concentration. It is not something you can always carry out fully because other factors come into the picture. And one would hope that in any policy of concentration, if a number of developed states followed this, there would be some multilateral means for assisting smaller states who might get nothing under this basis, and this would be very awkward.

Mr. Anderson: Awkward in the international political sense. My own view is, of course, that we should concentrate on perhaps a small area where we have a chance of doing something rather than a large area where we have no hope at all of ever really achieving any betterment of the living conditions of the people.

You also mentioned our emphasis on food aid and that we are assisting various countries around the world to increase their own food production. This is certainly a change from the international economy view of ten years ago when they were constantly emphasizing industry. Could you give me any indication of the increase in our efforts in this field over the last five or ten years?

Mr. Kidd: We can get the information for you in exact dollar terms, but certainly we

have placed high priority on India. As an example we had an agricultural task force that travelled out there especially to look at this whole question of agricultural productivity and in dollar terms we are devoting a large part of our effort to this. The food aid element would still, of course, be very high.

• 1015

As you know, to India in 1966 we gave up to \$75 million of food aid; in the current year it is \$40 million.

As I say, on hopes that this will get them to the point where they are able to grow their own resources. This, of course, is related to population increase, as well. In fact, at times one can almost say it is a race between the stork and the plough, so to speak.

Mr. Anderson: Yes; I am sure that is the case. Mr. Chairman, as my final question, may I ask whether the External Aid Office—now the Canadian Industrial Development Agency—advises, or submits briefs on behalf of, the underdeveloped world when it comes to tariff negotiations between Canada and other countries? I ask this particularly with respect to restraint negotiations with some Asian countries.

It appears to me—and I am quite sure I am right on this—that an aid program is rather pointless unless the increased industrial or agricultural capacity of the emerging nation is given a chance to flourish by way of exports abroad. Quite often our policy may be self-defeating because we do not allow some of these countries to develop new industries which might compete with our own. Do you advise when tariff negotiations are taking place?

Mr. Kidd: We are not, as you appreciate, responsible for tariff, but to the extent that we were consulted we would certainly want to put this point across.

We are very conscious of the importance of creating trade opportunities for developing countries because, no matter what aid you give, if you do not take some of their products in return, as you have correctly said, you may be cancelling it out.

Mr. Anderson: Is any attempt being made to create in countries abroad industries which might export to Canada under sort of long-term guarantee that we would take a certain percentage of their production, or take a certain dollar value of their total production in

an industry which we think is a viable one for that country?

Mr. Kidd: In our aid program we certainly assist industry abroad if it is something that the country is asking. We are not specifically relating this to imports into Canada. Individual manufacturing methods are financed more through private investment than public investment.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman I wish to ask these gentlemen a few questions about our progress towards attaining the announced goal of one per cent of our gross national product in terms of the cost of goods. I understand we are at .46 this year. Am I correct?

Mr. Kidd: The latest figure of national income is .59, as produced by DAC statistics.

Mr. Forrestall: That is using the standard that was recommended?

Mr. Kidd: This is correct.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): There is a big difference between national income and GNP.

Mr. Kidd: Part of the trouble is that occasionally one sees quoted figures of GNP at market prices and national income, and national income is normally about 75 per cent of the other figure.

Mr. Forrestall: But this does conform with the general formula that was called for...

Mr. Kidd: Through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Mr. Fergus J. Chambers (Director of Planning, Canadian International Development Agency): The problem at the moment is that we are sort of half way between two different target levels. The one which has been accepted by the DAC, on which we are still officially working, is one per cent of gross national income. On that basis we are now at .59.

At the UNCTAD, to which Mr. Kidd referred in his opening remarks, we accepted as the target level one per cent of GNP, to be achieved some time in the 1970's. That is a very general target level, but for practical purposes we are still operating on the old national income one, on which we are now at .59.

● 1020

If you want to take gross national produce at market prices—and this is 1967, not the current year—we were at .44 according to the DAC statistics. That is the total of official and private aid.

Mr. Forrestall: Roughly how does that compare with two years ago? Are we advancing at a rate that is satisfactory, or considered satisfactory by...

Mr. Chambers: I do not have the figures before me, but I do recall them from two or three years ago, at which time we were operating on a national income basis only. We were about .5 per cent at that time. We have come up on a national income basis, which would mean that we have also come up on the GNP basis.

There has been progress, but the difficulty is that it depends upon how fast the Canadian GNP rises. We cannot program this to come out at a certain net increase in our position each year until we find out what the Canadian economy has done; but we are making some small progress.

Mr. Forrestall: I realize you mentioned sometime in the 1970's, that it was general and that you are using approximations in dollars and in time, but does the government feel confident, in terms of its own references, that we will achieve this some time in the 1970's?

Mr. Chambers: Basically it is for Parliament to decide how much money should be allocated to the aid program.

I think it can be achieved. I do not think anyone has set down a definite figure on the aid position of our agency.

It would involve a very striking annual increase year to year to achieve the one per cent of GNP by, say, 1975. If you project the GNP figures until 1975, at the present rate of growth you come to a GNP of roughly \$100 billion a year. One per cent of that is \$1 billion. It can be assumed that some of this is private capital, but in Canada the private capital that goes to the developing countries is very small; most of our private capital goes into the United States or Europe. This means that the official aid flows which would have to be supported by Parliament would have to make up roughly 90 per cent of that, which is \$900 million.

This poses problems in financing and in administration. These are the implications of

this part of it, and this is why we are not willing to fix a specific date at this time.

Mr. Forrestall: Is part of the difficulty our inability properly to administer that much money?

Mr. Chambers: There are administrative problems involved, but I do not think...

Mr. Forrestall: These could be overcome?

Mr. Chambers: We could overcome those.

Mr. Forrestall: Have we nearly resolved the problems that we experienced six or seven years ago because of a lack of adequate engineering, or in other technological expertise?

Mr. Chambers: In the office, or within Canada?

Mr. Forrestall: Within your office and your offices abroad? It is relatively easy to grant a million dollars, but if you do not go and show them how to spend it properly there is not much point in sending it. That was a real problem a few years ago. Is it less of a problem today, or does it continue to be a major one?

Mr. Kidd: The problem exists to some extent; it is not an easy one to resolve completely. We do feel that we are getting on top of it and considerable progress has been made in some of the matters I mentioned in my opening remarks, such as in getting more people on the ground.

If you have a project that is going to run to a couple of million dollars it is wise to send someone out to resolve any problems even though it may cost a thousand dollars there and back, rather than to try to do it all by correspondence and find you have a failure on your hands later on.

We are also trying to provide integrated projects with additional technical assistance. In other words, as in the Caribbean, from which I returned recently and where I am familiar with some of the projects, where we undertake say, a water project to supply a capital city we will also arrange to provide a water engineer for a period until one of their people is trained to take over; because there is no point in their having a water project if they are not going to be able to maintain it.

It is in such ways that we feel we are getting on top of the problem, but it is not one that I can say we have completely resolved.

• 1025

Mr. Forrestall: What portion of the dollars and cents embodied in these Estimates is for military aid of one sort or another?

Mr. Kidd: There is no military aid at all, sir.

Mr. Forrestall: None at all; that has been taken out and separated?

Mr. Kidd: Yes. CIDA does not become involved in military aid.

Mr. Forrestall: This proportion created some confusion previously, I believe. I am pleased that it has now been separated.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Relative to our aid effort, what portion of the total expenditure for CIDA is directed to countries that you consider countries of concentration?

Mr. Kidd: This is approximately 80 per cent.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): To how many countries?

Mr. Kidd: Twelve countries.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Would you name those countries?

Mr. Kidd: Yes; India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Ceylon in Asia; Tunisia, Cameroon and Senegal in francophone Africa; Nigeria and Ghana in Commonwealth Africa; and the Caribbean.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Which country receives the largest amount, not *per capita* but *in toto*.

Mr. Kidd: India.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): And number two?

Mr. Kidd: Pakistan, I would say.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Number three?

Mr. Chambers: Including loans, grants and food aid, Latin America, as a whole, comes next. That is for all of Latin America.

Mr. Kidd: I think the Caribbean, as a region, would be number three.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): To follow up our philosophy of former years, of selecting an area of the world in which it was more or less within our ability to meet the total aid re-

quirements, rather than spreading ourselves thinly over the whole world, has consideration been given to making the Caribbean such an area? Because of its proximity and its size, would it be possible for us to move in with a massive aid program that would have a total impact, if I may put it that way?

Mr. Kidd: That we concentrate all our effort in the Caribbean?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): No, not concentrate all your effort, but concentrate on a program that could be considered one of total impact in that area?

Mr. Kidd: In the case of the Caribbean which is the largest *per capita* area, we certainly try to consider the maximum that we can give. I do not think we have reached that point yet.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My question was whether you had considered such a program for such an area, with the policy objective of having a total impact?

Mr. Chambers: Not in so many words, sir, but I think this is implied in the concentration in the Caribbean, for instance.

We have certain problems. You can only build up to this, as you can administer and find projects and programs to put your funds into.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): It should not be too difficult.

Mr. Chambers: It is more difficult than one would think to prepare projects and have the money spent properly.

You are, however, quite right. We can do that; and I think the Caribbean has been considered rather as one of our primary areas of interest because of...

• 1030

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): For example, you are spending \$52 million in India. Fifty-two million dollars in India, with the massive need that exists in that country, is a pretty small drop in the bucket. Not that I want to take aid away from India particularly, but let us say that the aid to the Caribbean should double from 9.2 to 20. The effect in the Caribbean area would be total impact, if that is the right word to use, as compared to the very small contribution we are comparatively making in India.

Mr. Kidd: And over a period of time I think this can be done, sir. It is a little diffi-

cult immediately, particularly with one unit in the Caribbean, to suddenly trebled the amount.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am not talking about sudden, I am talking about a policy where we are...

Mr. Kidd: This could certainly be. It is really in effect being done.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): But my question is, have you considered such a policy?

Mr. Chambers: Well, this is basically the main aspect of the policy of concentration which the Government has more or less instructed us to follow. This is basically a political decision, I think, ultimately, in which our funds will be spent and the office, I think, has a very great interest in knowing what this policy should be.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I would hope that CIDA would give some good advice to the politicians. After all, they were closer to the needs.

Mr. Kidd: One point too, if I might comment. It is true that in India it is a drop in the bucket, but in a specific sector, as in food aid, this may have been very effective. For instance, we hope that as a result of the aid over the last couple of years...

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I am not trying to belittle the program at all. I am concerned about our spreading ourselves too thin across the world, and with good intentions really not accomplishing very much, and particularly as it relates to an area of proximity such as the Caribbean where there are historic and practical ties where both our trade and communications are concerned. We probably have a special responsibility, and it would be a good pilot project I think, too. Coming back to Vietnam in the second last issue of the—what do you call your tabloid publication?

Mr. Kidd: Canadian International Development Agency Annual Review, 1967-1968.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Yes. You announced a new program of refugee centres for Viet Nam. I see no record of that in your annual report. Are you proceeding with that?

Mr. Kidd: Yes, sir. This is the rehabilitation centre at Qui Nhon where we have a team and we are training people.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I was not speaking directly of the rehabilitation centre. I

know that. You announced a program of—what I understood as I read the announcement—a refugee centre, a multi-storied housing unit. Could you report on that?

Mr. Chambers: We are negotiating still. This is very close to being finalized. We expect there will be no problems. The contractor who is building it has gone ahead, and the building is practically up. We are about ready to finalize the contract with the Government of Viet-Nam.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): What number of people would such a centre accommodate?

Mr. Chambers: Offhand I could not tell you. It is up in the thousands. They have a very high density per unit.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Have you an estimated cost per unit? Could the Committee have the estimated cost for such a unit centre, and the number of people that it is expected to accommodate, and something of the services that might be connected therewith?

A good deal of the, a good portion of the statistics that are given to us, as far as dollars and cents are concerned, perhaps an increasing portion, is concerned with loan. Could we have a report as to the amount, and also something perhaps of the effectiveness of this type of long-term, low-interest aid assistance?

• 1035

Mr. Kidd: Would you like the total amounts for areas?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I was thinking generally, I was not thinking specifically. You say you are spending, say, \$52 million in India or some other area. What portion of the over-all picture would be diverted to that as compared to last year? Something about the effectiveness of the aid assistance. I am not so much concerned with areas as I am concerned with totally.

Mr. Kidd: The total figure for loan programs for 1968 and 1969 is \$106 million as against \$90 million for last fiscal year. Of that \$106 million, you have got \$60 million in Southeast Asia, \$5 million in Francophone Africa, \$9 million in Commonwealth Africa, \$9½ million in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and \$10 million in other areas.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Are all of these without interest?

Mr. Kidd: There are two basic types of loan. There is the fully soft loan, that is the 50-year loan, with no interest and the 10-year grace period. Then in the case where it is felt that a country is in a better position to service the debt or can economically take it, you have a semi-soft loan which is at three per cent interest, 30 years, and a seven-year grace period.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): The subsidy required, as far as interest cost are concerned of this type of money, how is that channelled into your expenditures? Is it a recurring annual expenditure that goes into general expenditure, or are you able to determine the subsidy cost of such types of loan relating to interest?

Mr. McLellan: We are just spending the loan fund, really, as Parliament appropriates it, and under the terms and conditions laid down by Order in Council. But it is my understanding that eventually the Department of Finance will seek from Parliament authorization by appropriation to appropriate X dollars to cover the cost of the borrowing of the funds, as the funds are borrowed. We will not do it, but I understand the Department of Finance will.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): This is a very important figure because in 12 to 14 years at normal costs of interest you are doubling the amount of the original loan, and it is going to become a very important and an increasingly heavy burden as far as aid program is concerned. I am concerned as to what provision is being made for this, because it will become very sizeable and before long it will probably date the total amount of our aid, as the overall capital amount increases.

Mr. Chambers: I think you are quite right, sir. The way I personally look at the loans, it is not much different than a grant, in effect. We did some calculations on one occasion on the softest of our loans—50 years, zero per cent interest, and a 10-year grace period. If you use a six per cent cost of money, which is fairly reasonable now, less than the going rate, the value of that loan at the time you make it for a million dollars is something like \$90,000. In other words, a soft loan for a million dollars is equivalent to a grant of \$910,000, plus a loan at six per cent.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Actually, then you are considering these soft loans, called loans, as grants. And when and if they are

paid back or if they are not forgiven, it is consolidated revenue fund income.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have a number of questioners, and I know that some members may have to leave in a few minutes. Will it be in order if we pass the items now, reserving full right of discussion, so that if our quorum does fall we can continue. Would that be agreeable? If so, shall Item 30 carry?

Some hon. Members: Carried.

The Chairman: Shall Item No. 35 carry?

Some hon. Members: Carried.

The Chairman: And then we have Item L25 on page 577. Shall Item L25 carry?

Some hon. Members: Carried.

• 1040

The Chairman: Reverting to Item 1 of the Department of External Affairs Estimates, shall Item 1 carry?

Some hon. Members: Carried.

The Chairman: Shall I report the Estimates to the House?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: I am sorry for that little interruption, gentlemen. Now we can proceed.

Mr. Anderson: In connection with External Aid, I have reservations on Vote 30. I am not voting on that one. I think we should discuss it before voting on it.

The Chairman: We have a number of questioners.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, all right. It is being passed now, but I must say I did not vote for it.

Mr. MacRae: Mr. Kidd, what are we presently doing in India and Pakistan? What are our major projects there, both on our own and in conjunction with others?

Mr. Kidd: The major capital project there is one which we have been involved in for some years, the Kundah power development. We also have supplied four diesel hydraulic locomotives, three automatic bakery units, and medical equipment. We have assisted in the expansion of the Untru power station. We have provided vehicles and equipment for the Central Water and Power Commission, and equipment also for oil and natural gas exploration.

Mr. MacRae: That is India and Pakistan both?

Mr. Kidd: This is just India. Spare parts for the Trombay Reactor, spare parts for agricultural aircraft, electrical equipment for the Central Water and Power Commission, and food technology equipment. There is a long list here.

Mr. MacRae: Just the major ones.

Mr. Kidd: There is the Idikki power project. That is the other major one.

There has been also a large amount of commodities, fertilizers, sulphur, lead and zinc, nickel. And food aid, of course, has been a very major item.

Mr. MacRae: I presume that you do not contribute to the World Health Organization. That is done through another grant. Is that correct?

Mr. Kidd: Yes, that is not under our...

Mr. MacRae: That is not under your jurisdiction whatsoever. Mr. Kidd, a few moments ago you used the expression about the race between the stork and the plough. Inasmuch as the major problem in this world is overpopulation and the ever-increasing population, what are we doing in India to help them with this absolutely fundamental basic problem?

Mr. Kidd: We are not engaged in our aid programs, at this time, in the field of family planning.

Mr. MacRae: In other words, we do not enter into that area whatsoever?

Mr. Kidd: Not at this stage, no. Although it is a problem that we are very much aware of.

Mr. MacRae: Yes, I think we all should be very much aware of it because if we do not actually conquer this problem, then we are not going to achieve anything in this world whatsoever. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Kidd, what determines a developing country? Is there a list set out by the trade and commerce committee of the United Nations, or just how do we define a developing country?

Mr. Kidd: Basically, this would be as defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, through its Development Assistance Committee.

Mr. Ryan: What that OECD?

Mr. Kidd: The Development Assistance Committee, which is a committee operating within OECD.

Mr. Ryan: And then Canada takes its pick, as it were, from the list as developed by that organization?

Mr. Kidd: A lot of this has grown up historically, through the early staff in the fifties with the Colombo Plan and then the Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan and the Francophone Africa Plan and then the Caribbean. Basically, we are in all the major developing areas except the Middle East.

• 1045

Mr. Ryan: Does OECD kind of co-ordinate the assistance programs across the world, as a whole?

Mr. Kidd: No, not formally. It is a forum for exchanging information and discussing points related to the development, but it is not a formal co-ordinating agency.

Mr. Ryan: When you make grants in the nature of international emergency relief, do you make them through the International Red Cross, or do you make them directly, or how?

Mr. Kidd: We make a lot of grants through the International Commission of the Red Cross. For instance, the relief that is being provided to Nigeria and Biafra has all been at the request of the International Commission of the Red Cross.

Mr. Ryan: That would be the main method of distribution?

Mr. Kidd: It is the main one.

Mr. Ryan: I note that we seem to do very little in Latin American other than make loans. Behind the Iron Curtain we do not seem to be doing anything. In Europe only Turkey, apparently, is considered to be a developing country by Canada. Is there any other country in Europe that we would consider a developing country, such as Greece or Albania?

Mr. Chambers: The OECD and the World Bank, the International Development Association, have divided the world into roughly two groups, the developed and the developing countries, and the two lists are pretty well the same. Sometimes we will hear them referred to as part 2 countries of the IDA agreement—they are the developing countries. Part 1 countries are the developed, the

contributing countries. In Europe, Spain and Portugal are both developing countries, part 2 countries, Yugoslavia, I believe, is a part 2 country and also Turkey and Greece. There were a few anomalies at one time. Finland was also a part 2 country, but I think it switched its category in recent years.

The list does include a number of very curious examples, to come back to your original question. The developing world also includes Kuwait which has a higher per capita income than the United States. There are a few anomalies so one just cannot liberally accept all of these countries as being in need of aid. Technically, when we provide our statistics we take in all aid flows and private capital flows to all of these countries that are classed as developing countries, so if Canada provided any private capital to Spain, Yugoslavia or Greece that goes in as part of our aid flow.

Mr. Ryan: Mr. Kidd, I note that a lot of assistance is given under the heading of Agriculture and Rural Development to the Commonwealth, and under the Colombo Plan and under the special Commonwealth African Program. Could you outline for us the nature of this assistance in this particular area?

Mr. Chambers: Yes; in very general terms this assistance ranges from health to organizing co-operatives, a lot of technical assistance, extension services, some area redevelopment schemes in Ghana and in India, for instance, the fertilizer assistance would come under that heading; either that or Commodities.

Mr. Ryan: Would we send them some of our potato?

• 1050

Mr. Chambers: Yes. A lot of our technical assistance goes out as aid to the agricultural sector; to people who are veterinarians and are setting up, a sort of rural structure of assistance—advisers. We bring over trainees for training in co-operative and the agricultural colleges and this sort of thing and this adds up to a fairly long—

Mr. Ryan: Do we do any...

Mr. Chambers: We do not provide a great deal of agricultural equipment, just some special things. We attempt to keep our assistance as much Canadian as possible and, for instance, we do not produce tractors in Canada. Certain kinds of equipment in some of

these industries, yes, but not to any significant extent.

Mr. Ryan: Are we assisting in reforestation programs to any extent in any of these countries that we have picked?

Mr. Chambers: Not so much reforestation as such, but we are now developing a great number of programs of forestry control and how to exploit forests well and economically. We send out forest surveys to set up pulp, paper and lumbering operations. We provide technical assistance to the government departments of forestry so that they can improve fire control and so on. We have always done a bit of this, but it is becoming a much larger part of our program now, both in technical assistance and ultimately, I would expect, in capital assistance as well.

Mr. Ryan: Thank you.

The Chairman: I still have four questioners. Mr. MacLean, Mr. Howard, Mr. Gibson and Mr. Laniel. Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: Most of my questions have just been asked by Mr. Ryan and Mr. Thompson, but there are a few supplementaries I would like to ask. With regard to the underdeveloped countries that we are always talking about, could you be a little more specific in the definition of an underdeveloped country on the one hand and a developed country on the other?

It seems to me that surely there is a whole spectrum of degrees and in the case of a country that falls just on the developed side of the line—whatever the definition is—should not their contribution to the general development of underdeveloped countries be in proportion to how far they are above the line? Therefore, what is the basis on which this 1 per cent GNP is arrived at? To which countries does it apply in the way of developed countries?

Mr. Kidd: It seems to me this is essentially an arbitrary decision and you are very right. There are some countries that are more underdeveloped than others and you get into quite a grey area at some points. You really have to go at the present time on what has been the accepted basis of those that are underdeveloped and those that are developed. At some time a country reaches a point of economic takeoff, and there have been some cases that we are aiding. For instance, Formosa no longer takes any aid from the United

States because it reached a point where it did not require any more. This would be a decision taken by the major donor and recipient in that case.

Mr. MacLean: But even so, Formosa is still classified as a developing country.

Depending on your definition I could categorize Canada as an underdeveloped country, because of its small population, its vast untapped resources and this sort of thing.

Mr. Kidd: It is a very relative matter.

Mr. MacLean: Yes, so there is nothing very specific or definitive in this field. It would seem to me that this is where some international organization should start.

Now, I want to ask a supplementary or two to Mr. Thompson's questions about Vote L25. This year the amount is \$106 million. Last year it was \$90 million. At the present time, who bears the cost of that money, of having it in existence? Now, this money has to be borrowed at the present time by the government. Are the borrowing charges for taking these two years, roughly \$200 million, borne by the Department of Finance or do you have an accounting procedure where this comes out of your total vote?

Mr. McLellan: It does not come out of our total vote. Parliament approves loan funds year by year, soft terms. We administer these funds on these terms. The cost of borrowing funds is a matter which is administered by the Department of Finance and it is my understanding that if the Department of Finance has not already done so, it will from time to time seek the authority of Parliament by appropriation items to cover the cost of borrowing the funds.

• 1055

Mr. MacLean: So the cost of our External Aid program is actually the total of these votes, plus whatever the Department of Finance has to pay for the cost of borrowing. Now, with regard to the payment of these loans, do any repayments that occur—I do not know whether any of them are occurring yet or not...

Mr. Kidd: They have not been in existence long enough yet.

Mr. McLellan: May I say that the early loans we entered into during the first one or two years when \$50 million each year was approved by Parliament were made not with

any interest, but with a service charge of three-quarters of one per cent and a commitment charge on funds committed but not withdrawn. These service and commitment charges are repayable semi-annually by the borrowing government.

There are probably some 15 loans in this category, and every six months or so we receive a few thousand dollars revenue from such service charges. Later the decision was taken not to enter into that type of loan, but to have only two types; zero per cent interest, 10 years grace, 50 years maturity or 3 per cent interest, 7 years grace and 30 years maturity.

Mr. MacLean: Now where do these repayments go? Do they go back into this—

Mr. McLellan: They go into the Consolidated Revenue Fund as revenue, sir.

Mr. MacLean: I see. Now, I have one last question. With regard to this plan of sending retired executives overseas, does this come under your—

Mr. McLellan: Yes.

Mr. Kidd: It does not come under us directly, but through a voluntary agencies program on a matching basis we support CESO, the Canadian Executive Service Organization.

Mr. MacLean: Is this going fairly well? How many of these people have gone overseas and roughly what is the cost involved in the way of transportation, living expenses and so on?

Mr. McLellan: Is this CUSO?

Mr. Kidd: No, the CESO.

Mr. McLellan: CESO has asked for grants from the government and last year a grant was given in the amount of \$143,000 to enable CESO to get under way, to organize an administrative staff and to put some executives out in the field. In the current year thus far we have extended a contribution to CESO in the amount of \$175,000 with the approval of Treasury Board. They submit to us financial statements from time to time on their administrative expenses and the extent to which they have managed to field executives. They had hoped to field about 50 executives in the current year, but it is my understanding that they are not likely to exceed 25 or 30.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, Canada built two buildings at the University of Hué and the university is not now in use. What has happened to those buildings?

Mr. Kidd: In Hué?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In Viet Nam.

Mr. Chambers: I can find out.

Mr. Kidd: We could get that information for you.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I would be interested—

Mr. McLellan: Is this the tuberculosis Kuang Ngai clinic?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): No; the medical building and the assembly hall. We are going to have the witnesses back again for further discussions. Then I would like to go to vote 30. There are a number of items there which seem to be in the publicity field that have had very massive increases over last year. The Publication of Reports and Other Materials have gone from \$20,000 to \$52,000. Photographs, Films and Radio Tapes have gone from \$47,000 to \$86,000. This seems to be a rather remarkable increase in view of the fact that the total budget is not anywhere near that much.

• 1100

Mr. McLellan: The answer to that is that not too long ago the External Aid Office had a strength of 85 and an establishment of 109, and a Colombo Plan annual note of \$50 million. In the last three years the amount of money which Parliament has been giving us for aid programs has been increasing considerably. Our establishment now rests at 490 with a strength of 390. Because of the growing program, we started with a small Information Services Division consisting of one person and this division has now grown, I think, to some five or six people. The management of CIDA—and I think with the approval of the Minister—feels that our activities in the aid field must be exposed to Parliament and the public to a greater degree than has been the case in the past. Hence the Information Services Division requires funds for information purposes which approves films, radio tapes, and so on. I understand they wanted to go to Africa to take some films showing our aid in certain areas there

which were to be shown in Canada to indicate what we are doing in the field. This is really the reason for the request for larger amounts on the Information Services side.

Mr. Kidd: I would like to add that this is not all related to publicity, although publicity is the main element in it, as Mr. McLellan mentioned, but films and photographs are taken in connection with the large number of teachers and advisers we are sending abroad on orientation training before they go on the ground.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): You have a program where you use executives or retired people who go overseas, and in my experience there are a very large number of people in Canada who are in this category, people who retire early because they are successful, perhaps, and we could use many, many more of these people very effectively. Many of them wander around wondering what to do with themselves. They could be widows who were previously teachers or who had had business experience. They could be widowers or they could be couples, and this program could be expanded tremendously. I am speaking in terms of the numbers of people that might be available in Canada if they were sold on the idea of doing this. Is any concerted effort being made to make this program more effective in order to bring it to the attention of people? There are thousands of people in Canada who are not aware that the program even exists.

Mr. Kidd: They certainly conduct an advertising program and try to keep in touch with industry. However, I would like to add that this is not the only way in which a retired executive would be used. If he is sent out under CESO auspices, which we are supporting on a grant basis, these are normally short-term assignments of from three to four or even six months. In addition, we will also send out retired executives as advisers if there is a particular requirement for one, as we send experts throughout various parts of the world, which may be assignments for one or two years. So, it is not only through CESO that someone who is retired—and, as you point out, would be available for development work—might go abroad.

• 1105

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I know one such executive who applied once or twice for such a program, and he found that he was dealt with on the same basis as somebody

applying for a job with CUSO. They asked him what his high school principal would have to say about his abilities. They asked for some kind of a report of this kind. This was the kind of information they expected from a mature executive who had spent many years in the business world. It was a kind of "Mickey Mouse" operation—treating the man as if he were just a boy out of school.

Mr. Kidd: This is CESO you are referring to?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes. I am concerned about this because I think it has a basis for a very effective program if it could be made effective in the executive field in Ottawa. However, I do not feel it is reaching the people in the terms they expect to be dealt with. There is a tremendous untapped field available here if the people in Ottawa would talk to these individuals in terms they understand and in an effective way, and not treat them like boys out of high school.

Mr. Kidd: You are thinking in terms of the people in the CESO organization?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Yes.

Mr. McLellan: Their headquarters are in Montreal and the applications would go to Montreal, sir.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I am talking about an Ottawa department. I am talking about...

Mr. Kidd: CESO is not a government agency. It is a private agency.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): But there is a government agency operating in this field.

Mr. Kidd: As I mentioned, we might send a retired executive abroad as one of our experts. He would then be under our normal technical assistance programs and CIDA would be recruiting him directly. But in the case of someone going abroad under CESO auspices, we are only indirectly supporting that organization financially. We do not send the CESO executive abroad.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You mean that it operates like CUSO?

Mr. Kidd: That is correct, yes.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Then we do not attempt to control how they operate?

Mr. Kidd: We certainly have no jurisdiction. Since this is a related activity we are obviously interested. We supply the...

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Since we are putting up the money...

Mr. Kidd: ...financial support on a managing basis.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Since we are putting up the money it seems to me we should look into the operation. I have the feeling, in the limited look that I have had at it, that they could be more efficient in the way they operate and recruit.

Mr. Kidd: We will certainly take note of it.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I think that is all. However, I am amazed we do not do anything in the birth control field.

Mr. Anderson: May I ask a final question, Mr. Chairman? How do you decide on new projects, perhaps, in countries where you are not now operating? Do you rely entirely upon the advice or the suggestion of an ambassador who may go out there and have some idea put to him by the development agency of that country and he in turn writes a letter to you suggesting it?

Mr. Kidd: Are we talking here, Mr. Anderson, of the country in which we had an allocation?

Mr. Anderson: No, I am talking of a mythical country, whatever it might be, Ruritania, and the Minister of Economic Development tells the ambassador that they would like a nice, brand new Canadian dam and he then writes a letter to you. Do you then work on his advice, or how does this go?

Mr. Kidd: In this particular case, if there was not an allocation, it would probably be a project that was put forward that we would not be in a position to consider. However, if it was within an area where funds were available on the basis of the initial request, we would want to examine this very carefully and find out if any international organization such as the World Bank had made a survey of the country and had pointed to the needs in this field. If necessary we would be prepared to send someone out to make a feasibility study or a reconnaissance decision. We certainly would not go into the project until we were satisfied that it was a worthwhile development operation.

• 1110

Mr. Anderson: I am very glad to hear that. I had the feeling that one reason for the expansion of our programs in so many countries has been the desire of Canadian ambassadors abroad to act like pork barrel politicians at home and get little projects going in the public works field in their areas.

Mr. Kidd: We take a very hard look at it, I can assure you.

Mr. Anderson: I hope you will continue to do so because I have a feeling, particularly in Africa, Latin America and Asia, where our only connection with many of these countries is through the aid field or is very tenuous

elsewhere, that an ambassador might feel that his particular stature will be enhanced if he can get something for his country. As I said in connection with the pork barrel politicians at home, they feel their reputation will be enhanced if they can get some boondoggle going in their riding. So, I hope in the future you will continue to watch with great care and concern the recommendations from the field.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, that concludes our hearings for this morning. Before adjourning I would like to thank on your behalf Mr. Kidd, Mr. Chambers and Mr. McLellan for their excellent presentation.

APPENDIX Y

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL
DEFENCE

Presentation by the Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs
on the 1968-69 Estimates

The following information is presented to the Standing Committee in the hope that it will assist in the Committee's examination of the Department's Estimates for the 1968-69 fiscal year.

The Department encounters great difficulty in presenting our resource requirements in a manner that adequately illuminates the operations of the Department in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. As the President of

the Treasury Board recently announced, the Government is placing increasing emphasis on the need for budgetary information to be useful and informative in terms of the objectives being pursued by individual departments. We have been devoting a good deal of thought to this question.

The Estimates which are before the Committee set out our requirements in the familiar form, that is, in three Parliamentary votes: Vote 1, covering operations and maintenance costs; Vote 10, our capital requirements; and Vote 15, assessments to the budgets of international organizations, grants and voluntary contributions to certain multilateral aid programs such as UNICEF. An examination of these Estimates does provide some information as is illustrated in the following table.

	Revised Estimates	Expenditure	Expenditure	Expenditure
	1968-69	1967-68	1966-67	1965-66
Operational				
Departmental Administration	42,043,500	40,036,576	34,104,940	30,009,856
Indo-China	587,800	530,718	615,320	585,363
Special Administrative Expenses Canadians assigned to CmwltH Secretariat, ABD, NATO, OECD	110,000	43,461	68,937	51,206
Canadian Representation at International Conferences	390,000	351,816	330,728	275,187
Cultural Relations and Academic Exchange programs with other countries	1,460,000	924,696	838,023	843,055
Total operational	44,591,300	41,887,267	35,957,948	31,764,667
Capital				
Acquisition, Construction and Improvement of Buildings, Works, Land, Equipment and furnishings	7,000,000	6,442,374	3,081,668	1,983,311
Total capital	7,000,000	6,442,374	3,081,668	1,983,311

The growth in Departmental Administration reflects not only the steady increases in salary rates, prices of purchased goods and services and rents, but of course the growth

in departmental strength as the Department expands to meet the tasks assigned to us. This growth is reflected in the following table:

	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68	1968-69
Diplomatic and Consular Missions	80	85	86	87
No. of Canadian-based Employees	2,051	2,202	2,431	2,488
Locally-Engaged	717	733	805	804
Casuals	142	196	214	204

An examination of the Standard Object details will also reveal that personnel costs (salaries and allowances) constitute some 62.5 per cent of our total operating costs in the current year. This is not surprising in a Department whose principal "resource" is the men and women who constitute the foreign service. An examination of the further details will reveal that of the total of \$44.6 million in Vote 1, some \$26.7 million is spent to meet operating costs of our posts abroad.

None of our posts abroad are identical. Each faces different circumstances in carrying out its assigned tasks. While one cannot speak of an average or typical mission, it is perhaps instructive to consider that in expenditure terms, the "mathematical average" results in a post whose annual costs come to just over \$300,000 (made up of some \$230,000 for salaries, wages and allowances; \$65,000 for rents, utilities, communications and similar rather fixed costs and \$13,000 for controllable expenditures such as repairs and upkeep of buildings and equipment, information work, local travel, sundries, etc.). The flexibility open to the post to alter their spending to meet specific objectives is obviously not great.

Much more can, of course, be drawn from our existing Estimates than the foregoing. The Committee will appreciate, however, that any such examination will tend to focus on the costs of maintaining the Department rather than on the costs of what the Department is trying to achieve.

In keeping with the Government's plans, we have been considering a form of presentation for our Estimates that will describe somewhat more directly the role and activities being undertaken by the Department in the conduct of Canadian foreign relations. We have defined our program as being the protection and promotion of Canadian interests abroad. The essential function of the Department is, on the one hand, that of advising the Government on all matters relating to international relations and, on the other, the associated responsibility, implicit in the existence of the foreign service, of representing Canadian interests internationally. More explicitly, it is the primary responsibility of this Department in Ottawa to give the Government the best possible advice, based on information received from our missions and other sources and after consultation with other departments and governments, regard-

ing the policies which will best serve the enlightened self-interest of Canada. Co-essential with this is the responsibility, discharged mainly by our missions, to interpret and defend Canadian policies and interests abroad and to influence the thinking and formulation of policies of other governments along lines deemed to be in the Canadian interest.

In meeting these responsibilities, departmental staff are called on to undertake many duties:

- collecting and analyzing information and formulating advice to the government on international developments of interest to Canada including developments affecting Canadian unity;
- coordinating overseas operations of many departments and agencies;
- representing Canada and promoting Canadian interests internationally through the Department's missions abroad;
- providing, through those missions a wide range of consular services to Canadians and citizens of other countries on matters affecting Canadian affairs;
- operating a public information program to develop and maintain abroad an accurate picture of Canada and Canadian policies;
- operating a program of cultural exchanges with other nations, and
- providing extensive support services for all government operations overseas particularly in support of Canadian aid programs.

The foregoing statement of function and duties is still somewhat unsatisfactory as an explanation of what the Department actually does and how it spends its time and money. To reduce the array of departmental business to more manageable proportions, we have identified five areas or activities which are discussed separately in the following paragraphs.

Policy Formulation and Coordination

As was mentioned, the Department is responsible for advising the Government on all aspects of foreign relations and for coordinating the conduct of these relations. The task of coordination is becoming increasingly complex and demanding. Other departments have become more involved in the foreign field through international bodies such as FAO and ILO, attach members of their own staffs to certain of our key missions abroad, and staff

delegations to meetings of these organizations. While it is often assumed that most of the problems are of a technical or non-political nature and that they are unrelated to other aspects of our foreign relations, this is rarely altogether true. In recent years the addition of the problems created by the emergence of more and more newly independent states have made the consideration of political questions virtually inescapable in any international forum. The interrelation of all manner of activity renders consideration of one in isolation extremely hazardous.

There is an obvious necessity for the Department to have personnel who are competent in many aspects of our national life. This need has long been recognized in the economic and financial field and, of course, in the field of defence policy. Consultation in these areas has been facilitated by a well-established system of inter-departmental committees. In recent years the growing importance of the Canadian aid program has added a new dimension to the work of our officers. Immigration is yet another area of importance in the daily life of the Department. The extent of the coordination task is only partially reflected in the fact that of the total number of Government employees serving abroad, the staff of this Department represents about one-third.

It is perhaps obvious that as international relationships, and Canadian involvement in them, become increasingly complex, there is a corresponding growth in the need to engage in more formal and time-consuming planning activities. Planning must be undertaken not only in terms of policies and positions that the Government might adopt in pursuit of international policy objectives, but also in terms of resources of men and money needed for the years ahead. Both must increasingly be related to questions of governmental priorities.

These then are some of the tasks constituting 'Policy Formulation and Coordination'. In the main, they are carried out by the functional and area divisions of the Department here in Ottawa. During the current year we estimate that this activity will cost slightly more than \$3 million.

Direct Programs

While few of the Department's objectives are pursued by means of direct expenditures of money, there are four instances where such direct expenditures are involved. These four include information activities, cultural

relations, military assistance to developing countries, and defence support for Greece and Turkey.

Information

The importance of ensuring that Canadian objectives and interests are understood and received sympathetically has led to increasing efforts being devoted to the Department's information program. As a minimum, we should be in a position to respond to requests about Canada and things Canadian. Beyond this, the need for a proper understanding abroad of the Government's position on specific issues, such as the primacy of the Federal Government in the conduct of foreign policy, has led to such undertakings as our small program of bringing foreign journalists and writers to Canada. In the current year, we expect to spend some \$580,000 for purchases of publications for free distribution abroad, the distribution of films, the foreign journalists project, exhibits for use at international fairs, etc.

Cultural Relations

While an information program will serve as a useful vehicle for making known and understood abroad the bilingual and bicultural nature of Canadian society, it is through the development of effective cultural exchange programs that this can best be achieved. Like information programs, cultural exchange programs will have different objectives in different countries. The time and effort needed to make such programs effective is large and the results are seldom if ever immediately identifiable. They represent, however, an indispensable element in the conduct of international relations as between peoples as distinct from the interplay of economic and other forces.

During the current year we expect that expenditures for Canadian cultural exchanges with foreign countries such as tours of performing artists and artistic companies, exhibits of Canadian art, scholarships and bursaries, and the presentation of books, etc. to foreign cultural institutions will come to \$1,380,000.

Military Assistance

In recent years, the Government has responded to requests from several developing countries for help in the training of their military personnel. The need for security and

stability as an essential pre-condition for economic and social progress has been amply demonstrated. Training assistance has been extended to several countries including Tanzania, Ghana and Malaysia. During the current year, expenditures on military assistance projects are estimated at \$3,100,000.

Defence Support to Greece and Turkey

Canada has agreed to provide to Greece and Turkey, our allies in NATO, special assistance in support of their defence effort. While the Estimates provide authority for expenditures of up to \$1 million this year, delays in reaching agreement with the Greek and Turkish Governments on the most suitable form of Canadian assistance will probably result in expenditures of only \$100,000.

Foreign Representation

The two activities described above (Policy Formulation and Coordination, and Direct Programs) are carried out primarily from headquarters in Ottawa. To consider the Department in this context only would be to ignore the equally vital aspect of the External Affairs function which is the actual activity required, first, to ensure that policy is efficiently and effectively executed. It is from the field that there comes much of the information and advice upon which policy recommendations are based. It is to a large extent on the effectiveness of our missions abroad, that the success or failure of our policies depends. One of the prime functions of these missions is of course, reporting.

Policy recommendations are based on four main sources:

- (a) reports from missions;
- (b) information and representations from other diplomatic services;
- (c) information received through intelligence channels; and
- (d) the press.

Frequently, and most often in situations where the mission is actively engaged in a negotiating process (as, for example, during meetings of the UN General Assembly), these reports or assessments may themselves constitute the operative recommendation for the Minister. More normally, however, the substance of missions' reports find their way into policy recommendation after consideration and consultation with other interested missions and government departments.

In addition to what might be considered as the more glamorous aspects of the work of a mission abroad, are other equally important tasks. Perhaps the most obvious among these activities falls under the broad heading of consular work. It involves such activities as concluding arrangements with other countries to facilitate travel by Canadians, issuing and renewing of passports and visas, processing of immigration applications, scrutinizing and controlling applications for temporary entry, keeping track of and, where necessary, protecting Canadians abroad, repatriating indigents and making provision for their safety in an emergency. These duties are extremely important and are by their very nature the responsibility of any Canadian mission. They represent, in effect, the practical, immediate and easily recognizable returns to the travelling tax-payer of his investment in the Department of External Affairs. The steady increase in the number of Canadians travelling abroad (as reflected in the number of passports issued by the Department, i.e. 185,000 in 1962 and 320,000 this year) indicates in part the growth in demand for consular services that has occurred in recent years.

During the current year, the costs of maintaining our diplomatic missions and consulates, including capital expenditures are expected to exceed \$34 million.

The final two activities of Administration and Membership in International Organizations do not perhaps require any special attention beyond a passing reference to the heavy burden that is being placed on our administrative resources not only by the extensive growth in size and complexity of the Department itself but also by the necessity to adopt and adapt the many changes in the Government's administrative policies, e.g. collective bargaining, to the peculiar requirements of a rotational foreign service. The following paragraphs describe briefly the estimated expenditures we will be incurring in these areas in the current fiscal year.

Administration

—Departmental Administration—central administrative duties required for the management of the Department, including personnel, telecommunications and records, and finance and general administration (at an estimated cost of \$3.6 million).

—Operational Support—common overhead costs which are not distributed to individual units such as communications costs, removal expenses of personnel on posting, etc. (at an estimated cost of \$8.8 million).

Membership in International Organizations

Assessments related to membership in international organizations such as the

UN and its specialized agencies, NATO and the Commonwealth (some \$12.8 million this year).

—Grants to non-governmental agencies—including voluntary contributions to multilateral aid programs and grants to the UN Association in Canada, the Atlantic Council of Canada, the International Committee of the Red Cross, etc. (\$20.5 million in the current year).

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


ORGANIZATION CHART

1968-69

REVISED OCT. 1, 1968

FUNCTIONS:

1. Relations between Canada and other countries and of Canadian participation in international organizations, the protection of Canadian interests abroad.
2. The collection and weighing of information regarding developments likely to affect Canada's international relations.
3. The negotiation and conclusion of treaties and other international agreements.
4. The representation of Canada in foreign capitals and at international conferences.



OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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
Translations under the direction of the Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

Government
Publications



STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 19

TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1969

Respecting
Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

Mr. John Gellner, Editor, the *Commentator*, Toronto.

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

⁶ Allmand,	Harkness,	Nowlan,
Anderson,	Laniel,	Ouellet,
Buchanan,	Laprise,	Penner,
⁴ Cafik,	Legault,	⁵ Prud'homme,
Fairweather,	Lewis,	Roberts,
Forrestall,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),	³ Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Gibson,	MacLean,	<i>Miramichi</i>),
Groos,	MacRae,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
⁷ Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>),	² Marceau,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
¹ Harding,	McCleave,	Winch—(30).

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

¹ Replaced Mr. Brewin on January 16, 1969.

² Replaced Mr. Barrett on January 16, 1969.

³ Replaced Mr. Allmand on January 16, 1969.

⁴ Replaced Mr. Borrie on January 16, 1969.

⁵ Replaced Mr. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*) on January 16, 1969.

⁶ Replaced Mr. De Bané on January 16, 1969.

⁷ Replaced Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*), on January 20, 1969.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

THURSDAY, January 16, 1969.

Ordered,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be instructed, to hear evidence on and to consider Canada's policy with reference to defence and external affairs.

ATTEST:

ALISTAIR FRASER,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, January 21, 1969
(31)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Ian Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Laniel, Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), Marceau, McCleave, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ouellet, Roberts, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Wahn, Winch (24).

Also present: Messrs. Goyer and Kaplan, M.P.'s.

In attendance: Mr. John Gellner, Editor, the *Commentator*, Toronto.

From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Peter Dobell and Mr. Julian Payne.

On a motion by Mr. Marceau,

Resolved,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. John Gellner, Dr. O. Solandt, Dr. Raymond Gastil, Mr. Robert Krupka, and Professors A. Yarmolinsky, J. Eayrs, M. Breecher and K. McNaught, who have been invited to appear as witnesses before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, in the matter of its Order of Reference dated Thursday, January 16, 1969.

On a motion by Mr. Marceau,

Resolved,—That the Chairman be authorized to hold meetings and to receive evidence when a quorum is not present and to authorize the printing thereof.

The Chairman read the Committee's Order of Reference dated Thursday, January 16, 1969 and made an opening statement, in which he commented upon the proposed programme for future meetings as recommended by the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure. The Chairman also explained a method of questioning by members of the Committee, which would be implemented on a trial basis.

The Committee agreed to print the following documents presented by the Chairman, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

Proposed Programme For Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence and Programme: Phase I. (See Appendix Z)

The Clerk was instructed to obtain copies for the Members, of the position papers on foreign policy from certain academics, as mentioned on page 4491 of Hansard, dated Monday, January 20, 1969.

The Chairman introduced Mr. John Gellner, Editor, *Commentator*, Toronto, who made an opening statement. The Committee agreed to print a text prepared by Mr. Gellner for the members and his biographical sketch, as an Appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix aa*)

Members of the Committee questioned Mr. Gellner for the remainder of this sitting. With the questioning continuing, at 1:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING (32)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day, with the Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harding, Laniel, Legault, MacDonald (*Egmont*), Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ouellet, Roberts, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Wahn, Winch (20).

Also present: Mr. Goyer, M.P.

In attendance: Same as at the morning sitting.

At the start of the meeting, several members made suggestions regarding the method of questioning witnesses. The Chairman recommended that members submit these and any other suggestions to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, for its consideration.

Members of the Committee continued their questioning of Mr. John Gellner.

At the end of the question period, the members present agreed that a meeting of the Committee should be held on Tuesday, January 28, 1969, to discuss the agenda and procedures. This matter will be referred to the Subcommittee for its recommendation.

The Chairman thanked Mr. Gellner for his testimony, noting that it had been a valuable and pleasant experience.

The Committee adjourned at 5:25 p.m., until Thursday, January 23, 1969 at 11:00 a.m., when the witness will be Dr. O. M. Solandt.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, January 21, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe we have a quorum and we are ready to proceed. We propose to get our meetings started right on time, because we are pretty well limited to two-hour sessions. I would like to welcome members of the Committee back and wish all of you a Happy New Year.

We are beginning this morning our examination of Canada defence policy—a wide area of policy which will remain the focus of the Committee's attention for a number of months. We have had a very wide reference given to us and perhaps I could read it to members of the Committee. It is ordered by the House:

That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be instructed to hear evidence on and to consider Canada's policy with reference to defence and external affairs.

In the course of the inquiry we will be calling witnesses and accordingly I would like to get permission from the Committee so that travelling expenses can be paid. Will someone move the following resolution: that reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to the witnesses whom we will be calling, including Mr. John Gellner, Dr. O. Solandt, Dr. Raymond Gastil, Mr. Robert Krupka, Professors A. Yarmolinsky, J. Eayrs, M. Breecher and K. McNaught, who have been invited to appear as witnesses before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in the matter of its order of reference dated Thursday January 16, 1969.

Mr. Marceau: I so move.

Motion agreed to.

• 1110

The Chairman: Also under the new rules, as you know, authorization has been given, so that with a resolution passed by this Committee we can proceed with our hearings and hear evidence even if a quorum is not present. This

may save some time, although I must say that this Committee has always been very good in providing a quorum. Nevertheless, it might be desirable to have this resolution passed. Will someone move that the Chairman be authorized to hold meetings and to receive evidence when a quorum is not present and to authorize the printing thereof?

Mr. Marceau: I so move.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: Your steering committee held a number of meetings before the Christmas recess and developed a program which has been typed and circulated to all of you. The steering committee took into account that fact that the government has invited our Committee and the Canadian public to participate in discussion of defence questions in advance of decisions being taken by the government. Our hope is that our sessions during the next couple of months will provide an opportunity for informed members of the public and for members of the Committee to express views and make suggestions which will be of assistance to the government in the review that it has under way.

The steering committee understands that the government will, in due course, announce the results of its defence review. At that stage it is the expectation of the steering committee that the Committee will examine the government's report in detail. The program drawn up by your steering committee has been prepared with this general purpose in mind. It has been circulated, as I have said, for the information of members of the Committee. I would suggest if the Committee agrees that this outline might be included as an appendix to the report of today's meeting. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: I believe members of the Committee will see at a glance from that outline that it is proposed the Committee should conduct a very systematic examination of Canadian defence policy. I am not suggesting

that this precise outline should be formally approved by the Committee since I believe that the Committee would wish to retain a certain flexibility in its proceedings; for example, the timing of the publication of the government's report on defence policy will very much affect our work schedule.

It is put forward, therefore, more as a general guide for our future work and I suggest that we do not spend time discussing it today. If any of you have any comments you might initially bring them to me or take them up with your party's representative on the steering committee.

The effectiveness of our work will, of course, depend in large measure on the witnesses called before the Committee. Your steering committee has worked on the principle that we should seek to have expressions of opinion on all sides of whatever issue we are examining. We have, therefore, made an effort to select witnesses who are effective and known advocates of alternative courses of action for Canada so that the Committee will have a chance to consider carefully the choices that Canada faces.

The steering committee is seeking to invite witnesses sufficiently far in advance as to permit them to prepare themselves to meet the Committee. We have at this stage already invited witnesses to appear before the Committee up to the middle of February. You have received a list of these witnesses, and the topics to which they will be addressing themselves, for that period, which might also be included as an appendix to today's report if you agree. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: This initial list also indicates the further questions that will be dealt with up until about the middle of March. The list does not identify our suggested witnesses after mid-February since we have not yet been in contact with them.

At this stage, when no government policy has been formulated for the future, we have not yet invited individuals or groups to make written submissions to this Committee. However, I do wish to take this opportunity to indicate that the Committee is ready to receive such submissions although it will not be possible, in view of the large program that we have in mind until mid-March, to undertake to call persons or groups making submissions. At a later stage, when the government

has formally advanced its policy, we would expect again to invite groups and individuals to make submissions on any points that they consider important.

In an effort to make the proceedings more effective and systematic we are inviting witnesses, if they are able, to provide the Committee Clerk with texts of their presentations so that these can be circulated to members of the Committee in advance. This may not always be possible, but when they have been circulated we will be inviting the witnesses to limit their introductory oral observations to about five minutes or so, so that the Committee can concentrate on questioning them.

Party representatives have also suggested an experiment to make questioning more effective. It will be on a trial basis this morning. A questioner from each party will open a line of questioning and I would like to put a maximum time limit on this initial round of questioning of five minutes for each questioner. After the basic line of questioning has been indicated for each party in this manner, I will call a period of questioning by the Liberals followed by a period of questioning by the Conservatives, a period of questioning by the NDP and the Creditiste, in that order. Within each period allotted to each party I will permit supplemental questions from party members with the consent of the questioner. If any party wishes to agree upon its list of questioners I would be happy to accept any such list from a party representative.

● 1115

I think time will permit a third round of questioning and we will follow the same pattern for that. We may find that this experiment does not work out; it may be a bit awkward this morning but it is on a trial basis. The allocation of blocks of time to parties we hope will lead to the development of a more consistent line of questioning. If any member has any suggestions with regard to this procedure I hope he will pass those suggestions on to the party representative on the steering committee so that we can avoid taking too much time now discussing procedural questions. Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I would just like to say that I object to the whole procedure and I object to having to put it through a party representative. I do not think this is the way it should be approached, and I do not think this is the way the protest should be approached.

The Chairman: Well, I will take a note of that comment. Let us see how it works out; it is on a trial basis and if it does not work out properly we will have to change it.

Mr. Winch: Could I ask one question, Mr. Chairman, for clarification? Is my understanding from what you have said correct that this Committee will not be able to hear either the Secretary of State for External Affairs or the Minister of National Defence until after the White Paper on the Task Force has been filed?

The Chairman: No, I do not think any decision has been made on that, Mr. Winch. That would be an open question.

Before introducing our speaker, I think I should mention once again that the Committee is now in the fortunate position of having an adviser in the person of Mr. Peter Dobell, the Director of the recently established Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and Mr. Dobell is here. Would you mind standing up, Peter? I think everyone has met you and I believe you have an assistant at your Centre, Mr. Julian Payne. Members of the Committee will be aware that I have already mentioned Mr. Dobell's appointment to members of the Committee. However, it appears to have escaped the attention of the editor of at least one major national newspaper and it is for this reason that I think it important to note it again.

I should perhaps add that Mr. Dobell's role is not to act as an adviser on issues of policy. His role is rather to assist the steering committee in working out an effective work program to place before the Committee so that our time can be spent as productively as possible. I believe members of the Committee will agree that the comprehensive program which has been put before you today represents an improvement over our past more *ad hoc* practices and I consider this to be a confirmation of the utility of the adviser that we have.

Before calling on Mr. John Gellner to present evidence to you, I would like to give you some idea of who he is. I believe you have received a biographical sketch. Mr. Gellner is one of the most distinguished commentators on military affairs in Canada today. His commentaries on Canadian defence policies and programs have established for him an enviable

reputation of being extremely well-informed, perceptive and independent of thought.

His experiences as a lawyer in Czechoslovakia prior to the war, as an officer in the Royal Canadian Air Force from 1939 to 1958, and as a journalist and editor in subsequent years, have provided him with an invaluable background for his testimony before this Committee. Some hon. members may recall that he testified before the *ad hoc* defence committee in 1963. Further biographical detail of his qualifications and experience has already been circulated by the Clerk of the Committee.

Mr. Gellner has been asked to address himself to the most basic of all questions: Why do nations have defence forces? His views have been submitted in written form and circulated in advance to give Committee members time to reflect. Unfortunately, while the French version is on its way it has not yet arrived. As soon as it does come it will be circulated. We put it into the hands of the committee for translation as soon as we received it.

Mr. Forrestall: Not all the English versions arrived, either.

The Chairman: Well, the English versions were supposed to have been circulated to all members of the Committee in their offices.

Mr. Forrestall: Mine inadvertently in some way did not show up.

The Chairman: More will be made available for those who have not received them.

I will now call on Mr. Gellner to give a brief introduction to his submission, after which he is ready to be questioned. Mr. Gellner?

• 1120

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I have two points before Mr. Gellner gives his presentation. First, I wonder if it would not be possible, because of the fact of the importance of this Committee and also the importance of the attendance at this Committee, for us to sit in either Room 308 or 371 instead of here. It is really crowded here and it is not easy to work. We have all kinds of papers to look at and this room is not really the best one we could get.

The Chairman: This will not be our permanent committee room. It was the only one we could get this morning.

Mr. Laniel: The second point I would like to raise is that in the House yesterday the member from Fundy Royal asked the Minister to make available the basic working papers that were presented for the meeting of the experts with the people of the Department of National Defence and External Affairs. The Minister replied that they would be made available upon request by individual members. I wonder if the Committee could make a request for all of its members to get copies of these basic working papers.

The Chairman: Is that the desire of members of the Committee, or do members want to do that on an individual basis?

Some hon. Members: No.

Mr. Fairweather: These are the ones that are so-called secret.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Laniel.

John Gellner (Editor, the "Commentator", Toronto): Mr. Chairman, if my introductory remarks have been distributed, I would simply stand on them and be open for questioning. If, however, not everybody has got the remarks, I would read the salient paragraphs.

The Chairman: Have most members received copies of Mr. Gellner's summary?

Some hon. Members: Yes.

The Chairman: How many have not?

Mr. Lewis: How many of those who received them, read them?

The Chairman: Do not ask them that question.

Mr. Gellner: I will read out of my introductory remarks, then, only the basic paragraphs and leave everything which is concerned specifically with Canada for the questioning, if this is all right with you.

The Chairman: I think that would be best.

Mr. Gellner: I said in paragraph 5 of my introductory remarks that a state is secure if it is able to achieve its national objectives. These are negative—the security of territory, sea approaches and air space—and positive. The positive national objectives may be world peace, freedom of the seas, national unification, the establishment of communism the world over—any of a great number of national objectives.

The two aspects of security are equally important. Thus, the NATO guarantee may be giving West Germany all the negative security—that is, the security of its territory—it can reasonably expect, but this Germany is still insecure because its principal, proclaimed national objective—the reunification of Germany—remains unfulfilled. On the other hand, Israel has no unsatisfied, or unsatisfiable by its own efforts positive national objectives. It is insecure because of its continual concern over the negative side of security, the threat to its territorial integrity.

Armed force is one of the tools used to achieve national objectives, and thus national security. It acts as a tool to this end by being available—just by being available—even if it is never applied. For example, the principal national objective of Switzerland is neutrality, which is assured by diplomacy and by the existence of a not yet used in earnest, but known to be extremely effective, strong military establishment.

All this is pretty obvious, and need perhaps not have been emphasized were it not for the fact that the public so often overlooks the positive side of national security. Here, the term "defence" is no doubt misleading. As pointed out, a country can have great need for armed force even if it does not have to "defend itself" in the narrow sense of the word. This is difficult to understand, even for presumably intelligent people. Thus, the advocates of unilateral disarmament content that theirs is a rational proposition because, as they say, "there is no defence" against nuclear weapons. In fact, this has nothing to do with the need for, or the redundancy of, a national military effort.

• 1125

I will now skip all that which concerns Canada and go right to the last paragraph, where it is stated that military forces do not need to serve a particular purpose, or be capable of fighting a particular kind of war, but that they have to be available to help achieve essential national objectives, has been long recognized by some European powers with a long military tradition. The Canadian public generally still baulks at the idea of military forces-in-being for political purposes. Yet this is what the Canadian Armed Forces are primarily for. It is an important enough task to justify spending on it something like two-and-three-quarter per cent of GNP.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Gellner. Additional copies of Mr. Gellner's statement are coming and will be available for all those members who have not yet received it.

I call now upon Mr. Anderson of the Liberal party.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Chairman, I am in a bit of difficulty because I did not receive these introductory remarks until five minutes ago, so I am afraid I simply have not read the brief as presented by Mr. Gellner.

Before I go on to that, however, I am a trifle disturbed by the proposed program which seems to take up all our time until mid-March. It is certainly essential that we examine all aspects of defence policy, sir, but there are other questions which I think do deserve some consideration and, perhaps, are more urgent in some ways.

One I am thinking of in particular that I believe we should go into at one point is the matter of the Canadian territorial sea and the continuous fishing zones on our West Coast.

This is not a question for the Fisheries Committee. The biological aspects of it are perfectly clear. Our West Coast fisheries are suffering a savage exploitation by Russian and Japanese trawlers. It is a question for this Committee because what I would like to know is why the Canadian government which possessed enabling legislation to draw baselines on the West Coast in 1964, has not done so.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson, there are a number of questions of this sort which I know members may want this Committee to consider, but I think the preferable procedure would be for these suggestions to be given to the members of the steering committee. I have had a number already and we can see whether they can be worked in.

Mr. Anderson: On this particular point I believe we should question quite a number of witnesses, including the Secretary of State for External Affairs and his predecessor, to find out why this has not been done in the last four or five years.

Is this outline that we have been given strictly tentative, then? Will other subjects be discussed during this two-month period, as well as defence policy?

The Chairman: This is tentative, but the steering committee has felt this would be our

program and that other subjects would have to be worked in afterwards. I want to avoid any detailed discussion of the program at this time so that members may have an opportunity to consider it carefully and make representations either to me or to the representative of the steering committee. I imagine that there are a number of members who might have suggestions to make and I think the most effective way of handling them would be at the steering committee.

Mr. Anderson: I will bring this to the attention of the steering committee, but I would like to go on record now that I find it impossible to accept the suggestion that for two months we are stuck with one subject only. We were stuck throughout the fall period with the Biafran question, and very necessary too, but there are many questions as a result that have not been brought forward. I hope we will have a certain flexibility in arranging our program.

The Chairman: There will be flexibility within limits.

Mr. Anderson: Very good. Turning, then, to Mr. Gellner and his remarks, a point on which I am finding it increasingly difficult to make up my mind is the amount of flexibility that Canada itself has in its defence commitments and in its defence role. This is in particular with respect to the United States of America. If, for example—just for example—we wish to reduce the degree to which we participate in early warning systems or in continental defence; if for example we decide not to enter into some agreement with the Americans on the anti-ballistic missile system which they are at present setting up on the West Coast, at what point do you think, sir, that the Americans will regard their national interest as sufficiently compelling to put installations on Canadian soil, to take steps which would defend the entire continent, but in particular their own area, over and above Canadian objections? In other words, what amount of latitude do we have in changing our policy with respect to continental defence?

Mr. Gellner: You have to bear in mind, sir, that we are in the strategic forefield of the greatest military power in the world. This greatest military power has certain security requirements. We may not agree that in fact they have them, but they believe they have

them and they have this particular responsibility, which goes with superpower status.

• 1130

We have really the choice to satisfy the security requirements of the United States as far as they involve, say, the use of our territory, of our air space and of our sea approaches, or allow the United States to do it for themselves. As far as our relations with the United States are concerned, I am quite sure that it would not make the slightest difference whether they did it or we did it for them. The question really to examine is what such a surrender would mean to our self respect and to our status in the world. This is true; everything is connected with sovereignty.

Now, to come to the beginning of your question, I think that we do not have very much latitude. If I may be allowed by the Chairman to make a kind of additional longer statement, because this has been brought up by your question, I would like to say this: we have now a review of our defence position. Now, this is certainly useful, every review is useful, but I cannot see that it could basically come out with anything else than to stand pat by all our commitments, because what choice do we have? We can have unilateral disarmament, what the Prime Minister, in his talk at the University of Manitoba, called totally defenceless pacifism, and we could obviously get by with a small armed force for internal security, say 20,000 men organized as a military branch of the RCMP, but this would still keep the American security requirements unsatisfied. Therefore, the Americans would then have to come in in some force to satisfy their security requirement, simply because we are geographically positioned where we are. If Canada were in the geographical position of Venezuela it could probably get by with unilateral disarmament.

The other thing is to proclaim our neutrality. Now, this is impossible under international law because under the rules set by the second Hague Conference of 1907, it is one of the duties of a neutral to make his neutrality effective. That is, in practice, to have as much military power as would be necessary to discourage interference by belligerents. In other words, while the neutral need not necessarily have the strength to repel an attack, he must have sufficient to make such an attack unprofitable and thus unlikely to occur.

Now, you can imagine what military force we would need to make an attack on Canada unprofitable. We would, in fact, have to have a nuclear retaliatory force in order to make an attack on us unprofitable. Neutrality is good for a not very important country which is militarily very strong; Switzerland, Sweden.

The third possibility is to withdraw from NATO and to maintain our commitments with the United States and the United Nations. Now, this would not save us very much money, certainly in my opinion not enough to accept the political penalties which are connected with it. These are rapid calculations, but I came to the conclusion, just off the top of my head, that we would save about 17,000 men and \$250 million a year. Now compare the saving of \$250 million a year with the political penalties which we would take by getting out of NATO because we have to be quite clear that we cannot do it in the French way.

France is important, tremendously important; the defence of Europe is impossible without France and therefore everybody will try to accommodate the French in whatever form they co-operate with NATO defence, and they do. They maintain a bigger army in Germany than, let us say, Great Britain. Communications go through France freely. Now, for France exceptions will be made; I doubt whether they would be made for Canada.

• 1135

Finally, the fourth option is to stand by all our present commitments and I am quite sure that any examination must come to this conclusion.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson, we will come back to the Liberal questioners later. In the meantime I will call upon Mr. Fairweather from the Conservative party.

Mr. Fairweather: Well, perhaps the ending of Mr. Gellner's answer might be a good place to start again. You used the phrase "standing by our present commitments". If that happens to be the result of this review, is it not a fact that a great deal of modernizing equipment must go on? I am trying to avoid some of the language because I just do not understand it, but the equipment of our NATO force, such as tanks and aircraft, and so on, is in a serious state of antiquity at the present time.

Mr. Gellner: If I may say so, the equipment of all our forces, NATO and other is, of course, in a somewhat critical stage right now. Everything is getting old, and the reason is that we have a set disproportion between running costs, the ones which in the Estimates are under operation and maintenance, and the costs for modernization which in the Estimates are under capital and development. Now, with us it is four to one. That is for every four dollars spent on running expenses, we spend one dollar on modernization. Now, the general rule of thumb for a satisfactory development of a modern military force is two to one; two dollars in running costs for every dollar spent on modernization.

Apparently one can get by with a ratio of three to one, that is, three dollars for running costs for every dollar on modernization, but four to one is quite out of line. Now, if we got up to this three to one, we would have to increase our defence budget by 16 per cent, and this I think in the end is perhaps not 16 per cent but a substantial amount will be inevitable because everything is getting old. Concerning aircraft, Maritime aircraft, the Argus is coming to the end of the road; our air defence aircraft F101 is becoming antiquated; the CF104 with air division is coming to the end of its life—I mean the physical life of the aircraft—and so on.

We will have to spend more on equipment; it is just not reasonable to spend \$1,240 million a year on running costs and then spend only about \$250 million on modernization, it is just not the right proportion.

The Chairman: I will come back to the Conservative group later. I wonder if I could go to Mr. Lewis on behalf of the NDP?

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I do not really know where to start on this. First let me say that I agree with Mr. Anderson that there ought to be flexibility in the program, yesterday, as you will remember, I asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs whether the question of exchanging representatives with the Vatican could be referred to the Committee and he said he had no objection. I have not read his answer, but if I understood correctly at the time, he was saying that our terms of reference now are wide enough for us to take up any subject we wanted to and that he had no objection to this matter being taken up by the Committee.

• 1140

I suggest to you, without asking for an answer now, that I am a little worried about your statement "there will be flexibility within limits". I do not know exactly who will set the limits; that is a good enough statement to make you Prime Minister, Mr. Chairman. I think the issue of representation at the Vatican is something that cannot be delayed until March; it sounds as if some steps are being taken so I hope that the steering committee will consider placing that before us pretty soon.

As to Mr. Gellner's general statement, I have been reading his views over a good many years and I was not surprised by them. My impression, Mr. Gellner, is that your defence, in so far as there is one in your introductory statement, for our defence expenditures is mainly political. I would like to know from you, sir, why you insist that we must stay in NORAD despite the agreement by a good many people that NORAD is a rather useless exercise that does not serve any security purpose in any real sense, either for the United States or for us.

I would like to know why you say that we have no latitude. In other words, if I understand that statement correctly, we just have to fall in with what the United States wants us to do and that therefore the ABM system, either the United States will do without us—on our territory, if I understood you correctly—or we will have to co-operate with them in another exercise which McNamara pointed out was probably useless in the long run and terribly expensive for everybody concerned.

I would like to know why you state so categorically that Canada must make a military contribution to NATO. Is that for security reasons, because again I have read in your own material over the years very serious questions by you as to whether Canada's military contribution is, in fact, of value to NATO, and I got the impression from your writing that you thought our present military contribution is really of little, if any, value at all. Why should Canada continue a contribution that is of little or no value to NATO?

Finally, I am really disturbed by the suggestion in your paper which you repeated a little while ago that in the long run—and that means a not very long run, in the next

few years—Canada's defence expenditures will have to be increased by some 16 per cent in order to have more proper balance between operational costs and improvement costs.

Your attitude, Mr. Gellner, seems to me to be a pretty orthodox military approach to problems that are related to foreign policy as well as purely defence policy. Nothing in your paper has persuaded me that Canada's commitments to NATO or NORAD make any sense at all at the present time.

Mr. Gellner: I do not think I deserve the stricture that this is an orthodox military approach because I made it very clear that our military forces are here mainly for political reasons. Now, I tried to keep the general philosophic part, if you want, distinguished from specifics. I have not retracted my opinion that we should make a more specific contribution to NATO and that the present contribution could be greatly improved in its effectiveness and, in fact, at least in one sector, I think the air division, does not make real sense anymore.

• 1145

What I wanted to say is that we have three political military tasks. One is to maintain sovereignty over our own territory, air space and sea approaches and this is not too onerous a task. The second one is to stay in some kind of alliance in order to be able to deal with a bigger partner in a group and derive other political advantages from it. Third, it is to accommodate the United States because we really have not any choice but to accommodate them. Specifically...

Mr. Lewis: That is an assertion, Mr. Gellner, and not a fully convincing one.

Mr. Gellner: Well, then, specifically I do not think that we need to be too much bothered by the ABM system. I do not think the Americans really need us for that. In NORAD I would be much more bothered and much more worried by the American plans to reshuffle completely the anti-bomber defence and go away from the fixed radar stations in the ground, and put the early warning and tracking radars into big aircraft which would cruise around and have at their beck and call fighter aircraft from the ground for the actual interception.

This would certainly require the stationing of both big aircraft and fighter aircraft on our territory and if we insisted on our sovereignty then we may well have to purchase a big aircraft and some small aircraft. This is something that would worry me. The Americans insist that anti-bomber defences are still necessary because the Soviets have a bomber capability. Generally American planning is a capability planning. That is, if a potential enemy has a certain capability we have to guard against it, not whether it is likely or unlikely that they will use this capability but they have it and therefore we guard against it. Now, this is American planning.

The Russians are capable of bringing over nuclear bombs by bombers, or even now with their supersonic transport possibly by transport aircraft, which would be very difficult to intercept. Therefore, NORAD in this respect still, in American eyes, is full justification. They want complete coverage against the bomber threat just as they want complete coverage against the submarine threat which forces us to have maritime forces of considerable strength.

Furthermore, NORAD also has other functions. NORAD, for instance, monitors all movement in space by the SPADATS scheme and here we co-operate also. We have one of its installations at Cold Lake. It is very likely, of course, that the ABM system is going to come under NORAD even though it may be only an American responsibility.

The Chairman: I wonder, then, if we could come back to the Liberal questioners. I have not received any indication from the party representative so I will call the Liberal members in the order in which I have their names; Mr. Gibson, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Allmand, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Guay and Mr. Cafk. We will have about fifteen minutes available for this initial round of questioning from the Liberal group and, as I say, I will permit supplementals from the Liberal members with the permission of the particular questioner. We will then move to the Conservative group, the NDP and the Creditiste. Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: If our defence policy is based on the premise that we are an influential middle power striving for world peace, should we not then base our policy on active world disarmament coupled with a world peace-keeping force?

• 1150

Mr. Gellner: In every planning you have to do long-range planning and short-range planning. Obviously disarmament is a dream somewhere on the far away horizon. Possibly the younger people in this room will see it—I doubt it—but let us say that the more mature people will not—I mean mature in years, I am sorry. The same applies to a world peace-keeping force. There is no indication of a world peacekeeping force even being mooted by the United Nations, and even the very limited small-power peacekeeping scheme of 1956 is now just about in abeyance.

Mr. Gibson: Well then, if I may say this, sir, I recognize that we obviously have to have a defence mechanism against a hydrogen bomb, but at the same time you have expressed a hopeless despondent view, that the United Nations is doing nothing. I believe firmly that many millions and millions of young people throughout the world are absolutely fed to the teeth with the negative despondency at the United Nations big four conferences and old-style diplomacy. Should not part of our thrust be towards abolishing this negative despondency through active work; in other words, try to balance our scales and eventually have the weight of our policy towards peace?

Mr. Gellner: First of all, I would say that I have not said the United Nations are good for nothing. On the contrary, I believe very strongly in the United Nations. I also think that they are already completely directed towards peace, but surely you have to have something for today and something for the future.

Now, I hope that you and your colleagues in the House are continuously making plans for future universal peace, but at present there is none. At present you have both a big power confrontation and a greater incidence of small wars than before. Far from the world disarming, the pace of armament is very strongly increasing in the world. Now, we are not taking part. We are not taking part in the armament race. We are falling behind, in fact, but the fact is that peace is not in the cards right now. We must work towards it but we also have to be prepared for the world in which we live and in which we may live for the next 10, 20, or 50 years.

I think your deliberations must be directed practically to what to do today by always

keeping in mind that peace and brotherhood in the world is the ultimate aim. In fact, disarmament has been mooted for roughly a thousand years, and very actively for the last 70 years since the beginning of The Hague Conference. Not only have we made no progress, as I have said, but the armament race is really hotting up. We live right now in this world and, of course, our defence posture has to take account of the fact that we live in such a world.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Am I allowed one question now, or two or three minutes, or how do we proceed?

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Guay and Mr. Cafik have indicated they would like an opportunity to speak, and...

Mr. Roberts: I have a couple of short questions and then perhaps a more general one.

Looking at your paragraph 14 in which you say that if we did not want to accommodate the United States requirements for a comprehensive North American defence we could get by with something like 50,000 men at \$800 million. If you will refer to paragraph 10 you talk about \$1,488 million as, I think, a general running cost. Would I be comparing the right figures in saying that if we got out of comprehensive North American defence we would be saving something like \$688 million?

Mr. Gellner: I said in the last sentence of paragraph 10 that we should bring up the new equipment account and the following rough estimates are based on a budget of the Canadian Armed Forces of \$1,610 million of which \$1,239 million would go, as they do now, for day-to-day operations and \$371 million for modernization, but at present we have only \$249 million for modernization—this is to bring it up to the ratio of three to one. Then I said, generally, that about half of our defence effort is made necessary by our geographical position as the strategic forefield of the United States and we really have only the choice of doing certain things which are necessary for the security of the United States or letting them do it, and I think that half our effort, roughly, goes to this.

• 1155

Mr. Roberts: So, about \$800 million worth of effort.

Could I refer now to paragraph 8 because, along with Mr. Lewis and some of the other

members of the Committee, this seems to be the area in which I at least have the most doubts about your having convinced me in your case. My first point concerns the last sentence:

Canada must see to it that it does not have to meet stronger powers in isolation, and this is the sense of its alliances;...

I can see the point of Canada's not wishing to meet or deal with other countries in isolation, but surely it is not necessary to conclude that it must do this only through a form of permanent alliance; that is to say, on various questions in which we deal with other countries we will have common interests with other countries with which we will make a common front, but it seems to me a *non sequitur* to argue that because we should not deal with other countries on specific points in isolation we should try to collect as many friends to help us present our case as possible.

To go on to argue from that—and perhaps you are not arguing from that—that this need of Canada not to be found in isolation can only be met through some system of permanent alliance does not seem to be the necessary conclusion to draw from the premise. It may be true, but it does not seem to be the necessary conclusion.

Mr. Gellner: I had mainly the dealings with the United States in mind, of course. Obviously, it is not dealing with the Soviet Union; obviously they are never going to deal in isolation except in a practical specific case like an airline agreement, or something like that. Traditionally in history I think we have always tried to deal with a principal strong partner in a group. While the United Kingdom was our great partner I think we developed a very strong the American connection. This then produced in the 1920's and 1930's the strength of the Canadian argument for complete independence.

Now, with the United States again I think we would prefer to deal in a group, and in what group are we to deal? In a dealing—the United States and us—it is a dealing between a very big guy and a small guy. This again in specific cases, of course, makes no difference but in certain fundamental questions it would. Now, in what group are we to deal? We belong, I believe, with the Atlantic group, if you want to call it that; there we are and this is a group in which we deal with this very, very big partner.

This is what I had in mind; this need for belonging. For a country in our position the choices are very limited. The Commonwealth is not really an instrument of political force. We have doubts about joining the OAS. We need to belong somewhere and I think the Atlantic Alliance is the place where we belong.

Mr. Roberts: Could you give some examples of where this support or alliance has helped us to bring pressure to bear on behalf of our interests with the United States?

Mr. Gellner: I understand that in the NATO Council, for instance—of course this is not open dealings—we have been hanging on American coattails pretty strongly with the help of others. If you want a specific example—again, as I have no access to Cabinet papers it is only a conjecture—but it is said that at the time of the near break with France it was Canada's gathering a group together in NATO that prevented an open end, as we now see, fatal break with France which it is said—again I am making provisos—the United States at that time considered to be the best solution. Now, here you have an example.

• 1200

The Chairman: I wonder if I could come back to you, Mr. Roberts. Do you want to be put on the second line of questioners?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, I have more questions.

The Chairman: Now, of the Liberal members we have Mr. Allmand, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Guay and Mr. Cafik. Do any of you have to leave shortly so that you will not be available when the second Liberal question period comes up? Would it be in order, then, to ask Mr. Cafik—to move him ahead, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. Cafik: Did you ask me, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: If you have to leave, yes.

Mr. Lewis: If you take an oath that you are a Liberal.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Gellner, you suggested that there are only four alternatives that we can consider in terms of national defence. One was unilateral disarmament, another neutrality, another to withdraw from NATO and our other alliances but to continue to align ourselves with the United States, and the last one was to stand pat. I am rather disappointed, to be quite honest with you, at this par-

ticular stage when we are considering an overall review that we have started off with such restrictions, as it were, to these discussions here this morning.

I think possibly there are other alternatives, and I think it would be more useful at this particular time—and I would like to know your view—if we were to eliminate these restrictions—whether they are real or not does not make any difference—and consider the reasons why unilateral disarmament, for instance, is not a good idea. I do not think it is, but I think it is useful to discuss all the possibilities of what would happen if we did unilaterally disarm.

I think the same thing is true if we consider the prospect of complete neutrality. What are the implications pro and con in respect of each of these four alternatives? I am rather surprised that there has been no mention at this stage of perhaps a fifth alternative, of aligning ourselves in a peacekeeping manner with the United Nations as opposed to these other alliances and considerations that you have mentioned. I think possibly Canada might have a role, and I would like your views, of perhaps serving some useful purpose in the world in getting rid of some of the root causes of war and distrust, and so on, such as poverty and disparity between nations. I think this might be a positive side of defence which you do not seem to have mentioned.

Therefore, I would like your views particularly on what Canada could do, or what it might be advisable for us to do, through the United Nations and not through other nations, not through other alliances, and second, what positive steps you think we might be able to take in eliminating some of the root causes, rather than reacting against those who are reacting to us because of these causes.

Mr. Gellner: First of all, I would like to say that my third alternative was to shed NATO commitments, but maintain those to the United States and the United Nations.

Mr. Cafik: If I might ask my own supplementary, let us forget about the United States side for the moment; perhaps you might give us your comments strictly on the United Nations.

Mr. Gellner: As far as defence is concerned—again speaking only of the requirements of today and of the near future—the

United Nations at present is incapable both of fulfilling the defence needs of its members and of assuring world peace. Now, this is not a stricture on the United Nations; it is simply a fact that the United Nations has not developed in the way more enthusiastic supporters of the United Nations had hoped.

At present there are under way a number of very sanguinary contests which the United Nations, if it had any active peacekeeping capability, could settle comparatively easily. I speak particularly about two. One is the war in Yemen which has been going on for more than seven years. We do not have real casualty figures, but it is reputed that it is more sanguinary than the Viet Nam war; that so far there have been more casualties in the Yemeni war than there have been in the whole of the Viet Nam war.

• 1205

Now, this is a war, again among comparatively small nations, in which the United Nations could intervene if it had any active peacekeeping capability. It has not although. The war, as I say, has dragged on for more than seven years.

The other one, of course, is the war between Nigeria and Biafra, again between two militarily third- or fourth-rate powers. If the United Nations had any capability for active peacekeeping this two-year slaughter could very well be stopped.

It is not the fault of Canada that the United Nations does not possess this capability. On the contrary: it was Canada which came in 1956 with its plan of small power peacekeeping to keep the big powers out of conflict. That it petered out is not for lack of trying on the part of Canada. Canada, in fact, continuously tried to institutionalize this kind of peacekeeping and called a conference to Ottawa to deal with the technical problems. There is now no drive in the United Nations in this direction; it is in abeyance.

While we all hope that at some time the United Nations will be able to carry out an active peacekeeping role, it cannot do it now. Therefore, there must be other ways of protecting peace. There are other ways for instance, certainly NATO is one association in the direction of keeping the peace. So is the Warsaw Pact. I suppose it keeps the balance of power in Europe.

You say that we should increase our assistance in the direction of removing the reasons for war. I can only say, "hear, hear", but the fact is that we contribute proportionately less to foreign aid than the great majority of the developed countries. Among the fifteen developed countries I cannot say offhand in which position we are, but we are among the last. We are only expected to reach the United Nations goal of 1 per cent of gross national product in foreign aid towards the end of the seventies.

Now, there are at least two countries which already contribute more. I believe France, for instance, is one of the countries that contributes more than 1 per cent of gross national product. So in this respect we should really put our money where our mouth is. We continually speak about putting more into the removal of the reasons for war, but while in active peacekeeping we have really done something to make it a fact, in the field of foreign aid we are very sadly lagging.

Mr. Cafik: The point I was bringing up...

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik, I think we will have to go over to the Conservative group and we will come back to the Liberals later.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Gellner, first of all I would like to say that by and large I agree with your appreciation of the situation as you have outlined in your paper and I think emphasis has to be placed on the situation that exists in the world at the present time, the practical situation we find ourselves in, rather than what we would like and hope for the situation to be—of one peace-minded nations co-operating together to secure peace in the United Nations or in any other organization.

• 1210

Another thing that I think needs particular emphasis is the fact that a nation such as Canada, with our size and with our general capability, and particularly our geographical position, just cannot look after its own security in isolation. We can secure or maintain our basic independence, our general security, only by means of alliances with what we might call like-minded nations, other countries that have the same general ideals—freedom, democracy and so on, as we have ourselves. Under these circumstances it seems to me there is absolutely no alternative except alliances with the United States, first of all, and with NATO, the alliance of the other nations of really the Western world, if our

independence as a country and our future is to be adequately protected.

Now, to come down to some more specific points in your paper, I do not know that I would agree with the mathematical calculations you made in regard to how much of the defence budget is required for this purpose and so on, because in my view these things are integrated to a certain extent and the same proportion of our forces that you are devoting to NATO purposes also at other times is used for United Nations purposes, or may be used for the direct defence of the country. A breakdown of that kind does not seem to me too realistic.

Similarly I do not think that you can lay down any rule of thumb, or hard and fast requirement as far as the proportion of the defence dollar is concerned between maintenance and re-equipment.

I think this depends to a very large extent on what the re-equipment program has been in previous years. At certain times you arrive at a point where it may be that you have to spend as much money on re-equipment in any particular year as you spend on general maintenance. At other times you can spend a great deal less depending on how much modernization has taken place in the past, and how fast the general market technology has been. Certainly, I agree that the amount we have spent on re-equipment has been inadequate to produce the type of modern force which is required at the present time.

I would just mention one other thing. I was glad to see the emphasis you placed on the importance of civil defence. I have been disturbed by the way in which in recent years civil defence has been neglected to a very large extent, and I think people have been unwilling to face what the consequences of a nuclear attack would be and thus have been unprepared to take precautionary steps in the way of a Civil Defence Organization which would be necessary in such a terrible event and which, if it were in existence, could result in saving a very, very large proportion of the population which otherwise would perish.

Mr. Gellner: I would like to make only the following remarks: This breakdown is roughly what we need for the maintenance of our sovereignty, but what we need for sovereignty plus NATO and what we need for all commitments. It is very rough and I emphasize it

is purely tentative, just as a kind of illustration.

Now, on the second point you are absolutely right; the three to one cannot be applied every year, but through the years this has been a useful rule of thumb—in fact two to one is a useful rule of thumb. To give you an example the French, for a long time past, have spent one to one, as much on equipment as on running expenses.

Mr. Harkness: That is just the point.

Mr. Gellner: They are scaling down now, and over a period of, let us say, 20 years it will be shown that they will be somewhere near the rule of thumb.

Finally, I am very glad somebody brought up this civil defence business, because I think this is a most urgent task and one which could be tackled comparatively easily, and comparatively quickly.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: I just have one brief question, Mr. Gellner, and I share many of the remarks made by Mr. Harkness. I have some other reservations about parts of your philosophy, probably not so much borne out of this paper, but of having—as many others have, I am sure, in Canada—followed your writings over a number of years.

• 1215

I would just like to come back to a specific thing, just to broaden my understanding of your own concept. In any consideration of the defence structure in Canada, have you abandoned what was obviously a very effective instrument of economic development in the past in terms of the defence dollar remaining still a viable economic tool, a regional instrument of stability—economic stability, for example. Do you think this is a redundant position now or does it still have some viability?

Mr. Gellner: Well, I think it still pertains a certain part of the operations and maintenance costs, for instance. I could not say anywhere nearly which part is caused by the fact that we have to spend in a certain place. I apologize to any member here from Prince Edward Island for giving the example of the Station in Summerside. It seems to me that possibly this is a station which is not absolutely necessary for our defence and possi-

ty not necessary on this spot, but there is, as you rightly said, a good case to be made to keep the station on this spot so as to have the defence dollar produce certain economic effects.

Mr. Forrestall: In other words, in any review that you have made in recent months in your own mind, you have not necessarily rejected the economic argument, or have you?

Mr. Gellner: No, absolutely not. We are spending more per capita on operation and maintenance than any other country in the world and this is because of our peculiar setup where we have nothing except long term volunteers, and that is an expensive way of keeping a military force. It is a very efficient one, man for man, but very expensive. It may pay somebody to work out what the slice would be if one went ahead ruthlessly only from military considerations, and left out local political economic consideration altogether, my own guess is that it would not be a very great reduction, but obviously something could be saved by rationalization which would go counter to a local economic interest.

The Chairman: Mr. Nowlan?

Mr. Nowlan: I have two questions; one specific, and one more general. The first follows partly from what you were just saying, Mr. Gellner. You state in your paper that we have the highest per capita cost in the world at \$12,400. I would like to know if you could tell us here today just where some other countries fit, from your own figures, judgment and calculations?

Mr. Gellner: I should first say, that this is a slice. It does not mean that the servicemen get \$12,000.

Mr. Nowlan: No, no.

Mr. Gellner: It simply means the total operations and maintenance cost divided by the number of servicemen; it is the same as a divisional slice, the total army divided by the number of divisions you have.

Mr. Nowlan: I appreciate this slice.

Mr. Gellner: I hope it is quite clear that this is a slice. Now, to give a comparison, the same slice last year in the United States was just under \$11,000. The same slice in Turkey last year was just under 4,000.

You really cannot say it in such a way, but to put it in the most elementary way the Turks can field three soldiers for every Canadian soldier for the same amount of money.

Mr. Nowlan: We are not too much like Turkey, and we certainly have not got the size and the quantity in the United States, so do you have any figures on New Zealand, Australia, England or France?

Mr. Gellner: Unfortunately, not. I have a fairly old figure for France, about three years old, and at that time in France it was about half of ours, a little over \$6,000.

Mr. Nowlan: Would not New Zealand and Australia be closer to our situation? You have to have a certain administrative base to have any service personnel; the more service personnel, the less the slice.

Mr. Gellner: It would be an interesting question to ask the High Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand to work out their slices, but the statement that ours is the highest is based on a study which Americans made of these different slices and I just do not recall Australia and New Zealand. I only know this—ours is higher than the American. Now, this is not that our men are better paid, or better housed than the Americans; it is simply that they have so many draftees.

• 1220

Mr. Nowlan: I appreciate that. The next general question is, from your own experience—and the paper does not really come close to it, there may be good reasons—with all these countries, in these forms of alliances, has there been any consideration given that say Canada, because of its coast line and size but yet relatively little population, should concentrate on the Maritime command of the sea, and integrate service sea questions with say a non-existent coast guard? Where we do not have the personnel and do not have a history of drafts or conscription—basically it is not a healthy history. Trying to field even a peacekeeping Army of 100,000 is perhaps not realistic.

In other words, has consideration been given to specialization within alliances so that, say, Canada looks after the coast guard and the sea services, as I know it is concentrated in Maritime command, and that countries with more population provide some of

the army components in an alliance? In other words, why do we all have an army, navy and air force, or used to have.

Mr. Gellner: If you talk about NATO it is absolutely possible that there could be a redistribution of commitments provided everybody pulls his weight. Now, we are again at the lowest end of the scale. I will stand corrected if I am wrong, but I believe that in proportion of gross national product only Denmark gives less than Canada, so amongst the thirteen military contributors—because France is separate and Iceland does not contribute—militarily we are, I believe, in twelfth place, but this is something that some organization can work out for you. We are pulling our weight but not too strenuously.

It could very well be done in your way and the commitments redistributed, and such predominantly naval seapowers as the United Kingdom might provide a much higher proportion to the naval contribution to NATO and perhaps we could provide a higher contribution to the naval and air defence proportion of NATO. This is perfectly possible.

In fact, Canada has tried such a thing. If I am not mistaken—again I am talking without papers—in 1959 there was a suggestion that the whole ground contribution of Canada should be put into a mobile reserve for a change, that we should not have anything in the front line, so to speak. Now, this did not come out but now we have gradually increased our contribution to the ACE Mobile Force and scaled down our contribution elsewhere, so your plan is perfectly feasibly provided we pull our weight. I would very strongly advocate specialization in NATO.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis and then Mr. Winch. Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, it naturally follows after one hour and twenty-five minutes that questions have been asked and comments made on some of the thoughts I had in mind. I hope you will not mind, sir, if I put three questions together instead of asking them individually.

• 1225

I would like to ask Mr. Gellner first, if our forces in NATO are of little value—and I also have read a great deal of his comments in the past—why should Canada spend millions annually to maintain them there some 24

years after the winning of the Second World War?

I follow that up with my second question. Mr. Gellner stated, and I wrote down what he said, that there are three important matters of concern to Canada in establishing our defence policy and he outlined them, as I wrote them down, as maintenance of sovereignty, staying in alliances, and accommodation with the United States of America. I would like to know why, when he outlines these three, he did not include as a major consideration making effective, on Canada's proposal, peacekeeping under the aegis of the United Nations. What priority would he give as a major factor in Canadian defence policy and external affairs policy in this matter of peacekeeping?

Tied in with that, I would like to ask Mr. Gellner if he can tell this Committee, in as concise terms as possible, exactly what he meant when he categorically stated, as he did in paragraph 15 of his written presentation, that Canadian armed forces primarily are for political purposes? If Mr. Gellner actually believes that, then why not peacekeeping as a political policy instead of a defensive policy in accordance with his own statement this morning of staying in alliances and Canada accommodating the policy and views of the United States?

Mr. Gellner: I would first say that certainly our contribution to NATO should be changed, should be modernized, but I would draw your attention to the fact that we are not spending extra money on NATO. The same forces, if brought to Canada and stationed in Camp Gagetown, would cost the same.

If you look at the estimates for 1968-69 and divide the operation and maintenance costs of the brigade group and the air division by \$12,400, then by the number of men, you will again come out with 12,400. In brief, a Canadian soldier costs as much in Germany as he does at home.

Mr. Winch: Including his family and transportation?

Mr. Gellner: Yes, because he saves elsewhere. The operation and maintenance costs if he did not cart his family along would be less in Germany than they are at home and as we have the big establishment for dependents this balances itself out again. You will find, if you make this calculation, that by and large if there is any difference it is miniscule.

• 1230

If you bring back the 10,500 men in Europe and not dismiss them from the service but keep them here, let us say, as a reserve for peacekeeping, their cost is the same. Now, this is not to say that they should not be better employed there and that we should not try very hard to make NATO military plans more realistic, and Canada and others have tried. The French lost patience and left and, hopefully, this will happen only once.

The second question is, why not UN peacekeeping? Now, I did not put it in right now because this is a paper for 1969. Canada is always short-changing itself but in this we should not, because as far as peacekeeping is concerned Canada has been the driving force for peacekeeping. Now, we have not got anywhere. UN peacekeeping, as I said repeatedly today, is in abeyance and no amount of pummelling by us can at present change it.

I suppose you will at one point question Mr. McNaught or somebody who has been continuously engaged in this exercise and he will be able to give you chapter and verse much better than I can that it is just impossible right now to get active peacekeeping moving in the United Nations. Ever since the non-payment of dues has been accepted the thing is for the moment, a dead letter, so there is no point right now in putting a tremendous effort into peacekeeping because, let us say, the mobile forces which we have are trained so that they will be available for peacekeeping as soon as it comes to peacekeeping. For instance, if it came to a situation where a peacekeeping force was sent to Nigeria-Biafra, we could probably field it right now.

Third, why military forces mainly for political purposes? Because they are for political purposes everywhere. I gave the example of Switzerland. Now, Switzerland's main national objective is the maintenance of neutrality. They keep a tremendous military establishment. It has been said of the Swiss that they have an army on furlough. The Swiss is just as much in uniform as in civvies. They keep it for the sole purpose of maintaining neutrality. They have never been called upon to use this force in earnest. It serves its political purpose.

Here with us I would say the political purposes of sovereignty, of not letting the Americans—and this is not an anti-American state-

ment—for political reasons look after the security in our territory, in our airspace, in our sea approaches for making a contribution to an alliance which is necessary for us is our own military and our own political purposes which have, in part, to be met by the provision of military force. In my opinion they are sufficient to justify the maintenance of a military force of the size which we have.

Mr. Winch: Can I ask you to follow through on that? The political purpose of Canada is peace. That is the political purpose. Now, in the maintenance or trying to assist in the maintenance of peace for a political purpose, could we not use our forces to a greater extent, highly mechanized and highly mobilized, for peacekeeping purposes, where the United Nations knows there is a country that is ready to do this and, in addition, to organize our armed services on such a basis that for political purposes—and that is to make friends, to make friends as well as maintain peace—we could utilize our armed forces, organized and trained, in giving assistance in the building, in the rebuilding of countries, whether it is bridges or anything else. Now, is that not a political purpose? That is the direction that I am trying to get an answer from you.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, it is a political purpose but there is no demand right now. We have it. We have the capability if there were a demand. While there was a demand, roughly in the decade 1956-1966, do not forget that Canada was the only country in the world which took part in all 11 active peacekeeping operations staged by the United Nations. No other country has taken part in every one of them.

• 1235

Right now there is no active peacekeeping by the United Nations. If we want to work through the United Nations we cannot, because the United Nations is not engaged in active peacekeeping, but do not forget that also our contribution to NATO is in the direction of maintaining peace, the equilibrium in Europe. Our contribution to North American defence is for peace because if the deterrent force is safe I suppose it will not be attacked.

Now, surely, we are not maintaining any single soldier for attacking anybody. We would like, I am sure, to shift them for this UN peacekeeping, but where is the UN peacekeeping? The operation is Cyprus and it is

petering out and there were many opportunities for it. The United Nations could have prevented terrible bloodshed in the world but it is not capable right now of doing it and it is not our fault.

The Chairman: Mr. Winch, would you like me to put you down for the second round and go back, perhaps, to the Liberal group? I have Mr. Allmand, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Guay and Mr. Penner and then Mr. Roberts for a second question. There are a number so that if you could bear that in mind when allocating your time.

Mr. Roberts: Could I ask just one question for information, Mr. Chairman? Are we going on again this afternoon or what is the intention of the Committee?

The Chairman: We had intended to conclude our hearings at one o'clock. Mr. Gellner will be available this afternoon if there is the desire on the part of the members of the Committee, but we had originally planned on having just two-hour sessions pretty well throughout the hearings.

I believe now all of you have Mr. Gellner's introductory remarks. If you agree—Mr. Forrestall still has not received his—perhaps we could have the introductory remarks annexed to the minutes of our Proceedings.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: All right. Mr. Allmand, Mr. Laniel, Mr. Guay, Mr. Penner and Mr. Roberts from the Liberal group.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Gellner, in your statement what in fact you are saying is that if we are going to protect our national security in its negative and positive aspects, we must rely on our military power, have our own military forces and belong to military alliances, and that we must rely on this military power and the balance-of-power system in the world.

From my point of view, if we look at history this type of theory has never really protected national security and national sovereignty. As a matter of fact, the building up of military forces has always led to military conflicts in the long run. Now, that may not have been too bad in past centuries, although it became worse in this century, but now with the weapons that we have today where whole populations, not just armies, are involved when a war takes place, I think it

becomes more important than ever before to realize that the reliance on military power is not guaranteeing our security and that it has never guaranteed the security of anybody who ever relied upon it.

You mention three or four alternatives, but to my way of thinking there are two alternatives: either you rely on military power and the balance of power for your security, or you try to develop a system whereby your security is based on the respect for order, for law and for the sovereignty and the right to live by yourself such as we do within states, and this means building up the United Nations and building a system of world order and peacekeeping and everything else, and this has been brought up.

In answer to this you said that is very good for the future and I think Mr. Gibson said we should work towards that, but you said we must do something for today and by this you meant we will continue to rely on this particular system of military power. My comment is that if we continue to do something for today along the lines that you suggest we will never reach that particular goal. If we keep on relying today on military power the long-range goal, although we give word credence to it, would mean nothing.

Second, you said in answering Mr. Winch about trying to do something about peacekeeping that no amount of pummelling at the United Nations will change this, meaning that peacekeeping is now out of favour with the United Nations and, therefore, let us not do anything about it because we cannot do anything about it. I question that. While today the new type of peacekeeping is out of favour with the United Nations, we are planning a foreign policy for the future, not just for 1969 and 1970, and if we try to base our entire policy just on what they are doing at the United Nations in 1968 and 1969 we are not going to be doing very much. We have to look to the future and try to develop a policy that will really protect our security and bring about world peace.

• 1240

You mention different states that maintain armies for military purposes. You say Switzerland maintains a military force to guarantee its neutrality. I question that. I think if Switzerland remains neutral it has nothing to do with its military force; it is because its neighbours and the other nations in the world want it to remain neutral. I think they accept

the neutrality of Switzerland and I do not think the military force in Switzerland has anything to do with it. I think if the power struggle developed in a certain way the fact that there was an army in Switzerland would not count for anything.

So, I put it to you, there are two alternatives. One alternative is military power for our security; the other is merely trying to do something to bring about a world order in which we can have peace through the United Nations, through reliance on international law, through reliance on a much better world peacekeeping operation, perhaps, than we ever had before. Those are the only two alternatives and the first one has never worked.

Mr. Gellner: I disagree with you completely because history shows that peace does not follow disarmament but disarmament follows peace. If you had a peaceful situation, then you not only can disarm but you will have every reason to disarm to get rid of unnecessary expenditure at this point. If you look at the history of disarmament in our century you will find that disarmament made the greatest progress after the First World War because it was believed that we would have peace in our time and that the world had been made fit for democracy. Therefore, there was large scale disarmament. For instance, Canada disarmed practically to zero; the United Kingdom disarmed to the bone. There was real progress in limitation of arms and then, in the late 1920's, the dictators rose; the picture of peace disappeared, the spectre of danger rose again and this made an end of disarmament. The dictators rose precisely at the time when disarmament was making the greatest progress.

I think any study of history will show you that disarmament is a consequence of peace; not peace a consequence of disarmament. This would be much too easy. What you have to do is to establish world peace and then everybody is going to disarm.

Second, I agree with you that we must not give up the dream of active peacekeeping, and we are not. We are available; we still have forces assigned for this purpose although they are not going to be called upon now. As I said, Canada was the only country which has contributed every time. We simply cannot do more.

The third point is the example of Switzerland. Here again I must strongly disagree

with you; disarmed neutrals are invariably overrun. Switzerland was threatened very seriously in the Second World War by both Italy and Germany; the Germans even planned for the occupation of Switzerland. The thing which deterred the Germans was the price they would have to pay for it. The Swiss army is not capable of beating the Russians, but it is strong enough to make it too costly for anybody in relation to what they would gain by taking Switzerland. This is the sense of armed neutrality; there is no other neutrality under international law except armed effective neutrality.

• 1245

While your idea is perfectly valid and shared by everybody, I think you have to approach it from a different angle. You have to establish world peace and, without any doubt, this will be followed by disarmament. But where is world peace? It is farther away than it was 10 years ago and farther away than it was 15 years ago. If Czechoslovakia tries to reorganize its life it is occupied by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Allmand: Sir, may I just...

The Chairman: I think we will have to let Mr. Gellner answer your question and then go on.

Mr. Allmand: It was a misunderstanding. I say that when we had disarmament after the first world war there was no alternative security through the United Nations or the League of Nations. Therefore, there was a great difference.

Mr. Gellner: The League held the same promise as the United Nations.

The Chairman: I will call on Mr. Laniel. If it is the wish of the members to continue this afternoon then perhaps you can pick up your additional questions, Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I also had a long question but I will try to make it a very short one.

Mr. Gellner, from hearing you this morning and from reading your brief I come to the conclusion that you are more or less for the status quo as far as our defence policy is concerned, except for an emphasis on civil defence and perhaps a better use of our forces at the present time, making them more effective by reducing the maintenance and increasing the cost of modernization, the ratio between the two. I am just wondering—and this is a very simple and short question—

if you were the government, or the Minister responsible for advising the government, am I to understand that you would not recommend any change in the general orientation of our defence policy?

Mr. Gellner: I would not, simply because I cannot see where and how it is to be made. I think we are now at the point where, if we maintain our commitments—and my point in the brief was that we have only the commitments which are closely connected with our positive security, with our demand for the achievement of Canadian national objectives—we cannot spend less. I agree with the Prime Minister's statement at the University of Manitoba where he said just that. He said:

... apart from totally defenceless pacifism, the present posture or any conceivable variant of it will require as much money for defence as is being spent now, if not more.

I would strengthen it by saying not only "if nor more", but "certainly more". My answer is that I could not see any alternative to maintaining our posture, except perhaps to make it more rational in specifics.

Mr. Laniel: Even the negative side of our defence policy?

Mr. Gellner: All we do on the negative side is keep surveillance of our territory, of our air space and of our sea approaches and we do it with a minimum of investment.

Mr. Laniel: I will pass.

The Chairman: Are there any Conservative members who have questions?

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Gellner, something just cropped up, and again my question is specific and very brief.

In terms of our national sovereignty, do you feel there is any danger in our having abdicated by choice military bases for one reason or another in our Arctic regions and from the establishment in that region of scientific stations by other countries? I understand now that at some point later I will be able to obtain detailed information about the number of scientific establishments operated in the Arctic by other countries, but that is another area. Do you see any danger from this?

Mr. Gellner: I do not think we have abdicated any more than other countries in the Western bloc and probably less. Of course,

the United States is unique, but of the smaller and less important countries every one is going out from this principle of interdependence. There are certainly more foreign military installations in Germany than in any other country but even in France, which continuously speaks of its sovereignty, there are quite a number of foreign military installations. I gave the example of the German depots on French soil.

• 1250

Mr. Forrestall: The Germans are the only ones though, are they not, that now have military establishments in France?

Mr. Gellner: I believe that certain training functions of other NATO countries are also carried out in France; that test ranges are being used; that France allows overflights, although it is not a member of the military organization, so I do not think we have surrendered more sovereignty than others, but there is a certain quantitative distinction to be made.

I will give you an example. The Americans consider necessary for their security a complete coverage of the sea approaches to North America and by sea approach I mean submarines approaching North America. For this coverage quite an effort on our part is necessary.

The Americans, I think, would do it themselves; they would not insist that our maritime forces do it, but of course to do it they would need—I do not know; again I am speaking off the top of my head—installations in Halifax, Saint John, Yarmouth and so on. This would be quite different from the Americans using, together with us, our test range in Churchill. After all, we have access to American ranges if we need it, and so on. This would actually be fulfilling a complete defence function, a defence function which would be fulfilled by a foreign power. I think there is a very, very strong distinction here.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Gellner, I presume in all the scheme you have drawn up here, your own view would be very much along the lines that we should carry on business as usual, but basic to our alliances is the acceptance of certain other countries as being hostile to us, or at least being potential enemies, who might in some way attempt either to produce a direct attack or in some way indirectly affect our country. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Gellner: I would say there is a base of appreciation of a threat to our security and to our values, yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You would certainly admit that the NATO alliance particularly recognizes some fairly definite directions in this regard?

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Would you accept the fact that this is a static situation, that it does not change?

Mr. Gellner: No, it could well change and, in fact, General de Gaulle has spoken about the possible change now for many years, and it is not pure fantasy. However, for the time being in Europe I think the choices are very limited. We either have this kind of balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact—and I would like to say very strongly that the Warsaw Pact is a so very important factor that it must be viewed in the same light as NATO—or a confrontation in Europe between the United States and West Germany on one side and the Soviet Union and East Germany on the other. That is putting it very crudely.

Certainly, even from the European point of view, the present situation of the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is the more acceptable of the alternatives. Of course, the need for it will disappear once we come to a more or less unification or drawing together of Europe, as General de Gaulle has said, from the Atlantic to the Urals—and that is perhaps exaggerated because it would take in the Soviet Union—but let us say from the Atlantic to the Pripet Marshes. If this comes, there will be no need for NATO or the Warsaw Pact; in fact the Warsaw Pact even has a clause in the agreement which says that if there is an all-European security agreement the Warsaw Pact will disband.

Therefore, what we have to go after to get a change is to bring about this kind of all-European security pact, and again this is a vision of the future. General de Gaulle has said it and I suppose has pursued it, but for the present the security of Europe is based largely on the balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I gather it is your belief that it is important for these two institutions to continue to achieve that end, rather than cease to continue it. Is this your position?

Mr. Gellner: For the present, yes, until there is security in Europe.

The Chairman: A supplemental from Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: May I ask a supplementary about something Mr. Gellner said? If because of internal discord within the Warsaw Pact and Russia's obvious power regardless of the Warsaw Pact, and in token to the Nixon administration, Moscow tomorrow said the Warsaw Pact *per se* is through, would this change your thinking about the need for the NATO alliance?

• 1255

Mr. Gellner: I would first examine, of course, whether this were real or a fake. If it were real, then I would say that much, or perhaps the whole, of the *raison d'être* of NATO would disappear, but you know how it is—dictatorships are not subject to any control. The Russians have disbanded the Comintern, they have also disbanded the Cominform, they have also proclaimed peaceful co-existence, and after that Khrushchev addressed the West with the words, "we will bury you".

So much for peaceful co-existence. We would have to examine what the form of disbandment of the Warsaw Pact really means in practical terms. If it actually came to pacification through withdrawal of the Russians behind the Pripet Marshes I am sure there would be no more reason for a military NATO, but this is not in the cards, as you know. This is a possibility which may come, but it is so hypothetical as to be hardly worth examining.

Mr. Nowlan: It was just because of your stress on the equilibrium of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact that I asked the supplementary, because I admit and agree that regardless of the Warsaw Pact and, frankly, regardless of NATO, you still have the two supreme powers, the United States and Russia, and Russia could very well disregard the Warsaw Pact and still may not change its intentions to the world.

Mr. Gellner: Well, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, NATO is completely dependent on the shield provided by the United States, but as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, NATO is a valid counterweight.

The Chairman: I believe Mr. MacDonald has not completed his questions, Mr. MacDonald?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You made it quite clear that you think the present alliances that Canada is a part of should continue. In view of the changes that have occurred over the years, do you think there are other alliances that Canada should, in fact be entering into, perhaps Southeast Asia, Latin America and other places where we do not at the present time, in my understanding, have any kind of military commitments on one side or the other?

Mr. Gellner: I would say that NATO, in view of the fact that we are an Atlantic power and that it is an association of nations the majority of which are like minded, is a natural alliance but, of course, again it is hypothetical question. It may serve us at one point to concentrate on the Western hemisphere and play a leading role in the OAS. This is for you to decide.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am asking you, though.

• 1300

Mr. Gellner: Right at present, I cannot see any other useful form of alliance for us. I would, of course, hope that the Commonwealth could come to life as a political power instrument.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): And a military alliance?

Mr. Gellner: Even as an instrument of military power, but again this is a pious hope.

Mr. Guay (Saint-Boniface): Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, Mr. Nowlan asked a supplementary and a lot of other members wanted to ask supplementaries but you would not allow them. I think we ought to be consistent in our policy if we are going to carry on our meetings properly.

The Chairman: I agree with that. Perhaps I could explain to members just what the policy is, but before doing that it is one o'clock, and I still have a number of members. There is Mr. Winch, Mr. Guay, Mr. Penner, Mr. Goyer, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Allmand for second lines of questioning. Would the Committee agree to continuing the hearing after Orders of the Day? That would probably be the best way of doing it if everyone agrees. Is that satisfactory to you, Mr. Gellner?

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

The Chairman: We will re-convene, then, after Orders of the Day. We will re-convene in Room 308 at about 3.30 p.m.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The Chairman: Perhaps we can call the meeting to order. Mr. Gellner has been delayed briefly. He should be here at any moment. In the meantime, Mr. MacDonald has a point he wishes to raise.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I wish to raise a couple of points, really. One has to do with the way in which we were proceeding this morning, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to be critical of you or whoever it was that proposed this but it did seem to me that it created problems for the Committee which might not be necessary.

While I realize the attempt was made in order to give everyone equal time, so to speak, and give all areas of the Committee equal participation, I think one of the unfortunate things that could happen in this Committee is if we were forced to polarize either along party lines or along any other kind of artificial boundaries, particularly in a wide-ranging inquiry such as this which I presume will be basically for the gathering of information rather than the assuming of various positions, whether they fall within parties discipline or elsewhere.

• 1540

What I would be concerned about really is that each of the members of the Committee would have equal time to ask his questions, to follow up with supplementaries, but that also we would not disturb the regular flow of the Committee. I am thinking not only of the various members asking questions but—and this is something perhaps that has to be left more within your discretion than something we lay down inflexibly—it is important at times to follow up on supplementaries of other members where a new area has been opened that can be valuable to the Committee.

Perhaps the Steering Committee can consider this and perhaps also consider one concrete proposal I might make, that in the case of expert witnesses perhaps we might allow in the opening stages one question initially from every member so that every member

could very quickly ask his lead question and perhaps identify major areas of concern. After that, as members indicate, they might be allotted a period of time, say eight to ten minutes, so that they would have enough time to develop basic areas of questioning but no one will be excluded. That is one point I wanted to raise.

The second point I would like to raise is that I think it might be valuable for all the members of the Committee if we could devote one session fairly soon to the whole of the subject matter which you introduced to us today from the Steering Committee. What I am saying is that I think they are both areas of questioning. These were raised earlier today by some of the other members, areas of concern and very important to our study, as well as the witnesses themselves.

I think all of us would have some suggestions to make with regard to witnesses. I am not proposing that we make hard and fast decisions in this wide-ranging discussion at agenda, but we might put enough material on the table so that the Steering Committee could make definite decisions with regard to the procedure over the next month or two. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. MacDonald. I am glad this question has come up. As I indicated, the procedure this morning was somewhat confused because it was our first attempt to get away from the usual procedure which has been carried on in committees as long as I have been here. The purpose was not only to give every member a fair opportunity of asking questions; I believe it will be found that before we have finished today every member will have had a fair opportunity to ask questions.

A more important desire on our part was to permit a more effective questioning of the very valuable expert witnesses that we have. It is impossible for us to say that party members should caucus before a meeting with the witnesses, for example, to study carefully their statements and prepare carefully in concert the questions that are to be asked, but we can make it possible for them to do that if they wish. That was the main purpose of allocating a block of time to a party.

The way we did it this morning perhaps is not the best way of doing it, and certainly some of the suggestions you have made, Mr. MacDonald are very valuable. I was going to try to make an opportunity this afternoon to

ask all members who have suggestions about how we can make our questioning better and more effective to pass them on to their representatives on the Steering Committee or to me, because our desire is not only to make sure that each member as an individual, not as a party adherent, has an adequate opportunity but also to make sure that we make the best possible use of the time of the valuable witnesses who will be before us.

I entirely agree that particularly on this policy review there are no party positions. I am sure the Liberal members are not concerned at this stage to defend party policy because it is being reviewed and presumably could even be changed, so that the purpose was not to polarize. We want to avoid that, I agree. The purpose basically is to set up some sort of system so that those groups that wish to do so can collectively prepare in advance the line of questioning which will cover the major points they want covered without undue duplication.

Are there any further comments on this general subject before we call upon our witness?

• 1545

Mr. Cafik: Generally speaking, I agree with the remarks that have just been made. I do not agree with the present form that we have. I am inclined to think that perhaps the best way—and I am not too sure that it is the best way—when you go into the questioning is for some person, regardless of what party he represents to ask one question and it might be good then to permit a great number of supplementaries along that same line if you could keep the rules of relevancy, as it were.

Then when we close off on that, we could go to a new area and then develop that with supplementaries with participation of all parties and all individuals who are here. It would seem to me that there would be greater continuity in the questioning. At the present moment each set of questions are altogether distinct from and irrelevant, perhaps, to the previous question. This might be a worthwhile approach to some kind of conclusion.

The Chairman: If there are no further comments perhaps we could continue. Mr. Nowlan?

Mr. Nowlan: I think Mr. Cafik has said part of what I would have said. I think you have to have supplementaries which makes cross-examination or examination relevant. I do think that a government member, as in the

House, should have the priority at the first question and then let things fall where they may. Either the first round goes like the House goes—the government opposition, then NDP and Creditiste, and then let it be wide open with supplementaries even on the first round as in the House

To polarize it the way it was done this morning I think, is going to lead to difficulty. I think the government and the government spokesmen whoever he may be, have a just claim to the first question, but we should have supplementaries if they are relevant.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would like to add a comment here. I think particularly in the discussions that we are having now it could be demonstrated fairly simply that there is as much latitude within each of the parties as there is between any particular parties that are represented. For that reason I think it will be both difficult and somewhat artificial to attempt to enforce, at least in the kind of hearings that we are going to be going through in the coming weeks, any kind of what I would call artificial party positions when I think it is not in the interest of any of the individual members to develop it at this point.

The Chairman: It may well work out that way. As I say, it is experimental. It certainly would be helpful as a general rule, I think, to efficient questioning if the parties, or some of them, or some members of the party did prepare in advance a coherent and consistent line of questioning, and the purpose of allocating a block of time to a party was to permit that to be done, if it turns out that the parties are prepared to do that extra work in advance of our meetings.

Under the old system where the Chairman recognizes any individual member who puts up his hand, the questioning is bound to be fragmented and lack continuity. The only way to avoid that is to permit supplementals. Then, human nature being what it is, some people decide to use supplementals to get to the head of the line-up, and this has been a problem in committees.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Cafik has a good suggestion and perhaps we can try it more with the next witness if we can somehow isolate the major areas and deal with them on a consecutive basis and deal with each one in its position, rather than jumping from one to another and all over the lot and, in effect, short-circuiting any kind of depth

discussion of these major areas that are being looked at.

The Chairman: These suggestions certainly will be considered very carefully by the steering committee and if any other member has any other suggestions how we can improve these hearings, by all means let us make use of them.

Mr. Gellner is back with us. I think Mr. Winch was the first one on the list, and when Mr. Winch completes his questioning then the block allocation time to parties will have been completed for today's sessions. We will then just take individuals as they come. After Mr. Winch I have Mr. Penner, Mr. Goyer, Mr. Guay, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Allmand for second questions. Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman I have two questions and they are based completely on statements that were made this morning by Mr. Gellner. During the discussion about Canada and peacekeeping Mr. Gellner mentioned the fact that Canada is the only country that ever met all 11 requests. I know that all of us around this table and in the House of Commons and, I hope, in all Canada are very proud of the fact that we did, but what rather intrigued me when Mr. Gellner had pointed this out was his statement, which I wrote down. Mr. Gellner said, "... but we did not get anywhere."

• 1550

Now, Mr. Chairman, in view of what is going to be a most important discussion on defence policy, which obviously will include peacekeeping and perhaps trying to do more at the United Nations, I would just like to ask, in view of Mr. Gellner's statement, which I wrote down, "... we did not get anywhere", whether he does not think that we did get somewhere as far as Canada is concerned in the years that we were represented on the Gaza Strip, in what we have been doing and are now doing in Cyprus, with a surveillance team in Pakistan; with the fact that anything can eventually break and the fact that we are on the commission in Viet Nam? Did you really mean what you said, that with what Canada has done we did not get anywhere with Canada's move on peacekeeping?

Mr. Gellner: Oh, no. I think you took the words, "we did not get anywhere" out of context. I said that part from being in every one of the 11 active peacekeeping operations in which the United Nations were engaged,

we also tried very hard to institutionalize active peacekeeping; make it a kind of prepared automatic operation, and I said that we went so far as to call a conference in Ottawa which had as its purpose the institutionalizing of what was done from case to case these 11 times. In this connection I said, "we did not get anywhere," because we were not able to institutionalize what had been done in practice.

This was the connection in which I used the words, "we did not get anywhere". I could not agree with you more that every one of these 11 peacekeeping operations fulfilled a purpose; it did not fulfil, obviously, all the hopes which were put into this operation. Cyprus might, but the others did not, but because it is good enough to keep a lid on a situation for a certain time even this is worthwhile and I would say every one of them fulfilled a certain purpose.

For instance, you mentioned UNEF, the operation in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. The fact that it kept the lid on the situation from 1956 to 1967 at least gave a chance of preventing a further round and, indeed, if president Nasser had not demanded the immediate withdrawal of UNEF there might not have been a third round and an acerbation of the situation in the Middle East. Therefore, I want it understood that the words, "we did not get anywhere" are not in relation to the 11 operations actually undertaken, but to the great Canadian effort to institutionalize UN peacekeeping, and there we were totally unsuccessful, although we tried very hard.

Mr. Winch: To follow it up a little further, although perhaps the United Nations is not doing all that we would like on peacekeeping and we have great hopes that it will do more in the future, do you not also think we are getting somewhere in view of the fact that greater concentration and work and policy has been given, shall I say, to the establishment of a Mobile Command, to specializing on communications and transportation?

Also, although we may not have reached the culmination of, nor got as much satisfaction as we wanted from, peacekeeping forces do you not think that in this phase, too, we are getting somewhere and getting prepared? Would you agree with that?

Mr. Gellner: I would like to make it clear what I think the Mobile Command is for. Now, I said the Mobile Command is capable of providing the peacekeeping forces which may be necessary from time to time; take out

of its organization the peacekeeping forces which may be necessary from time to time but, obviously, peacekeeping is not the soul nor even the principal purpose of Mobile Command.

• 1555

If it were, as Mr. Hellyer when he was still the Defence Minister said, all we would have procured would be blue berets and billy sticks—they are only for peacekeeping. The fact that Mobile Command is being provided with a wide range of modern equipment shows that Mobile Command is to be available for any kind of deterrents of war and actually, if need be, engagement in war up to but excluding nuclear war; that is, the whole range of deterrents of conventional warfare and fighting a conventional war if there is an absolute necessity.

Mobile Command is not a peacekeeping force. Mobile Command is a force which can detail from its pool peacekeeping forces if the need arises. I would like to make a further point. The demand for white-skinned peacekeeping forces is bound to decline in the future. I believe it would be very difficult to persuade, let us say, African countries to let white forces keep the peace. Peacekeeping in the future, in my opinion, will very largely be done on a regional basis. I think if we have a peacekeeping task in the future, and I hope we do, it will be primarily in the Western Hemisphere and possibly on the fringes of the developed area.

I am very dubious that this will be acceptable in Africa or Asia. As far as Africa is concerned, I have the kind of feeling that white peacekeeping forces are there for the last time in the Congo. So, I would like to say that there is nobody who hopes more that active peacekeeping will be resuscitated in the United Nations, but we have to be very careful in examining our possibilities in the peacekeeping field. We are now capable, I think, of providing forces for any reasonable United Nations peacekeeping task in the old way. We already have this force.

Mr. Winch: Do you still feel that way in view of the fact that about three weeks ago the head of the Nigerian Government said that if there could be peace between Nigeria and Biafra and it would require to have a peacekeeping force, their first selection would be Ethiopia and their second would be Canada? I ask that in view of your statement.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, but you have to look at a particular case and I do not want to go into specifics. As you know from the Commonwealth Conference, the only solution which Nigeria is accepting is that Biafra surrender; that is, the maintenance of the unified country. What they have in mind as a peacekeeping force is possibly supervised pacification. Now, that is quite different from peacekeeping.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one more question. It is because we are discussing defence policy. Mr. Gellner has been into it for so many years in military matters, in military strategy and policy, that I was somewhat intrigued by a statement he made just prior to our adjournment at one o'clock. As I took it down—and I have it right—he said that Canada is an Atlantic nation. That is correct, Mr. Gellner?

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

Mr. Winch: From your study of military strategy, and God forbid, a war between the two major powers where Canada in the third war would be the Belgium of the first war, if I can put it that way, why do you say that Canada is an Atlantic nation as far as defence is concerned? My reason for asking that is that we go to the Pacific and on the Pacific, we hope never, China is on the Pacific side and also the U.S.S.R. is on the Pacific side and Siberia is just about as close to Canada as it is on the Atlantic. So, on what basis do you say that we are an Atlantic nation looking forward to what we have been talking about now, defence of Canada?

• 1600

Mr. Gellner: Our relationships are predominantly Atlantic. I am not saying that this could not change. It could well be that in the future sometime Japan, Australia, New Zealand, will be our main political and military partners. But right now our principal military and political partners are the nations which are together in the North Atlantic Treaty. I believe this is so. This is not unchangeable. There are many who believe that we are an American power and that we should concentrate on the Western Hemisphere. There are others, who like yourself, say we are just as much a Pacific power as we are an Atlantic power, but...

Mr. Winch: I am sorry. I have not made my point. My point is this: From a military strategic point of view, if the U.S.S.R. is

going to go after the United States through Canada, knowing our concentration is on the Atlantic, would they be stupid enough to come across the Atlantic instead of coming across the Pacific?

Mr. Gellner: I do not think that the case of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union should concern us too much because if it happens we can only duck. We should then have a civil defence effective enough to cut down our losses to the minimum, if you can talk about a minimum in case of a nuclear war in North America, but still to save what can be saved.

Also in the United States, for instance, Mr. Acheson, said that one area which is absolutely essential for our well being, apart from the North American area itself, is Europe; we need it absolutely; our relations with the rest of the Atlantic community are essential; everything else is very, very important.

I do not believe that the question of a war between the Soviet Union and The United States is a question that should be most on our minds, but what should be most on our minds is again the preservation of peace in an area that is essential to our development, to our well being. This has been achieved with our help. Is it not strange that while Europe was always the powder keg of the world, Europe has been the one peaceful area since 1945?

Mr. Winch: I would like to ask many more questions, Mr. Chairman, but I cannot abuse the privilege.

The Chairman: Thank you Mr. Winch. As I mentioned, we have completed the allocation of time to parties. Now perhaps we could follow up one of the suggestions that was made earlier this afternoon. Mr. Winch has raised basically the question of peacekeeping. Before passing on to the other questioners, are there any supplementaries with regard to peacekeeping that members would like to ask our witness, or can we assume that everything on that has been exhausted? Are there any further supplementary questions on peacekeeping? If not, I will call upon Mr. Penner followed by Mr. Goyer, Mr. Guay, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Penner: Mr. Chairman, I would like to pursue just a little further a line of thought that was opened up this morning by Mr. Nowlan concerning a greater amount of specialization in our defence policy. I would appreciate Mr. Gellner's remarks on this. It

seems to me that a nation such as Canada which is a comparatively small nation does not have unlimited resources for defence spending and we cannot possibly sample everything in the military hardware store and we cannot diversify our spending so much that we have a little bit of everything and nothing that is really very effective in its own right, or perhaps very potent in its own right.

I am wondering whether Canada ought not to select certain areas of defence specialization and concentrate its efforts there, something in which we could really take pride and which would be attractive to potential volunteers, and those engaged in it would have a great amount of esprit de corps.

• 1605

I am thinking of certain areas such as civil defence. In a country with as much geography as we have, it is very difficult to have effective civil defence units everywhere, so the possibility of a mobile civil defence unit or command strikes me as making good sense, standing ready for emergency wherever the need may arise. This is including peace as well as in the possibility of war.

The second area where we could possibly specialize would be air transport. There are already some signs that we can do this effectively. If there was more specialization we might become noted as a nation with the most effective air transport command in the world.

Third, because we are also a maritime power located on two coasts, there ought to be much more specialization in a sea force, a particular kind of sea force, and this could be worked out in consultation with our allies as to the particular form that it would take.

That, Mr. Chairman, is basically my question. I would like to have Mr. Gellner's comments on that kind of thinking.

Mr. Gellner: I would first like to say that we are already specializing. We have whole wide fields in which we are not militarily engaged. Broadly speaking we are not really engaged in any field which is concerned with strategic offensive. We have no bomber force; we are running down our capability for heavy ground fighting. For instance, as far as I know we are not providing any more tanks; we are just providing a light ground force; air transport of a ground force, so specialization is already taking place.

As far as your three points are concerned, I would like to single out the civil defence one, and I would like to make the following clear. There are two functions in civil defence. One

is the function of planning, training and preparation; this is basically the function of EMO with other government agencies and we have the planning staff for this purpose.

Then, if the worst came to the worst, there are two areas in which we have to be effective. One is rescue in a disaster area and the other is self-defence of citizens.

Rescue in a disaster area is by no means only the function of the military. It is a function of the police; it is a function of the fire services; it is a function of every organized force in the community which can do this kind of rescue. However, this kind of rescue would not help very much unless every citizen was able to defend himself. That is the really important part of it.

I will give you an example. Forgive me for giving Toronto as an example; it is my home town. If a bomb falls on King and Yonge streets in Toronto—a nuclear bomb—in an area of three, four or five miles around this ground zero there will be wholesale destruction and terrible conditions, and there what rescue can be done can be done only by highly trained, organized forces. All our armed forces together would not be sufficient. The organizations engaged in the protection of the community have to be capable of doing heavy rescue.

Then there will be a heat wave and bushes in suburbia will catch fire or paint on wooden houses will catch fire. The conflagration that can ensue could create as much damage as in the actual disaster area. In the disaster area one cannot do anything against the fact that damage has occurred, but this damage in the outskirts far away is preventable. It cannot be prevented by the army or the fire services, the police. They will be fully engaged, so far as they have survived, in the disaster area; this has to be done by everybody. Everybody has to prevent a little outbreak on his own property from destroying the whole suburb.

• 1610

The same applies to fallout. It is impossible in an emergency to tell everybody whether or not he can go out of the house. It is impossible because one does not know. Fallout is different in different places. Everybody should be able to measure it themselves. Immediate fallout is over in 24 hours or so, but a person must know whether it is safe now to leave the house and take the necessary actions. Again, this monitoring can only be done by the individual.

I cannot see any useful function by specialization of the armed services on civil defence. I would say that the armed services should be trained for civil defence. This would be something like in the last war when they were all trained for protection against gas warfare. This is simply part and parcel of the training of every serviceman, but this is not a proper specialization for the Services. What is necessary is the training in salvage and rescue of all civil organizations, and then the self-protection of every citizen and that is very simple. That is not something that need not impinge on our liberty in the least.

As far as sea force and air transport is concerned, our sea force is already specialized—in my opinion over-specialized. It is completely directed toward anti-submarine warfare. We have such a specialized sea force that we, in fact, have, with a few exceptions, just one capability: an anti-submarine warfare capability.

As far as air transport is concerned, of course the big problem always is the utilization of the very expensive transport—the rational utilization in time of peace. You simply cannot have 200 transport aircraft if you have really a need for only about 25. Much more useful than a tremendous increase in the Air Transport Command would be the creation of an air transport reserve; that is the equipment, or the storage of equipment, for all civilian airliners for quick conversion; the appropriate training of civil airline crews and mechanics, things like that, but Air Transport Command has a definite limit.

I am not saying that the limit has been reached in Canada; we could use some more military transport, but we have to bear in mind that this aircraft has to pay its way because it is something which is tremendously valuable, the crews have to be kept flying and you do not want to fly an aircraft that costs \$500 or \$600 an hour to fly, just to fly around. You use air transport command in peacetime to fulfil a function and at the same time train its personnel.

While I agree with you fully that we should fulfil certain specialized functions, I would summarize by saying that we are already specializing and perhaps we could specialize a little more, but not in those areas.

Finally, I would like to come back to civil defence. I think it is utterly necessary that the self-protection of the nation is finally taken in hand. It is a matter of a short course for every citizen, possible within the high

school curriculum, of further information, of having at home simple monitoring equipment, a stirrup pump or something like that; of having some kind of supervision so that this material is kept in good order.

This would increase our survival capability tremendously, even if the nuclear war were not in North America, even if the nuclear war were somewhere in the Pacific. Why this has never been carried out in Canada is beyond me, because this is a simple thing, an inexpensive thing and yet a tremendous insurance factor. If I can urge anything upon this body it is to look after this insurance factor. It is most important.

• 1615

The Chairman: Mr. Penner, on specialization. Are you going to open another subject?

Mr. Penner: No, the same; one more question on specialization. I gather from what Mr. Gellner has said that he accepts the idea that a nation such as Canada should specialize in its defence role in relation to other nations. He said we could specialize more. I would be interested in knowing in what area Mr. Gellner thinks we ought to specialize, or we could specialize.

Mr. Gellner: I will give you an example. All our grand forces should be tailored to one concept, in my opinion the mobile concept, because the mobile concept gives you an opportunity to do a very great variety of jobs but, in fact, we have now two types of ground forces. We have, so to speak, a heavy brigade in Europe which is devised for limited nuclear warfare on the continent of Europe and which has to be supplemented, of course, by certain forces in Canada for the necessary rotation. We have the beginnings of a true mobile force which is much more lightly equipped and where the concept is quite different. It is an intervention force for small conflicts. I would say, if this is politically feasible, let us drop this heavy ground force altogether. Let us have one type of mobile force. Therefore, let us opt out of manning part of the line of the Iron Curtain, and if we have to contribute a brigade group to NATO let us contribute it entirely to the NATO mobile force. Then it would be much more economical because we could rotate from a much greater reservoir. We would not have to have two types of equipment and, in a way, two types of training which is one thing I would have in mind.

29565—3

The other thing is the air. Here again we have a force in NATO for a task that is not duplicated anywhere else in the Canadian set-up; that is, the strike reconnaissance role. Strike, in NATO parlance, means attack with nuclear weapons. Now for this four squadrons, a piddling force, we have to maintain rotational capabilities and the training capabilities. We have to feed new crews into it. We have to exchange. Now, if all our air efforts are to be in the tactical field and an air supplement to the mobile concept for the ground forces, then it is true that we could not provide four squadrons of nuclear strike aircraft. As you know very well, they would hardly every be of any use and I cannot even think of a nuclear weapon carrier being of any use other than a deterrent. On the other hand, we would very much simplify and strengthen our capability for support of light forces for small conflicts, support by air transport, support by reconnaissance, by surveillance aircraft and possibly by some support on the ground. This is the kind of specialization I would have in mind.

Now, with the sea forces I would say again we could go again to the mobile concept. We could go into sea forces more in the direction of sea transport than antisubmarine warfare. This is a situation of negotiation with the United States and with our NATO allies, but this I think is actually what our military planners have in mind, this kind of specialization. Is it quite clear? Not two types of ground forces; not two types of air forces; not two types of maritime forces but one big concept of the utilization of the Canadian Military Forces.

The Chairman: While we are on the subject of specialization, perhaps we could have supplementaries on this general question. First, Mr. Anderson and then Mr. MacDonald, on specialization.

• 1620

Mr. Anderson: Sir, could you give me some indication of how expensive it is to carry out this very peculiar role that we have in Europe; in other words, for those people who are in the heavy armoured brigade in Europe? Does this mean that you have to have 50 per cent of the number of men who are actually on the ground in Europe in training in Canada in preparation for going over there, or 50 per cent training to get back in the Canadian role when they come back?

Mr. Gellner: No, no, but we have, for instance, certain types of equipment that are only there. To give you an example, we have only one tank in the Canadian armed forces which is the old Centurion. This old Centurion is possibly useful in the brigade group—I hope it still is—but nowhere else. It does not fit anywhere else. We have to train tank crews and because the Centurions are very old they require quite a lot of maintenance yet they are only for this one brigade group. Therefore, we have to do some heavy tank training in Canada, although we have no intention of putting anything like a 50-ton behemoth into the mobile forces. We could not transport it in the first place.

Mr. Anderson: I see this, sir.

Mr. Gellner: Therefore, a soldier is trained to be a soldier and he can fulfil all functions of an infantryman but, there are commitments which are special to the brigade group in Europe.

I will give you another example, the Honest John battery. We have there this strange battery which fires, or is supposed to be able to fire, a nuclear for the tremendous distance of 15 miles. This is of no earthly use anywhere, except possibly in the continental European context; yet we have to have a maintenance organization and we have to train specialists on a comparatively highly involved nuclear weapons carrier. This is what we should eliminate.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, I can see that sir, but what I would like to know is how much wasteage occurs because of our having these very peculiar and specialized roles in Europe? I was referring just to the tank corps we have there to try to make it more simple. For instance, instead of having this heavy armour there, instead of having these soldiers trained for the Centurion tanks, we had something which was interchangeable with the forces in Canada, what saving would there be in manpower? For instance, how many people are now training to be Centurion drivers in Germany which we would not have to do?

Mr. Gellner: He could be quickly converted to drive anything else. After all, a professional will do pretty well any job, but certain training is wasted and certain manpower which is lacking elsewhere is put into this militarily non-productive job.

Mr. Anderson: Yes, but can you give me a figure?

Mr. Gellner: I cannot say how many millions of dollars we would save but if we accepted any rationalization of a big enterprise which saves manpower; which saves money, then this rationalization is something which you will have to ask an expert.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I gather then, Mr. Gellner, you are suggesting that not only should we specialize but this specialization should go right through the piece including our air, land and sea operations, and that this, basically summed up, is a highly mobile unit.

At the beginning in response to Mr. Penner I believe you said that you felt we had too much emphasis on and, too much specialization in the maritime aspect of the antisubmarine submarine detection and that we should, in fact, go to a kind of transport for this mobile operation. Could you give us a suggestion of the proportions? Were you, in effect, suggesting that we should scrap our submarine operation, or should we have 50 per cent, or what did you envisage when making those suggestions?

Mr. Gellner: I made one important proviso. Specialization after clearing it with the United States and our NATO allies; that is, specialization which will still fulfil our necessary commitments. Just in sea forces this is a very great proviso, because United States insists on a complete coverage of the sea approaches to North America.

The North Atlantic area is divided into two parts. The northern part is called "Norland" and for that we are responsible. We have to put every ounce of our maritime effort into this coverage of the sea approaches to North America with a small navy and a small maritime air force. We have to put everything into it because there is this commitment to our principal partner in North American defence. We cannot go over to sea transport unless, of course, we increase maritime command quite a bit, unless we clear it with the Americans that such complete coverage is not necessary, so it is not in the cards right now.

• 1625

I am very sceptical about this necessity of complete coverage of the North Atlantic sea approaches. Look at it this way. In peacetime we may get a certain indication from the location of Soviet nuclear submarines, possibly missile carrying, so that we can perhaps

draw certain conclusions about their future intentions if we know where they are and where they are moving. These conclusions could be very easily quite wrong. They may continuously fool us, but in peacetime we cannot do anything about it provided they stay out of territorial waters. They are perfectly at liberty to cruise around.

Of course, a nuclear submarine is not going to come into territorial waters. After all, its missile is long range; it does not have to come so close. Now, if it comes to a nuclear war—and no other war is thinkable—their nuclear power, their nuclear armed submarines, would come into play and they would fire off their missiles. What is the use, then, of hunting them afterwards? Therefore, it is not really a rational pursuit. We are doing it because the Americans consider a complete coverage of the sea approaches to North America essential.

I believe that if we could renegotiate, if we could tell the Americans or persuade the Americans, that this perhaps is not such a tremendously important task, we then could detail off part of our forces for the transportation of our mobile force and especially the things which cannot be air-transported—for instance, fuel and so on—for intervention abroad. But please do not forget the proviso: provided we can clear this so that our commitments will change.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You feel it is a political rather than a military problem.

Mr. Gellner: It is a political problem which then could have very big military consequences.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Thank you.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions on the specialization of Canadian Defence Forces before we move on to Mr. Goyer? Mr. Fairweather?

Mr. Fairweather: Do you see any difficulties in a specialized role? Say we brought our forces back from Europe—this question has been posed I guess in other places—is there any reason why we should not be just as effective in our NATO commitments?

Mr. Gellner: We could not be as effective in our NATO commitments because...

Mr. Fairweather: I mean militarily, learning out politics.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, even militarily, because to bring forces back into Europe is not such a

simple thing. Right now we would not have the capability to bring these forces back unless we increased Air Transport Command in a fantastic way. This is for the military experts; you can well imagine I have no access to classified information but I would say we would have the same effect in Europe as we have now by having troops on the ground. We would have to triple Air Transport Command and this would go into fantastic amounts.

Second, there is really no reason for it because, as I said this morning, the troops in Germany do not cost us any more than in Gagetown. The only difference is that a certain amount of the money is spent in the German economy instead of the New Brunswick economy. Therefore, there are certain economic reasons for bringing them back. But from the point of view of the taxpayers' expenditure it is just the same whether we have them in Germany or here.

• 1630

There are certain military advantages for having them in Germany because they can exercise in bigger units, our command does get greater experience, and so on. Therefore, by and large, there is nothing gained by bringing them back.

However, we would be better off if we could use a mobile force as our NATO contribution and therefore have a brigade group in Europe which would not be capable of firing off Honest John nuclear weapons or disport themselves in Centurion tanks, but would be part of the NATO Mobile Force where much lighter equipment is being used.

The Chairman: Mr. Goyer?

Mr. Goyer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First a question for clarification and it is connected to Mr. Winch's last question concerning our Canadian security is abroad and not on the Fairweather. Do we have to assume, sir, after your remarks that the greatest threat to Canadian security is abroad and not on the Continent?

Mr. Gellner: I tried to say in my brief that we had no really great negative security worries. The integrity of our territory need not be a great military worry, because North America is only going to be attacked in all probability in the course of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union and, as I said, in this nuclear war we can protect our cities if we have good civil

defence, or part of our cities. Otherwise we can only duck. Therefore, I would not say there is a direct threat to Canadian territory, Canadian air space, or to Canadian sea approaches.

Our military establishment is for active security, for the support of our policy, for our relations with the United States. It is a protection of our common interests; for, if you wish, our membership dues in the NATO Alliance. It is difficult in this connection to connect it with any specific threat. I would say generally Canada is not physically threatened except in a nuclear war where the threat is absolute. But we still need military forces for reasons of policy. This is a basic thing which is so difficult for Canadians.

Mr. Goyer: This is an open debate, but is it a military necessity to have a military presence abroad? Is that help for the defence of Canada at long range?

Mr. Gellner: No.

Mr. Goyer: Not at all?

Mr. Gellner: No, because as long as we share the Continent with the United States we share their fate. The United States is not going to be attacked by a conventional force. That is not thinkable. It is the biggest nuclear power in the world. The whole of North America is a sanctuary for the United States nuclear deterrent force. We are not defending Canadian territory—if you mean it this way—on the Rhine. There is no direct connection between the two, but by being on the Rhine we assure ourselves of a place of influence in an alliance which, as I suggested, at present is the only thing for us.

Mr. Goyer: Do you think civil defence is a priority?

Mr. Gellner: Civil defence is a priority...

Mr. Goyer: Why?

Mr. Gellner: ...just as having fire services is a priority, because if it comes to a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union we are going to be necessarily affected and surely it is the duty of government to protect the greatest number of its citizenry to the greatest extent possible.

Mr. Goyer: How would you compare the dangers of a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States and a war abroad with conventional weapons?

• 1635

Mr. Gellner: *Time Magazine* had a list of all wars in the world since 1945, and there were almost 50, and they were all conventional. Of the 50 wars, we were only engaged in one, the Korean. However, Australia and New Zealand, which I suggest are just as peace-loving as we are, happened to be engaged in four wars. They were involved in the Malaya insurgency, the Malaysian-Indonesian confrontation, in the Viet Nam war and the Korean war. It is only an accident and our good luck that we were engaged in only one while the equally peace-loving Australians and New Zealanders were engaged in four.

Now, I believe the country which was engaged in the greatest number of wars since 1945 is India, which proclaims itself to be the great protector of peace and to be so particularly peace-loving. I believe they were engaged in something like seven or eight of them. Now, we have to have, in my opinion, a capability of fulfilling military tasks which are likely and which we can fulfil. There have been these 50 wars and we may have been called upon twice, or three times or not at all.

Mr. Goyer: Yes, but you did not answer my question. My question was: do you think that the danger of war is more important abroad today than between the United States and the USSR?

Mr. Gellner: Oh, yes; absolutely; yes.

Mr. Goyer: So civil defence is not a priority as far as Canada is concerned since the danger of war between the USSR and the United States where we can be involved is not as important as...

Mr. Gellner: I do not think it follows, because if it comes to a war in North America, it can only be nuclear and we have to be protected against the possibility.

Mr. Goyer: Very well, but your answer is that the danger is abroad.

Mr. Gellner: But it is not a danger to the Canadian cities. A war in, say, Yemen does not threaten the average Canadian citizen while even the remotest possibility of a nuclear war would directly affect the Canadian citizen so I cannot really see why he should not have the protection.

Mr. Goyer: Yes, but you will accept that if we have so many chips that we have to think

in terms of priority—and in terms of priority, if I listened correctly to what you said, civil defence is not a priority since a nuclear war cannot be expected at the moment.

Mr. Gellner: I do not know that I can make myself clear...

The Chairman: I believe that Mr. Gellner both understands and speaks French, if that will help.

Mr. Goyer: I think my question is quite clear.

Mr. Gellner: Yes. You see, here is the possibility that 10 million Canadians may be killed. Now this possibility may be as remote as you want it to be, but the possibility exists. The possibility of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be excluded. We believe that we were pretty close to it in October, 1962, and if it had come, there would not have been any proper protection for the average Canadian citizen.

Mr. Goyer: Yes, I understand very well that there is a danger of nuclear war as there is a danger abroad of a conventional war, but we speak in terms of priority and I think this is quite important. Of course there may be a long-range danger with China, but again we have so many chips and we have so much money to put in defence.

Mr. Gellner: If I were the one who drew up the priorities I would say that the first thing is self-protection, in terms of responsibility for the well-being of the nation, and that our capability to intervene in a foreign war would certainly take second place. I do not believe that this preparation for civil defence would be a great burden on the nation. It would certainly be a comparatively small amount compared to the other amounts which we pay out. I simply cannot understand why we should not tackle it because surely this is a safeguard; it is a precaution. It is a precaution for which you are responsible.

• 1640

Mr. Goyer: If the priority is to protect our own territory and if we take for granted that the war here will be a nuclear war, does that mean that Canada has a role concerning nuclear weapons?

Mr. Gellner: No, I do not think so because I do not think we could do anything militarily in a nuclear war except protect ourselves. I do not think we have any real place in the nuclear field.

Mr. Goyer: Thank you.

Mr. Legault: A supplementary, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Gellner. Based on what you have stated, it is highly improbable but possible that a nuclear war could be directed towards the United States where we would be the victims. Based on that and assuming that this is our main concern, what is our advantage, apart from the side benefits, in participating in the NATO commitment? Can it provide any protection for us in the event of a nuclear war?

Mr. Gellner: I tried to say as much as I could that this brings political advantages. To be in this alliance we have to pay something. We have to contribute. We cannot be a NATO freeloader. Now, do not compare us with France. First of all France is not a NATO freeloader. France has in the field and available forces with which NATO counts very much. The French always say, "S'il y a une guerre, on se bat." Therefore, they are not freeloaders. Apart from that they are absolutely essential for the defence of Europe because almost all communications go to France. The overfly rights through France are tremendously important and France has a small but very effective nuclear force which is just about the only effective European nuclear force; so France may be able to stay out of the military organization and still be a very influential NATO member because NATO cannot be without France. But if we went out of the military organization the question is: is NATO going to be interested in us? You have to weigh our interest in being in it against the expenditure of being in NATO. I said that if we went out of NATO we could possibly cut from our military establishment 17,000 men and save about \$250 million. It is up to you to ask yourselves whether the political advantages from being a member of the North Atlantic alliance are worth \$250 million a year. I would say yes. But, of course, here the opinions can be divided. The important thing is to bear in mind that one does not have military forces to fight a war; one has military forces to gain the goals of policy. There are countries which have very big military establishments which have served them very well to gain the goals of policy and have not fought in centuries: Sweden not since 1814 and Switzerland not, I believe, since something like 1801. Yet they have big, effective, military establishments

which serve the purposes of their policy. This is something difficult for us who are so far from the direct threat to territorial integrity to understand but the fact is that we achieve our national objectives through diplomacy; but diplomacy is backed by actual force: economic force, political force and military force.

• 1645

The Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Laniel? Was yours a supplementary on this question of priorities?

Mr. Laniel: Well, it was related to Canadian defence, especially in view of what we saw happening in Czechoslovakia and the toleration that we had to accept by the United States—by the true bloc—of a thing happening within a bloc. You seem to exclude the possibility of civil war developing in Canada, or in the United States, or even the United States, because of civil war in one of the countries or in both of the countries, deciding on an occupation. I wonder, as far as Canadian defence is concerned, if our troops would not be useful in Canada in a case like that, and performing civil defence at the same time.

Mr. Gellner: I said that we give about one-quarter of our defence efforts for our own security—this would include help to the civil power—one-quarter to being an alliance, and about one-half to fulfil our commitments with the United States, or let us say our common commitments in North America. I agree with you that even if we disarmed unilaterally, or what the Prime Minister called choosing totally defenceless pacificism, you would still have to keep, and I think I said it this morning, a small force, possibly 20,000 men, as an armed branch of the RCMP just for internal security. I think this would be necessary. Hopefully again, they would never need it. The RCMP could cope without this force, but it would be a precaution to have such. This would be just a minimum which we would have to maintain in any case.

Mr. Laniel: Is there not a danger in the fact that some of our forces are earmarked for NORAD? Does that restrict us a little?

Mr. Gellner: No. The fact is that outside Canada I do not know the precise figure. You can get it from the military whom you are going to question. I would be surprised if out of a force of 100,000, which we have, 15,000 serve outside Canada. There are 10,500 in NATO. There are some in different headquarters, as in NORAD headquarters. There is a

battalion in Cyprus, and so on. They are training staff in Tanzania, and so on. But if it all adds up to 15,000, it would be the very maximum. This means that 85,000 troops are actually at home, and of course at the disposal of government.

Every soldier plans to use the weapons being used by the government for anything the government needs. I hope that we will never have to use troops against our own people, but if this became necessary, the troops are here. The fact that they are earmarked for something else is neither here nor there. The government would simply say to use the troops in these barracks, march them out and do this or that, earmarked or not earmarked. They are after all servants of the government.

The Chairman: I have questions from Mr. Cafik and Mr. MacDonald. Are they supplementary?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): You mentioned the *Time* article about 50 wars. I wonder if we could have the actual reference to that. It might be useful.

Mr. Gellner: I think it was about two years ago. If you telephone the *Time* magazine bureau in Ottawa, they would be able to find this quickly. There was a release date, and I believe at that time there were 43, but in the meantime several new ones have broken out. So I am now giving a new statistic. If you call the *Time* bureau they will be able to put their fingers on it immediately.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik.

• 1650

Mr. Cafik: I believe this is a proper supplementary with respect to priority, and is related to the civil defence role which Mr. Gellner thinks Canada ought to play in respect to its citizens. The first question is in respect to NORAD. I wonder if you think that our relationship with NORAD in any way is directly related to our civil defence role. It strikes me that if we are connected with NORAD, we have some control over what it does, or how it might conduct a nuclear war in such an eventuality, and perhaps we might be able to take steps to ensure that our citizens were protected to the maximum amount. I would like to know your comments on that.

Secondly, and this again concerns civil defence and NORAD, have you considered the possibility of the United States producing

a defence system that would not require our assistance in terms of defence in North America? What would be the implications of such a defence system?

Mr. Gellner: First of all, as far as the first question is concerned, of course, civil defence is our own responsibility. It would not be directed by NORAD. NORAD is an agency for active defence against enemy attack.

Civil defence is a precautionary measure. It could well be under the Department of Health and Welfare rather than under the Department of National Defence. So NORAD does not come into it at all.

Secondly, as far as a defence of North America which would not require us, this does not exist. As long as the Americans say there must be an anti-bomber defence, they will always need a very broad belt of Canada to warn and intercept, and so on. They will also always need our communications.

One has read about the possibility of producing what they call a screening defence. The technical term for what we have now is dueling defence. An enemy weapons carrier comes as a missile or a bomber and you attack it again with a single weapons carrier be it a fighter or an anti-missile. But they have talked about the possibility of screening defence, of simply putting on top of a country a pool of heat radiation in which everything which came in would be destroyed. This is still in the kind of Jules Verne area. I cannot say that it will ever exist. Furthermore, I cannot say whether beneath this kind of screen of heat and radiation, life would be possible on earth. I do not know that. So right now North American defence still requires our air space and our co-operation.

Mr. Cafik: May I ask one further supplementary. I think maybe my first question was not really understood. I know that NATO has nothing to do with civil defence.

Mr. Gellner: NORAD.

Mr. Cafik: NORAD. But it strikes me that our relationships with NATO mean that we have some influence on how they will conduct themselves, and by having such an influence, and bearing in mind the well-being of our own citizens in the event of war, we may be able to prevent them from pursuing certain courses in defence that would be detrimental to our own citizens in the event of war.

Mr. Gellner: What you really mean is we should try and prevent them from using

defensive weapons which themselves create destruction. But even if we could do that, and this in itself is doubtful because as you know quite a number of the defensive weapons are again nuclear—the majority of the air defence weapons in NORAD are nuclear—but even if we could do that we could not have the same influence on the Soviet Union. We could not, for instance, arrange with the Soviet Union that they would not drop a missile on Detroit which with proper wind could wipe out every person in Southern Ontario. We could not prevent the Soviet Union from dropping a missile on Plattsburgh which could, with the proper wind, kill everybody in Montreal. So even if we made the defenders respect our health, we could not make the attackers respect our health.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts and then Mr. Winch. Unless yours is a supplementary, Mr. Winch.

Mr. Winch: Mine is a supplementary.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts has been waiting patiently, but if it is a true supplementary, please proceed.

Mr. Winch: After all this discussion, I am certain it is a true supplementary.

The Chairman: Almost anything would be a supplementary at this stage.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Gellner, in view of the emphasis that you have been placing consistently now on civil defence and the priority of civil defence, I take it that you personally are feeling very much dissatisfied with what has gone on in the past on civil defence, and what we are doing now. Therefore my question is: would you care to comment on what I will term in your estimation therefor the failure of policy and EMO, and what do you think should be done?

• 1655

Mr. Gellner: I do not think EMO has failed at all. EMO has fulfilled the job which it can fulfil, the job of organization, indoctrination and training. The Armed Forces have been trained in rescue operations in case of a nuclear attack.

Mr. Winch: Where is the failure then?

Mr. Gellner: The failure is that the citizenry had not been trained in self-defence. This is, in my opinion, a legitimate case where compulsion is necessary.

Mr. Winch: Would that be an extension of EMO?

Mr. Gellner: It may be supervised by EMO or, as I say, it may be supervised by the Department of National Health and Welfare. Surely just as you can enforce building standards you can enforce that every house has a working radiation monitor and a working stirrup pump. This can be legislated. The proper indoctrination of every citizen for self-defence can also be legislated. I think that we have not done too badly in the field of over-all organization, but that we have completely failed in making the protection general. This can only be done by self-defence. Everyone has to be able to defend himself; otherwise not only he is going to die, but also quite a number of his neighbours.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Mr. Chairman, I have one short supplementary question to ask before Mr. Roberts proceeds. I would like to ask the witness what lines of detection we have in Canada of ICBMs and so on. We have heard tell of the DEW Line, the Pine Tree Line and the Mid-Canada Line and so on. Who pays for the cost of these lines and what is Canada's share? Finally, and quickly if he can, of what use are they to Canada?

Mr. Gellner: If there is a possibility of a bombing attack—and that is an “if” but there is a possibility of almost anything—and if the Americans believe that this possibility exists, then the two lines which we have are capable of detecting bombers and of tracking bombers and of bringing, say, interceptors as defensive weapons carriers.

As far as missiles are concerned, there are no missile protection stations on Canadian soil. The three big missile detection stations of the Americans are in Alaska, Greenland and Scotland, but of course communications from them go partly through our country and furthermore we profit from them in so far as, let us say, information from them comes to us. So there is no absolute protection against anything, but as far as active defence is concerned, we participate in whatever active defence is from North America.

• 1700

My understanding of our contribution to NORAD—and again I would like you to ask a military expert, one in the forces who has facts and figures at his fingertips—is that we

are paying about 7 per cent of the total cost of North American defence. The total NORAD cost, I understand, is \$2 billion a year and the cost of the Canadian air defence is \$140 million a year. These are figures which you had better check. But I do not think I am very far away in saying that the Americans are paying 93 per cent and we are paying 7 per cent. This is roughly the proper proportion in view of gross national income. I believe the gross national income is, in fact, 93 to 7 between us and the United States. So I think we pay a small share, but in view of our smallness, a just share.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Thank you. Do you know the percentage of personnel as between U.S. and Canadian?

Mr. Gellner: I think it is roughly in the same proportion, but then General Dare will be prepared for you. He will probably have all the figures on paper. But if you look at the Canadian estimates for 1968-69, I believe that Air Defence Command—and this is the one through which NORAD operates in Canada—costs us \$140 million yearly. According to the American estimates the total NORAD costs are \$2 billion.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, you have been very patient, but would you let me ask one supplementary question?

Mr. Gellner, in your view, as a practical matter can we opt out of our present contributions to NORAD? If we failed to do what we are now doing under our NORAD arrangements, would the U.S. insist on doing these things itself on our territory?

Mr. Gellner: I am absolutely sure that it would want to man the two anti-bomber lines entirely. As you know, some of them are manned by them, but invariably they are under Canadian command. They would then man both lines themselves and they would insist on certain forward airfields which they need for vital defence being administered by them. They would insist on having control over the communications which are necessary from the lines into the command centre. They would insist on having fuel caches and so on. In my opinion the American presence would be quite noticeable in Canada.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Gellner. Mr. Roberts, you may proceed.

Mr. Roberts: Your intervention is quite apposite, Mr. Chairman, because it is exactly along this line that I would like to question Mr. Gellner. It seems to me that the key proposition in his argument is that we must play a considerable defence role which the United States government insists upon. He comes back to that again and again. I would like to focus on that because it seems to me at least questionable. For instance, in relation to NORAD—if I can say it ironically—he seems almost to be saying that the Canadian government should spend \$800 million a year in order to defend us against the Americans defending us against everyone else. It really comes back to paragraph 8 and the key insertion is:

...it has to satisfy U.S. defence needs to avoid a U.S. military presence on and above Canadian territory which would be bound to be politically constricting.

But the logical question that falls from that is defence from what? I assume that we are not talking about an amphibious operation descending from Alaska throughout Canada and the United States. While you have mentioned sea operations it would seem to me to be not beyond the realm of possibility that the Americans could mount their sea operations from, say, Seattle or Maine just as easily as they could from Vancouver and Halifax. So what you are really talking about is the interception of bombers and missiles.

• 1705

Mr. Gellner: And even sea operations. Again, a military witness would be more capable of giving facts and figures, but for instance, for the detection of a submarine you have devices which have a comparatively short range. Sonar, for instance, has a comparatively short range. We have a complete system of surveillance of our coast. This system of surveillance is done from shore establishments. I understand—I think this is in the classified realm and again you had better ask a military man about this—that we have also certain seaward detection apparatus of very great effectiveness right on shore. This could not be done from Norfolk, Virginia. You have to be much closer. As you know, in the Atlantic very important sea approaches come just from the northeast. The Banks, the Strait of Belle Isle, the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, all of these are critical areas. Now the Americans consider complete co-operation necessary. You have to look at it

from their point of view. They are a very, very great power with very great responsibilities which they are discharging. Of those, they are protecting everyone in the Western World by maintaining their deterrent capability and with correspondingly great risks.

You have to bear this in mind. We have certain advantages from being so close to them. There is the advantage of protection and we have, of course, very great advantages from them in the economic field. But we also have the disadvantage of being their immediate neighbour, and just in this position between them and the Soviet Union.

I am not criticizing the United States for demanding that. I am quite sure that if you were the President of the United States, you would also set down certain security requirements which are essential for this great power with great responsibilities and great risks, and that you would require nations which are closely connected to help in that.

The situation is not different on the other side of the Iron Curtain. If the Soviet Union felt itself threatened by the possibility of a change of regime in Czechoslovakia—it is a big power with great responsibilities and great risks—whether rightly or wrongly, we believe wrongly, it secured its western frontier.

Mr. Roberts: Why should we not say to the United States that if you believe these facilities such as shore devices and early warning systems are essential to your security, it is all right with us if you wish to man them and staff them, and we hope that there is technological development these will become less and less necessary. But if you want to do that, that is fine. Go ahead and do it; you pay for it and we will save \$800 million.

Mr. Gellner: Of course, if this were the position of the Canadian government, with the consent of the Canadian parliament.

Mr. Roberts: Well, how would that position be more politically constricting than the present situation?

Mr. Gellner: We are still what they call in Quebec *maîtres chez nous*. That is, we are still the masters here. We show inspiration from Canadian soil and we still have Canadians who are responsible to the commands of government.

Mr. Roberts: In what sense are we *maîtres chez nous*? In this regard if we cannot take the things out if we want to?

Mr. Gellner: Well, we could—

Mr. Roberts: You just said that the Americans would not let us.

Mr. Gellner: —if we choose the other alternative. Surely you have to be realistic. There are big powers and small powers. There are small powers which are more or less dependent on big powers. We cannot live in isolation. Our geographic position, I believe, compels us to pay heed to the needs of—

Mr. Roberts: But that, Mr. Gellner, if I may say so, assumes exactly the point that is at dispute. You are suggesting that we cannot escape political impositions on us because of this proximity. One of the purposes of the committee is to find out whether that is so or not.

• 1710

Mr. Gellner: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: You have argued that Canadian interests necessarily involve us in this alliance. If you define Canadian interests as protection of the security of the North American continent, which is what the alliance is designed for, then of course the proposition is true. But if you define interests another way, it is not necessarily true. What are the interests of Canada that necessarily require participation in the alliance?

Mr. Gellner: I would say the main interest is that we want to be the friend of the United States, and the closest friend. It is almost vital for us, I think. We have to perform in a friendly manner. They are performing towards us in a friendly manner. We are the privileged people in the western World. For example, the United States has no defence production exchange agreement with any country other than Canada. Everywhere else Americans are making money from exports of military materials. We have these agreements and we are exempted from all kinds of things.

I am on a foreign field here, but I believe we are exempted from some provisions of the America act. We are exempted from certain financial strictures which were imposed by the United States to reduce their balance of payments. We are profiting, I think, from our close relationship to the United States. We simply have to—again, in my opinion, and of course opinions will vary—we have to behave in a friendly manner to be treated in a friendly manner.

We have perhaps the greater need to do this because we are small and they are big. My friend J. M. Minifie has always advocated neutrality for Canada, and he has made a case for it in his book *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey*. I personally consider the argument very clever, but politically unfeasible. Now, as a politician, you may find it perfectly feasible. I can only give you my opinion.

Mr. Roberts: Is there any evidence from American sources that the Americans would regard so hostilely Canada's decision to get out of, say, the NORAD agreement, that they would insist upon implanting their troops and their facilities on our shores by force? What evidence is there for this?

Mr. Gellner: I would be interested to know—and, of course I cannot, having no access to Cabinet papers—what preceded both the conclusion of the NORAD treaty under the former Conservative administration and the renewal of the NORAD treaty under the Liberal administration. I would like to know whether there was arm-twisting, whether there was actually any other option than to do it in the most acceptable form, but do it.

Mr. Winch: Yes, but so would we. We were not consulted as Members of the House of Commons.

Mr. Gellner: Quite so, but this is a question I was asked: is there any evidence of real pressure upon us? Whatever pressure may have been exercised, if it was exercised, was in diplomatic negotiations and my answer is that I do not know. I would suspect that in 1958 the Conservatives had no option but to sign on the dotted line, and that in 1968 the Liberals—I mean the government—had no option but to sign on the dotted line. But this is my opinion.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: If I may summarize then. What you are saying is that in your opinion, while we would be better off to have North America defended without our participation—in terms of cost in any case—that the United States is a powerful country, addicted to black-mail, that is prepared to insist that we pay \$800 million for the privilege of letting them defend us.

• 1715

Mr. Gellner: No, I did not say addicted to blackmail. I said that they have a legitimate interest in their own security in view of their greatness and their responsibilities and the

risks they are incurring, and that they are entitled, in my opinion, to look after their security, and that they are rightly demanding from their friends who have so many advantages from being friends of such a big and powerful country, to help. And they want to help us. This has been the case ever since we made our first military agreement with the United States, I believe, in 1940.

Mr. Roberts: Would the same argument not justify, say, the invasion of Cuba if you could get away with it, or the exercise of American military power in the Caribbean or South America?

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, your last question was rather hypothetical, and time is running out. But please continue; you have raised some very valuable questions.

Mr. Roberts: I think Mr. MacDonald wanted to carry on.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I just want to carry on with a supplementary, because I think this has been a very useful line of questioning. Your basic objection, as I gathered, apart from what you might consider to be some kind of national pride that might be at stake here which we could debate for a long time in terms of the usual question of whether we are independent and constitute sovereignty, is that the Americans would not feel very happy that we would suddenly divest ourselves of say, \$100 million which they would then have to take over to keep the whole operation at the same level. I hope my question is not too hypothetical, Mr. Chairman, but it is in connection with this series of questions.

What do you think might be the reaction of the American government if we were to make the proposal that we ourselves felt no longer that it was militarily justifiable to ourselves to carry on this contribution, but that rather than simply reducing our over-all expenditures by \$800 million we were in effect proposing that there were certain kinds of things we were prepared to do, particularly in the area of peacekeeping or peacemaking, that perhaps are not available to the United States?

It has been proven, I think, that even a great power has a great number of limitations just because of its size in this whole field of international peacemaking, and we might in effect, as a kind quid pro quo, take up certain kinds of peacekeeping operations in place of this kind of military commitment that we felt

was really no longer, or not perhaps no longer, but simply was not as important to us in terms of priority, such as the kind of thing we have through NORAD. Do you think that that might be both militarily and politically acceptable to the United States?

Mr. Gellner: I do not think, sir, in case of the United States it is necessarily a question of money. This is a drop in the bucket in an \$80 billion a year defence budget. It is more, I think, that they would prefer us to be a co-operative ally.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We would still be co-operative by this.

Mr. Gellner: Yes, quite, sir. There is also this question. Once you let foreign troops occupy certain bases you do it on a contractual basis in the same way that the British did with the 99-year leases of certain bases, and we still of course have to honour the one in Newfoundland.

This constricts us in the future. We may change our minds, but in the meantime we have already given away a shore installation in Halifax, another in Yarmouth and another in Saint John, an aerodrome in Val d'Or, a fuel cache on Baker Lake or something like that. As it is now we are masters of our destiny. We can then adopt your plan when we feel we want to, but once we have adopted this plan, once we have given the bases away we cannot change our minds unless we wage war with the United States to evict them. I think by and large the present arrangement is a politically much more reasonable one and also the one which probably pleases the United States much more. I would like to repeat it is certainly not a question of money. It is a question of having a co-operative ally.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I find that even the internal weight of your argument is self-defeating and I just do not know whether there is a logic there to suggest that what in fact I am saying is a good idea, but not now. It might be a better idea next year...

• 1720

Mr. Gellner: I did not say it would ever be a better idea. I only said it gives you a certain freedom of choice. You can adopt your plan next year or in 10 years, but if you adopt it today then you have the Americans in these installations for the length of the agreement you have made with them, just as in the 99-year agreements you have them for

another 70 years or more. I would like to emphasize very strongly that we have common interests with the United States and the main common interest is to be friendly.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): It is not the common interest we have, I do not agree, upon being friendly, but the common interest is some kind of establishment of peace and if we can advance to the Americans that we have a more creative kind of contribution that we can make other than this annual 7 per cent, that in fact might be quite agreeable to them.

Mr. Gellner: It might be. I am sure that this may even have been put out. Papers are written on everything, as you know and every plan probably gets some treatment. I myself would be satisfied with the arrangement which we have now which gives us maximum sovereignty and still satisfies, which is very important to us, our most powerful neighbour.

The Chairman: We have had a very long and very good session. Before thanking Mr. Gellner perhaps I could draw to the attention of the members of the Committee that our witness on Thursday will be Dr. Solandt. Dr. Solandt will not be preparing in advance a written statement for distribution to the members of the Committee, but an article by Dr. Solandt was distributed to members of the Committee, I believe. Is that not true, Mr. Stewart? If possible I hope that members of the Committee will at least read that article so that the main burden of Dr. Solandt's suggestions will be known to them.

It would be most helpful to me if representatives of each of the parties could give me some idea before the meeting next Thursday of which certain basic questions they would like to raise. If they will do that—and it may even be that they will know what members are particularly interested in those lines of questioning—this will be helpful to me and I am sure that we can develop a useful form of questioning.

The second point that I would like to make is this. It has been suggested that possibly members of the Committee would like a meeting to discuss the program which was distributed this morning and also the list of witnesses which was also distributed this morning. As it happens, we had originally intended to have a meeting on January 28,

which is next Tuesday, and we had to postpone that. So that period of time probably could be made available for that purpose if members really want to do it that way. The alternative would be for members to speak to their representatives on the steering committee and to leave it in the hands of the steering committee and then save the time for that meeting, but it can be done either way so I will be discussing with members of the steering committee before next Tuesday and we can go whatever way members wish to go. If they wish to have a full-scale meeting to discuss the program which was distributed, fine. If they feel that the steering committee can handle it and develop the proper list of witnesses, fine.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Could we have a straw vote so that the steering committee would know whether this meeting next Tuesday could be that type of open agenda meeting?

The Chairman: What would be the wish of the members here now? Do they think a meeting such as next Tuesday's meeting would be desirable, or would they be prepared to leave it to the steering committee?

Mr. Roberts: Could we discuss agenda and procedures?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Cafik: I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the steering committee at least have a kick around on this procedure so that if we do have a meeting it can be brought in here with some kind of consensus on that level. Not that that would necessarily be adopted, but we would have worked out at least an approach that some of us agree on beforehand.

The Chairman: Do the members feel that a general meeting of the Committee just to discuss program, procedures, anything members wish to discuss without hearing witnesses, is desirable next Tuesday? We might be able to make that period available.

Mr. Cafik: I think that would be very useful.

The Chairman: Then the steering committee will meet before that time to follow through on the suggestion made by Mr. Cafik.

Now on your behalf, if there are no further questions to Mr. Gellner, I would like to thank him most sincerely. I know it has been a very, very valuable experience for us and a very pleasant one. I hope it has been equally pleasant to Mr. Gellner.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

● 1725

Mr. Gellner: Thank you.

The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned until next Thursday.

APPENDIX Z

PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE*Phase I Examination of certain fundamental questions*

- the *purpose* of this phase of the Committee's work would be to re-examine the basic assumptions which have determined Canadian defence policy in the post-war period.
- some topics*
 - why do nations have defence forces?
 - Canada's security requirements: where do these lie?
 - effectiveness of the United Nations in providing security.
 - neutrality as a defence policy for Canada: advantages and shortcomings.
 - requirements for home defence, including civil defence.
 - the role of regional security arrangements: the merits and implications of Canadian participation in alliances, including NATO and NORAD.
 - the question of stationing forces overseas.
 - the opportunities for peacekeeping in the future.
 - what purposes should Canada's defence forces serve?

Phase II Examination of the decision to renew the NORAD Agreement

- the *purpose* of this phase would be to consider the Government's decision to renew the NORAD Agreement. This would involve primarily the principle of cooperation with the United States in air defence and in other environments as well. This would require examination of the threat to North America.
- the *approach*: unless the Government had completed its Defence Review by this time, which is unlikely, the Government would not have decided on what forces to commit to NORAD in the future, so that the Committee would not be able to examine details of Canada's future contribution. This should not inhibit the Committee's work.

—the *method*: this phase would presumably begin with a presentation of the reasons which led the Government to decide to renew NORAD, which would include the military and political case for renewal. Witnesses from outside the Government representing various points of view, favourable and opposed, could then be called.

Phase III Examination of what defence purposes and national security interests are promoted through foreign aid

- it has been argued by some that Canada would be advised to reduce its defence expenditure and to put the saving into foreign aid. In order to assess the validity of this argument, it would be desirable to try to determine whether and to what extent Canada's foreign aid programme is intended to or could if desired be framed so as to promote national security interests.
- this specialized and limited examination of development assistance would place the Committee in the position where it could assess the validity of the thesis that aid and defence activity are alternative methods of promoting the same end.

Phase IV Examination of the Government's future defence programme, including Canada's contribution to NATO

- once the Government's defence review has been completed and the policy presented publicly, the Committee will wish to examine all aspects of that policy.
- the method of approach will presumably depend on the nature of the Government's decisions, the form and manner of the presentation, and the progress of the Committee's work programme at that time.

Note: Visit to European and North American defence installations

At the appropriate stage the Committee will probably consider it necessary to visit

defence installations in Europe and North America and to examine witnesses in the countries visited.

PROGRAMME: PHASE I

A. Topic: *Basic Issues*

- Why do nations have defence forces?
- What are the requirements for home defence?
- Does the United Nations provide an effective system of collective security?
- To what degree can it be said that there is a strategic balance in the world today?
- What can be done in the field of civil defence?
- What purposes should be served by Canadian defence forces?

1. January 21 — Mr. John Gellner: Editor "The Commentator"

2. January 23 — Dr. Oman Solandt: President of the Science Council

3. January 30 — Messrs. R. Gastil and R. Krupka: Hudson Institute

4. February 4th — Briefing by the Department of National Defence on the major roles and missions of Canadian forces as now defined.

5. February 5 — Professor Adam Yar-molinsky: Harvard University

6. February 6 — Professor James Eayrs: University of Toronto

B. Topic: *Neutrality or regional security arrangements*

- Canada's security requirements: where do these lie?
- Would neutrality offer a feasible basis for a Canadian defence policy?
- Does Canada still need regional security arrangements?

7. February 11 — Professor Charles Foulkes: Carleton University

8. February 13 — Professor Michael Breecher: McGill University

9. February 18 — Professor Kenneth McNaught: University of Toronto

C. Topic: *Defence relations with the United States*

- Is cooperation the most desirable policy for Canada?
- Alternatives to defence cooperation with the United States: Independent defence of Canada? Passive cooperation only?
- What criteria should be used to determine the extent of cooperation?
- What implications for Canadian relations with the United States in other fields would follow Canadian withdrawal from cooperative arrangements with the U.S. in defence?

D. Topic: *Canada and NATO*

- (1) Is NATO necessary in 1969: a European view?
- (2) Is Canadian security involved in Europe?
- Should Canada continue to be a Treaty signatory after 1969?
- Does membership in NATO affect Canada's relations with (a) the European members? (b) the United States?
- Should Canada maintain forces in Europe?

E. Topic: *Peacekeeping: What future role for Canada?*

- What is the prospect for future peace-keeping operations, within or outside the United Nations?
- Are Canadian forces likely to be asked for?

F. Topic: *What should be the objectives of Canadian defence policy?*

(Hon. Mitchell Sharp and Hon. Léo Cadieux)

APPENDIX AA

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCEINTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF
MR. JOHN GELLNER

1. From the establishment of the Undeclared Border with the United States up to the Second World War, the purpose of the Canadian defence effort was clear: to provide a base—a military cadre—from which, if and when an Imperial need arose, forces could be raised for intervention in an overseas conflict. If there was doubt about anything, then about the size of the cadre organization and its consequent ability to produce a specified amount of manpower in a specified span of time. There were no difficulties with organization, establishments, methods of training, equipment. They were all substantially British, with perhaps the odd local variation. Except for the rare eccentric scheme, there were no war plans, only mobilization plans. Essentially, the Canadian defence problem was to spend as little as possible on the peacetime cadre organization, while still retaining the maximum capacity for wartime expansion.

2. A radical change came with the end of the Second World War. Suddenly, there was no more sense in maintaining an auxiliary military organization for Imperial needs that were no longer relevant. The United States had replaced Great Britain as Canada's military principal. Now, Canadian defence requirements had arisen, not yet clearly understood but indubitably present, something that had not existed since the final politico-military settlement with the United States three quarters of a century earlier.

3. Until the mid-fifties, at least within the Armed Forces, the tendency was to deal with this new situation by simply switching from military principal to military principal, from Great Britain to the United States, and then carry on as before. This was patently an impossibility. The United States had no use for Canadian auxiliaries, least of all potential auxiliaries. What it was interested in was the extension of its defence organization into Canada, directly, or indirectly through a coordinated Canadian organization. Also, U.S.

global military interests perhaps jelled with Canada's in the North Atlantic area, but really nowhere else. In some special cases, which were later lumped together under the name of "peace-keeping", Canada's politico-military interests were often not those of the United States. In brief, the old, straightforward in its concept, and simple in its execution, second-to-principal military relationship no longer made sense.

4. But what does? This question can only be answered by taking the purpose of armed force in general as a starting point, and then working to the special purpose of armed force in the Canadian context.

5. A state is secure if it is able to achieve its national objectives. These are negative—the security of territory, sea approaches, and air space—, and positive—world peace, freedom of the seas, national unification, the establishment of communism the world over, you name it. The two aspects of security are equally important. Thus, the NATO guarantee may be giving West Germany all the negative security it can reasonably expect, but it is still insecure because its principal, proclaimed national objective—the reunification of Germany—remains unfulfilled. On the other hand, Israel has no unsatisfied, or unsatisfiable by its own efforts, positive national objectives. It is insecure because of its continual concern over the negative side of security, the threat to its territorial integrity. Armed force is one of the tools used to achieve national objectives, and thus national security. It acts as a tool to this end by being available, even if it is never applied. For example, the principal national objective of Switzerland is neutrality, which is assured by diplomacy and by the existence of a not yet used in earnest, but known to be extremely effective, strong military establishment.

6. All this is pretty obvious, and need perhaps not have been emphasized were it not for the fact that the public so often overlooks

the positive side of national security. Here, the term "Defence" is no doubt misleading. As pointed out, a country can have great need for armed force even if it does not have to "defend itself" in the narrow sense of the word. This is difficult to understand even for presumably intelligent people. Thus, the advocates of unilateral disarmament contend that theirs is a rational proposition because, as they say, "there is no defence" against nuclear weapons. In fact, this has nothing to do with the need for, or the redundancy of, a national military effort.

7. Canada need have some concern, but not much, for the negative side of its security. We form the strategic forefield of the strongest military power in the world, the United States. The latter, in its own interest, would see to it that this forefield was safe, even if we did not. Furthermore, because we share a continent with the United States, and because our common safety is based on U.S. nuclear deterrent forces largely emplaced on that continent, any attack against us would be a nuclear one, inviting a nuclear response. This, fortunately, is a highly unlikely eventuality. On the other hand, if it should occur, it would, whether or not it hit us directly, impose on us enormous tasks in the field of passive (civil) defence.

8. By contrast, our positive security is anything but assured. Canada, because of its geographic position between the two superpowers, has a special interest in the maintenance of world peace. Practically every conflict, anywhere in the world, which could lead to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, affects our security. At the same time, while our formal (legal) independence is not threatened, our factual independence is. Canada must see to it that it does not have to meet stronger powers in isolation, and this is the sense of its alliances; and it has to satisfy U.S. defence needs to avoid a U.S. military presence on and above Canadian territory which would be bound to be politically constricting.

9. This is not the place for any more thorough discussion of Canadian national objectives. What has been said was perhaps enough to show that Canada has security problems, rather minor on the negative, difficult and vexing on the positive side, and that they do require the availability of armed force.

10. We may now go from the theoretical to the practical. We need armed force. The Estimates 1968-69 provide \$1,714,954,000 for it. From this must be deducted \$144,618,624, which are statutory (service pensions). Another \$81,778,376 are for various purposes other than the maintenance of the Canadian Armed Forces (Emergency Measures Organization, defence research, mutual aid, special grants, and the like). There remain \$1,488,557,000 of which about 80% go for day-to-day maintenance (pay, housing, feeding, training, clothing, etc.), 20% for modernization (new equipment and construction). With a total force of just under 100,000, the per capita slice of day-to-day maintenance costs is \$12,400, the highest in the world. This figure—the per capita maintenance cost—must be always borne in mind, because, it being more or less fixed and likely only to increase with inflation, it ultimately determines the total cost of Canadian defence. The expense for modernization is a variable, with a certain optimum relation to fixed costs. This ratio is about one to two: one dollar for modernization for every two spent on day-to-day maintenance. One to three is considered barely acceptable. The Canadian ratio is one to four, which is quite out of line. To make a per capita expenditure for maintenance of \$12,400 a year worth while, expenditures for new equipment would have to be increased by close to 50%, or about \$120 million. The following rough estimates are based on a budget of the Canadian Armed Forces of \$1,610 million, of which \$1,239 million would go, as they do now, for day-to-day operations, and 371 million for modernization (at present, 249 million).

11. There are, at present, three main national objectives which, in order to be met, require the availability of armed force: Negative security. Membership in alliances. Good (for both sides) relations with the United States. They overlap, and it is thus difficult to assign a quantitative value to each of them. Only very roughly, and without direct application to concrete expenditure figures, it could perhaps be said that the first and second of these objectives require about one fourth, each, of our total military effort, and the third one half. In other words, if we were able to live in a shell politically, we could get by with one fourth of our present military effort; if we did not have national interests bound up with our proximity to, and relationships with, the United States, with one half of that effort.

12. Canada, for its negative security, needs the means for surveillance of its air space and territorial waters, and a very modest capability for grounds patrolling in the arctic and sub-arctic regions; and a passive (civil) defence organization based on universal training of the population for self-defence. The surveillance forces would also be available to provide assistance to the civil power. As to passive defence, it is a function which would more appropriately come under the Department of Health and Welfare than under the Department of Defence. It should consist of training in protection of own property against fire, and of one's own person against contamination from radioactive fall-out; and the maintenance in good working order of simple protective equipment, in particular stirrup pumps and radiological monitors, in every household. Only this can protect a nation, which is not the direct target of massive nuclear attack, from unnecessary extermination. The Emergency Measures Organization can only provide planning, instruction, communications, and, in conjunction with the Armed Forces, the police, the fire services, etc., rescue in nuclear disaster areas. The greatest part of the responsibility for the survival of the nation in case of nuclear war must rest with a properly indoctrinated and equipped citizenry. As a rough estimate, the negative defence tasks required could be performed for a yearly expenditure (not including statutory payments) of no more than \$400 million a year.

13. Canada has an obvious interest in membership in NATO, and must make a military contribution to it as all other members (except France which has opted out of the military organization of NATO, and Iceland) do, and proportionately to a greater extent than does Canada. The maintenance of a mechanized brigade group; two wings (they hardly deserve the designation of air division) of tactical aircraft; and a modest contribution on a stand-by basis to the Allied Mobile Force (Land), require a training establishment and replacement units in Canada at certainly no less than 15% of the troop strength in Europe. From the same replacement pool could be drawn the units and individuals which may be required if peacekeeping under U.N. auspices were revived. They are ample for the present diminishing commitments (Cyprus; some armistice supervision teams). All in all, the forces that must be available to maintain

Canada's status in alliances, including the U.N., probably do not require an expenditure greater than about \$400 million a year.

14. For its safety, the United States requires a complete coverage of the air and sea approaches to North America, and of the air space above it. This is an expensive requirement, both in air defence (NORAD) and in seaward defences. (These are theoretically earmarked for NATO, but in fact serve North American defence.) We carry a share of the burden, in particular, for political reasons, that part of it which requires the use of ground installations in Canada. As a rough estimate, we could get by with total Armed Forces of something like 50,000 men and a yearly expenditure for them (exclusive of statutory costs) of around \$800 million if we did not have—and want—to accommodate the United States in its requirement for a comprehensive defence organization covering North America.

15. That military forces do not need to serve a particular purpose, or be capable of fighting a particular kind of war, but that they have to be available to help achieve essential national objectives, has been long recognized by some European powers with a long military tradition. The Canadian public generally still baulks at the idea of military forces-in-being for political purposes. Yet this is what the Canadian Armed Forces are primarily for. It is an important enough task to justify spending on it something like two-and-three-quarter per cent of GNP.

JOHN GELLNER

John Gellner was born in 1907 in Trieste (then part of Imperial Austria-Hungary) of Czechoslovak parents. He received his higher education at Masaryk University, Brno, obtaining a Doctor of Law degree, and practised law until the occupation of his country by the Germans.

In October 1939 he emigrated to Canada, enlisted in the RCAF and served overseas, mainly with Bomber Command. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. He continued his service with the RCAF until 1958 when he retired with the rank of Wing Commander.

Since 1958 he has been occupied as a journalist, lecturer and author. He has written


numerous commentaries on national defence policies and programmes, writing frequently in *Saturday Night*, the *Canadian Commentator* and *Canadian Aviation*. In 1963 he testified before the *ad hoc* Defence Committee of the House of Commons. He was appointed

Editor of the *Canadian Commentator* in 1964, a position he still holds, and has continued to be a regular contributor to Canadian newspapers (*Globe and Mail*) and magazines. He was author of the recently published book "The Czechs and Slovaks in Canada".

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament

1968-69



Government
Publications

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 20

THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

Dr. O. M. Solandt, Chairman, Science Council of Canada, Toronto.

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand,
Anderson,
Buchanan,
Cafik,
Fairweather,
Forrestall,
Gibson,
Groos,
Guay (*St. Boniface*),
Harding,

Harkness,
Laniel,
Laprise,
Legault,
Lewis,
MacDonald (*Egmont*),
MacLean,
MacRae,
Marceau,
McCleave,

Nowlan,
Ouellet,
Penner,
Prud'homme,
Roberts,
Smith (*Northumberland-
Miramichi*),
Thompson (*Red Deer*),
Winch—(30).

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, January 23, 1969
(33)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Anderson, Buchanan, Cafik, Fairweather, Gibson, Groos, Harding, Harkness, Laniel, Legault, MacDonald (Egmont), MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, McCleave, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ouellet, Roberts, Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi), Thompson (Red Deer), Wahn, Winch (25).

Also present: Mr. Pilon, M.P.

In attendance: Dr. O. M. Solandt, Chairman, Science Council of Canada; *From the Parliamentary Centre For Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* Messrs. Peter Dobell and Julian Payne.

The Chairman introduced Dr. O. M. Solandt, Chairman of the Science Council of Canada. Dr. Solandt addressed the Committee, expressing his ideas in relation to Canadian defence questions.

Members of the Committee questioned Dr. Solandt on various topics related to Canadian defence and, in particular, on the views he had expressed in an interview with Mr. David Spurgeon, which appeared on page 3 of the *Globe and Mail*, dated December 16, 1968.

The Committee agreed to print each of the biographical sketches which it may receive concerning the witnesses appearing before the Committee, as an appendix to the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, on the day the witness appears. Dr. Solandt's biography appears as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (See Appendix bb)

At 1:00 p.m., the questioning having been completed, the Chairman thanked Dr. Solandt for his helpful information and suggestions. The Chairman announced a meeting of the Subcommittee, to be held at 3:30 p.m. this day.

The Committee adjourned at 1:05 p.m., until Tuesday, January 28, 1969 at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, January 23, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I believe we are ready to proceed. I believe also that a copy of the biography of Dr. Solandt, who is our witness today, and a copy of an article that was published in the *Globe and Mail*, December 16, containing a suggestion by Dr. Solandt with regard to the use of Canada's defence forces, have been circulated to all members of the Committee. Is there anyone here who has not received that material? If anyone does not have it I believe the Clerk has extra copies.

Our procedure this morning, I think, will be slightly different from that of our last meeting. I discussed it with representatives of the parties. Our object is to make sure that every member does get a fair opportunity to ask the witness questions. At the same time we would like to try to develop some system whereby the questioning will be as effective as possible, bearing in mind the time we have available.

With regard to the time, we have planned to conclude this session at one o'clock. Dr. Solandt has very kindly said that he will make himself available this afternoon if necessary, and I understand that the room and the translation facilities will be available. On the other hand we do have the debate, I believe, on the Omnibus Bill in the House this afternoon and some members may want to be there. If we can finish by one o'clock, good. If we have to carry on this afternoon then we can do so if necessary. That decision can be made later.

Instead of trying to allocate the time into blocks for each party, as we did at our last meeting, it is suggested this morning that we might call upon a representative from each party to lead off with a particular line of questioning and then permit supplemental questions from members of all parties on that same subject, then go on to another party, and so on, rather than attempting to allocate specific blocks of time to each party. This is purely experimental. The object, as I have indicated, is to give every member a chance

and, at the same time, make the questioning more effective. I am sure we will develop a sensible system before we go much further.

Biographical notes with regard to Dr. Solandt have been distributed, as I have said. I would like to add just one or two remarks of my own. Dr. Solandt has achieved distinction both in Canada and abroad. He has been actively involved in both the fields of physiological research and operations research. Both these fields have become increasingly important in the development of defence policies in this day of complex and expensive programs.

My second observation is that Dr. Solandt has not only been a participant and administrator in the field of research and development, but also has been involved in the very foundation of a number of research institutions. These include the Medical Research Council's Physiological Laboratory in 1941, the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Section of the Army Operational Research Group in 1942, and the Defence Research Board in 1947.

In 1947 Dr. Solandt was appointed Chairman of the Defence Research Board, a position he held until 1956. Since that year he has not been in any way connected with the Defence Research Board or the Department of National Defence.

After being responsible for research and development in a number of large private corporations, Dr. Solandt was appointed President of the Science Council of Canada in 1966. This professional background, in conjunction with active participation in a variety of other Canadian learned associations and institutes, gives Dr. Solandt a perspective that should be of utmost value to the Committee.

The Clerk has already circulated copies of the report of an interview given by Dr. Solandt to Mr. Spurgeon on December 16. In his introductory remarks, Dr. Solandt will be concentrating on the theme developed in this interview—the use of Canadian forces abroad for socially productive work. This theme is obviously very relevant to the over-all question concerning the Committee—the purpose of Canada's defence forces. Dr. Solandt?

Dr. O. M. Solandt (President, Science Council of Canada): Thank you, very much. I am very happy to have an opportunity of appearing here, but I feel I should warn you in advance that I am no longer currently a defence expert. As Mr. Wahn said, I left the Defence Research Board in 1956 and have had no really close contact with defence matters of Canada since then, although I naturally keep generally in touch, and am probably a little better informed than the average citizen because of my friendship with many people in the Canadian services. I want you to keep this in mind and if I dodge some of your questions it is merely because—well, I will say if I feel that I do not know enough about it to give you an answer, I will say so.

• 1110

Dealing first with the suggestion that the Canadian Forces might take on some challenging and creative peacetime tasks other than purely military ones, I think this may have been over-emphasized in Dave Spurgeon's article. It was just one idea among many that we discussed. It was quite a long, rambling discussion and he singled it out as being the one that was most interesting to him. I do not want you to feel that it represents a carefully prepared plan. I have given this idea a great deal of thought over many years; have, in fact, suggested it on several occasions over the past five years. It never got any publicity before; although I have said it in public no one ever picked it up. However, in saying that I do not want to suggest that I am backing down on the suggestion. I am merely saying that I have not thought it through carefully, but as far as I have thought it through, it seems to be quite a feasible thing and one to which we should give some careful thought.

Before going on to discuss it, I want first to make it quite clear that I am not proposing—and never did propose—that the Canadian Armed Forces should be abolished and that in their place we should have some sort of peace effort. I am firmly convinced that until human nature changes quite fundamentally we will need trained, disciplined and armed men in our nation to enforce the will of the majority and the rules of society.

I would also like to emphasize that in my opinion—and it is based on 15 years defence work; from 1941 to 1956 I was fully engaged in defence work, mainly with the Canadian Forces, partly with the British—Canada has

an excellent record, not only in our military forces—that is, our Armed Forces—but in other bodies such as the RCMP, a record of producing absolutely first-class bodies of well-disciplined, well-trained, Armed Forces to carry out the wishes of our country.

The Canadian Services, to my mind, have as good a record, if not a better record, of accomplishment in every way than those of any other country of comparable size and they, in fact, I think, compare very favorably with the armed forces of the largest countries. This is a tradition that we certainly should not throw away, or even give away. It is something that is very important to the nation.

Anything that I propose is with the long-term object of trying to strengthen the position of the Canadian Forces, rather than to weaken it. I feel that Canadian citizens should be very proud of their Armed Forces and I think we would do well to be more demonstrative of our pride in our Armed Forces. There is always the tendency, particularly in relatively peaceful times such as we have now, to play down the role of the Armed Forces and to regard them at best as a rather troublesome source of expense. Nothing that I will say will support that view.

• 1115

I will not go now into my views on the way the Canadian Forces should be employed. I do not think they are of much value because I have been out of touch for 10 years. From the press reports that I have read I think that I agree pretty well in general terms with what Mr. Gellner told you, but it may be that in questions you can get further enlightenment on my views as far as I have them formed. The argument that I went through in my own mind in reading up this idea of using part of the efforts of the Armed Forces for peaceful jobs is, first of all, if you look at the world as a whole today you could argue that perhaps the money we are spending on defence, which we are spending hopefully for peace—I think that most if not all Canadians feel they are investing in Armed Forces in the hope that this investment will contribute towards peace rather than prepare for war—would be better spent in helping the have-nots rather than in remaining ready to fight a war.

Then the other argument which I feel is quite important is that in times such as these when the roles of the Armed Forces are being questioned, except possibly the peacekeeping

role, and where again the jobs that the Armed Forces are in fact doing at the present time—again with the exception of some of the peacekeeping jobs—offer very little physical, emotional or psychological challenge to the individual.

There was a time when our image of the military man was a physically fit, personally brave and resourceful person and he got this way by careful selection, by training, and by experience. This image of the military man is beginning to change because, I think, the man operating an intercontinental ballistic missile, or the system of defence against it, does not really need to have these characteristics he does not have to be particularly fit physically; he does not have to be brave; he does not have to be resourceful to meet challenging and unforeseen situations. He has to be a very competent, bright and efficient technician or scientist. I think nowadays there may be a tendency to view this kind of person as the elite, and to look with less favour on the old image of the military man as being someone of very superior physical and intellectual capacity for resolute action.

As far as one can see now, the Canadian Armed Forces are not going to be forces that are primarily concerned with the operation of intercontinental ballistic missiles and other weapons of the kind. Our Forces will certainly be armed with the most modern weapons for the kind of jobs they might have to do, but if we get any wars I think they will be limited wars, and I think they will involve the kind of characteristics of the kind of man that we formerly held in such high esteem.

• 1120

Therefore, it seems to me to be very important to the armed Forces now to try to find some tough, difficult, challenging jobs that they can undertake, quite likely the construction of, say, railroads, roads or airfields in underdeveloped areas, and to send Canadian Forces units to take on these kind of jobs. I am sure that my outlook on this is coloured by the history of the Canadian forces in the thirties during the depression and up to the time of the war. I was not in anyway connected with the armed forces at the time, so all I know of it is secondhand, but from what I have learned in contact with the Canadian forces during and after the war, many of our best leaders were shaped by their experiences, running the Northwest Territories signal system or flying in the Arctic, because these were very challenging, very difficult

character-forming jobs, if you like, jobs that brought out the best in leadership in the individual.

If it had not been for those jobs, I think the people in the Canadian forces would have gone into the Second World War very much less well prepared for the jobs they encountered and did so well in the Second World War.

In the period after the war I was one who was very enthusiastic about the continued use of the army on the Alaska Highway, and all the Arctic flying the air force did and the part the navy took in the sealift and operation of Labrador in the Arctic. I think in the period just after the war, except for the Korean War, these were the most challenging and real jobs that the Canadian forces did.

Well, let us look very briefly at the pros and cons of the idea of choosing some jobs, challenging and difficult jobs, in other parts of the world or in Canada. I would not rule out doing these jobs in Canada. There is no reason why they should not be done here. The first benefit, I think, would be the creation of a sense of mission. If we chose a sufficiently big and challenging job, it would focus the aspirations, not only of people within the forces, but of young people throughout the nation.

It seems to me that one of our problems today is that young people do not have missions, at least they do not see any national mission that attracts their support. If you consider Canada today the people that are coming into their twenties now are really the first people in Canada that ever came into their twenties having grown up entirely in a period when there was no national challenge such as a world war or a depression or something of that kind. I really feel that part of the unrest among students, for instance, comes from this—maybe a great deal of it.

I do not want to over-emphasize the importance of this because obviously, unless you chose some colossal task, it would not have a very wide effect but I think it might have a good effect within the Armed Forces, particularly to tide over a period when the role and mission of the Armed Forces is particularly ill to find and vague.

Then I have already emphasized the benefits that such a job would give to the individual of having a rugged, challenging and broadening experience that would foster the qualities of leadership and decisiveness that are so

needed in the Armed Forces. I think possibly such a thing would widen the base of public support for the Armed Forces and, of course, for their budget.

As a Canadian who certainly is more biased toward the armed forces than a typical Canadian because of my long experience with them, I am disturbed by the indications of the growing apathy of the ordinary citizen toward the Armed Forces, the feeling that we really do not need them, and I think if they were doing something, even symbolically, that the public were enthusiastic about this would help.

• 1125

I do not want to suggest that everything is in favour of this idea. There are obviously some very real difficulties. I will not attempt to go into all of them. I know many of them will occur to you. First of all, the real difficulty is choosing the right project in the right place at the right time. This would be something for our experts in external aid working with the armed services. It is obvious that anything we chose should not be done with the idea that we are going to get gratitude or thanks for it. It should be done with no strings attached, doing it because it is something we think we ought to do, and obviously should be done with the full and enthusiastic support of whoever we are helping, but we must not expect that by doing it we will become international heroes.

I think ideally one should try to plan something that will increase the productive capacity of the country that is being aided and something that would be of lasting value, hopefully something that might establish a continuing relationship between Canada and the country concerned.

One of the real problems in using the Armed Forces for anything of this kind is competition with private enterprise. Canadian companies of a wide variety are doing well in international markets. They are doing well in big engineering jobs, and so on, and we must try to be sure that anything that is done by the Canadian Services would interfere as little as possible with private enterprise. I think on the other side of the coin we would have problems with our allies who would probably accuse us of doing this in order to try to move the Canadian flag and increase our trade abroad, so we would get criticized from both sides, and I guess if the criticism were about evenly balanced we could feel that we were doing the job right.

Clearly, one of the other problems would be the effects of such a plan on our defence partners. We would have to try to sell the idea to them that any money we were investing in this way was genuinely being invested in an experiment, if you like, in using money this way in order to promote world peace rather than spending it on armed forces.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize what I think was not quite adequately emphasized in Dave Spurgeon's report. I had suggested to him and suggest again that we should try an experiment in this field. We should recognize that it is a difficult field, one in which we are not quite sure of where we are going, but we should try an experiment of limited size, though it has to be big enough to catch the imagination of the Forces and the people of Canada.

Just to give an idea of the scope I had in mind, it would be something that might cost, say, a total of \$100 million and clearly a thing of this scope could be done in less than two or three years, and after we had tried an experiment we should then re-assess the effects of it—well, even while it is going on—and then decide whether to go further in this line or whether to drop it.

As I say, I want to make it clear that I am not suggesting we know enough about the problem to convert the Armed Forces mainly to this kind of peace role, and I would be doubtful whether we would ever get into the situation where we would want to convert them all. I am merely suggesting starting with one quite major project to see how it works.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Solandt. I will call upon Mr. Prud'homme to open the questioning for the Liberals, and if any of you have supplementaries I will make a note of your names if you will indicate or if you have new subjects that you wish to open. Mr. Prud'homme?

[Interpretation]

• 1130

Mr. Prud'Homme: Dr. Solandt, first of all, I am very happy to see that the Committee asked you to appear here and give us your views. You have in part, answered the first question that I wanted to ask you. But I would like to ask you to give us as many details as possible.

Doctor, do you think that we should put an end to our engagements with NORAD and

NATO? And could you also say, sir, if you make a distinction between our engagements with NATO and NORAD?

[English]

Dr. Solandt: Well, it is on this sort of question that I want to caution you that I am giving you not an expert opinion of one who is deeply engaged in defence problems, but an opinion of a citizen who is on the outside but formerly had a good deal of knowledge. First of all with relation to NORAD, I feel the answer on NORAD is very simple, that we just must in our own interests co-operate with the United States in the defence of North America. To me there is no alternative that makes sense at all. Obviously by ourselves we cannot effectively defend Canada.

It can be argued, of course, that no one would attempt to invade Canada or attack us because the Americans would defend us and I am sure we could pull out of NORAD and just say, "Well, you look after us". I am quite sure that they would, under some circumstances at least, want to station units in Canada but I do not think this is a situation that I or, I think, most Canadians would want to see. We are a relatively wealthy nation; if there is need for a defence of North America we want to contribute toward it.

Here I would like to add from my personal knowledge in the 10 years with DRB and a good deal of contact since. I possibly should explain that as a trustee of the MITRE Corporation which is one of the middle-sized nonprofit research organizations that works mainly for the Air Force. I have had, curiously enough, probably more inside contacts with U.S. defence policy in the past 10 years than I have with Canadian, because they have worked closely on many air defence problems including NORAD.

From that contact I want to emphasize that the way the U.S. has treated Canada within NORAD has been absolutely exemplary. I visited the NORAD Headquarters twice since I left the Defence Research Board for fairly extensive visits and it is very reassuring to a Canadian to go there and find that the Canadians who work there are genuinely integrated into the whole and are very highly thought of. Really the Americans' generosity in giving us this role in command at NORAD, when you consider what a small proportion of the total we are contributing, is quite remarkable; that is, when the Commander at NORAD is away the Vice-Commander who is

a Canadian really runs the place. I never believed it until I went there, but this is the fact, so I think we have a good relationship with the Americans now. I think we should keep it.

I am not by this suggesting that NORAD itself will not change and our role in NORAD change. I am sure that changes will happen, probably quite rapidly in the next few years. All I am arguing is that we should continue to have this kind of relationship with the U.S. in continental defence.

NATO, it seems to me, is a much less clear-cut situation. I am sure that General Foulkes and others who are appearing later will give you a better reasoned argument about our participation in NATO. It seems to me there is no doubt that a militarily strong Europe is one of the essential elements in the deterrent that prevents the outbreak of war between the U.S. and Russia. If you consider Canada's job to be to contribute toward this deterrent, this balance of terror if you like, then you can argue quite clearly that participation in NATO is a wise and prudent thing.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the Canadian contribution is quite small; that the European nations are now quite wealthy—when we went over there first they were still suffering from the devastation of war—and that consequently they really could remain quite adequately strong without our help, I think this is true and so it seems to me that the final decision as to whether we stay in NATO or pull out is, I guess, a political one rather than really a military one.

• 1135

If I had to make the decision, I would say let us stay in, but if a government decided on balance that they were going to pull out I would not say that the government was completely wrong. I think whether we pulled out or not would depend very much on what alternatives were available to us. I think we have to recognize that Canada is primarily dependent on alliances of different kinds and that if we are not in the NATO alliance then we would only pull out because we saw some other better kind of alliance and I do not see it now, so I am in favour of staying in NATO but not nearly as strongly in favour as I am of staying in NORAD and maintaining our contacts with the U.S.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean, was yours a supplementary on NATO and NORAD or a new subject?

Mr. MacLean: No, a new subject.

The Chairman: Mr. Smith, was yours a supplementary or a new subject? We are on NATO and NORAD at the moment.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): No, it is not on NATO or NORAD.

The Chairman: Mr. Fairweather, do you have a supplementary?

Mr. Fairweather: Yes, I have a supplementary on the NORAD aspect. I wonder if the witness has had an opportunity to study the implications of the so-called light ACBM system planned by the United States and whether we can avoid an entanglement in this?

Dr. Solandt: I really do not know enough about it in detail to give you an intelligent answer.

The Chairman: Mr. Anderson, is yours a supplementary?

Mr. Anderson: Yes, a supplementary on NORAD. Dr. Solandt, you mentioned that it is in our own interest to co-operate with the Americans in NORAD and you also mentioned that if we did decide to pull out the Americans probably would wish to station units in Canada.

Could you perhaps elaborate on this? It seems to me that NORAD is something we really cannot get out of unless we wish to turn over a fair bit of our sovereignty to the United States in Northern Canada, because they will simply insist upon having certain units up there, radar in particular, or else aircraft flying over that area with radar, and they will do this despite any decision of the Canadian government on whether or not we want them to do this because it is simply in their national defence interest to do it. They have no alternative in view of their understanding of the bomber threat and the ballistic missiles threat, so I wonder whether you could perhaps give me some comment on this particular aspect? Do you think the Americans would insist upon overflying Canadian territory in the North if we did pull out of NORAD and attempted to withdraw from that alliance completely?

• 1140

Dr. Solandt: The very simple answer is, yes; I think they would. I think probably their pressure, their need to do it, may be a little less in the future with the changing technology than it has been in the past, but I am sure they would want to have some advance units in Canada. I think we would find it very difficult to refuse this.

The Chairman: Are there further supplementaries?

Mr. Allmand: I have a supplementary. What you are suggesting, sir, is that the United States' attitude to Canada would be somewhat similar to the Soviet Union's attitude to the countries in the Warsaw Pact. It would take the attitude that Canada is essential to the defence of the United States and no matter what decisions we make with respect to neutrality or a greater independence, they would continue to use Canadian air space, and perhaps even territory, to defend their country.

Dr. Solandt: Yes, I think this is true. That is why I feel that the relationship we have had in the past and have now is so much more satisfactory. It is a positive relationship in which we have said, "Yes, we recognize your need and we recognize that we can help and that by helping you we help ourselves, let us do it," and having done that the Americans have responded, I think, very generously and have really allowed us to play a role in organizing and commanding NORAD that is out of proportion to our dollar contribution.

I think they recognized that the people we have in this are extremely good. Really why we have done so well is because when you get down to it the individual Canadians that have worked at NORAD have shown themselves to be absolutely first class, but there are very few international relationships where this would work out as happily as it has. I think when we are faced with the situation we just know that the United States has to use Canada as part of its defence area. It is elementary common sense, I think, for us to see that it is done on terms as favourable to us as we can make them.

Mr. Allmand: Therefore, the statement that is made by some people that we are a completely independent country is a myth.

Mr. Solandt: I think the statement that any country is completely independent is a myth. I think even the big ones like the United

States and Russia are very susceptible to external pressures—and they are in a much better position to resist them than we are—just as the idea that any individual is completely independent is a myth: everybody is subject to pressures and influences. In our case it is the geographic influence which is overriding.

Mr. Allmand: And the overwhelming power capability of the United States.

Mr. Solandt: But if you thought of the area of the United States being occupied by a weak, powerless country, Canada would be in a much more difficult situation that we are now, I think, because we would have to try to defend the continent ourselves.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts, do you have a supplementary?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, I want to follow along this line of questioning. Presumably, then, there are certain minimum requirements for security which the United States has in our country. Are we not meeting much more than those minimum requirements at the moment?

• 1145

Dr. Solandt: This is the sort of detailed problem about which I have no inside knowledge. My opinion, for what it is worth, is that we are not much above the minimum.

Mr. Roberts: Is there much hope that technological developments will decrease these minimum needs of implantation on Canadian territory, or is technological development really moving in the other direction where it will require more and more American involvement or a greater and greater American need for...

Dr. Solandt: Here I am not sufficiently on the inside in connection with antiballistic missile defence to know what the latest thinking is on location of sites.

Mr. Roberts: Is this basically a question of defence against bombers and missiles, or is there also necessary American presence in relation to sea defence?

Dr. Solandt: I do not think they felt any need—and here again I am a little out of date—of a presence on sea defence.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Prud'homme, on a supplementary.

Mr. Prud'homme: Dr. Solandt, you said that pulling out of NATO is more of a political problem than a military problem. Would you comment further on this? Do you think that pulling out of NATO would be detrimental to our economy in Canada, for instance? Would our allies retaliate for our pulling out of NATO? Do you see any connection?

Dr. Solandt: Yes, I am sure we would be very unpopular in Europe if we pulled out, and that this would undoubtedly have some effect on trade. How big it is, I do not know. When I said that I thought it was more political than military, I meant that if the European NATO countries decided that they wanted to replace the Canadian Force they could afford to do it, so that they could bring the strength back to what it is if they wanted to. They would not like doing it.

The Chairman: Dr. Solandt, if I may ask a supplementary, if Canada wanted to establish a neutral position, in your view could this be satisfactory to the Americans? Would it meet their requirements, or do they insist upon positive co-operation on the part of Canada? Do they need positive co-operation on the part of Canada?

Dr. Solandt: I could not give you a categorical answer to that question. I do not know enough about U.S. attitudes. I am sure they are much happier dealing with Canada when we are approaching the problem in a positive way. It would cause them a great many problems to try to twist our arm into allowing them to use our territory. I am sure they would be very unhappy to have to do it.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel, was yours a supplementary?

Mr. Laniel: Yes, it is, following yours, Mr. Chairman. In the article in the paper you said that a country either renounces war as a means of settling arguments entirely, or decides on some form of armed forces that suits its need. Is that really possible? From your answer and from the discussion we have been having here today and last Tuesday, we always look at the problem from the point of view of its effect on our relation with other people involved in NATO, or the United States involved in NORAD. How can we come to the principle you seem to establish by this statement, that you either renounce war as a means of settling arguments between countries, and then you make up your mind? Can Canada make up its mind now on its own?

Can we speak for the world? We cannot speak for the world; I do not think so.

Dr. Solandt: No; what I meant by that was that we, as a sovereign nation, can decide what course of action we want to take with regard to armed forces and the possibility of war. We could, for instance, decide to become neutral, but if we became neutral we would quite likely spend more on the Armed Forces.

• 1150

If you look at Switzerland and Sweden, for instance, they spend very heavily on their armed forces. Mere neutrality does not relieve you from the burden of defence. The only course of action would be a real pacifist one of just saying we are not going to become involved in the war. If anybody invades the country that is too bad; we will deal with them when they come. Then you could eliminate the Armed Forces, but I think it would be a choice which few Canadians would support. I am not sure I got your point.

Mr. Laniel: Actually I am just trying to find out about your suggestion of using our Forces for some kind of external aid abroad, and also as some kind of peace corps in Canada. Really this reaches the answer that you have given this morning as to the implication of our leaving NATO or NORAD or staying out of them in one way or another.

Dr. Solandt: It was for this reason that I began by emphasizing that I was not in favour of the elimination of the Canadian Forces. I am in favour of trying to keep them strong and effective, though they undoubtedly will have to be small because we have no reason for having very large forces. My suggestion for this peaceful use of part of the effort was really aimed at strengthening the Armed Forces and increasing both the public support for them and the enthusiasm of people in the Armed Forces; the feeling that while they are, as it were, marking time in NATO and NORAD and other commitments, waiting for something that may never happen, they are in the meantime doing something positive, useful, exciting and interesting.

Mr. Laniel: I would like to carry on but I would be getting away from NATO and NORAD, so I think I will pass.

The Chairman: If there are no further supplementary questions on the NATO and NORAD aspects I will call on Mr. Fairweather on a new aspect. Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: Dr. Solandt, in this day and age, when so much of the defence effort revolves around research technology it is difficult, it seems to me anyway, for a country even one as large as Canada to contribute its full share to research in this field. It is only the very large nations like Russia and the United States that can do a full-out effort in such things as pure military research, atomic research, space research, and so on.

In this situation how can a smaller country keep abreast of developments so that it gets a fair share of the benefits of the fall-out from this kind of research, so they can remain competitive in the industrial world, when huge efforts are going into research in larger countries that inevitably have a beneficial effect on their competitive position in purely civilian spheres? Would you like to comment on this?

Dr. Solandt: Yes, I think this is a very good question and one for which there are fairly straightforward answers. First of all, obviously Canada can never be in the position that, say, the United States is in of having a vast defence research program from which there is tremendous fall-out into civilian manufacturing. However, on the other hand, Canada can by a modest and reasonable expenditure of effort in defence research go a long way toward achieving an effective connection with the defence work that is going on, particularly in the United States.

As I see it, what we have to try to do in Canada, and on the whole we have been pretty successful at it, is to have two kinds of research going on in the defence field. One, we need to have a few very good people doing research in almost every field that is of importance both to our Armed Forces and where there is important scientific work going on, and by this I mean very few. These few are really merely a coupling device, so that we have somebody here that can talk intelligently to the people in the States and understand what they are saying.

This may sound odd to the uninitiated but it is very true in science that if you are not in the field it is very difficult to keep abreast of it. You have to have some work so that our defence research program has to consist of a very thin broad effort plus some sharp peaks

in which we become the leaders and in which we are able to make an effective contribution so good that the Americans or the British or the French will accept it as a major contribution and will, in fact, regard us as the experts in that field.

• 1155

We set out after the war on a policy of this kind and I could give you just a couple of examples. For instance, on looking at naval problems, it became clear that off the coastal waters, particularly on the east coast, we have the most difficult problems of thermo gradients, temperature gradients in the water, which make ordinary sonar ASDIC almost useless under many conditions.

Now, this is a problem that is encountered in other parts of the world but is very bad in our most important waters off Halifax, so we said, let us put a great deal of effort into finding a solution to this problem and we did over 20 years. I was gratified within the last year in Washington when I was talking to a high official in the Pentagon; I had just gone in on a personal visit. He said: You know, I do not know how you do it in Canada, but your sonar equipment is so far ahead of ours that we are just having to try to catch up to you. You have solved this problem through the variable depth sonar.

So, here we have an example of concentrating what by American standards was a very small effort, but it was enough to do the job adequately. I will not bore you with a lot of examples, but we did the same in work on radio communication and radar in the auroral belt because most of the auroral belt is in Canada and what is not in Canada is in Russia so we have to be the experts on these problems for the free world. We put relatively a great deal of effort into that and have become leaders in the field to the point that when satellites for this kind of investigation were considered it was just natural that Canada would build those satellites and all our three satellites now are in this area and they are tops. They are the best in the world.

Another small contemporary example is that the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment at Valcartier is the world's leader in certain kinds of high velocity gas guns. They can do research on some problems of re-entry physics there that cannot be done anywhere else in the world. Also in earlier periods they did some work in

supersonic ballistics of the early intercontinental ballistic missiles that could not be done anywhere else in the world.

Now, when you can make contributions like that the Americans particularly are very generous in saying, "Well, these guys are good; they are playing in our league to the best of their ability so let us give them what we know." The effort of this kind has, I think, paid just tremendously and I think it is one that we should continue.

Mr. MacLean: Do you not agree that for this reason alone it is important to be involved in international co-operation in the defense sense; in other words, to have a league to play in, because a country the size of Canada cannot cover the whole waterfront itself and have a league of its own, to use that expression? Is this not an important benefit?

• 1200

Dr. Solandt: Oh, I agree; I think it is a tremendously important benefit. A thing most people do not realize is that still today many of the greatest advances in electronics, computers, obviously in rocket propulsion and a wide variety of other fields take place in the military sphere and in military research and development. In fact, practice in so many of these fields is always years ahead of civilian practice, so that if we as a nation are not in touch with this advanced military work we will inevitably be behind scientifically.

I have found my association with the MITRE Corporation in Boston that I mentioned before of just tremendous value in, for instance, my job as Chairman of the Science Council because I hear about general trends and ideas—MITRE—is particularly in command and control systems and systems engineering—that we would not otherwise hear about in Canada for two or three years.

Now, I do not mean that I am the only the Canadian who hears about these because Canadians in the Defence Forces do too, but if we did not have this connection we would be a long way behind. It is a very valuable league in which to play.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you, very much. I have another question but the Chairman may not accept it as sufficiently related to what I have been talking about. With regard to the military forces engaging in semi-civilian activities, this is not a new concept. Canada

in years past has benefited from such activities. The Corps of Royal Engineers, for example, in Colonial days built the Rideau Canal and the Cariboo Road and ever so many things.

I think the suggestion is an imaginative and worthwhile one, but do you not think the greatest benefit would accrue if predominantly, in any case, these activities were carried on in Canada? It would seem to me that using this concept as far as mutual aid is concerned is a very difficult and sensitive matter because it would have to be handled with extreme care because, generally speaking, people do not value as highly something that has been given to them as something that they have achieved for themselves.

We might end up by making ourselves thoroughly unpopular in most of the countries that these activities took place in, no matter how carefully we tried to do it.

Mr. Solandt: Well, I mentioned that I did not rule out the possibility of doing things in Canada. I think the principal disadvantage there is that this would put the Armed Forces in direct competition with Canadian industry. The other thing about doing it abroad is that it would hopefully be a contribution to the long-term goal of world peace. I agree with you that it might well turn out to be a negative contribution in the short range and that we might be very unpopular wherever we went.

Many people have had that experience, but again Canadian experience on the whole has been very good. Most places Canadians have gone to work they have remained on friendly terms. We have a very much better record in this direction than other countries, but I emphasize that we should not go into it if we are going into it primarily to win gratitude because we cannot hope for that.

Mr. MacLean: I will pass.

The Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. Harkness: Yes, a supplementary. Do you consider there might be considerable sensitivity, as far as a lot of countries are concerned to having Canadian Armed Services personnel in their countries on construction jobs, we will say, or anything else along that line?

Dr. Solandt: Yes, I think it would require a good deal of discussion and that the terms on

which they would go in would depend on the local situation. I think in most cases they would have to go in unarmed. It would only be in such situations as, say, among the cannibals in New Guinea or somewhere that they would be armed, other than with the arms that the local police would carry.

Mr. Harkness: I think one of the great difficulties in any such proposal is that a large number of countries would not really want to have military personnel of another country operating in their territories, just as we are sensitive about having American military personnel operating in our territory.

Dr. Solandt: Yes, but they were operating as military personnel and, as you well know, there have been some hair-raising stories of individual problems although, in general, it has worked very well.

The Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. MacDonald?

• 1205

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I was interested in your comments earlier about the encouragement that you at least and, I presume, others gave after the war to the use of the Canadian military force in certain kinds of civilian projects. I think you mentioned the Alaska Highway and other Northern projects, and Mr. MacLean mentioned a couple of projects quite a bit earlier, the Corps of Royal Engineers and the Rideau Canal, and so on.

The thought has struck me that your own emphasis, especially in your opening remarks, was particularly on the importance of these projects to the servicemen themselves in giving them some sense of purpose in contributing something in the situation in which they are working, whether it be in another country or even in this country.

Both Mr. MacLean and I represent an area where there is one major project that might fall within this category and that would be the construction of the Northumberland Strait crossing. I knew that was going to get a bit of a smile around the table and I am not being facetious when I raise it, because quite obviously one of the difficulties for the federal government in building this project is the monumental cost of labour that will be involved.

The figures run anywhere from about \$180 million to \$300 million over all, but it was estimated that during the peak period of con-

struction it would involve 2,000 men. As an experiment, if you like, in seeing whether or not the adaptation can be made in this day and age from a military group to a kind of civilian operation, perhaps there would be merit in the federal government's thinking of this as a kind of pilot project, while also achieving one of the very definite aims of the government, not only in providing continuous communication with Prince Edward Island, but also overcoming a very heavy and growing annual deficit.

I do not know whether you would like to comment on that or not, but from your experience in defence research I am sure you are acquainted with the particular problem that confronts transportation to and from our smallest province. It could be that this might be a useful pilot project.

Dr. Solandt: I find this a difficult question to answer without getting into the pros and cons of the causeway. Here again I am in difficulty, because when I was with the CNR we spent many man-years studying the problems, so I know the background fairly well. My objection to this would be that I think there would be real opposition to using military people to do work that could just as well be done by civilians in an area where there are unemployed civilians. I can just see the headlines: "Unemployment going up in the area while government expenditure goes up at the same time."

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Of course, that might be true, but I think any kind of defence installation, whether it is for a civilian or military purpose, usually has the happy faculty of providing a great deal of fringe employment. Certainly we have found this with the military installations that are in the Maritimes.

Quite frankly I think the magnitude of the project—and this was the difficulty with the original tender call—is far beyond even a consortium of construction companies in this country. I suggest that particularly because it is of a magnitude beyond what would be normally considered a civilian operation. Attempts were made to get four or five very large construction companies to take this on, but the uncertainties because of the size of the project were so great that it really was not within their capacity to deal with it in the regular way, and I think perhaps that would be a couple of reasons why this might

be well worth considering as an alternative in this difficult situation.

Could I just go on to ask a general question on this same subject? You emphasized in your opening remarks the value to the military itself. I wonder whether you have perhaps given greater thought to this than we have been able to get so far from either this article by Mr. Spurgeon or you. I am a little hazy about how we are really going to make a substantial contribution towards world peace in doing these things. For instance, it seems to me that if we are going to convince the United States or some of our NATO allies that in decreasing this involvement and increasing a kind of public works or peace corps operation, it is going to be useful to the over-all picture in terms of defusing or reducing the amount of tension that is involved in these kinds of balances of terror.

• 1210

It does not seem to me that in building an occasional railway or some other kind of industrial installation we may be achieving that. Are there other kinds of things that you had in mind apart from, say, just public works projects?

Dr. Solandt: You phrased one of the most difficult problems of aid in general. I think there are a good many people who feel that the extent of aid being given by the developed countries to under-developed countries is so small that it is not maintaining the rate of economic growth in the underdeveloped countries; that, in fact, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer as they always have. It seems to me that you either say, "That is inevitable, so why do anything", or else you say, "Let us do as much as we can and try to encourage other people to do as much as they can and see if we cannot really increase the total volume to the point where it is effective".

I would not have any idea that any project undertaken by the Canadian Services would be more than a very small drop in a very large bucket and by itself would not create any change in world affairs, but if we and other nations that can afford to do this kind of thing do not do it, the alternative in the long run is going to be a real conflagration in which the have-nots rise up against the haves. Probably we both will be exterminated.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Taking your suggestion one step farther and following on

the heels of what has likely been our most successful overseas operation, the CUSO experience—CUSO in terms of numbers is still fairly small, I think it may be up to 1,000 or more. We would have the option here through the Armed Forces of putting perhaps 10,000 or 20,000 as individuals in specific situations where they would be doing jobs that would be more of a man for man kind of operation than a large-scale thing where we might run into the problems raised, I think, by Mr. Harkness. If we have 4,000 or 5,000 of our troops even doing essentially a civilian thing, we would be sending individual people to villages and creating a climate, perhaps, more than contributing structures, that would have some effect.

Dr. Solandt: It has always seemed to me that CUSO is an entirely different kind of thing than we are talking about. CUSO does not set out to make any material change in the nation. It is essentially a communications exercise and, I think, an admirable and useful one, but it would seem to me it and the kind of thing I am talking about are not in competition at all. They are complementary; you need to have both.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I see that. I was just wondering whether you could see your suggestion being taken in the next step and using military personnel for this kind of operation?

Dr. Solandt: No, because I do not think it would have the desired effect on the Armed Forces as an organized unit. I do not think it would be a project that would attract the loyalty and attention of the group. I think CUSO is very much a thing for the dedicated individual who wants to find out what the rest of the world is like and how these people live. I think it is a tremendous contribution toward world understanding, and that it is from that will come the generation who may, hopefully, understand enough about the rest of the world to find a solution to the problems that we have not yet solved.

Mr. MacDonald: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Smith, is yours a supplementary to the aspects raised?

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think so. I want to ask Dr. Solandt a question about the use to which other countries put their armed forces in peacetime. I understand he is familiar with

military matters in the U.K., in the U.S., and I believe the U.S. uses its armed forces for domestic projects such as dams and bridges, flood control, and so on, to a greater extent than we do in Canada. Is that right, Dr. Solandt?

Dr. Solandt: I could not give you an authoritative answer on that, but I think not. The corps of engineers that builds dams and all sorts of flood control projects, and so on, in the United States is, I think I am right in saying, completely different from the army.

Mr. Harkness: No, it is part of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, but it is really a management group.

Dr. Solandt: Yes.

Mr. Harkness: They do the technical engineering work and hire contractors to do the physical work.

Dr. Solandt: It does not involve any large number of military people, and you would not find a group of people in army uniforms building a dam in the States.

Mr. Harkness: It is a management thing on the part of the technical engineering personnel in the Corps of Engineers.

Mr. Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi): Would the same hold true in the United Kingdom?

Dr. Solandt: Yes. As far as I know, Britain has not used her troops for anything other than emergency works at home. Of course, inevitably overseas the military of Britain have in the past done many of these things; they have built railroads and other things, but these were being built basically for military purposes. For instance, the major railways in India and Pakistan were designed, built, and to some extent labour was done on them by the Corps of Royal Engineers, but that was part of the military occupation.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel, is your question a supplementary?

Mr. Laniel: Yes, it follows the line that we have been following up till now.

On Tuesday Mr. Gellner said that in his view our peacekeeping forces will have fewer uses in the future because of the fact that we are white people and the trouble area is in Africa, and so on. Do you not think this would have an adverse affect on your suggestion of using our troops?

Mr. Harkness spoke of the presence of military men, but I am speaking of the presence of military white men in a country that might be black, and at the same time these military white men would take the place of the local labour force. In our External Aid program we send experts, we send specialized labour, we try to teach these people to do something for their country. Do you not think that by adopting your suggestions we would work against that?

Dr. Solandt: We would have to try to ensure that the military project worked in that direction also. I agree it would be more difficult to do it with military personnel, but I think not impossible. There is no reason why they should not employ local labour and train local people, if they were working areas where there were local people.

Mr. Laniel: There is one thing, though, that you seem to forget. Although our Forces have done on occasion, I think, small chores or small projects such as building roads and airstrips and things like that, they did not join the Forces for that purpose. In using them for labour, you have to think about the fact that they enrolled in the Force voluntarily to start a military career. They did that for one purpose; they did not do that because someone felt one day they would render a better service to civilization by becoming specialized labourers in another country and start that kind of work. Do you not feel that there would be great disagreement among our forces, because I do not agree with you that it would give our military servicemen a purpose for peace.

• 1220

Dr. Solandt: Well, I would agree. I would be very surprised if you got unanimity among the Armed Forces at any level from the top down that this was a good idea, but I would be equally surprised if you had any difficulty in getting enough people to undertake a job on a volunteer basis if you announced an exciting and interesting project and the opportunity to go and work on it for a year, a year and a half or two years. I think you would have no difficulty in getting volunteers.

Mr. Laniel: Your suggestion gave me the impression that you want to do two things with our Armed Forces, but do two things wrong and weaken the purpose of our Armed Forces. I think if you are to have an armed force you should specialize in these days of

specialization, even if the force is small. It can be specialized for one military purpose.

Dr. Solandt: Well, I would expect at least half the generals to be on your side.

Mr. Laniel: Well, I hope the Committee goes abroad; perhaps we can get the answer from the forces. . .

Dr. Solandt: Perhaps more than half. I am not suggesting for a moment that this is an idea that would be universally popular within the armed services.

Mr. Laniel: But we will be dealing with them and this is where I do not see it.

The Chairman: Are there any further supplementaries on the aspects raised by Mr. MacLean and Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson: Sir, you mentioned the planning work done by Canada in the field of sonar and other very, very specialized military tasks, and I think we have heard from other witnesses before this Committee that, for instance, our naval forces are extremely specialized. We have heard, of course, about our aircraft in Europe being too specialized as well. Now you are suggesting another role for the armed forces which I find extremely interesting but something totally different.

Instead of all this compartmentalized specialization which has been going on before, we are now to have a construction corps as well spending, perhaps, \$100 million as you suggested, which seems to be a quite different concept from our previous Armed Forces. Do you suggest this would have to be set up entirely in addition to the present defence establishment? Do you think that from these specialized groups we have now we could switch over certain people to your new corps, or do you feel we are going to have to simply set up something entirely new and different which would be in addition to the roles we have now?

Dr. Solandt: Well, I have two comments. First, I would envisage that you would get the people for this purpose from the armed forces; that you would not set up a special force. This would defeat the purpose—well, it might be worth doing, but it would be a different thing than I am talking about.

Second, one of the reasons for suggesting a thing of this kind at this time is that the Canadian Forces do not have nearly enough money to keep themselves fully and modernly

equipped. If we were prepared to give them enough money to be experimenting with new equipment and buying new equipment whenever anything better turned up, then I think they would be so actively employed in this technical specialization of which you speak that they would not be interested in the kind of jobs I am talking about.

However, they are not in that position; they do not have enough money to get new equipment. They are slipping back all the time and, I think, will continue to slip back.

Mr. Anderson: As they have less money for equipment, as they are unable to carry out the specialized roles which perhaps they were able to carry out a few years ago, then they are a pool of military manpower which just simply does not have the sophisticated equipment it would like to have, and therefore you would like to use that pool of labour or manpower in another field entirely. Is this a too extreme analysis?

Dr. Solandt: Well, that is over simplifying my argument. It is emphasizing the lack of equipment more strongly than I would have done but that is an element of the problem. I remember just after the war at the Chiefs of Staff Committee we solemnly discussed the problem of the ratio of personnel costs to equipment costs in the annual budget of the Armed Forces and I remember we decided that we would be in trouble if the total personnel costs ever rose above 50 per cent of the annual budget. Those were the good old days—that was about 1948. I think it is now about 85 per cent.

• 1225

This is one thing we must recognize: If we are to keep our Armed Forces at the present size with the present budget they are not going to be the most sophisticated and highly-equipped armed forces in the world.

Mr. Anderson: Thank you.

The Chairman: Dr. Solandt, I wonder if I could ask a supplementary. You mentioned that you feared possibly some of the generals might not be in favour of this suggestion. In addition to officers, of course, our Armed Forces include private soldiers and riflemen. Any construction job involves a great deal of unskilled labour. Would a suggestion such as yours envisage the possibility of the private soldiers being used to provide that unskilled

labour, or what would their function be in such projects? Also, would this provide an inspiring purpose for those who constitute a large proportion of our Armed Forces?

Dr. Solandt: Again my answer, I think, should be in two parts. First, from what contact I have with young people now—and it is mostly with university students rather than with a private in the army, so I may be misjudging his attitude entirely—they are very much more idealistic than I was and as I remember the people of my own age. They really do want to try to do something important to help mankind, and I think are really prepared to make sacrifices to do it.

The popularity of CUSO and other things of this kind illustrate it. Therefore, if this could honestly appear as being of service to underprivileged people in underdeveloped countries, I think it would attract the support of a lot of young people. Now, if it resulted in their being on the wrong end of a shovel day after day, whether they would continue to feel idealistic is a different question.

However, as it was pointed out, you would have to try to use local labour as much as possible and I would expect that in fact the private might find himself doing a fairly interesting although not highly skilled job, but being a foreman, or driving a vehicle or something of that kind.

Mr. Nowlan: May I ask a supplementary? All the remarks that have been made on this concept by Dr. Solandt are most interesting. Earlier he talked about involving several more thousands than in the CUSO operation. However, when you start to analyse this suggestion, is this not the reason the U.S. army Corps of Engineers is, in effect, a management technical assistance group employing local contractors in the United States and local men on the shovel?

The same thing would almost inevitably apply in any foreign involvement of this concept of construction assistance that you have suggested, and while it might be an interesting idea and could be a part of the present service establishment, in actual fact it is not going to involve the thousands who are in the services.

Dr. Solandt: Oh, no. It would involve at most a very few thousands. I do not know, maybe two, three or four thousands.

Mr. Nowlan: That is what I mean. In other words, it might be another area to explore and perhaps develop, but certainly according to the article that first printed your comments the impression was that this was a substitute for, perhaps, present service commitments, whereas in reality it would only be an expansion.

Dr. Solandt: That is why in my presentation I sort of turned the thing around, because I think that conveyed the wrong impression. My idea is that you would not build up a continuing permanent organization for the purpose of doing this. You would try to choose an individual exciting project. You would get together a task force. You would go and do the project and the task force would come back, be broken up and go back into the army. It would be, as it were, an emergency operation and I am sure this would not be the most efficient way of doing the job, although I do not think it should be spectacularly inefficient. Also, it is not worth doing unless it has a good effect on the morale of the Armed Forces.

Mr. Nowlan: But assuming on the plus side you can do it and have the morale and enough dollars to make it worthwhile and to give them a cause to believe in, you still end up with the conundrum, in a defence or a foreign policy review, of what do you do with the rest of the Service?

• 1230

Dr. Solandt: Oh, yes. You see, I look on this—I suppose it is one of the disadvantages of growing older—as being much the same kind of thing as happened during the depression in pre-war years. I knew best the Canadian Army, and so many of the people that were their forward-looking leaders were people who had worked in signals on the Northwest Signal System, down the Mackenzie and Herschel Island and Aklavik and places like that, where they really got a tremendous building up of their independence, their character, their reliability and their ability to depend on themselves and make their own decisions, and so on.

I think it would be a good thing to have an element of this in our Armed Forces situation just at the present time. I am not advocating this as a continuing and permanent role for the Canadian Services, because I think the world will keep on changing and that the needs will change.

Mr. MacLean: I have a supplementary question. You spoke of the morale of the Armed Forces and of young people generally and their desire to make some worthwhile contribution. Would you not agree that perhaps one of the elements missing in our present day and age is lack of concrete, seeable, clear-cut, national goals and that some thinking should be done along this line about what kind of development is most necessary in this country and that the Armed Forces could make, with your suggestion, a contribution to the over-all plan of achievement of these goals?

I am thinking of such things as the fact that most of the development of our country is taking place in a few large metropolitan areas, where as there are vast territories in Canada where development is crying to be done. If our country is to develop into a strong and viable one where there is opportunity fairly equally spread throughout, there has to be tremendous development in many of the less populated areas.

Conversely, I am completely wrong, I think we are going blindly in the direction of large metropolitan areas that do not promise to give the greatest opportunity for a kind of life that brings fulfilment, a sense of achievement and a sense of well-being to the average inhabitant of a large city that is getting more and more complicated, where more and more people are spending more and more time in traffic jams, in polluted air, in noise, and so on.

Do you not agree that this is not the optimum environment to live in and that there are great opportunities for doing some real thinking along this line and orientating governmental as well as private effort towards, I suppose, delineating what the good life should be and then trying to lay out a program which might allow us to achieve it at some distant future point?

Dr. Solandt: I agree strongly with all you have said, and the Science Council has set out first of all to try to see how science can help in solving these social and economic problems of which the problems grouped around the city are our most pressing.

We had to write our own national goals. We could not find any. You will find them in our report No. 4. I was surprised that we were not attacked for doing this. We hoped we would be and that everyone else would join in and say, "Well, these are not the right

national goals; this is what we should be doing." We did this, as I say, in the hope that we would create a discussion on what our national goals are.

I think there is no more pressing problem in Canada today than to find out what is the proper pattern for growth in Canada. I do not think it is the present pattern of growth of our cities. I am sure...

Mr. MacLean: I could not agree more.

Dr. Solandt: ... we are piling up more and more troubles for the future but I do not know what the right pattern is and I do not know anybody who does know. We have got to try to find out. Science can help, but I think that Parliament can help, too.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik, you have been waiting patiently to open up a new aspect. Can your question be related to this rather wide discussion that has been going on?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I really would not want to be accused of being patient because I have not been really too patient; I have been quiet.

The Chairman: Well, then in the absence of patience perhaps that was the best...

Mr. Cafik: I had intended to bring up a new question but I find that it is a little different than the others. This is a new question which is really a supplementary, as opposed to a supplementary which is really a new question.

• 1235

The Chairman: Well, on that basis I think we can recognize it, Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you, very much. I had wanted to direct a few questions related to your concept of a global public works corporation, or whatever you really had in mind when you were writing this, and the questions that I have now are based to a large extent on the number of supplementaries that have been asked.

There have been points made that the psychology in a developing nation of army personnel going in there and directly doing work would be perhaps a disadvantage and I think you have admitted that this has created some problems. I think too that it has been illustrated to some extent, and I believe it is true, that it may well be uneconomical to us military personnel who are highly trained in a

given area of work to perform functions that are not within that area of work. In view of these factors which I think are disadvantages to your approach, I wonder why we go to the idea of using the army at all?

I can well understand why we should do something as a developed nation to assist underdeveloped nations, but I wonder why we have to go through this formality of proposing that the army be used. If there are too many in the army at the moment, and if this is the conclusion you have come to and consequently led you to another one, then perhaps we should have fewer in the armed services and establish an altogether different organization that does not wear uniforms, does not have all these other problems, that is specially trained for this purpose if we are going to go in and help developing nations. I wonder what you think of this as opposed to using the army, per se?

Dr. Solandt: I think if discussion and investigation suggested that the Armed Forces were not suitable for doing this kind of job—and again I want to make it clear I am not suggesting that they should be retailed to make this their principal job—it should be on the basis of just choosing a task force for one job, doing that and breaking up the task force. Then I would advocate that Canada's part in these things should be left to private enterprise, with government initiative in deciding broadly what should be done and probably in financing it, but I think Canadian private enterprise would probably do the most efficient job.

Mr. Cafik: Do you not think, Dr. Solandt, that to some extent Canada is doing what you really envisage that it should do right now? For instance, I think we give a fair amount of technical aid to other countries, financial aid certainly, and this encourages countries to help themselves. I think we have given assistance through our Armed Services, for instance, to other countries to develop their own armed services, to help train them to maintain their own internal security. Would this fall within the area of work that you envisage for the Armed services, which to some extent it is doing at the moment?

• 1240

Dr. Solandt: It is doing it quite actively and, I think, very successfully. I agree that all these things are being done but I think everyone agrees that more would be better. If

we can afford more I am suggesting this is one way of adding a small bit to what we are doing. The heading "Global public works" I think was quite misleading. Apparently some of you have got the impression that I was advocating the abolition of the Armed Forces and their replacement by this works program. Far from it, as you have heard.

Mr. Cafik: I think if you had advocated its complete abolition and the adoption of this kind of work it would have been a reasonable approach. I would not necessarily agree with it, but it is more consistent with the objective you have in mind than sort of mixing it all up with an Armed Service doing both functions. This does not seem to be consistent with good operations in either area. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman

Mr. Groos: I do not find Dr. Solandt's views entirely inconsistent with some thoughts that have occurred to me in the past. Would you comment on this aspect, Dr. Solandt, that perhaps in exercising our Mobile Command which must have a capability to proceed to any part of the globe to carry out one of its capabilities such as, for example, peacekeeping, in order to find out where deficiencies are perhaps by an arrangement with some Commonwealth emerging nation they could carry out that exercise in that friendly area and leave behind residual construction which would be of long-term benefit to that country: constructed by the military as part of their normal training program but, as I say, leaving residual long-term benefit for the emerging nation. That seems to make sense to me. Is that perhaps more what you had in mind when you wrote your article about it? Would this fit in with your thinking?

Dr. Solandt: This would fit in very well with my thinking. This is relating the construction much more closely to military activity than I had specifically envisaged, but it certainly fits my thinking.

Mr. Groos: It seems to me that depending upon the size of the element of Mobile Command that was to be involved and the duration, airlift is an essential feature pretty well everywhere; perhaps also sealift. In this Committee when we were recently studying the Biafran situation we noticed that there was a great shortage of airfields in the Biafran area.

It occurs to me that you cannot always count on having Kennedy airfield nearby for our Hercules and our larger aircraft to land

on; therefore, perhaps one of the capabilities of Mobile Command is going to have to be to be able to construct its own airfield, big enough to handle its own equipment, starting from a small airfield, building up eventually to the point where you have one with a Hercules capability.

• 1245

So, that would fit in with your thoughts. Perhaps it might be to the advantage of the Armed Forces if some of the cost involved could be borne by External Aid. That might be justified under the circumstances. Would you agree with that?

Dr. Solandt: Yes, this is certainly well within the kind of thing that I had in mind. Again, this is nothing new in the history of the Canadian Forces. I remember in England during the war being very much struck with the genius of the Canadian engineers who built the Leatherhead bypass. And the airfield at Dunsfold.

Mr. Groos: And the airfield, yes.

Mr. Solandt: Yes; these were things that the British needed. The Canadians were in the area so they benefited by them, so they built them. It is not strictly comparable, but similar.

Mr. Groos: Thank you.

The Chairman: I have questions from Mr. Allmand, Mr. Penner, Mr. Laniel and Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Allmand: Dr. Solandt, on Tuesday Mr. Gellner stated that in Canada the ratio between expenditures on the administration of our Armed Services and the modernization of our Armed Services was four to one: four time as much administration expenditure as modernization. He said this is far out of line. He said that the usual ratio was two to one and at the very worst it should be three to one. Therefore, he said, if this ratio continued our Armed Services would be left with very poor equipment, and so forth.

He thought that if we were really to pull our weight in the military alliances in which we take part we should actually increase our expenditures on defence and on the Armed Services, spend more on modernization, and so forth, to bring this ratio more in line. Since you have been in defence research, and so forth, what is your reaction to this particu-

lar point of view of Mr. Gellner? Do you feel that we should increase expenditures on modernization, and so forth, in Canada?

Dr. Solandt: As I already said, the percentage of the total defence budget that is going for new equipment is not high enough to maintain the present size of force at a high level of modern equipment over any long period. Therefore, I suppose we have three alternatives. We can maintain the present level of expenditure and size of the Force and have the quality of equipment steadily go downhill; we can increase the budget, or we can decrease the size of the Armed Forces. I think those are the only three choices open to us.

Mr. Allmand: If I understand your earlier statement, you approve of our present alliances, more or less.

Dr. Solandt: Yes.

Mr. Allmand: You would also disapprove of reducing our strength. I have the impression that you would be opposed to reducing the numbers in our Armed Services, and consequently the alternative that would seem best to fit your ideas would be that we increase our expenditures on modernization, which would mean that our defence budget would increase.

Dr. Solandt: I think there is no question that, viewed purely from the defence point of view, the sensible thing to do in Canada today is to increase the expenditure on defence, but there is no need for me to lecture a group of M.P.s on the fact that this is not the way you look at expenditure. You look at defence expenditure as a part of the total expenditure of the nation. It is my feeling that the public does not want more defence expenditure at the present time. It is not my place to tell you this; you are the experts.

From a defence point of view I would say we should spend more money. If the public, Canadians as a whole, decide they do not want to spend more money, then we have to look at the alternatives. There we have the two alternatives. We really have three: One is to reduce the size of the Force; another is to let it be ill-equipped; the third one, I think, is to choose roles that require less sophisticated and expensive equipment, so that we can be well-equipped for our particular job.

• 1250

Equipping an air force with very sophisticated aircraft costs a lot more per man than equipping a good infantry, so perhaps we may be forced to change the mix of our Armed Forces, but here again this interacts with what commitments we have decided to accept. I think it is a political question.

Mr. Allmand: From a defence point of view, how would you rate those various alternatives? You seem to put in the highest position from a defence point of view maintaining our present position, but to increase our expenditure on modernization. You have mentioned three other alternatives. How would you, as a person who has served in the defence establishment, rate those from a defence point of view?

Dr. Solandt: I honestly do not know enough about the current defence situation to give an intelligent opinion on which of the alternatives would be the most desirable. All I am saying really is that in selecting the roles for the Canadian Armed Forces the government has to be sure that it does not ask the Armed Forces to carry out a role for which they do not have the money. The two have to be related. The jobs of the Armed Forces and the budget have to be interconnected.

Mr. Allmand: If we as politicians in the Canadian government and, as you say, if the Canadian people do not approve of this increased expenditure for modernization and we leave the strength of the Forces otherwise the same, do you feel that our security will suffer in any way, or will the result be merely a political one in the international area? In other words, if as time goes on our troops become poorly equipped because of the modernization program, do you think this will affect our security or will the results merely be an adverse reaction from our allies?

Dr. Solandt: It will depend entirely on the state of the world at the time; that is, unarmed armed forces are no menace as long as there is no war. You only have to look at the history at the beginning of the...

Mr. Allmand: Do they not also serve as a deterrent or take part in the deterrent process? You mentioned that yourself.

Dr. Solandt: I think as long as the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile system is working efficiently the Russians are not going

to look too carefully at the age of our tanks and aircraft.

Mr. Allmand: Therefore, really our military force does not have that significant a role in the deterrent.

Dr. Solandt: It has a significant role, but its size is such that it is not a critical role. If all the armed forces of NATO, for instance, were allowed to run down so that their equipment was very bad, then I think this would have a very real effect on the deterrent because the Russians would feel that they could overrun Europe with ease.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Chairman: Before calling on Mr. Penner, would the members agree that we should attach as an appendix to our evidence the biographical notes that we have received from the witnesses who have appeared before us and those who will be appearing before us. Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Mr. Penner?

Mr. Penner: Dr. Solandt, you referred in your opening statement to people in the thirties who had certain challenging jobs, such as flying in the north, and that this had brought out qualities of leadership and initiative. Subsequently, you referred to your acquaintance with present university students and a measure of idealism that you felt they had.

I think some of us are rather baffled by the nature of the student revolt that is presently going on. Obviously there are certain needs that are not being met and the idea has been suggested and discussed from time to time that perhaps there is a need in our nation to mobilize our youth more effectively. One idea that has been voiced is that some sort of universal conscription, not exclusively for military purposes but for other purposes might be in line.

For example, Mr. Gellner referred to the inefficiency of our civil defence program and that the citizens really need to be trained in civil defence. Young people may be mobilized for a period of time to learn the skills of civil defence. In other areas in this country where there are tremendous needs for human energy—for example, in the hinterland of Canada outside the large metropolitan areas—there is an abundance of wretched housing, and also

in a foreign program young people could be mobilized.

This may be somewhat off the subject, but with your knowledge of these areas and your interest in this I would like to have you express your reaction to this kind of idea.

• 1255

Dr. Solandt: I would have grave misgivings about any national program to recruit all of our youth, presumably on a conscription basis—I mean on a national service basis—to spend, say, a year or two in some kind of a corps to do this sort of work. It seems to me that it is contrary to the whole trend of Canadian society to organize and draft our people like that.

The history of organizations of this kind has, on the whole, not been happy as I know it. I think as far as solving our problems in Canada is concerned, such as the poor housing in the North, and so on, that it would be far better if we could do this on a voluntary basis in the sense of recruiting people who wanted to do the job. I think if money were available there would be no great difficulty in finding people who wanted to do it.

I do not know whether that really adequately answers your question. Again I keep coming back to the idea that I am a dedicated free enterpriser in the sense that it seems to me the experiments in complete socialization of nations have not been very effective because they have not solved the problem of motivation, and I think we are doing very well in Canada in a free enterprise system with a very strong element of the welfare state in it to even up our advantages and disadvantages.

We still have a long way to go in this direction but I would prefer to see it done on a voluntary basis with the government, of course, giving leadership. Here I think we come back to the question of national goals. What do we want to do? If we decide what we want to do and go at it enthusiastically, we can do it.

Mr. Penner: It seems that a war imposes a national goal on everyone. How is it possible for a nation to develop national goals where there is not some great external force impinging on us? How do these national goals emerge and then how do people become committed to these goals?

Dr. Solandt: Well, you can try to put a man on the moon. That has been one solution and I think history will show that this has been an effective means of diverting the aggressive tendencies of the United States and Russia, and directing a lot of their spare money toward this, well, really quite harmless goal. I think history will show this as being a unique event in human history, unique up to this time.

Really, what we need in Canada is a substitute for putting a man on the moon that we Canadians feel is meaningful and worth doing and that will channel the efforts of the nation towards some worth while objective. If you can dream that up I think you will be the saviour of the nation.

Mr. Penner: My remarks were a little off the subject of defence but I certainly appreciate the comments you have made. Thank you, Dr. Solandt.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Dr. Solandt, would you acknowledge that the fact of the nuclear club buildup of arms and escalation, the mere fact of the escalation itself, is a contributing factor towards the hazard of a world war?

Dr. Solandt: I would rather doubt that escalation in Russia and the United States has much effect. I think they both for many years have had enough nuclear weapons to achieve more destruction than would be useful in a war.

I am much more worried about the growing nuclear power of other countries, because it is much easier to envisage a balance between just two forces than it is among several forces and it seems to me that the possibility of miscalculation causing a nuclear war increases rapidly as other countries achieve

that capability. We now have France, Britain, China—and China is probably in some ways the most worrying of them. Again, I am afraid that 10 years from now we may look back nostalgically on the stable days of the sixties when the balance of terror was evenly balanced between the two great powers.

• 1300

Mr. Gibson: As a corollary and very briefly, do you anticipate that if tremendous efforts are made at the highest levels between the big powers at disarmament, having regard to the build up we have already got, it would be possible to work an effective nuclear disarmament throughout the world?

Dr. Solandt: I am not really expert in this field now, but I am not optimistic about it.

Mr. Gibson: Thank you.

The Chairman: Before adjourning I would like to make several announcements. First, we will be having a special meeting next Tuesday morning to deal with the Committee's agenda and procedure. Then, next Thursday we will have one of our regular meetings and the witnesses will be Dr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka of the Hudson Institute. I would remind the members of the steering subcommittee of our meeting this afternoon at 3:30 p.m. That is quite an important meeting. I hope all members of the steering subcommittee will be there.

Now, on your behalf, if there are no further questions, I would like to thank Dr. Solandt for being with us this morning and giving us so much help. I know the information and suggestions, Dr. Solandt, are appreciated by all members of the Committee. Thank you, ever so much.

APPENDIX BB
BIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE
OF
OMOND MCKILLOP SOLANDT
O.B.E., M.A., M.D., D.Sc.,
D. Eng., LL.D., F.R.C.P., F.R.S.C.

Dr. Solandt was born in Winnipeg, Manitoba. He obtained a B.A. in Biological and Medical Sciences at the University of Toronto in 1931. He spent the next two years in post-graduate research under Dr. C. H. Best in the Department of Physiology, Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto, and obtained an M.A. He received his M.D. in 1936 and was awarded the Gold Medal. He also played on the senior intercollegiate football team.

Following graduation from the Faculty of Medicine, he spent a year in research at Cambridge and a year as an intern at the Toronto General Hospital. In 1939, after post-graduate work at the London Hospital, he received the M.R.C.P. (London) and then returned to Cambridge as a lecturer in Physiology and a member of the teaching staff at Trinity Hall.

Shortly after the outbreak of war, he was appointed Director of the Southwest London Blood Supply Depot and continued in that capacity until January 1941. He founded the Medical Research Council's Physiological Laboratory at the Armoured Fighting Vehicle School at Lulworth, and became actively engaged in research concerned with tank design and the physiological problems peculiar to tank personnel. In 1942, he turned from medical research to the then new field of operational research and formed the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Section of the Army Operational Research Group. The following year, he was appointed Deputy Superintendent, Army Operational Research Group and in May 1944 Superintendent. He joined the Canadian Army in February 1944 and left the Army in 1946 as a Colonel. In September 1945, he was sent to Japan by the War Office as a member of the mission to evaluate the effects of the atomic bomb.

Dr. Solandt returned to the Department of National Defence in Ottawa in 1946 to begin planning for a permanent defence research organization in Canada. This work resulted in

the formation of the Defence Research Board in 1947. Dr. Solandt became the first Chairman of the Board and the scientific member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Defence Council. In 1956, he left the Defence Research Board to become Vice President, Research and Development, of the Canadian National Railways. In 1963, he left the CN to become Vice President, Research and Development, and a Director of the de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Limited, and Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. In 1966, he left these positions to become Chairman of the Science Council of Canada and Vice Chairman of the Board of The Electric Reduction Company of Canada, Limited. He is also a Director of the Huyck Corporation.

Dr. Solandt was awarded the O.B.E. in 1946, and the U.S. Medal of Freedom with Bronze Palm in 1947. He received the honorary degree of D.Sc. from the University of British Columbia in 1947, from Laval University in 1948, from the University of Manitoba in 1950, from McGill University in 1951, from St. Francis Xavier University in 1956, from Royal Military College in 1966, and from the University of Montreal in 1967; and, an LL.D. from Dalhousie University in 1952, from the University of Toronto in 1954, from Sir George Williams University in 1966, and from the University of Saskatchewan in 1968; and, a D.Eng. from the University of Waterloo in 1968. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada (Section 111) in 1948, and an Honorary Member of the Engineering Institute of Canada. In 1956, he was awarded the Gold Medal of the Professional Institute of Canada and in 1961 he received the Civic Award of Merit from the City of Toronto. He was President of the Canadian Operational Research Society from 1958-60 and a Governor of Sir George Williams University of Montreal from 1957-63. He was formerly a Governor of the University of Toronto and of the Arctic Institute of North America, and

President of the Royal Canadian Geographical Society, and a Director of the Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition. He is at present a Trustee of the MITRE Corporation, Boston; a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians in London, and was selected Chancellor of the University of Toronto in 1965 (re-elected for a further 3-year term in 1968).

He is married to the former Elizabeth McPhedran of Toronto and has three children—Sigrid, Andrew and Katharine. He is a member of the St. James's Club of Montreal, the Rideau Club, Ottawa, the Athenaeum Club, London, England, the York Club, Toronto and of Bloor Street United Church in Toronto.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

PROCEEDINGS
No. 21

TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1969

Respecting
POLICY-DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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CITY OF TORONTO

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

³ Barrett,	Laniel,	Ouellet,
Cafik,	Laprise,	Penner,
Fairweather,	Legault,	Prud'homme,
Forrestall,	Lewis,	Roberts,
¹ Goode,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Harding,	MacLean,	<i>Miramichi</i>),
Harkness,	⁷ Macquarrie,	⁴ Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
² Howard (<i>Okanagan-</i>	MacRae,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
<i>Boundary</i>),	Marceau,	⁶ Whiting,
⁵ Hymmen,	Nowlan,	Winch—(30).

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4).

¹Mr. Goode replaced Mr. Allmand on January 23, 1969.

²Mr. Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*) replaced Mr. Groos on January 23, 1969.

³Mr. Barrett replaced Mr. Buchanan on January 23, 1969.

⁴Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*) replaced Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*) on January 27, 1969.

⁵Mr. Hymmen replaced Mr. Lessard (*Lac-St-Jean*) on January 27, 1969, who had replaced Mr. Anderson on January 23, 1969.

⁶Mr. Whiting replaced Mr. Gibson on January 27, 1969.

⁷Mr. Macquarrie replaced Mr. McCleave on January 28, 1969.

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, January 28, 1969.

(34)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Barrett, Cafik, Fairweather, Goode, Harding, Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laniel, Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (*Egmont*), MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn, Whiting, Winch—(25).

Also present: Messrs. Brewin, Deachman, Gibson, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Knowles, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Marshall, Pilon, M.P.'s.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Messrs. Peter Dobell and Julian Payne.

The Committee met to discuss its future agenda and procedure. The Chairman made an opening statement which contained recommendations from the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, as to procedures for questioning witnesses, the question of priorities in subjects to be discussed and a proposed trip to Europe.

A general discussion took place on the various subjects mentioned by the Chairman in his opening remarks.

The Clerk distributed copies, in English and French, of the document entitled *Special Task Force on Europe Seminar Papers*.

Members of the Committee made certain suggestions, such as the formation of subcommittees, the calling of additional witnesses and topics for discussion, which were referred to the Subcommittee for further study.

Mr. Lewis moved,

That Mr. Kierans be invited to appear before this Committee within the next ten days to two weeks.

Following a discussion of the Motion, Mr. Lewis requested and the Committee agreed that the motion be withdrawn. The question of Mr. Kierans' appearance before the Committee was referred to the Subcommittee.

The Committee continued to discuss agenda and procedures and made suggestions for Subcommittee consideration, including the names of additional witnesses, procedures for questioning, the proposed trip to Europe and the televising of proceedings.

At 12:50 p.m. the Committee adjourned, until Thursday, January 30, 1969 at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Hansard reporters present and reporting)

Tuesday, January 28, 1969

The Chairman: Gentleman, it is after 11 so perhaps we could begin our meeting.

This meeting is being held in order to discuss our future program of work. We will not be hearing witnesses this morning.

Your steering committee met last Thursday, following the two meetings we held last week, to consider the experience we had gained at the first two meetings and to review the proposed program in light of comments made during those first two meetings. The steering committee felt that the most effective technique for examining witnesses was the one we followed at our second meeting, and which evolved as the result of a number of useful suggestions from the floor during our first meeting last Tuesday.

Permitting supplementary questions on specific issues makes it possible to pursue and complete effectively issues as they are raised. It does, however, impose the necessity of self-discipline on members to make sure that supplementary questions are in fact supplementary to the issue then under discussion, and are not in fact bootleg supplementaries designed to gain priority on the list of questioners.

The steering committee also felt it was useful to call party representatives to open new lines of inquiry, thus permitting party members to prepare themselves in advance of the meeting, if they wished to do so. At the same time I should like to emphasize that the steering committee is open to any suggestion any of you may have which would make our examination of witnesses more effective. The most important issue which the steering committee dealt with concerned a general approach to be adopted by the committee.

It seemed clear that the committee was faced with a choice between concentrating on one subject long enough for members of the committee to become knowledgeable and

make a significant contribution, or trying to examine, necessarily for brief periods of time, a number of issues which are of importance to the country, realizing that if we did this we would probably not spend long enough on any topic to exhaust it or deal with it thoroughly. The steering committee recognized that this was a very difficult choice and one which was basic, with important implications for the future effectiveness of this committee.

As you know, the recent number of rule changes have added considerably to the importance of the standing committees, and this particular committee on External Affairs and National Defence is in a somewhat special position. Most committees have specific legislation with which to deal, and this establishes their priorities. Our committee will have the estimates of two major departments to examine, but a very limited amount of legislation. Therefore the committee is in a position of having to make its own decisions as to what priorities to choose.

Last year there were suggestions from time to time that this committee should concentrate this year on the field of defence, where the government was undertaking a major review of policy. This sentiment was strongly reflected in the steering committee, as a result of which a program was developed with the full support of the steering committee. It was submitted to you last week as a general guide for future work.

Copies of that program are available from the Clerk if any of you wish to see it.

The members of the Steering Committee were fully aware that there were other important subjects which the committee would not be in a position to examine while it was considering defence questions. The fact is that we will, generally speaking, be able to count on having two sessions a week only, in view of the fact that so many other committees will be sitting at the same time.

For a subject as wide as that of defence your Steering Committee felt that a major program would have to be undertaken if we were to make a significant contribution. The Steering Committee was particularly influenced in this decision by the knowledge that the government was undertaking a review of defence policy at this time. Although this review has been under way for some time, we understand that to date the work undertaken has been mainly of a preparatory nature and that no long term decisions have yet been taken. Indeed, it is the Steering Committee's understanding that no such decisions are likely to be taken for a number of weeks.

You will also recall that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when appearing before the committee in December, specifically encouraged us to undertake a systematic examination of defence questions and indicated that the government would take into account views which were expressed in the committee, both by witnesses and by members of the committee.

In these circumstances your Steering Committee felt that this committee and its members had a unique opportunity publicly to explore national issues relating to defence. The discussion could serve as a focus for national debate, and by this means would have some impact on the government's consideration of defence questions. In other words, your Steering Committee is convinced that the discussion which takes place in this committee will be taken into account by the government in their consideration of future defence policy. For this reason they felt justified in giving priority to the consideration of defence questions, even though they realize the importance of other questions suggested for consideration by members of the committee.

We realize, of course, that this decision limits the committee's capacity at this time to examine these other important questions which have been mentioned. We can, of course, receive submissions from interested organizations or individuals both on defence questions and on other issues. We will certainly inform members of the committee as these submissions are received. They will be considered by the Steering Committee and will be open for examination by all members of the committee. In this way the committee

will be able to keep abreast of the views of interested Canadians on all these subjects.

In reaching these conclusions your Steering Committee felt that the choice we make is the more important because our current round of meetings is taking place immediately following the adoption of the new rules of procedure. The practice which this committee adopts at this time will serve to some extent as a precedent for its future work. Therefore, it is not a matter to be decided lightly, and I invite you to join in considering whether the conclusions of your Steering Committee which I have outlined to you are justified.

Before opening the subject for discussion perhaps I should make one additional announcement. As part of our study of defence questions your Steering Committee has reached the conclusion that it would be desirable for the committee to make a visit to Europe early in March, if this can be arranged. This visit would form an integral part of the first phase of the committee's study of defence questions, which we hope to complete before the Easter recess. A two week visit should provide sufficient time to give members of the committee an opportunity to explore at first hand the following important questions or subjects:

1. How important is NATO, and what does it achieve?
2. How do European political leaders regard NATO?
3. The effectiveness of peacekeeping arrangements.
4. What are the possibilities in the field of civil defence?
5. The neutrality option.
6. The prospects of disarmament.

The Steering Committee would anticipate that this would be a working tour and we would actually hold sessions in Europe and hear witnesses over there. The evidence taken would form part of our record.

If the committee approves the emphasis that the Steering Committee is placing on the basic review of defence policy and the general program that has been presented to you, then the proposal is that the Steering Committee will meet following this committee meeting to consider a detailed program for such a visit to Europe in early March, which

would attempt to achieve the six objectives that I have outlined. Therefore I would ask the members of the Steering Committee to make themselves available for a few minutes following the meeting so as to get this under way.

I suggest that at this meeting we might deal with at least three matters. First of all, we would receive your comments regarding the actual program which has been outlined by the Steering Committee. This is set out in two memos which have been circulated to you. One is a memo that sets out the four phases of the program. The second memo sets out in detail the subjects which will be dealt with in phase one, and identifies certain of the witnesses. That is the first matter that we might discuss, the actual program, and we hope to obtain your approval.

Secondly, the Steering Committee would like to obtain your suggestions, if you have any, in regard to the specific witnesses that you feel we might consider calling before the committee; and thirdly, we would like to ascertain whether there are any suggestions that you might have with regard to the nature of the trip to Europe in early March.

Mr. Fairweather: Mr. Chairman, before we start, about ten days ago I asked the minister in the house, and was followed up by a request from this committee, for the information on which the independent review of foreign policy had been made. I had hoped that this material would be available some time ago. The last word I had was that we would receive it this morning. Is it available?

The Chairman: The Clerk informs me that it has just arrived and so is available now. Do you want to have it distributed now or following the meeting? I will distribute it now.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, in view of what I consider to be a very full report from the Steering Committee, and since the Steering Committee felt that there may be one or two additions to the calling of witnesses, perhaps we might have the names of witnesses who are already on call and also those which have been added, so that all members of the committee will be aware of the names of those who are now on the agenda.

The Chairman: Am I right in thinking that you would like me to announce the names?

Mr. Winch: We did not have the name of General Burns on the original presentation given to us, but I see the Steering Committee recommended that his name be added. I thought that as part of our procedure today if we could have read out the names of the witnesses who are already on call, it might help to expedite the operations of our committee.

The Chairman: That is a good idea.

Mr. Laniel: I notice that on February 4 there is to be a briefing by the Department of National Defence. I wonder whether we are allowing enough time for this? We give lots of time in our meetings to witnesses coming from outside the forces and I believe we need more time during which people from the department of National Defence and so forth can give their views as to the military aspects of our involvement with NATO, along with other nations, and so on. With only one day for this, I do not think we are likely to have enough time, and I wonder whether we ought not to reserve some other day, say, after February 9, and call back the witnesses from the department.

The Chairman: That is certainly a sound suggestion. A great deal would depend on how much ground was covered in that one session. Although the submission will be as described in the memorandum I would think the question would cover a wide field, including views with regard to the necessity or the desirability of NATO or NORAD. We would have to allow as much time to members as they required, and it might be that we would have to program new arrangements.

Mr. Laniel: Do we also plan going to NORAD? The two subjects are directly related.

The Chairman: This has been discussed, but no definite decision has been made. It is thought that a trip to NORAD installations could be arranged very quickly, if thought desirable.

Mr. Lewis: Two questions. Does the outline of our program mean that the request I made at an earlier date, that this committee discuss the subject of exchanging representatives with the Vatican, will not be met?

The Chairman: If we follow this program, Mr. Lewis, it would not come up until we had completed the program we have outlined here, unless of course we were specifically

directed by the house to interrupt this program to deal with that particular subject.

Mr. Lewis: The problem arises that this review of foreign and defence policy is to be completed some time in March. I have a memory that that is the target date, because NATO is holding a meeting at the end of March or in April. I understood the Secretary of State for External Affairs to say that this would make it a target date for completing the government's review. Therefore do you not think the question of exchanging representatives with the Vatican is part of that review, and should not this committee consider it before that review has been completed?

The Chairman: Certainly we should retain a degree of flexibility, and approval of this general program does not necessarily mean we would be bound rigidly by it. The steering committee considered it desirable to get as much done in connection with defence policy as we could before the government makes its announcement, because we want to have an influence on that policy, we want our witnesses to have an influence on it. But if, for example, it became apparent that we could profitably take time off to deal with the other subjects, we could always do so.

Mr. Prud'homme: With all due respect to the Vatican, I would think it was no more important to us to discuss relations with the Vatican than it would be to discuss diplomatic relations with China or Gabon, for instance. If we consider them one by one I think we could spend much longer than expected discussing these administrative decisions. I see no reason why we should attach more importance to recognizing the Vatican than to recognizing Red China.

We could stay here a very long time discussing whether it involved religious recognition or political recognition, and so forth. With all due respect to what has been said in the house concerning the Vatican, I do not see the urgency of the need for discussion.

Mr. Lewis: I think Mr. Prud'homme should perhaps address his remarks to the Prime Minister rather than to me. The Prime Minister made a particular point of recognition of the Vatican. He made a special trip to Rome for the purpose. He placed recognition and an exchange of representatives with the Vatican on a basis which to me is extremely

dangerous and divisive. I want to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that I am not opposed to exchanging representatives with the Vatican if we are shown that there is value in doing so—and there may well be; but I am very disturbed about the statement by the Prime Minister that one of the reasons at least, if not the main reason for doing so, is that we have a large number of members of that church in Canada. This seems to me to be an irrelevant, dangerous and divisive reason.

I hope there are other and more relevant reasons. International exchanges ought not to be based on religious divisions. As to the recognition of Red China, I see no reason why the exchanging of representatives with mainland China should not be a subject for discussion.

The point I am making is that it is all very well to set out a program which is theoretically consistent and deals with some of the major questions facing Canada, such as NORAD, NATO and the like; but there are also other questions related to defence and foreign affairs which the government undoubtedly is considering in its review. Because the point I raised has some delicacy, it seems to me the Steering Committee ought to reconsider its decision to push every item aside except defence. I am not objecting to your program, sir; but I think a session or two dealing with some matters such as I have mentioned ought to be convened before the end of the review, and not afterward.

The Chairman: Would you care to comment, Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): May I comment on the questions raised by Mr. Lewis. Our problem in this committee, it seems to me, is that a great many questions are potential for discussion, and it is difficult to discuss them. Certainly the government's review and its decision are questions for discussion. It seems evident that it is difficult to involve the majority of committee members in any discussion taking place here, simply because the committee is so large. I wonder if we could not capitalize on the quality of our committee members by operating in subcommittees, and discussing therein such questions as exchanges with the Vatican or recognition of mainland China. That would give us an excellent opportunity to conduct in depth discussions on specific areas concerning us and

would take nothing away from the work of the central committee. Of course, some members of this committee can devote more time to attending subcommittees than can other members. Some of our committee members are heavily involved with other committees. We can only attend one committee at a time. I am a member of a committee which at the present time is not meeting, and therefore it is easy for me to be here now.

Possibly we might even schedule the meetings of extra subcommittees so that specific questions such as ones to do with the Vatican and mainland China can be discussed conveniently. The point raised by Mr. Anderson earlier about straight base lines might also be discussed usefully.

Perhaps we should not decide this question now. Perhaps the entire question ought to be dealt with by the committee on procedure. Personally, I think we could make better use of our 30 committee members. Attendance at this committee has been very good, and the calibre of our committee members, if I may say so, is extremely high. I think it might be a good idea to permit our committee members, who are obviously interested in the work of the committee, to carry on discussions in various subcommittees.

The Chairman: The Steering Committee will consider that suggestion, if that is satisfactory. The problem at the moment is that we are limited by physical facilities. If we split the committee into a number of subcommittees we shall still be faced with a problem of finding committee rooms, having proceedings printed, translated and so on.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I am sorry the government house leader left. He could have told us whether the government has taken steps to enlarge and improve the facilities of the committees of the House of Commons. The suggestion I raised is one that ought to be considered, I submit.

Before the committee deals with other matters, I wonder if members of this committee would comment on my suggestion. Do they think subcommittees could do useful work in the way I have outlined, or is there serious objection to subcommittees. Personally I see nothing against the concept of subcommittees. Does anyone disagree with that suggestion?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, may I follow up a point that Mr. Lewis

raised. Mr. Lewis spoke about what the Prime Minister said in the house. The Prime Minister told us about his interview with the Pope and about why he went to see him. He also said that one of the principal reasons he went to the Vatican was to obtain the reaction of the Canadian people to his proposal to exchange representatives. I think the latter point ought not to be forgotten in our discussions here. I think it ought to be emphasized.

Mr. Laniel: I completely disagree with a point Mr. Lewis raised. The Prime Minister said he would consult the people of Canada on the Vatican question. I think the first duty of the committee is to review defence policy and related external affairs policy. That is where the committee's priorities lie. I do not see why we should single out the Vatican for special study or consideration. I think the question of renewing relations with Gabon may be more important than the question of recognizing the Vatican or exchanging representatives with it. We ought to take some time to look into the implications of diplomatic exchanges, and to examine the principles we should follow in establish diplomatic relations with any country. At the same time I submit that our first priority in any of our discussions is the review of our defence policy.

The Chairman: Are there any other comments on Mr. Lewis' point?

Mr. Harkness: I do not think there ought to be any difficulty in arranging for members of the committee to meet once or twice to discuss subjects such as the diplomatic recognition of the Vatican, of Red China, or anything along that line. I think we should obtain accommodation for at least one meeting a week. If members of the committee wish to look into some of these matters, I do not see why subcommittees should not be established for that purpose.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, I think it is a matter of common sense that we should keep some room for flexibility in the committee and allow it to remain supple. I hope the committee will evolve on less rigid lines, and not split along party lines in discussing problems that come before it.

Mr. Lewis: Hear, hear.

Mr. Roberts: I hope the structure of the committee will not develop along rigid party lines that may be followed in the house. I

think the program that has been discussed here and outlined is extremely valuable. From time to time questions which will interest members of the committee will arise, and I do not think we should need two months notice that those questions are to be discussed.

I myself do not feel very strongly about the issue which Mr. Lewis has raised. But it does seem to me that the government's recent announcement, in view of the discussion with the government of mainland China, is a matter with a far greater degree of urgency which the committee may wish to consider.

It does not seem beyond the realm of our imagination to devise a satisfactory means of supplementing the program our Chairman has outlined. It may be that Mr. MacDonald's observations may be useful. It may be also, however, that there would be difficulty in securing facilities. It would seem to be unwise to have a program from which we cannot deviate over the next two months. I would hope that the Steering Committee could find some means of opening up possibilities other than the ones described.

Mr. Stewart (Cochrane): I agree there should be a little more flexibility. I think that whether we use the system of subcommittees or whether we have additional sittings, I would certainly be agreeable to either of those suggestions. There are any number of other things regarding the foreign policy of this country and the defence policy that are very important and need to be discussed. One of them which comes to mind is our relationship with Latin America which, for the future of Canada, is one of the most important subjects we could have before us. If we are going to confine ourselves to one or two subjects over the next few months, I am afraid we will not accomplish a great deal in the committee. I would certainly support some kind of flexibility.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): We have a pretty formidable schedule in front of us and I suppose we could say that we will be very bright and brilliant. We will roll all these problems into a ball and solve them all within a month or two without too much trouble, and get on to the next one. We could handle a few other problems as we go along. We can look after the problem of the recognition of the Vatican and Red China. These are minor things that we can throw in. It seems

that maybe we are not that bright, or maybe we have to learn more about some of these problems. Surely we can devote a few weeks to these problems that are of major proportions and major concern to Canada and the world. Surely there is time to deal with these other problems in due course when the present problems have been dealt with in our brilliant fashion.

I like the idea of using subcommittees. Surely there is a great deal which could be gained by very close examination of some of these problems that are already on the agenda. I am in favour of using the subcommittees. I am not in favour of spreading our efforts so thin that we are not putting in enough effort on the problems before us.

Mr. Legault: First of all, I am very happy to hear all the various comments; but necessarily some of this must be referred to subcommittees. Here we have an example where the Steering Committee, which is a subcommittee, has met and was unanimous in meeting and accepting procedures such as you have suggested, Mr. Chairman, and secondly to adhere to the program which has already been prepared as a positive step. We could bring in about a thousand things that come to mind, but first I would like to see this committee accept the program which has been prepared and suggested unanimously by the subcommittee composed of members from all parties, and then perhaps to take into consideration further meetings of this subcommittee as to the programming which will take place in the future.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I agree with everybody who emphasized the importance of the program before us. But that is not the issue. I agree also that the recognition of Red China or Gabon is of importance to Canada. I would like members of this committee to accept also the seriousness with which the subject I have raised is to be viewed. My reason for singling out recognition of the Vatican is an internal Canadian reason, rather than merely the foreign affairs aspect of it. My impression may be wrong—but I don't think so—that there may well be in the mind of the government a decision to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Vatican. If that is the case I may well support it, but I am anxious that if this is done it should not result in a divisiveness within the country.

Mr. Legault: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, this is a subject that can be suggested, but I do not believe at this time that it is in the interests of this committee to deal with the question of the Vatican, such as has been done by Mr. Lewis. This is what I want to bring out.

Mr. Lewis: I don't know whether it is a point of order. If you will be good enough to let me finish, I think this question is important inside Canada because if the impression is left that the reason for the exchange of representatives with the Vatican is on a religious basis—and that is the impression that unfortunately has been left and widely reported, not only in Canada, but outside by the statement the Prime Minister made—then I think it will have a deleterious effect on our situation in this country.

We have enough divisive elements in this country without adding to them. I think there are reasons for exchanging representations with the Vatican based on the progress of our external affairs and our relationships with people all over the world.

Mr. Legault: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, are we now discussing the Vatican?

The Chairman: I think we should permit Mr. Lewis to conclude.

Mr. Lewis: If these gentlemen wish to turn this discussion into a donnybrook I am as ready on Tuesday morning to enter into it as is anybody else. I know enough about order, Mr. Chairman, to know that I am in order. I am giving the reasons why in my opinion this particular subject is a separate and distinct subject that today calls for the consideration of the Steering Committee and should be discussed by the committee.

I am saying that if we do discuss it and have before us representatives of the Department of External Affairs or perhaps the minister himself to give us reasons, in terms of popular international political relations, for the exchange of representatives with the Vatican, we will do a necessary and desirable job for the people of Canada.

I have received letters and statements by the dozens objecting to this. I have replied to these to the effect that I do not agree with them because I object to the prejudice and narrowmindedness which is expressed in the letters, and other communications I have

received. I believe this subject should be aired before this committee on the basis of grounds and reasons other than religious. I appeal to the members of the committee to realize that there is a special problem involved here which could easily be added to the other problems we face in this country.

Since the Prime Minister and one of the members of the committee said that they wanted the people of Canada to discuss this matter, I suggest this committee is a very proper forum for having the discussion in a proper way. I originally started out with a question which was blown up. What I intended was to ask the Steering Committee not to forget this suggestion. I agree with Mr. Roberts, that it is the rigidity of the program that worried me. I hope the Steering Committee is prepared to take some other subjects into account and make room for them.

May I say finally that I agree with Mr. MacDonald that we may have a suggestion which would be the solution; that is, that the committee meet in two or three parts with subcommittees, each dealing with a subject which would be reported in the minutes. In that way members of the committee could attend the meetings of the subcommittee in which they are particularly interested.

I wish to explain that I am emphasizing one item, not because it is the most important from the point of view of external politics but because from my mail, which has not been inconsiderable, it is obvious it is a matter which is very important to the people of Canada. I believe a most unfortunate reason was given by the leader of our country for considering this point. This is something which I would hope the committee would have an opportunity to clear up.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lewis. I do not think we should become involved in a debate concerning whether we should schedule a hearing in respect of recognition of the Vatican. The suggestion has been noted and the subcommittee will certainly give consideration to this. This program is not a rigid one. It is a program which the Steering Committee is recommending to members of the committee at the present time. Necessarily we reserve the right to deal with other subjects if it becomes desirable to do so. Before we get back to Mr. MacDonald's suggestion, are there any other comments, not in the nature of debating points, with regard to representation with the Vatican.

Mr. Laniel: I do not disagree with the basic question raised by Mr. Lewis. I am sure all members of the committee wish to look into this and a few other matters. To my mind it is a question of priority. I place the priority on the foreign review.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I believe the gist of this discussion is that there is a feeling that we must keep the agenda of the committee flexible, in order to deal not only with the priorities that are established, as suggested in the program, but also other issues which may come up. If we do this and keep in mind the priorities I am sure we will be able to handle the problem.

Mr. Cafik: I believe there are two problems here. One is that if there is a program which is totally flexible it is difficult for witnesses to be given the advance notice which would enable them to be here at the proper time and to have statements prepared. On the other hand we want to be flexible. Perhaps the Steering Committee ought to give consideration to setting aside one or two meetings each month that are not named at all.

In other words there would be a particular time at which members of the committee could bring up urgent problems. Otherwise the meetings would be arranged to deal with subjects of which notice has been given. This might be a possible solution to the problem. We could have one meeting, say, at the beginning of the month and one at the end of the month which would be left open so that current problems could be discussed at those meetings.

Mr. Legault: I think this is a very logical suggestion. This would give us an opportunity to make the program a little more flexible.

The Chairman: If there is no further discussion on this point we have the suggestion of Mr. MacDonald that the committee be divided into subcommittees. We might have the views of members on that point.

Mr. Fairweather: For a long time I have felt that a committee composed of 30 members is quite unwieldy. It is considerably larger than the United States Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which recently was cut down. I think the subcommittee idea is an excellent one. I agree with Mr. Lewis that for part of the educative process we might start with the matter of continental China and for the Vatican. I believe that by this means we might be able to help bring some understand-

ing to the people of Canada concerning why these things are necessary or a good idea.

Concerning the matter of co-ordinates, I have been here seven years and have listened to a series of ministers discuss base line co-ordinates. I do not know whether I will end my parliamentary career still listening to the difficulties in respect of headland to headland. I suspect we will be prepared to have a go at that and then perhaps the public will understand why this is a problem.

The Chairman: Are there any further comments in respect of the suggestion about subcommittees?

Mr. Winch: May I add a word on this? On various occasions in the Public Accounts Committee when special matters of interest come before it we established subcommittees. My experience is that subcommittees are effectual because they do the basic in-depth study and then report their findings to the general committee. I am most strongly in support of a subcommittee studying a matter in depth and then reporting to the general committee.

Mr. Nowlan: I wish to add my support to the general proposition of subcommittees. Mr. Fairweather has mentioned the United States Foreign Relations Committee which operates with subcommittees. My contribution is related to Mr. Lewis' point, because there are some specific issues that could be canvassed by subcommittees. This problem of committees and subcommittees is going to be with us, in view of the new rules, because committees are to take more of the work from the Commons. With respect to legislative bills I can see these being divided up, with a subcommittee looking at one bill and another subcommittee looking at another bill, with interested members serving on both subcommittees.

I appreciate the difficult problems with respect, to interpretation, room accommodation, time, etc., but if the committee system is going to function, then this committee, because it is dealing with a broad area of policy review, with a time limit, should be the first committee to raise this whole question of subcommittees, so that we can carry on our work effectively and perhaps define the problem for the other committees. I think a subcommittee system is going to work, as has been found possible in the United States. I think a subcommittee should not only study by but really explore other views to see if they could be implemented.

[Translation]

Mr. Prud'homme: My only comment is that I agree completely with Messrs. Nowlan, Winch, Cafik and MacDonald (Egmont).

I believe that the Steering Committee will give us a report, at its next meeting, on the possibility of dividing itself into sub-committees to study very specific questions.

As far as I am concerned, I would be quite willing to support such an idea and, to end as soon as possible this morning's discussion, to ask the Steering Committee to report to us at the following sitting, which is next week, about the possibility of dividing itself into sub-committees to study very specific questions. I believe that at that time, discussion should be easier.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Prud'homme, any further...

Mr. Prud'homme: May I make a motion, Mr. Chairman, suggesting that the Steering Committee look into the matter and make a report next week as to the advisability of setting up subcommittees?

The Chairman: I don't think it is absolutely essential to have a motion passed. The Steering Committee will do this, in view of the representations made by members of the committee.

Mr. Prud'homme: And if I may make another suggestion, it is that Mr. Lewis and myself be placed on a subcommittee dealing with the Vatican question.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I have only one thought pertaining to a subcommittee system. This committee was formed to give everyone an opportunity to express an opinion and discuss all various points. If you institute subcommittees they are going to spend a lot of time studying various matters and then reporting on a question to this committee, where the whole matter will be threshed out again. This is one of the things I am afraid of. However, I am not taking a stand one way or another on the suggestion.

Mr. Winch: That has not been my experience on other committees where subcommittees have been appointed.

The Chairman: If we have exhausted that particular subject, perhaps we could get back to the question of the program, which is

divided into four phases. The first phase is an examination of basic issues. The second phase is really a more detailed examination of NATO, the third phase an examination of the possibility of aid in lieu of defence expenditures, and the fourth NORAD. Are there any suggestions with regard to that program?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would like to say, as some other hon. members have already suggested, that I think the Steering Committee is to be commended for the basic draft of future discussions, but I am a little concerned with our first experience under topic A, at the way in which the questions were responded to by the witnesses we have had, to date, and whether or not the subsequent witnesses will adequately answer these basic questions that we are looking at. For example, one basic question has not been reached and needs to be replied to, and we need to have some kind of expert witness on it. Of course it is one of the most difficult questions to answer—the technology of defence. That is a basic question for a country such as ours. Would it be possible to have a witness under that category? Have the witnesses named here been given specific areas within the broad, over-all statement of six questions with which they are dealing?

I am a little concerned that with regard to the first two witnesses we have had, a pretty wide ranging series of questions was directed to them. Some of the questioning has been relevant, but some of it has not, with respect to these basic questions. Perhaps you, Mr. Chairman, or other representatives of the Steering Committee can tell us whether the people invited to speak have been invited to speak to one of these specific questions. It would be good to know if that is the case, so that the questions could be more sharply defined, rather than covering the broad spectrum with each and every witness.

The Chairman: We have not attempted to be rigid in our instructions to the witnesses. We have indicated to them the particular subject matter which led us to ask them to appear as witnesses. For example, the two witnesses who will be appearing on Thursday are particularly competent on matters of civil defence. However I would anticipate, since they are able witnesses, that members of the committee will probably get beyond that and ask them questions which have been raised in the two meetings we have already had, with regard to their views on American policy, or Canada's policy in relation to the United

States. But they know they have been asked to appear before the committee because of their competency in a particular field.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Have they been asked to respond to the six questions that are laid out under topic A? With what terms of reference will they be coming to the committee? Is that a fair question to ask?

The Chairman: They are familiar with our program, but they have been asked to appear to give evidence in the field in which they are particularly competent.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): As I understand it, the purpose of this first discussion is really to have what may be considered more of a theoretical discussion, without taking into account questions that might relate to our continental defence, or even our NATO commitments and basic questions of national relationship with the United States and/or defence itself.

There is one question which seems a little more political, in the sense that it concerns questions of the United Nations and possible collective security. But the question of the strategic balance in the world today is a very large one. I wonder which one of these speakers—perhaps it is the last two—will be more competent to deal with this question. There might be others who could contribute something useful to that discussion. But it seems to me that in this first, sort of brainstorming session, if you like, where almost anything goes, we should try to have a free-wheeling discussion and bring in all the areas. Then as we reach the more specific questions we can become a good deal more practical.

The Chairman: It was not the intention to limit the questioning to any one or more of those six questions which are listed under phase A but, as I say, some of the witnesses will have a particular competency.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): With regard to my specific question about the technology of defence, was any consideration given to inviting a person who would have some competence in this field and could speak specifically to that kind of question, because it seems to me this is the area in which we could best discuss it, and then relate it to our other discussions later on?

The Chairman: Some consideration was given to that question; perhaps not enough. When we come to the question of the witnesses to be called I will give the committee

an indication of whom we are thinking of calling. If any member has in mind a particular witness, the steering committee would be happy to receive names. We shall be happy to receive the names of witnesses that members might wish to suggest.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I completely agree with what Mr. MacDonald (Egmont) has said. I see his point. I think we should tell ourselves individually to try to limit ourselves to the line of questioning, but I do not think we should lose the advantage of sometimes asking additional questions which might help when we have before us a witness covering a specific point. It is a matter of trying to limit the kind of questions about which we are talking. I have been fairly satisfied with the questions we have had, but I think we could improve the questioning a little.

The Chairman: Perhaps I could just correct a statement I made earlier with regard to the four phases. The first phase is the examination of certain fundamental questions. The second phase suggested is the renewal of the NORAD agreement. The third phase is foreign aid, and the fourth phase is NATO. I believe I interchanged phases 2 and 4. The second phase is NORAD; the fourth phase is NATO.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, subject to the discussions we have had, are we not prepared to accept the program?

Mr. Cafik: I think so.

The Chairman: Are there any further comments?

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, I think I would be expressing the view of the Steering Committee if I said that the program they suggest is a guide line. It was never the intention of the Steering Committee, nor would it be within its power, to say that this is "it", and we could either take it or leave it. There is an understanding that, naturally, the Steering Committee will listen carefully to the views of the committee as whole from time to time and make adjustments where these are feasible. The Steering Committee will obviously examine carefully all the suggestions that have been made and will try to accommodate as many of them as are practical, trying to arrive at the most practical use of the time available to the committee in the weeks ahead.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. MacLean. If there are no further comments on the pro-

gram, perhaps we could have suggestions from members with regard to witnesses who might be invited to attend our hearings. As you know, we have already invited, in addition to Mr. Gellner and Mr. Solandt who have already appeared, Mr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka, of the Hudson Institute, who will be here to give evidence this Thursday.

On February 4 I believe we will have General Dare and officials of the Department of National Defence. On February 5 we will have Professor Adam Yarmolinsky, of Harvard University and on February 6 we will have Professor James Eayrs, of the University of Toronto.

Other names have been suggested. The Clerk reminds me that in addition we have Professor Charles Foulkes, of Carleton University and Professor Michael Breecher, of McGill University; and on February 18 Professor Kenneth McNaught, of the University of Toronto, will appear before the committee.

Mr. Winch: I believe we had also agreed on General Burns.

The Chairman: General Burns' name was mentioned at the steering committee meeting last week.

Mr. Winch: I think he should be an obvious witness to call, having been attached to the United Nations as the first commander on the Gaza Strip and Canada's representative on all disarmament conferences at Geneva. It appeared to me that he would be a most worth-while man for us to hear.

The Chairman: In addition to hearing from the two ministers, Mr. Sharp and Mr. Cadieux, the other men we proposed to call are Professor Albert Legault, Queen's University; Professor Harold von Reckhoff, Carleton University; Professor Stephen Clarkson, University of Toronto and Professor Paul Painchaud, University de Laval. None of those men have been contacted as yet, so these are only suggestions.

Mr. Laniel: How about Professor Lester B. Pearson?

The Chairman: That is an additional name we could put on our list.

Mr. Fairweather: You had better clear that with Judy.

The Chairman: We propose to call Mr. David Golden, Professor John Warrock of the

University of Saskatchewan, General Burns, who has been mentioned and Professor J. Granatstein, York University. Those are the names we have discussed so far, and we would be happy to receive other suggestions.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a suggestion and a motion that the Postmaster General be invited to appear before this committee. I do so very seriously. He should be invited to explain his position in taking what I think the Prime Minister has called the antithesis to the position of the Minister of National Defence. If the government is taking the position that members of the cabinet are free to take any position they like in respect of defence and foreign policy, until the government has made a decision—and this may be a very good attitude and very worth while, even though it is somewhat confusing I am sure to the people of Canada—then, not only should the two ministers we have heard from appear before the committee, but also any minister who takes exactly the opposite position. That minister should be subjected to questioning, instead of being satisfied to make speeches such as the one he made in Nanaimo at a time, perhaps coincidentally, when a by-election was taking place there. I think it is the duty of the minister who has taken this position, to appear before this committee, and I think it is our duty to see that he does.

Mr. Kierans should be asked to explain his position. I might say I have more sympathy toward that position than the position taken by Mr. Cadieux. In any event he should appear before this committee to give us his reasons for taking a position which is distinctly opposite to the position of other members of the government. I hope that this committee is going to consider these very important and controversial speeches, which may have been made with the intention of having some influence on the government's decision. We should hear from members of the government who have expressed positions of the sort Mr. Kierans has expressed. Surely they should appear before the committee.

The Chairman: Before you place your motion, I might say that for the reasons you have given it would probably be desirable to call Mr. Kierans. It is my feeling that the Steering Committee would also adopt this attitude. We were not thinking of having formal motions passed at this meeting calling for specific witnesses to appear, but rather to hear your suggestions in order that the Steer-

ing Committee could consider them a report. If the Steering Committee decided not to call a particular witness perhaps that would be the time for a motion. I wonder whether this is necessary now because the matter will be before the Steering Committee, which can perhaps be trusted to make a decision in respect of witnesses and report back to the committee.

Mr. Lewis: I am prepared to leave this to the Steering Committee, subject to one thing which worries me. This involves the same matter I raised earlier. Having looked at the agenda I note that we have already made commitments in respect of calling certain witnesses. It does not appear that we could hear Mr. Kierans before the end of February or the beginning of March.

From the point of view of topical and worth-while discussions it would appear desirable that Mr. Kierans appear sooner, in order that he may discuss his speech within days rather than within months. I do not intend to press the motion, but I think this is important. I received Mr. Kieran's statement, as I am sure did other hon. members, and I read it with great care. He made some very important statements about regional alliances and military divisions, as well as the division of people resulting from this kind of alliance. I should like to have a discussion with Mr. Kierans, at which time he could be questioned and asked to justify his position to us as members of parliament and members of this committee and, through us, the people of Canada. I do not think this should be delayed for five or six weeks. I should like to see Mr. Kierans here next week. I understand he is out of town this week. The news reports I have read indicate he is to be away all this week.

It is for those reasons I desire to make a motion. However, if I have your assurance that the Steering Committee will not only consider calling Mr. Kierans but also make some time available within the next ten days for him to appear, then certainly I do not intend to press my motion.

The Chairman: Of course I could not bind the Steering Committee as to the time we should call Mr. Kierans. We originally discussed the possibility of Mr. Kierans giving evidence with regard to one specific phase, namely foreign aid. You will recall that he had some suggestions in respect of foreign aid. This subject does appear later in our program. I can give you the undertaking that

this will be considered by the Steering Committee, including the time of calling and your remarks in respect of urgency. I do not think we can undertake to call him at any specific time. Nor can we decide that any other witness be called at a specific time.

Mr. Lewis: I am sorry to be a little ornery over this, but I think that Mr. Kierans' evidence should come under B, and that it could come under B even though he dealt with NATO, which is the fourth subject. He could discuss under B the general theory of regional security arrangements.

The Chairman: It is clear that he could be called on phase one as part of the general review as well, and perhaps the Steering Committee might also consider that question. The point that I was making was that I could not give an undertaking to Mr. Lewis that he would be called at any specific time.

Mr. Lewis: In that case, and with your permission, I move, seconded by Mr. Winch:

"That Mr. Kierans be invited to appear before this Committee within the next ten days to two weeks".

The Chairman: Is there any discussion of this motion?

Mr. Laniel: I completely disagree with that proposal. I do not want to impute motives, though I could. I do not consider Mr. Kierans a specialist. He has an opinion. If we are going to call everybody who has an opinion, then I would go as far as amending the proposal to the effect that we call Mr. Diefenbaker, the right hon. member for Prince Albert, Mr. Harkness, the Leader of the New Democratic party and the Leader of the Creditistes, and try and put all of them into contradiction with each other.

As I say, I disagree with this proposal. I do not want to impute motives, but this proposal is not going to help the committee. It will only bring division to it and bring politics into the committee more than we want.

Mr. Winch: Could I make a comment?

The Chairman: I have a list of speakers on this subject. I will first hear Mr. Nowlan.

Mr. Nowlan: I did not necessarily want Mr. Lewis to move a motion, but the question I have to ask is related to a point that Mr. Lewis brought up. I should like to know how many of the professors in the list of witnesses that we have before us, and among some of

the suggested witnesses that you named, were on the task force that met in seclusion across the way for that week end of meditation. I do not know; perhaps none of them was on the task force. However, are we not duplicating our efforts here? Are we shortening the list of witnesses if we do bring in Mr. Kierans, or for that matter Mr. Camp or any other individual who has some very definite opinion?

I suggest we might consider using, instead of the tables and the seminar papers, the papers that these men presented at the week end conference. I notice that these papers before us have not been signed by anybody, though I have only looked them over briefly, since they came before me, and I do not know whether they represent conclusions which these men reached. Are these the individual papers that were advanced by each professor?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): No, I think they were prepared by the department. They are departmental papers.

Mr. Lewis: None of the professors had anything to do with them.

Mr. Nowlan: That answers that question, which brings me back to my first question. If some of the witnesses that you have named on the program sheet, along with the others that you have suggested, did in fact present papers at that week end conference, would it be possible to get these papers so that we might read them beforehand, and then perhaps we might call a lot more?

The Chairman: I am told that none of the academics at the meeting to which you have referred presented papers.

Mr. Nowlan: So it was just a discussion.

The Chairman: There may have been some departmental papers, but I am informed that the academics did not present any papers.

Mr. Nowlan: Then that answers my question. It does not help shorten the list of witnesses.

The Chairman: Mr. Cafik?

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, this is a very interesting motion. I agree wholeheartedly with the observations of Mr. Laniel. In my view, Mr. Kierans is not reluctant to express his views publicly. I think that the department and the members of the committee are aware of the views that he has expressed so

far, and I am sure he will express others as time goes by. I do not see that we will learn anything from him. I do now know whether he has any special knowledge of or background in external affairs or national defence that would qualify him as the kind of witness that we would want before the committee. I am not saying whether I agree or whether I disagree with what he said.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Kierans please note!

Mr. Cafik: I do not feel that a committee of this stature should call before it a man like Mr. Kierans on a subject in which I do not consider him to be expert. His views may well be right, but it is for the committee to make a decision on this question. Surely we can go to people with specific knowledge of these subjects and get knowledge in depth from them, and to a greater extent than from Mr. Kierans.

For this reason, I see no useful purpose being served in his appearing before this committee. Secondly, I can see such appearance being counterproductive, if I may use that term, because I think it would introduce politics into this committee. Mr. Roberts, on numerous occasions before, as well as other people in the committee, has tried to put forward the argument that the further we keep parties out of these deliberations, the better off we are. I do not think that this would be a step toward achieving a united front for all members of this committee, but rather an approach which would bring the parties into the committee.

Mr. Winch: Could I ask Mr. Cafik a question?

Mr. Cafik: Of course.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Kierans is a cabinet minister and he has expressed his views at a meeting in Nanaimo. Mr. Cadieux made his views known at a meeting of the Rotary Club in Ottawa yesterday. Therefore, does the hon. member feel equally that we should not hear Mr. Cadieux?

Mr. Cafik: I do not think that that argument holds water at all. First of all, Mr. Cadieux is in a position of responsibility and we as a committee ought to hear him.

Mr. Winch: Is not Mr. Kierans in a position of responsibility?

The Chairman: Order. In answer to Mr. Winch may I say that the question was not

whether or not we hear Mr. Kierans; I am sure that we will. The question was whether we should pass a specific motion requiring him to be here within two weeks. We expect to hear Mr. Cadieux and Mr. Sharp, but not within two weeks.

Mr. Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, you are speaking for yourself. Your understanding of the remarks of Mr. Laniel and Mr. Cafik was that they objected to Mr. Kierans being called, period.

Mr. Cafik: I am speaking against this motion. Probably my reaction, had a motion been put forward concerning whether we should hear him at all, would have been exactly the same. However, the motion on the floor stipulates that we hear him within two weeks, and it is quite sufficient for my purpose that I oppose that motion. Whether I would oppose or be in favour of some other motion is entirely irrelevant; I am against the motion that is on the floor at the moment, and I have given my reasons.

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Chairman, I am second to none in my admiration for the imagination, intelligence and ability of Mr. Kierans usefully to discuss issues of both national and international importance. But that really does not seem to me to be the issue before us.

In the past it seems to me the committee has proceeded on the basis of arranging for witnesses to appear at mutually convenient times. As far as I know, we have not compelled any witness to come and I do not think we should start to establish time limits within which witnesses should arrive. Mr. Kierans is a very busy man and his activities involve the public affairs of the country. It might well turn out that a ten-day limit would not be mutually convenient. I think we owe it as a courtesy to Mr. Kierans not to lay down a rigid time limit. It would seem to me that the proper way in which to proceed would be as we have proceeded in the past, that is, to ask the Steering Committee or its chairman to discuss with possible witnesses times which would be mutually convenient. I do not think we should consider laying down a hard and fast line insisting that witnesses be heard at a certain time.

Mr. Fairweather: I should like to support the Chair. I would certainly hope that Mr. Kierans would be prepared to appear before this committee. I can imagine nobody here resisting the opportunity to hear the point of view on this issue which Mr. Kierans has

expressed. The other day a proposal to hear Mr. Dalton Camp was placed before the steering committee. I think he has a point of view to express. I felt perhaps there would be a political implication about such an appearance which would not be understood. This is obviously happening in the case of Mr. Kierans. But the thought that we might be prevented from hearing from any of these people who have given thoughtful attention to any point of view upsets me very much. Let us arrange it through the Steering Committee. All parties are represented on that committee and I am satisfied Mr. Kierans is one of the witnesses we would expect to hear.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I want to follow what Mr. Roberts said. I am not a lawyer, but it is my understanding that committees of the House of Commons do not have the power to subpoena anyone.

Mr. Lewis: Oh yes they have. But I was not suggesting that procedure.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Nevertheless, I think one of the factors which we shall have to take into account is whether Mr. Kierans himself wishes to appear. In view of the things Mr. Roberts has said, he may indeed be anxious to appear, not only to present a set piece, but to answer specific questions. When we are thinking in terms of the present administration we do not, of course, want to hear from everyone in the cabinet, but it might be well for the committee to give consideration to the views of the former minister, Mr. Hellyer, inasmuch as he was involved with the department during a very difficult time, during which there was a great deal of restructuring within the armed forces. He had definite ideas as to what the next phase would be and I believe it is vital for somebody with Mr. Hellyer's experience to appear as one of the witnesses.

Mr. Roberts: Would you suggest that the government leader in the Senate be called?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I would not be opposed to the idea.

The Chairman: I think Mr. Lewis has another question.

Mr. Lewis: I want to avoid a lengthy discussion.

Mr. Barrett: You started this one.

Mr. Lewis: I intended to start a discussion. I knew there would be one and I knew some

members of the committee would react as they did. You can attribute political motives if you like; I cannot stop you. Politicians always do that, one to the other. But it is my sincere opinion that when a member of the government takes a point of view contrary to that of his colleagues, who are directly responsible for affairs in a particular field, it is the duty of the committee to discuss the position with him. It does not have to be political. The fact that there is this difference of opinion is public knowledge. I do not suggest that Mr. Kierans should come here so that we can find out where he stands; we know that. But when there is this kind of difference of opinion in the government—and I am sure that there are differences of opinion most of the time, the only difference here being that this particular difference of opinion has been enunciated publicly—it is worth while, desirable and instructive to hear, from the person who opposes what is at the moment official government policy, the reason for his opposition.

Some of the reasons given for the unwisdom, if I may put it that way, of setting a time limit have impressed me. My motion invites; it does not force. I do not intend that anybody should be forced to come. Nevertheless I can see that if a deadline is set difficulties will be created. Mr. Kierans is busy; that did not occur to me. Therefore on your assurance and the assurance of other members of the committee that the matter will be discussed and that Mr. Kierans very likely will be invited, I am prepared to withdraw the motion.

The Chairman: Is that satisfactory to members of the committee? May the motion be withdrawn?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Motion (Mr. Lewis) withdrawn.

Mr. Cafik: I hope that Mr. Lewis' statement does not imply that all members of the Steering Committee agree that Mr. Kierans ought to appear.

Mr. Lewis: If some committee members do not agree to that, I can introduce the motion again.

Mr. Barrett: You are keeping the entire matter non-political, of course.

Mr. Lewis: Just as non-political as the way Liberal members treat these matters.

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I wish to talk about the list of witnesses to be called before this committee. That list struck me as being far too heavily weighted with academic and theoretical people, so far as the questions before this committee are concerned, and I think it would be better if more people with practical backgrounds, possessing knowledge of the subject matters to be discussed before the committee, were to be called. To hear such people might be more useful to this committee than hearing the theories of many academics. Therefore, instead of calling too many academics or theoreticians—and both Mr. Kierans and Mr. Camp are theoreticians, neither having had practical experience in matters we are concerned with—we ought to call more witnesses who have had practical experience. One name I suggest is that of Mr. Léger who has recently returned, after being embarrassed—

Some hon. Members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Lewis: I beg your pardon—ambassador in Paris.

Mr. Barrett: That was a convenient slip of the tongue.

Mr. Harkness: Previous to that he was ambassador to NATO. He has a long background of practical experience in dealing with the particular matters we are studying. Another name I might suggest is that of Air Chief Marshal Miller, who has had greater experience from a military point of view in dealing with questions before the committee than anyone else in Canada.

Mr. Barrett: We could call General Allard.

Mr. Harkness: Presently he is head of our defence staff.

Mr. Barrett: We could also call General Dare.

Mr. Harkness: General Dare, I presume, will give us the views of the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Thompson: You could include Mr. George Ignatieff.

Mr. Harkness: I was going to mention George Ignatieff because he will be here for a few days before going on to his posting at Geneva. He was our ambassador to NATO for a number of years, and ambassador at the United Nations. I think this committee will gain a great deal of specific information from

men like these, who have had practical experience in dealing with questions of interest to the committee during the past 10 or 20 years. We will get more information from men like these than from men who are dealing with this subject matter from a purely academic or theoretical point of view.

The Chairman: These are valuable suggestions. If there are any other names to come forward, they will be considered. We wish to get witnesses from as wide a range as possible.

Mr. Harkness: One man who would be invaluable, and I do not know if we can obtain him, is Dean Rusk. Perhaps we might obtain one of the assistant secretaries who served during his regime. These men are not now employed in government business and therefore might be available.

Mr. Marshall: When dealing with the role of Canada's defence forces in any foreign policy, perhaps the committee might consider calling members of the defence association who represent the reserve forces in Canada, now integrated into the Canadian Armed Forces. It might be interesting to hear what such people have to say. Their information might be valuable.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): I want to speak about Mr. Lewis' withdrawing his motion. Possibly the matter he raised might be referred to the Steering Committee, and it might make a report. There is a precedent for that kind of action. It will be remembered that both Mr. Brewin and Mr. MacDonald (Egmont), who are members of the house, were called as witnesses before that committee. While I do not consider them experts, I felt their testimony was useful to the committee. I merely felt that Mr. Lewis' recommendation might be examined by the Steering Committee, after which it could report to the main committee.

Mr. MacLean: I want to add a few words to what Mr. Harkness has said. We must remember that more people wish to appear before this committee than we could ever hear. We must be careful not to create an impression that all someone who is not an expert, or who is a self-appointed expert, has to do in order to appear automatically as a witness before this committee is to sound off in public, on radio or television, expressing some point of view.

Surely we must bear in mind the people we want to call before this committee are people

that we as a committee believe are expert in the field, and have come to some particular point of view as a result of that experience, and within those limitations we should try to hear every point of view, but from experts.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I just want to follow up the last line of Mr. MacLean's statement, which I think is very important. We could get into a confrontation between the practical people with years of experience and the so-called theoreticians. I think that some of the theoretic people also attempt to be practical. The basic thing, and one of the primary virtues of this is that we should look at all points of view and possibilities in the broadest possible spectrum. Surely the very fact this committee is meeting is so that it can have the freedom to look at the widest possible spectrum. I have in mind two specific persons, who, I think, might make useful presentations to the committee. One is an academic, professor David Cox, who has written and said some very interesting things. He has done a good deal of study on NATO and NORAD. Another person, not so much on the specifics of defence, but later when we move into the question of foreign aid, and a person with a great deal of experience, is principal Escott Reid, who is an outstanding representative of this country, and one who has contributed a great deal to the subject of foreign aid.

The Chairman: Are there any other suggestions with reference to witnesses the committee should consider?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): I would like to suggest the name of Chester Ronning for The China review.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Professor Paul Lin.

Mr. Lewis: At McGill University.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard, you are suggesting Chester Ronning for—

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): China.

Mr. Roberts: Your list has got so long I am not sure if these names are not already on it. I think the committee should consider John Holmes and Payton Lyon.

Mr. Winch: If that decision is made, I would have to resign.

Mr. Harkness: Both have had a considerable amount of practical experience, as well as now being in the academic field. They are on both sides.

The Chairman: Any further suggestions? If you think of names later, please give them to members of the Steering Committee and they will be considered carefully. It is just a question of time in making sure all points of view are expressed before the committee.

Mr. Prud'homme: Mr. Laniel said jokingly, "Mr. Pearson on NATO".

The Chairman: I already have his name.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Earlier Mr. Harkness talked about Dean Rusk. I don't know if there is any possibility of this, but it seems that Mr. McNamara would be a very important person.

Mr. Nowlan: How about Lyndon B.?

Mr. Winch: Is not my memory correct that one of our witnesses is an under-secretary of the United States, Yarmolinsky?

The Chairman: Are there any further suggestions with regard to witnesses? If not, perhaps we could hear any suggestions you may have for the steering committee with regard to its trip to Europe in March.

Mr. Lewis: Is it the intention that all members of the committee will go?

The Chairman: That would be the suggestion, Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis: I have no objection, but to me it is a bit unwieldy.

Mr. Barrett: Is that a political manoeuvre, too?

The Chairman: I may say the Steering Committee emphasized this would not be a trip to just visit defence installations, but to achieve these objectives I outlined. We would get some ideas with regard to civil defence, neutrality arrangements, peacekeeping arrangements—this type of thing.

Mr. Laniel: Would this program restrict us to visiting NATO countries? There are other countries in Europe, like Switzerland, which are in the middle of things. We might like to visit some of these countries.

Mr. Winch: That is the reason the question was raised concerning neutrality. There is Switzerland and Sweden. If the visit continues, one or the other of these countries probably would be visited.

The Chairman: We would not be limited necessarily to NATO countries. Are there any further suggestions?

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): We really have not dealt with one key question which I thought we would discuss; that is the method of proceeding in the general committee. It seems to me that we have been sort of feeling our way. We have tried a couple of different methods. I believe we are trying to achieve a situation that fully satisfies two needs. One is to make the best possible use of a witness in terms of what he has to contribute to the discussion, and then to allow for equal participation by all members of the committee so that neither one party, if that is possible, nor any one individual steals the show.

I am wondering whether there are any suggestions in respect of the way we conduct our meetings. I thought that the way our last meeting was handled was very satisfactory. However, perhaps it is possible that that can be improved upon by suggestions today.

The Chairman: Perhaps you were not here, Mr. MacDonald, but at the beginning of the meeting I suggested experience indicated that the way we had proceeded at our second meeting was probably better than the way we had proceeded at our first meeting. I said that we would try to evolve a procedure along those lines.

Mr. Roberts: I was not here, either, at the beginning of the hearing. This is a point I wish to raise. I believe the procedure during our second meeting was much more satisfactory. Obviously we face a difficulty when we have such a large committee. There is the difficulty of examining the people who appear before us in a logical or continuing manner.

In the committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs the procedure is to deal with a bill on a clause by clause basis. That procedure could not of course be applied rigidly to our committee, but the idea of taking one subject at a time and discussing it would seem to be desirable.

Mr. Laniel: We might recall the situation at our last meeting. Mr. Cafik was third or fourth on the Chairman's list of people who wished to ask questions. However he was the last questioner, because there were so many supplementary questions. I wonder, after a witness is heard, or at the opening of the

meeting if there is no witness, whether the Chairman could not say he will take the names and then run down that list. Each speaker will continue his line of questioning. This may mean different points will be covered, but I think this is a possibility.

The Chairman: Are there any other suggestions with regard to the method of proceeding? The Steering Committee discussed this point last week and decided that the procedure that we followed at our second meeting worked better than the procedure followed at our first meeting. It was suggested that we should continue along that line, but make any changes that experience indicates might be desirable. Generally speaking we would try to take a subject at a time. We would permit supplementaries but would ask members to try to exercise a degree of self discipline. If necessary, the chairman would have to cut off supplementaries if they appeared to be getting far afield.

Mr. Cafik: I have given further thought to this matter, subsequent to our subcommittee meeting. It seems to me that one of the problems is that the asking of irrelevant or non-supplementary supplementaries is almost unavoidable, because in the way we proceed the members asking supplementaries are working blind; they do not know what will come up.

It might be a worth-while suggestion that, after the witness has presented his case, the Chairman would obtain the names of those members who have original or new topics they wish to bring up. The person when giving his name to the Chairman would indicate the topic on which he intended to question. In that way the Chairman might find that there were several major areas on which there would be questioning. The Chairman would then put these, in order, and the person could sit down and formulate any supplementaries he might have under any particular heading. He will know what will be coming up in the future and will be in a position to refrain from asking supplementaries at one time, because he will know that five minutes later it will be more appropriate to do so under the discussion on NORAD, NATO, or whatever it might be.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether I might raise a mechanical question. I see there is a fairly permanent

sign up outside the door. Does that mean that this room is to be our permanent room?

An hon. Member: No.

Mr. MacDonald (Egmont): I hope we will have a room which will be large enough not only for the members of the committee but also for any members of the public who might be interested in our discussions, and members of the press.

The other point I have relates to some suggestions which have been made from time to time about the possibility, on an experimental basis, of broadcasting one of the committee's meetings. I would like to see the Steering Committee give consideration, because of the public and national interest in these questions, to an experimentation in radio and television reporting. By this I do not mean the full and continuous recording of a committee's proceedings, but rather the same kind of application the print media already has of using whatever is pertinent.

I believe that this would be of great value in getting the public reaction to the major questions that will be discussed here. Right now useful reporting by the two major media is prevented. I suggest this would not be a new departure, in the sense that we would be breaking new ground because about a year and a half ago one committee when it travelled out west did on an experimental basis permit this kind of reporting to take place. I believe it would be possible for the committee, if it so decided, to go ahead with this on an experimental basis.

The Chairman: Thank you. The question of television has been discussed on an informal basis. I believe a resolution of the house would be required for this. However, this question can be explored and the steering committee will consider it.

Mr. Prud'homme: I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. MacDonald that this is a point we should look into. Radio and television are now a continuation of modern reporting, for instance in the written word. I once was opposed to this, but now I am getting to the point where I believe this is the modern way to get to the people. I think this is something which might be considered in respect of a committee and perhaps in respect of the house. I attended a meeting in Geneva where this was tried.

The Chairman: We had intended having a meeting of the Steering Committee following this meeting, but now as a result of the many points that have been raised at this meeting I do not think it would be possible for the Steering Committee to complete its business before one o'clock. Therefore I would ask


members of the Steering Committee to meet this afternoon at 3.30. Notice will go out to members of the committee concerning where we will meet, but the meeting will be held at 3.30 in some convenient room.

The meeting is now adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 22

THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Barrett,	Laprise,	Penner,
¹ Brewin,	Legault,	Prud'homme,
Cafik,	Lewis,	Roberts,
Fairweather,	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>),	Smith (<i>Northumberland-</i>
Forrestall,	MacLean,	<i>Miramichi</i>),
Harkness,	Macquarrie,	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>),
Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	MacRae,	² Sulatycky,
<i>Boundary</i>),	Marceau,	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>),
Hymmen,	Nowlan,	Whiting,
Laniel,	Ouellet,	Winch—(30).

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4)(b)

¹ Mr. Brewin replaced Mr. Harding on January 29, 1969.

² Mr. Sulatycky replaced Mr. Goode on January 29, 1969.

CORRIGENDA

Issue No. 14—Thursday, November 21, 1968

Evidence:

Page 560:

Left-hand column line 29—the word elusive should be *lucid*.

Right-hand column line 19—the word Joint should be deleted.

Page 561:

Left-hand column line 40—the word Eighth should be *ACE*.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

(Text)

THURSDAY, January 30, 1969.
(35)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Barrett, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Forrestall, Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laniel, Legault, Lewis, MacDonald (Egmont), MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Ouellet, Roberts, Ryan, Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), Stewart (*Cochrane*), Sulatycky, Winch (25).

Also present: Mesrs. Bell, Gibson, Guay (St. Boniface), Pilon, M.P.'s.

Witnesses: From the Hudson Institute, Inc.: Dr. Raymond D. Gastil and Mr. Robert A. Krupka; *From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* Mesrs. Peter Dobell and Julian Payne.

The Vice-Chairman drew attention to three errors in Issue No. 14 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. The Committee agreed to the three corrections.

The Vice-Chairman introduced the two witnesses for this morning's sitting, Dr. Raymond Gastil and Mr. Robert Krupka of the Hudson Institute. Dr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka both made opening statements concerning civil defence systems.

Members of the Committee questioned the witnesses for the remainder of the meeting, on subjects related to civil defence.

The Committee agreed to print the paper entitled *The Effectiveness of Civil Defense* by Raymond D. Gastil and Robert A. Krupka, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendix cc*)

The Vice-Chairman thanked the witnesses for their testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 1:10 p.m., until Tuesday, February 4, 1969 at 11:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, January 30, 1969

The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, I think we should call the meeting to order. We are entitled to do that under our new powers, and I would think we will shortly have a quorum from the looks of things.

I had a call this morning from our Chairman, Mr. Wahn. He has been prevented by the weather from returning to Ottawa and regrets his inability to preside today. Fortunately, our two resourceful witnesses from the United States, recognizing yesterday evening that it might be impossible to get to Ottawa this morning, decided on reaching Montreal yesterday evening to take a bus here. So they are able to be with us this morning.

It looks as if we will just have a couple of hours with them, as they intend to return on the 4.15 this evening if possible.

Before introducing our witnesses, I should like to ask your indulgence to make a few personal corrections to the record of our *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 14 of Thursday, November 21, 1968. I had a bad day that day. At page 560 in the first column I would like to ask agreement to making a correction in line 29. The word "elusive" should be "lucid". Then, in the right-hand column of page 560 in line 19, the word "joint" should be deleted. In the left-hand column of page 561 the word "eighth" in line 40 should read "ACE". I simply ask your agreement to the making of these corrections. Is it agreed?

Mr. Lewis: For the sake of posterity, yes.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. Now, gentlemen, today the Committee will be hearing the views of our two American witnesses, Dr. Raymond Gastil and Mr. Robert Krupka. Both Mr. Krupka and Dr. Gastil have come to Ottawa specifically to testify before this Committee. Their presence here as a stimulant and as a source of ideas to assist us in our

deliberations about defence policies is much appreciated.

Both Mr. Krupka and Dr. Gastil are presently employed at the Hudson Institute at Croton-on-Hudson, New York, an institution that has received publicity as one of their nation's foremost "think tanks". Biographical detail concerning their other relevant experience has already been circulated to the members.

I would, however, like to draw the attention of the Committee to the particular areas of expertise of the witnesses. Both are currently working in the area of civil defence and civil defence planning. Mr. Krupka has previously directed studies on defence systems involving new areas of technology. Dr. Gastil has engaged in studies for a number of United States Government agencies, including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Army Missile Command; and Department of Defence Research and Engineering.

• 1110

At our meeting on Tuesday, a suggestion was made that the Committee should have more opportunity to hear testimony on some of the technical problems which arise in the field of defence. Dr. Castil and Mr. Krupka will provide us with such an opportunity. There has been very little discussion in Canada of the whole field of civil defence, even, I might say, a reluctance to consider the subject. Dr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka have been asked to try to present their remarks in non-technical language. Unfortunately, due to the inefficiency of the mails, Dr. Gastil's written testimony has only just reached us, so that members have not had a chance to prepare themselves on this complex subject.

I am sure that Dr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka will be pleased to respond to questions which extend beyond the field of civil defence. I have no doubt that they are well-informed on questions affecting the United States and world security problems in general. But members will understand that it is unlikely that they will be sufficiently well-informed on

Canadian affairs to feel confident about responding to questions about Canada beyond the field of civil defence—although they are of course free to do so if they feel up to it.

Now, Dr. Gastil, have you a presentation to make?

Dr. Raymond D. Gastil (Professional Staff, Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, New York): I will try to summarize what is contained in this paper.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. Would you proceed then, please.

Dr. Gastil: All right. Of course, I had hoped that you would all have had this paper in time to look at it. I intended to make a very short summary. I will make a slightly longer one, but the main arguments I am trying to make are in this paper.

It should have been added in the opening remarks that we are not really going to make many comments about Canadian civil defence either, in that our experience has been that of the Americans; so that these will be general remarks. Applying them to the specific Canadian situation is something we will try to do tangentially, but that is not the central thrust of our presentation.

Discussing civil defence, as you know, has lead to a great deal of controversy both on, programs that would be very large and those that would be smaller.

A good deal of this controversy has surrounded the question of what can actually be accomplished by civil defence, and with what kind of reliability; and it is to that question that we are mainly addressing ourselves.

Civil defence programs can be thought of, if you will, as in two major layers of discussion. First, there are high-budget programs. Here we are thinking of programs for building blast shelters costing many billions of dollars. For a United States program you might think of \$10 billion or \$20 billion, up to \$40 billion for such a program. The second layer of discussion is on much less expensive programs, ranging from the present size of the U.S. civil defence program, which is less than \$100 million—an equivalent program in Canada might be less than \$10 million—up to, perhaps, a program in the \$1 billion or \$2 billion a year category. That would still be a relatively small program, with very little building of blast shelters, and so on.

• 1115

Turning to the first level, the attempt of a high-budget program would be to protect the population against all effects of nuclear weapons at the point where the people live at the time of attack; in other words, you would put these shelters in the target areas, perhaps 10 or 15 minutes' walk from where the people actually are.

The shelter is called a blast shelter. That means it protects against the primary effect of a nuclear weapon. The other effects, such as fire, fallout damage, and so on, would also be prevented by a blast shelter. In other words, what overcomes a blast shelter is blast. The other kinds of effects are generally supposed to be more or less 100 per cent prevented by the shelter if it functions as a blast shelter. If it does not function as a blast shelter it has no function.

What can actually be accomplished by very expensive programs? A few years ago it was assumed by Estimates of the Office of Civil Defense in the United States that a high-budget program would still mean that perhaps 20 per cent of the population of the United States would be killed in a major nuclear war. In other words, this would imply the kind of destruction in such a country as the United States that no country in modern times, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union in World War II, has suffered.

There have also been some theoretical estimates in the civil defence field that it would be possible, by the proper placing and sizing of shelters for equivalent amounts of money, to reduce fatalities to far below this level.

We present some argument on this and the thought we have is that it would probably be possible somewhat to reduce this kind of level of destruction; but with civil defence alone—that is, without a large anti-missile system and anti-air system and the whole defensive picture—one would not expect it to be possible, within the realm of the kind of budget we are talking about, to reduce fatalities to very low levels; that is, low in terms of this strange discourse in which we talk about a few millions of fatalities as being low.

The primary reason that it would not be possible to attain these theoretical goals is, first of all, the fact that some localities in the United States—and this would be true no doubt in Canada, too—are so geographically

or geologically situated that it would not be possible, perhaps, actually to put in an effective blast shelter system. In other words, it might be impossible to keep out water, for example, in places such as Manhattan and New Orleans and other places in the United States.

Another type of problem, of course, would be that the environment of a city which has been attacked by nuclear weapons would be such that it might be very, very difficult to get into it for a long period of time—perhaps more than a month—after an attack, and some of those in the shelters might die from secondary causes because of the inability to get them out in a reasonable length of time.

• 1120

Another problem, of course, is the time it takes a person to get into a shelter. It is possible that there will be sufficient warning, not only from radar surveillance systems such as the BMEWS system, but from other types of warning of impending attack, that the majority of people would be in shelters. You cannot, however, count on the type of warning you are going to have. This being the case, even in a very expensive shelter system, you cannot count on getting everybody into the shelters before the weapons arrive. In that case, and by that very fact alone, you are going to lose a number of millions.

I am presenting this as a kind of history of what can be accomplished. We assume that Canada, like the United States, would be much more interested in the low-budget programs for the foreseeable future.

The low-budget program in the United States was originally meant to be what was called the full fallout shelter program. This was a program costing a few billion dollars and consisting of building fallout shelters which would give very great—nearly perfect—protection against radiation dangers after a nuclear attack to all of the people in the United States who would not otherwise have shelters.

The Congress did not accept this kind of program, so another interim program was suggested, and it has remained, up till today, the United States' program. This is the NFSS program—the National Fallout Shelter and Stocking Program.

The program in the United States consists, first, of finding out where are the buildings that will, by the very nature of their con-

struction, provide a good deal of protection against nuclear effects; then of marking these shelters and stocking them with supplies of certain types; and, finally of developing a system by which people know to which shelters they should go in the event of a nuclear attack.

In the case of a nuclear attack against the United States, this system will save many millions of people. However, we feel it has certain limitations. One of the main ones is that the larger amount of shelter tends to be in the centres of the larger cities. The result is that some of those places—which, in any hypothetical nuclear war, are attacked—are in fact, where the shelters are placed. Therefore, in those wars, to have people going to those shelters obviously would not be the ideal thing to do. I repeat, nevertheless, that in any hypothetical war many of those shelters will help the people. I do not want to be too critical of the program. Nevertheless we feel that there will be a tendency of people to wish to move out of the centres of cities in intense crises and that this tendency is probably correct. People will have the right intuition and will want to move away from the middle of cities.

Therefore, we have tended to emphasize the possibility of a program which we call immobilization base program, or sometimes we refer to it as a crisis evacuation program. It is not necessarily founded about evacuation, but is founded on two concepts. One, the idea that the centre of the city is not the place to be in a nuclear war and second, the idea that we are likely to get in many possible wars kinds of warning which will be of a great deal of use in the days and weeks preceding the actual nuclear attack.

In other words, there is going to be a crisis, a kind of Cuban affair if you will, such as we had in 1962 only, we would imagine, much worse than that. We imagine a war breaks out for example in Western Europe; perhaps West Berlin is taken or something of this sort has happened so that the atmosphere of the world is very different and people are suddenly interested in doing things in the civil defence area that they simply are not interested in doing in this kind of peacetime environment.

Therefore, we think a low budget program should concentrate on preparing the plans and capabilities to take advantage of improv-

ing protection in these last couple of weeks, days, and so on, before an actual attack. These kinds of preparations would include in some cases preparations for partial evacuations; in other cases there would be preparations to improve rapidly the capacity of shelters, particularly shelters in areas which are not likely to be target areas, so that at the very minimum we would not want to have to move people toward cities but rather, in so far as possible, have them move away and still have adequate shelter.

• 1125

After that, let me just make remarks on two more subjects. The possibility of recovery after a nuclear attack is often raised as a reason not to be too interested in civil defence. We believe that in so far as it is possible to research a topic of this kind—and I think there are very great limitations on that possibility—there seems to be very little historical experience to suggest that people would, in fact, not continue to act in their own interest and thereby to a large extent in the interest of the country in the face of a nuclear war before, during and after it. In other words, there would be relatively little panic and if the people did survive and if there were food and water enough for biological survival, if you will, then we would assume there would be a good chance for other kinds of recovery.

Nethertheless, the kind of discussion we are talking about here is concentrating on getting people through this attack period and the latter period, in some sense, will have to take care of itself. Also in this regard I think we should mention the fact that even if one believed recovery was impossible from a very large nuclear attack there are a number of possibilities of nuclear wars ranging all the way from a few nuclear weapons being used against particular targets up to much larger possibilities, and certainly in the smaller cases one would want to have a civil defence capability which would be able to preserve as many people as possible.

Finally, the particular position of Canada—the American civil defence debate has tended to revolve about the possibility that civil defence, whether it be blast shelter building or evacuation programs, would tend to exacerbate crises and tend to raise tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is argued that while you are trying to develop a program which will save people you will, at the same time, be developing a program which will raise the

likelihood of war and therefore the end result of the program will be a higher chance of people being killed than as though you had not started the program in the first place.

For a number of reasons I disagree with that argument, but I think in the case of Canada the force of the argument in any event is much less because I think it can be argued that the kind of civil defence actions, whether these be peacetime actions in the building of shelters or wartime actions such as evacuation, will be much less important to the development of the crisis than will actions in the United States. An example of this kind of thinking may be found in the civil defence efforts in Europe where it is interesting to note that the countries with by far the largest programs are Sweden and Switzerland. Sweden, for example, as also to some extent the other Scandinavian countries, emphasized the placing of shelters in all buildings, and these are not only fallout shelters but even low protection blast shelters. They also emphasize evacuation programs. Switzerland has had somewhat similar programs.

• 1130

One of the reasons these programs could be developed as much as they were was this decoupling, if you will, between civil defence and the kinds of strategic considerations that often get involved in the debate. We would particularly think that Canada might be interested in the low budget approach in evacuation possibilities because of the possibility that the United States might be attacked without Canada being attacked, particularly in small wars, and that Canada would want to be in a position to evacuate people from the long fallout areas which might develop from nuclear attacks against the United States. Therefore, there are a number of reasons it seems to me why Canada might want to be in a position to take advantage of saving some of its citizens in these events.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Doctor. Would the Committee like to hear Mr. Krupka before questioning?

Some hon. Membres: Yes.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Krupka, do you have something to add?

Mr. Robert A. Krupka (Professional Staff, Hudson Institute, Incorporated, Croton-on-Hudson, New York): Yes, let me just make a

few remarks. Let me tell you what my work is generally at the Institute—has been before. Basically I am a technologist and I have been working on effects of nuclear weapons and protection against those effects for perhaps the past 15 years. Over those years the programs or feelings about them have changed a good deal from the days of long warning time bomber defences to very short ABM systems in which warning times are in the order of 15 minutes or less.

Let me make one or two statements about attacks and warning times. It is quite clear in the United States that "bolt out of the blue" attacks are very devastating attacks and there are almost no systems other than short-access, high-quality blast systems that will solve the problem, coupled with ABM programs.

At the other end of the spectrum there are a lot of people in the United States who, even today, work on attacks of 25,000 and 30,000 megatons on the United States and try to design programs around them. We think those are kind of uninteresting attacks since, if you put 30,000 megatons on the United States it is just a very bad situation. I once read a report by a man who was working in Pittsburgh and his job was to look at the water supply problem in Pittsburgh after a nuclear attack. He wanted to be a really good researcher so the thing to do is pick the worst case and solve that; then you kind of have the problem licked. So what he did was put 350 megatons on Pittsburgh and then worried about the water supply. Well, clearly you do not have a problem. Those are the kinds of arguments you do get in civil defence. People say you cannot do anything because you do not have any warning and that is right; you cannot do anything because the attacks are large and that is right, too.

I spent many years working on NORAD in Cheyenne Mountain. It is clear with NORAD, too; NORAD does not survive a direct hit. It has several hundred psi protection but if you drop a 10-mt weapon on NORAD it is gone and you dig it out nicely—and Omaha, too. We have got weapons designed so that you can dig things out at 800 feet or 1,000 feet by multiple shots. There is almost no place where you can go and have a nice umbrella over your head if the enemy is kind of dedicated and wants to get you. Those kinds of attacks are the kinds that people like to think about—both people pro and con civil defence. We at the Institute must take—

• 1135

Mr. Lewis: You do not mean they like?

Mr. Krupka: They really do like it. We call it megaton oneupmanship. If I design a civil defence system against a 2,000 megaton attack, the other guy one ups me and he says: "No, 10,000 megatons and you are dead", and that is right; he has got you. You see, it is that kind of a game. You work on 1-MT weapons and the Russians say: "50-MT—100-MT." You know, "We have got you." Well, that is right. The Americans say: "1,000 megatons", if you want.

Mr. Fairweather: Does anyone work in reverse?

Mr. Krupka: Yes, people work, and for very good reasons, in reverse, mainly because smaller weapons give you larger initial nuclear radiation for the buck. They are called "clean weapons".

The Vice-Chairman: I would ask the members to hold their questions at this time.

Mr. Krupka: The issue I am trying to make is that in thinking about nuclear war, writing scenarios and designing kinds of attacks, anything is possible—anything is possible in technology. If you think about it we can build it. If you want to talk about multiple re-entry vehicles, if you do not like 10 per shot we will give you 20 or 50. If you want 10 cities, fine. It is just a matter of money. Right now we will build a booster, we will protect it, we will give you 20 cities per shot. So you cannot end-run the civil defence problem with strategic technology nor can you end-run it by not assigning the Soviets or others with the capability of doing it in the future.

What do we really talk about? What is the sense of all of this? The sense is quite clear, and that is they are clearly prudential systems. You would not like to lose half your population by default when the technology is clearly there for protecting them even in time of emergency. One of my colleagues likes to use the statement that civil defence and protection is not over when the bombs fall. You keep digging, you keep putting stuff over your head as the weapons fall, as the fallout comes. What you are interested in is staying alive and you are interested in protection. So you are going to work very hard before a war, during a war, to keep yourself alive. That is the name of the game.

On the other hand, it is very difficult to support those kinds of dynamic programs in peacetime. It is hard to make people—or Congress—much less people—think about nuclear war, on a sort of day-to-day basis. It is not possible and it is kind of unfair to do that. What we advocate in low-budget programs is what we call “crisis programs”—emergency programs—programs in which you are able to do things quickly in a crisis where essentially the country is up for grabs to protect people. You are willing to use almost all your resources in a very short time. You are interested in things like evacuation, emergency shelter building, resource allocation during that period, protection any way you can get it. We have tried a few programs, written a few programs, and we think it is possible to prepare emergency plans, well thought-out plans that might be given out to the country in a crisis. It might make a big difference.

Certainly the problem in the United States is a very difficult one because of the high urban population but, on the other hand, one would not like to lose the rural population for lack of knowledge about protection. So my argument here essentially is, learn something about nuclear facts, about what is possible. Unless you do that somebody is liable to sell you a bill of goods. You want to be, it seems to me, very well informed about what fallout is, what you can do to protect against it, how much it decays, what blast effects are like, and what kind of supplies you may need in the shelter. Are there cheap things you can do in peacetime that would make a big difference in wartime? That is the kind of questions we are addressing ourselves to, and you might like to do that. We think the answer is yes, there are many things you can do and that will not cost a lot of money.

I think that is about all I would like to say. If there are questions of a kind of technical nature that people might like to address to me I would be happy to answer them.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Krupka. I think we could proceed on the basis that any member of the Committee will feel free to address a question to either of you gentlemen if that is agreeable to you. The first questioner I have is Mr. Cafik.

Mr. Cafik: Mr. Chairman, I do not know that I should direct this question to one particular witness. I think either one of them may contribute. But as Canadians I think we are in a slightly different position than the

United States in that probably we would not be the object of a direct attack. We might end up with the results of an attack on the United States which would overflow into this country and that brings to mind a question. In your studies to what extent do you feel that enemy missiles coming over here would be accurate—to what degree? For instance, if they were shooting at New York would they hit Boston? I think this is quite important to Canadians where we sit right beside large American cities.

• 1140

Mr. Krupka: The CEP—the circular error of probability—that is a term used to denote missile accuracy.

Mr. Lewis: What was the first word?

Mr. Krupka: Circular error probability. It is a measure in nautical miles where a number, such as 50 per cent, of the weapons fired at you fall in a circle of that radius. We think the circular error probability of weapons today is down to one nautical mile.

Mr. Cafik: So 50 per cent of the weapons aimed at a particular point would fall within one mile. Where would the other 50 per cent go?

Mr. Krupka: I think it depends; there will be some weapons we consider unreliable in the sense that they will not be within that calculation at all. They might go almost literally anywhere. I think the chance of a weapon which is going to an unknown point hitting anything very important and killing many people is quite low, so if a weapon is really going wild, I do not think the fear needs to be very great that it will kill many people.

On the other hand, I do not know how to measure the probability of the Soviet Union considering the United States a separate target from Canada. I have no way of judging that.

Mr. Cafik: In an attack by the Russians, we will say, on the western world, would it not be reasonable to assume that the attacks would be to immobilize a counter attack by the United States?

Mr. Krupka: That is one kind of an attack . . .

Mr. Cafik: Would you anticipate that the primary purpose of an attack would be to destroy population? What advantage would it

be to the Soviet Union to wipe out the American population as opposed to wiping out the deterrent effect, or the attacking effect, of the United States?

Dr. Gastil: This is a much discussed question. It is always assumed that if you are really looking at it as a purely rational attack, the overwhelming way to be attacked will be against our missiles, air bases and so forth—parts of the purely defensive apparatus—and if that type of attack occurs then, of course, over-all casualties, and so forth, from the civil defence point of view will be much less. However, Soviets have, in their discussions in the past of what they would attack, listed categories of targets which range all the way from things such as transportation, communication and industrial centres—and by that you can read cities—to the types of strategic forces, so I do not think we can necessarily assume that they are going to avoid cities.

• 1145

Mr. Cafik: All right. In a massive attack against the United States and presuming that no weapons fell directly in Canada but very close to it along the border—Detroit, and so on—what would be the effect of fallout in this country? For how long a period would we be under this cloud of fallout?

Mr. Krupka: Well, the decay varies, but generally we try to think in terms of about two weeks.

Mr. Cafik: Then things would more or less be back to normal at that stage?

Mr. Krupka: At that time the fallout will have decayed sufficiently so that people in some places could emerge, or that decontamination would be possible.

Dr. Gastil: That is, over the vast mass of the country. Now, there would be particular smaller areas where it might last for a much longer period of time but I think, to get back to the original point, that civil defence preparations to reduce casualties to near zero in the event of the attack you are talking about would be quite practical and quite possible.

Mr. Cafik: Many of us have heard of the civil defence activities of Sweden and Switzerland and I think it would be of interest, to me at any rate, to find out what you know about the civil defence activities of a country like Russia. To what extent are they concerned with this problem; more than the United States or less?

Mr. Krupka: I could say something about that. Leon Gouré of the Rand Corporation has written a paper which you might like to read, about Russian civil defence. He actually made a visit there and talked to a number of reporters, American and foreign newspapermen, in Moscow and categorically they have said there are not any fallout shelters in Moscow.

Leon, in his testimony before Congress, showed pictures of fallout shelters in Moscow. He said the reason they did not know about them is that they did not know how to look for them. You see, the ventilator in the back of the apartment building in Moscow is, in fact, a ventilator for the basement shelter. The Moscow subway is a fallout shelter and has, in fact, blast doors, if you are willing to look for them.

There is a book on civil defence put out by the Soviet Union and they have some excellent designs for rural shelters—they are trench type shelters with a covering—and there is every indication that they take gas warfare—chemical, biological and radiological warfare—much more seriously than we do. We think they do have, in fact, a very good, ongoing program.

Mr. Cafik: Now, do I gather...

Dr. Gastil: Let me add to that a bit. It is very difficult to tell what the Russians have, partly because they do a great deal of talking about their capabilities and they claim to have millions of people trained to handle the problems of a nuclear war. They have talked a great deal about evacuation systems but it is hard to know how operational these would actually be. Therefore, I think there is a lack of information. My general judgment is that they do somewhat more than the United States in the civil defence area, but apparently a good deal less than a country like Sweden.

Mr. Cafik: Did I read you correctly when you were talking about apartments with blast shelters in the basement? When they build new buildings, do they take this problem into account?

Mr. Krupka: There is an indication they do.

Mr. Cafik: They put blast shelters in all—

Mr. Krupka: Not blast shelters; fallout shelters.

• 1150

Mr. Cafik: Fallout shelters. Is the public in Russia trained in the use of them, do you feel?

Mr. Krupka: I can only go by the testimony given in Congress that I have read by people who have been there and our experts, and the evidence seems to be that they are trained in a way the United States does not do training, but how widespread it is I do not know. We do know that the literature is available. I have a Russian civil defence book and it is very good.

Mr. Cafik: I have one last question. In respect of Sweden and Switzerland, what is the public reaction to their approach to civil defence? Do you consider them sort of alarmist, or do the people feel that the government is being overly cautious in this particular regard? How is it viewed by the general public?

Dr. Gastil: We had a person from Sweden at the Institute a couple of years ago who looked into this and one of her conclusions at that time was—that is about three or four years ago now—that people in countries such as Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and so forth, do not generally question the government in the sense that it is popular in England, the United States and perhaps Canada. Therefore, there is a different attitude on the part of the people in relation to the government, and they tend to go along with these things much more so than we would without questioning.

Now, Sweden and Switzerland, of course, have also very strong defence establishments in general, so their feeling has been that true strength will keep them separate from the wars of the world, so to speak. Therefore, civil defence seems to me to fit very neatly into that package and that is probably the way it has been viewed.

Some of the other countries in Europe, of course, such as France and England notably—less so Germany—have taken an absolutely all or nothing attitude towards the whole field. Their civil defence is very slightly developed and they just have not made any significant preparations.

Mr. Cafik: In the civil defence activities of Sweden and Switzerland, have you any idea what proportion of their defence budget would go to civil defence?

Dr. Gastil: I do not know. I saw a figure the other day that Sweden was now spending at the rate of \$3 per capita on civil defence.

Mr. Cafik: Well, how much on defence as a total figure per capita; do you know?

Dr. Gastil: I am not sure.

Mr. Cafik: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MacLean: Surely one of the main purposes of civil defence is to frustrate the basic cause for an attack. It would seem to me that if a country were attacking another country its objective would be to destroy the will to resist, rather than necessarily to kill a lot of people. That might be incidental, but in our very complex civilization, could you not have a situation where by true civil defence efforts you might save a lot of life—the majority of the population—yet have such a complete breakdown in our complicated way of life that is so dependent on communications, power, water and sewage, food distribution, and so on that the will to resist would be destroyed nearly completely because of the utter breakdown in all of these services, coupled with the destruction of many key people in governments, plus the destruction of some of the hardware for retaliation.

Surely if civil defence is going to be a deterrent to an attack in the sense that it would frustrate the purpose of an attack, you have to go beyond just the saving of lives. You have to have a population that is still in a position to function.

Dr. Gastil: I think that is right. We have tried in our own thinking to separate the concept of civil defence from the debate on deterrents, partly because of some of these issues of the degree to which civil defence might contribute to the exacerbation of crisis, particularly such actions as evacuation. We have even thought of the possibility of pointing out to the Soviet Union in a crisis that we would not look upon their evacuations with alarm, for example, so that we can get a symmetry to the sense that civil defence was to protect civilian populations from a war that might occur. But to go back to your point, certainly you would want to try to avoid the breakdown of the will to resist; you would want to try to avoid the destruction of key leaders, but I think many historical examples suggest that breaking the will of

people in general—their will to survive, so to speak, or their will to resist—is often exceedingly difficult by the application of sheer power. You can do it in other ways.

• 1155

Some people have no will to resist in the beginning. For example, the siege of Leningrad, about which we have just had a book come out again—there have been several books on that subject—is an example of a situation in which all of the public services you are thinking about, the water and the sanitation and the normal distribution of food and so forth, broke down for some very long period of time and still it did not break the will of the people of Leningrad to resist.

They continued to hold the city and continued to hold together in a very remarkable way. Now, they have a particular social system that perhaps we cannot duplicate, but I think you can give a lot of other examples of that.

On the other hand, if the will is eroded to begin with—one German soldier crossing the border in World War II in some countries tended to paralyse the defence capabilities of the country. So I think all you can do is do the best you can along this line, and know that in some cases you will succeed and in some you will fail.

Mr. MacLean: I do not want to take up too much time, so I will jump now to a different question. I suppose consideration has been given to the possibility that perhaps the kind of civilization we know—I was going to say western civilization, but I mean not only that but the Russian civilization as well, in other words, a highly developed and complex civilization—is embarked in a direction that may not, in the long run, due to the fact that it runs completely counter to the laws of nature or the laws of God, whichever you prefer, that our type of civilization is not a viable one.

We take a very snobbish view of ourselves, I think, and conclude that we are the finest product of civilization up until now and that, therefore, we should hope that some time in the future the highest ambition of other less developed people should be to copy our way of life. But philosophically is it not possible that we are off on the wrong track entirely, and that our type of development as a civilization may have in itself the seeds of its own destruction, and that we are trying to prevent something that is inevitable, perhaps.

This is a very dark view of the situation. But after all we learn from history. At the present time we have archaeologists digging and working in places like Troy and so on. Is it not possible that in a couple of thousand years from now there may be Eskimo archaeologists poking around in New York and Montreal and Moscow?

Dr. Gastil: I do not know how to answer that.

The Vice-Chairman: They both sound a little hypothetical.

Mr. Krupka: The resident of New York City feels towards civil defence sort of the same way, that without New York City life is just not worth going on.

Now, talk to a guy in Colorado and he does not see that argument at all. In fact, he would say, you know if New York City goes it is not all that bad, in fact there are some latent benefits. And as far as survival is concerned, he survives. With 10 megatons on New York City he can survive quite nicely, and goes on living. He goes up in the mountains and shoots the deer as he usually does and goes out and strings them up, and he has his water. He is unaffected.

• 1200

Mr. MacLean: I have one supplementary question along this line. Is it not possible that modern cities are obsolete or obsolescent? After all, cities were designed, I suppose, in the first place for obvious reasons that no longer exist as a convenience for communication. People had to be near together when communications were difficult, and when transportation depended on muscle power the same was true. Then you could put a wall around them for defence. But all of these things have passed from the plus side to the negative side, as far as cities are concerned in this modern age. Communication, transportation and defence are more difficult, I would think, in a huge complex metropolitan area than they are in an area where the population is more evenly distributed and spread out.

Dr. Gastil: It is certainly true if you think of civil defence as being a defence. It may be that there are types of active defence systems which would actually benefit a country such as Japan, for example, as compared to one as spread out as the United States or Canada.

Mr. MacLean: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: I would hope the problem Mr. MacLean has posed might be solved in some other way than by ten megatons.

I would like to ask Mr. Krupka what reasons he has, in terms of international policy, to assume a limited nuclear attack, if one should occur. If a war breaks out between the Soviet Union and the United States of America what logical reason in history, in strategy or in anything else is there for assuming a limited nuclear attack by the Soviet Union on the United States—or by the United States on the Soviet Union, if the United States should be the first one to make such a move.

Mr. Krupka: I do not think I will answer that question; I will let you do it! That point is a subject...

Mr. Lewis: You are the one who was talking about the oneupmanship and...

Mr. Krupka: Yes. I was using it in a different context, though; that if in fact the Soviet Union does have a 25,000 megaton capability the problem of civil defence may become academic.

Mr. Lewis: My understanding of what you were implying or arguing when you made those statements—and if I am wrong you can correct me—was that there are levels of nuclear attack against which there “ain’t no defence”, if my English teachers at school will forgive me, but that you are therefore preparing for levels of nuclear attack against which you think there is some defence. What logical reason is there for assuming that if there is a nuclear attack by one super power against another super power that it will be at the lower rather than at the maximum level of their capability?

Dr. Gastil: Part of the argument is given here on pages 2 and 3 of this paper. Back in 1963 the office of civil defence was talking about a Soviet attack of over 5,000 megatons against the United States. In 1970 we would judge that would still be a very large attack. The reasons for this is that given the projections of Soviet weapons for that period we would have to assume there was virtually no attrition by U.S. forces of Soviet capability during the war. Second, we would have to assume that U.S. defensive capabilities against submarines, missiles or airplanes were practically nonexistent. Third, we would have to assume a high reliability for Soviet systems. Fourth, we would have to assume that the Soviet Union would be willing to fire

essentially everything they had, holding nothing back for post-attack bargaining purposes. So that in terms of the forces as they now are in the world and the capabilities of the Soviet Union, 5,000 megatons in 1970 would be a real achievement for the Soviet Union and it is something they would be unlikely to do.

As you look into the future at the buildup of forces you will see that it is very often the case that the total megatonnage does not go up. As a matter of fact, it goes down. For example, if you look at the buildup of U.S. forces from 1960 to 1975 you will see there has been very little if any, and in some ways a decrease in the actual amount of megatonnage in the U.S. forces. As the weapons get more complex, more highly advanced, and so forth, the megatonnage they deliver tends to be reduced. For example, the B-52 bomber, in terms of its ability to deliver sheer megatonnage, was unexcelled. B-52s are, of course, gradually being phased out and when we think in the future of attack bombers or long-range bombers they will probably be able to carry a good deal less than the B-52. Even the B-52, as it gets the more advanced systems, tends to carry less megatonnage. So, the projection is not toward these extreme abilities to deliver sheer megatonnage. As somebody mentioned here, one of the objectives of the attack would probably be to destroy the opponent's strategic forces. That objective is usually attained by such things as high reliability, high accuracy, and so forth, which may not be closely correlated with simply megatonnage.

• 1205

However, there is another argument. That is part of the more or less technical argument. The other argument is that there are a number of different situations where it would be possible for a war to be brought to an end before both sides had totally destroyed one another. The whole discussion of nuclear war is in some sense in never never land because it is very, very hard to imagine just how you get into a nuclear war in the first place. We have thought a great deal about decisions or events which would really lead people to use nuclear weapons. One reason we do not think the United States should count on nuclear weapons for its defence, or indeed even for the defence of Europe, is because of this difficulty of getting into a situation where you actually start having these kinds of exchanges. We find it is almost impossible to get into that kind of situation. Nevertheless,

in this impossible world one can imagine a situation where one side could deliver a few weapons along with a message that this should now stop, and it would be theoretically possible to stop at some early point. For example, they often talked about a counter force phase followed by a counter value phase. In other words, a phase of attack by strategic forces on strategic forces, followed by a phase of attack on cities. It might be possible to end the war between one phase and the other. These are hypothetical phases and in actual war would not be that distinct. Nevertheless, many analysts assume some possibility of stopping them.

Mr. Lewis: Is it on that kind of analysis that you propose a country like yours spend up to \$40 billion and a country like ours up to \$4 billion or \$5 billion on civil defence?

Dr. Gastil: No. The \$40 billion program would be meant to greatly reduce the effects of an all-out war. Any program you talk about would greatly reduce the effects of an all-out war. We are saying that if you are talking about wanting to hold casualties, fatalities, to some particular level and you have an intuitive feeling that beyond that level you might as well lose them all, then the chance of holding to that level should not be judged only in terms of worst case analysis, you should think in terms of a number of other possibilities and the ability of your civil defence system, whatever it is, whether low or high, to defend against these possibilities.

Mr. Lewis: What would be the minimum cost of the kind of civil defence that you would recommend for the United States if you were now giving evidence before a Congressional Committee? We will divide that figure by 10 and assume that that would be the cost for Canada. May I say that without any knowledge—let alone expertise—in this field that this 10 per cent figure does not strike me as logical for a country which is scattered across a large area, as is the case in Canada. The mere population ratio is probably not a logical ratio. My logic tells me that it is wrong because you have a different set of circumstances in the stretch of our population across the continent. What size of civil defence budget would you recommend as a minimum for the United States to a Congressional Committee?

• 1210

Mr. Krupka: I have a feeling that if I were the Director of Civil Defence I would recom-

mend that they do not cut my budget any more. Do you mean next year they give me the same amount they gave me last year?

Mr. Lewis: What is the budget?

Mr. Krupka: \$79 million.

Mr. Lewis: What has it accomplished?

Mr. Krupka: Almost nothing, so I would hope they would not cut it.

Mr. Lewis: In order that you may continue to have almost nothing.

Mr. Krupka: In order that the entire thing does not go down the drain.

Dr. Gastil: We have made this point before. The system we now have in the United States, in almost any war you can imagine, would save many millions of people. What I think Mr. Krupka means is that the present system is not really adding much to this capability year by year but by having the kind of budget that we have had up until now we have been able to develop a system that can save some millions of dollars. We would hope with the \$79 million to do some other things and perhaps add to that capability.

Mr. Lewis: You said "save some millions of dollars"; I presume you meant "millions of lives".

Mr. Gastil: Yes, save some millions of lives.

To go back to your question about what we would recommend, I think you would want to think of civil defence, in the large budget sense, as not being just an isolated item. In other words, I do not think you would want to go into a huge civil defence system without thinking about a rounded defensive system that included active and passive defences and other types of things, and then you would want to figure out the size of your civil defence budget in terms of that more complex system.

I personally am in favour of defensive systems in general, and the exact proportion of this to be spent on civil defence would have to be worked out after taking that possibility seriously.

Mr. Lewis: I have three more questions which should not take too long—at least in the asking—and you are welcome, as far as I am concerned, to make your answers as long as you like.

What did you mean when you said that if you had a nuclear unit—whatever it may

be—fall you would have dangers resulting from fall-out for about two weeks and then you would return to normal. That sort of contradicts all I remember having read about fallout—it lasts much longer than two weeks.

Mr. Krupka: You really should not contradict that.

Mr. Lewis: I am not contradicting it, I am asking.

Mr. Krupka: No, no. It should not contradict all you have read because "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons", which is the bible in radiation effects, generally shows a decay rate such that after two weeks the biological hazard is very very low. That is, after deposition of fallout at the rate of, say, 3,000 roentgens per hour, that rate will fall sufficiently in two weeks such that one could emerge from the shelter for some periods of time and not have very damaging effects.

Mr. Lewis: You are talking now about the effect of the fallout on the human being?

Mr. Krupka: Oh yes.

Mr. Lewis: You are not talking about the effect of the fallout on grass, animals, vegetables, trees, fruits and all the other things that you may later consume with deleterious results?

Mr. Krupka: We have done an awful lot of work on ecology in the United States—so-called post attack research. A lot of work has been done on that very subject, and we think that the limiting factor is the human being and not the food sources. We think there are lots of ways of decontaminating food sources. Uptake problems of strontium, iodine and so forth, into certain foods could be reversed or minimized. The roentgens on the human body are probably the limiting factor in postattack damage.

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Mr. Gastil: I think one of the points that should be made is that when you are thinking of a postattack environment you want, as it were, to throw away all the assumptions that you make about the pre-attack environment. In other words, in our pre-attack environment now maybe there is a test in Nevada and the level of radiation goes up in the milk somewhere in Utah and so forth and people get very excited about it. There is a possibility of a very low number of people getting

perhaps leukaemia or some other type of disease from these sorts of events.

Mr. Lewis: What do you mean by a low number, only one half of 1 per cent or something like that?

Mr. Gastil: No, no, just two or three people or a dozen—this kind of thing. In a peacetime environment you are rightly worried about these kinds of things but in a postattack environment, when you are talking about millions of people being killed by other effects, your standards are going to be very different. You are going to have numbers of people—thousands of people dying of the kinds of effects that we worry about in peacetime. They will not be important numbers in comparison with perhaps 5, 10 or 40 million people dead, but they would have been important if you had looked at them from this point of view.

Mr. Krupka: We are not trying to say that we are looking for a post-attack world that is as good as the pre-attack world, because that is clearly out of the question. In fact we are both arms controllers in a sense, because we understand the problems. Our job is not to have nuclear wars because we understand those problems very clearly. Nevertheless we sometimes talk about going back to the 1920's in post-attack and having that kind of a world, or maybe the early 1890's and so on.

Mr. Gastil: And those kind of death rates.

Mr. Lewis: May I ask you a question about Switzerland and Sweden? Would their civil defence programs not be in large measure concerned with conventional warfare as well as nuclear warfare? As Switzerland is right on the continent of Europe would it not be concerned about the possibility of a conflict in which nuclear weapons are not used?

Mr. Gastil: They are in the sense that they are direct descendants of World War II programs and for a number of years basically their assumptions in terms of the type of protection and so forth were based on World War II concepts. More recently they have started thinking in terms of the kind of blast effect, fallout effect and so forth which are directly associated with nuclear war. Switzerland assumes that it might be attacked, for example, with tactical nuclear weapons, as does Sweden—both tactical and strategic.

Mr. Lewis: I was merely referring to the size of their civil defence budget. For example, I would have thought it would partly be

explained by the fact that it is a continuation of the Second World War civil defence as well as by any additional defence measures they may take against the possibility of nuclear attack. Is that not true?

Mr. Gastil: Historically, yes, I think so.

Mr. Lewis: Now in connection with the Soviet civil defence system, how much credibility can one really put into the motions that are presented in good faith, let me add, by people like Mr. Goure or anyone else who visits the Soviet Union for the purpose of investigating civil defence? How much can they in fact learn?

Mr. Krupka: Well, he brought back pictures showing the blast doors in the Moscow subway; he brought back pictures showing the outside ventilators in apartment buildings—clearly for civil defence purposes; he brought back documents and he brought back two very good scintillation counters—radiation counters, which were an excellent device.

Mr. Lewis: Was that sufficient for you to make a conclusion that the Soviet civil defence program is higher than the American one?

Mr. Krupka: No. In that sense it is not for me.

Mr. Lewis: Is it for Mr. Goure or anybody else?

• 1220

Mr. Krupka: He makes the statement that they take the problem very seriously and that every worker has civil defence training. That seems very clear, and I have no reason to doubt it.

Mr. Gastil: I think if you look at their own statements and believe what they say they are doing in civil defence areas then you would assume they are doing a good deal more than we are.

Mr. Lewis: Do you believe their statements in other areas?

Mr. Gastil: Well, that is an interesting question. One thing is clear, that they do not accept the idea which has been prominently accepted in the United States, that it is good for the strategic balance not to have defences. In fact, they continue to emphasize the fact that they will be able to protect their people, and to emphasize evacuation as well as sheltering possibilities, which is one thing that

has not been talked about in the United States officially for many years. So we assume they are doing things that we are not doing in our country. However, the actual size of what they are doing does not seem to be as impressive, particularly in terms of blast shelters, as in Sweden.

Mr. Krupka: We believe that the Soviets do not look at defensive systems as being provocative; it is merely an extension of their basic policy.

The Vice-Chairman: We have seven questioners, and if Mr. Fairweather returns we will have eight. The next in order are Mr. Laniel, Mr. Brewin, and Mr. Howard. Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: It is my impression that in civil defence you have to give an emphasis on the involvement of people, that is in the protection of North America or of the United States against war. If it is a question of money, perhaps the people can criticize that. But you cannot establish a good civil defence system, I think, unless you involve the people where they are, in their day-to-day life. How are the American people interested, involved in these programs of civil defence in the United States? Are they concerned about them?

Dr. Gastil: I would just like to make a couple of remarks. One of the reasons we have emphasized the crisis programs is the fact that we assume that you would not want to, and perhaps could not, involve the vast masses of people in civil defence until there was actually a crisis staring them in the face. Then they would start wanting the knowledge, and you would be there to give it to them.

Another point is that a number of studies have been made of the polling type as to the attitude of Americans towards civil defence type preparations. At least up to the last couple of years when the last poll was taken, an overwhelming majority of people are in favour of civil defence measures.

Mr. Laniel: Yes, but to make your system work, the question of information to the people is very, very important, and does that reach the people? I am just thinking of Canada here. There was a suggestion made that an approach to civil defence might be the establishment of a mobile civil defence force that could travel from one end of the country to the other, and establish public relations with regional and local authorities.

The problem is to inform the people, and especially to make the people not only depend on the state to protect them; they have to do their share. They must have the will to survive at one level of an attack or another.

It is all right to build protection shelters for blast fallouts, but there are little things that people should know about, as you said, sanitation, water, food, welfare, panic, morale, evacuation. Also the possibility which you touched on, of creating peacetime usage of civil defence forces as in Sweden, for conventional warfare or tactical nuclear weapons but also for riots. Public relations should be so good that the people of the United States and the people of Canada would really feel that these people are there not only for use on the eve of their death. What would be your opinion of some kind of a mobile civil defence force? Have you thought about that?

Mr. Krupka: Yes, we have; in fact that is going to be the subject of our latest paper. The point you make is well taken and we in the States have on-going state and local organizations that are funded by the federal government in matching funds; 50 per cent of the salaries are paid by the federal government, 50 per cent by the state or local government.

Every state has a civil defence organization headed by a full-time civil defence director, and many of the states and localities have civil defence organizations. The information of this nature, how to protect yourself, is available at almost every office. It is also available on pre-program tapes on our emergency broadcast system. In case of crisis, it can be broadcasted both on radio and television, and there is a system to distribute pamphlets on how to survive, on how to build a shelter, what to do in time of emergency. They have several pamphlets for industry too, for example on how to shut down and on how to protect your employees.

Of course, in peacetime there are not many people coming around civil defence offices picking up the pamphlets. In general people are not very interested in civil defence or crisis. Civil defence in the United States has gotten its best publicity during natural disasters, when they found, we think, a new direction, a new friend. They have been able to make really big inroads in cases of floods. In hurricanes on the Texas coast, the civil defence forces did a marvellous job.

So, although I think you are right in that everybody ought to know about it, we think

it is impossible for everybody to be interested in it, or to be interested in it on a continuous basis. We believe that the attitude of civil defence is that it is going to be a very low-level interest organization. You are going to have to accept that in time of crisis, you are going to have to protect people, save people, in spite of themselves, that it is a very thankless job of prepare for nuclear war in peacetime.

Mr. Laniel: Outside of civil disasters, did your organization do any worthwhile exercise with the co-operation of the population?

Dr. Gastil: In the early days, when evacuation was talked about, there were a number of exercises of this sort. Since that is no longer being talked about, there has been less in the way of exercises. Since then they have had exercises which, as it were, exercise the internal system but do not involve the public. Is that not about right?

Mr. Krupka: That is about right, except that some schools in the nation still practice monthly or bi-monthly civil defence drill.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, it is contemplated in these examples put before us that the Russians might launch—is it 5,000 megatons in that paper—that scale of an attack upon the United States, and the various civil defence systems are worked out on that basis using those figures. Am I right in that?

Dr. Gastil: The first example given on the paper is based on such an attack. In the later ones I think you will find that it is somewhat smaller.

Mr. Brewin: What I am interested in is that this would still leave, sufficiently invulnerable American strategic forces that could launch at least a similar megatonage in reply upon the USSR. Would it not?

• 1230

Dr. Gastil: If you consider the kinds of attacks, and the hearings which have been held in the last few years, the assumption generally is that the United States would have enough of a force left to do to the Soviet so much that the Soviet Union would not be willing to have made the first attack. This second strike, so-called, or counterstrike, is generally directed largely against population centres and, therefore, is not necessarily

nearly as big as the 5,000 megatons. In other words, I think you want to distinguish between the effectiveness of the attack on the one hand, and the size of the attack on the other. Because if you are thinking only of a second strike, it will tend to be directed more against the kind of thing we are talking about here.

Mr. Brewin: What I am really trying to get at is this, and I am trying to assess the rationality of anybody launching the attack that would make all these figures relevant. I would like to know whether you think it is a reasonable assumption that, notwithstanding the launching of an attack of this sort, the counter-strike could produce roughly equivalent inevitable losses? You have a figure here of 45 million unavoidable fatalities. Is it not reasonable to assume that the counterattack which would follow would produce at least a somewhat comparable figure of unavoidable losses in the USSR?

Dr. Gastil: I think that is right. I believe I made the point that it is very difficult to imagine how these wars start, yet I think there is a kind of intuitive feeling in many people—and I include myself—that the war might start by a process that is not totally rational. For example, at the time of the beginning of World War II and their attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had studies that showed they would inevitably lose the war with the United States no matter how successful they were at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, they went ahead and made the attack on the basis of some rather flimsy thought that the United States might just go home after Pearl Harbor and Japan would have won the war. Therefore, it is possible for countries to do things which are not totally rational.

Mr. Brewin: Yes, I agree with you. What you are saying, if I understand it, is that however irrational the launching of the attack may be irrational things happen. Human beings are not always rational.

Mr. Lewis: Governments even less so.

Mr. Brewin: But you are not disagreeing with my proposition that you have to presuppose that degree of irrationality? After all, the launching of an attack when you know that it will be followed almost immediately by the loss of your own people in the millions and tens of millions is surely rather an irrational act, is it not?

Dr. Gastil: That is right. Although one of the arguments I would like to make is that if you really believed that this made it unimportant to worry about the danger of this kind of war then you would not be interested in disarmament questions. I am very interested in disarmament questions, primarily, I think, because I just do not believe in the system. I do not think it is a totally reliable system.

Mr. Brewin: Let me put this to you. Basically does there not exist here the same problem that exists in all other expenditures of money and resources on defensive systems, namely, that you have to choose your priorities? If you are going to spend money on this sort of package then you do not have it to spend on some other directly defensive activity that you have to weigh against this, or on poverty in cities, or on some other thing. It is a question of priorities—or external aid, as Mr. Lewis suggests.

In other words, if we were going to buy this our problem would be what other things we could buy with the money that might seem to meet a higher degree of need, or meet a risk more likely to have to be met?

• 1235

Dr. Gastil: It was actually in expectation of the discussion of priorities that we assumed that you would be interested primarily in the low-budget programs.

We do believe that it is possible to have programs that cost very little and have very high potential, if somewhat unreliable, returns; and we think they would be worth while. If you are talking about a blast shelter program in all cities priority questions become very intense, and you would not be likely to make that choice at this time. I think that is right.

Mr. Brewin: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): Mr. Chairman, I wish to question the witnesses on their basic assumption in the brief, which deals entirely with threats, or possible threats, from the Soviet Union. There is no mention of threats from any other source.

I suggest, for example, the possibility of China—not now perhaps, but in a few years' time. It seems to me that the United States and the Soviet Union have both run parallel courses politically in the sense that they have

both arrived at about the same time at the same conclusion, as has been suggested here this morning, that nuclear disaster is out of the question except in the case of some complete miscalculation.

We do not, however, have any such assurance in the case of China, which has what I might call a soft civilisation in the sense that its people are spread out and much more ruralized than in the United States and Russia. They have much less to lose, in terms of the total that they have, than have the United States or Russia.

In the preparation of a brief of this kind are we perhaps not pointing our guns in the wrong direction? Have you any comments on that?

Dr. Gastil: It is interesting to bring up China. Primarily we tend to ignore China because there is so much talk about it today that we do not want to add to that discussion too much.

Your point is, however, partly an answer to the question raised earlier about how likely a smaller attack would be. China is a good example of a possible small attack, not anywhere in the range that we have been talking about here.

However, if you use this gentleman's assumptions about the irrationality of attack, I think the case can be made that the irrationality of attack from China is a good deal greater than that of attack from the Soviet Union.

It is possible that at some future date a group of Soviet military commanders could put together a story which would show how they could defeat the United States and not suffer overwhelming losses by a nuclear first-strike; that is conceivable. By making a series of optimistic assumptions either the United States or the Soviet Union in the next 20 years might be able to put together such a story. It should not be believed, but it could be put together.

In China, for the next 20 years, their leaders just cannot put together any such story; therefore, I think the irrationality of attack would be a good deal higher.

I also believe that because of the spread of population in China—it is a rural country—the Chinese leaders, to the extent that they think of themselves as participating in the modern world, emphasize those capabilities which are very much concentrated and relatively easy to destroy. In other words, China

as a purely rural country, has no competitive possibilities in the world. The China that has a capability of producing advanced fighters, that has a capability of producing a nuclear weapon, and so on—this is the China its leaders are thinking about as a leader of the underdeveloped world—not the peasants. That is the point I am trying to make.

To destroy this China, both in terms of its facilities and its technical capability, which are concentrated in a relatively small portion of the population, would be much easier than to destroy the capability of the United States, which is much more scattered and much more thoroughly spread throughout the whole population. Therefore, to return China to a rice-growing or millet-growing economy, as I guess it would be in the north, would, I think, end the hopes of the Chinese leaders as they now see their country.

• 1240

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): You made reference earlier to water supplies in Pittsburgh going out of business under certain conditions. We live in an environment much more complicated than was that of Leningrad at the time of their disaster. Just how possible is it for us to cope with disruptions in supplies of electricity and water and communications that we depend upon to much more today than in the past?

Mr. Krupka: That is really a difficult question to answer because it has so many degrees. Besides Leningrad we have historical examples of disasters from which recovery was more or less easy, and we have some that were not so easy. There has been a lot of study of post-attack situation and we do not see sort of insurmountable problems in terms of power and communications.

I have just finished the post-attack exercise in the State of Connecticut in which we went through this whole concept of trying to put many megatons on the state and see how they could function with lines out and with communications out. It turned out that I could not give them a problem they thought they could not solve. Now, that may not be that they could solve them, but they told me they have had similar problems where an underground cable has been broken for many miles and they were able to go to a storeroom or jury-rig a system fixing up the cable and the same with the power plant. So it was hard for me, for example, to give them a problem they could not solve.

Dr. Gastil: Let me mention one of the points of interest and that is the netting of systems in our more complicated society. Whether this be a communication system, an electrical power system, a railroad system, a highway system, this kind of intricate net means that you can knock a lot of points out of it and still make movement possible through the system.

Also, of course, another thing that you do with the attack is to knock out a lot of the consumption. For example, the industries would be silent for some time so you would be taking a lot of the consumption out of the system as well as the production. One assumes that there would be periods of time during which electrical supply would stop and there would be periods of time during which some key point in a railroad net would be out, but these could be patched relatively easily.

The difference by the way—it is interesting—between an eastern area in the United States and, for example, transportation into a state like California with relatively few points and without a real net is quite remarkable.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Yes; as a resident of British Columbia I have seen how easy it is for an area to be cut off in the event of a flood where, within a matter of hours, communities would be without essential supplies of gasoline and some food supplies. Has the Hudson Institute made any appraisal of Canadian civil defence capability?

Dr. Gastil: No.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): This never concerned you in any way?

Dr. Gastil: No.

Mr. Krupka: Not directly. I might remark with regard to this gentlemen's assumptions over here about Canada's actually costing more for the amount because the population is spread out more, my own intuition about that would be it really would not turn out that way. If you were talking about blast shelters you would, after all, be putting those in the urban centres and urban centres are more or less the same in both countries.

• 1245

If you are talking about protection of the rural areas from fallout danger you would probably want to emphasize home shelters and very scattered school shelters, and that

sort of thing, which again really would not be too different from the United States. I think the situations would be comparable. If you are just separating Canada from the United States, of course, it would be much easier to isolate the parts of the country from one another—you know, if you are thinking of Canada as a separate problem.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Is there any peacetime advantage at or economic use for various civil defence measures? I am referring to multi-use structures, and this sort of thing. Can you turn a gymnasium into a shelter? Is this being done to any extent?

Mr. Krupka: Yes, it is in the United States. Dual use is the word; that is the word, dual use in any facility.

Dr. Gastil: In Sweden, for example, some of the blast shelters are built as underground parking lots in solid rock and, of course, they have blast shelters too. There are some estimates that in terms of the actual cost it might often be better to build single use. I have seen that suggested.

Mr. Krupka: Yes.

Dr. Gastil: But at any rate dual use is—

Mr. Krupka: Many organizations in the United States have done a great job in disaster control, in finding lost hunters and downed aircraft, and this kind of thing. Usually it is handled by civil defence in the West.

Dr. Gastil: Dual use of the organization.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Fine; thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacRae?

Mr. MacRae: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is really addressed to you. What did we pay for civil defence in this country of ours in the last fiscal year?

The Vice-Chairman: I do not have that right at hand.

Mr. MacRae: I imagine to get it through the Order Paper would be the easiest way.

The Vice-Chairman: We will try to get that for you, Mr. MacRae.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you. In the meantime, I will go on with my next question. Mr. Howard really covered the second question I had which dealt with China. I take it that very

little thought is being given to the potential of China at this moment. Perhaps that is not expressing it correctly. May I say this as an observation, then: I have always believed that when nuclear war comes—and I believe it will come eventually because of the imperfect civilization in which we live—it will be China that will be aligned against the West. However, the immediate problem is Russia. I would like to ask these gentlemen exactly what is meant by the expression “overkill” and how much of it is there?

Mr. Krupka: I do not know how much there is. I can tell you what “overkill” means. It means killing somebody or something either by multiple weapons—that is, more than one weapon targeted at the same spot, killing people who are already dead—or using too big a weapon to do the job; that is killing NORAD with 100 megaton when 5 will do or killing with more than one effect.

You may ground burst a weapon on a city—you lose some effect if you ground burst; you get less damage—but you want to get fallout but you may have already killed the people so why ground burst?

Mr. MacRae: Is that the way the expression is used?

Dr. Gastil: I think possibly in a technical discussion that is the sense in which you talk about overkill. In the actual popular sense it was usually discussed differently. Let us say a writer made a study of the Soviet Union and he assumed you could destroy the Soviet Union with 51 megaton bombs. Then he looked at what was in the U.S. inventory and said you know, we have 10 or 20 or 50 times this, everything above the 50 is an overkill capacity.

Mr. MacRae: That is my understanding.

Dr. Gastil: This is in popular discussion.

Mr. MacRae: All right; what are the ratios, then, of the overkill as to the Soviet Union and as to the United States?

Dr. Gastil: The answer to this is that most of the weaponry we have is for one of two purposes. First it is to be able to have enough so that if the Soviet leaders were making a calculation of whether they could defeat the United States by striking first, they could not calculate because there would be enough left and you want to have some margin here. In other words, you want to make it clear that they cannot calculate that there would be.

The other thing is the vast majority of what we have was built to be targeted against Soviet strategic forces so that we could say, for example—let us say the Soviets were trying to take Europe we could give a message to the Soviets—stop your troops or we will make a first strike, for example, and there would seem to be some sense to that, in the sense that we could take out all the Soviet weapons.

● 1250

Destroying their cities really does not make sense; it is the weapons you have to destroy, so the vast mass of the force was always for one or the other of these uses, riding out an attack or destroying a Soviet attack. I have always taken the position that the capability to destroy cities was sort of in the noise of the system; in other words, the weapons that were kind of left over at the end could destroy cities. Of course, if you have the possibility of Soviet ABM's and so forth, that raises another question and you are really worried about the number you have left to destroy the city. That becomes a different kind of question.

Mr. Krupka: It is part of the so-called assured destruction policy. That is why we have the multiple system, the Polaris system, which in itself is, as the Navy says, sufficient to make the Soviet Union a less than viable society. The Air Force says the same thing.

Dr. Gastil: This is another approach. We have three basic systems; the manned aircraft, the long-range missiles and the missiles from submarines. It might well be that one of these systems would fail, or would be found at the last minute to fail for some particular reason, or they could destroy it for some particular reason. The thought here is that all three would not fail at once. That is another point of view.

Mr. MacRae: The next question you just touched on very briefly. Again my own feeling about this is that there is something much more dangerous than nuclear warfare and that is bacteriological warfare and, of course, chemical warfare. In the last war I was quite deeply interested in chemical warfare for some years. What practical defence is there against bacteriological warfare if that becomes an all-out means of destruction?

Dr. Gastil: Let me try to say that bacteriological warfare is theoretically very destructive but is actually extremely difficult to

deliver. It is extremely difficult to deliver bacteriological germs in a form that will accomplish what they are supposed to accomplish. Most of the people who have looked at this have assumed that if there were a large bacteriological campaign against the United States, the correct answer would be nuclear war, nuclear retaliation, and that nuclear retaliation is always a surer kind of capability than is bacteriological, so that generally the people have assumed that for strategic content—this might not be true if you are talking about a particular event, let us say some small tactical area at the front where you might want to use a chemical weapon or something of this sort which would have a particular effect—if you are thinking about two nations trying to destroy one another, nuclear weapons do so very well at this job that nothing else really competes.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. MacRae, I now have that information for you through the good offices of Mr. Dobell. Would you like to take a pencil? It may be that the whole Committee is interested, too.

In the last fiscal year the total budget for civil defence in Canada was approximately \$14 million, made up as follows: for the Canadian Emergency Measures Organization, which includes grants to the provinces, \$7 million; for the Canadian Forces, including warning systems, Armed Forces survival support, etc., \$6 million; for other departments, \$1 million. The total will be \$14 million all together.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Gastil: As a remark on that, it appears to me as though the \$6 million would probably be in another budget of the United States—the warning plan which you mentioned. The \$7 million is probably the equivalent, and I would think rather equivalent to the size of the U.S. effort.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Macrae.

Mr. Sulatycky: I would like to know how far ahead we are looking in our civil defence thinking. Are we planning for today's probabilities or possibilities, or are we looking ahead to the probabilities of 5, 10, 15 years from now?

Mr. Krupka: Certainly in the design of the higher budget systems we do look ahead because we want the system to have some legacy value. That is, if you go ahead and deploy a shelter system and you put it in the ground, chances are you cannot move it. It is something you want to last for 20 years, and surely if something changes you do not want to be in the position where the Soviets can negate your system. This is not true for the low-budget systems; they are more applicable to this kind of thing because you just change the plans as their capabilities change, or yours change.

Mr. Sulatycky: Are we then planning on a nuclear war such as one which would occur today, or are we looking ahead to a type of war which might be different ten years from now?

Mr. Krupka: We are looking at so-called 1975 wars and there has been some talk in the Institute about designing a year 2000 war, so that we are looking several years ahead.

Dr. Gastil: One of the differences between an ABM anti-ballistic missile system and a blast shelter system—and one of the advantages of a blast shelter system—is that the changes in technology and so forth really do not affect it very much. For example, if we are worried about bacteriological warfare, it probably would be best handled also in the same blast shelter, with decontamination methods and so forth. The blast shelter is a very adaptable thing to a variety of different kinds of potential wars.

Mr. Sulatycky: To what extent are community planners incorporating civil defence concepts in their plans?

Mr. Krupka: There is an ongoing program called CSP (Community Shelter Plan) and almost every urbanized area in the United States is preparing, or will have a Community Shelter Plan, which incorporates the National Fallout Shelter Survey plus some other things, tell people where to go, what to do.

Mr. Sulatycky: Are all your new communities built around these plans, or are these plans being incorporated into existing communities.

Mr. Krupka: Yes, incorporated.

Dr. Gastil: I think he is talking about urban planning and that kind of thing.

Mr. Sulatycky: Yes, urban planning, part of it.

Dr. Gastil: I think in general urban planners do not take as much cognizance of this.

Mr. Krupka: No, but the reason they do is that the government will pay them to do it, so it is included.

Mr. Sulatycky: Did I understand you correctly in saying that urban planners do not take much cognizance of civil defence?

Dr. Gastil: In general they do not. What Bob is saying is that when they actually develop programs for particular communities, in so far as there is government support for particular types of plans they will incorporate that.

Mr. Sulatycky: Does this not indicate a lack of co-ordination and planning? Would it not make more sense to have community plans incorporate civil defence plans? That is, new communities that are being built. I understand you cannot take a city that is one or two hundred years old and rebuild it, but new areas, suburbs.

Mr. Krupka: That is a kind of complicated sociological question. Let me say that I have been in the business of trying very hard to get schools, for example, to spend 1 or 2 per cent of the cost of the school for civil defence purposes, on a matching front basis, by the way, and it is hard to do. It is not hard to do technically, moneywise; it is hard to get people to take things very seriously.

Dr. Gastil: I might say, to go back to the Scandinavian experience, a couple of years ago I understand it was generally true in Sweden, and I believe Norway as well, and possibly Denmark, to require private buildings to build shelters into their own basements at their own expense, so that you could do it by law with very little cost to the national treasury.

• 1300

Mr. Sulatycky: I believe Mr. Krupka made the statement that one of the difficulties in the United States is the high degree of urbanization. Are we not compounding the difficulty by increased urbanization in your country and in ours?

Mr. Krupka: Compounding the civil defence?

Mr. Sulatycky: Civil defence difficulties.

Mr. Krupka: Yes, of course.

Mr. Sulatycky: Could community planners not play a more important role in the whole civil defence system by trying to develop communities which are not as closely attached to the areas which might be the target of a nuclear attack and these communities would incorporate sound civil defence measures?

Mr. Krupka: It depends on the amount of seriousness and the amount of money it takes to do the job. If you are saying: should you design a community with, let us say, 20 per cent of the effort designed for civil defence purposes, that might be a hard thing to sell. If you are saying: would you be willing to spend 2 or 3 per cent for civil defence purposes, or to orient the design of civil defence, then you might be willing to do it. It is a question of how serious you take some future war, how prudential you want to be. Our experience is that you get very little response.

Dr. Gastil: Let me add to that. As times change and people move about, different effects occur. For example, Soviet cities a few years ago were thought to be a good deal smaller than American, more tightly compacted. And of course from a nuclear war point of view it is a disadvantage for a country to have its cities more tightly compacted. So that while urbanization to some extent does make the problem more difficult, certain aspects of urbanization such as urban sprawl, for example, actually make the problem less difficult. The enormous size of the urban sprawl from north of Boston to south of Washington, for example, develops an area with an economic capability which is very difficult to destroy by nuclear attack unless you are thinking of fallout, and fallout can be relatively easily protected against.

Mr. Sulatycky: You are not saying that a means of protection is increased urbanization.

Dr. Gastil: No, but suburbanization is in effect a means of protection.

Mr. Sulatycky: To what extent are the civil defence people co-ordinating their efforts with the military people? Are strategic military locations being developed near areas of high population?

Mr. Krupka: Yes, that is a noticeable problem. It is called a "collateral damage problem", and there have been many people in

the United States who have expressed that point directly to Congress. Why do you put a missile farm around Tucson, Arizona, for example, when you are just inviting a target? Why do you have a SAC base right next to Detroit, Selfridge Air Force Base? Why do you put one in downtown Albuquerque, and put one in downtown Omaha? Well, if you read the testimony you will find that the dollars that the base brings into town just mean an awful lot more to people than co-location. Nobody believes there will be a war.

Mr. Sulatycky: The general conclusion I draw is that there is very little co-ordination between the civil defence people and community planners, between civil defence people and the military establishment.

Mr. Krupka: No, that is not true; the first statement is not true. There is co-ordination between civil defence and community planners.

Mr. Sulatycky: In the sense that you are building civil defence into a community after a community is developed, but you are not building a community around a civil defence plan. In other words, there is very little thought being given to civil defence until a community is built?

Mr. Krupka: Yes.

Mr. Sulatycky: Thank you.

Mr. Gastil: May I just say that part of that is a problem of the society in general. In other words, our society in general is not planned, and a lot of the community planning really is not community planning. Plans are seldom followed, if you really look at the history of it.

The Vice-Chairman: Our last questioner appears to have left the room, so I will just

ask a question myself in his place. Dr. Gastil, do you foresee an exodus from the United States into Canada in the event of a nuclear crisis, and into Mexico, too, probably.

Dr. Gastil: I would assume that if Canada was unhurt, and the United States was very badly hurt, people would try, if that was possible, to move into Canada in some fairly large numbers, insofar as those people live close to the Canadian border.

Mr. Krupka: There is a written agreement, by the way, between Canada and the United States to that effect.

The Vice-Chairman: So there is some protection then?

Dr. Gastil: As well as among States. To Mexico, on the other hand, there is not very much of an area immediately adjacent to the United States into which people would want to go, and where they could live easily.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. I wonder if the Committee would agree to print the written presentation we have received from Dr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka as an appendix to today's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence? Is that agreed?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chairman: Dr. Gastil and Mr. Krupka, on behalf of the members of the Committee I would like to express our sincere appreciation for your appearing before us, for your excellent testimony and the manner in which you have answered all our questions. I think we have learned a lot from your good offices and I wish you a safe journey back to the United States, particularly in view of the inclemency of the weather. The meeting is now adjourned.

APPENDIX CC

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

by

Raymond D. Gastil

and

Robert A. Krupka

H1-1153-P

January 23, 1969

(This paper represents the views of its author. There has been only limited circulation of the Paper to the Institute staff and no formal review procedure. No opinions, statements of fact, or conclusions contained in this document can properly be attributed to the Institute, its staff, its Members, or its contracting agencies).


Peacetime civil defense systems may be conveniently divided into high budget (\$10-50/cap. per year) and low budget systems (\$0.50-2/cap. per year). In the first category are primarily blast shelter systems, while in the second there is a variety of programs ranging from fallout shelter to mobilization base approaches. After examining systems at both of these levels we will briefly consider questions of long-term recovery, popular attitudes and the special Canadian situation. We regret that our experience is with calculations for the United States, but the arguments would be approximately the same except for scale.

1. *High Budget Peacetime Systems*

In order to judge the effectiveness of civil defense against possible future Soviet nuclear attacks, we should re-examine the estimates which have been made, and see how these might reasonably be modified in terms of alternative assumptions. Let us examine the following figure (p. 2), adapted from a graph developed by the Office of Civil Defense in 1963. In order to interpret this graph we must understand that this is an attack of more than five thousand megatons, 65% of which is surface burst. Although targets are both military and urban, nearly every city of any size is hit, many repeatedly. Current projections for Soviet forces suggest that it would be very unlikely that the Soviets could or would deliver such an attack in 1970. Although the Soviets may have more than 5,000 MT's in 1970, it would be very unlikely that this amount would reach the United States. First, we would have to assume virtually no attrition by U.S. forces of Soviet capability during the war. Second, we would have to assume that U.S. defensive capabilities against submarines, missiles, or airplanes were practically non-existent. Third, we would have to assume a high reliability for Soviet systems. Fourth, we would have to assume that the Soviet Union would be willing to fire essentially everything that it had, saving very little for post-attack bargaining purposes. We would judge, then, that this attack is an unrealistically large attack for the immediate future, although in the longer term it is surely conceivable that attacks of this size could be delivered against the United States.

Figure 1

Lifesaving Potential
(Millions of People)



*Projected Population
for 1968-1970

If we look at the types of programs being used to defend the U.S. population, we should note that blast shelter and ABM were estimated to give roughly the same return for the money. We are speaking of civil defense here, so we will assume that this is a large blast shelter program. The system is a \$40 billion program (perhaps spent over ten years), and the fatalities are "unavoidable" within the limits of this size program. We should also note that the 50 million lives saved by fallout shelters were saved in this case by a large program of shelter construction. The present OCD system of marking shelters in existing buildings would achieve part of this saving, but not all.

One can conclude from this bar graph that civil defense could make a great deal of difference in the number of fatalities. Looking at the 45 million unavoidable fatalities, however, critics have concluded that civil defense would not make "enough" of a difference.


Some studies have claimed that most of the "unavoidable fatalities," suggested in OCD studies such as this, are, in fact, avoidable within the conventional limits of the discussion. This has led to a considerable divergence in estimates of what can be accomplished by sheltering systems.

Let us examine the reasons for these differences. The 1963 OCD concept was for the construction of blast shelters ranging from 10 to 30 psi (the relatively low level of protection which can be obtained without the use of blast doors). Studies which achieve lower vulnerabilities for the dollar are based upon the use of a range of shelter hardnesses up to 100 or 500 psi, as it now common in OCD studies. Shelters in these systems are somewhat more expensive per person, but their life-saving potential in crowded urban areas more than makes up for the added expense. Using these latter calculations, William Brown has suggested that blast shelters may be able to achieve savings as in the following graph: fig. 2. In Brown's conception, shelters are to be arranged so as to give the opponent a uniform targeting option in terms of the vulnerability of the population. Data on this chart stand for the number of people that would be killed by each megaton-equivalent weapon, optimally targeted against the United States for population effect. We note from this chart that the number of fatalities expected from a 1,200 megaton-equivalent attack directed against urban centers would be only 5 million. Since large megaton attacks are generally calculated on the basis of much larger weapons than 1 MT, and the larger portion of most attacks is usually against military targets, a 1,200 megaton-equivalent attack against urban populations is approximately the same size as the OCD attack described above. On Brown's graph this very low vulnerability is achieved for \$31 billion. We would not want to be too precise about these figures so we can assume that this is about a \$40 billion program. But the program appears to be nearly ten times as effective.

Our judgment is that the use of very hard blast shelters and something like the Brown's approach should achieve more than the original OCD estimates. However, much of the gain is unlikely to be achieved. The OCD estimates were based on an assumption that at least 10% of the people would fail to use shelters. It can easily be seen that reducing fatalities to 5 million in a full shelter program must rest on an assumption of essentially 100% effective use. Assumptions of 100% use are wrong for a number of reasons. First, one can assume that a few people will be confused and uninformed. Second, it is hard to build a blast shelter system in which tactical warning that missiles are on their way will allow 90% of the people sufficient time to get to shelter. It is possible that there will be other kinds of warning earlier, and most urban people will be in blast shelters before opponent attack, but the significance of this probability is very hard to judge. One must also assume that if we rely on shelters, with very little ABM or other defensive capability, urban destruction and the resulting isolation of millions in cities into which rescue workers cannot go for days will lead to additional post-attack fatalities. There are also likely to be a number of system limits. For example, in certain areas such as Manhattan Island or New Orleans, it might not be possible for a blast shelter system to succeed against a determined effort to overwhelm it by flooding. Political considerations will also reduce the cost-effectiveness of any practical sheltering system. Perhaps, then, the original OCD estimates of "un-

avoidable fatalities” in the very large attack could be reduced by more careful attention to the size and location of shelters, but civil defense alone cannot be relied upon to achieve drastic reductions.

Figure 2
Blast Mortality Estimates for Postures Based
on a Uniform Vulnerability (β) of the Urban Population



2. Low Budget Civil Defense Systems

Let us look, then, at another attack with a range of alternative low budget systems (Table I, p. 7). First, the figure illustrate the difference between what could be accomplished by the present OCD marking program and by a fallout shelter construction program. The marking and stocking program (NFSS) has probably cost over \$300 million by now, but the shelter construction program would cost over ten times that. Only the complete fallout program essentially eliminates fallout casualties. It should be noted that since fallout descends one

to several hours after nuclear groundbursts, the problem of reaching fallout shelter is very different from that of reaching blast shelter. If undestroyed shelter is available locally, then people will move to fallout shelters in time. We would suggest that if a nation wishes to pay for a complete fallout shelter program and contemplates building shelters with protection factors of 500, then it should consider the possibility of changing its fallout shelter plans to low psi blast shelters. The costs would not differ greatly.

TABLE I

1965 WAR

195 Million People S.U. Mixed Counterforce and Countervalue Retaliation			4,336 MT Groundburst (1,140 MT-Equivalent)					
Program	Protection Factors		Mortalities (Millions)					
			Blast	F.O	Total	Surv.		
No Protection.....		2.5	64	92	156	38		
Gov't Survey.....	URB: 25%	100	64	37	101	93		
	25%	40						
	25%	20						
	25%	2.5						
	RUR: 20%	40						
	40%	20						
	40%	2.5						
Complete.....	50%	100	64	.1	64.1	130		
Fallout.....	50%	500						
50% Evacuation.....	URB: 50%	100	32	8	40	154		
	50%	40						
	RUR: 50%	100						
	50%	20						
80% Evacuation.....	URB: 100%	500	13	5	18	176		
	RUR: 25%	500						
	50%	100						
	25%	20						

It is clear that the government survey is very cost-effective against an attack of this type and that it can accomplish a great deal. However, it should also be clear that it is only one step and that other, perhaps more important, steps can be taken. These steps include changes in attitude from peacetime to wartime. For example, it should be understood that in areas with heavy poten-

tial fallout damage it may be preferable to crowd those shelters with high protection factors rather than allow people to go into shelters with protection factors of 20 to 40. In some areas lives will be saved by having protection factors well above 100.

Many suggestions for improved very low budget systems have been based on the view that nuclear war will not suddenly descend on the peacetime system. We believe that it is quite likely that a general nuclear war will come only after a period of deep crisis. Possibly there will be a more or less gradual escalation through conventional war to tactical nuclear war outside of North America to all-out nuclear war: In this period of crisis and escalation, it may be quite possible that enough time would be available to achieve many of the goals of more expensive civil defense programs. Developing plans to exploit these opportunities is what we call a *mobilization base*.

We think particularly that it would be possible to have plans, procedures and training by which the protection factors of shelters could be upgraded in extreme crises so that many of the fallout fatalities which the government survey currently allows could be avoided. Fallout protection is attained by the addition of mass, whether it be water or dirt or concrete or wood. It can also be achieved through methods of decontamination during fallout. Therefore, in many situations protection can be significantly improved in a matter of hours.

We also believe that a great deal can be accomplished by making plans and preparations for evacuating at least part of the urban population previous to nuclear attack. Unless everything is attacked at once partial evacuations can occur even during attack. Since heavy fallout can be predicted in some cases many hours ahead of its occurrence, evacuation from some areas could literally outrun the fallout. In the face of all-out nuclear war, we think it is undesirable to have people go into, or stay in, densely crowded urban centers. We think it will be the intuitive reaction of people to leave these areas and that their intuitions will be essentially correct. It is particularly desirable to develop alternatives for people who live at points targeted in nearly all scenarios. Generally, fallout protection in rural areas will be available for refugees or easy to upgrade. It should also be noted that partial urban evacuation raises the average protection available to those people left in cities because the better facilities may be used by the remaining people.

3. *Public Attitudes and Recovery Possibilities*

Panic reactions are not as important as often thought. Studies suggest that under almost all circumstances people generally react to extreme danger in ways which are in their interest. Historically, people have wanted to build and rebuild after disaster. Most recently, we have the example of the Jewish community in Europe which underwent the worst disaster of modern times. While there are psychological scars on individuals today, the ability of most Jews to rebuild their lives in America, Israel, Canada, or elsewhere has been outstanding. Of course, the likelihood of orderly rebuilding is greater if there is less destruction and fewer people killed. However, as long as there is food and water available, we imagine that recovery will proceed. In any event, the greatest suffering will be in the war and its immediate aftermath, and it is toward the alleviation of this suffering that our plans should be primarily directed.

4. *Special Canadian Considerations*

Civil defense in Canada should be free of some of the more disturbing aspects of the civil defense controversy as it has affected the United States. A liberal country such as Sweden, which finds itself outside of the power bloc confrontation is able to spend \$3 per capita for blast shelters and evacuation plans. It drafts its civil defense workers and requires blast shelter in private dwellings. One of the reasons for the larger efforts of Sweden or Switzerland is that the argument cannot be made that their civil defense is in any way threatening to another power or will induce an arms race. While Canada's position is not quite analogous to that of Sweden, it is much more difficult to argue that the Russians will be greatly concerned about Canadian civil defense actions than it is to argue that they will be concerned about American actions.

While we believe a good case could be made for Canada following the Swedish approach, we imagine that political constraints will make it more likely that a less expensive approach will be adopted here. This approach should include considerable interest in the discovery of all possible fallout shelter, including the provision of shelter in both urban and rural localities for the same population. It should include provision for crisis upgrading. The evacuation alternative is also more available to Canada than to the United States, for Canada will not be as likely to destabilize crises by evacuating. Canadians might particularly consider the possibility of partial evacuation from the path of fallout after nuclear explosions in the United States.

RAYMOND D. GASTIL

Professional Staff, Hudson Institute

Born in 1931 in San Diego, California, Dr. Gastil received from Harvard the B.A. degree in Social Relations (1953), the M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies (1956) and the Ph.D. in Social Science (1958). On a Fulbright grant (1953-54) he attended the University of the Punjab, studying Islam, Persian and Urdu. In 1956-57 he returned to do field work on Iranian culture in Shiraz, Iran, on a Ford Foundation Fellowship.

Dr. Gastil spent 1958-59 at the Harvard Center for International Affairs as a research associate studying intercultural communication difficulties relevant to U.S. aid programs, as well as participating in a number of other Center activities. From 1959 to 1962 Dr. Gastil taught anthropology at the University of Oregon on undergraduate and graduate levels, giving half-time to a Social Science course in the "Honours College." He also did limited field research on the Diegueno Indians of California. Dr. Gastil joined Hudson Institute in July, 1962, and was elected an Employee Member in October of that year.

While at Hudson Institute Dr. Gastil has engaged in studies for the Office of Economic Opportunity; Health, Education and Welfare; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Civil Defense, Army Missile Command, and Department of Defence Research and Engineering. His work has involved strategic analysis of nuclear war policy, and a study of projections of the United States birth rate. He has been recently engaged in studies of the problems of poverty in the United States and guerrilla war. In conjunction with this latter work Dr. Gastil visited South Vietnam, Thailand and Iran in 1966.


Dr. Gastil is currently in charge of both civil defense and international peacekeeping work at Hudson Institute. His writings include: "Middle Class Cultural Impediments to Iranian Mobilization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1958; "Relative Linguistic Determinism," *Anthropological Linguistics*, December, 1959; "The Determinants of Human Behavior," *American Anthropologist*, December, 1961; "Culture and Civilization: In Man and Out There," *The Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers*, 1964. Hudson Institute papers include: "Avoiding Major Nuclear War," HI-268-DP, July, 1963; "Postattack Scenarios," HI-316-RR, January, 1964; "Study of Political and Strategic Implications of an ABM Defense," HI-335-RR/2 (Draft), April, 1964; "Alternative Birth Rate Projections for Maternal and Child Health Planning," HI-607-RR, November, 1965; "Toward a New Basis for the Evaluation of Anti-Poverty Programs," HI-750-RR (Draft), February, 1967; "Problems in Population Projection and Education," HI-954-P, January, 1968; and "An Analysis of the Possible Contribution of a Civil Defense Tension Mobilization Base to Civil Defense," HI-926/3-D, March, 1968. Recent publications include: "A Pair of Related, Pessimistic Scenarios" in *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-three Years*, Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener (New York: The MacMillian Company, 1967); co-author, *Can We Win in Vietnam?* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

ROBERT A. KRUPA

Mr. Robert A. Krupa was born in New York City in 1926. He obtained B.A. and M.A. degrees in chemical engineering at the City University, New York City, and was later an instructor in mechanical engineering at that university.

He has held the position of co-ordinator for computing activities for Babcock and Wilcox Corp.; later he was director of research for an international consulting engineering organization and directed studies with respect to the SAGE system, deep underground command posts, the mobile weapons systems.

He joined the Hudson Institute in August 1963 and while there has been concerned mainly with civil defence planning. He has also been concerned with the study of "limited war" and "central war termination".



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 23

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESSES:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

³ Allmand	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	MacRae
Barrett	<i>Boundary</i>)	Marceau
Brewin	Hymmen	Nowlan
Cafik	Laniel	Penner
Fairweather	Laprise	Prud'homme
Forrestall	Legault	Roberts
¹ Gibson	Lewis	Stewart (<i>Cochrane</i>)
⁴ Groos	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
² Goyer	MacLean	Winch—(30)
Harkness	Macquarrie	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4) (b):

¹Mr. Gibson replaced Mr. Whiting on January 30, 1969.

²Mr. Goyer replaced Mr. Ouellet on January 31, 1969.

³Mr. Allmand replaced Mr. Sulatycky on February 3, 1969.

⁴Mr. Groos replaced Mr. Smith (*Northumberland-Miramichi*), on February 3, 1969.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

(Text)

TUESDAY, February 4, 1969.

(36)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:05 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ryan, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Cafik, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Goyer, Groos, Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, Macquarrie, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Winch—(23).

Also present: Messrs. Guay (*St. Boniface*) and Sulatycky, M.P.'s.

Witnesses: From Canadian Forces Headquarters: Major General M. R. Dare, Deputy Chief Operations and Reserves; Brigadier General D. R. Adamson, Director General Operations Air.

The Vice-Chairman introduced the witness, Major General M. R. Dare, Deputy Chief Operations and Reserves. Major General Dare's biographical sketch is appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix dd*).

General Dare read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed, in English and French. The statement dealt with the present roles, missions and tasks of the Canadian Forces and the Forces available to accomplish these tasks. The Committee recessed at 11:50 a.m., during General Dare's briefing and resumed at 12:00 noon.

Members of the Committee questioned Major General Dare on several of the subjects mentioned in his briefing.

At the end of the meeting copies of the following document in English and French, were distributed to the members present: *Preliminary Report Of The Ministerial Mission To Latin America October 27-November 27, 1968*.

With the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned at 1:15 p.m. It was agreed that another meeting should be arranged at a later date, to complete the questioning of Major General Dare. The Committee will meet again at 3:30 p.m. on Wednesday, February 5, 1969, when the witness will be Professor Adam Yarmolinsky.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, February 4, 1969

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I will call the meeting to order; we will have a quorum shortly, I expect.

This morning I would like to welcome Major-General Michael Dare who is appearing before the Committee on behalf of the Department of National Defence. A resume of Major-General Dare's career in the Canadian Armed Forces has already been distributed to hon. members for their information.

General Dare has been asked to speak on the present roles and missions of the Canadian Forces. Members will appreciate that this background information is essential for our deliberations. However, members will be aware that as a public servant General Dare is not in a position to express personal views before public forums such as our Committee on the relevant merits of alternative policy. I am sure hon. members will respect General Dare's position in this matter.

Before we hear General Dare's introductory remarks, I would like to draw to the attention of the Committee that the Clerk has received the written briefs of Professor Yarmolinsky and Professor Eayrs who are to appear as witnesses on February 5 and 6 respectively. Members should have received their copies by now.

Professor Eayrs, as I recall, is particularly anxious that each member read his brief before he appears. Both briefs are quite comprehensive and detailed and if any members have not yet received their copies for advance reading they might contact the Clerk.

Major-General Dare would like to speak from the podium at the far end and I will now call upon General Dare.

Major-General Michael R. Dare (Deputy Chief, Operations and Reserves, Canadian Forces Headquarters): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear in front of you on behalf of the Department of National Defence and I hope we will achieve a factual presentation to you of our present commitments and roles as indicated by your Chairman.

Gentlemen, the primary roles, missions, and tasks now assigned to the Canadian forces and the resources now available for accomplishing these tasks can be traced directly to policy guidance provided by the White Paper on Defence of March 1964. This will continue to be the case until the current review on External Affairs and Defence is completed and new policy guidance and direction is provided.

My briefing this morning will confine itself strictly to the specific topic requested by the Committee, namely:

- a the present roles, missions and tasks of the Canadian forces, and
- b the forces now available to accomplish these tasks.

Following integration and then unification of the Canadian forces, functional commands were established, each command having a specific function or role, and these roles further sub-divided into more detailed missions and task. I will outline the roles of each operational command and the forces available to these commands. Training Command and the Canadian Forces Communications System have been excluded. While these very important groups have significant contributions they are only support functions. I will cover briefings on each command in the following sequence:

• 1110

- a Mobile Command (including Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany).
- b Maritime Command.
- c Air Transport Command (including Search and Rescue).
- d Air Defence Command, and
- e 1 Air Division

There are, in addition, certain commitments dictated by governmental policy which are primarily controlled by Canadian Forces Headquarters and which, although drawing on the resources of commands, can be separated from the functions of commands which I have just mentioned. I will brief on these separately under the following headings:

- a Aid of the Civil Power/Assistance to Civil Authorities.
- b National Survival, Warning and Reporting Capability.
- c Military Training Assistance.
- d Truce Supervisory Operations and Special Tasks.
- e Reserve Forces.

I would like to make one point before continuing with the briefing, by saying that the relationship between the roles and tasks of commands and the employment of these forces for specific Defence of Canada, of North America, or in a NATO, United Nations or peacekeeping context, and so on, is reasonably complex. In some cases, which you will note, the same forces are tasked to assist in providing defence in each of the areas I have just mentioned. I will summarize this at the conclusion of my briefing on commands, and on our special commitments.

Mobile Command

The role of Mobile Command is to provide combat ready land and tactical air forces to meet Canada's defence commitments.

Except for a formation stationed in Germany (4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group), a contingent in Cyprus and minor truce supervisory groups and individuals serving in the Middle East, the India/Pakistan border area, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Korea, all elements of the Command are currently on a standby basis in Canada.

In consonance with the principle of "forces-in-being", units are mission-oriented and held at appropriate states of operational readiness. To this end there is frequent participation in operational training exercises and overseas deployments.

The Commander, Mobile Command's missions are:

- a The direct defence of Canada/North America.
- b NATO Central Region (to maintain a mechanized brigade group and associated base support for operations as a component of SACEUR's deterrent forces).
- c NATO flank regions (to maintain in Canada for operational employment on the NATO flanks an air transportable brigade group north or a battalion group south).
- d Peacekeeping.

- e Special purpose missions at home and abroad.

The foregoing missions entail tasks as follows:

- a Countering any land threat to Canada.
- b Enhancing the NATO deterrence by virtue of timely intervention in Central Europe or on a threatened flank.
- c Assisting in the discharge of approved UN mandates, the Geneva Accords and other peacekeeping arrangements.
- d Maintaining at a high degree of readiness an operational capacity to assist in peacekeeping operations anywhere in the world.
- e Maintaining in Canada the necessary command and control structure, field logistic and base organization to ensure an appropriate, rapid and effective response within the terms of his assigned responsibilities.
- f Providing manpower and material resources, when necessary, in aid of the civil power or when assistance is needed by civil authorities.

Defence of Canada/North America

The Commander Mobile Command is responsible for the conduct of tactical land operations in Canada and, under the terms of a reciprocal agreement with the United States, with providing land forces for joint operations against enemy lodgements occurring in the Alaska—Canada—U.S. regions.

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To satisfy this requirement one air transportable brigade group has been assigned primarily to the Defence of Canada. Provision has also been made to assign to this task any, and if need be all, of the land forces available in Canada. This includes operationally ready units of the Mobile Command reserves. In view of the nature of much of the terrain in Northern Canada, it is considered essential to have a parachute capability. The Canadian Airborne Regiment fulfils this requirement and is held in readiness for this task and others.

NATO—Central Region

4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group is maintained in Germany to meet our NATO commitment on the central front. Since its present strength is not sufficient to ensure its viability as a combat formation, it would be

reinforced in an emergency from land forces available in Canada.

NATO—Northern—Southern Flank

Canada is committed to provide to NATO an airtransportable brigade group for employment as part of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force Land on the Northern front. Canada is also committed to provide an airtransportable battalion group to the NATO southern flank. This battalion group would be part of the AMF(L) committed airtransportable brigade group. The point I want to make here is that it is not in addition. This airtransportable brigade group is formed from within Mobile Command units located in Canada.

Peacekeeping

Units and individuals of Mobile Command are tasked for various peacekeeping duties under the United Nations or other jurisdictions. In addition, the Canadian Airborne Regiment is available for United Nations or other peacekeeping duties and could be rapidly deployed by Air Transport Command should the need arise.

Forces

To accomplish the major missions of Mobile Command, the following forces have been assigned to tasks as follows:

a Defence of Canada/North America

(1) Counter lodgment operations—an airtransportable brigade group in Canada.

(2) Internal security—all forces in Canada available, as directed, including reserve forces.

b NATO Central Front

4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group—a mechanized brigade group with an associate logistic base.

c NATO Flank

An airtransportable brigade group located in Canada, to be deployed to Europe in support of NATO.

d United Nations—Peacekeeping Operations

The Canadian Signals Regiment, Kingston other forces as required.

The resources of Mobile Command are grouped regionally in the interests of geographical balance, training and administrative considerations. The only exception is the

mechanized brigade Group in Europe. The present resources of Mobile Command are:

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- Headquarters Mobile Command
- 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (Europe)
- 1 Combat Group, Calgary
- 2 Combat Group, Petawawa
- 3 Combat Group, Gagetown
- 5 Groupe de Combat, Valcartier
- The Canadian Airborne Regiment, Edmonton
- The Canadian Signals Regiment, Kingston
- 10 Tactical Air Group
- CFB Soest and Base Medical Unit
- Other bases in Canada
- Minor units not included above.

Here are some of its major equipments:

(Slides of various equipments shown to members)

10 Tactical Air Group

10 Tactical Air Group was formed during the past year to provide command for the tactical air elements of Mobile Command. It is an integral part of Mobile Command. The elements, which make up 10 TAG and its associated wings, are assigned the task of providing the tactical air support to land forces. The specific tasks include artillery observation, reconnaissance, close support, interdiction, helicopter support and light tactical air transport support.

Resources

- a One CH113A Voyageur Medium Transport Helicopter Squadron at St. Hubert with a detachment at Edmonton.
- b One CUH-1H Iroquois Helicopter Operational Training Squadron at Petawawa.
- c One Tactical Fighter Squadron now operating T-33 Aircraft, and soon to be converted to CF-5's at CFB Rivers.
- d One Operational Training Squadron at Cold Lake Alberta, which is now being equipped with CF-5 Aircraft.
- e One Tactical Transport Support Squadron with Buffalo Aircraft at St. Hubert, P.Q., with a detachment at Edmonton.

Summing up Mobile Command, its role, tasks and forces are:

Role:

To provide combat ready land forces and tactical air forces to meet Canada's defence commitments.

Tasks:

- a Defence of Canada/North America.
- b NATO Central Front.
- c NATO flanks.
- d Peacekeeping and other special tasks.
- e Tactical air and transport support for land forces.

Forces:

- a Canada/North American Defence—An air transportable brigade group, and Canadian Airborne Regiment.
- b NATO Central Front—4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and reinforcements stationed in Canada.
- c NATO flanks—an air transportable brigade group
- d UN—peacekeeping and special tasks—Canadian Airborne Regiment, and other special forces as required.
- e 10 Tactical Air Group—1 Sqn. Medium Helicopters; 1 Sqn. Utility Helicopters; 1 Sqn. Light Transports; 1 Sqn. Tactical Fighters; 1 Operational Training Squadron.

Maritime Command

The role of Maritime Command is to provide combat ready maritime forces to meet Canada's defence commitments, to conduct operational training programs to develop tactical doctrine and to promulgate contingency and operational procedures for these forces. Additionally, Maritime Command is to operate immediate support services.

Canada's maritime forces are multi-purpose in character and their functions do not lend themselves to a neat distinction between those which are directly related to the Defence of Canada and those which serve broader purposes. Broadly speaking, the functions of the maritime forces comprise defence against missile firing submarines, contributing to the flexible response capabilities of the West, the transport of land and air elements of the Canadian Forces overseas, and the maintenance of national sovereignty.

Bearing in mind the broad statement of the role of Maritime Command and the multi-purpose character of our maritime resources,

the Commander, Maritime Command, has been directed to be prepared to conduct the following missions:

A Direct Defence of Canada Mission.

(1) This basic mission is concerned with the defence of the Canadian territorial waters, the Arctic archipelago, contiguous land and airspace and ocean approaches thereto against attack from the sea or from infringement of territorial and offshore rights. The mission implies the primary responsibility of Maritime Command Forces to maintain surveillance of the ocean approaches to Canada which, in addition to defensive purposes, represents an assertion of Canada's sovereignty over territorial waters, and protection of fishing and mineral rights.

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(2) All Maritime Command resources are assigned to the direct Defence of Canada mission.

(3) Within this basic mission, the Maritime Commander conducts operations and trains his forces for a number of tasks such as air, surface, and sub-surface surveillance to gather intelligence, anti submarine warfare, control and protection of shipping, and countering lodgements in co-operation with other operational commands.

b Defence of North America Mission

(1) This Mission is concerned with the conduct of Maritime operations in conjunction with the forces of the United States for common defence against attack, from seaward. In the Canada-United States basic security plan, which includes our NORAD and ALCANUS responsibilities, Canada also commits forces and the Maritime Commander exercises a joint responsibility for the maritime aspects of the defence of North America.

(2) The precise numbers and plans for the deployment and employment of CANUS Forces is, of course, as you will appreciate, classified which cannot be discussed in an open forum. However, because Canada and the United States constitute a strategic entity whose security poses an indivisible defence problem, it can be stated that the Canadian maritime commitment is substantial.

c NATO-SACLANT.

(1) This third mission is to participate, when directed, in operations in the Canada-US region of NATO, in the Canadian Atlantic area and other areas of the NATO Allied Command Atlantic under the operational command of SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. This Mission may entail either joint operations by Canadian and other NATO forces or unilateral action by Canadian maritime forces in support of NATO objectives.

(2) It is within this context that Canada participates in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.

(3) Canada "earmarks" forces to SACLANT. By this I mean Canada informs SACLANT of the maritime forces we will make available for SACLANT's control in a NATO emergency. Forces are earmarked as category "A", available within 48 hours; category "B", available from 48 hours to 30 days or category "C", available after 30 days. The vast majority of our maritime forces are earmarked category "A" and most of the remainder are in category "B" owing to refits or maintenance. SACLANT is kept informed of the status of our earmarked forces on an almost daily basis. Precise details of our SACLANT commitment is classified but it is permissible to state that Canada allocates forces to NATO virtually to the limit of the Maritime Command resources.

(4) The Standing Naval Force Atlantic was mentioned earlier within this mission. This Force operates under the operational control of SACLANT. Countries contributing forces to the Allied Command Atlantic provide units for this Force on an *ad hoc* basis and normally Canada has provided one destroyer for approximately a four-month period each year. The Force is constantly on the move in peacetime, taking advantage of as many NATO or multinational exercises as possible during the year. Subject to NATO Council control, SACLANT could in a period of tension, direct the Force to operate in an area of the Atlantic where the presence of the Force would give the best indication of NATO solidarity and determination to resist aggression. In this regard, individual countries retain the

prerogative of withstanding their units at any time.

(5) Another mission of Maritime Command is to provide support to the forces of Mobile Command. It would normally be in support of NATO Europe land operations on the Northern flank. The aircraft carrier and operational support ships are the principal forces involved; however, all other combatant and support units are subject to assignment.

(6) The tasking of Maritime Command operational units to sealift Mobile Command units to Europe is a possibility for which Maritime Command has a real capability. However, feasibility or advisability will depend on the importance of this task in relationship to the other priority missions at the time of decision.

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e Peacekeeping

(1) This mission is to provide maritime forces, as directed, for peacekeeping undertakings either as a purely maritime operation or in support of other national or international forces. Maritime forces may be required to undertake peacekeeping operations anywhere in the world.

f Special Purpose Missions

(1) Maritime Command is prepared to conduct special purpose missions at home or abroad as directed. Any or all Maritime Command resources may be assigned to these missions.

(2) It is within this type of mission that the Maritime Command conducts search and rescue operations, is prepared to give aid to the civil power and is expected to support Canadian diplomatic interests abroad.

Gentlemen, that completes Maritime Command for the purpose of this briefing. It may appear to you that double tasking to meet the various Maritime missions is carried to an extreme. May I emphasize that this is not at all unusual for Maritime Forces of any country because, to repeat a statement I made earlier, their multi-purpose character and their functions do not lend themselves to a neat distinction between those which are directly related to the Defence of Canada and those which serve broader purposes such as continental defence and collective security.

To sum up, following are the role, task and forces of Maritime Command.

Role:

To provide combat ready maritime forces to meet Canada's defence commitments, to conduct operational training programs, to develop tactical doctrine, and promulgate contingency and operational procedures for these forces.

Tasks:

- (a) Direct defence of Canada.
- (b) Defence of North America.
- (c) NATO—SACLANT.
- (d) Peacekeeping—UN.
- (e) Special tasks as required.

Forces:

Atlantic: 1 Aircraft carrier; 9 Helicopter destroyers; 4 Destroyer escorts; 2 Operational support ship; 3 Submarines; 1 Tracker squadron; 4 Argus Squadrons; 1 Sea King helicopter squadron.

Pacific: 9 Destroyers; 1 Operational support ship; 1 Submarine; 1 Argus squadron.

Air Transport Command

The role of Air Transport Command is to maintain an operationally effective Air Transport Force to meet Canada's defence commitments. The basic functions associated with this role are:

- a To provide strategic and tactical airlift in support of operations and other commands;
- b To operate operational training programs for Air Transport Forces; and
- c To operate immediate support forces for the above functions.

Operational Tasks

The Air Transport Command's emergency operational commitments involve the provisions of strategic, tactical and air logistic airlift support to:

- a Units of other commands assigned to the Defence of Canada, and/or North America;
- b Canadian forces assigned to the defence of the NATO area, including the initial deployment of the Canadian contribution to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land); and
- c Canadian Forces assigned to the United Nations, e.g., peacekeeping, including the rapid deployment of the UN Standby

Ready Force, and the provision of trained personnel and aircraft for air elements attached to UN forces.

During peacetime, Air Transport Command is charged with maintaining operationally ready Air Transport Forces. This requirement is met by the following activities:

- a Participation in mobility and training exercises with other commands;
- b Airlift of all personnel to or returning from duty with 1 Air Division and 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Europe;
- c Provision of logistic support to all commands in Canada, for 1 Air Division and 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Europe; and
- d Provision of scheduled and special passenger freight flights.

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Airlift Resources

The airlift resources of Air Transport Command are divided into the following categories:

- a Heavy transport—12 Yukon and 23 Hercules aircraft. The Yukon aircraft are based at Trenton and the Hercules aircraft are based at Ottawa and Edmonton.
- b Medium and light transport—7 Cosmopolitans, 7 Falcons, 17 Dakotas, and 8 Caribou aircraft. One of the Caribou aircraft is continuously assigned to a UN detachment in Pakistan.

The heavy transport fleet is primarily committed to the maintenance of a state of operational readiness which will ensure a global capability in strategic airlift. This capability must be such as to meet the emergency North American, United Nations or NATO operational requirements in accordance with the operational plans. In addition, the heavy transport fleet also provides logistic airlift support of our NATO and Canadian based forces on a continuous basis.

The Hercules aircraft also maintain a tactical air transport capability to ensure that tactical logistic support can be provided to our land forces on a large scale in any likely operational environment. Joint exercises are periodically completed to enhance this capability.

The medium and light transport fleet is primarily committed to transport duties in

North America. Again, an operational readiness state is maintained to facilitate a rapid increase in the activity rate during an emergency. These aircraft are employed in peacetime on administrative and logistic support activities.

The entire Air Transport Fleet is operated in peacetime in a manner that will not only ensure the maintenance of the required state of operational readiness, but which will also meet Department of National Defence airlift needs.

Search and Rescue

The role of search and rescue in the Canadian Forces is essentially one of fulfilling a dual requirement. First, there is the need to have a military organization with the capability to locate and rescue downed aircrew during times of hostilities. Second, there is the responsibility assigned the forces by Cabinet Directives No. 18 of 1950 and No. 22 of 1951 whereby the Canadian Forces are tasked with providing search and rescue services on behalf of the government under the terms of the International Civil Aviation Agreements, and for the co-ordination of all Canadian marine search and rescue. In practice, this latter task has involved operational participation in marine incidents as well as their co-ordination. Because of the existing facilities, the Search and Rescue Organization also becomes actively engaged in such tasks as mercy flights and searches for lost persons.

The Search and Rescue Organization is committed to maintain a medium range Search and Rescue aircraft and crew, including a Parachute Rescue Team, on call at Comox, Winnipeg, Trenton, and Summerside on a 24-hour-per-day basis. The Organization must arrange and conduct searches of variable magnitude as required.

The primary Search and Rescue forces consist of nine Albatross triphibian aircraft, five specially configured Dakota aircraft, six Labrador, and four H21 helicopters, four Parachute Rescue Teams, and 27 Ground Search Teams. The aircraft, helicopters and Para Rescue Teams are located at Comox, Winnipeg, Trenton, and Summerside. The Ground Search Teams are located at various bases and radar sites across Canada. In addition, every Canadian Forces component operating aircraft is considered as a secondary search and rescue resource and can be called upon to supplement the primary resources as required. To give you some feel for this, in 1968 we conducted more than 2,000 searches,

a total of some 8,143 flying hours and, thankfully, we rescued some 240 lives.

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An hon. Member: Can you repeat that, please?

Maj. Gen. Dare: In 1968, we conducted more than 2,000 searches, a total of 8,143 flying hours and thankfully saved some 240 lives.

To sum up, following are the role, missions and resources of Air Transport Command.

Role:

- a Strategic, logistic and tactical airlife.
- b Operational readiness training.

Missions:

Strategic, tactical and logistic airlift in support of:

- a Defence of Canada.
- b NORAD.
- c NATO.
- d UN.
- e Search and rescue and special tasks.

Resources:

Aircraft—Yukons 12; Hercules 23; Cosmopolitans 7; Falcons 7; Cessna 182 3; Dakotas 17; Caribous 8. Search and Rescue—9 Albatros; 6 Labrador Helicopters; 4 H21 Helicopters; 4 Para Rescue Teams.

Mr. Lewis: I got the information from one of my colleagues but what is a triphibian?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Snow, sea and land.

Air Defence Command

To guard against a bomber threat to North America, the United States and Canada established interdependent systems which constitute the essential elements of North American Air Defence. These are a detection and identification system that would provide the maximum warning time in which to launch a retaliatory force and an active Air Defence system that would make penetration of North America airspace as difficult as possible.

The North American Air Defence (NORAD) Agreement, under which the power to direct, co-ordinate, and control the operational activities of the Air Defence Forces is delegated to an integrated headquarters, was devised to provide a more effective system of air defence than was possible under national agreements. The government to government agreement specifies a willingness to co-oper-

ate and to participate in joint planning but does not commit Canada to any particular level of resource allocation. From time to time the levels of participation are resolved and approved by the two governments. Air Defence Command provides the Canadian Forces assigned to NORAD.

The primary role of Air Defence Command is to provide combat ready Air Defence Forces to meet Canada's defence commitments, to conduct operational training programs, to develop, evaluate and recommend tactical doctrine and to promulgate operating procedures for these forces. In addition, Air Defence Command provides immediate support services when required to sustain this role.

The specific missions assigned to Air Defence Command are defence of Canada-North America, training to support the Air Division in Europe and training and support missions.

The Defence of Canada-North America mission is to participate in air defence operations in conjunction with a force of the United States for common defence against attack from aircraft.

To accomplish this mission, assigned Air Defence Forces are tasked with:

- a Surveillance of airspace and target identification above Canadian territory and contiguous coastal waters to provide early warning of penetration.
 - b Interception and destruction of hostile aircraft by manned and unmanned interceptors.
 - c Satellite tracking observations.
 - d Command and control of manned and unmanned interceptor forces.
 - e Maintaining and operating electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipped aircraft to provide operational training to the air and ground environment of the Command.
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- f Maintaining nuclear safety and security within the purview of the Command.

The Air Defence Surveillance and Identification task is a function of the Distant Early Warning Line consisting of 22 search radars located in Northern Canada and the Pinetree Line consisting of 27 search radars

and 53 height finder radars located generally in southern Canada.

The interception and destruction capability is provided by both manned and unmanned interceptors. Air Defence Command has three all-weather squadrons equipped with CF101 aircraft providing a total of 48 manned interceptors. In addition, eight CF101 manned interceptors, assigned to a training squadron, provide an augmentation force for air defence purposes if required. There are 56 Bomarc surface-to-air unmanned interceptor missiles divided between two squadrons.

Satellite tracking is provided by a Baker-Nunn space tracking optical sensor located at Cold Lake, Alberta.

Command and central of the Air Defence Force is provided by a semi-automatic system consisting of a co-located combat and direction centre and two remoted control centres.

An electronic warfare squadron equipped with CF100 electronic countermeasures aircraft plus T33 aircraft are employed as a simulated target force to provide training for both the manned interceptor force and the ground radar system. This force continually exercises the defence environment and simulates very closely the expected tactics of an attacking force.

In the training and support missions the Air Defence Command is responsible for conducting operational flight and ground training for aircrew personnel and technical training for groundcrew personnel selected for CF104 employment with the Air Division in Europe. A CF104 training squadron equipped with CF104 aircraft and a field technical training unit located at Cold Lake, Alberta is tasked with providing this training support.

To sum up, following are the role, tasks and forces of Air Defence Command.

Role:

To provide combat ready forces to meet Canada's defence commitments, conduct operational training, evaluate and recommend tactical doctrine for Air Defence Forces.

Tasks:

- a Early warning and identification of penetrating airborne objects.
- b Interception and destruction of hostile aircraft.
- c Satellite tracking.

- d Command and control.
- e Electronic countermeasures training.
- f Nuclear safety and security.
- g Operational training support to Air Division.

Forces:

Combat—56 manned CF101 interceptors—56 unmanned Bomarc. interceptor missiles.

Training—14 CF100 electronic countermeasures aircraft—40 CF104 aircraft—48 48 T 33 aircraft.

1 Air Division

The role of 1 Air Division is to provide combat ready air forces to meet Canada's air commitment to NATO Europe. In peacetime these forces maintain high standards of operational readiness and effectiveness, and participate in exercises with other allied forces in Europe so that they may be available at very short notice in response to contingencies. As well, they represent a credible portion of NATO's deterrent force in-being. In the event of war, these forces will participate in strike, attack and reconnaissance operations in conjunction with other allied air forces.

In line with the new strategic concept as agreed upon by NATO in December, 1967, 1 Air Division is prepared to carry out tasks in response to aggression at three levels. These are:

- a Direct defence, or meeting the enemy at the level he chooses to fight; or
- b Deliberate escalation where, if necessary, NATO is prepared to raise the intensity of the conflict through selective use of tactical nuclear weapons; or
- c General nuclear response, which is the NATO capability for launching nuclear strikes.

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1 Air Division's specific tasks in support of this strategy are:

- a Tactical nuclear strike operations;
- b Conventional tactical attack operations in support of ground forces on the central Europe front;
- c Air reconnaissance operations to contribute to SACEUR'S intelligence requirements; and
- d Command and control of assigned air forces.

The present operational forces of 1 Air Division consist of a headquarters at Lahr, Germany, and six CF104 squadrons at three wings: Zweibrücken, Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, Germany. In the next few months the wing at Zweibrücken will close, and the two strike/attack squadrons will be repositioned at the other two wings.

1 Air Division possesses a communications flight of six Dakota aircraft based at Lahr. This resource is augmented as required from time to time by Air Transport Command.

Summing up 1 Air Division, its role, tasks and forces are:

Role:

To provide combat ready strike/attack and reconnaissance air forces to meet Canada's commitment.

Tasks:

- a Tactical nuclear strike.
- b Conventional attack in support of ground forces.
- c Air reconnaissance.
- d Command and control.

Forces:

Combat—Assigned CF104 aircraft.

4 squadrons strike/attack.

2 squadrons reconnaissance.

Support—6 Dakota transport aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, I have been speaking for about 45 minutes and with your permission we might have a short break. I am about two-thirds through the brief.

The Chairman: We will have a 10-minute break.

(After recess)

The Chairman: I will call the meeting to order and ask Maj. Gen. Dare to continue with his presentation.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, next will be:

Aid of the Civil Power/Assistance to Civil Authorities

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These activities do not include search and rescue or mercy flights, which I have already touched on. In general, aid of the civil power involves the Chief of the Defence Staff authorizing troops to support the civil authority, while assistance to civil authorities involves

all other forms of aid. No forces are specifically allotted for such tasks but any unit may have this role as a secondary mission.

The headquarters that control the reserves by virtue of their decentralization on a geographical basis, are used to co-ordinate these activities. Requests for assistance or aid are received from provincial authorities by regional or district commanders. They, subject to certain restrictions, may call upon any available units of the Canadian Forces.

National Survival, Warning and Reporting Capability

Privy Council Order 1041 of 1965 as amended to 1968 allocates military responsibilities in emergency and survival operations as follows:

- a Emergency government communications.
- b The national survival and attack warning systems (NSAWS).
- c The nuclear detonation and fallout reporting system (NDFRS).
- d Post-strike operations.

Emergency government communications are provided between Central Emergency Government HQ (CEGHQ), six permanent and four temporary Regional Emergency Government HQ (REGHQ), and a number of central and regional relocation units. The warning of attack to the public is accomplished by the communications between the Federal Warning Centre (FWC) and each of the Provincial Warning Centres (PWCS) located at the CEGHQ and REGHQs, which in turn control the 1,790 sirens which have been installed across the nation. The NDFRS function of collecting and disseminating nuclear weapons effects data is accomplished over the same communications system as the NSAWS, between NORAD HQ, Northern NORAD Region HQ, the Federal Warning Centre, Provincial Warning Centres, CF installations and the civilian component of the reporting system organized through Canada EMO. Post-strike operations, primarily the management function, is organized on the

basis of a Task force HQ and Task Force Team to assist local government operations.

Military Training Assistance

A Cabinet decision of June 1, 1961 authorized the training of military personnel of Commonwealth countries subject to the approval by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence. This training was not to be to the detriment of our NATO or Continental defence commitments.

On August 27, 1964, Cabinet approved in principle programs for military assistance for Malaysia and Tanzania. At the same time Cabinet established the Interdepartmental Military Assistance Committee with the responsibility of preparing recommendations on request for military assistance from non-NATO countries. Membership of the Military Assistance Committee is provided from DND, External Affairs, DDP and the Department of Finance.

A Cabinet decision of February 10, 1966 provided that funds required to cover the cost of all approved military assistance programs would be obtained through the main or supplementary estimates of external affairs. In addition, the Military Assistance Committee was authorized to approve, for one year at a time only, the provision of military training in Canada for individual members of the Armed Forces of non-NATO governments.

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The principal aim of the current Military Assistance Program is to assist newly independent and underdeveloped countries to develop the forces necessary to maintain their internal security and stable central authority as prerequisites to effective programs of economic and social development.

Canada has at the present eight programs of military assistance for seven countries, involving the provision of training or equipment or both. The scope of this activity is illustrated by the following:

Country	Number of Students Trained in CDA	Major Equipment Provided	Cost of Programs	Termination Dates
Ghana.....	=18		\$ 78M	1972
Jamaica.....	30		\$ 60,000	Continuing
Kenya.....	1		\$ 2,800	Continuing
Malaysia.....	134	4 Caribou A/C 250 Motorcycles	\$ 4.5M	Continuing
Nigeria.....	69		\$ 45,000	Suspended
Tanzania.....	370	4 Caribou A/C 8 Otter A/C Military Academy	\$ 17.6M	1970
Zambia.....	31		\$ 30,000	Continuing
Totals.....	653		Approx. \$23M	

There are 110 service personnel assigned to this activity overseas and a limited number of instructors employed part time training foreign students in Canada.

The total cost of this program to date over the last five years is of the order of \$23 million.

Truce Supervisory Operations and Special Tasks

Canada has participated in a wide variety of peacekeeping operations under United Nations jurisdiction and has contributed mili-

tary personnel to other truce supervisory operations and to special tasks such as the current Nigerian Observer Team. The only major commitment at present is that is Cyprus where we still have a reduced battalion—and I should point out that the size of that Battalion is as dictated and required by the United Nations—together with HQ and support elements consisting of 51 officers and 528 men under the United Nations force in Cyprus. Following are our current commitments to truce supervisory operations and special tasks, and the numbers of personnel involved.

Operation	Initial Contribution Date	Present Contribution
UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group, India—Pakistan)	1949	9 Officer Observers 3 Aircrew 5 Ground Crew 1 Caribou Aircraft
UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization).....	1954	20 Officer Observers
MCCD (Military Components, Canadian Delegations to the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia)	1954	11 Officers 15 Men
UNCMAC (United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission)	1954	1 Officer 1 Man
UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus).....	1964	1 Reduced Battalion HQ and support
Nigerian Observer Team.....	1968	2 Officers

Reserve Force

The primary role of the Reserve Force is to provide personnel for augmentation and reinforcement of the Regular Forces. The secondary role is to assist in the development of a training base if an emergency were to extend or escalate. To accomplish these roles we have divided the active reserve which includes land, sea and air environments, into three categories for employment. These are the Ready, the Canadian Regional and the Mobile Command Reserves.

The Naval Reserve is fully committed as Ready Reserve in support of Maritime Command. It is composed of some 16 naval reserve units located in major urban centres from Newfoundland to Vancouver Island. The over-all strength now is approximately 3,000 officers and men.

A total of approximately 1100 undertook training at sea with the regular navy last summer. A major activity at the present time is exercise "Maple Spring". We have 140 reservists employed in 11 ships of which 80 are now on board HMCS *Gatineau*.

The Militia today is composed of 96 major units with an establishment of 300 and over. There are also 136 minor units. The effective strength is about 24,000.

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The Active Reserve is considered as part of the Forces in Being. We now have approximately 16,000 militia tasked to take their place in Regular Force establishment vacancies in the event of an emergency. About a thousand are Ready Reservists. These will take their place as individuals, in vacancies in static HQS, depots and other like units, should the need arise. Fifty-three hundred are tasked as Regional Reserve. This is the civil emergency organization and like types. These

are in support of that internal security mission as well. Finally, 9600 have been formed into sub-units to support Mobile Command.

Training for these roles includes local training during the winter months for trades and higher rank, actual in job training for the Ready Reserves in the vacancies which the individuals will fill in an emergency, trade and rank training at Regular Force schools and at local regional summer schools and finally collective training by Mobile Command sub-units under the direction of HQ Mobile Command.

The Air Reserve was placed under the control of the Commander, Mobile Command as of January 1, 1969. It consist of six Flying Squadrons each of five Otter Aircraft with a total strength of approximately 840 all ranks. Two squadrons are located in Montreal, two in Toronto and one each in Winnipeg and Edmonton. They have a light transport, reconnaissance, and photographic capability and will shortly be able to monitor radiation. They also provide a reserve of trained pilots for Mobile Command aviation squadrons. Training consists of individual courses conducted at local headquarters and some trades courses conducted by Regular Force schools. Collective training includes transport for regulars, reserves and cadets, search and rescue missions and exercises and special map and photographic missions. The Air Reserve is a part of Mobile Command reserves.

This, gentlemen, completes the briefing on the roles and tasks of our operational commands and of the forces available to meet these commitments. I have also covered the special task assigned to the Canadian Forces.

In conclusion, the following shows the relationship between the forces we have and the commitments of these forces as directed by existing foreign and defence policy.

	Relationship Between Forces Available and Foreign Policy and Defence Objectives				
	MOBCOM	MARCOM	ATC	ADC	1 Air Div
Defence of Canada and Internal Security (Sovereignty).....	X	X	X	X	
Continental Defence of North America (Sovereignty-Collective Security).....	X	X	X	X	
NATO (Collective Security).....	X	X	X		X
United Nations and other Peacekeeping or Special Tasks (Collective Security)...	X	X	X		

This indicates that Mobile Command, Maritime Command and Air Transport Command provide highly flexible forces to meet a variety of commitments and, in fact, help provide forces for all of our commitments under different command and control arrangements. Most, if not all, of the forces of Mobile Command, Maritime Command and Air Transport Command are dual tasked or, in some cases, multiple tasked.

Gentlemen, I hope that what I have given you proved to be a factual description of our operational roles and missions as now defined and of our operational forces.

This concludes my briefing and I thank you very much for your attention.

The Vice-Chairman: General Dare, there are six members of the Committee who have indicated they would like to ask you some questions. I wonder if you come and have a chair beside me here, and be so good as to answer them.

The first questioner will be Mr. Cafik and then I have Messrs. Harkness, Brewin, Groos and Laniel in that order.

Mr. Cafik: General Dare, my first question is related to the comments in your brief on page 25, section 50, subsection (c) where it says:

General nuclear response, which is the NATO capability for launching nuclear strikes.

I had the impression that our strike reconnaissance force in NATO was not an offensive capability at all. It was more or less defensive. This implies that our forces over there are for the purpose of launching retaliatory responses or strikes. What is your comment on that?

Maj. Gen. Dare: You have the correct impression. Possibly due to the frailty of words, the meaning was not clear. What we intended to show was that whatever were the defensive measures required, including if necessary escalation, we have the capacity built in to the tactical or the strategic plan for the employment of the Division. I am sure you appreciate that these missions are assignments given by SACEUR.

• 1215

Mr. Cafik: Yes. Our forces over there, however, are capable of launching and, I presume, prepared to launch nuclear strikes against the enemy?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Yes; when they were at a state of emergency at which time the Dare nuclear forces of NATO might be released and given the authority to act this would stem, indeed, from the Commander of NATO and the NATO council; they have that capability.

Mr. Cafik: They could be under these terms of reference, then, for attacks other than strategic attacks or strategic defence.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Yes, I suppose you could do anything. I want to impress on you that their targeting—which, as you well appreciate, here I cannot go into any detail—is part of a coordinated NATO-wide plan. When we use the words “tasking” I think we ought to be clear that these are tactical type aircraft; hence they have not got the capability of reaching vast distances.

Mr. Cafik: What is their range?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I would prefer to keep their operational range of the record. However, it is significant in a tactical way. I think that really no useful purpose could be served by discussion. They respond to tactical targets in Europe which would only occur at a time of aggression.

Mr. Cafik: Would you be able to inform us whether these aircraft would be capable, for instance, of flying to Moscow—that type of thing?

Maj. Gen. Dare: No, they would not.

Mr. Cafik: All right. Now the next line of questioning is—and I do not know how important it is—on page 17 where you talk of our airlift resources you mention 7 Falcons. Now I do not know a Falcon from a row of beans but I saw some pictures up there and one looked like a pretty ritzy looking little jet, and I presume that is the Falcon. What is the purpose of that aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Dare: That is indeed a Falcon. It is our newest aircraft in the transport fleet and its purpose is communication flights for all levels of people conducting the daily business of the Department.

Mr. Cafik: It is not in any way used for defensive purposes; it is a transport aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Dare: It is a transport aircraft.

Mr. Cafik: There is one other question. This is a matter of information, not being familiar with the terms of the Defence Department.

On page 6 you use the term "close support, interdiction." What does "interdiction" mean?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Interdiction is where you are isolating a part of the tactical battlefield and where enemy forces are moving in to attack here, you seal off movement of his reinforcements or, hopefully, of his major assault forces.

Mr. Cafik: Mentioned in your report on page 4 is the fact that that our strength in NATO is not sufficient at the present moment and that it would be augmented by forces from Canada. How many forces could we take over there and in what sort of space of time with our present equipment.

Maj. Gen. Dare: The requirement to put the ground forces of the Canadian mechanized brigade group in an operational posture is of the order of 3,000. That includes completing to operational establishments plus the immediate battle reinforcements for a 30-day period. In so far as the Air Division is concerned, because of the nature and the specialty of the commitment, they do have the capability on the spot.

Mr. Cafik: Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

• 1220

Mr. Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the question which concerns me I think more than any other after listening to the brief outlining the roles and particularly the commitments of the Canadian defence forces is the extent to which, in view of the commitments we have, the numbers of personnel and the equipment we have are capable of meeting those commitments. Our commitments, as far as I know, are essentially the same as we have had for quite a number of years past. Our numbers in the armed forces have declined materially and the matter of re-equipment has been very slow. I think perhaps one of the things this Committee is most interested to get at is the extent to which we are actually capable at the present time of meeting these numerous commitments. I do not know whether this is a question I should be asking you or not. Perhaps I should be asking the Minister rather than you. I am not certain where the line is drawn.

Maj. Gen. Dare: If you are not, Mr. Harkness, I do not know who would be. I will attempt to answer partly. I think the question

of numbers, which I suspect you are alluding to, was really discussed...

Mr. Harkness: I am alluding to both numbers and equipment.

Maj. Gen. Dare: It was discussed pretty thoroughly when the Deputy Minister, Mr. Armstrong, appeared in front of the Committee on Thursday, November 21, at which time he explained that our current establishments are of the order of 103,000 to 104,000. He went on to say that at the moment, because of financial constraints, it had been necessary to restrict the regular force by approximately 5 per cent; in other words, about 98,000 people. That is where we are today, sir.

So far as equipment is concerned, I am a professional as you know and I could never be satisfied.

Mr. Harkness: Before we go on to equipment, on the actual numbers of personnel then the situation is we have not sufficient personnel at the present time to meet our commitments, at least this is the implication of what you have said.

Maj. Gen. Dare: That is not quite true. If we had to man all our commitments simultaneously the answer is, of course, you are correct because either our establishments which add up to between 103,000 and 104,000 are valid or not. You are well aware that we are constantly seeking means of improving our operating and maintenance costs by reducing overhead. People are one of the most expensive commodities. Hence it is a constantly moving figure but, as I say, if we had, for example, to re-inforce Europe and perform all our other commitments we could not do it. We are short some 6,000 personnel if we had to respond simultaneously to the full spectrum of our commitments.

In so far as equipment is concerned, as I say, as a professional I guess I would never be satisfied and I think our Minister has made abundantly clear that he has a major problem here in over-all finance. Presumably this is something which is going to be the product of the current defence review which is being required by the government. Our capital expenditures last year were of the order, of \$239.2 million for equipment. The construction figure was \$19.5 and our development figure about \$17 million. There are postponements on equipment procurement which we simply are living with at the moment.

Mr. Harkness: From the equipment point of view—take the case of the mechanized brigade in Europe—the element, and that with which you are most familiar as an Armoured Corps officer—the tanks—are now obsolescent. How much longer useful life have those tanks?

• 1225

Mag. Gen. Dare: I would say in general terms until the mid seventies—1975. Our tank is, as you are very well aware, Mr. Harkness, the improved Centurion. This vehicle has the improved 105 mm. gun which is the best there is in NATO. It has the improved ranging systems; it has increased armour on the front and it has increased fuel under armour; it also has the Canadian navigational kit and infrared. I think I can say to you—and reassure you, because I know you wish genuinely to be reassured about this point—that we have a fully operational key battle weapon in the present tank.

I would not pretend that this will go on past the mid seventies. I would say also—and I think General Ned Amey who is here can add to this if you wish—with all frankness that there is nothing immediately in front of us which we feel is a suitable alternative to that improved tank. It does not mean the British do not have a new tank which is called the Chieftain, and it is certainly a fine piece of equipment, but we just do not think it is for our needs. It is a very excellent machine, but if I may use the term it is also Rolls Royce. We would hope that we could get something a little more universal in our next buy and, frankly, there is no development that I am aware of which would meet our needs and is immediately available. I am not suggesting that these are not in the design stage but I am speaking of shelf hardware.

Mr. Harkness: What about the other equipment of the brigade?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I believe I can say that while we are always in need of something, so far as the significant major equipments are concerned the brigade is fully operational at the present time. It has the new self-propelled artillery piece, which was introduced about two years ago. It has a good APC and generally the equipment capability to meet its tactical mission at the present time.

Mr. Harkness: Somewhat along this same line, we have the air transportable brigade

and also the airborne regiment. Now, the air transportable brigade has a commitment to go to Northwest Europe. To what extent have we the heavy transport aircraft which could lift that brigade to Europe? We have the 12 Yukon and the 24 Hercules, not all of which would be available at any one time, of course, for that one task.

Maj. Gen. Dare: I would like to answer your question in order of magnitude, if I may, because you will appreciate as a former minister that one cannot become too specific, but in general terms we have about a 30 per cent capability within operational response times to deploy this force by air.

Mr. Harkness: What you mean is that you could transport less than one third of that brigade to Europe, really.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Let us say one third.

Mr. Harkness: And how much of its equipment would that include?

Maj. Gen. Dare: That would include its required airtransportable equipment for the role to which it is assigned.

Mr. Harkness: So in effect we are short at least 70 per cent of the heavy transport aircraft required to meet the commitment of the air transportable brigade?

Maj. Gen. Dare: If we are totally dependent on Canadian forces air transportable response, yes.

Mr. Harkness: Now, if you have a situation where the airborne regiment needs to be employed at the same time as the air transportable brigade, then you have nothing left for it?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Correct; however what I suspect would be the situation is again a decision one would have to make on priorities. The airborne regiment, as I detect from your question, might be a commitment in defence of North America or Canadian Operations. I am sure we would all understand, gentlemen, and agree that if there were active operations in North America these would have to be first priority.

Mr. Groos: Could I ask a supplementary on a point of clarification? You left me with the impression that you would be able to transport one third of our ready reserves. That would be in the first wave? When would the second third be ready to be transported?

• 1230

Maj. Gen. Dare: What I said, I think, Mr. Groos was in a reasonable operational period. Again, gentlemen, as you know as well as I do, this is all a question of timing and if, by reason of strategic intelligence or whatever means we are able to anticipate a requirement for a show of strength or solidarity in Europe, you could improve that timing. But, Mr. Groos, my remark related to the total component, not just to the first flight, in a reasonable operational period of days. I am sure you will understand. I should not really specify, actual days.

Mr. Groos: Thank you.

Mr. Harkness: What this comes down to really is that we have a very serious air transport deficiency in order to meet the commitments that we have and the roles which the air transportable brigade and the airborne regiment have been assigned, to say nothing of the numerous other requirements for air transport in the event of an emergency of any kind.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Yes, this is true but it is also correct when dealing with Europe which is the basic point of your question. We have had a very serious deficiency for a great number of years. You well know, to honour the previous balance of a division's requirement as the operational plan to support NATO, this is nothing terribly new.

Mr. Harkness: I do not think this is a very good analogy because I believe it was always recognized that building up the division in Europe was a matter of sea transport and was something which could not be done under any circumstances in less than 60 days with the best of luck and the best of protection, and so forth. Therefore, as far as immediate operations were concerned, it was always recognized that it was a completely unrealistic concept and nobody counted on it or expected it.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Except that that was the operational plan of the day.

Mr. Harkness: It was a paper plan but, as I say, it was fully realized by everybody that unless it was a long, drawn out crisis where you had an opportunity before operations really started to get these extra two brigades overseas, they were never going to get there.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Right.

Mr. Harkness: The present commitment, as I take it, for the air transportable brigade is a

different sort of commitment altogether. The presumption is that it will be got there.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Well, it is all part of SACEUR's plan and I really think we are not being quite fair to the facts here. This is an extension of the forces that we make available to SACEUR, admittedly in a slightly different way than the balance of the division, but it is also part of the same plan. How do you get additional forces to Europe at a time of crisis?

Mr. Harkness: It was a change that was made essentially in order to get away from something that was impractical to something which was supposed to be practical...

Maj. Gen. Dare: And I want to make...

Mr. Harkness: ...and I think it was an advantage from that point of view because certainly this business of building up to a division in Europe was just not a practical proposition.

Maj. Gen. Dare: I agree with you.

Mr. Harkness: It was foolish to have it continued; it was far better to substitute something like the air transportable brigade for it.

Maj. Gen. Dare: I would like to make it quite clear, in case the wrong impression is growing, that I am only speaking in response to the direct question you asked about air transport resources. I am not speaking of capability which could be supplemented by sea lift which was, in effect, what Mr. Groos was indicating. That would materially improve our capabilities and I think I made this quite clear in the briefing. It would mean using some of the Maritime resources at the moment unless we were able to charter additional sea lift.

Mr. Harkness: My next question is: what possibility is there of chartering or taking over commercial aircraft to meet this commitment?

• 1235

Maj. Gen. Dare: I think this is a very real alternative. In fact, Sir, at the moment there is a comprehensive examination of that problem, and my answer to all these capabilities was entirely within our own Department of National Defence resources, and would be supplemented in times of emergency such by various means as you describe.

Mr. Harkness: It seems to me that the only really practical means of meeting this commitment is in taking over the civilian aircraft.

Maj. Gen. Dare: It could well be the case.

Mr. Harkness: There is a great number of other questions I could ask but I have a luncheon engagement and also there are a lot of other people who want to ask questions so I will quit at this point.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask General Dare first of all—and it has been partially discussed—about the statement on page 4, paragraph 14 of the briefing document. This seems to me to be a very striking statement. The last sentence of paragraph 14 reads:

Since its present strength is not sufficient to ensure its viability as a combat formation it would be reinforced in an emergency from land forces available in Canada.

My first question on that is, what is the deficiency in strength?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I thought, Mr. Brewin, I explained that but I guess I did not.

Mr. Brewin: You did mention...

Maj. Gen. Dare: Three thousand, which would include the personnel to complete 4 CMBG establishments operationally from its present overseas ceiling, plus its first line reinforcements.

Mr. Brewin: I put this to you. How long—and again you have touched on this in answering questions asked by Mr. Harkness—would it take to make that particular reinforcement of which you speak?

Maj. Gen. Dare: A matter of a few days.

Mr. Brewin: A few days?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Again, Mr. Brewin, we get back to this question which we previously discussed. If one could have some warning time in a period of heightening tension we could anticipate this by making certain preliminary moves. This would be a matter of a few days.

Mr. Harkness: If your air transport is available for this purpose.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It was done in 1958.

Mr. Brewin: I had always understood that it was essential...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): It was done in 1958.

Mr. Brewin: I had always understood, General Dare, that it was essential...

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Yes, and you were not thinking of...

Mr. Brewin: Are you going to conduct the examination, Mr. Guay?

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): We had a consultation of our own. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Order. Continue Mr. Brewin.

Mr. Brewin: I had always understood it was absolutely essential to have a force actually present that was viable and ready to deal with any attack—any large scale attack, at any rate—that might be launched; that you could not wait for these reinforcements even for the few days that you mentioned.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Mr. Brewin, with the force that is there now which I commanded once...

Mr. Brewin: I know.

Maj. Gen. Dare: ...I would be quite prepared to participate in the emergency deployment as required by the defence plan of NATO. The balance of the reinforcements which are part of this 3,000 have always been retained in Canada; this is nothing new. This is an attempt to make sure that we maintain an effective force here and a flexible force in terms of responding to any emergency as opposed to committing resources.

I should emphasize that these troops are trained people. These are all regular men which General Anderson, the Commander of Mobile Command, has earmarked, and could, without any hesitation, commit to battle.

• 1240

Mr. Brewin: I will pass on to another subject, although I must say that I have grave reservations about maintaining a combat formation in Europe to deal with this matter that has to have reinforcements, even for a few days, to be fully—as you put it—viable.

However, I will go on and ask you about the Air Division. I recall that in this Committee or a similar Committee—I think it is now several years ago—the value of the Air Division was called in question by reason of its vulnerability. General Foulkes told us then, I

think—and this is at least three or four years ago—that the air division had trained on it U.S.S.R. IRBMs, medium rockets, and could be virtually wiped out in a very short time. For that reason he questioned the usefulness of such a vulnerable strike force. Has that position changed at all? Perhaps you did not agree with General Foulkes when he said it, but has it changed or is it still highly vulnerable?

Maj. Gen. Dare: There is certainly still a threat because there has been no reduction in the Russian capability, but I do not think that vulnerability is quite as black and white in those terms. There is a significant capability in the Air Division which is known as quick reaction alert. These aircraft, with any kind of reasonable intelligence lead—by that I mean a matter of minutes—could be airborne to their primary missions.

I would not suggest to you for one second that bases as such are not vulnerable, Mr. Brewin, because of course they are, but I would suggest to you that a significant element of the strike capability to deter aggression could, and would be off the ground and airborne.

Mr. Brewin: Is it not true that in the operation of the other force on the other side the rocket forces also are available and ready to be used at a moment's notice, and if you have a vulnerable force and a force capable of destroying it, both of which could act in a matter of minutes, in moments of tension you have a pretty dangerous situation to see which is going to get there first.

Maj. Gen. Dare: The edge of nuclear war is certainly a pretty unpleasant and dangerous situation all right.

Mr. Brewin: I think it was suggested in the White Paper that for this reason this particular Air Division might not be replaced when it was worn out or phased out, but that was several years ago. Has there been any change in that picture at all?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I do not really think we have gone beyond the expected useful life of the 104. After all, there is a study called the defence review. If in consequence of the review the government decides in the longer term in favour of commitments as they presently define them, then no doubt the question of a follow on of a role for the Air Division and type of aircraft will come out.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Could I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman?

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): How many C-5s do you have delivered and how many more are on immediate delivery lines?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Mr. Thompson, do you mind if I just check the facts; I do not want to be inaccurate.

Brigadier General D. R. Adamson (Director General, Operations Air, Department of National Defence): We are just now taking delivery of the first of the CF-5 aircraft off the production line. They are being phased into the operational training unit at Cold Lake that General Dare spoke of in the briefing. There is a total of 115 airplanes in the program.

• 1245

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): There is no intention of any being deployed to the air wing in Europe, NATO?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I do not think at this stage, Mr. Thompson, we are that far. As I say, we have a most adequate aircraft in the 104 and if the defence review establishes or re-affirms a European commitment, or whatever the decision of the government may be, that problem will be discussed.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Brewin, do you wish to continue?

Mr. Brewin: Yes; I have only one more group of questions that relates to our Air Defence Command. I would like a little clarification of an item on page 22 of the briefing from General Dare. Paragraph 41 starts out:

To accomplish this mission, assigned Air Defence Forces are tasked with:

(f) maintaining nuclear safety and security within the purview of the command.

Would you explain that, sir?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I think you are aware, Mr. Brewin, that bomarc missile has a nuclear warhead. All that is meant here is to ensure the safe custody and action prevention for such nuclear weapons as are held in Canada and also, of course, the storage sites for the CF 101 force.

Mr. Brewin: I have just one or two other questions on this whole matter of our Air

Defence Command. I think the paper makes it perfectly clear that the whole NORAD setup and the Air Defence Command are geared to dealing with a manned bomber threat. There is no doubt about that, is there?

Maj. Gen. Dare: That is correct.

Mr. Brewin: I recall General Simonds, three or four years ago at any rate, telling us that in the missile age the bomber threat was a diminishing threat and indeed the Russians would not launch it unless they were crazy, and I think he said they were not crazy.

As I recall, the White Paper on Defence said that as this threat diminishes we will be phasing out this particular form of anti-bomber defence, the Bomarc, bage missile interceptor, and so forth. I would like to ask generally about this bomber threat. Now it is four or five years later and there has been an immense production of missiles in the U.S.S.R. In your judgment, is this really a continuing threat? Have we begun to phase out the attempt to deal with it or are we just carrying on as before, notwithstanding what was said in the White Paper?

Maj. Gen. Dare: The question I suspect you really are alluding to and want to think through is, should or should we not participate in something beyond a manned bomber threat? I think I can say to you, and as I believe the Minister made very clear in a speech that he made to the Rotary Club of Ottawa in the latter part of January, that there still is a significant air threat in terms of aircraft. This is not to say that the greater threat now is not missiles. I am not pretending to you for one moment that it is not which is really, I suppose, what General Simonds was referring to.

The question of whether we should move into the next step and participate in some form of defence arrangement with the United States in terms of the anti-ballistic missile system is one about which I have to ask the Committee's indulgence; I could not answer here publicly. This subject is part of the over-all government review on what should be our future defence posture. I think I ought to make clear that it is a different arrangement than is at present in effect in NORAD. The United States has its own plans which have been quite publicly announced by former Defence Secretary McNamara concerning the system they wish to proceed with.

• 1250

As usual, the Americans are always very co-operative with the Canadian Forces. They have made certain basic information available to us, but I would have to stop at that, Mr. Brewin, because certainly there has been no decision that I can give you as to whether we are going to move into that type of defence arrangement.

Mr. Brewin: I appreciate that and I can see why you do not want to discuss with us what we may be going to move into—a new anti-ballistic missile system—so I wonder whether you would like to add anything on the question of the non-existence of the bomber threat. If it was disappearing or diminishing in 1964—we are now in 1969—the missile threat has grown, has the other not diminished practically to the vanishing point? That is really what General Simonds said. He said they would be crazy to use manned bombers and they are not crazy. Is that not still perfectly correct?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I would certainly be the last person to say that the Russians, in terms of strategy or tactics, were crazy. I do think, however, that there is still a continuing bomber threat. I am sure you realize and you read in the paper from time to time that there are a number of intrusions happening off the coast.

Mr. Brewin: They are not real attacks on Canada; they are incidental, surely—perhaps to make us think there is a continuing threat and waste our money, I suggest.

Maj. Gen. Dare: So long as he has in his inventory a significant heavy bomber force, I think it is prudent for us to have some form of countermeasure.

The Chairman: Mr. Goyer, do you have a supplementary question?

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: A supplementary question, Mr. Chairman. Do you consider that the possible presence of submarines or conventional Soviet aircraft in and around Canadian territorial waters is really of an offensive nature? Do you feel that one day Canada would be in such a situation that it would have to defend itself against these conventional forces or do you feel that Canada will have to attack these conventional forces?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Dare: Yes, I do, and it is for this reason that Maritime Command keeps a very close intelligence on the movement of the potential enemy submarines threat. Alternatively, if you are asking me if Canada could be the number one objective of this attack versus some other target, that I would not attempt to answer because only at the time of the decision by the opposition would that be known. However, I think I can assure you that in terms of a submarine-launched missile threat there is a threat to Canada.

• 1255

If, on the other hand, you are thinking of these possible landings, say from the fishing fleet type of thing, we are not terribly concerned that this would be of major consequence. If I understand the gist of your question we are not thinking that there would be a major invasion. However, we do think there could be interruptions of our resources and defence facilities, conceivably landed from the sea.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: Would I be correct in interpreting your thought by saying that you do not share the view of other witnesses who have appeared before us and who have been claiming that the only real military threat to this country was a nuclear attack?

[English]

Maj. Gen. Dare: I am afraid you are taking too much from what I said about that. I did not mean that. I think that Canada, certainly the populous areas of our country, could well be the subject of part of the initial strike by an enemy. If I may say so, gentlemen, a threat is made up of two things. In the first place, capability and second, intentions. That is what constitutes a threat. We know pretty clearly what the Russian capabilities are. We make no pretense to know what their intentions are. This is a matter of judgment, day to day, month by month, year to year.

We know, for example, and I think it is of interest to the Committee, that the missile track of a ballistic missile launched from China, for instance, is almost precisely the same as one launched from Russia. Hence, even if not directed against us intentionally at the outset, it is conceivable that by reason of some malfunction it could fall on Canadian territory.

Coming back to your second question; yes, indeed I do think there is a distinct possibility

ty of Canada's becoming a target of some element of the Russian offensive support in the case of a general war.

Mr. Goyer: Thank you.

Mr. Groos: General Dare, I noticed on our last slide which appears on page 37 of your brief that you do not include Air Defence Command as part of NATO collective security. You use it only for continental defence of North America. I have always held the view that NORAD or the continental defence of North America was really a part of NATO collective security. Do you not share that view?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Indeed I do, Mr. Groos. We have had the same discussion ourselves, and either in the interest of clarity or modesty we did not want to impress the Committee too much with double or triple tasking of our forces.

Your fundamental point here is: is a secure North America a significant contribution to the success of NATO. The answer just has to be, "of course".

Mr. Groos: I think it ought to be in there.

Maj. Gen. Dare: A fair observation.

Mr. Groos: That is just my personal view and I am glad to hear you confirm it. I find some difficulty in explaining this to some of our NATO colleagues in the political field.

The other day we had before us Dr. Solandt who had produced a newspaper article in which he made some rather interesting suggestions. He expanded on these when he was before the Committee and I am sure you followed them. One of the things that appealed to me which I brought up in questioning was that perhaps when we are planning our exercises for Mobile Command we might get the assistance of some underdeveloped nation in the form of an invitation to carry out an exercise on its territory, on its soil, which would leave behind residual benefits for that underdeveloped nation; and that perhaps the military might be able to charge off part of the cost of doing their exercise against Canada's External Aid program. The idea of using trained military personnel for building what I called then and I call again residual benefits for an underdeveloped nation does have some appeal for me. I wonder if you would care to comment on that?

• 1300

Maj. Gen. Dare: This is, of course, a very interesting point of view. We have at the

moment certain negotiations with a country which might just be in harmony with that theme. After the exercise a troop of engineers may well improve an airfield or something of this description, which I think is the kind of project you have in mind. Therefore, the short answer to your question is, yes. This is certainly something our forces would be more than happy to participate in. There is also, of course, another question; if one is manoeuvring in one's own country, say possibly in the North, we might assist in some significant civilian project.

Mr. Groos: I have a last question General. I was interested in your search and rescue figure because I asked a question on the Order Paper about this some years ago and I was not able to get such a specific answer. I do not think the records were being kept in such a way in those days that they could produce this. You mentioned that there were 2,000 searches involving 8,143 flying hours in 1968.

Maj. Gen. Dare: Correct.

Mr. Groos: That is a lot of searches and a lot of flying hours and I assume there is no financial recovery from that activity.

Maj. Gen. Dare: That is quite correct.

An hon. Member: Just a lot of lives.

Mr. Groos: Well 240 rescues which I assume means a lot of lives. I am not arguing the necessity of this at all. I am able to pursue the question now that we have some figures. It seems to me that this 8,143 flying hours is a considerable expense. Could I ask you to venture a ball park figure of what that would cost?

Maj. Gen. Dare: Could I just see if we have the facts?

Mr. Groos: I do not mind your dodging that one.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: I am sorry Mr. Groos; I was engaged in a conversation and missed your question.

Maj. Gen. Dare: The approximate value of 8,143 flying hours in search and rescue.

Mr. Groos: I know it involves every known type of aircraft and numbers of crew.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: In quick dollars to the Department you could multiply it by about \$150. There is as the General mentioned a

government commitment that DND has taken on behalf of the government and there is therefore an expenditure allotted to DND for this but it does not nearly cover the commitment as it has grown over the years.

Mr. Groos: This is growing all the time as flying increases so we are up over \$1.25 million a year and it is growing. The reason I asked this earlier is that it seems to me this involves not only Canadian aircraft but visiting aircraft from other countries flying over our territory and waters and coming from British Columbia as I do I know what some of the difficulties are in search and rescue operations over mountainous country.

It seemed to me before that the fitting of some approved crash position indicator should be made obligatory in all aircraft. I would just like to put this on the record here and now—and I cannot think of a better place to put it on—that as I understand it these crash position indicators are not expensive compared with the cost of the aircraft itself.

If the Department of Transport were to see fit that crash position indicators be made obligatory in all aircraft flying in Canada this would not increase greatly the over-all cost of the aircraft. Concerning visiting aircraft I understand, having talked to people who are in this type of industry that it is by no means impossible to fit a type of crash position indicator on to a visiting aircraft when it checks in at the border crossing point as it must do.

• 1305

I do not think that is even a novel idea because I further understand that in a different area—and I am talking about automobiles—when you cross the Italian border you are obliged if travelling on their superhighways to rent or take on a type of light which you can put at the side of the road if your car runs into difficulties, and this seems to be a reasonable extension of that idea.

I would just like to put on record that this is my view, and I do not think I am alone in this. Some type of crash position indicator should be on every aircraft flying over our country to make it simpler for search and rescue operations. I wonder whether you would care to comment on that.

Brig. Gen. Adamson: Everything you have said certainly has had the support of—and the initiation, in fact, of a lot of the programs you have suggested—the Department of

National Defence over the past several years. In fact, right after the last war we did initiate a program prohibiting civilian airplanes from flying what we used to call the Northwest staging route between Edmonton and Fairbanks, Alaska, without checking through the military because we were responsible, as we are now, for the searches.

As the environment of that route became a little more sophisticated and offered better facilities that degree of control was relaxed, but we have negotiations and discussions going on all of the time with the Department of Transport trying to persuade them to bring about the type of legislation you are talking about now.

Mr. Groos: Have you any idea what is holding it up?

Brig. Gen. Adamson: You are really asking me, I believe, to comment on a political question.

Mr. Groos: I will leave that line of questioning and just make one observation. It seems to me from the charts you have showed us, General Dare showing what Canada's military commitments are that we are rapidly reaching, if we have not already reached, the point the public in general, does not understand, that the sun does not set these days on Canada's military commitments or responsibilities.

Maj. Gen. Dare: I think that is a very correct statement and entirely true, Mr. Groos. The other point I think of interest, which was possibly in the back of your mind and I am sure in the minds of several of the members, is that if the mineral and oil development in the North up through the Northwest Passage, and so forth, becomes of increasing economic significance its activity undoubtedly we will generate a great deal more responsibility to ensure the rescue of lives in crashed aircraft and ships in difficulties.

Mr. Groos: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: It is now after 1 o'clock and we have just one more questioner. I won-

der, Mr. Laniel, whether you are going to be long, or should we adjourn?

Mr. Laniel: There is another member there, Mr. Chairman, I do not mind. Are you available, General, this afternoon?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I am afraid not this afternoon but we are happy to make ourselves available to the Committee any time tomorrow or later this week, whichever is convenient. I am afraid this afternoon several of us have another commitment.

The Chairman: Mr. Robert, are you intending to be long with your questioning?

Mr. Roberts: I do have some questions I would like to ask but I am quite willing to put them off to another date.

The Chairman: And you, Mr. Laniel? I think it will be necessary to adjourn, General. Can you give us an idea when it might be possible for you to be here?

Maj. Gen. Dare: I am at your service tomorrow or any time during the remainder of the week; whatever is convenient.

The Chairman: We will arrange a time, then. There is one thing I would like to put to the Committee before we adjourn. We have been furnished by the Secretary of State for External Affairs with the Preliminary Report of the Ministerial Mission to Latin America. That mission took place in the period between October 27 and November 27 last fall. Is it the wish of the Committee that it be distributed now?

• 1310

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: On behalf of all members of the Committee, General Dare, I would like to express our sincere appreciation to you for your fine presentation and thank you very much indeed for the manner in which you have answered our questions.

The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX DD

MAJOR-GENERAL MICHAEL R. DARE
DSO, CD

Maj-Gen. Michael R. Dare was born in Montreal Aug. 7, 1917, and educated in Brantford, Ont. He began his military career in the non-permanent active militia in 1937 with the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada.

In 1940-42 he served with the Royal Canadian Regiment. He held several appointments at brigade and divisional levels, serving in northwest Europe from 1944 until the end of hostilities.

After serving as a brigade major with the 4th Armoured Brigade, he was appointed second-in-command of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment early in 1945, shortly thereafter becoming assistant adjutant and quartermaster general of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division.

After the Second World War he held several staff officer appointments in Vancouver, Edmonton and Camp Borden, Ont.

In September, 1953, Gen. Dare became a general staff officer at headquarters, 1st Com-

monwealth Division in Korea. On his return to Canada in 1954 he was appointed to command the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School at Camp Borden.


Gen. Dare became commander, Canadian base units in the Middle East in December, 1956. He returned to the Armoured Corps School in 1957 and became director of armour for the Canadian army a year later.

He was appointed director of military training in 1959 and appointed commander 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in February, 1962.

In August, 1962, Gen. Dare became commander, 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, in West Germany, going to the Imperial Defence college in January, 1965. He was appointed chief of staff operations and training, Mobile Command, Montreal, early in 1966. In August 1966 he became deputy chief operations and reserves at Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69



STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 24

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1969

Respecting
Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:
(See Minutes of Proceedings)

THE QUEEN'S PRINTER
OTTAWA, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Harkness	Macquarrie
Barrett	Howard (<i>Okanagan</i>	MacRae
Brewin	<i>Boundary</i>)	Marceau
Cafik	Hymmen	Nowlan
Fairweather	Laniel	Penner
Forrestall	Laprise	Prud'homme
Gibson	Legault	Roberts
Goyer	Lewis	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
Groos	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Winch—(30)
¹ Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	MacLean	

(Quorum 16)

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

Pursuant to Standing Order 65(4)(b):

¹ Mr. Guay (*St. Boniface*) replaced Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*) on February 4, 1969.

(Text)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, February 5, 1969.

(37)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barrett, Brewin, Fairweather, Forrestall, Gibson, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Hymmen, Laprise, Legault, MacLean, Macquarrie, MacRae, Marceau, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'homme, Roberts, Ryan, Thompson (*Red Deer*), Wahn. (24)

Also present: Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*), M.P.

Witness: Professor Adam Yarmolinsky, Harvard Law School, Cambridge Massachusetts.

The Chairman introduced Professor Adam Yarmolinsky of the Harvard Law School. Copies of a biography and an advance presentation by Professor Yarmolinsky had been distributed to the members. It was agreed to print these papers as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix ee*).

Professor Yarmolinsky made an opening statement and was questioned thereon.

The Chairman noted that a group of students from Carleton University were present as observers.

Members continued their questioning until approximately 5:25 p.m.

The Chairman gave a progress report on behalf of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, concerning the suggestions made by the Committee at the meeting on Tuesday, January 28, 1969.

Mr. Forrestall suggested that copies be obtained of the existing defence agreements between Canada and other countries, for the information of the members.

The Chairman thanked Professor Yarmolinsky for his testimony. The Committee adjourned at 5:30 p.m., until Thursday, February 6 at 11:00 a.m. when the witness will be Professor James Eayrs.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by electronic apparatus)

Wednesday, February 5, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, the Committee is honoured to have before it as a witness today Professor Yarmolinsky of the Harvard Law School. I am sure the Committee very much appreciates the fact that Professor Yarmolinsky has travelled from Cambridge, Massachusetts specifically to appear as a witness before this Committee and to assist us in our deliberations.

As a biographical sketch of the witness' background has already been circulated to members there is no need to recount in detail his career. I would like to point out however that Professor Yarmolinsky was appointed and served as Special Assistant to the United States Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, from 1961 to 1964. He served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) from 1965 to 1966. The experience and insight gained by the witness during these years—years when attempts were being made to rationalize both the structure and the strategies of the United States Department of Defense—will be of value to us here today. Professor Yarmolinsky is currently completing a study on the impact of the military establishment on American society.

As copies of the witness' prepared testimony on problems of maintaining a strategic balance and on the importance of non-nuclear forces in preserving this balance were sent to members last week Professor Yarmolinsky will therefore be making only a brief introductory statement before questioning begins.

Perhaps I should add that although Professor Yarmolinsky is well informed about United States' policies and world problems he does not pretend to be equally so about Canadian defence policies and problems. I should hope that the Committee will take advantage of Professor Yarmolinsky's special experience. Professor Yarmolinsky?

Professor Adam Yarmolinsky (Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I am grateful to the Chairman for pointing out to you the particular area in

which I certainly have no claim to expertise. What I have tried to convey in my prepared statement is really a couple of fairly simple propositions—Unfortunately, in my view, these propositions have not yet come to be generally accepted by the public and by those who are concerned with military policy throughout the world.

● 1540

There are really two points that I tried to make in this statement. The first is that the advent of nuclear weapons has made the use of any kind of military force in the world a good deal more dangerous. It has in fact made it impossible for any nation, no matter how great its economic and military power, to hope to prevail over another power without itself suffering such damage that the victory it sought to achieve only amounts to a defeat for both sides.

My second point is that the existence of this nuclear standoff makes non-nuclear forces a good deal more important in the world today—particularly, I would like to suggest, the non-nuclear forces of powers which are not, like Canada, themselves nuclear powers. That is to say, those nations which do not possess nuclear forces are perhaps better able to affect the course of events with their non-nuclear military forces than the nuclear great powers are. Now let me just sketch very briefly why I think this is so. First, we have reached the point in world history and in military history when the development not only of nuclear weapons but of the most sophisticated means for the delivery of those weapons halfway around the world at speeds several times beyond the speed of sound has meant that no nation is able to launch the kind of attack on another nation which will destroy so much of the other nation's nuclear forces that the other nation will not be able to strike back to inflict unacceptable damage on the initial attacker. If either side launches a major nuclear attack against the other it must know that while it may be able to destroy the civilization of the nation it is attacking, that nation will have sufficient surviving force to destroy the civilian society of the attacker as well. This situa-

tion, which is perhaps misdescribed as parity or equilibrium, because it really is a highly unstable equilibrium, amounts to at least a kind of nuclear standoff.

I would like to emphasize the instability of the equilibrium because it is a situation in which both sides have to run very fast in order to stand still; both sides have to engage actively in research and development in order to make sure that neither one is outstripped by the other. There are constantly new developments in the laboratories or in the testing areas. For example, the so-called multiple independently guided re-entry vehicle—the multiple head nuclear missile—while still in the development stage, if it were deployed by either side—and if it were deployed by one side it would be deployed by the other—would make the nuclear balance a good deal more unstable than it is today. It would be harder for both sides to know how many effective warheads the missiles on the other side's launchers actually held. This is merely a single example of the kind of technical development which is constantly going on, and while I think it is a fair statement that technology has moved so far that no nation can hope through a technological advance to achieve a first strike capability in the face of the ability of the other side to counter that technological advance, still there is process of mutual escalation which can go on indefinitely unless it is curtailed by mutual agreement through the kinds of talks that are now in contemplation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

● 1545

In the face of this nuclear standoff, I think it is important to realize that the deterrent effect of a nuclear arsenal is really limited to those situations in which the most vital interests of the nation possessing that nuclear arsenal are involved, because any nation knows that if it uses its nuclear weapons, its own society will in turn be destroyed (or so thoroughly crippled as to be unrecognizable) in the retaliatory second strike that it can expect. Therefore no nation will venture to employ nuclear weapons except in the protection of its most vital interests. The fact that each nation knows that it cannot so employ nuclear weapons means that its potential enemies know this too. Its potential enemies are not deterred from engaging in a variety of military adventures, below the threshold of these nuclear deterred adventures, in turn, can only be deterred by non-nuclear forces. Thus I come to my third point.

In this world in which we now have a mutual standoff and in which this threshold of nuclear deterrence is quite high, all of us have to rely—on non-nuclear force to deter the kinds of low-level or middle-level military adventures which are simply not deterred by the existence of nuclear arsenals. And I suggest that since in any episode of violence in the world today there is always a danger that that violence might escalate into a major nuclear exchange, Armageddon, it is less dangerous to the peace of the world if a substantial responsibility for deterring episodes of violence is in the hands of nations which do not themselves possess nuclear weapons. Therefore the non-nuclear forces of non-nuclear nations are more important today than they have ever been in the past. I think perhaps I should stop at this point, Mr. Chairman, since my purpose here was really just to summarize briefly what I have tried to lay out in my prepared statement.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Yarmolinsky. The steering subcommittee has suggested that we should permit proper supplementaries after a particular subject has been opened up, so it would be helpful if each questioner could in the first instance, at any rate, restrict himself to one specific subject, which could then be exhausted by supplementaries before going on to others. I have Mr. Roberts, Mr. Fairweather, Mr. Brewin, Mr. Allmand, Mr. MacLean. Mr. Roberts?

● 1550

Mr. Roberts: I would like to restrict myself to one question at the moment.

The Chairman: To one general subject, and not necessarily to one question, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: I wanted to ask Professor Yarmolinsky about, as it were, Canada's role in nuclear delivery systems. I take it from what you have said to us now and from the brief you have presented that you see great advantages to non-nuclear powers in Europe in a position to respond to a less than nuclear attack by Soviet forces. Would it be correct to say, then, that Canada's participation in the reconnaissance strike role in NATO is a role which, given the development you have described, could perhaps usefully be diminished, to be replaced by a more flexible non-nuclear role in the NATO alliance; that in a way our reconnaissance strike effort is redundant to what might otherwise be done, but that we would have a more useful opportunity to play

our role in a more conventional approach—a mobile force approach?

Professor Yarmolinsky: First, as I understand it, the reconnaissance strike role is a dual-configured role—I apologize for using jargon here, Mr. Chairman. What I am speaking of is the fact that reconnaissance strike forces normally are available for use in a non-nuclear as well as a nuclear strike mission. My own bias, just as a general matter—and I do not want to substitute my judgment for that of expert military people—is that by and large the non-nuclear mission is the more important because I put the higher priority on warding off Armageddon. However, to the extent that the Canadian reconnaissance strike forces in NATO have this non-nuclear capability, I think they can make a very important contribution because it is possible, without nearly doubling the expense, to have this additional nuclear capability which might conceivably be called on and as nuclear armament is not something that Canada is called upon to supply or, as I understand it, to finance, produce or develop, this seems to me a not unreasonable arrangement.

The Chairman: Do you have any other questions?

Mr. Roberts: I have a supplementary on this. Would I be correct in taking from your paper that in a way we should try to reach a specialization of function among countries; that some countries obviously do and are going to continue to play a nuclear role but that the real value, now that we have a nuclear stalemate, for middle and smaller powers is to play a non-nuclear role.

Professor Yarmolinsky: That is my view but, as I understand the present situation, such a division of functions essentially exists today. I would not envisage a significant change in present functions.

The Chairman: The subject we are discussing is Canada's nuclear role in NATO and whether it should be changed. Are there any further supplementaries before we continue?

Mr. Harkness: Yes, I have a supplementary. Would you make a distinction between a nuclear power—and you speak of nuclear powers in your paper and in your previous remarks—which has control and really has within its judgment the determination whether to use these nuclear weapons or not—countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—on the one hand,

and countries such as Canada, Italy, Germany and some others on the other hand, which have some nuclear weapons which they can use only under the authorization of NATO or, so far as this continent is concerned, the authorization, really, of the President of the United States operating through NORAD.

Professor Yarmolinsky: As I understand your question, sir, you are speaking of nations which make their own military delivery vehicles available—in effect, aircraft—to carry nuclear weapons which are provided by the United States or Britain and which are operated on a two-key system. Clearly a sharp distinction must be drawn between those two situations. When I speak of nuclear powers I am speaking of the powers which have custody and control of the weapons themselves.

• 1555

Mr. Harkness: In other words, you would not include Canada among the nuclear powers. This is the point I wanted to make.

Professor Yarmolinsky: No, I would not, and I believe I am speaking in accordance with common parlance on this subject.

Mr. Harkness: Yes, that is correct.

The Chairman: If there are no further supplementaries on that point, I will call upon Mr. Fairweather.

Mr. Fairweather: By way of illustration, would failure—and I do not comment on this—on the part of the West to respond to something like the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia be an illustration of your first proposition, and how do you rationalize the response or lack of it of a country such as Canada to this type of thing?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I am not sure I fully understand your question, sir. I assume that if the West had, as you say, responded to the lamentable Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the chances are the building in which we are sitting today and the building in which I normally work in the United States would be large holes in the ground and there would be corresponding holes in the ground in the Soviet Union, and none of us would be here to debate whether this was a failure or a success.

Mr. Fairweather: Yes. That is exactly the proposition that I understood you to make as the first of your three.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes.

Mr. Fairweather: I find it easier if these are illustrated by specific events such as Czechoslovakia, that is all.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Perhaps I misunderstood. I thought you were asking whether this inaction was somehow inconsistent with my hypothesis. I do not think it is inconsistent.

Mr. Fairweather: Oh, no.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I do not see how, in the world in which we live today, the United States could have intervened in Czechoslovakia, nor do I see how a non-nuclear power could have attempted to intervene in Czechoslovakia because this would have involved a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would not have tolerated such a confrontation.

Mr. Fairweather: But if it were a country outside the so-called Warsaw Pact or the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union the West might have to make this decision. Clearly it would not think of making the decision within the bloc.

Professor Yarmolinsky: No, and even as a private citizen one hesitates to imagine situations where a Western nation would intervene with non-nuclear force. Let us suppose, for example, that one of the well-established and popularly-based regimes—and there are some in Latin America—were to be invaded by an external power and were unable to defend itself and repel the invader with its own military forces and it asked for support from the West. Clearly it would be asking for non-nuclear support. It would not be asking anyone to come in and drop a nuclear weapon. In that instance non-nuclear support coming from Western powers which do not themselves possess nuclear weapons would be somewhat less dangerous. That is of course providing that on balance it were thought it was more dangerous to allow the situation to continue, because uncontrolled violence anywhere in the world may flare up into a major conflagration, than it would be to respond to the request for non-nuclear intervention. It might be less dangerous if that assistance came from a non-nuclear power than from a nuclear power.

Mr. Fairweather: Thank you.

The Chairman: Members may be interested to know that we have with us today a number of students from Carleton University who

are studying external affairs with Mr. Dobell. We welcome them to our meeting.

• 1600

Mr. Brewin: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your remark that Professor Yarmolinsky's, main expertise is in the American rather than the Canadian situation, but as we are concerned with the Canadian situation I would like to ask him some questions about our policy generally. Am I correct in inferring from your paper, sir, that Canada really does not need to put a very high priority on what might be called territorial self-defence? You spoke of a nuclear power using its power only to protect its vital interests. Would not the territorial integrity of North America, including Canada, be considered as of vital interest to the United States?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I would certainly suppose so.

Mr. Brewin: If that were so, would that not make it almost unthinkable—perhaps nothing is totally unthinkable—that anyone would launch a military attack on Canadian soil except perhaps as part of a major war that had got out of hand?

Professor Yarmolinsky: This would seem to me a reasonable conclusion, yes, sir.

Mr. Brewin: Yes; and if that is so, does that mean that Canada's major interest should be to use its forces to bring about stability in the world so that minor conflicts, of which we have seen many, do not escalate into major conflicts?

Professor Yarmolinsky: You have restated my thesis more eloquently than I was able to do in my statement.

Mr. Brewin: I hope I will be able to continue as well as that.

I wish to follow on from that to the proposition that this contribution should be made in the form of conventional forces, which means forces probably lightly armed and highly mobile. Would you agree with that, as a general rule?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I would agree with that as a general proposition, yes.

In my paper I suggested that the essential prerequisites for non-nuclear forces in a nuclear world are readiness, flexibility and responsiveness to civilian control.

Mr. Brewin: I know there are political difficulties involved, but if it were possible

would any such interventions, for the sake of stability, be better if they were undertaken through multilateral action such as the United States...

Professor Yarmolinsky: Very much so.

Mr. Brewin: Would you go along with my thinking so far as to agree that a Canadian contribution of forces available to the United Nations in peacekeeping, and perhaps to other regional organizations, would be a most useful one?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes, I would say, however, that this contribution can go well beyond peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping, as I understand it, is a function in which military forces are used entirely as a symbolic presence, perhaps, for what are better described as police purposes.

Mr. Brewin: Yes; but you are thinking, of some actions which go beyond mere policing when you talk of...

Professor Yarmolinsky: Take the Canadian contribution to the NATO ground forces in Europe. This is very important contribution, although, perhaps, not as important numerically. It is important because it is symbolic of the concern of the smaller nation-members of NATO for the preservation of the flexible strategy on which the political-military philosophy, of NATO is based.

Although I do not espouse any kind of mechanistic domino theory, I believe that a substantial diminution of Canadian ground forces might have an adverse effect on the national will of the European nations, the non-nuclear powers, which contribute to these non-nuclear forces that make for flexible strategy.

Mr. Brewin: Would your reasoning apply if the Canadian contribution were changed from the static forward defences to a greater contribution, shall we say, to the NATO mobile forces?

• 1605

Professor Yarmolinsky: As between static forces and mobile forces I think one is into areas of highly specialized military expertise. It depends on what the needs are and on what military balance is thought to be best at a particular time.

I do think that there is a political issue here on the extent to which these forces ought to be Europe-based rather than North

America-based, to the extent that that was the issue you were raising by your question.

Mr. Brewin: I really did not mean to raise that. What I was suggesting was that if Canada is going to contribute, perhaps for the political reasons you have suggested, the contribution might be made, without going against your doctrine, by making it a mobile force rather than a static force.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Let me suggest that the NATO forces might be generally more flexible if Canada were to contribute forces without specifying the use to which they were to be put, and were to use its voice in the councils of NATO to emphasize the importance of the ACE mobile force and the other provisions for a high degree of mobility within NATO itself.

Mr. Brewin: I have just one further question. I do not want to monopolize the question period.

You mention on page 3 of your brief:

... The increasing importance both of military advisers to third countries and of military peacekeeping teams ...

Professor Yarmolinsky: Do I have the same pagination?

Mr. Brewin: It is at the end of what is page 3 in our copy. The paragraph starts, "Responsiveness to civilian political authority ..."

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes.

Mr. Brewin: At the end of that paragraph you refer to the increasing importance of military advisers to third countries, and of military peacekeeping teams, and of this being symptomatic of situations in which the political leverage of small military actions can be very great.

We have heard rather a downgrading of the importance of military peacekeeping, partly perhaps because of the difficulties of financing that was raised at the United Nations. I would be pleased if you could elaborate on this and suggest situations in which these peacekeeping forces might be used.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I think they have already been put to very great use in Cyprus; and in the Middle East the situation then probably would be even more dangerous, than it is today ...

Mr. Brewin: Perhaps I could put a leading question and, suggest to you that if there is a

settlement in Viet Nam some enlarged truce force will be necessary.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes. I suspect that one of the important elements in putting together a satisfactory settlement in Viet Nam would be agreement on an appropriate peace-keeping element.

Mr. Brewin: I will mention one other situation in which I have had a special interest, which is the civil war as I think you call it, in Nigeria. If that is to be resolved, will it not almost certainly require some sort of peace-keeping force?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I suppose that it would. I am not as familiar as perhaps I should be with the military situation there, but I suppose that it would.

Mr. Brewin: If I may put it another way, is it your view that this peacekeeping function can be performed by smaller nations such as Canada, and that their readiness to perform that function can be of very great importance to the keeping of peace and the stability of the world?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I believe it is important. Without denigrating its importance in any way, however, may I simply reiterate that an equally important function is that of being available for the kind of very occasional non-nuclear military intervention that may still be required in the world today. In the past decade there have been some instances in which my own country, in my view, has moved too far too fast in this area, but I am not prepared to say this is not a function that is still going to have to be performed, or that the world would not be worse off if forces were not available to perform it.

• 1610

Mr. Brewin: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson, have you a supplementary question?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): I proposed to ask Professor Yarmolinsky about Canada's role in NATO, particularly as it related to American policy, you may consider that as a supplementary at this point, NATO having been mentioned, but perhaps I should defer it until later as a separate topic. That is your decision, sir.

The Chairman: Perhaps you can place your question then, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): My question is...

Mr. Roberts: I have a supplementary which is related to peacekeeping, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Perhaps we could have Mr. Roberts' supplementary followed by yours then, Mr. Thompson. Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: On the question of peacekeeping, is there perhaps a growing feeling that peacekeeping operations are going to have to be managed on a regional basis—that for instance, in the African situation it would be difficult for peacekeeping activities to be undertaken by white troops in what are essentially black communities and that this kind of limitation, while it will not decrease the importance of peacekeeping, will ensure that it is done on a regional basis or perhaps a continental basis rather than on what I call a world-wide basis; that the form is changing even though peacekeeping is still important?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Well, sir, wearing another hat I teach a course in the legal problems of cities. I have just finished reading some material on the old city machines in the United States, in big cities, in which it was pointed out that whereas you could not have a Polish precinct captain in a Lithuanian ward or vice versa, you could bring in an Irishman in either one. It seems to me quite possible that the only kind of peacekeeping forces that would not become embroiled in the dispute might just be peacekeeping forces that did not come from the region where the dispute took place.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Thompson?

Mr. Thompson (Red Deer): Professor Yarmolinsky, you made a brief reference in answering Mr. Brewin's questions to the importance of Canada's involvement in NATO as it related to some of the smaller nations of NATO. Would you enlarge on that? Secondly, would you give your thoughts on the importance of Canada's involvement or continuing involvement in NATO as it may relate to American policy? In other words, is Canada's presence in NATO something vital as far as American policy is concerned, or is it really not that important?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Let me take those two questions in turn. First, I think it is only natural and understandable that some of the smaller European members of NATO, while

intellectually aware of the danger that the NATO alliance is intended to ward off, tend to fall into a kind of "it can't happen here" psychology in which they are more concerned about problems of domestic budgets than they are about the need to provide that essential minimum of force to the alliance which seems necessary in order to discourage destabilizing military actions on the other side, whether those actions result from greed for empire or from fear and misunderstanding of what is going on on our side. I think the actions on the other side of the Iron Curtain no doubt are motivated by a mix of the two emotions.

• 1615

Given that situation, if any member nation in NATO reduces its commitment, if any member nation in NATO by its actions suggests that there is no need to maintain non-nuclear forces because all the NATO alliance needs to have is big brother in the form of the Strategic Air Command—as the ultimate deterrent, I think we increase significantly the danger that there may be a small incursion into Western territory. Such an invasion might result from a dispute over Berlin or whether, as I suggested in my paper, it might be occasioned by the continued internal deterioration in Greece as a result of the unhappy regime that is in power there, or for some unimagined other reason. The possibility that such a situation will develop and that the alliance will not be able to contain it before it grows and escalates increases the danger of general nuclear war. It is that danger that I think would be heightened, and more than minimally, by any action on the part of Canada to reduce its non-nuclear commitment. I speak of Canada not as distinguished from other members of NATO, but Canada like any other member.

You asked about the United States' attitude towards Canadian participation in NATO. I take it you mean participation generally, without specific reference to particular roles or missions that Canada has accepted. Here again I think that the United States, the American leaders, are aware of the very unfortunate effects on other members that would result from any lessening of Canadian concern for this essential non-nuclear protection which is provided by all the members of the alliance working together. Therefore I think the United States would be very much concerned—very much concerned indeed—at any suggestion that Canadian interest in commitment to the alliance might diminish.

I might just take the occasion to say, if I may, as a private citizen because I have had occasion to read some of the earlier testimony that has been given before this Committee and discussions of it in the newspapers, that the suggestion that has been made that the United States would not tolerate, let us say Canadian withdrawal from its defence commitments on Canadian soil seems to me just unthinkable—inconceivable. I do not say that in any way to minimize the degree of the United States' concern that such a possibility would produce.

The Chairman: A supplementary, Mr. Prud'homme?

Mr. Prud'homme: Would you consider NORAD and NATO on the same level, or would you say that the Americans would give much more importance to our withdrawing from NATO than to our withdrawing from NORAD? Or would they consider them equally?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Would I rather lose my coat or my shoes and socks? I do not know. Without making a judgment about what would be the official position of the United States Government, in my own view, Canadian participation in NATO is even more important than Canadian participation in NORAD, without in any way diminishing the importance of NORAD as well.

The Chairman: Mr. Hymmen?

Mr. Hymmen: Professor Yarmolinsky, is it possible, in your estimation, for Canada for example to consider in isolation NATO, NORAD, nuclear non-proliferation and general disarmament and the peace of the world? I suggest they are all involved together.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I should have made that point myself in connection with my replies to previous questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Laprise, do you have a question? If not, Mr. Allmand, followed by Mr. MacLean, Mr. Gibson and Mr. Hymmen on my list of questioners. Mr. Allmand.

• 1620

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Chairman, I have two questions. The first one is related to some of the questions that have already been asked. From your statement, sir, I conclude that you think that we should not only have a balance of power in the nuclear sense, but also in the non-nuclear sense. Therefore, you feel that an

alliance in Europe such as NATO is good to preserve this balance and that Canada's participation in it is good. Recently, Mr. Healey...

Professor Yarmolinsky: Shall I comment?

Mr. Allmand: Well, you could comment on the whole thing. The British minister stated that there was no balance in the conventional sense, in the non-nuclear sense, in Europe. As a matter of fact I think he said that the Warsaw Pact countries were considerably stronger in conventional forces than the NATO forces in Europe. I do not know whether you are familiar with the statement of Mr. Healey. I would like you to comment on that and if it is so, if you agree with that, it would follow from your thesis put forward here that we should strengthen considerably NATO, and that perhaps Canada should increase its forces in NATO in Europe.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Let me answer this question by making three points. First, Mr. Healey, whose judgments and accomplishments in this field I greatly admire, has been consistently on the pessimistic side with regard to the non-nuclear capabilities of NATO. He has been on that side ever since I have known his views—over a period of years. Second, even though he is a consistent pessimist, you will recall that in his statement he said the NATO non-nuclear forces would be able to contain an all-out Soviet non-nuclear attack only for a few days. Now I would point out two things in that statement. In the first place he was talking about an all-out Soviet attack, which seems to me about the least likely way in which hostilities would be initiated in the European area and, in the second place, he said that even under those circumstances NATO forces would be able to contain Warsaw Pact Forces for a few days. A great deal can happen in a few days. After all, in the few days of the Cuban missile crisis we were able then to avert World War III. In those few days, while the NATO non-nuclear forces were holding back the forces of the Warsaw Pact, we might also be able to avert World War III. Lastly, it is my view, not as an expert but as one who has to a certain amount sat and listened to the experts, the amount of improvement in our non-nuclear forces that would be required to make them capable of containing an attack from the East for a longer period than a few days, is relatively small—and it goes as much to quality as it does to quantity.

You recall there was a considerable debate three or four years ago over the relative capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in which it was pointed out that the Soviets are not 10 feet tall and that with the way they count their divisions—a Soviet division is a lot smaller than a NATO division—Although it was agreed that there was a gap, the gap was found to be bridgeable without extraordinary effort now from which of the members of NATO and in what kind and way additional contributions might help to bridge that gap is a highly technical question on which I am several years behind in expertise and so am unable readily to render a current opinion. But that it can be bridged I believe is still a fact.

Mr. Allmand: May I also conclude from what you say that not only is it possible but you would think that in the interests of peace or maintaining this balance perhaps it should be done?

Mr. Yarmolinsky: Yes. And as I recall though—again I am not really up to date on this one—it was calculated that if the member nations of NATO maintained the same percentage of gross national product that they had devoted to military expenditures in the early sixties without any of them increasing their percentages, it would be perfectly possible to achieve this end. It was the reduction in the percentage of gross national product devoted to non-nuclear military force that had produced the gap.

• 1625

Mr. Allmand: The second question has to do with the statement on the first page of your paper which says that according to you an antiballistic missile system is unworkable.

Mr. Yarmolinsky: That is not quite what I said.

Mr. Allmand:

an antiballistic missile system designed to protect against an all-out attack by a nuclear great power is unworkable,

Mr. Yarmolinsky: That is a carefully qualified statement.

Mr. Allmand: Then, is this statement by you based on your knowledge of the technology of the antiballistic missile systems proposed?

Mr. Yarmolinsky: No, it is not. It is based on what I fondly believe is common sense. Let me tell you why I think so. Let me say at

the outset that none of my comments are addressed to the workableness or the desirability or not of the so-called sentinel system, which is about to be deployed by the United States as a temporary defence against the possibility of a Chinese missile attack or an accidental attack. My argument is addressed solely to the possibility of deploying an antiballistic missile force designed to protect against an all-out attack by a major nuclear power. These two kinds of ABM systems are wholly different in purpose and effect, in my view. Why do I think that the latter would not work? Because no matter how effective and efficient an ABM system may be it is always possible to defeat the purpose of the system if the potential attacker builds enough missiles to saturate the anti-missile system, and since the security of the Soviet Union depends essentially on its second strike capability, just as our security depends on our second strike capability, the Soviet Union would find itself required to build enough missiles to saturate such a system, if we were foolish enough to construct one, just as the United States would be required to build enough missiles to saturate a Soviet system if they were foolish enough not to construct one themselves, and at the end of this additional round of the arms race we would both come out at a point where we would each have spent an additional \$50 billion to \$75 billion and neither of us would have purchased a single dollar's worth of additional military security. The only thing we would have done through what I would call this kind of vertical proliferation would be to make it even more difficult to secure adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, and if thereby we were to encourage the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to new nations we would be taking a step which would very seriously decrease the security of the entire world.

Mr. Allmand: Therefore the present ABM system is merely to protect the second strike force?

Mr. Yarmolinsky: The Sentinel system is intended not only to protect against an accidental firing of a single missile, which it would be able to catch, but to cover that rather delicate period between the time when the Chinese acquire an intercontinental missile capability and the time when they have a secure second strike capability, because during that period the Chinese leaders and the Chinese generals will know that if they do not strike first they cannot strike at all. They will also know of course that if they strike

first they will bring down the pillars of the temple around themselves and they themselves will be destroyed as a society. But it is not inconceivable that in a situation where the Chinese convince themselves that they are about to be attacked by the white imperialists—that the attack is coming anyway—they might decide to take their enemy with them, so to speak, and to launch a suicidal attack. Once they had acquired a second strike capability they would not be as likely to succumb to such a temptation because they would always know that even if they were attacked they would have enough surviving missiles to strike back. So that this is an extraordinarily dangerous period and the danger is one that it seems prudent, in the view of the advocates of the sentinel system, to protect against, since this is the only kind of nuclear attack that you can protect against.

• 1630

The Chairman: Mr. Howard, on a supplementary, then Mr. Brewin on a supplementary.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan Boundary): In connection with the suggestion that the NATO forces should be expanded to cope with an all-out Soviet attack in Europe, it seems to me that your argument breaks down on the advantage of conventional forces in such an instance because surely if we are confronted by an all-out conventional attack by the Soviets in Europe this then becomes a nuclear situation and your conventional forces are of much less value. Surely the purpose of the conventional forces is not really their use in a confrontation with the Soviets. It is in a confrontation with small nations in a peacekeeping role, an interim situation perhaps with Cuba or Israel or Egypt or some nation of this kind. I do not follow your argument when you say that we should be increasing in order to cope with an all-out Soviet attack.

Mr. Yarmolinsky: Sir, I was asked originally to comment on Dennis Healey's observation and I would agree with you that the likelihood of an all-out non-nuclear Soviet attack across the Western Front is about as low on the scale of probabilities as any military contingency that we can think about. But nevertheless its probability is greater than zero. A little higher up on the scale is the possibility of a flare-up over Berlin, a flare-up on one of the flanks, a situation in which the non-nuclear forces of NATO might well be able to contain an outbreak of violence long enough for the machinery of diplomacy to arrive at a

settlement and long enough to prevent it from escalating into a nuclear conflagration. But it is also possible, although, as I say, it seems to me very, very unlikely, that the Soviets, realizing that a nuclear exchange would mean mutual destruction, might for some reason launch a major non-nuclear attack. If they did so, the question was: could we contain it long enough to prevent its escalation? And my answer was that even Dennis Healey thinks we can contain it for a few days. With some slight improvements in our forces we could contain it for longer and decrease the possibility of a major escalation. But I quite agree with you that the major purpose of non-nuclear forces should not be to deal with such a highly unlikely contingency.

The Chairman: Mr. Brewin, on a supplementary.

Mr. Brewin: I want to go back to your statement, sir, about the rationale of the Sentinel ABM System. We had here two gentlemen from the Hudson Institute who believed that the proposition was irrational for either of the major powers to launch an attack on each other. And they coined a phrase something like this: that it was doubly irrational, it was irrationality compounded, for the Chinese to launch a missile attack on the United States with the sort of forces they would have for many years to come and that therefore to set up an expensive system of billions of dollars to protect itself against the possibility of the Chinese being guilty of compounded irrationality does not seem too sensible. What would your comments be on that?

Mr. Yarmolinsky: I have to say I do not agree. My disagreement is based on the assumption that there are some circumstances in which men are less likely to behave rationally than in other circumstances. I can imagine a Chinese ruling group, dominated by the military, for a variety of possible reasons concluding that the attack by the Western imperialists, which they have been propagandizing about for decades, was about to begin, and that they might as well go down in style because they were going down anyway, and why not give those missiles? This is clearly an irrational act, but it is not irrational to suppose that fallible men might decide to commit it.

• 1635

Mr. Brewin: You do not think it is a little irrational to impute total irrationality to others?

Mr. Yarmolinsky: No, because we know that there are people walking around today who are totally irrational. After all, we had the experience of Hitler; he was scarcely a rational man. And we have had the experience of others in brief authority whose behaviour could not by any stretch of the imagination be described as rational. One has to count the costs as against the possible avoidance of a highly unlikely but a terrible catastrophe that would be involved here. In my own view the calculation is a very close one. I started out feeling that the Sentinel System was a mistake and now—it depends on which side of the bed I get out of in the morning. But the one thing that is quite clear to me is that while there is a close argument about the Sentinel System there is no argument about the ineffectiveness and the positive undesirability of a so-called thick ABM system.

Mr. Brewin: I certainly agree with you about the last one.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, on a supplementary.

Mr. Ryan: How good is the multiple-arranged radar of the Sentinel System in determining whether an incoming object is a missile or a decoy? Does it lock onto decoys and fire its Spartans or whatever the anti-ballistic missile is?

Mr. Yarmolinsky: I have to disqualify myself on any kind of quantitative estimate. If I knew it it would probably turn out to be classified, but I do not know it. I can only tell you what I read in the newspapers and what my technically qualified friends tell me in general terms. It is designed not to lock onto decoys. Whether it will meet its design specifications in action I am not the fellow to tell you.

Mr. Ryan: There are computers that will...

Mr. Yarmolinsky: There are devices designed to discriminate.

The Chairman: Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MacLean: The discussion has related to the general field of a question I was intending to ask but I will ask it anyway because it is not quite the same, I think. The witness has given a beautifully rationalized description of the nuclear stand-off at the present time, but is not one of the premises that nations will act rationally in this situation and that the facts of history are that nations do not always act rationally? For example, after World War I Winston Churchill said that victory was

purchased at such a price as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. Yet we had the Second World War and I think, in retrospect, almost nobody would look back on either one of them and conclude that it was a good idea. What is the danger, in your judgment, of there being a totally irrational action taken by a nation that has in its possession nuclear weapons? It may be safe to assume at the present time that the stand-off works but as time goes by...

Mr. Yarmolinsky: I am very glad you asked this question because I did not mean to convey the impression that it is my view that everything is just jim dandy. The nuclear stand-off is no substitute, no substitute at all, for what I hope we achieve some day by way of a world rule of law.

Mr. Fairweather: You might ask Curtis LeMay.

• 1640

Mr. Yarmolinsky: I do not think that was a... So long as these weapons are available there is always the possibility that they may be used. Somebody might decide to press that button. As I tried to point out a little earlier, I think that part of the justification for the Sentinel System is that the Communist Chinese might act irrationally. I think the possibility of that kind of irrational action is reduced, and significantly reduced, so long as nuclear powers know that they do not need to pre-empt, that they do not need to strike first, that even if the enemy launches the most powerful attack that it can launch against them, they will have enough weapons left so they can strike back and inflict terrible damage on the enemy. That is our best guarantee, but it is by no means a perfect guarantee because, as you say, men do not always act rationally.

There is a significant distinction between the situation today and the situation during, let us say, World War I and World War II. At the beginning of World War I it was possible for troops to be engaged, fighting to be going on, and for statesmen secure in their offices and homes to say, "We will have the boys out of the trenches by Christmas". In the event of a World War III the act of engaging nuclear forces would produce a reaction such that within a matter of hours none of those statesmen would be around to speculate about how long it would take to get the troops out of the trenches.

Mr. MacLean: Is there not a danger that we may over-rate the rationality of humanity in general and the leadership of various nations from time to time?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes sir.

Mr. MacLean: This may not be a fair question, but what research is being done, perhaps learning from history as much as possible, and from other studies, as to the basic cause of war, if you like—the motivation of humanity. I think there is a danger of us being smug about our highly developed intelligence and civilization and so on, and to downgrade too much the instincts of humanity to defend their territory and this sort of thing, even irrationally.

Professor Yarmolinsky: My own view is that what is required are the kind of supranational security arrangements which correspond to the security arrangements in a nation consisting of states, where the responsibility for security is delegated to a national authority. It seems to me it is more important, at the present time, for us to concentrate on ways to work towards that objective than to do research on human motivation. We know that man is capable of acting irrationally, and capable of destroying others and himself.

The most important single step that could be taken at the moment, in my view, is to get on with the talks on arms limitation and possible arms reduction between the West and the East, which apparently the Soviets are willing to get into, and I think it is time we got into them too.

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: My question flows directly from the last questioner, and I would like to ask you, Sir, whether you see Canada having an active role as an intermediary between the East and West in initiating and publicizing the need for world disarmament now; not 10 years from now, not 15 years from now, but immediately?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I wonder a little bit about your use of the word "intermediary". It seems to me that there are genuine substantive differences between East and West in the way we think about political organizations, individual liberties and the rights of man. Perhaps I should not say this, but I do not see Canada as taking a middle position. I think Canada's position is clear. Nevertheless, nations like Canada, which are not major nuclear actors, have a greater potential for

pointing the way towards arms control arrangements. I do not know about disarmament. I think that substantial disarmament will probably have to wait on the kinds of political arrangements which provide a more stable location for international peacekeeping functions than is now available.

Certainly I think that Canada can help to point the way towards arms limitation, arms control, arms reduction arrangements in a very useful way.

Mr. Gibson: I find this, Doctor, disturbing in that we have heard of these disarmament talks going on endlessly for year after year, but they never seem to really hit the headlines and get firm world action. The United Nations seems to be a negative force, the young people in the world all seem to be insisting on action in this direction. We seem to be completely helpless and our hands seem to be tied in our efforts to advance towards these goals. Have you any suggestions?

• 1645

Professor Yarmolinsky: I understand the basis for your pessimism, Sir, but I think it is perhaps worth pointing out, as President Kennedy did, at the time that he signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, when he said "The longest journey begins with a single step". We did take that step and we have taken a few other faltering steps since then. I regard the agreement reached on the non-proliferation treaty as such a step, and I look to ratification of that treaty by my country and by the requisite other signatories in the near future.

We may or may not win the race to avoid complete destruction. The bulletin of the atomic scientists has a clock on the cover which for a long time was set at five minutes of twelve, to show that we had about five minutes to save ourselves from destruction. After the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed they set the clock back about 10 minutes. So there is some hope.

Mr. Groos: That is an old Chinese proverb.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I think President Kennedy identified it as such.

The Chairman: Mr. Hymmen?

Mr. Hymmen: Mr. Yarmolinsky, to go back to your brief with particular reference to NATO, I believe you presented a very clear case for Canada's involvement militarily by your reference to the importance of conven-

tional force as a deterrent to the use of the nuclear force, and also specific reference to the non-nuclear powers.

Mr. Thompson asked you a question, I believe, about the view of the United States on Canada's continuing its commitment. Do you have any views on the position of the smaller powers—we will ignore France for the moment—particularly West Germany? I believe it is very important to these powers that Canada should continue its role.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes, it is important for the alliance as a whole, and, therefore, important for each member of the alliance, because each member depends on the alliance, and the alliance depends on all its members. Therefore, each member depends on Canada's continued participation. I am not trying to avoid the question. I submit that really is a reasonable sequence of propositions.

Mr. Hymmen: A while ago I asked you a supplementary question and I probably erred in combining my question with a statement. I wondered if you could enlarge on this matter of involvement of NATO, NORAD, the non-nuclear proliferation and disarmament generally. It is a very important matter, and I do not think we can consider any of them in isolation.

• 1650

Professor Yarmolinsky: No, because everything that is said and done in the world today that affects our common security, is said and done in the shadow of the nuclear cloud. Any episode of violence, any quarrel between nations contains within itself the seed of a nuclear war, and, therefore, everything we do in the sphere of external affairs must be done not only in the light of its immediate effects, but in the light of its consequent effects on this overhanging danger of nuclear war. This is the ultimate danger that NATO is designed to avert. It is the danger that NORAD is designed to help to deter.

It is not that NORAD would be likely to make a significant difference in damage inflicted on North America. I can conceive of some circumstances under which it might, but primarily NORAD is an agent of deterrence rather than defence. It is with the same aim in mind of avoiding Armageddon that those of us who are particularly concerned about the problem of arms control, mutual arms reduction, address those questions because, again, they go to the same issue as does any question that relates to the way in which

nations live together in a world in which oceans and continents are painfully shrunken.

Mr. Hymmen: I have one final question. Would you agree that if we are going to have disarmament, as we must have, it must come from a position of strength rather than weakness?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I think that President Nixon took a great step forward last week when he acknowledged that the proper word to describe the American goal—and, I think, the Western goal—was not nuclear superiority but nuclear sufficiency, because if both sides address themselves to achieving superiority the only thing we can be sure of is that neither will achieve superiority and the arms race will go on indefinitely.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, before calling the next questioner I should inform you that the Committee will be meeting tomorrow morning at 11 a.m. However, this room will not be available because of preparations for next week's Constitutional Conference. Instead we will meet in room 253D, the Railway Committee room in the Centre Block. Do members of the Committee agree that the advance presentation of Professor Yarmolinsky be printed as an appendix to our proceedings?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: Mr. Groos, followed by Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Groos: Professor Yarmolinsky, I was very interested in the second-last paragraph on page 4 of your presentation. I will read out the last part of the sentence:

...the existence of non-nuclear forces can be an effective deterrent to non-nuclear conflict—provided their readiness is apparent and their political commitment is clear.

I think that is very important and I am glad to see you have stressed that. I think—this is just an observation that I might ask you to comment on—we could have foreseen that this year of 1969 would be a year of uncertainty within NATO inasmuch as this is the time for all countries to re-assess their position in it, so it is a particularly uncertain time, and so the readiness is not perhaps as apparent now, nor is the political commitment quite so clear for each country in NATO as it has been in the past, and perhaps will be in the future.

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• 1655

Professor Yarmolinsky: I would submit that the political commitment of its member nations to NATO is more a function of political and military necessity than it is adherence to a particular document, no matter how many seals and signatures it carries. The frontiers of the United States and, with respect I would submit, the frontiers of Canada, are on the plains of Western Europe, not because we have signed a document saying that this is so, but because the facts of political and military geography make it so.

Mr. Groos: Could I follow this up with a supplementary and ask you whether you think the political situation or the geographic situation have changed sufficiently in Europe in the last 20 years to warrant any change in NATO and its organization, particularly the adherence of any of the member nations to NATO organization.

Professor Yarmolinsky: First I would say that I do not believe that any changes in the situation over the last 20 years have affected the essential commitment of the members, including the one nation whose commitment is formally stated to be a commitment to the treaty but not to the organization. I think the commitment is clear; there are a variety of changes in organizational arrangements that I think are at least worth considering, but these do not go to the substance of the commitment.

Mr. Roberts: I want to ask some questions about the extent of the necessary involvement of the United States and Canada in the defence of North America. To go back to an answer you gave to Mr. Hymmen, I think you said that NORAD is an arrangement of deterrence and not of defence.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I said I thought it is primarily a matter of deterrence and not defence.

Mr. Roberts: Is that because it helps to preserve a second strike? Could you elaborate somewhat on that statement?

Professor Yarmolinsky: If the Soviet Union or any other nuclear aggressor is aware that any attack it might launch with bomber aircraft would be blunted, if not completely prevented, by the reaction of NORAD, this cannot help having an impact on their judgment as to the pros and cons of launching any kind of attack on the United States.

Clearly, the ultimate deterrent is the retaliatory secure second strike capability. The existence of NORAD contributes to the deterrent in part by helping to protect the second strike capability, although it is not the primary element of the deterrent.

Mr. Roberts: Really, in effect the more effectively it defends, the more credible is the deterrent strike capacity.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: What are the necessary requirements that the United States would have in Canada effectively to defend North America? We have had some testimony before the Committee on this subject.

Professor Yarmolinsky: This is a technical issue on which, I am afraid, I am not qualified to respond.

Mr. Roberts: Could you say whether for instance, technological developments would hold out prospects that these requirements would diminish with the passage of time or would they increase?

• 1700

Professor Yarmolinsky: I would not think so. In general, technological advances have made overseas bases less significant rather than more significant, as mobility has increased, but then Canada is not overseas vis à vis the United States any more than the United States is overseas vis à vis Canada, so I really cannot give you, on the basis of my knowledge, any kind of definitive answer.

Mr. Roberts: I was happy to hear you say earlier, in contradiction of what some witnesses have said to us, that you cannot imagine the United States insisting by force on maintaining certain security arrangements necessary for their security on Canadian soil. Is it possible to say whether she could still effectively protect herself, even though at much greater cost, without the arrangement she now has?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I suppose this is a technical question, but until I am corrected on the subject by a better informed authority I would say yes, protect herself militarily, but let me come back to some of the fundamental propositions with which I began. Neither the United States nor any other nation can defend itself against an ultimate nuclear attack. All it can do is hope to deter that kind of nuclear attack by retaining a secure second

strike capability. I think it is clear that the continued maintenance of that secure second strike capability is not dependent on access to Canadian soil. It might be made more expensive if that access were not available. I am not technically informed enough to know this. But the extent to which both the United States and Canada would suffer as a result is something that I really cannot estimate.

But I cannot imagine United States insistence and I cannot imagine Canadian dissociation from the common defence of North American territory. I cannot estimate the extent to which both the United States and Canada would suffer, because any adversary would necessarily feel more confident and less deterred from the whole spectrum of hostile activities if it thought the political understanding and shared bond between our two countries had been stretched or weakened. It seems to me that is really the essential fact, not the question of technical military...

Mr. Roberts: I put my questions the way I do because there is a point of view—although it is not one I share—that since the United States in its own interest is necessarily committed to the defence of the North American continent, and if the United States is capable of doing it without Canadian participation that Canada should save money and withdraw from these arrangements and go along for a free ride. This is not a noble or glorious thing but it is quite a rational thing to want to do. I am trying to get at the critical reasons against it.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I do not think it is a rational response, if I may say so.

Mr. Roberts: I mean a free ride is a rational thing to want.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes, but I do not think in this situation there is any free ride because neither the United States nor any other country in the world can defend itself or its neighbours against a nuclear attack. All it can do is hope to deter a nuclear attack. If a nuclear attack is launched, even with the best defences that the strongest nation in the world can erect, that nation and its neighbours will suffer incredible damage. Therefore it seems to me that Canadian participation in the common defence is an essential element in the political deterrent, and there is no free ride.

Mr. Roberts: I think you said at the outset of your testimony that it is very difficult to

imagine any country wanting to attack Canada unless it was also involved in an attack against the United States.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes, I did say that.

Mr. Roberts: So, if the deterrent power of the United States was effective, Canada would automatically be protected to the extent that the deterrent was credible, whether Canada participated or not?

• 1705

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes, but you must remember that I also said a lot of things can go on below the nuclear threshold which may undermine the stability of international relations and increase the likelihood of World War III, of a nuclear holocaust. A division between Canada and the United States would be just the kind of circumstance that would have that effect. That is why I find it...

Mr. Roberts: Is it fair to say that the fundamental argument is a political rather than a military one?

Professor Yarmolinsky: The fundamental argument is a political one, and one of the consequences of the nuclear situation in which we find ourselves is that many military arguments are transformed into political arguments. To take an overdramatic example, President Kennedy was quick to point out during the Cuban missile crisis that the swift and secret installation of missiles in Cuba did not increase the military threat to the United States and the Soviet Union. The threat was a political one.

Mr. Roberts: May I ask a further question, Mr. Chairman. This again may be a technical question but perhaps you can answer it. It concerns something that has puzzled me. We have had some testimony about Maritime Command and the defence against nuclear missile-carrying submarines. I understand how one can detect submarines which are carrying nuclear missiles but I am not quite sure how you protect yourself against them. Presumably they can sit in international waters, and aside from some pre-emptive attack against them there is not much you can do about it. Surely they can sit close enough to whatever their targets are that by the time they have released their missiles it is too late to do very much about it. Have there been some effective...

Professor Yarmolinsky: As I suggested earlier the missiles that are based on Soviet ter-

ritory could not all be intercepted even by the most elaborate ABM system that we could install because the Soviets would presumably build more missiles so as to be able to saturate the system—as we would do in the opposite case. Therefore you could say we have no defence against Soviet missiles. The only defence we have, which is really quite an effective defence, is the fact that we can deter the firing of those missiles with our second strike capability. The same thing applies to submarine-launched missiles.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Professor Yarmolinsky, following up the line of questioning with regard to NORAD, may I ask this question. Do you know if the warning systems which have been maintained under NORAD are still as necessary as they were, or is it probable that they can soon be dispensed with entirely? Perhaps this is a technical question on which you would prefer not to express an opinion.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I cannot imagine a situation in which warning signals could be dispensed with entirely, but on a technical level I am not competent to answer the question.

The Chairman: Do you know to what extent American forces are now patrolling Canadian territory, airspace or sea approaches under the NORAD arrangements?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I do not.

The Chairman: Turning to NATO for a moment, previous witnesses have indicated that Canada obtains an advantage from its participation in NATO because of the influence which it gains from being part of that alliance. Other Canadians have indicated they fear that Canada's commitment of troops to NATO, and particularly the troops in Europe, would automatically involve Canada as an active belligerent in the event of hostilities breaking out in Europe, which might be either in the form of rather minor attacks on the flanks, which you said are most likely, or perhaps a more important attack, which is less likely. So, to some extent it is argued that Canada's commitment to NATO really acts as a tripwire which would automatically involve Canada in any war which might break out in Europe.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I cannot imagine a major war in which Canada would not be involved in spite of itself. Because of the involvement of the United States I cannot

imagine Canada being spared. The possibility of Canada establishing itself as a neutral—a la Sweden or Switzerland—seems to me somewhat farfetched.

• 1710

You first asked me about the importance in my view of the argument that by associating itself with NATO Canada preserves an influence over the other members. I would be inclined to rate the arguments in perhaps the inverse order. I think the most important reason for Canada's involvement in NATO is its contribution to the deterrence of potential aggressors. The second most important reason for its involvement is its example to the other members as to the size and quality of their contributions. The third factor in importance is the influence of Canada in the deliberations of NATO itself.

The Chairman: Putting it very bluntly, Professor Yarmolinsky, what in your personal opinion does Canada get out of NATO? In other words, what is in it for Canada?

Professor Yarmolinsky: What Canada gets out of NATO is the somewhat reduced likelihood that all of us in this room will be burned to a cinder. I think that reduced probability is worth a good deal to you, as it is to us.

The Chairman: Again, in your personal view, Professor Yarmolinsky, is neutrality a possible policy for Canada? I realize it is a personal opinion I am asking for.

Professor Yarmolinsky: It is a personal opinion. My reaction is a little bit like that of the Vermont farmer who was asked by the tourist lost in the hills, "How do you get to East Farmington?", and the farmer thinks about it for a while and tries out various routes and finally says, "You can't get there from here". I suspect that you can't get there from here, but that is a purely personal view.

Mr. Allmand: Professor Yarmolinsky, in view of the fact that certain nations have not signed the non-proliferation treaty and some of these nations are actively working towards obtaining nuclear capability . . .

Professor Yarmolinsky: How actively? Which nations?

Mr. Allmand: Well, we hear of Israel. We hear of West Germany and India. I was going to ask you about these possibilities and what is the probability of this and how would it upset the . . .

Professor Yarmolinsky: Well, I will go out on a limb and venture the purely personal opinion, first that those nations are not now working towards attaining a nuclear capability in the sense of developing nuclear weapons. It would be a violation of treaties, for West Germany certainly, to do so and second, that all three of them will sign the non-proliferation treaty.

Mr. Allmand: You think there is a good chance that they will?

Professor Yarmolinsky: I do.

Mr. Allmand: Because of China developing its nuclear capability and its delivery system, I believe there was talk that India felt that it wanted some kind of balancing protection.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I think it is perfectly possible, perfectly feasible, for India to receive the kind of multilateral guarantees that will satisfy it sufficiently so that it will not feel compelled to develop its own nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Macquarrie: I might ask the Professor if he will elaborate a bit on his comment that it would be far-fetched for this country to adopt a Sweden-like approach—and I do not want to be invited to be lost in Vermont. I have had that happen before and a lovely state it is.

Would it not be possible for this country as a political decision to offer to the United States in the context of continental defence its propinquity which it has anyway, its space which it has anyway and its friendship? Would it not be conceivable that the military establishment which we maintain—not large—could be abandoned and replaced by another direction of our national treasure, to use an old-fashioned word?

• 1715

I invite you to elaborate just a bit on the far-fetchedness of it.

Professor Yarmolinsky: You ask me, sir, to comment on subjects that I am not sure it is really proper for a non-Canadian to address himself to.

The Chairman: Please do not feel hesitant, Professor Yarmolinsky.

Mr. Ryan: It is just at election time.

Mr. Macquarrie: If you had not used the expression "far-fetched" I would not have thought of asking you.

Professor Yarmolinsky: Let me just say that I believe the alternative that you describe, sir, is not one that I would call neutrality. If Canada were to make available to the United States its propinquity, its airspace and its friendship, I do not believe that enemies of the United States would regard Canada as a neutral nor would they be inclined to treat it so.

Under those circumstances I think Canada has more to gain than to lose by contributing that additional amount which it now contributes to the common defence. This, apart from the issue of Canada's contribution to the non-nuclear forces at the disposition of NATO, it would seem to me, goes to several additional points. For one, the fact that for any member nation of NATO to withdraw its ground force, its non-nuclear force contribution, in my view significantly weakens the whole alliance, it weakens the deterrent against non-nuclear aggression and, therefore, makes the whole international situation more unstable.

Let me just say this: If Canada had entered the nuclear age as a neutral, the situation would be quite different from the one that we are discussing here at the moment.

Mr. Ryan: What about the situation of Iceland inside NATO as a partner? It contributes nothing but its geography. Luxembourg and other partners contribute in such minuscule ways that it really is not important. Could Canada take a position in NATO parallel or analogous to these states.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I realize that Canadians are innately modest, but I think the analogy with Iceland is a little far-fetched.

The Chairman: Is your question a supplementary, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: It really follows along what Mr. Macquarrie was saying; it also goes back to the free ride, earlier. What Mr. Macquarrie was describing is what I was inappropriately trying to get at in the free ride. I understand that your answer was that we had to look into the political effects of Canada trying to be defended automatically by the United States without having to bear the cost of defence which we now bear.

If I interpret it correctly you said that this would add to political instability and therefore increase the danger that we would all be burnt to a cinder. I am just trying to understand in objective terms why it should

increase so much the instability; for instance, why would it increase instability any more than France's withdrawal from the military aspects of the alliance?

No doubt we would have to weigh the international considerations, but it does not seem to me *ex hypothesi* that the probability is so great we would thereby weaken the alliance that we should arrive at the conclusion it is not at least thinkable.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I do not want to be understood to think it is unthinkable. I am a good enough friend of Herman Kahn to be willing to think about almost anything. I do believe, first with reference to your analogy to the French situation, when General de Gaulle withdrew France from the Organization he made it quite plain that France remained within the embracing arms of the treaty, and I think that was an important distinction, although I believe also that France's withdrawal was an unhappy event from the point of view of world stability and prospects for peace. I have hopes that at some point France may even come back into the alliance, perhaps even during one of the many lifetimes of General de Gaulle.

• 1720

Mr. Roberts: I hope you are not talking of reincarnation.

Professor Yarmolinsky: However, I think the analogy to the French action is really a rather distant one if you are speaking of Canadian withdrawal from the alliance. After all, General de Gaulle maintained the French military forces; he made some changes in their organization, but he did not substantially reduce them, and he did not very significantly change their composition, as I recall. It seems to me you are speaking of much more drastic actions.

Mr. Brewin: Professor Yarmolinsky, to come back to Mr. Macquarrie's question, which I think was something along the line that you had said neutrality was unthinkable, would it be putting it correctly from your viewpoint..

Professor Yarmolinsky: I have refused to say anything is unthinkable.

Mr. Brewin: Would it be putting it correctly from your point of view to say that you suggest it would be unwise, because the thesis of your paper and what you told us is that the contribution of conventional force by a small non-nuclear nation like Canada,

either through the collective devices like the UN—preferably through that but also through regional organizations like NATO—can play a vital part in stabilizing the world so that we are not going to have a nuclear holocaust?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Yes, sir, if I may, let me just recapitulate very briefly. I suggested that the threshold of nuclear deterrence is very high in a world where both sides have second-strike capabilities. I suggested there is a great deal that can go on below that threshold that can be quite destabilizing, and I suggested that the destabilizing events below that threshold could, all too easily, lead to nuclear war.

Mr. Brewin: Then does it not behoove us not to worry so much about whether or not we are neutral, but to ensure that the contribution we do make is directed to having force to fulfil the purposes of which you are speaking; having force to act in a conventional way to either limit conflict or to deter small-scale warfare.

Professor Yarmolinsky: It seems to me, what we were talking about was not neutrality or no neutrality. It was the prospect of withdrawing from an existing alliance. And that, I think is destabilizing.

Mr. Brewin: And you are making the point that sometimes people think of neutrality...

Professor Yarmolinsky: I would not urge, for example—speaking as a private citizen as I have all along here—that Sweden abandon its neutrality. I think Sweden is a neutral nation and is a powerful force for peace in the world. But Sweden started out as a neutral nation.

Mr. Brewin: And some people think of neutrality as unarmed neutrality. You certainly would not advocate that Canada try and get a free ride, to use Mr. Roberts' expression, by not spending anything at all on the premiums involved, the insurance involved, and some military contribution.

The Chairman: Professor Yarmolinsky, you will have seen that at least some of the members are rather interested in getting lost in Vermont, and emboldened by the questions which have been asked. I would like to ask you one more, relating to that subject. Bearing in mind Canada's geographical location between the two super-powers, if Canada could establish effective neutrality...

Professor Yarmolinsky: You are speaking of Vermont and Maine.

The Chairman: If Canada could establish effective neutrality and secure the acquiescence of the Soviet Union and the United States to that policy, would Canada not then be making a very positive contribution toward the maintenance of world peace? You mentioned that you felt Sweden was now. Would Canada not be making a very effective contribution in those circumstances?

• 1725

Professor Yarmolinsky: Again, I do not doubt that as a neutral country, Canada could make a powerful contribution. But in order to become a neutral at this point in world history, Canada would have to withdraw from some of the alliances into which she has entered. To withdraw, it seems to me, would not be a contribution to world stability or world peace.

The Chairman: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Forrestall: I would much sooner sit and listen than inject myself into these conversations, but I am prompted by the boldness of our Chairman. Might I just ask you—I think I take a different point of view than the one suggested by our distinguished Chairman's question—what, for example, would China, in your opinion, think of us, think of Canada from any point of view other than wheat, say, up to ten days ago or two weeks ago? What would be their candid opinion of us? Would they, in fact, think of us militarily in any—I think we called it "irrational" consideration that might or might not be given during the very tender period that we are going to be faced with, or the United States is going to be faced with?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Let me make sure that I understand your question, sir. What would China think of Canada, if what? If Canada were to...

Mr. Forrestall: What, in your opinion, does China think of Canada? In other words, do they think about us at all, other than as a land mass adjacent to a very powerful nation?

Professor Yarmolinsky: Well, I am no China-watcher. But I would suppose that China probably thinks of the members of NATO as all—to a greater or lesser degree—involved in the same Western capitalist, imperialist conspiracy which dates back to the days of Marco Polo, and which is now preventing China from occupying its rightful

place as the most civilized country in the world.

I have had the privilege of listening to my colleague, John Fairbank, on this subject recently, and I think he is probably the wisest as well as the best informed of the China scholars. He seemed to suggest that there was more of the traditional Chinese distrust, negative hostility, towards the outside world in the attitude of communist China than there was even of the communist ideology. I am simply suggesting that it is all one great big barbarian blur to them, to a great extent.

And while I do not suppose, if one follows his analysis, that they have territorial ambitions beyond the limits of the ancient empire of China, they are awfully fearful—paranoid is not too strong a word—and they might react out of fear, if not out of ambition in a very dangerous way.

Mr. Forrestall: In the event that they did react from circumstances that you have been touching upon, Canada's neutrality would not matter a damn to the holocaust that would be rained upon us if they had the capabilities.

Professor Yarmolinsky: I don't know how good their aim is yet.

Mr. Forrestall: That is my point.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions? Perhaps if members will bear with me, before adjourning the meeting I might make a brief report on the discussion of the steering committee on some of the issues which were raised in the Committee on January 28. I will keep it brief. I thought it best to do this at the end of our Committee session rather than at the beginning, in view of the fact that we had a witness here and I was not quite sure how long our examination would take.

There was an interesting suggestion made of establishing subcommittees to go into separate issues. Your steering committee is seeking information on precedents and technical implications.

We have learned, for example, that subcommittees which have operated effectively in the past have had limited tasks. As, for example, subcommittees of the Public Accounts Committee have often met *in camera* and have not kept written records or had the benefit of translation facilities. I assumed that the suggestion for subcommittees was rather an attempt to permit the Committee to pursue two or more major topics at the same time,

with both subcommittees to meet in public and with full records. Since this is a new principle, we felt it important to have information on all the implications before proceeding further with our discussion and we will report back when we have this information. It may be rather difficult; the facilities are stretched to capacity, I understand, at the present time.

• 1730

Your steering committee also took note of the several suggestions that our program threatened to be too inflexible and on this point we feel it important to make it clear that the steering committee is agreed that at any time if a matter of major importance were to arise which the majority of the members of the steering committee, or the majority of the members of the Committee, felt more deserving of attention than what we are doing now, then, of course, we would give it all appropriate consideration. We felt that none of the subjects suggested on Tuesday morning were of sufficient importance that members of the Committee would wish to interrupt our present program for the first phase of our examination of the defence question. Our plan is to complete the first phase and possibly even to prepare a report, if this seems appropriate, before the Easter recess and before the government has taken decisions on its future defence policy. However, any delay might result, particularly with the Easter break, in the government making public its decisions before our Committee has completed the first stage of its own review.

With regard to the important question of Canadian representation at the Vatican the steering committee is considering the possibility and desirability of having a study made which could be made available to members in the near future if interest seems to warrant it.

Your steering committee also considered the matter of future witnesses bearing in mind the many useful suggestions that were made by members of the Committee. At the present time we are in the process of consulting possible witnesses to see if they would be available at times convenient to the Committee, and I hope within a week to be able to report to the Committee on the program and the witnesses for the next few weeks. In particular there was a suggestion that Mr. Kierans be invited to appear as a witness. The steering committee has attached importance to inviting academic and professional

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people, or people who have had extensive experience in the field of defence policy, to give evidence before the Committee and to hear all points of view. The steering committee felt that Mr. Kierans, like any other Canadian citizen, can submit briefs to the Committee which will be considered and made available to the members. In fact, I did speak to Mr. Kierans and outlined to him the principles which we are following in selecting witnesses during the first phase of our study and he agrees that the principles we are following are probably sound in the circumstances.

That pretty well covers the various points that were raised at the earlier committee meeting when we discussed agenda and procedure. As I say, I will make a further report as soon as I have further information with regard to those various points.

We have had a very good session this afternoon and on your behalf I want to thank most sincerely our witness, Professor Yarmolinsky. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, just before we adjourn, I wonder if it would be possible for the Committee to have for its consideration the existing defence agreements between the United States and Canada and other countries. I have in the back of my mind that there are some 37 different notes and agreements, and if that is true I would like very much to see them. I think they might be pertinent to what it is we are attempting to do.

The Chairman: We will make inquiries and discuss the matter with you, Mr. Forrestall.

APPENDIX EE

NOTES FOR STATEMENT OF ADAM
YARMOLINSKY TO STANDING COMMIT-
TEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL DEFENCE
HOUSE OF COMMONS 5 FEBRUARY 1969

Nations that are quite without imperial ambition have maintained armed forces for a wide range of purposes, not only to protect themselves against their neighbors, and to help their friends if needed, but also to carry out internal improvements, and to provide a suitable occupation for younger sons.

The advent of nuclear weapons has drastically changed the considerations involved in the use of armed forces. It has made the use of any kind of military force a good deal more dangerous, but it has also made national non-nuclear forces even more important.

Properly speaking, this situation has resulted not from the invention of nuclear weapons by itself, but from the technological advances, in nuclear weaponry and in long-range ballistic missiles. These advances have made it possible for a nuclear great power, after the strongest nuclear attack that could be launched against her, to retain sufficient retaliatory force to strike back to destroy the attacker. In a nuclear war, both sides are losers.

The first nuclear weapon, dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to bring World War II to an end in Asia, represented an enormous increase in destructive power. Like the inventions of radar, of the breech-loading rifle, of the stirrup, it gave a temporary but decisive advantage to the side that developed it first. But the development in the United States and in the Soviet Union of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles so powerful and so small that they could be launched from submerged submarines scattered throughout the oceans, or underground silos dispersed across the plains and the steppes, meant that a nuclear attack by one side would only meet with retaliatory destruction by the other side. For the first time in the history of warfare, neither side could afford to wage all-out war against the other, unless it were prepared to accept the destruction of its own society.

Neither side can expect any longer to be able to defend itself against an all-out nuclear attack. It can only rely on the deterrent effect of its own nuclear forces to persuade the

other side not to launch an attack in the first place.

One consequence of this nuclear standoff is to make the idea of nuclear superiority irrelevant. If each side has enough weapons, well-enough protected, to inflict unacceptable damage in a second strike, it doesn't do either side any good to acquire more. The arithmetic of this situation is that one attacking missile is not enough to be sure of destroying each missile reserved for a retaliatory strike, provided the retaliatory missiles are adequately protected and dispersed. In any nuclear arms race, therefore, the retaliatory force can keep ahead of the first strike force.

By the same token, an antiballistic missile system designed to protect against an all-out attack by a nuclear great power is unworkable, because the other side can always build enough offensive missiles to saturate the ABM system—and will feel compelled to do so in order to maintain its own deterrent power.

In order to maintain this delicate nuclear balance of terror, both sides feel compelled to engage in very active programs of military research and development, in order to be sure that a technological breakthrough on one side can be countered in time on the other side. The pattern of technological advance gives grounds for confidence that a breakthrough on one side will take long enough to work out in practice so that the other side will have time to counter it. Nor is it at all necessary for either side to put its new developments into operation, if suitable agreements can be worked out between them. The question "How much is enough?" is always an agonizing one in measuring the size of a nuclear arsenal. One has to calculate how many weapons will survive an enemy attack, how many of those that survive will misfire, or stray from their targets, and how many should be assured of destroying their targets in order that the total expected destruction would deter the enemy from launching a first strike. Is it enough to be able to destroy one-third of his population? Or should it be one-half? One-half his industrial capacity? Or

should it be two-thirds? But in any event, there is an outer limit, because no matter how enormous your nuclear arsenal, the other side will be sure to have enough so that if you hit him he will hit you back. And neither of you will ever be the same again.

The most important consequence of the nuclear standoff is that non-nuclear military forces come back into their own. The United States renounced the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation in 1961 and adopted the doctrine of flexible response. At the same time Mr. Khrushchev announced to a world Communist party congress that there were three kinds of wars: nuclear wars, which could only lead to mutual destruction; conventional wars, which were too dangerous, because they might lead to nuclear wars; and what he called wars of liberation (we would call them subversive aggression), which he felt should by and large be encouraged.

What both sides in the cold war had discovered was that a nuclear great power could only use its nuclear force to deter actions that threatened its most vital interests, because to use nuclear force would threaten terrible nuclear retaliation. Below the threshold of nuclear deterrence, other powers could engage in all kinds of aggressive behavior with relative safety, unless they knew that non-nuclear military force could be mounted against them. It is just not reasonable to suppose that if the Soviets sent a battalion probe across the Western front, the United States would respond by unleashing nuclear Armageddon. And if we find it unlikely, the Soviets won't believe it either. The object of the strategy of flexible response, then, is to mount the kind of non-nuclear force that will put on the other side the awful burden of deciding at every level of conflict whether to escalate or to back down.

If the two nuclear great powers are unwilling to use their nuclear forces except to protect their most vital interests, the other nuclear powers are likely to be similarly inhibited. And in fact it is worth recalling that no power, other than the United States, has ever fired a nuclear weapon in anger—and the United States only did so when it had a nuclear monopoly, in a situation where it was reasonable to suppose that more lives would be lost, on both sides, by not using nuclear weapons. New nuclear powers cannot foresee the consequences of crossing the nuclear Rubicon. As nuclear weapons spread, and new national nuclear powers are created, the dangers are multiplied. They are particu-

larly acute in the period when a new nuclear power has acquired its first few relatively unprotected weapons so that it must strike first if it is to strike at all. Here the danger of a pre-emptive strike, by the new nuclear power or against it, is greatest.

The nuclear standoff has its impact on non-nuclear conflict as well. Khrushchev pointed out the danger of a conventional war escalating into a nuclear war; and any outbreak of violence anywhere in the world takes place in the shadow of the nuclear threat. That threat puts a premium on three qualities of non-nuclear forces: readiness, flexibility, and responsiveness to civilian control.

Readiness is important because of the increased importance of containing conflict before it spreads. Most conflict is best contained by avoiding outside intervention altogether. But where intervention comes, it is better that it come early. It is argued, not unreasonably, that a high state of readiness in the military can encourage adventurism among its political masters. But I should prefer to rely on the master's sense of responsibility rather than on the servant's inadequacy.

Readiness depends on the state of training of the forces, the willingness of defense managers to limit themselves to a relatively simple arsenal of multi-purpose weapons, and the availability of adequate air and sea lift. The history of weapons development in the United States over the past eight years indicates some of the problems that arise within the military establishment itself in attempting to avoid the proliferation of highly complex, specialized weapons and weapons systems. This is not to suggest that readiness can be purchased on the cheap, but rather that it depends on quality and simplicity in weapons, and not on quantity and complexity.

Flexibility is a corollary requirement of readiness. If forces are to be available to deal with a very wide range of military contingencies, with a very small probability that they will be involved in any particular situation, they need to be flexible. Again, flexibility is largely a matter of training, and of seeking multipurpose equipment.

Responsiveness to civilian political authority is important because of the danger that any armed encounter, particularly between nuclear powers, or between nations with ties to different nuclear powers, could escalate into nuclear conflict. The classic case of responsiveness is the behavior of the United States forces in the Cuba missile crisis, when

even the slightest military move was considered in advance in the Pentagon and in the White House. But even in less dramatic situations, responsiveness may be critical. The increasing importance both of military advisers to third countries and of military peace-keeping teams is symptomatic of situations in which the political leverage of small military actions can be very great.

In the immediate aftermath of the shift from the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation to the doctrine of flexible response, there was a mood of near euphoria in some governmental circles in the United States about the possibilities of limited war. Courses in counter-insurgency were required for people going to certain overseas posts, and the Special Forces, in their green berets, were dramatized as men who could combine the skills of the jungle warrior and the village politician. Khrushchev seems to have been overcome by a similar euphoria in his call for general support for "wars of liberation".

Both Americans and Russians have been badly disillusioned. The United States is trying to find its way out of the Viet Nam morass, and the Soviets seem to find their role in the third world more embarrassing than it is rewarding. One hopes that Soviet disillusionment will lead to some degree of withdrawal from the troublemaker's role in a number of places on the globe, and that United States disillusionment will lead to a more measured response. One fears that Soviet disillusionment may be overcome by equal parts of concern and ambition, and U.S. disillusionment may lead to a very much greater reluctance to become involved in any military commitments overseas of non-nuclear forces. It can be argued with some force that a greater reluctance than has prevailed in the last few years may be desirable, but too great a reluctance could leave a real power vacuum in some critical situations, in the Middle East, in Africa and in Asia.

It is in this kind of situation that the military forces of non-nuclear powers may have a key role to play. Their employment, either in a strictly peacekeeping role, or to assist actively in flare-ups that threaten to break out into serious international violence, may help to avoid a much larger conflict which they would be drawn into eventually. Their involvement in this kind of role may be very occasional. It would be self-defeating if it were offered to stifle domestic uprisings or to help a regime that could not help itself. But it would be less threatening, and less likely to

escalate the conflict, just because these nations do not have their own nuclear arsenals.

Non-nuclear military forces need not be used, however, in order to be useful. As the existence of nuclear forces, alert and protected, serves as a deterrent to nuclear conflict, so the existence of non-nuclear forces can be an effective deterrent to non-nuclear conflict—provided their readiness is apparent and their political commitment is clear.

NATO forces in Europe, whether they are described as a shield, or a trigger, or a plate-glass window, have one essential function, to discourage any attempted violent shift of the Iron Curtain, by assuring that there can be no bloodless revolution. The size and disposition of NATO forces, and their national composition, will be subjects for intensive debate over the next few years. Clearly a Soviet assault across the Western Plain is the least likely eventuality for anyone to be concerned about. The nuclear balance between East and West seems assured. But if the non-nuclear balance is thrown off, there is always the danger of a Soviet miscalculation below what they regard as the threshold of nuclear deterrence. Berlin could become a problem again, or the present unhappy regime in Greece could so weaken that country that it became a tempting target as it was in the late 'forties—or some unforeseen contingency could arise. NATO troops in Europe are in effect a non-nuclear deterrent, and, perhaps equally important, they are an outward and visible sign of a common commitment to the collective security of all its members.

Thus it appears that the armed forces of the non-nuclear powers serve an essential purpose in the nuclear age, even when they are not required primarily for territorial self-defense, because their very existence provides a deterrent to violence elsewhere in the world. Most such violence occurs below the threshold of nuclear deterrence, because it does not affect the most vital interests of the nuclear powers. But it is important to discourage even minor violence, because there is always the danger that it may flare up into a nuclear conflagration.

Adam Yarmolinsky

A.B., Harvard 1943; LL.B., Yale Law School 1948

Law Clerk: Judge Charles E. Clark, U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals; Mr. Justice Reed, U.S. Supreme Court. Law practice: Root, Balantine, Harlan, Bushby and Palmer (New

York City) 1949-1950; Clearly, Gottlieb, Friendly and Ball (Washington, D.C.) 1951-1955. Secretary, Fund for the Republic, 1955-1957; Public Affairs Editor, Doubleday and Company, 1957-1959; consultant to philanthropic foundations 1959-1961. Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense 1961-1964; detailed as Deputy Director, President's Task Force on the War Against Poverty 1964; Chief, U.S. Emergency Relief Mission to the Dominican Republic May-June 1965; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) 1965-1966. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School 1966—. Member, Institute of Politics, John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard.

Member: New York and District of Columbia Bars, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, American Bar Association, American Law Institute, Council on Foreign Relations, Institute of Strategic Studies (London). Trustee, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial, Vera Institute of Justice. Public Member, Hudson Institute. Fellow, Ezra Stiles College, Yale. Fellow, American Academy of Arts and

Sciences. Member of the Board of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences. Director (elected), Associated Harvard Alumni, 1965-1968 Overseers' Committee to Visit Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, 1964-1966.

Lecturer: American University Law School, 1951-1956; Yale Law School, 1958-1959.

Publications: Case Studies in Personnel Security (1955) (ed.); Recognition of Excellence (1960); articles in various periodicals. Special Correspondent, The Economist (London) 1956-1960.

Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, 1966.

Clubs: Federal City (Washington); Coffee House (New York); Harvard Club of New York City.

U.S. Army Air Corps 1943-1946.

Married, four children.

Office: Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.

February 1968

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-eighth Parliament
1968-69

STANDING COMMITTEE
ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS and
NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Chairman: Mr. IAN WAHN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 25


THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1969

Respecting

Policy-defence and external affairs

WITNESS:

(See Minutes of Proceedings)



THE QUEEN'S PRINTER, OTTAWA, 1969

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Ian Wahn

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Perry Ryan

and Messrs.

Allmand	Guay (<i>St. Boniface</i>)	MacLean
Barrett	Harkness	Macquarrie
Brewin	Howard (<i>Okanagan Boundary</i>)	MacRae
Cafik	Hymmen	Marceau
Fairweather	Laniel	Nowlan
Forrestall	Laprise	Penner
Gibson	Legault	Prud'homme
Goyer	Lewis	Roberts
Groos	MacDonald (<i>Egmont</i>)	Thompson (<i>Red Deer</i>)
		Winch
	(Quorum 16)	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[Text]

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 6, 1969.
(38)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:00 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Wahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Forrestall, Gibson, Goyer, Groos, Guay (*St. Boniface*), Harkness, Howard (*Okanagan Boundary*), Laniel, Laprise, Legault, Lewis, MacLean, MacRae, Marceau, Macquarrie, Nowlan, Penner, Prud'Homme, Roberts, Ryan, Wahn, Winch (24).

Also present: Mr. Stewart (*Cochrane*), M.P.

Witness: Professor James Eayrs, University of Toronto.

The Chairman introduced Professor James Eayrs, Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto. Professor Eayrs made an opening statement which dealt with questions of Canadian defence policy.

The Committee agreed to print a biography and the paper prepared by Professor Eayrs for the members, as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix ff*).

Members questioned Professor Eayrs, with particular reference to subjects discussed in his paper for the Committee. At the end of the question period, the Chairman thanked Professor Eayrs for his helpful and interesting testimony.

The Committee adjourned at 1:35 p.m., until Wednesday, February 12, 1969 at 3:30 p.m., when the witness will be Professor Charles Faulkes.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, February 6, 1969.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, on behalf of the Committee I would like to welcome to these hearings Professor James Eayrs, who is perhaps Canada's foremost scholar in the field of recent Canadian defence policy and I am sure that the Committee appreciates this opportunity to hear his views and to question him about them.

Professor Eayrs has published a number of scholarly works. Among them have been two historical studies of Canadian defence policies; historical studies of Canadian external relations from 1955 to 1957 and most recently a collection of his articles on foreign affairs and defence published under the title, *Minutes of the Sixties*. His historical writings have been noted for their fairness and attention to detail.

● 1105

On contemporary affairs Professor Eayrs has established for himself a reputation as an astute and well-informed critic. The Clerk has already circulated details of Professor Eayrs' education, experience and published works. Last week the Clerk also sent to members copies of his comprehensive brief which the witness kindly forwarded well in advance for members to read. I believe that members of the Committee would wish me to compliment Professor Eayrs on his brief which represents a very thorough and thoughtful contribution to our work and one which should provide us with an excellent basis for our discussion today and for our future examination.

Professor Eayrs, perhaps you would like to make a few introductory remarks on the question of what should be the role of the Canadian Forces; then no doubt members of the Committee will want to question you on your written brief. Professor Eayrs.

Professor James Eayrs (Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto): Mr. Chairman, I had no explicit directives from this Committee as to in what areas my opinions were being sought. Mr. Dobell telephoned me some weeks ago and gave me to understand that the Committee would be indulgent and indeed expected me to go back to first principles and to attack these problems on what would be considered

ordinarily very elementary levels and to address myself to such kindergarten questions as, why have a military establishment at all? What can it do for you? What should it do for you? As I said, my impression is that the Committee was prepared to be indulgent to the extent of entertaining the most elementary analysis and observation, and that is what I have produced, though I would like to note in passing that the observation that the emperor has no clothes on is, of course, very elementary, but it also can be extraordinarily pertinent at times.

It was with this assurance of the Committee's readiness to look at it at this level that I prepared some notes on the future roles for the armed forces of Canada. They are not only elementary; they were prepared in some haste in various odd moments that I was able to take off from my prime duty as professor of riot control at the University of Toronto.

I received the Committee's invitation on January 21. I sent these notes up on January 27 to Mr. Stewart and I had really to forego any opportunity I might have had to revise them or to compress the argument or indeed more importantly even to finish off the argument, because you notice when it comes to the really interesting part, "what do you do?", "how do you design forces?", it tails off into a recommendation that somebody else should do the job on my behalf. If I had had a little more time I might have been able to finish off my paper.

What I have done, then, operating on this very elementary level, is to begin by asking what sort of things a military establishment can do for its country. I was at once struck, as I looked at it from this point of view, by the versatility of the military establishment. It can do so many things for a country, and I suppose this is one reason why practically no member of the states-system has unilaterally chosen to disarm, to do away with it, because it is useful to a country in such a wide variety of tasks.

Its primary role, as the paper suggests, is to defend the country or to attack another country, but in addition to that it can do all sort of things, like modernizing and developing the country, keeping the country under control from anybody inside its frontiers who

might want to make a fuss, to conduct itself in such a way as to make the members of the country feel proud of their country, and it has the very important ceremonial role and in addition it can be used for insurance against a hostile environment which may appear some day on the scene. It used, of course, all the time to reinforce the country's diplomatic missions in various ways. All of this the paper goes into and gives some examples. It is the versatility of the military establishment that strikes one first.

● 1110

The next thing that struck me and that followed on from it is the heterogeneity of the ways in which the military establishment serves each member of the system. If you turn page 12 of the brief you will there encounter my first and probably only foray into quantitative political science since I started practicing the trade 18 years ago. I have some figures there, and what I did for my own interest was to assign in a very crude way a total of 10 points among the half dozen functions that I discerned for the military to serve a country and took about 15 or 20 countries, which are obviously rather different in geographical location and political circumstance, and tried to allocate those points in a very rough and ready way among the countries concerned. Of course that does not prove anything at all. What you then have to do is to go on and justify your allocation. However, you would notice in passing, for example, that a country such as Israel quite clearly relies upon its military establishment to a very great degree for the defence of the country—The Arabs would say, for the attack on their countries—so you put without any hesitation eight points under the strategic slot.

On the other hand, when you come to take, just as an extreme argument, a state such as the Vatican City you can very safely assign its meagre force to the ceremonial role; maybe nine points for ceremony and one for the papal Zouaves who can turn people out of St. Peter's Square if they are not behaving themselves. There is a terrific variation.

Sweden presents a problem to me because I was unsure whether the five points that go under Sweden's main item should be in the realm of strategy or in the realm of insurance. Mr. Chairman, while I am briefly on the subject of Sweden I should like to say, with respect to the Committee, that Sweden is a lovely country. It has a very sophisticated community of defence analysts who are worth talking to, but I would have thought, as an example, as a country whose military establishment has anything to offer to this country, that if the Committee is thinking of going there it is heading in the wrong direction. We never had anything in the nature of a Swedish situation. We though we had, we scrapped the Swedish option when we

scrapped the Arrow in 1959. The Swedes have lots to teach us, but not in the field of defence. If you want to go anywhere, go south, go to Mexico. That is a nice country too, it has a nice climate, and its situation is very much more relevant to Canadian concerns than the Swedish.

Now the third thing that struck me, besides the variety of things that a military establishment can do for its country and the different ways in which it does it from country to country around the system, is that whereas it is true that the state system is a very motley collection, and every case is a special one—the lawyers say "Every case is a hard case"—the case of Canada is a really special case among the special cases. Every country is unique, but in these matters of defence we are most unique. That makes things very challenging for our defence planners. It also makes them extremely perplexing because there are very few countries that one can go to for guidance. You can go to Sweden for guidance on slum clearance but, as I say, there is not much guidance to be had there in the realm of defence.

There are two features of our unique situation which I would like to single out and underline for special attention and emphasis.

● 1115

The first—and this really is a large part of the nub of the argument; if I cannot make this point I cannot make any point—is that, unlike almost any other country in the state system, we can currently find no strategic justification, on my definition of the term "strategic", for the Armed Forces. That does not mean for a moment that we should consider disbanding the Armed Forces; it just makes it very difficult to know how to design them and how to plan them. They are not needed for the defence of Canada, and presumably we are not planning even in the near or intermediate range future to attack another country. We do not need them for strategic purposes. This is a curious situation, it is a fortunate situation, it is also a perplexing situation, and I think a lot of the confusion and uncertainty about defence policy over the last few years has arisen in consequence.

The second feature of our situation that I think is unique and perplexing is the extraordinary commitment to what I would call the ceremonial function of the military establishment. If you read my paper you will see that what we are spending a very large proportion of our \$1.8 billion a year on really comes down to ceremony. I say there is nothing wrong with ceremony, it has its place in life, but something is wrong if you are spending compulsively a great deal on it. It would be better to spend the money on some sort of treatment to find out what sort of creature you were that caused you to spend your money in this odd way.

A third odd, perplexing and unique feature of our defence policy is that when you get right down to it a great deal of our perplexity derives from our relationship with the United States. A great deal of our defence policy is designed with an eye to American reaction. There is an extraordinary parallel here. It has been said that history never repeats itself, it is only historians who repeat one another. But I wonder about that, because I go back in my mind's eye to about 60 years ago, to the last great defence debate in this country—and this debate may have taken place in this very room—Sir Wilfrid Laurier's naval bill of 1909 and 1910. Of course the threat at that time was supposed to be from imperial Germany, but if you go back over that debate you will find that in the Canadian context the debate was not over Canadian-German relations but over Canadian-British relations—Canadian imperial relations. And of course exactly the same thing I think is true now: the debate is not over Canadian-Soviet relations but over Canadian-American relations. And of that debate I hope there will be no end, because when it ends that is signification that we have become the fifty-second, fifty-third, or fifty-fourth state, whatever terms of union our negotiators can cleave out for us.

These are some of the reflections. I have a couple of concluding ones which I jotted down over breakfast this morning.

The first is, please take it seriously. Now I do not want to be misunderstood. This is a little like the sort of error that the lecturer on the Baltic problem or the Afghanistan problem commits when he goes into some remote community in northern Manitoba and harangues the little knot of public spirited citizens that have come out to listen to him for their lack of public interest in public affairs.

Of course you are taking it seriously or you would not be here. I would like, if I can, to speak through you to the bureaucracy, to the policymakers of this country. I think it is up to the people and to the members of this Committee to really rub the noses of the bureaucracy in the fact that there really are options in this foreign policy and defence review that is going on. When I say to take it seriously I mean that there are real arguments here. It is true they go back to first principles and it is disconcerting if you discover that your first principles are wrong, that your assumptions are wrong and you have to start all over again, but nevertheless this has to be done.

I have another concluding reflection about unification. I think one of the difficulties of getting a radical defence and foreign policy debate going in this country at the present juncture is that the military establishment of this country has just, and in my view quite properly, been subjected to one of the most radical shaking ups of any military establishment in the world. It has just undergone what any bureaucratic structure would realize is very radical and very severe

change. It does seem to be a terrible injustice, hard on the heels of that radical structural reorganization, to come along and say, in effect of what I have been doing, the role is wrong, the assumptions are wrong, the equipment is wrong, the design is wrong. Nevertheless, this is what has to be said, because this is how it is. It is like the other shoe dropping. Mr. Hellyer dropped one, it is too much to ask him to drop both, but I am dropping the other shoe.

● 1120

Mr. Hellyer made it even more difficult to drop the other shoe, because what he did, in effect, I think it is fair to say, is to bribe the services to a certain extent. Perhaps the word "bribe" is unparliamentary, Mr. Chairman, and I take that back. I mean he tried to reward the services for this unusual degree of shaking up and radicalization by paying it off in splendid equipment which it really does not need. So now the design has been set once again in the wrong direction.

If I have to say anything, it would be to take it seriously, that these are fundamental issues and there is a case to be made on the other side.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Eayrs. Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: Professor Eayrs, you do not categorically suggest in your paper that we should leave NATO. You suggest that we make quantitative and qualitative changes in our military establishment and that perhaps we should have studies on what so much money will buy us, I got the impression that you would have us stay in NATO with perhaps changing our contribution. Would you explain?

Professor Eayrs: That certainly would be an option which I believe would be open to us and one which I think that we should explore. It would be in the nature of an attempt to reduce the membership dues, and to reduce them significantly. It would be an attempt to try to keep on getting the advantages which advocates of our membership in NATO now say we derive from that membership without paying so excessively for it. I see nothing wrong with that. It is in keeping with the principle of the free ride and it is in keeping with the principles of foreign policy, as I see them.

There is, of course, a case to be made for leaving NATO. One of the least explored aspects of that case, in my mind, is the case for reducing the membership, which has become terribly unwieldy. Fifteen people, as any member of a committee knowns, is too many to make decisions very rapidly and is certainly far too many, if I may closely paraphrase what George Kennan said as long ago as 11 years ago, to show the kind of subtlety, of understanding and flexibility of response which is necessary to negotiate great issues with

the Soviet Union. So all this talk about—which comes from the Secretary General of NATO—of using NATO as an instrument for détente I think is going to run aground on that particular reef.

I would think that one of the things that we might do is to explore the possibilities of maybe an associate membership. There are various ways of cutting it down. You could say perhaps membership for the next 20 years should be confined to those states professing a direct interest in the outcome of the German problem.

I think, if we wanted, we could so argue that this was no longer our primary concern. It is important to go back to the founding days of NATO in 1948 and 1949 to recall the reason that the membership got as large as it did. It was largely as an act of psychological warfare against the Soviet Union that the alliance was formed: the more the merrier, 10 was better than 8, 12 was better than 10, and that is how we got into the present thing. Maybe we could do a service by trying to bring the membership down to more manageable proportions.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Eayrs, you were introduced as one of the outstanding experts in international affairs in Canada. The witnesses we have had so far in this review have suggested that we stay in NATO and, for the most part, have suggested that we increase our contribution.

When I asked you whether or not we should get out, you said that is an option, and you put before me certain alternatives. Have you not in your own mind come to any conclusions about this? The others that were here said, "Yes, we should stay in". You are the first witness that has come to this Committee and has presented a paper which is more or less contrary to what the other witnesses have said, but yet you do not come out and categorically make any statement as to whether we should get out. Like many academics perhaps, you give us many alternatives but do not really say what we should do. If you have not made up your mind then that is fine, but I am asking you if you ever have made up your mind on this particular point?

• 1125

Professor Eayrs: It would be silly to make up your mind before you take a look at what kind of bargain you have, and you cannot know what the terms of the bargain are until you start negotiating on it. So when one sees the conditions under which we could, though greatly reducing the costs of our membership, nevertheless retain our membership, one would want to know how significantly those costs have been reduced before making a decision about membership or not. Meanwhile one keeps in mind the very pertinent fact that membership in NATO, quite apart from the costs, has certain liabilities of which its advocates must surely be aware—and they are dishonest if they do not

mention then—the liabilities being, as I have said, the creation and the perpetuation of a very unwieldy apparatus, a very *status quo* type of apparatus together—and this is an argument which was more cogent a few years ago than it is now—with the disadvantages that our diplomacy with the third world might suffer in consequence of their thinking that we are not as free an agent as they would like us to be because of our NATO membership.

These are things that should be borne in mind. Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, I always take the reference "academic" not as a pejorative term but as a complimentary term. I think there is still some mileage in the academics yet. So I do not see that there is anything wrong with waiting before deciding, until you see what the terms of decision are.

Mr. Allmand: With respect to the free ride theory or thesis, if we were to reduce our military establishment, if we were let us say even to withdraw from NATO or adopt a more neutral position, would this in fact make us more independent in the eyes of the third world or, let us say, the so-called Iron Curtain countries, the socialist world, China. Would they consider us neutral and would we really be able to fulfill a better role as an intermediary nation to do other things? People have suggested that we reduce our military, that we adopt a more neutral position and, in doing so, we could do more to bring about peace in the world because we could act as an intermediate country, we could be a negotiator, we could do some of the things that Sweden does. Could we? Would we be credible because of our geographic position and would we in fact be independent enough to do these things?

Professor Eayrs: To take the first part of that very complicated and leading question first, I would say that it would be a foolish policy to make radical changes in our society for the sake of what in some position papers' hypothesis other countries might think of us. That would be one reason for doing it but it would surely have to be very far down on the list of reasons for doing it because you do not know—international politics is not as scientific as that—the reactions of other countries. As you know, all countries have action policies and declaratory policies. The action policies are what they really think and do; the declaratory policies are what they tell other people they think and do, and the two differ. And so it is with countries in the third world.

I would like to evade the question by suggesting that I understand a further witness is going to be my colleague, Michael Brecher of McGill University, who has recently undergone the rather harrowing experience of spending 70 or 80 hours with Krishna Menon and a tape recorder. Mr. Menon spoke long and loud on the subject of Canada being worthless, in his view, because it was a member of NATO. In his book, which is published on the basis of that, you will see Krishna

Menon's testimony to the effect that he thought Mr. Pearson was a fine man but he was a NATO man, and in his eyes this disqualified him. How seriously you are going to take that kind of testimony is something that you will have to ask yourselves before you say that you should do this because other countries are going to think better of you.

● 1130

The second part of the question involves the concept of saliency in mediation, which is a very tricky thing. How credible is Canada's role as a mediator precisely because she has these various connections with France, the Commonwealth and with the United States? Do these things get in the way? Do they help or do they hinder? Again I think the rather evasive answer is that it depends specifically on the mediation that you have in mind. There are some kinds of mediation where I would think disaffiliation from the United States would be a disadvantage, and some in which it would be otherwise. So, you would have to look at the case. I could not say there is any general rule on the matter because I do not think there is.

Mr. Allmand: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Howard?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I have found this brief a most interesting and different approach to the subject. The brief asks as many questions perhaps as it answers, and I would now like to further some of these questions.

First of all, do you reject the peacekeeping role for Canada completely?

Professor Eayrs: No, I do not reject it completely. I think it has been overplayed. I think we are overcommitted to it. I think that both in the interests of the United Nations and of peacekeeping it would be well to temper our enthusiasm for the role with a little moderation.

I specifically have in mind the very deleterious by-product and consequences of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from UNEF at the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic. That is a very diplomatic way of saying it. Nasser kicked us out. What I thought was terribly disquieting was the way—in an unguarded moment, I guess—the then Secretary of State for External Affairs said it was unfortunate that U Thant had agreed that the force should go. It is unfortunate that these events should have happened but it was inevitable that U Thant would agree because he obviously had in mind the future of peacekeeping and the dubious future which would exist for it if a United Nations force, having gone there with the assurance of the host government that it would go at any time, was then kept against the wishes of the host

government and reliance was placed upon a very tortious and involved document that somebody fished out of Mr. Hammarskjöld's files as to the reason it should stay. I think the reason there was such a furor in the wake of that was precisely because of the extent to which we had committed the prestige of Canada in that particular peacekeeping role. It was the first one; we were the innovators; we were the crucial contributors. If you remember the history of it, Mr. Hammarskjöld did not want it at all; it was Mr. Pearson who talked him out of his fears and misgivings. We went through; we put the troops in there; we had by far the largest commitment to it and then when we were kicked out it seemed like the end of the world, and people acted as if it was.

I think for our future well-being and for the well-being of peacekeeping that our commitments should not be on that excessive scale. As I say in the paper, I think it would be well to scale it down to the level of a battalion rather than the level of a brigade; to show the flag but not to wave it around so vigorously.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): You referred to the advantages of having military forces because of the unifying effect they can have on a nation. For example, in Canada it can provide an opportunity to train people in the field of bilingualism and it can provide technical training for Canadians, and yet to a great extent you appear to reject the total advantage of military forces. You must foresee some alternative role. After World War II Canadians, along with other nations, engaged in the Allied Military Government, which was a military function. I wonder if there is any role along this line for Canadian military forces in the underdeveloped nations? Would it provide the function of a training ground for Canadians and at the same time a useful function in world affairs?

● 1135

Professor Eayrs: As I understand it, I think this is a proposal which has become associated with the name of Dr. Solandt; the notion that some new role, an untried role for the Canadian forces, could be found in the scope for modernizing and developing other countries besides our own. I think this is an interesting as well as novel suggestion and one which should be tested, but again on the smallest scale and in the quietest possible way and with as little as possible fanfare, because it is in fact like the peacekeeping operation in that the success of the operation depends on factors which are largely beyond the control of your people and your government. Third countries are very sensitive of their sovereignty, as would be, and it would not be well for us to say that this is the future role, this is the main role or even that this is a very important role for the Canadian military, and train it for this role and then find there are no invitations. You cannot shoot your way in to do a modernizing role; you have to be invited. You do not want to crash the party. Does that answer the question, sir?

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Yes. On page 14 you refer to the Luddite stage. What is the Luddite stage?

Professor Eayrs: Net Ludd was a person who took it out on the industrial revolution by smashing all the machinery. His followers were called Luddites.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): On page 15 you refer to the possibility of Quebec separating and you say there is no scope here for dauntless heroism. You were referring to military action. Were you thinking here in terms of a military or a moral opinion?

Professor Eayrs: Military.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): We had a discussion yesterday with Professor Yarmolinsky relating to a comment by Dennis Healey to the effect that we needed larger NATO forces of a conventional nature in Europe in order to contain the possibility of a sudden Russian advance, and that by larger conventional forces we could hold them in check for a long enough period of time to negotiate and prevent a nuclear explosion. Do you subscribe to this view?

Professor Eayrs: I find it very difficult to get an authoritative opinion on the levels—let alone the adequacy—of conventional NATO manpower in Western Europe. A running argument is going on across all the capitals of Europe right now between Dennis Healey and General Lemnitzer, the Supreme Commander, as to the level of forces and the adequacy of the forces. Dennis Healey says there are not enough and General Lemnitzer says that of course all generals want more but he is convinced it is an adequate amount. So, it is difficult, in view of that internecine NATO skirmishing that is going on, to express an outsider's view. I agree with Mr. Yarmolinsky that almost anything is better than starting a limited nuclear war in Western Europe, and if it could be conclusively shown that the withdrawal of our brigade would precipitate—or even risk precipitating—nuclear war, I would suggest we leave them there at any cost. However, that is not the argument; that is not the issue.

What you say further about the level of forces depends very largely on your assessment of what has happened to the balance of conventional forces as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, and once again August opinion differs on that. I think it is true to say that NATO opinion comes down very heavily on the side that the balance has swung against it, but it is also possible to argue—and I have argued and people who know much more about it than I have argued—that the balance of power has swung against the Soviet Union in consequence of the defection of at least two of its Warsaw Pact alliance from any eastern movement on the part of Soviet troops. The Soviet Union can no longer rely on Czechoslovakia, which it must have counted on, at

least in part, in a supplementary role. It can no longer rely on Rumania, and much of its forces are tied down in occupation duties which were not part of their mission beforehand. So, I think it is possible to argue that militarily things are better for NATO than they were before August.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): I have one final question. In your introduction you referred to the fact that you rather left us up in the air in your brief as to the alternatives to the NATO role and to our defence commitments. Are you going to enlarge on the alternatives to the free ride theory?

● 1140

Professor Eayrs: I do not regard the free ride as a theory. I regard it as a fact and therefore there can be no discussion about it.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): Is there no alternative role for Canada? I do not mean an alternative to the free ride, I mean an activity in other directions to replace the free ride.

Professor Eayrs: I see. I think I mention in the last part of the paper that I leave it to parliamentarians and others to put to a constructive use the billion or so dollars which I am perfectly prepared, given my head, to liberate for any purpose. I assume there are things which this country can do with such a sum of money. I assume we are not so rich that it is coming out our ears. I assume there are very important items to attend to. There seems to be concern that the budget is now up in the \$12 billion category. Well, this is one way of cutting it back.

Mr. Howard (Okanagan-Boundary): But as an alternative to this you do not see an international role for Canada?

Professor Eayrs: I see the pendulum of mood and opinion in this country swinging away very definitely from what the Japanese quaintly call a "high posture policy" in international affairs. I have a very strong feeling that it would be unrealistic to expect the same priority for and the same attention to the external role that we have sustained for so long from 1947-48 when Canada took the leading part, much more leading than the United States.

I would like to remind you, if I can go off in this digression and then recollect the thread of my discourse, that in April, 1948 the Secretary of Defence, James Forrestal, came up to Ottawa on some mission or other and wrote in his diary that for some reason which he could not understand the Canadians were all hot about this Atlantic Alliance of which, of course, later the Americans became the prime mover.

I think it would be unrealistic to try to sustain this intense activity in international affairs which lasted roughly from 1948 down to when? When can you pick out a kind of symbolic watershed, to use the fashionable term? I would say perhaps when the Canadian Forces in UNEF were given the heave-ho from the United Arab Republic; that might have been a kind of symbolic place at which to break it off.

I now think the big problems of this country and where the energy should be—I think Mr. Hellyer got it just right, you know. He left Defence and went into housing. That is the priority. I think the big problems are domestic problems and that is why I hesitate to follow in the line of some of my colleagues who advocate a more independent role for Canada, who want to redirect energies and attention to some alternative roles in the external sphere. I think the external sphere has become terribly unmanageable and that our own affairs have become unmanageable enough that we should put them in order.

I do not think that it is right to call this a mood of isolationism in any pejorative sense. I am a historian of isolationism and I would not like to think that we are going back to the low, dishonest decade of the nineteen-thirties. We are not, of course, because we are in the seventies. It is impossible to go back to the thirties. We are a different country and it is a different system. I do not think of it being isolationism in the sense of the kind of bolt from the blue that hit Senator Vandenberg somewhere on the road from Grand Rapids to Ann Arbor when he suddenly thought, "Gee, it is better that the Germans do not win the war after all. Britain should win the war", and the Americans thereby got into line.

● 1145

I do not see it like that at all. I see it as what somebody is now calling a mood of introversion rather than isolationism as distinct from an extrovert mood. We have had the extrovert bit; now I think our thing is to concentrate on matters at home.

If I could get back to your question when you ask for alternative roles, I have not ponder them deeply because I do not think they are terribly important.

Mr. Harkness: May I ask a supplementary question arising out of one of the statements that Professor Eayrs made? It is the statement that General Lemnitzer says there are enough conventional forces or, at least, your statement was roughly along this line. Then you qualified it by saying, of course, every general always wants more. What authority is there for that statement whatever?

Actually, in my own experience and everything that I have read it is just the reverse. The Supreme Commander of NATO from the very beginning of NATO has continued to emphasize that the member countries

had to supply more conventional forces and this has continued right up to the present time, with the strongest possible pressure being exerted on all the members not to withdraw any of the forces they have there at present but, on the contrary, to build them up.

Professor Eayrs: I guess General Lemnitzer was wearing his NATO hat rather than his U.S. military hat when he made that statement. I would refer you sir, since you ask for authority to an authoritative statement by a high U.S. defence official—alas, his name now escapes me—which is reprinted in the September 1968 issue of *Survival*—Alain Enthoven's statement—and there again he says in response to arguments that the conventional forces are insufficient, that they are sufficient. I may say I was surprised when I read that statement but, it is on the record.

Mr. Harkness: As I say, the NATO Supreme Commander, including General Lemnitzer, continues right to the present time to insist that more conventional forces be supplied.

Professor Eayrs: Well, I would be prepared to accept that, but I would not be prepared to accept that he was right.

Mr. Harkness: No, but the point is, I think, that there has been a very considerable emphasis on building up the strength of the conventional forces for many years past and this emphasis still continues.

Professor Eayrs: However, it is fair to reflect that on at least one side of this divided argument in the councils of the Alliance as to the adequacy of the forces, there are those who keep on pointing out that on the ground and conventionally the number of men NATO has under arms considerably outnumbered the number of men that the Warsaw Pact nations have under arms.

Mr. Harkness: But not in situ, is the trouble.

Professor Eayrs: Yes. Not in situ, but situ is getting easier to get at all the time, you know, with the new aircraft.

Mr. Harkness: This again is a very debatable point because you need an enormous number of transport aircraft to put any considerable number of troops and their equipment into a position where they are needed.

Professor Eayrs: Correct, and that is why the United States are buying them.

Mr. Harkness: Yes, but the number that actually exists in the NATO countries, including the United States, is nothing like sufficient to move rapidly equal or greater numbers of people into position in Europe

in the event that there was a Soviet conventional attack.

Professor Eayrs: Granted.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I have three questions, but may I say first of all that in view of the most thoughtful 28-page précis prepared by Mr. Eayrs I just cannot believe that it was done hurriedly. I have been most interested in some of the remarks made before this Committee by Mr. Eayrs, and based on his remarks, I would like to ask three questions.

● 1150

First, the terms of reference to this Committee are of such significant importance that it may be advisable for this Committee to go outside Canada in order to obtain the information it wants direct in reaching its conclusions. If that were a decision of the government and this Committee, would Mr. Eayrs say why he said this Committee should not go to Sweden, because the evidence before our Committee heretofore has led us to believe that country has, perhaps, the most efficient system of civil defence, which is one of the important terms of reference to this Committee?

Also, part of our study is the question of neutrality and both civil defence and neutrality are matters about which perhaps Sweden knows a great deal. Tied in with that, because Mr. Eayrs made the comment at the same time, what is the United States' relationship with Mexico—which he said perhaps we should visit in preference—on a military basis that has lead you, Mr. Eayrs, to say it would be more beneficial for our Committee to visit Mexico than Sweden? That is my first question.

Professor Eayrs: I think both are easy to answer. The Swedes, of course, are in the position of not being able to exploit in any way, shape or form the protection offered by anybody, except the protection conceivably offered by the Soviet Union in the event of the United States first attack upon the Soviet Union passing over Sweden. It has very likely discounted that scenario as improbable and wonders whether anybody will come to its defence if it is attacked by the Soviet Union. The answer after a tenth of a second reflection is, no.

There is a certain *schadenfreude* around the system which would sort of like to see the Swedes go under; they have had it so easy these last 150 years. There is nobody going to come to their help. If you are in the line of attack and nobody is going to come to your help that is a perfect reason for building up a very powerful—within the limits of your resources—self-sustained, first to second strike force, which is what the Swedes have.

They have put their money largely, as you say, into civil defence but also primarily into a weapons system

based around the Vieggen Saab 37 Fighter Interceptor which works out at a cost of about \$5 million a ship. It is cheap at that price. If you go to Sweden you will see these aircraft parked on side roads all around the country. They have a take-off capability of 300 to 400 yards. That is one reason why they are so expensive. They could carry nuclear weapons. They have a range of about 500 miles which enables them to get to cities over the Soviet Union and drop an atomic bomb and maybe get back again.

Now, what is in that for us? Nothing. Nothing whatsoever. It is not remotely comparable to our situation here where the United States does it all on our behalf. So, as I say, the girls are glorious, the defence community is very interesting to talk to, but really there is just nothing in Sweden for this Committee to learn about.

Then you ask what is so instructive about Mexico? Well, I think the Mexican experience, apart from the fact that it is a country which has over the years deliberately let the military establishment run down to very modest proportions, having to do largely with modernizing and development and, unfortunately, shooting people up when they get a little restive under their totalitarian dictatorship—that is part of it too.

Understand, I am not recommending the Mexican system of government to this country. I am only recommending a look at its military apparatus. One of the things that it is instructive for the Committee to examine is the fact that in the very early nineteen fifties the United States urgently sought out what it called, I think, bilateral mutual assistance pacts, defence pacts, with eight Latin American countries of which Mexico was one, and seven of them in the old way immediately fell for it and entered into these mutual security pacts and their officer corps got some aircraft in return, with which they proceeded to shoot up people.

● 1155

However, the Mexicans said, "No." The Mexicans said, "We will not enter into a military defence pact with you because this jeopardizes our independence and we do not want to be in the pact," and a very interesting thing to me about that first is that the Mexicans were able to say, no, with impunity and then get away with it, because so far as I have been able to discover the terror of Mexican-United States relations pursued its even way. There was no ruction, there was no retaliation, there was no revenge, and it shows what you can do if you try to do it.

Mr. Winch: Are you comparing in that statement the independence of Canada as compared to the independence of the United States . . .

Professor Eayrs: Sure.

Mr. Winch: ...because we do have military pacts?

Professor Eayrs: Sure I am saying, as I think Mr. Yarmolinsky said yesterday if he was quoted correctly in the paper, that the United States would accept—necessarily would accept—as a fait accompli anything we wanted to do in this country with regard to our defence establishment.

Mr. Winch: Mr. Chairman, I hope my second question will be understood by the Committee and Mr. Eayrs and that you will not feel I am being naive in asking it, but I would like the comments of Mr. Eayrs. I would like to ask whether you hold any opinion at all on NATO lessening forces which may have an impact on the Warsaw Pact countries in accepting the honesty of a view of the Western powers that direct confrontation might thereby be reduced.

In other words, do you have any feeling that if this were done by NATO, either by the withdrawal of a country like Canada or a reduction of all forces, it might result in a lessening of the cold war and give an indication that the Western powers believe that we should work toward the goal of diplomatic and not military pact confrontations?

Professor Eayrs: Well, Mr. Winch, I wish I could respond to that more hopefully than I am about to do. I do not see any mileage in that, either for us or for NATO. I think a corollary of this first law of international politics, that it consists of taking free rides on other people, is that you should not give up something for nothing, and I see no advantage in a gesture of that kind which would materially tip the balance of power in the Soviet's favour simply in order to try to make them think we are good-hearted, honest people.

I do not know what their reaction would be. I think probably the conventional view of their reaction would be that they would be terribly cynical and think, "these simple, pacifist bourgeois; they never learn", and proceed to take advantage of it. I rather think they would be very badly rattled by it. I think they would not know what to make of it and anything that rattles the Russians, anything that rattles people with nuclear weapons, is something you should not attempt with impunity so I do not like that suggestion.

Mr. Winch: Would your opinion be, then, that if we are going to have any change in military pacts such as NATO, Warsaw, SEATO and any others, the move must first be made through diplomacy by mutual agreement?

Professor Eayrs: I think my opinion would be that you try to get something in return for what you do.

Mr. Winch: That would be by means of diplomacy, then, before you actually make any reduction.

Professor Eayrs: If you mean it has to be formally negotiated, no, because a lot of the understanding between the two great powers is in the absence of what you call, I believe, diplomacy. It is done by signals, by tacit understandings and that is just as acceptable a way of doing it in my view.

● 1200

Mr. Winch: I have only one more question, Mr. Chairman, and I raise it because I was interested in a statement of Mr. Eayrs. I would like to ask Mr. Eayrs whether, from his intent studies, he supported and now supports the principle of the unification of our armed forces; whether he would comment or whether it is his opinion that the defence policy and Canada's role should have been decided before the question of integration and unification was ultimately decided upon, but in view of the fact that we now have a fait accompli—which we certainly have—would Mr. Eayrs state whether, in his considered opinion, an early decision is now required by Canada of armed forces priorities; that it is essential, but that it cannot be done before external policies are more decisive?

Professor Eayrs: I am very much in favour of unification largely, I think, because it is one of those things that helps to differentiate the product—the Canadian product. It is very hard—presumably the reason we exist as a separate country in North America rather than going over to the higher standard of living along with the greater propensity to riot in the streets is a determination to show that there is some scope for experimentation and doing something different, and doing something new. From that standpoint I very much commend the unification policy.

I observe in passing, and I do not think this need be misunderstood, that it would be a very risky policy for a country which had to rely on its armed forces in its strategic role; you did not know when you started whether there would be defection, dismay, despondency, resulting in such an impairment to the armed force that if you really had to use it to fight, you might go under.

I think one would look very much more closely at such a policy from that aspect in Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United States or in Israel, or any of these countries that have to use their armed forces in order to survive, than in this country where we do have the luxury of experimenting with our armed forces just because we do not need to rely on them to survive.

As to your question about whether something needs to be done now, right away, I think I am going to disappoint you again, sir, by saying no, I do not think something needs to be done now, right away. It is better not to do it now, right away than to do it for the sake of doing it now, right away and getting the wrong kind of policy. Therefore, I am a bit upset when I see deadlines being imposed on foreign policy

reviews, because that suggests that policy is being made to suit the convenience of bureaucrats and position-paper writers and it should never be that way though too often it is.

Finally, in answer to your third question I would say yes, of course, defence policy has to follow foreign policy and not the other way around. It always has and always will.

Mr. Winch: Perhaps you might expand just a little. The reason I put that is because of certain statements made recently that we might be in trouble with our armed force personnel if we were called upon to fulfil all our commitments at the same time. Now, basically behind my question about whether or not we now require in the not too distant future, if I can put it that way, an external affairs policy decision on what are the priorities of the armed forces of Canada, are the recent statements that if we had to fulfil all our commitments, we could not.

● 1205

Professor Eayrs: Perhaps it is permissible to take a question as a comment, and not respond to that. I will let that stand.

The Chairman: Have you finished, Mr. Winch?

Mr. Winch: Yes, thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Macquarrie?

Mr. Macquarrie: I would like to say how pleased and delighted I am to hear from and be informed by my erstwhile colleague. I will ask him only one question, although I know he could answer many, many more. Professor Eayrs demonstrates that not all good men have left the halls of academy for other places.

I was interested in the Professor's thinking out loud about the diminution of NATO as perhaps being of itself a good thing, and I accept his thinking that it might indeed be an unwieldy gathering. Lloyd George said it was impossible to wage war in Sanhedrin; perhaps that still applies. I am just wondering how likely it would be that NATO countries, as they calculated the advantages of leaving and remaining—how likely it would be that many of them, after a process of national soul-searching, would come to the conclusion that their interests would be served by withdrawing from NATO.

We are, of course, struggling here in our own country, and we are constantly told by some that the saving in our national expenditure would be important; others suggest that new roles of peacekeeping would be important although, as you point out, the invitations are not coming in overwhelmingly, and very rarely with the travelling expenses. Then there are

sometimes those who say that anti-Americanism is fun, anyway.

However, I am thinking of some of the other countries. What would it benefit a country with no military contribution such as Iceland and many with small military contributions? What would be the prospect of their taking themselves out of the club, and how likely is it that this diminution might come?

Professor Eayrs: This has been the contention of Mr. Martin and I think it remains the contention of Mr. Sharp that one of the reasons making it advisable for Canada to stay put and, indeed, to stop questioning and soul-searching is because of the catalytic effect upon the smaller European allies, the theory being that if we go, or even give signs of thinking of going, they may decide to go too and if they go then the whole things goes.

That, you will recognize, is a kind of West European version of the domino theory and it carries with it the overly heavy burden of assumptions that the domino theory carries in South East Asia, and I do not see how we can play it in Western Europe while rejecting it in South East Asia. It assumes that governments have no minds of their own, no wills of their own, no capacity to discern their own interests and are simply searching for ways and means of falling flat on their faces.

I cannot see any precedent for that. I am reminded that when the French left the organization—though not, of course, the alliance—the response of the British, so far from scaling down their contribution to the alliance, was to beef it up again, to commit more troops to the British Army of the Rhine, so I see no reason to fear that what we would do would precipitate a panic in Western Europe always, of course, provided that it is done in the right way.

There are a number of alternative ways of leaving a room. You can knock over the green baize tables, and sock somebody and stamp out through the door way, or you can make a graceful exit with a note passed to your colleagues saying that there is more urgent business elsewhere, and it is the latter example that I would commend to the Department of External Affairs in any phased withdrawal of that kind.

Mr. Nowlan: May I ask a supplementary? I would like to know how the Professor distinguishes between collective introversion or introspection, as he called it, before each of these NATO countries—or the countries of the world going through their introspection and introversion, I think were his words—the difference between that and isolation.

Professor Eayrs: Well, they are not all going through it, of course.

Mr. Nowlan: Regardless of whether they are going through it or not, you used the words; it was a seman-

tic, professorial, tutorial distinction, as far as I was concerned. You said: "it is not isolation if we withdraw and look after domestic problems", which we all want to look after anyway. I am asking how you can distinguish between individual introspection and introversion, as you called it, and the old cliché of isolation if every country did what you are suggesting.

Professor Eayrs: It sounds as though you, Mr. Nowlan, are asking the academic questions to refine this kind of distinction.

Mr. Nowlan: I am asking a practical question at a most revered academic who lacks a lot of practical experience.

● 1210

Professor Eayrs: Yes, true.

Mr. Nowlan: That is why I put the question that way, sir.

Professor Eayrs: You cannot think, if I can use a kind of maritime metaphor to . . .

Mr. Nowlan: Please do.

Professor Eayrs: You cannot. . .

Mr. Nowlan: You may seduce me.

Professor Eayrs: You cannot think of foreign policy as being run by somebody up on the bridge of the ship and he has got—what do they call it?

Mr. Nowlan: He has got the wheel.

Professor Eayrs: Not the wheel; no, this is a modern ship — *Bonaventure* type — it has something that has engines full astern and out engines, and that kind of thing—it is not like that. He does not have two positions as in a car. He does not have one marked "isolationism" and the other marked "internationalism", so that when he decides the time has come, the mood is right, he pushes if from isolationism up to internationalism and back again.

It is not like that. It is a question of emphasis, it is a question of when you have a really cracking good man in your office and there are two problems; one is to look after counter-insurgency in Yemen and the other is to look after counter-insurgency at home, you would do it at home first. That is the kind of thing I am thinking of.

The thing that has made it essential, of course, is that the old tranquility—you may have noticed in this country and in Western societies—the old authority, the old paternalism is gone. I have students and if they do not like my seminar they run a counter-seminar; I run a counter-counter-seminar.

Mr. Nowlan: I agree, and I appreciate most of the answer. The point I disagree with is the smugness of saying that this is just happening in Canada. Do you not think the old paternalism, the old clichés, the old order is sort of in despondency and disrepair everywhere in the world? That is why I come back to my original question of how you can separate semantically individual nations going through introspection or introversion and settling only domestic problems from the old word of isolation.

Professor Eayrs: I separate them because of the utility of going so. The term isolationism conjures up, as I say, images of Roosevelt in 1935, images of Vandenberg in 1940, as imagines of Mackenzie King in 1937 and 1948. That is not the mood of this country right now. It is a committed mood; it is a question of the things that you want to commit yourself to first; it is a question of degree of priority; it is a question of your sense of concern, not that there is any complacency around.

Mr. Nowlan: This is the last attempt at this, Mr. Chairman. I may have some other questions later on a few other things the professor said.

The Chairman: This is on a supplementary, Mr. Nowlan?

Mr. Nowlan: This is still on a supplementary. I may agree about the mood of the country, and you may have it assessed correctly, but my question is related not to the assessment of the mood of this country, but assuming that that mood is in every country how do you, the professor, using the word "introversion" or "introspection" separate that from isolation, if all the nations of the world had this same move, which I think perhaps they may have?

Professor Eayrs: You do what you can, and what you can do is influence, to a very large extent, the policies of your own country. It is difficult enough getting this country moving again without trying to get a whole host of other countries moving again.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, you have a supplementary?

Mr. Ryan: Yes. Professor, have not the countries of Norway and Denmark in about the last four or five years been soul-searching in respect of NATO, and have they not gone through the process in which we are now participating? For a considerable period of years they have been looking at renewal of their allegiance to NATO in 1969, and did they not, finally, after going through this self-torturing process both come down on the side of continued participation in NATO? Particularly the Norwegian government, it seems to me, came down with an overwhelming vote in their parliament. Is this not the case?

Professor Eayrs: Yes.

The Chairman: Now, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps briefly on a point of information first, Mr. Chairman: is it your intention, or is it our intention, to go on this afternoon, perhaps?

● 1215

The Chairman: Will you be available this afternoon, Professor Eayrs, if we do not finish this morning?

Professor Eayrs: I am embarrassed because I had no idea there was an afternoon session, or the possibility of one. I have undertaken to give a lecture tonight at Sir George Williams University, if it is still there. To do that I have to get on a plane at ten minutes after three. Subject to that limitation I am at your disposal.

The Chairman: This means that we should try to finish by one o'clock.

Mr. Roberts: There have been so many interesting questions raised.

Mr. Allmand: It seems to me that Mr. Eayrs' paper and his ideas are very important because, as I said at the beginning, he is the first witness who has taken quite a different point of view from the other witnesses we have heard. I think we should have an adequate opportunity to question him. We cannot do anything about this afternoon but if he could return, in the event we do not finish, I would like to ask some more questions after everybody else has finished.

The Chairman: I think that is true of all of us. Now, what is the best solution? It would be a shame to have to ask Professor Eayrs to come back again.

Professor Eayrs: On the other hand, I should say that I am ready to do that. I do apologize. I thought that we would run out of questions after 15 minutes, actually.

The Chairman: I do not think there is any indication of that, Professor Eayrs. Should we try to arrange a sandwich lunch here and go through? What is the wish of the Committee?

An hon. Member: Let us go on for half an hour and see how it develops.

The Chairman: I think we have to make plans now because we are not going to finish by one o'clock.

Mr. Allmand: How many questioners do you have on your list, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: I have six and I think there are indications that others may be coming along.

Mr. Guay (St. Boniface): Mr. Chairman, we are speaking of the Professor's activities and the last line of the paragraph of the first page intrigues me, and I would like to quote it.

The Chairman: Mr. Guay, Mr. Roberts was questioning. We must decide whether we want to go through the lunch hour or adjourn at one o'clock.

Mr. Roberts: Personally, Mr. Chairman, I have enough questions to keep Professor Eayrs going almost all afternoon. I would like to have him stay as long as is convenient for him. It is certainly not his fault that we are in this situation, and I would be quite happy to take the Professor to lunch. If other people want to stay, perhaps we should order sandwiches.

The Chairman: Perhaps we could plan on doing that, when the time comes, for those who are prepared to go through the lunch hour with sandwiches.

Mr. Roberts: Perhaps I could ask a fairly brief series of questions which start in relation to the middle of page 13 and go on to some points raised on page 23.

The last sentence in the third paragraph says:

This gives us a powerful vested interest in the design of United States deterrent forces—for example, ballistic missile defence.

It seems to me that in some ways that sentence or that proposition rides a bit uneasily in harness with much of the rest of your paper. If I could expand on that in a series of questions, do we not also have a vested interest in the capacity and credibility of the western states flexible response? Do we not also have a vested interest, as I think you have indicated in reply to a question by Mr. Howard, in the potentiality of the conflict or kinds of conflict in Europe? In other words, do we not have strong vested interests which go beyond the vested interest that you have described at that point?

Professor Eayrs: Yes. What you are really saying is that it would be nice if we could shape to our own advantage the weapon systems and defence policies and foreign policies of every state whose miscalculations could place us all in danger. My answer to that is yes, it would be nice. The thing to then ask is what can you actually do in respect of designing the weapon systems of other countries to your own favourite specifications. The answer to that, quite clearly, is not very much. We cannot do very much in the perennial battles within the United States military between the air force and the navy for a share of what is "going". It would be imprudent to try.

Mr. Roberts: I am sorry, but if I could interrupt at that point, does that mean that you think we have no influence on, for instance, the design of the defence

system of the United States, or an influence on the design of the defence arrangements in NATO?

● 1220

Professor Eayrs: We have an influence on the design of the defence arrangements of the United States to the extent that they require our facilities for the construction of the weapon system in question. The most graphic example that I can recollect, of course, goes back to the early 1950's and the day of the Lincoln studies when the feasibility of distant early warning was proven up and it was concluded within the Washington defence community that it was absolutely vital for the defence of the United States for them to have those facilities in the Canadian north. It would have been, in those circumstances, I think, very difficult for a Canadian government to have said no. I do not want to pursue that further. However, I do not think that we are in that position today of being vital to the United States in regard to ballistic missile defence programs, for example. I do not know, I am not permitted to know enough about it to speak with the authority that I should, but—

Mr. Roberts: If I may say so—perhaps it is simply that I have not understood you—this seems to run contrary to your whole argument. It seems to me that what you are saying now is that we have a purchase or an influence in so far as we are either necessary or useful to these defence systems. What you are then going on to say is that we should stop really being useful because we do not have any influence or purchase on that.

Professor Eayrs: The purchase again comes not through influence derived out of money spent as an earnest of our good faith and favour. It derives as a kind of ambiguous legacy of geography, that is all: something over which we have no control.

Mr. Roberts: But then to the extent that Canadian participation or continued participation is extremely important to the United States, we would also have influence over the design of their defence system?

Professor Eayrs: Yes, because it would be within our ultimate power to veto it; so we can go and blow it up.

Mr. Roberts: Or make things very uncomfortable for them. It seems to me that the assumption to be drawn from page 13, which you really go into in more detail on page 23, is that removing ourselves from participation in these defence arrangements would really have no effect on the points of view of our present allies. I wonder if that is really a reasonable assumption to make? Admittedly we are dealing here with non-tangible, non-concrete things.

In the last two paragraphs on page 23 you really set up a pretty extreme straw man on the domino anal-

ogy. While it is true that no one, I think, really believes in the domino theory in its most extreme form, it is, I think, not deniable that the actions that various states take often do influence the actions that other states are going to take. I suppose the extreme analogy the other way might be the Greek city-states, that whereas it would be rational for a Greek city-state not to have bothered defending itself against the Persians if all the others were going to co-operate in defending against the Persians, when one city-state does not bother to do so then other city-states, perhaps acting in a non-rational manner, also do not do so and you would have a division, which weakens the common defence interest.

It seems to me difficult to suggest that we could withdraw from our various alliances or military participation or roll back our military participation in these alliances without thinking it is going to have some effect on the way in which other countries look at us and look on their own problems. It is intangible; it is maybe difficult to calculate but certainly you have to make the attempt.

Professor Eayrs: My answer to that would be very much the answer that I gave to Mr. MacQuarrie's question, that of course it is going to have an effect: what A does affects B in some way. What you do, I think, is to design what you do to make sure that the effect is not disadvantageous to you. That is put in a very abstract way. Putting it concretely, what you do in the event of any change of NATO policy is to do it so as to minimize the fear, the fuss, the bother. Any change is upsetting to bureaucracy. So, you do it in a way that upsets it least. De Gaulle's purpose, of course, was entirely different, and that is not the model that I would recommend.

● 1225

Mr. Roberts: One of the models you have recommended is Mexico, but surely there are obvious differences between the position of Mexico and that of Canada?

Professor Eayrs: Yes, there are obvious differences between any two countries.

Mr. Roberts: But the obvious differences in this case go to the essential nature of the problem; that is to say, in Canada's case we are midway between the Soviet Union and the United States: we are directly on the missile path, which Mexico is not.

Professor Eayrs: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: There are certain sea approaches in relation to submarine warfare, which we could participate in the defence of, which Mexico would not do. These are not just differences as in the case of differences between all countries.

Professor Eayrs: Mr. Roberts, if you were the commander of a Chinese Polaris-type submarine in the 1970's and you wanted the shortest distance between a Pacific point and Colorado Springs, you would rise somewhere in the Bay of California. . . .

Mr. Roberts: Why not—

Professor Eayrs: . . . get out your protractor. . .

The Chairman: Mr. Gibson on a supplementary?

Mr. Gibson: Would you explain, sir, de Gaulle's intention and purpose as you see it in withdrawing French—

Professor Eayrs: What the purpose was?

Mr. Gibson: Yes, in taking French troops out of NATO.

Professor Eayrs: To weaken the cohesion of the organization and to augment the grandeur of France—in the reverse order.

Mr. Roberts: To get back to submarines and Mexico and Canada, the point is we are not yet in the 70's. It may be that in the 70's we may be in a very different position. At the moment we are in a position where we have to worry, not only about submarines, but air and missile attacks.

Professor Eayrs: I can see why a parliamentarian does not want to project himself into the 70's, but for defence planners it is absolutely crucial. We have to think beyond. I cannot usefully say anything about the day after tomorrow but—

Mr. Roberts: No, no, but you have been using Mexico as an example.

Professor Eayrs: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: And what I have really been saying is that the two situations have been very different in the past.

Professor Eayrs: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: They grow more and more close together.

Professor Eayrs: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: But the point has been that Mexico may have been able, or it may have been desirable for them, to pursue a policy very different from that which we have had to develop because the strategic positions are fundamentally different.

Professor Eayrs: Yes. There is no disagreement between us, Mr. Roberts. I agree that Mexico and Canada are not the same countries. They are strategically, politically and culturally and in every other way different. So, too, are any two countries that you could name. But the Mexican example is a useful one for us to look at in certain respects. That is all I am saying.

Mr. Roberts: I have many other questions, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to come back to them after other people have had a chance.

The Chairman: Did you have a question, Mr. Penner?

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Goyer: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question with respect to the position of France towards the NATO Alliance. You say that the step France took by withdrawing from the Organization, was first of all a policy of grandeur. I think that this is treadly admitted by everybody. You also added that it was voluntary act on the part of France to diminish the force or the efficiency of the Organization. Could you elaborate on this, please?

[*English*]

Professor Eayrs: I begin by apologizing for not responding in French. If you look at the testimony offered by Arthur Schlesinger in his history of the Kennedy presidency, and if you look at the testimony of the former Secretary-General of NATO, Dirk Stikker, in a book the name of which escapes me for the moment, you will find almost identical testimony as to General de Gaulle's feelings on this point.

● 1230

One of the striking things that he said within weeks to both President Kennedy and to Dirk Stikker in the spring of 1961 was that what NATO had done for France, what the organization had done for France was to weaken the loyalty of the generals of the French army and the admirals of the French navy, to France and to de Gaulle. He specifically told each of them that he had in mind the Algerian revolution and the activities and attitudes of his armed forces with regard to that. He said he could no longer trust his generals and that was an intolerable situation. He blamed it on the organization; he blamed it on the fact of their having to pay allegiance to an abstraction and to—these were his words—"an American general". And he found it intolerable and thought that France would have to leave the organization on that account. I think that is a point that is sometimes missed in the analysis.

The other point to which I would simply draw your attention is that it is entirely consistent with de Gaul-

le's whole attitude which insists on the primacy of the nation-state, because he is hostile to all forms of international organization, not just the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but the United Nations which he calls "ce machin", and the European Common Market which is fine so long as it is a device with which French policy may be implemented, and terrible when it comes to having to obey the dictates of technocrats in Brussels. It is very clear, I think.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Goyer: Is it not true to say also that France, even if it withdrew from the Organization while maintaining its membership in the Alliance, still belongs to the Defence Network of Europe, i.e. the indirect contribution of France remains very important and it is only the French command which does not come directly under the Organization?

[*English*]

Professor Eayrs: Yes, it is true that there is an indirect contribution, the extent of which—this is a matter of gratification to the other members of the alliance—may perhaps be reckoned by the size of the bills which they are now attempting to present to General de Gaulle for the inconvenience he has caused them.

I would not have thought it possible to interpret de Gaulle's action as one which is helpful to the concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is true that, although he has left the organization, he remains a highly sceptical member of the alliance. The reason he is highly sceptical is that, as he told President Kennedy, he cannot believe that in the days of nuclear weapons alliances mean anything any longer. No country, whatever they may say, is going to place its nuclear weapons at the disposal of another.

[*Interpretation*]

Mr. Goyer: Do you consider in the appreciation of the French decision that the presence of the U.S.S.R. is an important element, i.e. the possible trade relations with Russia could be added to the two other factors that you mentioned that decided France to withdraw from the Organization?

[*English*]

Professor Eayrs: I do not think I am qualified to pass a useful opinion on that. If it is possible to respond in that way, I should like to.

Mr. Goyer: Thank you.

Mr. Allmand: Professor, I want to pursue further your comparison of the Canadian situation with Mexico. You feel that we could learn a certain amount

from Mexico, but I wonder. I see so many real distinctions with Mexico. One is our historical links with Western Europe, with France, with people from France, England, Scandinavia, Western Europe; our identification and the fact that we have similar socio-economic and political systems, parliamentary democracy and so on; the fact that we fought in Europe in two wars, World War I and World War II, for many reasons, but some of which were because our forebears came from these countries; also we had connections with them; also because we believed in a certain way of life.

We are also much more economically involved with Northern Europe, the NATO part of Europe, than Mexico. We are also more advanced as a trading nation than Mexico. Furthermore, I think within our own country we are more advanced in terms of the standard of living and therefore we are expected to make a greater contribution to the defence of Western Europe and North America.

● 1235

As Mr. Roberts said, we also lie between the Soviet Union and the United States; we are perhaps the more strategic target for any potential enemy of the United States. I see all these distinctions. Maybe there are others, but in addition to this, how free and independent is Mexico, despite their particular attitude toward military alliances and so forth?

If we look at Cuba, it took a certain position. It was entering into a pact to establish missile bases in the country, to co-operate with the Soviet Union. President Kennedy drew the line. Despite the fact that Cuba wanted that, or it appeared they wanted this particular thing, the United States said no, they were not really that independent to do it. I doubt whether Mexico is any more independent. Their independence probably results from the fact that it is suitable for the United States to a certain extent to allow them to be exactly what they are right now. If it did not suit them, if they became let us not say neutral—if they became too co-operative with either China or the Soviet Union, we might see the United States take a completely different attitude towards Mexico.

We probably could learn something from Mexico, but I am wondering whether we could learn anything more from Mexico than from Sweden. I think your suggestion gives the impression—in reading your brief, and also in listening to your comments this morning—that Canada is pretty much in the same position as Mexico, and perhaps we should emulate the policy of Mexico.

The Chairman: Is that a question, Mr. Allmand?

Mr. Allmand: I think that is an oversimplification and I put that to you. I think it is quite an oversimplification.

Professor Eayrs: As the unofficial travel agent of this Committee, I am perfectly prepared to talk you out of a trip to Mexico, provided you do not go to Sweden either. I do not want to press that parallel as hard as you want me to press it. If you do not think the Mexican relationship with the United States in respect to how they deal with waterway problems, how they deal with territorial problems, how they treat American branch plants, how they treat capital invested in Mexico, if you do not think any of these things have anything to offer Canadians, then it is quite possible. But then very few countries will, if you do not think that is relevant.

Mr. Allmand: I would like to be, if there are real examples with respect to foreign policy and military policy. If Mexico is really a good example, I am willing to be convinced. I am raising objections to your . . .

Professor Eayrs: Well, I am raising counter-objections to your objections. Let me simply point out that in addition to the old saw about having the United States as a common problem, the Mexicans and Canadians are alone in the hemisphere—possibly Chili, as well—in maintaining an embassy in Havana.

Mr. Allmand: That is right, and probably other things, too.

Professor Eayrs: You add them up, and there is a kind of interesting parallel about which you do not want to become obsessive. Of course not.

Mr. Allmand: What about the military alliance? I mentioned certain distinctions between Canada and Mexico. I mentioned historical links, socio-economic links, the links of our people with Europe, not counting Spain and Portugal perhaps, but the main part of Europe, Northwest Europe. All these things, I feel, are . . .

The Chairman: Mr. Allmand, I wonder if you could put your question.

Mr. Allmand: What I am doing is trying to feel out Professor Eayrs on his example. If it is a good example I am willing to be convinced, but I see certain objections. Perhaps my objections are wrong or badly founded, and I want him to knock them down.

Professor Eayrs: I am just going to say it is not as good an example as I thought. I am a great believer in appeasement. My university experience recently has taught me that.

• 1240

Mr. Allmand: I have another question with respect to your table on page 12. Under "strategic", you have no points allocated for Canada. Is this your assessment

of what Canadian policy should be, or what you think it is at present?

I feel that under our present policy we would allocate some points under "strategic", because I think our involvement in NATO and NORAD, according to your definition of strategic, would mean that we would give certain points to that particular item.

Professor Eayrs: I do not know how we think of it really, but this is how we should think of it, that if we thought we were performing a strategic role we would be kidding ourselves. The facts are not so.

Mr. Allmand: Therefore you would disagree with Professor Yarmolinsky yesterday who more or less suggested that because of the fact that there is a nuclear standoff, that non-nuclear forces become quite important, and therefore Canada has a role to play in non-nuclear forces, not only in Canada, but also in an alliance such as NATO. To me this would seem to be strategic.

He said that our frontier is really the frontier in Europe, in other words that we have to look at it that way. Our frontier are not just Halifax, Newfoundland or Victoria. Therefore if we belong to an alliance, we do have a strategic role and the strategic role is in the non-nuclear role. You do not agree with that?

Professor Eayrs: I do not agree with that, and I think I can give an illustration of why I do not. Every winter the mobile brigade takes part in what was first called Exercise Winter Express. It is airlifted up to Bardufoss in northern Norway in the company of cameramen and gentlemen of the press, and two or three weeks later an article appears on how splendidly the Canadians went through their manoeuvres in the company of the Norwegian and Alpini, and a detachment from the United Kingdom that also goes along in this exercise.

The plan here is an almost incredible plan. The plan is that in the event of a Soviet low-level probing of Western intentions around Northern Norway—you know, there is a frontier of some 200 miles—this ace mobile brigade, this NATO northern flank force, is going to be dropped in there and you will find that the Canadians in the company of the Italians, the British and any Norwegians still around are holding off the Russians until the United States decide whether or not it is going to call this a *fait accompli*. That is the plan.

An hon. Member: It is simply stupid.

Professor Eayrs: Well it is not on, because if you project yourself into the East Block, into the meeting of the Cabinet which considers whether it is going to—not give the order to carry out the manoeuvre but give the order to put Canadians to fight where you say the strategic frontier is, there will not be any takers around the table. They are not going to move. The

planes will not take off. So that is my answer to the question: Is our strategic frontier in Europe? Do we go there first, regardless of what anybody else is going to do, and fight for our lives there? That is what I mean by a strategic frontier. The answer to me clearly is no. But if they dropped across the river I suppose we would.

Mr. Allmand: Let me make clear that I ask these questions not because I am hostile to your ideas but because I want to exhaust the arguments which you put forward in respect out present foreign policy. As you say, we should take these things seriously, and that is what I am doing in putting these questions. I am looking for a way, as are all members of the Committee. I want to make clear that I am not necessarily hostile to what you say but I want to exhaust your arguments.

Professor Eayrs: I hope no hostility in my responses has appeared to enable you to so interpret my questions.

Mr. Allmand: No, not at all.

The Chairman: I have Mr. Roberts on a supplementary?

Mr. Roberts: I just want to make sure that I have understood this business of the strategic front in Europe and so on. I think one of the arguments has been that this might give us two, three or four days' time, as the United States had over the Cuban missile crisis, in which to talk and to negotiate. Do you think that there is any validity to that point of view—that is to say, if there is a strategic front in Europe and if you are talking of a probe across, that this will enable you to undertake some kind of action and at the same time give you two or three days' breathing space or some time to find out what the hell is going on and to try and counteract it?

• 1245

Professor Eayrs: I do not want in my replies to take refuge in a definitional kind of response but it is my liberty to define terms as I want and then to defend them. My definition of a strategic function is when the armed force will go into action to fight and protect those who are near and dear to it. And my reason for saying that we do not have—contrary to what Mr. Yarmolinsky has said yesterday—a strategic role to play in Western Europe is that if we were out there on that limb all by ourselves, with 6,000 men, their 18,000 dependents, and the Eatons, the Simpsons, the T.V. and all the rest of it—right out there as hostages all on our own—we would very soon see the cold air about us and we would get out quickly, because it is not a strategic area. That is perfectly clear. We would not do that on our own.

Mr. Roberts: A further supplementary, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: I will come back to you, Mr. Roberts. I have you next on the list.

Mr. Roberts: All right.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Eayrs. Do you feel that our membership in NATO and NORAD inhibits our contributing to nuclear disarmament?

Professor Eayrs: I guess it does, obviously. It is one of a variety of pressures which beat in upon the decision makers to maintain a highly equipped military establishment and the military industrial complex necessary to sustain it. It is easy to answer the question as I have done. It is very difficult to follow up a supplementary and say: "Well, how much weight would you attach to it?". That would be hard for me to answer and I pre-empt the question by saying "I cannot"?

Mr. Gibson: Do you feel that Canada has taken sufficient initiative through the United Nations and by other diplomatic means to create conditions for a disarmament conference at the highest levels between the heads of state of Russia and the United States?

Professor Eayrs: You can always do more, I guess. You can always make a better speech, you can always prepare a better paper, you can always ask more of General Burns of Mr. Ignatieff than they have given. I am impressed by the fact that the government uses good people. If it did not take it seriously it would not put good people on the disarmament desk or whatever they call it in External Affairs. I think they have done so. They have sent their representatives abroad. I say they can do more but I am not going to excoriate them for having done little, no.

Mr. Gibson: I sense that the voter, the little fellow on the street wants disarmament probably in Russia as here, probably in China as here—but at the top level the leaders are not getting together and discussing it sufficiently. They discuss it only at a low level, they have a little conference going on for six months somewhere, and the leaders are not grappling with it.

Professor Eayrs: Yes, there are two approaches to the problem and I should have distinguished them earlier. One is what Canada can do to present plans, ideas and arguments of such overwhelming attraction and conviction that the major nuclear powers are going to say: "Ah, here is the formula that we have been looking for! Why did you not come along with it five years ago! If we had only known!" Then there would be a significant reduction of armament among the great powers. And that is presumably what we are trying to do at Geneva. But then the other side of

disarmament is what we could do over that which we have full control, in my judgment, namely our own level of military contribution, our own industrial military establishment, our own military forces. And there we can do with it what we want. And if you want disarmament, just follow these ideas. Those are the two ways of going about it.

● 1250

Mr. Gibson: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts: I would like to go back for a moment to this question of being out on a limb because I understand that if we were all out there by ourselves, it would not make much sense.

Professor Eayrs: We would not be there.

Mr. Roberts: But does that really go to the argument that we have a joint strategic interest on being out there and that if we can persuade or arrange with other nations to be out there there might be sense in being out on that limb with a whole lot of people. I suppose the analogy breaks down at that point . . .

Professor Eayrs: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: . . . because the limb might drop off.

This may be a disrespectful thing to say but I only say it because he is a former colleague of mine. Are you sure . . .

Professor Eayrs: Are you searching for information or are you trying to score a debating point?

Mr. Roberts: No, no, I am searching for information. He is not only a former colleague but I think a former student.

Professor Eayrs: I did not want to mention that.

Mr. Roberts: It seems to me that while it makes sense, if you are talking in terms of strategy, to say—and this is what you are tending to say in your paper—"Let us look at it as an individual country, let us look at it alone." If you start to look at it in terms of Canada being in a partnership—and maybe that is not the best way of looking at it—some of the arguments that you are making lose their validity. You see, just to put it in terms which my constituents would understand, it does not make much sense for one onion grower to hold out against the purchasing company but if a lot of them can combine it does make sense. And it may be that Canada is in a similar position.

Professor Eayrs: Yes.

Mr. Roberts: That things which would not be rational, looked at from an individual point of view, would be a rational approach to take acting in co-operation with other countries.

Professor Eayrs: Well there is no military threat to Western Europe. And George Kennan has argued in his memoirs that there was no military threat to Western Europe in February 1948.

Mr. Roberts: It is certainly arguable . . .

Professor Eayrs: Is it just the presence of those forces that keep the Red Army from marching to the channel?

Mr. Roberts: The Red Army is not going to march to the channel.

Professor Eayrs: Well you do not know.

Mr. Roberts: That is the problem—not strategy.

I do not really want to restart the discussion we had earlier but, just thinking it over, I tried to put it in a way in which I thought it would capture your position in essence. So would you agree with the statement that we could cut back on our military participation in NORAD and NATO and while that might or would have an effect on the actions and policies of our allies, it would be possible that such a withdrawal could be undertaken in ways which would not weaken the capacity or credibility of flexible response to military threats?

Professor Eayrs: Yes, I would agree with that, and I would also not want to do it for nothing.

Mr. Roberts: Right.

Professor Eayrs: I would want to try and get some reciprocal response from the Soviet Union as part of the deal.

Mr. Roberts: I would say that on this point you probably differ most markedly from Professor Yarmolinsky yesterday. His reaction would be that that would not be possible. This is one of the reasons that I want to crystallise it. I think that on this particular area you two embody very different approaches to our problems.

Professor Eayrs: I cannot understand how somebody can come here and say that a hypothetical action of a kind which is clearly feasible is not possible.

Mr. Roberts: No, no—without that kind or consequences that I described it is feasible for us to do it but that it would be very unfortunate in terms of our interest and the interest of other countries. You think it is feasible . . .

Professor Eayrs: But the future is inscrutable. You do not know until you try. • 1255

Mr. Roberts: How would you feel if the NATO Alliance did collapse?

Professor Eayrs: Collapse?

Mr. Roberts: Yes. Suppose Canada got out and other countries got out, suppose we dismantled it.

Professor Eayrs: Well everything depends on how it is done and what it is done in exchange for.

Mr. Roberts: Yes.

Professor Eayrs: I mean you would really have to be a saboteur. I am far from that. I am one of the ardent Canadian patriots I talk about in my paper. I view with great alarm any kind of unilateral collapse of Western power and responsibility. I am not looking to that at all. I am looking for a re-establishment of control over these monstrous mechanisms and bureaucracies that we have built up and that are now so mindless. I am not talking about collapse.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: Do you believe that a proposal of the following nature would be foolish or possible: namely, that Canada get in touch with a Warsaw Pact country, perhaps Rumania which shows marked signs of liberalism at the moment, and set a tacit agreement to the effect that both countries withdraw, one from the Warsaw Pact and one from the NATO Pact?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: I had, along with many others, hopes that such a standoff might be possible a year ago. I must say that the Soviet invasion has made very delicate and difficult, and probably unwise, a Canadian venture of that very high posture nature into the internal affairs of Eastern Europe. I would say—and I say this with regret because as Sir Anthony Eden once said, “It is never the right time for some”, that this is not the time for that kind of operation. But notice, as I am sure you have, sir, how diametrically that flies in the face of the current NATO conventional wisdom than to which nothing is more anathema than the notion that one of the NATO countries should charge off on its own and start negotiating disarmament. It all has to be done according to the current dogma, it all has to be done at the centre—en bloc—from pact to pact, and as soon as you agree to that that is like postponing it until the Greek calends—it will never be done. If that is what you want, that is fine. And I am sure that is what a lot of people want—that is fine by them.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: How do you interpret the recent statement by Rumanian authorities, after their meeting with Marshal Tito from Yugoslavia, to the effect that the countries from both pacts should consider the possibility of reducing their military participation in their respective alliance and, if the NATO countries were to consider a reduction in their military forces, then Rumania would be the interpreter of a similar policy within the Warsaw Pact?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: This comes as news to me; it is the first I have heard of those proposals. They are extraordinarily interesting.

I think this is in line with my governing *dictum* that you do not disarm unilaterally. You do not do it, as I think Mr. Winch recommended earlier, as a gesture of good faith, because that would probably be misunderstood. You do it for something—a *quid pro quo*.

I would not like to give the impression, however, that, once that agreement has been reached in principle, it would thereafter be plain sailing, because one of the most difficult things to do, which relates to the element of heterogeneity in the states system that I spoke about earlier—the fact that all countries are different—is to agree on equality of sacrifice.

It is very difficult to arrive at that co-efficient of reduction wherein each side will go home from the arms control conference satisfied that it has lost nothing and has gained something; and, of course, that is what people go to a disarmament conference or any conference to do—to gain something; you do not go to a conference to lose something.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Ryan: I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Ryan, on a supplementary.

Mr. Ryan: Do I gather from what you just said, professor, that you have little or no respect for the Harmel Report?

• 1300

Professor Eayrs: I think it is generally regarded as having been a hasty, and a not as searching, examination of the alliance in its second twenty years as one would have liked.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I move now to the bottom of page 19 and the top of page 20. It is back to submarines, I am afraid, but this time on your side. This is an idea which I find, on the face of it, very attractive. What you are saying here really is that Canada should perhaps have a kind of super coast guard; that this is the basic maritime operation it should consider. I find that a very attractive idea.

May I ask your opinion on such arguments as the following. It seems to me that in many ways what we have been doing is building a kind of very expensive Maginot air defence line across the north of the country, which simply encourages people who want to attack North America to look at the possibilities of nuclear, missile-carrying submarines. As far as I can see there is very little that you can really do about an attack from submarines, that is, unless you are prepared to undertake a pre-emptive action against them. You can detect them, they can sit off in international waters and at the right moment blast away and they are close enough that by the time they blast away there is very little you can do about it. Is this a fair description of the situation we are in; that we have an air defence system which may be more or less efficient in intercepting missiles or planes, but that there is very little we can do about submarines which kind of swing around in that area?

Professor Eayrs: I think the testimony before this Committee of previous maritime and air defence commanders ought to be relevant here, but I would have thought that there is very little efficiency in defending the North American continent against bomber attack, and practically none at the present time against missile attack.

Stanley Baldwin said, "The bomber will always get through." This is still true. You might be able to bring down 15 or 20 per cent. I do not know what the current efficient estimate might be; it is probably meaningless. Missiles—everything gets through. After the sentinel system I do not know what gets through, but it does not take very many, as people have been pointing out. Therefore, I do not think you should be under any delusion of safety in regard to the possibility of attack from the Soviet Union or China by missiles or bombers. If they want to they are going to; there is nothing we can do about it.

About the state of the art of antisubmarine warfare, I think one thing which is perfectly true is that you cannot do it cheaply. You may be able to attack a submarine, but it is going to cost a great deal to destroy it. That is something for great powers to do. In any case, submarine warfare has to take into account the fact of what Von Morgenstern called the oceanic system, that is, that if you have to have a balance of terror the most stable kind of balance to have at the present level of technology is a system by which each side has a very sizeable, and therefore invulnerable, force of missile-firing submarines. Neither can be

detected, and both have second-strike capability; therefore, you are as safe as you can possibly be in that kind of a world.

It always seems to me that the admirals are terribly old-fashioned when they take it upon themselves, as their prime mission, to destroy the other force by which we alone have our safety. Because if you ever got into the position of taking out the Soviet Union's second-strike capability that would be the surest possible inducement for the Soviet Union to launch a first-strike upon us. We live in that kind of world.

There is one further point about the submarine and that is that it has an extraordinarily potent symbolic aspect to it that should never be forgotten. If you read, as anybody on this Committee should, Thomas Schelling on the strategy of conflict and *Arms and Influence*, which I mention in my paper, you see the importance of symbolism in weapons control and arms control. The image of the submarine conjures up the image of the Lusitania going down; it conjures up the image of the Athenia going down. The thing to remember is that for a Soviet submarine to fire a torpedo on a NATO vessel is a very provocative act. It takes you right up to rung 28 of Herman Kahn's escalation ladder and people who speak of it glibly as a kind of low-level scuffling effect out there in the North Atlantic simply do not know what they are talking about. If you read once again the accounts of the missile crisis you will see that the one time that John Kennedy lost control of himself in the national executive council was when an admiral slipped in and said that a Soviet submarine was trailing the ship. He said, "My God, not a submarine." He was an old navy man. He knew the symbolic importance of submarines. As soon as you start talking about submarine warfare it is extremely important to remember the level of warfare of which you are talking, and that seems to have completely escaped the attention of the admirals.

● 1305

Mr. Roberts: Thank you. That is very helpful.

The Chairman: Have you finished, Mr. Roberts? Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. Roberts: I have not finished. I have a supplementary.

Mr. Forrestall: I just have a supplementary. Is it incredible, then, even to think of this in terms of any attempt on our part to defend against it?

Professor Eayrs: No, I am not saying that. What I am saying is that you are talking about third world wars and I have doubt about the likelihood of third world wars in my sections dealing, respectively, with strategy and insurance.

I do not think there is very much we can do on our own to stop a Soviet fleet which is out to destroy

North America. I think the United States can do what McNamara called "damage limitation," but there is an awful lot of damage anyway. This is a very expensive role which we are in, for the sole purpose of spending money on something to show that we are doing our job, not because there is any strategic need for it.

The Chairman: Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: I have only three more questions and they are not very long.

On page 21 you talk about some of our out-moded, or potentially out-moded, equipment and the cost of re-equipping.

Would you maintain the present forces until they are obsolete, or do you think they are obsolete right now?

Professor Eayrs: This is where I ran out of time and gas, Mr. Roberts. I cannot really say what I would do with any particular weapon system until I have before me those plans that the Committee is going to commission about what we can design for much lower levels of money than we now have. Then you fit it in.

Mr. Roberts: Yes. You put the emphasis on saving money here. I wondered if for instance you could re-equip the planes very cheaply and make them effective, whether you think it would be worth doing? The answer, I suppose, is just to look at it in a context of the other options open to you?

Professor Eayrs: Yes; but since the weapons are not functioning, as I again suggest, in a strategic role it does not matter really whether they fly or not.

Mr. Roberts: I have another question relative to what you say at the top of page 22, and on which we have touched previously, I think.

You say:

... there is no need to assume

that the United States

... would press for base facilities for fighter interceptors in Canada.

Professor Eayrs: Yes; and I was delighted again to see a report of Professor Yarmolinsky's testimony which confirms that from a much more authoritative source than I.

Mr. Roberts: I wish to ask a hypothetical question. I know the Chairman, as a lawyer, does not like hypothetical questions, but we are not in a court of law.

Would I be right in taking from your earlier testimony that, if there did turn out to be a necessity of

operating out of the Canadian north, you would, in a way, welcome this as giving us an essential bargaining point to give us purchase in influencing the arrangements of the American defence system?

Professor Eayrs: You have to shape your hypothesis according to how you want it to come out. If the assumption is that the Americans want facilities and we are happy that they have them, then there is no problem. You give them the facilities on such terms as you negotiate. The problem arises when the Americans are absolutely crucially intent upon having them and you are absolutely crucially intent upon their not having them.

Mr. Roberts: If they were crucially intent upon having them and you were the government what action would you take?

Professor Eayrs: I do not see that hypothesis as one worth discussing today because I cannot see it lying in the technology. I cannot see that. I can conceive of its happening in the future, but with all of the weapons systems floating around and orbital platforms and all the rest of the junk, I cannot see any reason for expecting that to come about.

Mr. Roberts: I ask because a point of view that has been presented to me by knowledgeable people is that indeed it will be a necessity and might even be an increasing one.

Professor Eayrs: What we are postulating is a situation wherein the United States has to have it, not just for convenience, but for reasons vital to its national security and we for some reason—perhaps because we have gone "Castro-ite"—are determined that they should not have it. I think you are then in the realm of Mr. McNamara's absurd scenario wherein you take care of it by developing an independent, real strike-capability targeted on New York.

● 1310

Mr. Roberts: What I am trying to imagine is why we would be determined that they should not have it. However, I suppose we are now in a double hypothesis and perhaps that is not fruitful.

Professor Eayrs: Yes; but still, if you want to pursue it, all around the states system are countries with populations, with American bases in their midst, who are determined not to have them there. So it is not so very far-fetched—Okinawa, the Philippines.

The Chairman: Have you a further question, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Roberts: This is my last question. As a former academic I have noted that people often use the term

"academic" in a pejorative way, and as a former diplomat I have noticed that they often use the term "diplomatic" in an almost pejorative way. . .

An hon. Member: You are a member now.

Mr. Roberts: And politicians often use it in a pejorative way.

On page 24 you talk about prestige and about diplomatic influence. I wondered if perhaps you would agree that we might call that political influence? It seems to me that sometimes, because you cannot quantify, or make precise, or concrete political influence, you almost dismiss it as not worth paying attention to. I take it from the testimony today that you would not hold that view; that even though it is difficult to quantify it, political influence is a valuable commodity for a country to be able to exercise and that the question really is what kind of defence policies or external policies would help to maximize that influence. But even though it is vague and intangible it is an important thing, which requires consideration and judgment.

Professor Eayrs: It is like all the good things of life. You cannot turn your back on influence any more than you can turn your back on power. The more you have of it the better things are, despite certain theories to the contrary. It is what you do with it, of course, that is good or bad, so what you are saying is incontestable—that all countries would like to have as much influence as they possibly can, because that is just another way of saying they would like to run things their own way.

Some would run them very badly so far as humanity is concerned and some would run them very benevolently. All I am weighing in with is to say that we are paying a billion dollars or more a year in the belief that this is the way to get the influence that we want to get, and I am saying, you know, how can you tell? Price it out.

Mr. Roberts: But is there any way really to price it out? That is the problem.

Professor Eayrs: You can try another way and see if your influence diminishes.

Mr. Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: In your view, which is the most modern and the best equipped conventional army in Western Europe, right now?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: I am sorry to return these dusty answers to all of your questions. I do not have an

expert opinion on that and I might be guilty of leading people astray if I—

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: Would you consider the West German army as one of the best equipped and most modern in Europe right now?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: When you are assessing military strength you have to look at imponderables. I have read recently that there is a great shortage of sergeants—important components in any military force. I am not in possession of any expertise about the condition of the West German military, but from my position as a layman I have reason to believe that it is not to be measured by their armed force alone but that there are imponderables of morale and others which have to be taken into account. That leaves me to believe that it is perhaps weaker than it might seem on the surface.

● 1315

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: West Germany is nevertheless a fairly strong power among the NATO countries. In view of this, do you think that German rearmament creates tensions with adjoining countries of Eastern Europe?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: I think most of the adjoining countries in NATO have got used to the idea by now. There is still a bit of tension between England and Germany, as is evidenced when the Germans got there to train. A couple of years ago the Welsh were up in arms but perhaps that was a manifestation of their displeasure with London, Westminster control. I think the real anguish, of course—and it is a genuine one—is in Eastern European countries, the Warsaw Pact countries and particularly the Soviet Union. I read not too long ago a review of Harrison Salisbury's new book about the battle of Leningrad, and the fact is just simply, soberly, repeated for us once again to see that the Russians lost 25 million killed in the great patriotic war of 1941 to 1945, with 400,000 of them killed in the City of Leningrad alone. So it is reasonable to assume that this has been a searing and formative experience.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: Do you believe that a decrease in the participation of Canada in the Organization would cause Germany, which would thus feel threatened on its borders, to want to increase its military forces thus creating even greater tensions?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: As I understand the situation, it is the Germans who are reluctant now, as they have always been since the Second World War, to embark upon re-armament or further re-armament. It is the United States, principally, which is interested in getting the West Germans along with the other Western European members of NATO to make more of a contribution one way or another, to the defence of Western Europe. I cannot see that the amount of German effort necessary to take up whatever gap was left by the Canadian departure would be such as to put anybody in a particular spirit of concern or of fright. I would like to say—I hate to do it, I know—but you have, after 25 years, to treat the Germans as having returned to normality and to the comity of nations. You treat every case, as I keep on saying, as a special case. The Germans are a special case but I have never felt that there is any longer any justification for NATO as a kind of reformatory for the imprisonment of its number one juvenile delinquent, Germany. I think that the Germans have to be dealt with from the position of full equality in every respect.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: Do you believe that the reaction of the Eastern countries is to consider Germany as a country which henceforth has reached a normal political stability and that there is no reason to be alarmed?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: There were certainly signs, before the August invasion of Czechoslovakia, of a return to normalcy. The abandonment of the Hollstein Doktrin and the establishment of working relationships between West Germany and, I believe, Czechoslovakia and Roumania, though I may be wrong, indicated that there was at least a return to that normality of relations that you speak of. I think the August invasion may have rattled the Eastern Europeans a bit in that regard.

[Interpretation]

Mr. Goyer: You certainly noted in the inauguration speech of President Nixon—I do not want to quote it, but I think it was the spirit of his words—where he said that the day is not far when the United States will have to decrease its commitments in Europe to pay more attention to its own domestic problems. And similar statements made by the new Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, which were published in one of the recent editions of *Life Magazine* follow the same line. It seems that to replace this military presence of the United States in Europe, which is rather important, the European countries will be asked to take care of their own business to a greater extent and to increase their military participation in NATO.

● 1320

Then, do you believe that the fact of Germany arming itself in a yet more modern way and allocating more of its budget for its armed forces would not create more tension between the Western and Eastern countries?

[English]

Professor Eayrs: I think the question is the degree to which developments in Germany, be they good or bad or encouraging or discouraging, really lie within Canadian control. It seems to me we have very little influence or control over that kind of thing. The Germans are at the mercy of their political forces if Adolf von Thadden or someone like him should sweep to power in an unholy alliance with Franz Josef Strauss or something like that, when they deplore it, when they wish it were otherwise, but there does not seem to me to be very much we can do about affecting German attitudes. The kinds of hypothetical remilitarizations or further militarization of Germany that you speak of are, of course, directly related to those attitudes over which I believe we have very little control. So my response to this line of questioning would be to say we had better attend to those matters over which we do have control.

Mr. Goyer: Thank you.

The Chairman: Professor Eayrs, in your view, does our membership in NATO increase or decrease the likelihood of our being involved in war, on balance? Can you answer that question?

Professor Eayrs: It is a hard one to answer but I do not think it makes any difference. The commitment is perfectly explicit and perfectly clear. If you look at Article 5 you will see that all we are pledged to do, as a member of NATO, is that which we want to do in the event of an attack upon any of the membership. There is no automatic commitment at all. That, of course, is why we accepted it.

The Chairman: Does the fact that we have troops in Europe, in your opinion, increase or decrease the likelihood of our being involved as a belligerent in the war?

Professor Eayrs: I think it is not so much the troops, whose numbers are negligible, in a military sense, as their weaponry which is important. I had the very strong feeling at the time the Starfighters received their nuclear weapons that the only kind of mission for which they were destined, namely the kind of over-killing of various Eastern European centres of population and industry, was one which, to the extent that the Russians understood what it was all about, would

find de-stabilizing and unsettling, so I think it is not so much the troops; it is the doctrine, it is the weapons system, it is the kind of mindless blundering into roles that nobody understands at the time that they are entered into that lead to these consequences later on.

The Chairman: In your view, Professor Eayrs, what substantial benefit does Canada gain from continuing membership in NATO?

Professor Eayrs: I suppose it is all in the realm of intangibles. I have indicated that we are not more secure. We do not sleep more soundly at night as a consequence of our membership. We may walk more proudly about our streets as a consequence of the membership. I am very much impressed, as I am sure all members are here, by the Gallup poll which indicates that of the 50 per cent or 60 per cent of Canadians who have ever heard of NATO before, about 60 per cent or 70 per cent of those are in favour of continuing membership and are in favour of having troops over there. I think I would put the value largely in terms of how people feel about it. It makes them feel good. I do not want to take that feeling away but I have the feeling that it is possible to design other systems and other policies which might even make them feel better.

Mr. Prud'Homme: A supplementary to that. We might not sleep better but would you not say that we might help other people to sleep better?

● 1325

Professor Eayrs: Yes. I was just trying to ponder a reply. Perhaps more strongly for a couple of seconds. Not very much. I do not think it is crucial.

Mr. Prud'Homme: I do not mean we Canadians but . . .

Professor Eayrs: No, I understand.

The Chairman: I gather, Professor Eayrs, from your earlier testimony that you felt that we should not withdraw from NATO unless we got a *quid pro quo*. If in your view there is no major benefit in continuing, why would we insist upon a *quid pro quo* for getting out? If you can get it, it is a nice thing to get but if there is no benefit from continuing association, why should you wait to get a *quid pro quo* before you get out?

Professor Eayrs: But why not? I would hope that every public servant in the government, every member of Parliament in the House of Commons is devoting night and day to seeing how life can be made better for Canada and for Canadians. That is what they are paid for and I cannot see turning down any kind of opportunity or any kind of advantageous deal that we

could make; but I think this is where I would differ from the position of the Postmaster General who, as I understand it, just wants to leave, period, without any thought as to what one might get out of it. I would have thought that that comes badly from a man who has recently raised the postage. I think that he owes us a little something in return.

The Chairman: Are you really serious in suggesting that the best reason for remaining in NATO is that we should be paid something for getting out? That is what you seem to be saying.

Professor Eayrs: I think you have tied me up in knots, Mr. Chairman. I did not mean to come out with that patently absurd argument.

Mr. Allmand: A supplementary question.

The Chairman: All right, Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Allmand: This is my original question. If there are more reasons for getting out than for staying in, balanced one against the other, I think we should get out. I do not think that we should—I do not think we do—measure everything in it. The *quid pro quos* are the pros and the cons and once you add up the pros and the cons, properly weighted, if there are more good reasons for getting out than staying in, you get out. I think the debate has been couched—as it so often is—in the wrong terms, in the wrong frame of reference. The question of staying in or staying out of NATO or getting in or getting out of NORAD is a pretty sterile debate until you have some conception of what it is you want to do in the world. I think that is the way one should properly approach it. What ought the Canadian role in world affairs, and in its own affairs, be in the 1970s? Having determined that, you then take a look at whether your membership in NORAD and in NATO costs so much or is subversive to your prestige in such a degree that it makes impossible, difficult or problematical the attainment of your national goals. Those are the things that you look to first.

Mr. Allmand: I would agree—

Professor Eayrs: That is why I really cannot get excited over the business of whether or not to leave NATO or whether or not to leave NORAD; it depends on the terms.

Mr. Allmand: — but if we opt for an alternative we have to take the hard decision to either change our role within NATO or leave altogether. I agree that we have to decide these things you mention, but we finally have to make certain decisions and act.

The Chairman: Professor Eayrs, one of the directions to our Committee is to explore the possibility of

neutrality. In your view is neutrality a possible option for Canada?

Professor Eayrs: Yes, it is a possible option, it depends on whose model. Once again you have to notice the limited utility of models. We are not India, therefore we cannot do it the Indian way. We are not Switzerland, we cannot do it the Swiss way. We are not Sweden, and we should not do it the Swedish way. However, the difference in these cases is instructive to observe because the Swedish way is an armed neutrality which costs an enormous amount of money, and if we opted for that we would be going from the frying pan into the fire. I have described the Swiss neutrality some place as a kind of hotel keeper neutrality. They do it very largely as a service to European powers as Europe becomes periodically embroiled in war every 20 years, and it is mutually convenient to have a place like that. India's neutrality, of course, started out with very brave hopes and sort of went down the drain when the Chinese came out of the Himalayas. We are not India, so we do not have the qualifications to practice that kind of saintly neutrality. I hope you will question Michael Breecher, who is an authority on this, when he appears before you.

● 1330

The Chairman: Finally, Professor Eayrs, I would like to be sure that the members of the Committee fully understand your recommendation, particularly as you say at the bottom of page 27 that it is your "sole recommendation" in developing a rational military policy for Canada from 1970 to 1984. You suggest there that a study be made to explore possible military establishments designed to a number of hypothetical budgets. Picking up what you said just a few minutes ago, do you not have to decide what your purpose is before you start designing your budget, rather than start by designing a group of budgets and then picking out one which happens to be at a bargain basement price whether it serves your purpose or not. If so, what should Canada's basic purpose be?

Professor Eayrs: I think the notes that I prepared offer some very rough guidelines on that point. They certainly show to my satisfaction that we are overspending very considerably in the area of air defence and rather than re-equipping—which I suppose is what Mr. Cadieux means when he asks for a guaranteed 3 per cent of what is going, according to GNP that could be let drop. As I testified earlier, and for the reasons I gave then, I think the peace-keeping operation has been overemphasized and, I think it could be approached more modestly, both for our benefit and for the benefit of peacekeeping.

I am of the opinion that underdeveloped as we are, we are not as underdeveloped as a lot of countries and

we do not have to go through the motions of relying on the military establishment in order to train our citizens for that which we think they should be trained. Therefore I can really see no possibilities there for a greater expenditure. However, I do lay importance on the insurance role. I lay importance on the law and order function, the notion of ballast, the notion of a ship of state moving more smoothly through turbulent seas because there is a small and efficient military establishment unobtrusively in its midst. I see some possibilities for the development of the Solandt idea of modernization and development overseas, but again only if it is done modestly and with no great fanfare of announcements or trumpets.

As I say, implicit in my assumptions is the assumption that there are better things to do with this money than to spend it in the pursuit of the shimmer of influence. I really come down to the old recommendation that at a time when all around the state system important donors are losing confidence in the device of foreign aid for all the things that it can do, this is certainly the time for this country to devote a very great deal of interest, attention and money to foreign aid and presumably in different forms than has been attempted in the last 15 years. I think the suggestion that an institute of international development—or whatever it is going to be called—be developed in this country is a very good one. This is a hopeful sign and I hope something will come of it.

The Chairman: Other witnesses appearing before us have emphasized civil defence. Is that in your order of priorities?

Professor Eayrs: No, the game is not worth the candle. I have read testimony to the effect that it would be better for Canada if every home, had a stirrup pump and a bucket of sand in its basement. I know what a bucket of sand is. I do not know what a stirrup pump is but my idea of it is that it is something which is peculiarly helpless before a megaton bomb.

● 1335

The Chairman: So the members agree that a copy of Professor Eayrs' statement be printed as part of our proceedings?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: On behalf of the Committee I would like to thank Professor Eayrs very warmly for having prepared such an excellent paper for our advance information and also for the very helpful and interesting evidence he has given to us this morning. Thank you very much.

APPENDIX FF

FUTURE ROLES FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF CANADA

Notes prepared for the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, 6 February 1969, by Professor James Eayrs, University of Toronto

A. *Alternative Military Policies*

Military policy concerns decisions of governments of members of the states-system about their military establishments. Military policy is inescapable. To be a member of the states-system is to have a military policy.

While a government of a sovereign state has to have a military policy, it does not have to have a military establishment. It confronts, instead, four options:

1. To maintain its own military establishment for some or all of the purposes to which it may be put;
2. To rely on the military establishment of another state, or of some other states, for some or all of the purposes to which it may be put;
3. To rely on establishments other than the military for some of the purposes to which a military establishment may be put;
4. To forego the purposes to which a military establishment may be put, thus dispensing with its own and with reliance on any other.

B. *Historical Choices Among These Alternatives*

The contemporary states-system comprises approximately 140 states. None of these has chosen option 4. Even Vatican City, with only 108.7 acres of territory and 900 inhabitants to defend (and of whose military capability Stalin was notoriously sceptical), maintains a miniscule armed force. More newly-independent microstates maintain their own military establishments, on however small a scale; or else have exercised option 2, as for example, does Western Samoa which looks to New Zealand's armed forces rather than to her own, which are non-existent.

A very few governments have considered option 3, and one or two have chosen it. Tanganyika, on first attaining independence, considered it but opted instead for her own military establishment. Costa Rica may be unique in her reliance upon a Civil Guard, complement 1,200 men, to replace her Army abolished in 1948, together with a paraval force consisting of 1 motor launch (Atlantic), 1 motor launch (Pacific), 1 tug and what *The Statesman's Yearbook* describes as "smaller craft".

Iceland is an instructive special case, not least because an "Iceland solution" has been mentioned as a possible option for Canada.

Iceland's military policy is a combination of Option 2 and Option 3. As the Secretary General of her Ministry of Foreign Affairs has remarked, her people "are and have been for centuries... without arms". She makes, accordingly, no military contribution to the Atlantic Alliance to which she has belonged since its inception. In this respect she is unique; and it is presumably in this respect alone that the "Icelandic solution" offers an option to Canada.

In 1940, Icelanders paid the price of defenceless in the form of occupation, against their will, by the United Kingdom and Canada—an occupation designed to pre-empt occupation by Germany. In 1941 Iceland exchanged these undesirable protectors for American protectors, on whom she has relied again since 1949. The U.S. forces stationed in Iceland have been designated by the Icelandic government as the Iceland Defence Force—the purest example of Option 2 to be found within the states-system.

The Icelandic Defence Force deters occupation by the Soviet Union. It did not, however, deter trespass by the United Kingdom. To rid what she regarded as her territorial waters of this intruder, Iceland relied upon her eight armed fishery protection vessels, doubling for this purpose as Iceland's non-existent navy; they acquitted themselves well in the so-called "codfish war". This is Option 3.

Option 1 remains the choice, however, of the overwhelming majority of the members of the states-system, whether Great Power or microstate. Nearly all governments maintain their own military establishment. It is true that the force which these military establishments are able to deploy ranges over a scale of destruction whose extremes are as far apart as lower and upper limits could be—from the pikestaffs of the Papal Zouaves, able to pick up by the seat of his pants some unwanted interloper in St. Peter's Square, to the megaton bombs and the orbital missiles of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, able to obliterate a continent. But practically no member of the states-system has felt able to dispense with a military establishment of some kind, capable of exerting force on some scale.

Why should this be so? The answer is to be found in the unusually large number of purposes military establishments may serve.

C. *Six Purposes a Military Establishment May Serve*

1. Where a military establishment is maintained primarily to attack one or more states, or to deter one or more states from attacking the homeland, or to defeat the attacker if it is not deterred, it may be said to serve its country in a *strategic* role.

The strategic function of the military is its original function. It is commonly thought to be its primary function, though often (as is conspicuously the case with Canada) it is nowhere near its primary function. It is vulgarly thought to be its sole function—sometimes by people (such as Chiefs of Staff) who should know better.

The best example of a military establishment maintained primarily (none is maintained purely) for a strategic purpose are the armed forces of Israel, the budget for which in 1968-69 (\$628,000,000) consumed roughly 80% of public expenditure and 17% of estimated GNP for 1967. An armed force functioning almost exclusively in a strategic role is necessarily exempt from the normal calculations of budgetary balance and prudence. To live well one first must live.

2. A state may exist through periods during which it neither desires to attack one or more states, nor is in turn in danger of being attacked. There are thus absent from its environment both armed conflict and the threat of armed conflict. Their absence does not, however, necessarily justify the laying down of arms.

If the international environment is friendly, it is incontestably fluid. Today's ally may be tomorrow's enemy. Protection conferred by geography may be wiped out by technology. Moreover, the world is filled with perfidious polities: one may mistake one's foe for friend.

To guard against these contingencies a military establishment may be justified. To the extent that guarding against them is its primary role, it may be said to serve its country for *insurance* purposes. It may not be needed now. It may be needed in future. So one keeps it just in case.

Where the external environment is primitive and its weaponry "unsophisticated", the costs of such insurance are usually low. It may be provided by training citizens in the arts of war, cheaply and easily learned when the most complex weapon-system is the long-bow. It may not even be necessary to maintain a force in being, so long as the capability is present.

Few members of the contemporary states-system could so perceive their environment today. Weapons are too complex, warfare too specialized, to rely on part-time warriors—reservists and "summer-salters"—for protection. A full time force in being is required. This can be very expensive, especially when its airmen must learn to handle efficiently Mach. 3 fighters.

Any government does well to heed the maxim of Machiavelli (whose corpus is largely a series of commentaries on the adage "keep your powder dry") when he asks us to consider the predicament of fallen rulers:

One will find in them first a common defect as to their arms. [They] must not [however] accuse fortune for having lost them, but rather their own remissness; for having never in quiet times considered that things might change (as it is a common fault of men not to reckon on storms in fair weather) . . .

Military insurance is prudent policy. The future's inscrutable, the states-system's malign, the international environment's hostile. But there is another side to the insurance business. As with individuals, so with governments. It is possible to carry too much insurance. It is possible to be over-insured. There are other things to do with the nation's resources besides putting them into a military establishment to guard against contingencies unlikely to occur. "How much is enough?" is a question just as properly raised about a military establishment maintained primarily for insurance purposes as about a military establishment maintained primarily for strategic purposes.

The best example of a military establishment maintained primarily for insurance purposes is the Japanese Self-Defence Force. Left to their own devices, many, perhaps most, Japanese would have preferred to be faithful to the letter of their 1946 constitution, eschewing all war and the means thereof and relying (as in Option 2) upon the United States and, one day, perhaps, the United Nations to protect them against evil. They were not left to their own devices. Instead, the United States, then pinned down in Korea, goaded the Japanese into a reluctant rearmament. The present-day Self-Defence Force is the result.

In inspiration, the Self-Defence Force served Japan primarily in a diplomatic role (see section 6, below), namely, to propitiate and so to preserve good relations with the United States. In being, it acquired its present purpose, which is to provide Japan with a strategic capability in the event, as Machiavelli puts it, "that things might change"—that the United States withdraws, or is expelled, or that external enemies—China, Russia, Korea—appear on the horizon.

To enable it to serve this purpose, a sum of \$1,172,000,000 was expended in 1968-69 upon the Self Defence Force—roughly 1% of Japanese GNP in 1967. So much for the statement in Shigeru Yoshida's *Memoirs* (1961) that "for Japan to attempt anything which could be considered as rearmament . . . is completely out of the question . . ."

This modest defence expenditure (recall Israel's 17% of GNP) nonetheless purchases a force of impressive power. It consists of an army (Ground Self Defence Force) of 174,000, organized in 12 infantry divisions, 1 mechanized division, 1 airborne brigade, with supporting artillery, engineer

and signal brigades, and equipped with 740 M-4, M-24, M-41 and type 61 tanks, artillery up to 203 mm. guns, 2 surface-to-air missile battalions using the Hawk missile, 140 aircraft and 160 helicopters; a navy (Maritime Self Defence Force) of 36,000, with 8 submarines, 23 destroyers (1 missile-firing), 17 frigates, and nearly 200 other smaller vessels exclusive of the Coast Guard's 84 armed patrol ships; and, most impressively, an air force (Air Self Defence Force) of 40,000, equipped with 570 combat aircraft including 200 F-104J Eiko interceptors. Watching pilots of the latter scramble at Chitose air base, one sees in these Samurai in Starfighters the very model of a model prudential policy.

Personnel of the Self Defence Force are all volunteers.

3. Military establishments may be required not so much for protection from without as for protection from within. They thus perform a *law and order* function.

This ranges in importance across a broad spectrum. At one end the military props up a civilian regime which, without its support, would collapse like cards. Or perhaps the military is the regime. At the other, a military establishment serves as ballast for the ship of state: without it, passage is less sure, less smooth, less safe.

The traditional military description of this role—"aiding the civil power"—conjures up images of troops seizing plant from strikers, clearing city streets from rioters. This does scant justice to the subtleties of the military's contribution to a stable society. The military establishment aids the civil power by the mere fact of its existence—or, more strictly, of its presumed existence in the minds of citizens. (If it did not exist, there would be no need to invent it provided people thought it did exist.) It deters disorder as well as quelling it. Any polity—however placable its population, however benign its social climate—functions better for the knowledge that a military establishment is unobtrusively in its midst.

The law and order function of a military establishment has an insurance aspect. An orderly society today may be a disorderly society tomorrow. Prudence may require the maintenance of a military establishment if only to be able to call upon it to help quell the fire next time.

"Fire" not in metaphor alone. Subsumed under the law and order function are all those things the military may do for the community when, in the grip or wake of disasters natural and unnatural, its own non-military agencies—fire-brigades, police forces, ambulance corps—are unable to cope.

The military establishment in every country expects to be called upon, and is called upon, to help

clean up the mess after flood, famine, conflagration, pestilence or earthquake. It makes little difference whether the mess is caused by nature (high tides, high winds) or by man (high jinks, high explosives). Hence the *civil defence* function is most usefully placed under this heading.

So, too, is *peacekeeping*. This takes place when a foreign government, unable to restore law and order with its own military establishment, calls for the help of foreign military establishments. Peacekeeping is both theoretically and practically best regarded as a form of aid to the civil power where the civil power in question is not one's own government but some other. Theoretically, because it helps to distinguish a peacekeeping operation, which is one thing, from a combatant operation, which is something else again. Practically, because there is then less of a temptation to train, equip, deploy and recall national contributions to peacekeeping forces as if they were on strategic assignment. Conceived as *gendarmerie* rather than as battlefield soldiers, members of peacekeeping forces are more likely to perform their mission successfully. The principles of aiding the civil power do not alter merely because the locale of peacekeeping is foreign rather than domestic.

The best example of a military establishment maintained primarily for keeping *domestic* law and order is that of Mexico. "Mexico today", writes an authority,

is one of the most lightly armed nations in the world. Only one out of every eight hundred citizens is in uniform. The 50,000-man military establishment is the same size today as it was a quarter of a century ago, even though the population has doubled from twenty million to forty million since 1940. The 1966 budget for the army and air forces amounted to a modest 1333 million pesos (\$107 million), or just under 7 per cent of the total budget. [Recall, again, Israel's 80%.] Combat forces in the navy got 300 million (\$22 million) or about 1½ per cent of the total. Thus the composite armed forces budget was about one-twelfth of the total, a relatively small fraction compared to nations like Brazil and Argentina, for example, where the military receives nearly one-sixth of the total. Also contributing to the modest military budget in Mexico is a minimum expenditure upon equipment. *Military hardware is purchased neither for display nor for defense against a quite improbable external threat, but only for purposes of preserving internal order* [my italics].^x

^x Edwin Lieuwen, *Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army* (Albuquerque, N. M., 1968), pp. 146-7.

The italicized sentence correctly denotes the purposes of the military establishment's equipment; the military establishment itself serves another important function, namely, the modernization and development function (see below, Section 4). A major portion of the Mexican military budget in recent years has been expended upon road construction and other items of social capital.

It is worth reflecting on the Mexican experience. Just as Mexico's distinctive treatment of the problem of foreign ownership offers useful lessons for Canada, so too does her distinctive approach to problems of military policy. Those Canadians who predict dire consequences in the wake of disengagement from North American defence arrangements ought especially to ponder the fact of United States acquiescence in Mexico's refusal, unique among the eight Latin American nations approached by Washington in 1951, to enter into a military defence assistance pact.

The Mexicans, while using their military establishment to maintain law and order on the *domestic* front (most recently, and tragically, during the "noche triste" at Tlatelolco, October 1968, when at least 34 civilians were killed and hundreds wounded in a clash with the army), are loath to deploy it to maintain law and order on the *international* front. They have little taste for the peace-keeping role, partly because it appears to them to violate their cardinal foreign policy principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, partly because "the Mexican government seems to think that active participation in international police actions will bring unnecessary internal repercussions, weakening the national consensus that has been achieved after a century of political disunity and instability . . . This", adds the author of the quotation, a Mexican scholar, "is a not uninteresting contrast with the policies of a number of other middle powers, including Canada".^x

No country has so far maintained a military establishment primarily for participation in peacekeeping operations.

4. Every military establishment serves its country to some degree as an instrument of *modernization and development*.

A military establishment is a training establishment. It imparts attitudes and skills to people who might not otherwise acquire them and, in underdeveloped countries, who would not otherwise acquire them. The swiftest and surest way for a

newly independent country to create the rudiments of a skilled labour force may be to conscript for service in the armed forces. Snatched from village and tribal life, the entrant learns how to read and write, how to use a wrench and hammer, how to drive a truck or tractor. He learns that it is possible to get ahead in the world. He learns how to get ahead in the world. Only when thus instructed is he of any value to the state.

Along with technical instruction may go political indoctrination. This is especially important in what have been called "mobilization systems", of which Cuba offers an example. The Cuban National Militia, created in 1959, is an important adjunct to the regular armed forces. Since November 1963, service in the Militia has been compulsory; the law promulgating the Revolutionary Armed Forces, in addition to encouraging military learning, foment the sense of revolutionary discipline and morals, and contributes effectively to the cultural and technical formation of the enlistees".

As well as training the labour force and indoctrinating the populace, a military establishment may improve the environment. Here more self-conscious effort is required, sometimes called "civic action". The civic action military establishment builds roads and bridges, digs irrigation ditches, clears forests for air fields.

Civic action duty is more delicate in plural than in totalitarian societies, involving competition with the private sector and the labour force.

In less developed nations, civic action is increasingly a function of the regular military establishment: this is the case in Mexico (already mentioned), Colombia, Guatemala, Israel, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand, among others.

In the United States, the Army Corps of Engineers has been specially developed and trained for the civic action role. In the United Kingdom, under the rubric "Military Aid to the Civilian Community" (MACC), it is being developed (largely at the instigation of the Commander in Chief, Scottish Command) to include not only public works but public welfare, including the secondment of soldiers to social service organizations, such as youth clubs and hospitals.

5. A military establishment is in varying degrees a status symbol, serving a *ceremonial* function.

As a general rule, where the strategic function ranks high, the ceremonial function ranks low; and *vice versa*.

The military establishments of such countries as Israel, Yugoslavia, Malaysia, and Sweden, do not much stand on ceremony: they are too preoccupied by their primary role, which is to defend the state.

^x Mario Ojeda Gomez, "The Role of Mexico as a Middle Power", in J. King Gordon (ed.), *Canada's Role as a Middle Power* (Toronto, 1966), pp. 142-3.

On the other hand, Vatican City, facing no very evident strategic threat, maintains an armed force of 220 Swiss Guards (with supporting gendarmerie) primarily for ceremonial purposes. So do many newly independent nations for which the military establishment is "a symbol of national prestige and of the apparent need to assert a community's standing in the eyes of the world". So strong may be the urge to display the military as an ornament of statehood—along with the national airline, the national dam, the national steel works—that governments sometimes succumb to the temptation to create armed forces knowing that they are thereby creating rivals to their own authority.

Maintaining a military establishment primarily for prestige is not necessarily inexpensive. It depends on the ceremonial. One can spend a lot or a little on getting married, or getting buried: so, too, with military ceremonial. At one extreme, a colour guard, pleasing to the eye of the tourist and flattering to the visiting dignitary, provides adequate pageantry at a price within the means of almost any state; the main expense (apart from pay and pensions) is dry cleaning. At the other extreme, the nuclear ceremonial, even more expensive if delivery systems are thought to be among those items necessary though optional at extra cost.

6. Finally, the military establishment may be used as an adjunct to various non-military techniques of statecraft. It is convenient to lump these functions together under the general heading of the *diplomatic role*.

Arms are a means to influence. (Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence*, 1966, expands this proposition to a book.) An army can be just as much a political argument as an instrument of combat. And not an army only. Nelson displayed a natural occupational bias in describing a man-o'-war as "the best negotiator in Europe". So did Vice Admiral Donald Gibson, flag officer, R.N. Naval Air Command, when deploring the emphasis of the British White Paper on Defence (1966) on air power at the expense of sea power: "A bomber can drop a bomb. The Fleet Air Arm can also drop a bomb but can give a cocktail party or play a football game, which is better than dropping bombs". So, for some purposes, it is.

The military establishment can be an instrument of propaganda. Here the gradation of persuasion extends across a wide scale. At one end, a Great White Fleet conveys an image of the power of its proud possessor by friendly visits to friendly ports. (The mid-20th century equivalent of this favoured device of Teddy Roosevelt's diplomacy was the R.A.F. Vulcan bomber, also painted white, for many years the star of the air show at the Canadian National Exhibition.) At the other end, a 50 megaton bomb is defiantly detonated on the eve of

an Afro-Asian conference by a Soviet government intent on blasting its way into the councils of the non-aligned.

The military establishment is an essential part of the apparatus of economic warfare. Without it, blockades are difficult to mount and impossible to run. Boycott and embargo are imposed in its absence only at one's peril. (Sanctions, as someone has said, mean war.)

As an adjunct to these non-military techniques of statecraft (it must be conceded that economic warfare may only with difficulty be described as non-military), the military establishment may be used on a variety of non-military assignments.

It may be used to acquire access to sources of intelligence or to locales of consultation or decision-making, from which its controlling authority might otherwise be excluded. The cost of armed forces retained for this purpose resembles the price of admission to some private entertainment, the dues of membership in some exclusive club.

It may be used to purchase high esteem from those who might otherwise think less well of the purchaser. The cost of armed forces retained for this purpose resembles the depositing of funds in a bank; the subject is to create a stock of diplomatic credit, a balance of favourable regard, upon which the depositor may draw at some later date, on some rainier day.

It may be used to catalyze friends and allies into making a more energetic commitment to their own defence than they might otherwise make; this, if one is in the line of attack, is as useful a contribution to make as any strategic deployment. The best example of a military establishment maintained primarily for its catalytic effect upon the defence commitments of other states is the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg which contributes to the land forces of NATO a battalion of 105 mm. howitzers.

It should be noted that for all of the above purposes, it frequently does not matter to what use the military establishment is put, just so long as it is used; or of what it is composed, just so long as it is composed of something; or how much it costs, just so long as it costs enough. If the object is to convince friends and allies that one is pulling one's weight, that one is not a parasite or freeloader, that one is bearing fair shares of sacrifice, what matters is that one is spending X per cent of GNP, Y per cent of the annual budget, and that X and Y are well up on the list wherein the respective performances of members of the coalition are invidiously compared. Defence expenditure under such circumstances resembles the potlatch ceremony practiced by the Kwakiutl Indians of the Northwest coast of North America. It is a ceremony familiar enough to anthropologists but with

which defence analysts might with profit become acquainted—particularly those analysts trying to make sense out of recent Canadian defence policy.

requires, of course, its justification: the following portion of these notes (Part E) attempt a justification of the entries for Canada.

D. A Crude Classification of States According to the Purposes their Military Establishments are intended to serve.

Not every military establishment serves its country in all six of those ways. But every military establishment serves its country in at least one, usually in more than one, sometimes in most, occasionally in all.

The importance attached to each purpose varies from state to state in accordance with its circumstances and situation.

A rough comparison among the varying degrees of importance attached by particular states to the varying purposes served by their respective military establishments will help both to indicate the wide variations extant within the states-system and to emphasize the uniqueness of the Canadian case.

Suppose a total of 10 points be assigned to each state. These 10 points are to be allocated among the six purposes served by a military establishment according to their relative importance. Each entry

E. The Special Case of Canada

The members of the states system are a motley lot. Every case is a special case. In military policy, Canada presents a special case among the special cases.

1. A glance at the table (see above) will show that Canada, in common with Mexico and the Vatican, does not require a military establishment in a strategic role. This statement, as previously emphasized, must now be justified.

A military establishment is not now, or in the foreseeable future, required in order that Canada may attack another country. Nor is there any threat of attack upon Canada against which her military establishment can, or need, make any effective preparation. The United States does it for us. This has nothing, or little, to do with sentiment. It has everything to do with geography and the technology of modern warfare. The United States is bound, by virtue of geographical position and the nature of the threat, to regard any attack—by lodgment,

	<u>Strategic</u>	<u>Insurance</u>	<u>Law & Order</u> (domestic)	<u>Law & Order</u> (foreign)	<u>Moderniz.</u> & Dev't.	<u>Ceremony</u>	<u>Diplomatic</u>
AUSTRALIA	5	1	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	2
CANADA	—	1	1	2	1	1	4
CUBA	2	—	3	—	4	1	—
GREECE	1	—	7	—	1/2	1/2	1
ISRAEL	8	—	—	—	2	—	—
JAPAN	1	3	1	2	1	—	2
MEXICO	—	—	5	—	5	—	—
SWEDEN	5 ^x	—	1/2	2	—	1/2	2
U.K.	1	3	1	1	1	1	2
U.S.A.	3	—	2	1	1	1	2
U.S.S.R.	3	—	1	2 ^{xx}	1	1	2
VATICAN	—	—	1	—	—	9	—

^x Alternatively, these 5 points under “insurance”

^{xx} For “law and order” in Eastern Europe

bomber or missile—upon Canada as an attack upon itself. It will not wait until the intruding megatonnage has passed over Canadian territory and crossed the border without a visa. Canada is thus the involuntary beneficiary of the deterrent power of the United States. Conversely Canada incurs the liabilities of United States imprudence or provocation. This gives us a powerful vested interest in the design of United States deterrent forces—for example, ballistic missile defence.

Aggression from China is a different matter. But this belongs in the realm of insurance.

2. The metaphor of insurance figures prominently in statements and speeches of Canadian leaders over the years about Canada's military policies—reflecting, perhaps, the peculiar feature of the national character that makes Canadians invest more money, *per capita*, in insurance than do any other people in the world. There is a revealing aside in the biography of our former Prime Minister, Louis S. St. Laurent, who, we are told, on leaving law for politics, was the proud possessor of no fewer than 33 insurance policies the annual premium on which amounted to several thousand dollars. It was natural, then, for him to invoke the metaphor of insurance when, on Armistice Day 1948, he appealed to his countrymen to "support a North Atlantic Treaty (as) an insurance premium which will be far, far less costly than the losses we would face if a new conflagration devastated the world".

Three potential aggressors could at some future date conceivably disturb the tranquillity of Canada's present strategic situation. One is the Soviet Union. Against the threat of Soviet attack, Canadian military preparations are superfluous, for the reasons given in Section 1 (above).

A second is Communist China. It is hard to envisage a Chinese attack upon Canada save as *en route* to the primary target of the United States. But if China were to attack the United States, its attack need not, and probably would not, be directed (as would a Soviet attack) over Canadian territory. Insurance against a Chinese attack upon Canada is best provided not by our participation in any United States so-called "Chinese-oriented" BMD system (deploying Spartans and Sprints in the point-defence of Greater Vancouver), nor by any other military preparations. It is best provided by political measures—recognition of the People's Republic and the conclusion with its government of a Canadian-Chinese non-aggression pact.

A third is the United States. (The United Kingdom and France, which conceivably might possess the capability of attacking Canada, would be deterred from attacking—assuming the highly improbable contingency of their wishing to do so—by fear of

retaliation by the United States.) The former U.S. Secretary of Defense, speaking in Montreal (May 1966) with great vehemence, insisted that "there is not a remotest set of circumstances, in any imaginable time-frame of the future, in which our two countries would wage war on one another. It is so unthinkable an idea as to be totally absurd". But "absurd" does not mean "impossible". It means "out of keeping with reason or propriety". Much of the activity in and about the states-system in our time may be so described.

The means for deterring a deliberate military attack by the United States upon Canada lie well within Canada's capabilities. We could make nuclear weapons if we needed them. Their delivery system poses no problem. It only needs a range of half a mile to take out Detroit.

A less implausible type of military incursion from the United States might arise as follows. We are in the early '70s. The Vietnam war is over. But the racial war is worse. Negro Americans, led by well-trained veterans of Vietnam, have passed through the Luddite stage of their revolt. They no longer burn down their own ghettos. Instead, they are embarked upon a highly organized campaign of guerrilla and commando warfare. One of their columns has just executed a hit-and-run raid on some target of national significance—a governor's mansion, a missile complex—and turns and runs for Canada, to seek political asylum. Hard on its heels, in hot pursuit, are U.S. army troops. Upon which column, if either, do the armed forces of Canada open fire?

As insurance against possible attack by the Soviet Union (or by the United Kingdom or by France), a Canadian military establishment is redundant. As insurance against possible attack by China it is inappropriate. As insurance against possible attack by the United States it is a liability, serving only to escalate the putative battle not to deter it.

All things considered, the weight of "1" assigned to the insurance function of the military establishment in the Canadian column is probably excessive.

3. When we turn to law and order, both in its domestic and its external (peacekeeping) aspects, we find a more convincing justification for the maintenance of a Canadian military establishment.

The maintenance of a military establishment on some scale (how much less than its present scale is briefly considered in Part F, below) is justified by the "ballast" function already described (Part C, Section 3, above), as well as by the need for such a force when disasters occur.

But not the disaster of civil war. The possibility that Quebec might separate from the rest of Canada, taking its place in the states-system as an

independent political community, is real if remote. It has been argued that the maintenance of a military establishment at the disposal of the central government is needed to meet the threat of so mortal a blow to the Canadian body politic. I would argue the contrary. Should the tensions of Confederation become so acute as to cause French Canada to wish to secede from the rest of Canada, it would be best to have no military establishment at the disposal of the central government lest it yield to the temptation, to which a panicky and rattled ministry might be prone, to send it out to fight in what would surely become the most tragic and futile among modern civil wars. There is no scope here at all for dauntless heroism.

Much more scope lies outside the frontiers of the Dominion. Peacekeeping—the maintenance of law and order in foreign countries at the invitation of their governments—is a role in which the Canadian military establishment has already proven and distinguished itself. Yet it is clear, only five years after the Defence White Paper (1964) predicted that “the peacekeeping responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations may be expected to grow”, that peacekeeping faces an uncertain future. The reluctance of the Soviet Union and of France to accept an interpretation of the Charter which enables the General Assembly to act in security matters where the Security Council is unable to act; the increasing tendency of the Great Powers to resort to unilateral action; the erosion of “world public opinion”; the tenacity of nationalism among newly independent nations which causes them to resent the presence of foreign troops, even United Nations troops, within their territories; the wearing off of novelty, the wearing thin of glamour—all these factors combine to diminish the importance of peacekeeping as a means of abating international conflict. A country which maintains a military establishment primarily for peacekeeping purposes is likely to find that its members have nothing to do. (This is doubtless why no country maintains a military establishment primarily for peacekeeping purposes.)

In view of these discouraging prospects for peacekeeping, Canada's commitments to the role appear excessive in relation to probable demand. Moreover, Canada's preparations for peacekeeping are geared to a scale of participation which past experience shows to be lavish and unwise. To become, as Canada became with UNEF and to a lesser extent with UNFICYP, the critical contributor is to invest the nation's prestige in the outcome of the operation. This investment must be considered unwise in view of the fact that under the rule the operation may be brought to an end at any time at the whim of the host government. In future peacekeeping operations, Canada's contribution should be a sizeable proportion of a battalion, rather than

a sizeable proportion of a brigade. This would reduce the need for manpower and equipment, and afford scope for a considerable reduction of costs.

4. Since the Great Depression, when the military establishment was engaged on domestic civic action missions—training and putting to work on various public projects the able-bodied, single and homeless among the nation's unemployed—it has contributed in two main indirect ways to the modernization and development of Canada.

One is by up-grading those members of the labour force which pass through its ranks and its officer corps.

The training of a modern soldier, sailor or airman is a complex business, or ought to be. It is no longer a matter of learning how to disembowel a sack of straw with a bayonet. The acquisition of military competence in, for example, the technical communications field makes its possessor far more valuable to his society. Canada's military establishment functions as a national institute of technology, of which the nation is the beneficiary. Its value is all the greater in that constitutional and political inhibitions have prevented the central government from directly assisting institutions of higher education to the extent the nation's needs demands.

You cannot buy happiness but you can buy bi-lingualism. To the extent that the nation is imperilled by the failure of so many of its English-speaking citizens to speak French, the military establishment offers an obvious way to alleviate that peril. Its members could be trained to a pitch of linguistic proficiency in much the same way that they are trained (or used to be) to disassemble and put back together a Bren gun blindfolded. “Berlitz, not blitz” might be its (unofficial) motto. H.M.C.S. *Ottawa* now serves the nation as a laboratory of bi-lingualism. It should be noted that this project was first put forward in 1951 and took the better part of two decades to put into practice. If our Royal Commissioners are to be believed, the country hasn't that much time ahead.

Valuable as the military establishment may be as a national institute of technology, one cannot justify its existence on the grounds of modernization and development alone—not, at least, in Canada. There are more direct, and economical, ways of giving aid to education than as a by-product of the military career.

The other method by which the military establishment contributes indirectly to the modernization and development of the country is by offering a market to industry to produce its equipment, and to contractors, merchants, etc., to house and care for its personnel.

A drastic curtailment of the size of the military establishment (such as will be recommended in the final Part F, below) would doubtless be a blow, severe if temporary, to those communities (Rivers, Gagetown, Summerside) which have prospered through its presence.

It would also be a blow to the munitions industry—"munitions" in the broadest sense—to the extent that the Canadian military establishment offered it a protected market. There will remain, however, other military establishments to which to sell, national policy permitting.

There are two ways of looking at defence production. One sees it as a national asset which ought to be encouraged. ("The beginning of one of the happiest episodes in the history of the Canadian aircraft industry" is how the official history, *The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967*, engagingly describes the manufacture of F-86 Sabres at Canadair, Ltd., under license from North American Aviation.) The other sees it as a national weakness which ought to be overcome by placing prosperity on firmer foundations than those on which "defence production" rests. It is dependent upon the enlightened self-interest of allies, principally of the United States, which has not always been forthcoming (e.g., its refusal to order the CF-105) and may not always be forthcoming. It is dependent upon the perpetuation of political tension among the great powers, which it is (or ought to be) Canada's policy to abate. Salvador de Madariaga made the point long ago:

Armament firms... are all industrial enterprises which have in common with every other industrial enterprise... that their aim is to manufacture dividends. They only differ in that the intermediate products wherewith they manufacture dividends are guns and battleships instead of motor cars or cheese. Now an industrial enterprise is essentially interested in its market. There is no mystery about that, no villainy. It is all above board. Let us print it in capitals, for it is blatant, open and obvious, in fact it is a platitude: ARMAMENT FIRMS ARE INTERESTED IN FOSTERING A STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH WILL INCREASE THE DEMAND FOR ARMAMENTS.^x

Happy, then, the country which prospers in the absence of a munitions industry.

Might not a military establishment make a contribution to modernization and development in other countries than its own, by the performance abroad of civic action missions? That it has not been done in the past (save in the execution of an

imperial mandate) does not mean it could not be done in the future. A Canadian development and assistance corps, specially equipped and trained to undertake the construction of needed facilities in laggard communities throughout the world, could make a more constructive contribution than any of the roles which past and present policy has managed to contrive for our military establishment. (As a previous witness, Dr. O.M. Solandt, has argued the case for such a corps before this Committee, there is no need to develop it further here.)

5. A military establishment maintained for strategic or insurance purposes, for keeping law and order at home or abroad, for modernization and development at home or abroad, may justifiably be used in a ceremonial capacity when not engaged upon these other tasks. A military establishment may indeed be retained solely for ceremonial purposes on condition (i) that the national pride derived from its possession contributes to national well-being in some constructive way, and (ii) that the price is right. What is not justifiable is to retain, at enormous expense, a military establishment solely or mainly for ceremonial purposes. In such a case—certainly, in most such cases—it would be better to scale down the ceremony, investing the savings in ways and means of overcoming that national inferiority complex which made so extravagant a commitment to military pageantry seem necessary or justifiable.

The Defence White Paper (1964) defines the defence of Canada as "those aspects of North American defence which must, *for reasons based upon Canadian national interests*, be subject to Canadian control". The italicized phrase is evasive, or at any rate less than frank. Not national interest but national pride compels the government of Canada to undertake for itself, rather than to entrust to others, what the White Paper calls "the minimum requirements for the defence of Canada". Entrusting them to others (as Part B, above, makes clear) is an option (Option 2 in Part A) by no means inconsistent with conduct befitting a modern state. Most states resort to it to some extent; some states (notably Iceland) resort to it to a great extent; a few states (for example, Western Samoa) resort to it to an entire extent. Entrusting them to others is, however, certainly inconsistent with conduct befitting overly prideful and vain-glorious communities.

"The minimum requirements for the defence of Canada" are listed in the White Paper (1964) as follows:

The ability to maintain surveillance of Canadian territory, airspace and territorial waters; the ability to deal with military incidents on Canadian territory; the ability to deal with

^x *Disarmament* (New York, 1929), pp. 10-11.

incidents in the ocean areas off the Canadian coasts; and the ability to contribute, *within the limits of our resources*, to the defence of Canadian airspace [my italics].

The qualification attached to the last of these tasks (in italics) suggests that all but the last lie well within the capacity of Canada to finance and perform on her own without undue strain. This is obviously true of some of them—for example, dealing with military incidents on Canadian territory (short, presumably, of such unlikely contingencies as that of a massive Red Army lodgment on Baffin island), or maintaining surveillance of Canadian territory. It is less obviously true of others—for example, maintaining surveillance of Canadian territorial waters or air space.

Surveillance of territorial waters is suggestive of traditional and modest maritime missions—chasing smugglers to their lair, warning foreign fishermen who venture too close to shore. These missions do not cost much to carry out. Moreover, they cannot in their nature be entrusted to a foreign jurisdiction. (Even disarmed Iceland, as previously noted, does not entrust the protection of her fisheries to her United States-manned Defence Force but maintains her own fleet of armed trawlers for the purpose.) There is no case, therefore, for Canada looking to some foreign power for their performance; although there is a case for devolving them upon a Canadian para-military force, such as a sea-going R.C.M.P. or Department of Transport coastguard.

Surveillance of territorial waters also involves searching for submarines. This mission costs a good deal—as much as \$50 millions to \$100 millions annually, depending on how you add it up.

The motives for Canada's commitment to a costly ASW role are mixed, as motives generally are. It is argued that the role has strategic significance, providing "defence against surface and air attacks which can be expected during this time period [i.e., until the 1970s]",^x that it serves an insurance function, that the ships involved can be used "to support peace-keeping operations";[†] that participation in ASW is as good a way as any for Canada to demonstrate to her allies that she is prepared, as a self-respecting nation, to assume her fair share of the common defence. Something may be said for each of these contentions, most on behalf of the last, least on behalf of the first (see above, Section 1).

The objection to allowing the United States to take over from Canada the ASW defence of North America runs variously along the lines of "We are a proud people and proud people pay their own way"; "the Americans would despise us for chickening out"; "it would be a blow to self-respect"; "a national disgrace—what kind of people do they [advocates of quitting the role] think we [the people who pay for the role, namely, the Canadian taxpayers] are, anyway?" etc.

I do not underestimate the emotional intensity of any of these responses. I wish only to identify them for what they are. They are emotional responses, not the product of operational research. They have little to do with national security. They have everything to do with national pride. Security against attack is what you buy with armed forces. Pride may be purchased in a variety of ways, many of them by no means military in nature.

There is a more sophisticated version of the same argument. To abdicate from our small share of the defence of North America—ASW being the principal component of that share—would mean letting the United States do it for us. Letting the United States do it for us would mean an intrusion upon our sovereignty on a scale offensive to our people and degrading in the eyes of other nations. In the case of ASW, intrusion upon sovereignty is minimal. Serious ASW is carried on by attack submarines. Attack submarines are the least intrusive of weapons systems. They are neither seen nor heard. That which is neither seen nor heard leaves sovereignty intact, in any practical sense, even if it should occasionally cruise around in Hudson Bay.

The White Paper (1964) concedes that there is one aspect of the defence of Canada which it may not be possible for Canadians to manage on their own. This is "the defence of Canadian airspace", for which the White Paper requires only that the armed forces "contribute, within the limit of our own resources". This contribution has taken the form mainly of fighter interception, carried on by three squadrons of CF-101s (Voodoo); and missile interception, carried on by two squadrons of Bomarc B rockets. In 1966, the Acting Commander, Air Defence Command, estimated before the Standing Committee on National Defence that this contribution comprised "approximately one tenth" of the air defence of North America.

Two factors suggest the unwisdom of attempting to maintain this contribution throughout the 1970s. The first is the diminishing threat of bomber attack upon North America. The second is the mounting costs of interception. The price per plane of a successor to the Voodoo, assuming that one is available, could work out to as much as \$10 millions, perhaps even more. The bill for re-equip-

^x House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 26 (March 23, 1965), p. 1047.

[†] *Ibid.*, p. 1049

ping the 60-65 aircraft now assigned by Canada to NORAD thus could reach \$600-650 millions, perhaps even more. At the required levels of technology there is a risk, notwithstanding the Tiffany price tag, that the aircraft may prove unserviceable. (Consider the F-111.) It is possible, as noted previously (Part C, Section 2, above), to be over-insured. For Canada to continue the air defence role is, in my view, a clear case of over-insurance.

It is argued that, as with the ASW role, if we don't do it, the Americans will; and that, unlike ASW, the intrusion upon sovereignty would be both seen and heard. To which may be replied:

(i) It is by no means certain that the United States would wish to add the better part of a billion a year to its defence budget in order to keep NORAD's fighter interceptors up to present strength. On the contrary, it is now United States policy to carry through what a former Minister of National Defence described in 1966 as "a very substantial reduction in interceptor squadrons, notwithstanding the fact that the aircraft are available". This policy follows from the United States perception of the threat of bomber attack, which is that it is diminishing and will diminish further during the 1970s.

(ii) If the United States assumes full responsibility for the air defence of North America, there is no need to assume it would press for base facilities for fighter interceptors in Canada. Such facilities could be convenient but they are not essential in the sense that the Arctic sites for Distant Early Warning were essential in the 1950s. Testimony by previous witnesses before this Committee that the United States would demand base facilities and that those demands could not, in the nature of the Canadian-American relationship, be resisted by a Canadian government is wholly speculative. I find it unconvincing. It simply assumes the least favourable outcome for Canada. One does not know what one can do until one tries.

While insisting that United States aircraft assigned to North American air defence be based in the United States, there can be no objection to their overflight of Canadian territory subject to existing arrangements of prior notification. Sovereignty thus remains intact.

But does pride? The ardent Canadian patriot may still experience a nagging twinge of doubt. It will be caused, more likely than not, by the notion of the impropriety of the free ride. The ardent Canadian patriot must, in his own interest, be made to understand that there is no impropriety about taking free rides in foreign affairs. That some nations are producers and others consumers of security—to revert to the phraseology of an

earlier era—is an inescapable fact of international life. The notion of the free ride lies at the foundation of the policy of nuclear non-proliferation—a policy to which both Canada and the United States are fervently, and properly, committed. So far as its national defence is concerned, Canada cannot help freeloading off the United States. It is the gift, not of generous Americans, but of a dispassionate geography. The late R. J. Sutherland has called it "the involuntary American guarantee".^x Because it is involuntary, nothing is owed it in return—even if there were such a thing as gratitude in foreign policy, which may be debated.

6. The annual cost of maintaining the military establishment of Canada over the last few years ranges between \$1.5 and \$1.8 billions. That it is no greater reflects the lack of any strategic justification for the military establishment. That it is as great as it has been reflects the conviction of successive Canadian governments that such an expenditure is required to enable the military establishment to function in what they conceive to be its primary role, which is the diplomatic role.

Since the early 1950s, with the arrival of the first Canadian forces in Western Europe under NATO, the military establishment has been used in aid of two diplomatic objectives.

The first is to deter not enemies but allies. The presence of the military establishment in Western Europe is held to be exemplary and inspirational. It is meant to serve as a good example to other NATO members who, in its absence, might grow restive and weary on their watch. A Canadian withdrawal, then, is to be avoided at all costs for, as a former Secretary of State for External Affairs testified before the Senate External Affairs Committee on 15 March 1967, "it could start a chain reaction by exerting pressure for similar action on the governments of the other members of the alliance".

This argument has always appeared to me to be inherently improbable, like the domino theory of which it is a variation. It assumes that the governments of our allies are akin to falling dominos, pulled only by gravity, with no mind of their own, no will of their own, no capacity for acting in accordance with their individual national interests as these may be perceived. But they are not like that at all. If the United States, or the United Kingdom, or Italy, or Norway, really want to withdraw their troops, they will withdraw their troops, regardless of the Canadian commitment. (France's withdrawal serves as an example.) Con-

^x R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation", *International Journal*, vol. XVII, No. 3, Summer, 1962, p. 202.

versely, if they want to keep their contributions intact, they will keep them intact, regardless of the Canadian withdrawal. (The effect of France's withdrawal was to cause the United Kingdom to strengthen its commitment.)

It is perfectly feasible to withdraw from the defence of Europe without any catalytic effects upon the rest of NATO, without creating panic and disarray, without precipitating a rout, without inducing a mood of defeatism and despair and *saue qui peut*. Even Dean Rusk has denounced the domino theory as "much too esoteric". We should stop hobbling our options by applying it to Western Europe, the more especially since our statesmen deny its application to South-east Asia.

The second diplomatic mission of our military establishment is to purchase respect and influence and prestige. A former Secretary of State for External Affairs has testified that Canada should not withdraw forces from Western Europe since withdrawal "could do harm to Canada's good name with its allies [and] could cause our allies to ask themselves whether we were making a respectable contribution . . ."^x

The claim that the military establishment enhances Canadian diplomatic influence and Canadian prestige must be carefully considered; for in the belief that it is correct, most of the \$1.8 billions of our defence budget is expended, and not in Western Europe only.

Prestige in international affairs isn't hard to come by. But it's hard to know how it's come by. In the pursuit of prestige it doesn't always pay to be in hot pursuit, or to seem too ardent in its acquisition. Prestige is largely a matter of serendipity—"the faculty of making happy and unexpected discoveries by accident". You cannot always buy your way, you cannot even blast your way, into the grace and favour of other governments—never mind into the hearts and minds of other peoples. And, as George Kennan reminded the United States Foreign Relations Committee three years ago, "there is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives".

Suppose, for argument's sake, it were possible to purchase influence, to buy prestige. How much does it cost a dozen? If \$1.8 billions buy x units, do \$3.6 billions buy $2x$? Or \$900 millions $1/2x$?

By how much, if at all, would withdrawing the air division and infantry brigade from Western Europe impair Canada's reputation in the world? Is there a consolation prize for keeping them in being, though based at Cold Lake and at Gagetown? Or might we just as well disarm and be done with it?

When the military establishment exists to procure prestige for the homeland, rather than to defend the homeland, it is exceedingly difficult to determine with any precision what should be spent on it, what it should be equipped with, where it should be deployed. Compare Canada's situation with Sweden's. The Swedish Parliament has issued the following directive:

The armed forces are to work for the preservation of our peace and freedom. Therefore, the armed services are to have such strength, composition and state of preparedness that attacks against Sweden require such large resources and are so prolonged that the advantages which stand to be gained by the attack cannot be realistically evaluated as worth the cost.^x

From this lapidary formulation flows, without illogic or contradiction, the formidable Swedish military machine, with its Saab-37 Viggen attack aircraft and the biggest atom shelter in the world. But try to adapt the Swedish formulation to Canadian conditions. One starts out like this:

The armed forces of Canada are to work for the maintenance and enhancement of Canada's prestige and influence in the world. Therefore, the armed forces are to have such strength, composition and state of preparedness that . .

That what? One may read thousands of pages of testimony, millions of words of testimony, by our ministers of national defence, chiefs of the defence staff, commanders of mobile brigade, expert witnesses of every kind, without finding a satisfactory answer to this question.

It is not surprising, for to answer it satisfactorily one would have to know the rate of exchange between arms and influence. No gnome of Zurich will help much here. The rate is pegged to no international medium of exchange. There are no upper and lower limits through which one or other may not rise or sink. There is no assurance of convertibility. It fluctuates perilously over time. It differs enormously as between different parties.

^x Quoted in Paul Martin *Speaks for Canada: A selection of Speeches on Foreign Policy 1964-67* (Toronto, 1967), p. 48.

^x Quoted in Kjell Goldmann, "An 'Isolated' Attack Against Sweden and Its World Political Preconditions", in *Co-operation and Conflict: Nordic Studies in International Politics*, No. II (1965), p. 18.

The price of influence resembles that of the favours of a lady of easy virtue. There are times when no offer, almost, is high enough. And there are others when she gives them away. When weapons-systems are exchanged for influence, what Mr. McNamara has called "the cost-effectiveness of each system, i.e., the combat effectiveness per dollar of outlay", becomes a calculation impossible to make.

The rate of exchange between outlay and influence is fluctuating and uncertain, the medium of exchange shifting and evanescent. But that is not all. Influence acquired in one capital may diminish influence in another; what pleases Washington may displease New Delhi, what pleases London may displease Paris. To the complexities of calculating the cost of influence must accordingly be added the complexities of calculating the ratio of power.

The concept of influence itself is not to be taken for granted. There may be no such thing for sale. Conditions of sale may make purchase impossible, Credit may not exist, or may only very imperfectly exist, in international society. The state system may not resemble a banking system. It may be hard to accumulate a balance of favourable regard. Governments may have no memory. Or they may feign amnesia when the time comes to cash in.

When military outlays are used to purchase defence, rather than to purchase influence, the question "How much is enough?" is relatively easy to answer. "The military planning process", a veteran of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Council has written, "insofar as it relates to the ponderables of real or hypothetical campaigns, turns out tidy and complete answers. . . The quotients are precise, the columns are even, and the conclusions concrete".^x When military outlays are used to purchase influence, rather than to purchase defence, the question becomes very much more difficult to answer. The first type of mission involves proportions of force, readily quantified by computers and operations researchers. The second type involves intangibles of assessment, which even the most experienced foreign service officers—one might say especially the most experienced—do not dare to venture with any pretence at precision.

If, then, the aid and comfort of cost-effective programming are denied to the military establishment of Canada insofar as it is intended to be used in its diplomatic function, might its price-tag not be just as well pulled out of a hat? A rhetorical question, the answer to which is "no". Yet this is more or

less how the present level of military expenditure has been determined.

The planners entrusted with designing a military establishment to fit in with the ideas of the defence White Paper (1964) were told to consider a number of hypothetical military budgets. These ranged in amount from \$500 million at the lowest to \$2.5 billion at the highest. The government finally picked the figure of \$1.5 billion. \$1.5 billion happened, through surely no coincidence, to be what previous governments had annually expended on the military establishment.

The new figure had the ineluctable advantage of requiring no change in the balance of the budget. It required, as well, no change in the arguments justifying military expenditure. It had behind it the weight of precedent. It was a billion dollars cheaper than the most expensive hypothesis. What more was required?

Accordingly, a deal was struck between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Defence. The former agreed to make \$1.5 billions available annually in future (adjusted to take into account any drastic increases due to inflation) on condition that the latter would not hector him for more. The latter agreed to this agreement.

That is one way to determine military policy.

F. A "Rational" Military Policy for Canada, 1970-1984

It follows from the foregoing that the Government of Canada is over-spending on each and every purpose for which its military establishment is maintained. It could therefore cut back, with no adverse effect upon the national interest, on its outlays for insurance, for law and order (domestic), for law and order (peacekeeping), for modernization and development, for ceremony, and for influence.

The principal extravagances (and thus the principal potential savings) may be found in the outlays upon insurance, ceremony and influence. We do not need to keep a military force in being to fight the kind of wars aggressors are going to fight in the 1970s. We do not need to bear, for the sake of a spurious sense of self-respect, those defence burdens (ASW and air defence) which the United States would be in its own interest compelled to assume if we were to lay them down. And we do not need to contribute, in an illusory search for influence and international prestige, to the defence of Western Europe and North America. Cutting all this out could liberate roughly \$1 billion annually for other, more worthwhile, purposes.

^x Charles Burton Marshall, "The Nature of Foreign Policy", in *The Exercise of Sovereignty* (Baltimore, 1965), p. 61.

The sole undefended assumption of these notes is that other, more worthwhile, purposes may be found.

The sole recommendation of these notes is that the Committee commission a series of detailed studies exploring what a military establishment, designed to a number of hypothetical budgets ranging from \$250,000,000 annually to \$750,000,000 annually, might look like, and what it might do for Canada.

The sole guess of these notes is that any such military establishment will turn out, on detailed investigation, to be able to do more for Canada than anyone has thus far supposed.

Respectfully submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

James Eayrs

Toronto, 26 January 1969

JAMES EAYRS

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Fellow, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He is the author of nine books on Canadian, Commonwealth, and international affairs. His *In Defence of Canada* (2 vols., 1964 and 1965) won the Governor-General's award for non-fiction. His latest book *Minutes of the Sixties*, was published by Macmillan's in the fall of 1968. He is a frequent lecturer at staff colleges in Canada and the United States and this spring is to deliver the Mountbatten Lecture on a defence topic at the University of Edinburgh. He writes a regular weekly column for the *Montreal Star*. Much of this activity is due to his being married with five children.

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